83d Congress, 1st Session – – – – – – – – – – – – House Document 83–239

83d Congress, 2d Session – – – – – – – – – – – – House Document 83–509

84th Congress, 1st Session – – – – – – – – – – – – House Document 84–235

Foreign Relations of the United States 1952–1954

Volume XV

Korea

(in two parts)
Part 2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE · UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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PREFACE

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. The volumes in the series include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions of the United States together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. Documents in the files of the Department of State are supplemented by papers from other Government agencies involved in the formulation of foreign policy.

The basic documentary diplomatic record printed in the volumes of the series *Foreign Relations of the United States* is edited by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. The editing is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and in accordance with the following official guidance first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925.

There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

> *a.* To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
>
> *b.* To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
>
> *c.* To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
>
> *d.* To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
>
> *e.* To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department before the decision was made.

Documents selected for publication in the *Foreign Relations* volumes are referred to the Department of State Classification/Declassification Center for declassification clearance. The Center reviews the documents, makes declassification decisions, and obtains the clearance of geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State, as well as of other appropriate agencies of the government. The Center, in coordination with the geographic bureaus of the Department of State, conducts communications with foreign governments regarding documents or information of those governments proposed for inclusion in *Foreign Relations* volumes.

Edward C. Keefer compiled this volume under the supervision of John P. Glennon. Louis J. Smith assisted in declassification, and David W. Mabon in final editing. Margaret Roman prepared the lists of names and abbreviations.

Until his retirement in 1979, Deputy Historian Fredrick Aandahl directed the entire *Foreign Relations* project, including the preparation of this volume.

Vicki L. Ettleman performed technical editing under the supervision of Margie R. Wilber in the Publishing Services Division (Paul M. Washington, Chief). The Twin Oaks Indexing Collective prepared the index.

William Z. Slany
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

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INTRODUCTION

Scope of the Coverage

This volume presents documents on United States policy toward Korea and on United States–Republic of Korea relations during the years 1952–1954. During the first year and a half of this period, the continuation of the Korean war provides the focus. Although the fighting in Korea was stalemated during the 19 months until the armistice, casualties continued while the United Nations Command and the Communist side met at Panmunjom to attempt to reach a military armistice. These negotiations were supposed to preclude political considerations, but by the nature of the issues at stake and the ideology of the cold war, they became pre-eminently political. The editors have chosen to emphasize the formulation by the Executive Branch of the basic policy decisions raised by these political issues. Thus, deliberations on the policy of voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war, on the role of the Soviet Union in any future postarmistice conference on Korea, and on the question of a political settlement on the Korean peninsula loom large in this volume. Conversely, the technical side of the armistice which was still unresolved at the beginning of 1952 is given less space.

Efforts to achieve peace in Korea were not limited to the truce tent at Panmunjom and the editors have included documentation on diplomatic approaches via the Indian Government to the People's Republic of China, an initiative to the Soviet Union, and a serious attempt in late 1952 by the United Nations General Assembly to produce a formula capable of ending the fighting. A corollary to both the Panmunjom negotiations and the diplomatic initiatives beyond the truce tent was the question of what the United States should do in the event it was unable to attain an acceptable peace in Korea. Contingency planning which had atomic war as an option was ultimately discussed and accepted by the National Security Council in 1953. This decision has been given the most complete treatment possible.

Armistice did come to Korea in July 1953. The basic story of this success, except for the question of the Republic of Korea's adherence, is generally known. This volume serves to fill out the details.

As for the bilateral relationship between the Republic of Korea and the United States, the editors have sought to illuminate the principal issues. In May and June 1952, when President Syngman Rhee was involved in a political and constitutional struggle with opponents in the National Assembly, the United States attempted with minimal success to dissuade the Korean President from using extralegal means to achieve his ends and even considered plans for United Nations Command intervention into South Korean affairs. This political crisis was resolved by Rhee's victory over his opponents in the legislative branch. The plan for intervention was shelved. When it became obvious in June 1953, after President Rhee released the nonrepatriate Korean prisoners of war, that the opposition of the Rhee government was the main obstacle to the armistice, the United States again considered intervention. This time it was rejected in favor of negotiations with Rhee to obtain his promise not to disrupt the armistice. The mission of Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson, which accomplished this task and paved the way for signature of the armistice, and Secretary John Foster Dulles' trip to Seoul in August 1953, which completed Robertson's work, were both part of this campaign. The decision to negotiate with Rhee rather than to attempt to replace him with a more amenable South Korean leadership and the evolution of these negotiations are naturally given extensive coverage.

The Korean armistice brought to the fore the remaining bilateral issues between the United States and the Republic of Korea which were generally resolved during the next year and a half. These questions are treated in less detail than the issues of war and peace. They include the final details for a Mutual Defense Treaty, economic reconstruction, military aid, redeployment of United States forces from Korea and expansion of South Korean armed forces. Also part of this bilateral list was the nagging question of currency advances from the Republic of Korea to the United States forces there. This was an issue which plagued both countries virtually throughout the 3-year period covered in this volume. The editors attempted to document this problem only when it reached the highest level of consideration or brought on a crisis. They followed the same approach with a multilateral issue, the question of reimbursement of the United States for costs incurred by nations participating in the United Nations effort in Korea.

The successful conclusion of the armistice also revived the issue of a political settlement in the Korean peninsula. The editors attempted merely to highlight the preliminary political negotiations at Panmunjom, which ended unsuccessfully in December 1953. Material on the problem posed by President Rhee's threat of unilateral action against the North, in view of the failure of the United States and the Communist side to reach a political settlement for Korea, forms a crucial segment of the compilation. Vice President

Richard Nixon's visit to Seoul in November 1953 during which he received assurances from Rhee that he would not take unilateral military action without first consulting the Unites States is dealt with in as much detail as the records provide. Contingency planning similar to that considered in June and July 1953 was again discussed and approved by the National Security Council in the event that Rhee should attempt such action.

In early 1954 a shift of serious consideration of the Korean question from Panmunjom to international conferences in Europe requires that the reader use other *Foreign Relations* volumes in conjunction with this one. The records of the Berlin Conference of January and February 1954, in which the decision to call a conference of Korean belligerents in Geneva was agreed upon, may be found in volume VII. Documents on the Korean phase of the Geneva Conference, including United States efforts to persuade the Republic of Korea to attend, are contained in volume XVI, an essential companion to this volume.

In this volume the editors have attempted to account for major policy decisions on Korea during 1952–1954, to include as much political reporting as possible from United States Missions which they believe influenced these decisions, and finally to document as fully as they are able the interaction of United States policy with that of other nations with interests in Korea. Given the limitations of space, the task has required that the editors make value judgments as to the relative importance of issues as well as individual documents.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, SYMBOLS, AND CODE NAMES

Editor's Note—This list does not include standard abbreviations in common usage; unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified at appropriate points; and those abbreviations and contractions which, although uncommon, are understandable from the context.

AB, airborne
Actel, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Acheson while away from Washington
AE, ammunitions ship
afld, airfield
AKL, light cargo ship
AM, fleet minesweeper
AmEmb, American Embassy
ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (the ANZUS Pact Nations)
AO, oiler (vessel)
AOB, air order of battle
AP, Associated Press
AR, repair ship
ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ARL, landing craft repair ship
ASAP, as soon as possible
bn, battalion
BW, bacteriological warfare
C, Counselor of the Department of State
CAFIC, Communist Air Force in China
CAMG (CA/MG), Office of Civil Affairs and Military Government, Department of the Army
cav, cavalry
CCAF, Chinese Communist Air Force
CCF, Chinese Communist Forces
CFI, Custodial Forces of India
CEB, Combined Economic Board
CFM, Council of Foreign Ministers
CGAFFE, Commanding General, American Forces in the Far East
CGArEight, Commanding General, Eighth Army
CGEUSAK, Commanding General, Eighth United States Army in Korea
CGKCOMZ, Commanding General, Korean Communications Zone
ChiComs, Chinese Communists
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIC, Counter Intelligence Corps
CI & E, Counter Intelligence and Espionage
CINCFE, Commander in Chief, Far East
CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCUNC, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
CINCUNC-Adv, the headquarters of the UNC negotiating team at Panmunjom, located at Munsan-ni near Panmunjom
CIs, civilian internees
CMC, Collective Measures Committee, United Nations
CNA, Chinese Nationalist Army
COFS, Chief of Staff
COMFEAF, Commander, Far East Air Forces
COMNAVFE, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in the Far East
COMSAC, Commander, U.S. Strategic Air Command
CPR, Chinese People's Republic
CPV, Chinese People's Volunteers
CRIK, Civilian Relief in Korea
C/S, Chief of Staff
CSUSA, Chief of Staff, United States Army
CW, chemical warfare
DA, Department of the Army
DD, destroyer
DE, destroyer escort
Def, Department of Defense
Delga, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
DEPTAR, Department of the Army
Deptel, Department of State telegram
DIP, military series indicator for diplomatic traffic

DNP, Democratic Nationalist Party (South Korea)
DMS, Director of Mutual Security
DOD, Department of Defense
DPs, displaced persons
DRF, Division of Research for the Far East, Department of State
D/Z (DZ), Demilitarized Zone
ECA, Economic Cooperation Administration
EDC, European Defense Community
EE, Office of East European Affairs, Department of State
EM, enlisted man
Embtel, Embassy telegram
EST, Eastern Standard Time
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUSAK, Eighth United States Army in Korea
EVERREADY, plan covering eventualities of ROK domestic disturbances and non-cooperation with UNC
FAO, Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FE, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
FEC (FECOM), Far East Command
FINAL, UNC plan for signing armistice
FOA, Foreign Operations Administration
FonMin, Foreign Minister
FonOff, Foreign Office
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information
G, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State
G-1, Army general staff section dealing with personnel at the division level or higher
G-2, Army general staff section dealing with intelligence at the division level or higher
G-3, Army general staff section dealing with operations and training at the division level or higher
G-4, Army general staff section dealing with supply at the division level or higher
GA, General Assembly, United Nations
Gadel, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
GHQ, general headquarters
GOI, Government at India
HICOG, High Commissioner for Germany
HICOM, High Commissioner
I, internal time
IAC, Intelligence Advisory Committee
IC, Indochina
ICJ, International Court of Justice, United Nations
ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross
IN, incoming
INS, International News Service
ISA, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
J-5, Office of Civil Operations, Far East Command of the UN Command
JA UNC, Judge Advocate, United Nations Command
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JOEWP, joint operation emergency war plan
JSPC, Joint Subsidiary Plans Division of JCS
KCAC, Korean Civil Assistance Command
KCOMZ, Korean Communications Zone
Kentel, series indicator and special channel for telegrams to or from Ambassador Kennan in Moscow
KMAG, United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea
KMT, Kuomintang (Nationalist Party), Republic of China
KPA, Korean People's Army
L, Legal Adviser, Department of State
L/E, Legal Adviser to the Bureau of Economic Affairs
LITTLE SWITCH, operation for repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners of war
LOC, line of communication
LSM, landing ship, medium
LST, tank landing ship
MAC, Military Armistice Commission
MB, medium bomber
MDA, Mutual Defense Assistance
MDAP, Mutual Defense Assistance Program
MEDO, Middle East Defense Organization
MDT, Mutual Defense Treaty
M/L, martial law
MP, military police
MLR, Main Line of Resistance
MSA, Mutual Security Agency; Mutual Security Act (of 1951); Mutual Security Assistance
MSP, Mutual Security Program
mytel, my telegram
NA, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
NDC, National Defense Corps (ROK)
niact, night action, communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
NK, North Korea
NKA, North Korean Army
NKPA, North Korean People's Army
NNIT, Neutral Nations' Inspection Teams
NNRC, Neutral Nations' Repatriation Commission
NNSC, Neutral Nations' Supervisory Commission
NOTAL, not needed by all addressees
NSC, National Security Council
NSF, National Safety Forces (Japan)
OCB, Operations Coordinating Board
OCS, Office, Chief of Staff
OFD, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State
OMP, Office of International Materials Policy, Department of State
OPI, Office of Public Information (ROK)
OSD, Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense
ourad, our radio (telegram)
P, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
PC, Political Conference
PCEC, escort amphibious control vessel
PIO, Public Information Officer
POL, petroleum, oil, and lubricants
POWs, prisoners of war
PM, Prime Minister
PNG, persona non grata
Pres US, the President of the United States
PriMin, Prime Minister
PSB, Psychological Strategy Board
PSF, President's Secretary's File (Truman Papers, Truman Library)
PsyWar, psychological warfare
PPS, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
PW, prisoner of war
RAAF, Royal Australian Air Force
rad, radio (telegram)
RCAF, Royal Canadian Air Force
RCT, regimental combat team
reftel, reference telegram
reurad, re your radio (telegram)
ROK, Republic of Korea
ROKA, Republic of Korea Army
ROKG, Republic of Korea Government
ROKN, Republic of Korea Navy
S, Office of the Secretary of State
SC, Security Council of the United Nations
SCATTER, screening plan for repatriation of prisoners of war
SE, Special Estimate
SEA, South East Asia
SecDef, Secretary of Defense
Secto, series indicator for telegrams to the Department of State from the Secretary of State
sitrep, situation report
SK, South Korea
SOA, Office of South Asian Affairs, Department of State
S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
SM, Secretary's Meeting
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
STU, short ton of tungsten
Supr Com, supervisory commission
SYG, Secretary-General of the United Nations
Telac, series indicator for telegrams to Secretary of State Acheson while away from Washington
telecon, telecommunications conference
TIAS, Treaties and Other International Acts Series
TO & E, Table of Organization and Equipment
Tofoa, series indicator for telegrams to Foreign Operations Administration
Topad, designation for telegraphic correspondence in either direction between the United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers in Japan and the Department of State
Tosec, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Secretary of State
TopSec, Top Secret
TS, Top Secret
UC, Unified Command
UKHC, United Kingdom High Commissioner
UNA, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State
UNASYG, United Nations Assistant Secretary-General
UNC, United Nations Command
UNCACK, United Nations Civil Assistance Command, Korea

UNCURK, United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea

UNGA, United Nations General Assembly

UNP, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State

UNPW, United Nations prisoner of war

UNKRA, United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency

urad, your radio (telegram)

urtel, your telegram

USAF, United States Air Force

USIS, United States Information Service

USMC, United States Marine Corps

UST, *United States Treaties and Other Agreements*

USUN, United States Mission at the United Nations

WE, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State

WIROM, series indicator for certain Department of State administrative telegrams

YO, fuel oil barge

ZI, Zone of the Interior

LIST OF PERSONS

Editor's Note—Throughout this volume individuals generally are identified in context as their names appear. This list is designed to provide ready reference for identification of those persons mentioned most frequently. The identification of the persons on this list is generally limited to positions and circumstances under reference in the volume and is confined to the years 1952–1954. All titles and positions are American unless otherwise indicated. Where no dates are given, the individual usually held the position throughout the period covered by the volume.

Acheson, Dean G., Secretary of State to January 20, 1953.

Adams, Sherman, Assistant to President Eisenhower from January 20, 1953.

Alexander of Tunis, Harold R.L.G., Field Marshal and Earl; British Governor General of Canada to March 1, 1952; British Minister of Defense to October 18, 1954.

Allen, George V., Ambassador in Yugoslavia to March 11, 1953; Ambassador in India from May 4, 1953.

Allen, Stanley V., Canadian Commercial Secretary in the United States to January 1953; Commercial Counselor in the United States, February 1953–May 1954.

Allen, Ward P., United Nations Adviser, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State.

Allison, John M., Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, to January 31, 1952; Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, February 1, 1952–April 7, 1953; Ambassador in Japan from May 28, 1953.

Anderson, Robert B., Secretary of the Navy from February 4, 1953; Deputy Secretary of Defense from May 3, 1954.

Armstrong, W. Park, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence.

Austin, Warren R., Permanent Representative at the United Nations to January 1953.

Bacon, Ruth E., United Nations Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State.

Bajpai, Sir Girja S., Secretary General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs to May 1952.

Barbour, Walworth, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from May 26, 1954.

Battle, Lucius D., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from June 26, 1951; Foreign Affairs Officer, Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs from October 13, 1952; Attaché in the Embassy in Denmark from January 30, 1953; First Secretary from July 26, 1954.

Bendetsen, Karl R., Assistant Secretary of the Army for General Management to 1952.

Bohlen, Charles E., Counselor of the Department of State to March 1953; thereafter, Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

Bolté, Lieutenant General Charles L., USA, Deputy Chief of Army Staff for Plans to 1953.

Bonbright, James C. H., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs to April 1954; thereafter Special Assistant to the Permanent Representative in Europe at Paris.

Bond, Niles W., Counselor of the Embassy in Korea to 1954; Deputy Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State, from August 12, 1954.

Bowie, Robert R., Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, and Department of State Representative on the National Security Council Planning Board from May 18, 1953.

Bowles, Chester B., Ambassador in India to March 23, 1953.

Bradley, General of the Army Omar N., USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to August 14, 1953.

Briggs, Ellis O., Ambassador in Czechoslovakia to August 27, 1952; Ambassador in Korea from August 25, 1952.

Bruce, David K. E., Ambassador in France to March 10, 1952; Under Secretary of State, April 1, 1952–January 20, 1953; Consultant to the Secretary of State to February 18, 1953; thereafter, Observer at the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community at Paris and Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community.

Byroade, Henry A., Director of the Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State, to 1952; Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs from April 14, 1952.

Cabell, Lieutenant General Charles P., USAF, Director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to January 1953; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from April 23, 1953.

Calhoun, John A., Second Secretary of the Embassy in Korea, December 1952–March 1954; thereafter, First Secretary.

Campbell, Peter, Second Secretary of the Canadian Embassy in the United States to March 1953; thereafter, First Secretary.

Carney, Admiral Robert B., USN, Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, 1950–1952; Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe, 1952–1953; Chief of Naval Operations from August 1953.

Carter, Brigadier General Marshall S., USA, Director of the Executive Office of the Secretary of Defense to 1953.

Casey, Richard G., Australian Minister for External Affairs.

Chang Han-fu, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in the People's Republic of China.

Chang Myon (Chang, John M.), Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea, February 1951–April 1952.

Chang Taek-Sang, Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea, April–May 1952.

Chase, A. Sabin, Chief, Division of Research for the Far East, Department of State, to 1954; First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in the Philippines from March 25, 1954; Counselor of Embassy from October 22, 1954.

Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, President of the Republic of China.

Cho Chung Whan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Republic of Korea.

Choi Duk Shin, Brigadier General, Republic of Korean Army; Delegate of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations Command Armistice Delegation at Panmunjom, April–May 1953.

Chou En-lai, Premier of the Government Administration Council (after September 1954, State Council) and Minister of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China;

in 1954, Head of the People's Republic of China Delegation at the Geneva Conference.

Churchill, Winston S. (Sir Winston from April 24, 1953), Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and First Lord of the Treasury.

Clark, General Mark W., USA, Commander in Chief, Far East, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, and Governor of the Ryukyu Islands, May 1952–August 1953.

Collins, General J. Lawton, USA, Chief of Staff, United States Army, to August 14, 1953; U.S. Representative on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Group, August 1953–October 1954; Special Representative of the President in Vietnam with the rank of Ambassador from November 3, 1954.

Colson, Brigadier General Charles F., USA, Chief of Staff, United States I Corps; assumed command of Koje-do prison camp in May 1952; relieved of command shortly thereafter and demoted to Colonel.

Connally, Senator Tom, Democrat of Texas; Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to January 1953.

Cordier, Andrew W., Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Coulter, Lieutenant General John B., USA (ret.), Agent General, United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency from May 1953.

Cutler, Robert, Administrative Assistant to President Eisenhower, January 21–March 22, 1953; thereafter, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Dean, Arthur H., Deputy to the Secretary of State for the Korean Political Conference from September 1953.

Dennison, Rear Admiral Robert L., USN, Naval Aide to President Truman, 1952.

De Palma, Samuel, Staff Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, March 1952–September 1953.

Dillon, C. Douglas, Ambassador in France from March 13, 1953.

Dodd, Brigadier General Francis T., USA, Commandant of Koje-do prison camp, February–May 1952; thereupon relieved of command and demoted to Colonel.

Dodge, Joseph M., Director of the Bureau of the Budget, January 21, 1953–April 15, 1954.

Dulles, Allen W., Deputy Director of Central Intelligence to February 26, 1953; thereafter, Director.

Dulles, John Foster, Consultant to the Secretary of State to April 1952; Secretary of State from January 21, 1953.

Eddleman, Major General Clyde D., USA, Assistant Chief of Army Staff, G–3, Operations, 1952–1953.

Eden, Sir Anthony, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Eisenhower, Dwight D., General of the Army to July 1952; Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, to May 30, 1952; President of the United States from January 20, 1953.

Emmerson, John K., Planning Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, to 1952; Counselor of Embassy in Pakistan from July 28, 1952.

Emmons, Arthur B., III, Acting Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, to February 1952; Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs, February 1952–August 1953.

Everest, Lieutenant General Frank F., USAF; Director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1953–1954.

Fechteler, Admiral William N., USN, Chief of Naval Operations to August 17, 1953; thereafter, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe.

Ferguson, John Haven, Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, to August 12, 1953.

Finletter, Thomas K., Secretary of the Air Force to January 20, 1953.

Foster, William C., Deputy Secretary of Defense to January 20, 1953.

Gleason, S. Everett, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.

Gross, Ernest A., Deputy Representative at the United Nations and Deputy Representative on the Security Council to January 1953.

Hammarskjold, Dag H. A. C., Secretary-General of the United Nations from April 10, 1953.

Han Pyo Wook, Minister of the Republic of Korea in the United States.

Hanlon, Rear Admiral Byron H., USN, Deputy Chief of Staff, Far East Command, from May 1952.

Harrison, Major General William K., Jr. USA, Plenary Member, United Nations Command Armistice Delegation, February 1952–July 1953; Senior Delegate, United Nations Command Armistice Delegation, May 23, 1952–July 1953.

Harvey, Mose L., Chief, Division of Research for USSR and Eastern European Affairs, Department of State.

Hemmindinger, Noel, Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, to 1954; Acting Deputy Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, from September 9, 1954.

Henkin, Louis, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State.

Herren, Major General Thomas W., USA, Deputy Commanding General for Civilian Affairs, United States Eighth Army in Korea, to July 1952; thereafter, Commander of the Korean Communications Zone.

Hickenlooper, Bourke, Republican Senator from Iowa; member, Far East Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Hickerson, John D., Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs to July 27, 1953.

Hickey, Lieutenant General Doyle D., USA, Chief of Staff, United Nations Command, 1951–1953.

Hickman, Colonel George W., Jr., USA, Staff Officer, United Nations Command Armistice Delegation.

Howe, Fisher, Deputy Special Assistant for Intelligence to the Secretary of State to November 1954.

Huang Hua, Delegate from the People's Republic of China to the preliminary discussions for a Korean Political Conference at Panmunjom, 1953–1954.

Hull, General John E., USA; Vice Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration, United States Army, to October 1953; thereafter, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, Commander in Chief, Far East, and Governor of the Ryukyu Islands.

Humphrey, George M., Secretary of the Treasury from January 21, 1953.

Jackson, C. D., Special Assistant to President Eisenhower, February 16, 1953–March 31, 1954; Representative, United States Delegation to the Ninth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1954.

Jebb, Sir Hubert Miles Gladwyn, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom at the United Nations to 1954; British Ambassador in France from April 1954.

Jenner, William E., Republican Senator from Indiana.

Jessup, Philip C., Ambassador at Large to January 2, 1953; Alternate Representative at the Seventh Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952.

Johnson, Earl D., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Material, 1952–1954.

Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to October 1953; Ambassador in Czechoslovakia from December 1953; United States Coordinator for the Geneva Conference, 1954.

Jones, William G., Chief, Northeast Asian Economic Branch, Division of Research for the Far East, Department of State, to 1953; Acting Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, from November 1953.

Joy, Vice Admiral C. Turner, USN, Senior Delegate, United Nations Command Armistice Delegation until May 22, 1952.

Judd, Walter H., Republican Representative from Minnesota; member, Far East Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Kennan, George F., Ambassador in the Soviet Union, May 14–October 3, 1952.

Ki Sok Pok, North Korean Delegate to the preliminary discussions for a Korean Political Conference at Panmunjom, 1953–1954.

Kimball, Dan A., Secretary of the Navy to January 20, 1953.

Kim Il Sung, Premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army.

Kingsley, Donald, Agent General of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency to May 1953.

Kitchen, Jeffrey C., Acting Chief, Policy Reports Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, from May 26, 1952; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from November 9, 1952; Deputy Director, Executive Secretariat, from January 23, 1953; Deputy Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, from October 10, 1954.

Kyes, Roger M., Deputy Secretary of Defense, February 2, 1953–May 1, 1954.

Lacey, Major General J. K., USAF, Senior United States Military Representative on the Military Armistice Commission from July 1953.

Lalor, Rear Admiral William C., USN, Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 1953.

Lamb, Lionel Henry (Sir Lionel from January 1, 1953), British Chargé in the People's Republic of China, March 1951–December 1953.

Lanham, Henderson L., Democratic Representative from Georgia; member, Far East Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Lay, James S., Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.

Lemnitzer, Major General Lyman L., USA; Director of Foreign Military Assistance, Department of Defense, to 1953; Deputy Chief of Army Staff for Plans and Research from 1953.

Libby, Rear Admiral Ruthven E., USN, Member of the United Nations Command Armistice Delegation to 1952; Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, for Operations, from June 1952.

Lie, Trygve H., Secretary-General of the United Nations to April 10, 1953.

Lightner, Edwin A., Counselor of Embassy in Korea, March 1, 1951–February 18, 1953.

Limb, Ben C., Ambassador at Large of the Republic of Korea and ROK Observer at the United Nations.

Lloyd, John Selwyn, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs to October 1954; thereafter, Minister of Supply; Chairman of the United Kingdom Delegation at the Seventh Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952; Acting Chairman at the Eighth Regular Session, 1953; Vice Chairman at the Ninth Regular Session, 1954.

Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr., United States Representative at the United Nations from January 26, 1953.

Lovett, Robert A., Secretary of Defense to January 20, 1953.

MacArthur, Douglas, II, Counselor of Embassy in France to October 15, 1952; Counselor of the Department of State from March 30, 1953.

Makins, Sir Roger M., British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to December 30, 1952; British Ambassador in the United States from January 7, 1953.

Malik, Yakov Aleksandrovich, Deputy Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs to March 1953; thereafter, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom; Member, Soviet Delegation at the Eighth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1953; Vice Chairman of the Delegation at the Ninth Regular Session, 1954.

Manhard, Phillip W., Second Secretary of Embassy in Korea to February 1954; Second Secretary of Embassy in Japan from March 1954.

Mao Tse-tung, Chairman, Central People's Government Council, People's Republic of China, to September 1954, thereafter, Chairman of the People's Republic of China.

Mansfield, Mike, Democratic Representative from Montana, 1952; Senator and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from January 1953.

Martin, Paul, Canadian Minister of National Health and Welfare; Member of the Canadian Delegation at the Seventh Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952.

Matthews, H. Freeman, Deputy Under Secretary of State to October 11, 1953; Ambassador in the Netherlands after November 25, 1953.

Matthews, Lieutenant Colonel Jack B., USA, Member of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Department of the Army.

McCardle, Carl W., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from January 30, 1953.

McClurkin, Robert J. G., Deputy Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, to September 1954; thereafter, Acting Director.

McCormack, John, Democratic Representative from Massachusetts; Majority Floor Leader, House of Representatives, to January 1953; thereafter, House Minority Whip.

McFall, Jack K., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations to September 9, 1952; Minister in Finland, November 15, 1952–May 1, 1953; thereafter, Ambassador.

McNicol, David W., First Secretary of the Australian Embassy in the United States to March 1953.

McWilliams, William J., Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State to August 19, 1953.

Meloy, Francis E., Jr., Assistant to the Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State, to 1952; Second Secretary of Embassy in France, January–July 1953; Second Secretary of Embassy in Vietnam, October 1953–May 1954; thereafter, First Secretary.

Mendès-France, Pierre, French Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs from June 19, 1954.

MENON, V.K. Krishna, Member, Indian Delegation at the Seventh and Eighth Regular Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952–1953; Chairman, Indian Delegation, Ninth Regular Session, 1954; Indian Representative on the Trusteeship Council.

MERCHANT, Livingston T., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs to March 24, 1952; then Deputy Special Representative in Europe at Paris to March 11, 1953; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from March 16, 1953.

MEYER, Clarence E., Personal Representative of President Truman and head of the Special Economic Mission to the Republic of Korea, March–May, 1952.

MILLET, Pierre, Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States to September 1954; thereafter, Minister.

MOLOTOV, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union from March 1953; Chairman of the Soviet Delegation at the Geneva Conference, 1954.

MORTON, Thruston B., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations from January 30, 1953.

MUCCIO, John J., Ambassador in Korea to September 8, 1952.

MUÑIZ, João Carlos, Brazilian Ambassador in the United States from October 20, 1953; Permanent Representative of Brazil at the United Nations from 1952.

MURPHY, Charles S., Special Counsel to President Truman to January 1953.

MURPHY, Robert D., Ambassador in Belgium to March 19, 1952; Ambassador in Japan, May 9, 1952–April 28, 1953; Political Adviser to the United Nations Command on Korean armistice negotiations, April 28–July 11, 1953; Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, July 28–November 30, 1953; thereafter, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

NAM IL, Lieutenant General, Korean People's Army; Chief Delegate, North Korean and Chinese Delegation to the armistice negotiations, July 1951–July 1953.

NASH, Frank C., Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to February 10, 1953; then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to February 28, 1954.

NEHRU, Pandit Jawaharlal, Prime Minister of India and Minister for External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations.

NEHRU, R.K., Indian Secretary for United Nations Affairs from 1952; Indian Secretary for External Affairs from July 1953.

NERVO. *See* Padilla Nervo.

NITZE, Paul H., Director of the Policy Planning Staff to April 1953.

NIXON, Richard M., Republican Senator from California to January 1953; thereafter, Vice President of the United States.

O'CONNOR, Roderic L., Assistant to the Secretary of State from January 21, 1953; Special Assistant from February 21, 1954.

OLIVER, Robert T., Chief of the Washington Office of the Korean Pacific Press, a Republic of Korea registered agency; Adviser to President Rhee.

PACE, Frank, Jr., Secretary of the Army to January 21, 1953.

PADILLA NERVO, Luis, Mexican Secretary for Foreign Relations from March 1953; Permanent Representative of Mexico at the United Nations, 1952–1954.

PAEK SUN YUP, Major General, Chief of Staff, Republic of Korea Army.

PAIK TU CHIN, Minister of Finance in the Republic of Korea to September 1953; Acting Prime Minister, October 1952–April 1953; Prime Minister, April 1953–June 1954.

Pandit, Srimati Vijaya Lakshmi (Madam Pandit), Chairman, Indian Delegation to the Seventh and Eighth Regular Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, and to the first meeting of the Ninth, 1952-1953-1954; President of the Eighth Regular Session, 1953.

Panikkar, K.M., Indian Ambassador in the People's Republic of China to July 1952.

Pearson, Lester B., Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs; Chairman of the Canadian Delegation at the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Regular Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952-1953-1954; President of the Seventh Regular Session, 1952.

Peng Teh-huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers in Korea.

Perkins, George W., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs to January 31, 1953.

Phillips, Joseph B., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, 1952-1954; Director, Office of Public Affairs in Bonn from June 30, 1954.

Pillai, Narayana Ragnavan, Secretary General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs from 1952.

Pleven, René, Prime Minister of France to January 1952; Minister of National Defense, March 1952-June 1954.

Plimsoll, James, Australian Representative on the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, March-December 1952.

Popper, David H., Deputy Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State, to October 1954; thereafter, Director.

Pyun Yung Tai, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea; Prime Minister from June 1954.

Radford, Admiral Arthur W., USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific, and U.S. Pacific Fleet, to July 10, 1953; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from August 15, 1953.

Raghavan, Nedgan, Indian Ambassador in the People's Republic of China from September 1952.

Rhee, Syngman, President of the Republic of Korea.

Riddleberger, James W., Political Adviser to the Economic Cooperation Administration to May 14, 1952; Director of the Bureau of German Affairs to July 31, 1953.

Ridgway, General Matthew B., USA, Commander in Chief, Far East, and Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, to May 1952; Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, June 1952-May 1953; Chief of Staff, United States Army, from August 15, 1953.

Robertson, Walter S., Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs from April 8, 1953.

Ross, John C., Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Security Council, 1952-1954.

Ruffner, Major General Clark L., USA, Deputy Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, as of 1952; Military Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, in 1953.

Salisbury, Lord (Cecil, Robert A.J.G.), British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, March-December 1952; Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, June-October 1953.

Sandifer, Durward V., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs to February 28, 1954.

Sargeant, Howland H., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, February 21, 1952-January 30, 1953.

Schuman, Robert, French Minister of Foreign Affairs to January 8, 1953.

Schumann, Maurice, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to June 1954; Deputy Chairman of the French Delegation to the Geneva Conference.

Scott, Walter K., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration to March 21, 1954; thereafter Director of the Executive Secretariat.

Shepherd, General Lemuel C., Jr., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps from January 1, 1952.

Shin Ik-Hi (P. H. Shinicky), Chairman of the National Assembly in the Republic of Korea to June 1954; Leader of the Democratic Nationalist Party.

Shin Tai-yong, Minister of National Defense in the Republic of Korea, March 1952–June 1953.

Short, Joseph, Secretary to President Truman to 1952.

Smith, Lawrence H., Republican Representative from Wisconsin; Member, Far East Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Smith, Walter Bedell, Director of Central Intelligence to February 8, 1953; Under Secretary of State, February 9, 1953–October 1, 1954.

Snyder, John W., Secretary of the Treasury and Chairman of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies to January 20, 1953.

Sohn Won Il, Admiral, Republic of Korea Navy; Minister of National Defense in the Republic of Korea, from June 1953.

Spender, Sir Percy C., Australian Ambassador in the United States.

Stalin, Iosif Vissarionovich (Djugashvili), Generalissimo; General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Stassen, Harold E., Director for Mutual Security from January 20, 1953; Director for Foreign Operations from August 1, 1953.

Stelle, Charles C., Member of the Policy Planning Staff from February 17, 1952.

Stevens, Robert T., Secretary of the Army from February 4, 1953.

Strom, Carl W., Counselor of Embassy in Korea from June 4, 1954.

Sullivan, Charles A., Chief, Northeast Asian Section, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense in 1953; Director of the Office's Policy Division, 1953–1954.

Talbott, Harold E., Secretary of the Air Force from February 4, 1953.

Tasca, Henry J., Special Representative of the President for Korean Economic Affairs, April–June 1953.

Taylor, Lieutenant General Maxwell D., USA, Deputy Chief of Army Staff for Operations and Administration to 1953; Commander of the United States Eighth Army in Korea from February 1953.

Thimayya, Lieutenant General K.S., Indian Army; Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, June 1953–January 1954.

Thorp, Willard L., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs to November 15, 1952.

Tomlinson, Frank S., Counselor of the British Embassy in the United States.

Treumann, Walter, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, to June 1953.

Truman, Harry S., President of the United States to January 20, 1953.

Tsai Cheng-wen, Major General, People's Liberation Army, People's Republic of China; PRC Staff Officer at the Military Armistice Negotiations to April 1953; PRC Plenary Member of the armistice delegation, April–May 1953.

Twining, General Nathan F., USAF, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, to June 30, 1953; thereafter, Chief of Staff.

Vandenberg, General Hoyt S., USAF, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, to June 29, 1953.

Van Fleet, Lieutenant General James A., USA, Commander of the United States Eighth Army in Korea to February 11, 1953.

Van Ittersun, Baron G. E., Netherlands Representative to the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, April–August, 1952.

Vorys, John M., Republican Representative from Ohio; Member of the United States Delegation at the Sixth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1951–1952.

Vyshinsky, Andrey Yanuaryevich, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs to March 1953; First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative at the United Nations, April 1953–November 1954.

Wadsworth, James J., Deputy Representative at the United Nations from 1953.

Wainhouse, David W., Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs to 1954; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs from February 28, 1954; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from August 25, 1954.

Waugh, Samuel C., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from June 5, 1953.

Webb, James E., Under Secretary of State to February 29, 1952.

Webb, Thomas Clifton, Minister of External Affairs of New Zealand to November 1954; Chairman of the New Zealand Delegation at the Seventh and Eighth Regular Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952–1953.

White, Lieutenant General Thomas D., USAF, Deputy Chief of Air Force Staff (Operations), to 1953; thereafter, Vice Chief of Staff.

Wilson, Charles Erwin, Secretary of Defense from January 28, 1953.

Wisner, Frank G., Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency.

Won Yong Duk, General, Republic of Korea Army; Provost Marshal of the Republic of Korea from June 1953.

Wood, C. Tyler, Associate Deputy Director of the Mutual Security Agency from January 1, 1952; Economic Coordinator for Korea at Seoul from September 30, 1953.

Wrong, Hume, Canadian Ambassador in the United States to August 3, 1953; thereafter, Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Yi Pom-suk (Lee Bum Suk), Korean Home Minister, May–July, 1952.

You Chang Yang, Ambassador of the Republic of Korea in the United States.

Young, Kenneth T., Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, from March 20, 1952; Acting Director, Office of Philippine and South Asian Affairs, from September 13, 1954.

Yount, Brigadier General Paul F., USA, Commander, 2d Logistical Command in Korea.

Yun-kyong, Chief of the National Police in the Republic of Korea from May 1952.

Zinchenko, Constantin E., Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Zorin, Valerian Aleksandrovich, Deputy Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs; Permanent Representative at the United Nations, 1952–1953.

LIST OF SOURCES

The Korean war represented one of the major foreign policy crises of the 1950's. Policy toward Korea involved Presidents Truman and Eisenhower and their advisers as well as executive agencies beyond the Department of State. Consequently the editors have made extensive use of appropriate files outside the Department of State in order to make the record as complete as possible. The papers printed in this volume were drawn from the following files and collections of official and private papers.

PART A. UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

Department of State

1. *Indexed Central Files.* Papers in the indexed central files of the Department for the years 1952-1954 are indicated by a decimal file number in the headnote.

2. "*Lot Files.*" Documents from the central files have been supplemented by lot files of the Department of State, which are decentralized files of operating areas. A list of the lot files used in this volume follows:

Conference Files, Lot 59 D 95

Collection of documentation on certain official visits of heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the period 1949-1955, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Conference Files, Lot 60 D 627

Collection of documentation on certain official visits of heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the period 1953-1958, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

FE Files, Lot 55 D 128

Top secret files of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs concerning the Korean war and ceasefire for the years 1950-1952.

FE Files, Lot 55 D 388

Files maintained by the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs for 1953.

FE Files, Lot 55 D 480

Files maintained by the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs for 1954, including documentation on the Geneva Conference, Southeast Asia, and the Korean Black Book.

FE Files, Lot 60 D 330

Files on relations with Japan and Korea for the years 1950-1953, as maintained by the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.

Matthews Files, Lot 53 D 413

Collection of cables relating to the Korean armistice, 1951–1953, maintained in the Office of Deputy Under Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews.

INR-NIE Files

Files maintained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

IO Files

Master files of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs of the Department of State, comprising the official UN documentation and classified Department of State records on United States policy in the UN Security Council, Trusteeship Council, Economic and Social Council, and various special and *ad hoc* committees for the period from 1946 to date.

IO Files, Lot 71 D 440

Master files of classified records and correspondence of United States Delegations to sessions of the UN General Assembly for the years 1945–1965, maintained by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

OCB Files, Lot 62 D 430

Master files of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563

Master file for the years 1947–1953 of the Policy Planning Staff, comprising memoranda and related correspondence.

Secretary's Daily Meetings, Lot 58 D 609

Chronological collection of the records of the Secretary of State's daily meetings with top Department of State officials during the years 1949–1952, as maintained by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, Lot 64 D 199

Chronological collections of the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation and the Under Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, Lot 65 D 238

Chronological collections of the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation with the President for the years 1949–1952, memoranda of the Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State for the years 1951–1952, and the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation with Senator Tom Connally of Texas for the years 1950–1951, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Secretary's Staff Meetings, Lot 63 D 75

Chronological collections of the minutes of the Secretary of State's daily staff meetings which were held twice a week during the years 1952–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/P-NSC Files, Lot 61 D 167

Serial file of memoranda relating to National Security Council questions for the years 1950–1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff.

S/S-NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351

Serial master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947-1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files, Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation, including NSC Records of Action, for the years 1947-1963, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

State-JCS Meetings, Lot 61 D 417

Top secret records of meetings between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the Department of State for the period 1951-1959, and selected problem files on the Middle East for the period 1954-1956, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Note: Because of the heavy involvement of the Department of Defense and the military services in Korean policy and implementation of that policy, special mention must be made of the numerous Department of Defense telegrams and related documentation available in the files of the Department of State. For 1952, telegrams related to Korea are contained in binders in the central files under the basic Korean decimal number. Additional copies as well as new materials for 1952 are located in FE Files, Lot 55 D 128, the so-called "Korean Black Book" of documentation relating to the Panmunjom negotiations. The Matthews Files, Lot 53 D 413, represent the best source for military telegrams for 1953 and include also a backup for the previous year. The 1954 military cables on Korea in Department of State files are both fewer in number and less important than in the two previous years; they are located in FE Files, Lot 55 D 480. Lastly, Lot 55 D 388, while not a source of many military cables, does contain a few for 1953 which were considered most important and were therefore closely held at the time.

United States Mission to the United Nations, New York

USUN Files

Files of the United States Mission to the United Nations, 1950 to date.

Archives-Museum, The Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina

Mark W. Clark Collection

Papers of General Mark W. Clark, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, and Commander in Chief, Far East.

Department of Defense

Department of Defense Files

Documents specifically requested by the editors from the Department of Defense.

JCS Files

Documents specifically requested by the editors from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

Dulles Papers

Papers of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State, 1953–1959 (some 1952 material included).

James C. Hagerty Papers

Papers of the Press Secretary to the President for the years 1953–1961.

C. D. Jackson Records

Records of C. D. Jackson, 1953–1956. Jackson was the President's Special Assistant for International Affairs, 1953–1954; and speechwriter and consultant to the President, 1958.

Whitman File

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953–1961, maintained by his personal Secretary, Ann C. Whitman. The Whitman File includes the following elements: the Name Series, the Dulles–Herter Series, Eisenhower Diaries, Ann Whitman (ACW) Diaries, National Security Council Records, Miscellaneous Records, Cabinet Papers, Legislative Meetings, International Meetings, the Administration Series, and the International File.

National Archives, Washington, D.C.

JCS Records

National Archives Record Group 218, Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey

Dulles Papers, Dulles Appointment Book

Daily log of Secretary of State Dulles' meetings and appointments for the years 1953–1959.

Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri

Acheson Papers

Papers of Dean Acheson as Secretary of State, 1949–1953.

Truman Papers, President's Secretary's Files (PSF)

This collection contains the papers of Harry S. Truman as President of the United States. Records relating to Korea are included with the National Security material in the subject file, in a documentary collection compiled by the Departments of State and Defense and given to Truman just before he left Office, and in intelligence-related papers.

Truman Papers, White House Central Files, Confidential File

Papers of Harry S. Truman as President of the United States contained in the classified portion of the White House Central Files.

PART B. PUBLISHED SOURCES

The following publications, including secondary accounts, were particularly useful in the preparation of this volume. No responsibility is taken by the Department of State for the truth or accuracy of events set forth in unofficial sources.

Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1969).

Dean Acheson, *Sketches From Life of Men I Have Known* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1959).

Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929–1962* (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1973).

Mark W. Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1954).

Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years, Mandate for Change, 1953–1956* (Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Company, 1963).

Allan E. Goodman, ed., *Negotiating While Fighting: The Diary of Admiral C. Turner Joy at the Korean Armistice Conference* (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1978).

Gregory Henderson, *Korea, the Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1968).

Walter G. Hermes, *United States Army in the Korean War, Truce Tent and Fighting Front* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1966).

C. Turner Joy, *How the Communists Negotiate* (New York, MacMillan & Company, 1955).

John A. Munro and Alex I. Inglis, eds., *Mike, The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson*, vol. II (New York, Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Company, 1973).

Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (London, Collins, 1964).

David Rees, *Korea: The Limited War* (New York, St. Martins Press, 1964).

Matthew B. Ridgway, *The Korean War* (Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Company, 1967).

Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs, Years of Trial and Hope*, vol. II (Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Company, 1956).

United Nations, *Reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, 1951–1954* (UN documents A/1881, A/2187, A/2441, A/2711).

United States Department of State, *American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents*, vol. II (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1957).

United States Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1952–1954.

United States President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1952–1953* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1966).

United States President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1960).

William H. Vatcher, Jr., *Panmunjom* (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1958).

VII. JUNE 8–JULY 27, 1953: ARMISTICE ATTAINED

RHEE'S UNILATERAL RELEASE OF NORTH KOREAN NONREPATRIATE POWS; UNITED STATES REACTION; SUSPENSION OF PANMUNJOM NEGOTIATIONS; FORMULATION AND CONSIDERATION OF POLICY TOWARD KOREA AFTER THE ARMISTICE, NSC 154, 156, AND 157 SERIES; ADDITIONAL UN FORCES FOR KOREA AND THE PROBLEM OF REIMBURSEMENT; THE ROBERTSON MISSION; RESUMPTION OF THE PANMUNJOM NEGOTIATIONS; FINAL DETAILS; ARMISTICE

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

TOKYO, June 8, 1953—6:06 p. m.

C 62910. Ref: A. CX 62890.[1] B. Ltr, AGJ 370.2 (4 May 53) CJ-P, Hq Far East Comd, 22 May 53, subj: Revised Outline Plan EVER READY.[2] This msg in 2 parts.

Part I.

a. In order to be prepared for the remote possibility that the ROK govt may take unilateral action due to curr armistice developments, I have reviewed existing directives in light of the curr sit (ref A) and have issued the instructions contained in part II.

b. All component comdrs are fully alert to the sit and their aprop plans have been revised.

c. These instructions to my component comdrs are being forwarded to you by wire, in order that you will have them aval for ready ref in the remote case it becomes nec to implement any portion of these instructions.

Part II.

To: Commanding Gen, United States Army Forces, Far East; Commander Naval Forces, Far East; Commanding Gen, Far East Air Forces.

1. Eff date: The provisions of this ltr are eff for planning purposes upon receipt and for execution *only* upon my personal order.

2. References:

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[1] Dated June 7, p. 1149.

[2] Letter not printed (Department of Defense files); for Outline Plan EVERREADY, May 4, see p. 965.

a. Ltr, AG 312.1 (29 Dec 52) JSPOG, Hq Far East Comd, 29 Dec 1952, subj: Ltr of instructions.[3]

b. Eight Army outline plan "EVER READY", 4 May 1953.

3. Assumptions:

a. That the UNC is committed to acceptance of curr proposed armistice agreements.

b. That the UNC will assume responsibility to assure compliance with provisions of such armistice agreements.

c. That the present ROK govt will be reluctant to acpt the terms of the armistice and this reluctance may produce any one of the folg conditions:

(1) ROK trps, while not overtly hostile, are not responsive to UNC directives. (Condition A).

(2) ROK govt and mil units proceed along an independent course of action. (Condition B).

(3) ROK govt, mil units or people are overtly hostile to UNC trps. (Condition C).

d. That present favorable relationships between UNC forces and the ROK Army may decline gradually or suddenly and the conditions described in subparas (1), (2) and (3) above may develop in sequences, or any one of the conditions may be precipitated on short notice. (*Note:* There is currently no accepted evaluated intelligence which indicates that such conditions will dev.)

e. In the event that the present ROK govt cannot be forced to acpt the armistice terms, an amenable ROK govt, with a reasonable capability of controlling and maj elements of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces, the national police, and the pers engaged in log support operations of the UNC, can be established.

f. That if conditions indicated in assumption *e* above prove not to be factual, the obligations under assumption *b* will take second priority, and the UNC will devote its maj effort to actions designed to insure its ability to maintain intact the maj mil elements of the UNC.

g. That, despite an armistice agreement, the Communists may attack at any time.

4. Plans:

a. Be prepared to take such measures as are deemed nec to insure the scty of UNC forces in the event an emerg is created by any action on the part of the Republic of Korea govt.

b. Take nec action to insure the integrity of UNC forces.

5. Missions:

a. Army Forces Far East.

(1) Continue presently asgd mission.

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[3] Not found.

(2) Be prepared to implement Eighth Army outline plan "EVER READY" on my order.

(3) Action to establish a UNC Mil Govt in the Republic of Korea will not be undertaken.

(4) Upon implementation of outline plan "EVER READY", KCOMZ will be attached to Eighth Army for opnl control.

b. Naval Forces, Far East.

(1) Continue presently asgd missions.

(2) Support the CG AFFE as required in the implementation of outline plan "EVER READY".

c. Far East [Air] Forces.

(1) Continue presently asgd mission.

(2) Support the CG AFFE as required in the implementation of outline plan "EVER READY".

d. For all commanders. When the conditions of outline plan "EVER READY" as listed below are in effect, comdrs will take the folg actions:

(1) Condition A (passive resistance to UNC leadership and direction).

(*a*) Intensify intel coverage of all ROK govt and mil activities.

(*b*) Maintain scty of all UNC installations and facilities.

(*c*) Alert all UNC units for emerg action, in accordance with curr plans.

(*d*) Initiate action to reduce levels of supply for ROK forces.

(2) Condition B (overt violation of armistice agreement, but no maj hostile activity directly toward UNC trps).

(*a*) Remove ROK mil units and indigenous pers from vital UNC log installations in Korea.

(*b*) Close out non-essential log installations in Korea.

(*c*) Discontinue air and naval support of ROK forces.

(*d*) Prep to discontinue log support of all ROK mil forces.

(3) Condition C (maj hostile action directly against UNC forces). Be prepared to execute plans to evac Korea on my order.

6. Copies of these instructions will be furn only to members of your staff on a strict "need to know" basis. In the dissemination of these instructions to subor comdrs you are authorized to make such pertinent extracts as are deemed essential in the execution of your mission. Auth is herewith granted to make extracts of outline plan "EVER READY" as are required. Sgd Mark W. Clark, Gen United States Army.

795.00/6-853

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretaries of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) and Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 8, 1953.

Subject: U.S. Position Regarding a Political Conference on Korea Following an Armistice.

In order to make possible effective planning for a post-armistice conference on Korea, and consultation with our allies, it is desirable to determine as soon as possible the position which the United States should take on a number of questions. We recommend that the following positions be approved:

1. *Composition of Conference*—The General Assembly should designate a United Nations Delegation to the Conference, constituted from among the 15 UN Members with forces in Korea. (In addition to the United States the Delegation might consist of Australia, Colombia, France, Thailand, Turkey and the United Kingdom). The ROK would be a party to the conference in its own right. The Communist side would presumably be composed of representatives of the North Korean and Chinese Communist regimes.

Several of our allies, including the United Kingdom and Canada, feel that the Soviet Government should be sounded out in advance of the General Assembly meeting as to whether the U.S.S.R. wishes to participate in the political conference. We agreed that this should be done by the U.S. or the U.K. and if the Soviet Government wishes to attend the conference, arrangements should be made for them to do so but *not* as a representative of the United Nations.

2. *Scope of Conference*—The conference should deal only with questions related to a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem. It should not deal with other Far Eastern questions.

3. *Objectives of the Conference*—The objective of the conference should be to obtain agreement to a plan for a unified, independent and democratic Korea to be carried out under UN auspices and supervision.

In the event that no such agreement is reached, it would be our objective to leave the onus for failure of the conference upon the Communists, and to leave the ROK in as strong a defensive posture as possible.

4. *Substantive Positions to be Taken at the Conference:*

(*a*) *Plan for Unification*—We should develop a plan for unification of Korea which is designed to bring about a free and independent Korea as secure as possible against external aggression or internal subversion.

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[1] This memorandum, drafted by Johnson and Henkin, was also addressed to Matthews. A note by O'Connor indicated that the Secretary of State approved this memorandum "in general" on June 10.

The plan we insist on should go as far as possible to meet the point of view of the Government of the ROK and be reasonable and acceptable to the UN and to world opinion. We will not agree to any plan which involves dissolution of the ROK and will continue to insist on its integrity and sovereignty.

(*b*) *Withdrawal of Troops*—While it will not be possible to reach firm decisions on this complicated question except in the light of then-prevailing circumstances, the following general considerations should control:

(1) The issue of withdrawal of troops should be decided in such a manner as to assure maximum security for a unified, independent Korea, or for the ROK if Korea remains divided.

(2) While it is desirable that we retain the right to continue our forces in Korea under the UN aegis, we should avoid any commitment to do so.

(3) In the first instance we should not agree to the withdrawal of US and UN forces except as an aspect of the implementation of an acceptable unification plan.

(4) If efforts at unification fail we might nevertheless consider agreement on phased withdrawal of non-Korean forces on both sides.

(*c*) *Neutralization and Security of Korea*—As part of a plan for unification, we might include a provision for a neutral buffer zone along the Yalu perhaps supervised by the UN Commission.

If Korea remains divided and the armistice continues in effect indefinitely, the security of the ROK would be guaranteed by the Greater Sanctions Statement, and the continuing responsibility of the UN.

5. *Approval of Results of the Conference*—Any agreement reached at the conference would be transmitted to the GA for approval, and for any necessary UN implementation. Insofar as the agreement might include provisions binding the ROK and the Communist regimes represented, such agreement would of course have to be approved by them.

6. It is important that at least a tentative decision be reached as to the Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the conference so that a working group could be established under his leadership to develop the details of a position along the lines approved.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

TOP SECRET — TOKYO, June 9, 1953—2:03 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX 62926. Refs: A. CX 62856 NOTAL.[2] B. CX 62727 NOTAL.[3] C. CX 62890 NOTAL.[4] D. DA 940816 NOTAL.[5] E. C 62910 NOTAL.[6]

1. In ref A I indicated the strong desirability of having neutral agencies in place upon the eff date of the armistice and I trust all steps are being taken to accomplish this. The resolution of the POW issue will now make signing of the armistice agreement possible in the near future and possibly as early as 18 June. In order to prevent needless loss of lives I intend to press for early signing, and acpt the risks involved in not having the neutral agencies ready to move into place at the time of cease fire. The actual signing of the armistice will place a moral responsibility (for whatever that is worth) upon the Communists to carry out their responsibilities under the terms of the armistice without having the inspection teams in place. I further propose to seek Communist agreement to making the eff date and time of the armistice coincide with the time of cease fire in order to deny the enemy the possible advantages pointed out in para 2 of ref A insofar as practicable. However, nothing in the foregoing alters my belief that under no circumstances should we sign the armistice until all NNRC members have officially acceded to the terms of ref and publicly announced their intention to serve as indicated in ref D, since to do so would amount to creating a cease fire condition without a firm resolution of the non-repatriate issue. In this connection I am having informal conversations with the Swiss, Swedes and Indian representatives here and providing them with complete info on the terms of ref.

2. To the possible obstacles to carrying out an armistice set forth in ref B, must now be added Rhee's specific threat that he will not permit the entry of Indian trps as reptd in para 8 of ref C. Rhee could greatly increase the reluctance of the neutral states to undertake armistice functions by a simple notification of ROK non-acceptance of their services, and a ROK intention to forcibly oppose their entry or stay in Korea.

3. As you are fully aware, there is no question that should we face active ROK phys opposition it will be impossible to implement fully all

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Briggs and Taylor for their exclusive information.

[2] Not printed. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

[3] Dated May 29, p. 1112.

[4] Dated June 7, p. 1149.

[5] This telegram, June 7, not printed, dealt with the mechanics of signing the POW terms of reference and notification and accession of the individual neutral nations on the Repatriation Commission. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

[6] Dated June 8, p. 1152.

the terms of the armistice as presently agreed and doubtful that we would be able to fulfill a guarantee of neutral security. The attitude publicly displayed by the ROK Government may cause India, Switzerland and Sweden to delay their accession to the terms of ref and their acceptance of our invitation to participate in the neutral nations repatriation com. Consequently, I believe that we should conclude the final agreement with max speed in order to limit the actions which Rhee can take to increase neutral apprehensions in an effort to forestall the armistice. The most important result I look for in presenting Rhee with the armistice as a *fait accompli* will be to trigger any action he may have planned, and thereby force him to reveal his true intentions. In this connection I will cont to the best of my ability to reconcile Rhee to the idea of acptg the armistice, once accomplished, as the wisest course for him and the Republic of Korea. In the event that my efforts prove unsuccessful and Rhee actually initiates any of the more desperate courses of action he has threatened, I will be prepared to take action along the lines outlined in ref E.

795.00/6–953

Memorandum of Conversation, by the United Nations Adviser to the Bureau of European Affairs (Allen)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 9, 1953.

Subject: Greater Sanctions Statement

Participants: Mr. Millet, French Embassy
Mr. Hickerson, UNA
Mr. Johnson, FE
Mr. W. P. Allen, EUR

Mr. Millet called on instructions to follow up on the conversation of Ambassador Bonnet and the Secretary of Monday, June 8, in which the Secretary expressed a favorable view toward an addition to the Greater Sanctions Statement which would indirectly refer to the Indochinese situation, but pointed out the probable negative attitude of the rest of the sixteen and the difficulties of re-negotiating it. Mr. Millet stated that although the French are approaching the UK in London, they urge in view of the shortness of time that a meeting of all sixteen be convoked in order to obtain agreement expeditiously. Mr. Millet expressed his government's disappointment at the delay in receiving US definitive reaction to the French suggestion which they had raised with us quite some time ago.

Mr. Johnson explained that quite frankly the principal reason for our delay and hesitation was that just about that time one or two of the other adherents to the statement became very shaky on whether a statement should be issued at all and it seemed to us desirable to re-solidify our agreement on the issuance of the statement before considering any question of amending it.

As to the French suggestion of the meeting of the sixteen, Messrs. Hickerson and Johnson pointed out that the UK, Canada and South Africa are the keys to obtaining any agreement for modification and that in the absence of their willingness to accept the addition we felt little purpose would be served in a general meeting of the sixteen. In point of fact a meeting might stimulate more opposition. After discussion it was finally agreed that if the French are able to persuade the British and Canadians to accept the addition the US will seek to obtain South Africa's approval and the matter would then be taken up individually with the rest of the sixteen.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commanding General, United States Eighth Army, (Taylor) to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) [1]

TOP SECRET SEOUL, June 9, 1953—5:07 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

G 5812 KCG. 1. I called on President Rhee at 1000I to discuss assignment of 15 officers hld back from Leavenworth. Rhee immediately launched into discussion of ltr he is preparing to Pres Eisenhower. He states he is finding it very difficult to write because, while not wishing to oppose the Pres, he feels that he must state the reasons for his present opposition to armistice. He repeated many of his statements regarding inacceptability and his determination to go it alone with present ROK resources.

2. I took advantage of opportunity to stress deficiencies of ROK Army and need for time to make it a balanced force capable of protecting Korea. It apparently had never occurred to Rhee that the delay entailed by the political discussions would allow the completion of the 20 division program to which he has attached so much importance. He likes the idea of having the eventual 20 division force and the political power which would go with it. This thought seemed to make the idea of an armistice somewhat less repugnant but he stressed need for definite assurances from the US to allow him to convince Korean people. I asked him to specify the points which, if met by the UN, would satisfy his requirements. He wrote down the following points (text not verbatim) on a paper which he started to give me, then withheld:

a. Reasonable limit on duration of political discussions, preferably about 60 days.

b. Mutual security pact with the US.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to the JCS for their information.

c. Continued expansion of the ROK Army to 20 division ceiling, accompanied by development of Navy and Air Force.

3. I expressed view that these terms were probably not far from what I understood the US position to be. However, a formal mutual security pact would take some time to draft and, in the end, might require Senate ratification. Rhee brushed this to one side, saying all he wanted was simple statement in writing that the US would come to aid of Korea if attacked.

4. After discussing the 3 points which he seemed about ready to lay down as his terms, Rhee suddenly added a fourth, the barring from Korea of Indian and Communist representatives. The consideration of this point led Rhee to tense and emotional statements of his deep resentment of this particular provision, which he has repeatedly said his people would never accept. I asked him whether, in view of the long range advantages which might accrue from the first 3 points, he would not use his great influence to overcome the national objection to this provision. Rhee seemed to try to bring himself to an acceptance of this thought but could not swallow the loss of face arising from a withdrawal from the uncompromising position which he has taken publicly on this point.

5. Rhee then said that he was reluctant to put these points into his letter to Pres Eisenhower without getting some advance indication of how they would be received. He toyed with the idea of asking me to transmit them to CINCUNC on a trial basis but in the end said that he was not yet ready to take a final position and that he wanted to think the matter over a little longer.

6. In connection with the assignment of the 15 officers, he indicated he will take no final action pending return of Paik. I feel sure that his action in suspending their movement overseas was largely a gesture and that he has no real feeling about retaining them in Korea at this time.

7. My overall impression is that Rhee has not yet accepted the inevitability of an armistice and the unchangeability of the essential provisions with regard to prisoners. He needs to be convinced that since the armistice is an accomplished fact, it should be used as a point of departure in building up new terms most favorable to Korea. In readjusting his position, he is greatly handicapped by the extreme position on foreign troops which he has taken and he can find no face saving means of escape. He needs help to get over this hump.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) and to the Political Adviser for the Armistice Negotiations (Murphy) [1]

TOP SECRET SEOUL, June 9, 1953—7:25 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

GX 5817 KSG. Fol msg transmitted for Amb Briggs.

"Gen Taylor has told me of his talk this morning with Pres Rhee in which latter discussed with considerable frankness matters of greatest concern to him in formulating his reply to Pres Eisenhower's letter. Summary of conversation has been telegraphed to CINCUNC by Taylor [2] and is presumably now avail in Washington.

"Taylor's conversation with Rhee has given first indication since Clark's and my meeting with him June 5 of direction in which his mind has been turning. I believe points Taylor made have contributed helpfully to clarifying issues in Rhee's mind and possibly to indicating way in which differences might be resolved.

"Although we may be able to find some formula to reassure Rhee re duration of political discussions, and have already accepted his points re Mutual Security Pact and 20-div ROK Army, see no easy solution to his demands for barring from Korea Indian and Communist representatives provided by armistice terms. Perhaps if we can help him re duration of political conference and at same time convince him of advantages accruing to ROK from armistice, for example, time it will afford for continued buildup of ROK forces and rehabilitation and reconstruction of ROK, he can be persuaded to modify stand on Indian and Communist representatives. I agree with Clark (CX 62926[3]) that speedy conclusion of armistice may limit actions which Rhee might take to block it and could also be helpful in convincing him of its inevitability.

"Taylor and I plan to accompany Admiral Radford to call on Rhee tomorrow June 10 at 5 PM Seoul time when opportunity may arise for us to obtain further indication Rhee's thinking. If Dept has any comment would appreciate receiving it soonest." Signed Briggs.

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[1] This telegram was sent to the JCS for their information.

[2] See telegram G 5812 KCG, *supra*.

[3] Dated June 9, p. 1157.

795.00/6–953: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 9, 1953—7:29 p. m.

1183. Korean Briefing Meeting, June 9.

Hickerson described plenary meetings June 6–9. At June 6 meeting UNC informed Communists prepared accept their June 4 proposal as basis PW solution. Agreement subsequently worked out that number explaining representatives should be seven per 1,000 PWs with minimum of five. Further agreed explaining representatives would be allowed bring two communications teams if all PWs in one area, and if PWs separately accommodated, one communications team each location, team to consist six men with necessary facilities. UNC and Communists agreed staff officers should draw up final text PW agreement and revise draft armistice agreement to meet changed operational situation. PW agreement signed June 8 and made public.[2]

At June 8 meeting UNC noted only remaining issue is line of demarcation and proposed previously agreed line be accepted despite minor changes in troops positions since November 1951. At June 9 meeting Communists noted prior agreement that demarcation line should be line of contact at time of armistice and said line should be determined anew; saw no justification for altering agreement. However, in order expedite armistice and permit work of revising line be carried out in "stable situation", Communists proposed it be undertaken after armistice goes into effect. UNC disagreed and said if Communists desired renegotiate line, UNC prepared for staff group immediately do so.

At June 8 meeting UNC referred to provision in PW agreement providing for accession by both sides and by five powers named to Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. UNC considered accession by five would be accomplished when after publication text, governments concerned issued formal statements announcing willingness participate. At meeting June 9 Communist spokesman said formal procedure should be adopted to ask consent of five neutral states. His side had already transmitted text to diplomatic representatives of five in Peiping. He asked whether UNC prepared do same or already had done so. Hickerson said USG drafting formal communications to five governments asking if prepared accept.

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[1] This telegram, drafted by Brown and cleared by Johnson, was a summary of the briefing held in Washington on June 9 for the 15 nations with fighting troops on the U.N. side in Korea. A complete report on the briefing can be found in the memorandum of conversation, by Brown, June 9, 1953, not printed. (795.00/6–953) This telegram was sent to London, Moscow, New Delhi, Paris, USUN at New York, Luxembourg, The Hague, Wellington, Bogotá, Addis Ababa, Ankara, Athens, Bangkok, Brussels, Canberra, Manila, Ottawa, and Pretoria.

[2] Not printed, but see the editorial note, p. 1151.

Group was given text Greater Sanctions Statement and mechanics for issuance (Deptcirtel 1016 June 6, 1952 then classified Top Secret).[3] Hickerson explained in light imminence of armistice necessary alert participating countries to be prepared act promptly this matter. Subject to time armistice signed, he suggested appropriate arrangement would be to set perhaps 2-hour period when respective Ambassadors would come individually to sign statement. No ceremony planned. SecState would sign first. Statement would be released shortly thereafter. Hickerson recalled understanding each signatory who so desired would transmit text to UNSYG for his information.

DULLES

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[3] Not printed. (795.00/6-652)

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

TOKYO, June 10, 1953—3:22 p. m.

CX 62966. Ref: A. G 5812 KCG.[2] B. GX 5817 KSG.[3] C. CX 62890.[4]

1. Taylor conferred with Rhee yesterday and submitted to me a rept of his conversation, the details of which are contained in ref A. Subsequently Taylor discussed his meeting with Briggs, whose comments to me are in ref B.

2. I have nothing to add to either Taylor's or Briggs' obsrs other than to repeat that it is my conviction Rhee has been, and is still, convinced of the inevitability of an armistice agreement. There has been no material change in Rhee's attitude as reptd in ref C.

3. Pub statements from ROK ofls and pressure groups continue to oppose an armistice, demand the release of Korean non-repatriate POWs and threaten the use of mil force against Communist elements and Indian armed forces who attempt to enter South Korea. Rhee is trying to balance the advantages of a mutual security treaty with all of its attendant benefits against the bitterness he feels personally and officially about the non-unification of Korea and the apparent transgressions against ROK sovereignty. The longer we delay an armistice agreement, the longer he is subject to doubts and apprehensions about his own psn, and it is for this reason that I feel we must push to an

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[1] This telegram was sent to Briggs and Taylor for their exclusive information.
[2] Dated June 9, p. 1159.
[3] Dated June 9, p. 1161.
[4] Dated June 7, p. 1149.

agreement as quickly as possible to reduce the time Rhee is exposed to conflicting influences.

4. I feel that Rhee fully recognizes the cold facts of the situation and the reasonableness of the steps the US is willing to take in ROK behalf as set forth in Pres Eisenhower's ltr of 6 Jun.[5] In my opinion, Rhee sees the reality of an armistice coming closer and closer. Our hope is that his bluffing will begin to dissipate and, as we move to actual signing of the armistice, his true intentions will be more clearly revealed. We must wait and see. I will watch developments closely and keep you informed.

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[5] Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1148.

795.00/6–1053: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 10, 1953—7:57 p. m.
PRIORITY

775. Personal for Briggs. Repeated Tokyo 2885, personal for Murphy and Clark. You are authorized in your discretion and in consultation with CINCUNC to inform President Rhee that President Eisenhower has several times expressed the thought that there would be a better and more acceptable understanding by him of the President's purpose in seeking an armistice if they could sit down together and talk things over personally. The President could then make unmistakably clear his determination to seek by peaceful means the unification of Korea and could explain that he considers this an actual possibility, not a mirage. Also, the matter of a security pact and economic aid could then be discussed in greater detail. You could inform President Rhee that if he feels disposed to accept such an invitation, you are confident that President Eisenhower would sympathetically consider promptly extending it.

DULLES

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Dulles and Johnson.

795.00/8–1153: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET SEOUL, June 11, 1953—10:40 p. m.

111340 Z. Repeated information CINCUNC personal for General Clark and Ambassador Murphy, Pusan personal for Bond.

I believe Rhee visit to Washington would be desirable if he agrees to make it, as that will probably mean he is prepared to abandon (for a consideration) his opposition to armistice. However, I interpret Rhee's opposition as based primarily on sincere if irrational patriotism and if that interpretation is correct Department may wish to consider effects of possible refusal by Rhee before invitation is extended.

Also, Rhee might conclude from invitation that he will be able to extract very substantial additional concessions from US (for example in terms of economic aid) in return for abandonment of opposition.

Again, failure to convince Rhee that no amount of bluff or threat can budge us from our position as set forth in President Eisenhower's latest letter[1] might well impair whatever chances exist that Rhee will eventually accept armistice.

Thus, to dart forward with invitation to Rhee without awaiting reply to President Eisenhower's letter which clearly and eloquently sets forth our position might prove tactically premature. Although I realize time is pressing, I recommend invitation be deferred at least until Department considers whether foregoing factors warrant delay.

Briggs

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[1] Reference was to the letter of June 6; see footnote 1, p. 1148.

795.00/6-1153

The Secretary of State to the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 11, 1953.

MY DEAR PRESIDENT RHEE: In my personal capacity I send greetings and best wishes and as Secretary of State my hope that our two Governments can work closely together as we pass from war to new efforts to unite Korea. As President Eisenhower said to you in his letter of June 6, he is convinced that it is in fact necessary now to seek the unification of Korea by methods other than continuing the present military warfare. I want personally to say to you that when we talk about unification of Korea by methods other than war, we are not using empty phrases. We have a real determination to achieve this objective and we have hopes that it can be achieved, hopes which are based upon ideas which we are in the process of developing into plans. The pending armistice terms contemplate a political conference about the unification of Korea which will be participated in by a delegation appointed by the UN General Assembly as well as by your Government.

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[1] This personal and private message was drafted by Dulles with the concurrences of Robertson and Johnson. It was transmitted to Korea as telegram 779, June 11, 1953, 6:56 p.m., eyes only for Briggs, and repeated to Tokyo as telegram 2899, eyes only for Murphy and Clark.

Presumably, the United States will be a member of that UN delegation. However, we believe that no delegation of that character can be an adequate substitute for the close cooperation of our two Governments which have made the sacrifices needed to bring resourcefulness and resolve to the highest pitch. Therefore, it is our desire in this matter to work in special and close concert with your Government.

President Eisenhower and I should like as quickly as possible to establish contact with your Government at a level which would permit a highly confidential exchange of views between our two Governments. The ideal procedure would be for you to come to Washington where you could talk on a confidential basis with President Eisenhower and myself. If, however, your responsibilities in Korea make this seem impracticable, let us think up some alternative. Let me emphasize that these talks must be at a high level and strictly confidential.

I have never forgotten the days when I was with you in Korea in June 1950 when I proudly stood beside you before your National Assembly and said that the Republic of Korea would not stand alone. That promise has stood the test of time and of adversity. I can assure you that it still stands. We want to have you with us and we want to be with you in formulating concrete plans to achieve peacefully the unification of Korea. You may remember that when I saw you in Pusan in December 1951 I said that I believed that we can get unification in that way. I still hold that conviction and I ask you to work with us practically and concretely now that we approach this phase of the problem.

With best wishes to Mrs. Rhee, in which Mrs. Dulles warmly joins,

I am Faithfully yours, JOHN FOSTER DULLES

795.00/6–1253: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET SEOUL, June 12, 1953—9:10 p. m.

NIACT

Unnumbered, DTG 121210Z. Repeated information CINCUNC (personal for General Clark and Ambassador Murphy).

a. President Rhee delighted your letter[2] contained Deptel 779 which I delivered to him at 5 this afternoon. He asked me to express his "sincere personal appreciation for Secretary's exceptionally friendly message".

b. Meeting with Rhee lasted approximately one hour marked by cordiality on his part. After I handed him letter, Rhee read it slowly aloud and following expression of thanks spoke at some length of necessity maintaining intact Korean-American friendship no matter how we might differ on any given issue. Although he said he did not see how he could get away for visit to Washington at this time, I think he is tempted accept if he can see way clear to go.

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[1] A marginal note by O'Connor on the source text indicated that the Secretary of State saw this telegram on June 15.

[2] *Supra.*

c. During rather rambling but alert and carefully expressed monologue that consumed most of the time of my visit, President asked me assure Secretary that current demonstrations in Korea must not be misinterpreted and he cited various public statements along line of "US is entitled to go its own way" which I said I had already communicated to Washington along with reports on daily development. President Rhee likewise referred to following points:

d. The commitment given General Clark several weeks ago and recently repeated to both of us that should Rhee ever find it necessary to take unilateral action with Republic of Korea Forces he would inform General Clark in advance. Rhee reiterated that assurance and implied such action not imminent.

e. To armistice and Rhee's inability to accept it, these references however were made in somewhat perfunctory vein in contrast to previous observation concerning armistice.

f. To political conference, Rhee suggesting Panmunjom negotiations ought to be converted directly into political conference in order save time. (First time Rhee has mentioned that idea.)

g. To alleged difficulties with foreign correspondents in Seoul who had, Rhee declared, recently been especially unhelpful, he remarked that it behooves everyone these days to be most careful in public statements, (an observation I hope not lost on Foreign Minister Pyun).

h. To President Eisenhower's letter of June 6[3] on which Rhee said he had spent much time this week trying to draft reply, he indicated this task "very difficult for me" and that reply still in preparation. I conclude from meeting that Rhee is genuinely pleased with Secretary's letter, especially invitation, even though he has not decided whether to accept. Believe general atmosphere has been improved by letter despite fact he indicated no specific modification of his previously expressed attitude toward armistice.

Briggs

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[3] Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1148.

795.00/6–1453

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET SEOUL, June 14, 1953.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I wish to thank you most sincerely for your warm and encouraging letter of June 12. I wish I could accept your kind invitation to come to the US but the situation here is such that I can not leave the country even for a short while.

I wonder if you could make a trip here so that we may talk things over face to face. Your tour to this part of the orient may be considered timely. Our direct discussion on the present critical problems may be helpful. I hope you could manage time.

Mrs. Rhee joins me in wishing you and Mrs. Dulles best of health and all success.

Cordially,

SYNGMAN RHEE

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[1] This personal message was transmitted to Dulles in telegram 1 from Seoul, which was repeated to Tokyo eyes only for Murphy and Clark, June 14, 1953, 4 p.m. Also part of the telegram was a covering letter from Rhee stating "I desire to show our appreciation for the Secretary's kind invitation so that we can have [an] opportunity to discuss problems face to face."

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file [1]

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 14, 1953.

Subject: Korean Situation

I attach hereto:

1. Copy of my personal message to President Rhee of June 12 [*11*] [2] (previously sent you).
2. Telegram from Ambassador Briggs, reporting on the reception of this message.[3]
3. Personal telegram from Rhee, suggesting I come to Korea.[4]

The importance of getting Rhee to accept the armistice can hardly be overestimated. Also, it is important to provide him some "face-saving" formula. It is possible that my acceptance of Rhee's invitation, coupled with specific assurances given him in Korea with reference to a security pact and coordinated action in the political conference, could serve this purpose.

However, on balance, I feel that it would be a mistake for me as Secretary of State to go there before Rhee's position on the armistice has been made clear and when he has not answered your letter. I do think, however, that it might serve a useful purpose if someone of high but lesser position such as Robertson or MacArthur should go there for the purpose of explaining and developing with Rhee the reality of the post-armistice proposals which you made in relation to (*a*) security pact, (*b*) economic assistance and (*c*) a political program for Korean unity. He should preferably go prior to the Bermuda Conference, as Rhee will surely be suspicious that at Bermuda we will be persuaded by Churchill into a course of action lenient toward Communist China.

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[1] A copy of this memorandum is also in file 795.00/6–1453.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1165.

[3] Dated June 12, p. 1166.

[4] *Supra.*

I believe that in this way we might get Rhee thinking more about post-armistice conditions and what these could mean for him, and that in the meanwhile he might allow the armistice to become an accomplished fact.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

795.00/6-1553

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretaries of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) and Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 15, 1953.

Subject: UN Action Immediately Following an Armistice in Korea.

Discussion:

While our position at the proposed political conference is being studied, we believe it important to reach decisions on steps prior to the convocation of the conference. Our key allies have been pressing us for a firm view of our position on a number of questions. Ambassador Lodge has also reported active interest on the part of other delegations, and there is danger that if other delegations are not informed of the views of the United States, ideas and plans may develop which we would consider undesirable.

Recommendations:

We recommend that the following positions be approved:

1. There should be a meeting of the Security Council as soon as practicable after the armistice is signed.

2. The General Assembly should reconvene two to three weeks after the armistice is signed. This should take place regardless of the timing of the Bermuda conference.[2]

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[1] This memorandum, drafted by Henkin and concurred in by Allen, was sent through Matthews.

[2] Marginal notation initialed by Dulles indicated that the first two recommendations were "O.K."; the next three were crossed out. A note by O'Connor to S/S, dated June 17, confirmed that the Secretary of State had approved paragraphs 1 and 2, but not 3, 4, and 5 on the basis that the ROK had to be consulted. The Secretary stressed, according *Continued*

3. The General Assembly should designate a UN Delegation to the conference, chosen from among the members with troops in Korea. A number of our key allies have indicated that they would agree to a delegation consisting of Australia, Colombia, France, Thailand (or Philippines), Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States. (The ROK would be a party to the conference in its own right. The Communist side would presumably be composed of representatives of the North Korean and Chinese Communist regimes).

If the Soviet Government wishes to participate in the conference, arrangements should be made for them to do so but *not* as a representative of the UN.

4. The General Assembly should instruct its delegation to discuss Korea only. If it appears impossible to get the General Assembly to limit the scope of the conference, the scope of the agenda of the conference should be left to the UN Delegation to be negotiated at the conference. The General Assembly should designate as the objective of the conference the achievement of a unified, independent and democratic Korea.

5. Immediately following an armistice there should be an approach to the Soviet government either by the United States or by the United Kingdom to inform them of the proposed procedures in the Security Council and in the General Assembly, and to determine its attitude concerning Soviet participation in the Political Conference.

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to O'Connor's note, the need to impress the ROK that the United States would strongly and directly support South Korean peaceful efforts to seek a unified Korea; therefore prior consultation was most important. (795.00/6–1553)

For documentation on the Bermuda Conference, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1710 ff.

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 154

Draft Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council [1]

TOP SECRET
NSC 154

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1953.

UNITED STATES TACTICS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING AN ARMISTICE IN KOREA*

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. An armistice in Korea would not indicate that Communist China had abandoned its basic objectives or its willingness to seek these objec-

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[1] According to a covering memorandum by Lay, June 15, 1953, this draft statement of policy was prepared by the NSC Planning Board in response to NSC Action No. 777–*d* (2) of Apr. 28, which directed the Planning Board to prepare for the Council's early consideration a report on "U.S. Policy Toward Communist China in the Event of a Korean Armistice." This statement was to be submitted to the Council for consideration at its meeting of June 18. Also enclosed was an NSC staff study for the information of the

tives by armed force. The danger of aggression would continue, particularly in Southeast Asia, while the Communists would attempt to exploit the armistice as a tactical device to weaken and divide the free world.

2. After an armistice the major allies of the United States would be increasingly unwilling to support the United States in maintaining political and economic pressures against Communist China. As a result, existing differences between the United States and its major allies over policy toward China would be intensified, and this might lead to a serious breach between the United States and its major allies over the Far East.

3. It is important to our national security, as well as to the objective of obtaining an acceptable settlement in Korea, that political and economic pressures against Communist China be developed and maintained during the immediate post-armistice period, and that the expected opposition of our major allies to such pressures be overcome.

INTERIM COURSES OF ACTION

(to be pursued during the political negotiations for a peace and until a review of basic U.S. policies toward China and toward Korea is completed)

Pressures Against Communist China

4. Continue to recognize the Government of the Republic of China on Formosa as the Government of all China, and as the sole representative of China in the UN and all other international organs; continue to extend economic and military aid to the Republic of China on Formosa.

NSC. This statement incorporated relevant courses of action from NSC 118/2, Dec. 20, 1951 (*Foreign Relations*, 1951, Part 1, p. 1382), and was intended, if adopted, to supersede paragraphs 2-*a* and 2-*d* of NSC 118/2. A record copy of NSC Action No. 777-*d* (2) can be found in S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.

*This statement of policy is based on the assumption that the Republic of Korea will cooperate satisfactorily with the UN in carrying out the terms of the armistice. [Footnote in the source text.]

5. Use all feasible means to prevent seating of the Chinese Communist regime in the UN and related bodies.

6. Continue the U.S. total embargo on trade with Communist China, prohibition of U.S. shipping to Communist China, and current financial controls with respect to Communist China.

7. Make every feasible effort to induce other free world countries, pending a settlement regarding Korea: (*a*) to maintain their current levels of controls and restrictions over trade and shipping with Communist China and North Korea, and, where possible, to extend their embargo lists to include the remaining items hitherto proposed by the United States, either bilaterally or in multilateral bodies; and (*b*) to tighten enforcement of such restrictions.

8. Together with the other 15 co-signatories, issue the "greater sanctions" statement† immediately after an armistice is signed, in order to demonstrate that the 16 UN members now participating in the Korean action will again be united and prompt in resisting a renewal of armed attack, and to warn the aggressor that in all probability it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea if there is a renewal of armed attack.

9. Issue, with France, the UK, Australia and New Zealand, and as many other co-signatories as possible, a supplemental statement to the effect that any Communist aggression elsewhere in Asia, following the armistice, would be considered inconsistent with its terms and purposes.

10. Continue a program of covert operations designed to assist in the achievement of U.S. objectives vis-à-vis Communist China and Korea.

UN Military Strength in Korea

11. Maintain UN military strength in Korea at a level consistent with U.S. objectives and with the terms of the armistice.

12. Carry on a vigorous campaign to secure additional armed forces from other UN members for service in Korea, with a view to possible limited redeployment of U.S. forces.

Security in UN Forces

13. Continue in effect all pertinent instructions to the UN Command involving the maintenance of the security of UN forces in the Korean area.

Aid to the Republic of Korea

14. On the assumption that the Republic of Korea will cooperate satisfactorily with the UN in carrying out the terms of the armistice:

a. Continue to develop and equip dependable ROK military forces in accordance with the present program, with a view to the assumption by the Republic of Korea of greater responsibility for the defense of Korea.

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†For text of statement, see Annex. [Footnote in the source text.]

b. Conclude a treaty with the Republic of Korea guaranteeing its political independence and territorial integrity. Such a treaty should cover the territory now or hereafter brought peacefully under the administration of the Republic of Korea.

c. Working in and through the organs of the UN where feasible, continue to strengthen the government and democratic institutions of the Republic of Korea, and continue to contribute to the United Nations effort for economic recovery and rehabilitation in the Republic of Korea.

Political Conference

15. Endeavor in the UN to obtain agreement to the establishment of a UN Delegaton to undertake negotiations looking toward an eventual political settlement which would establish a united, independent and democratic Korea.

16. Adhere firmly to the UN interpretation of the armistice agreement that only Korean problems will be discussed at the political conference to follow the armistice.

17. Develop as a matter of urgency the position which the United States will take during the political negotiations with respect to the Republic of Korea.[2]

Persuasion of Allies

18. Conduct a high-level diplomatic campaign to persuade our allies to accept U.S. courses of action.

19. Make an inventory of economic measures we could take, if necessary, to induce our allies to accept U.S. courses of action.

Review of Policy

20. Undertake, in the light of the post-armistice situation, a fundamental review and reassessment of our basic policy toward Communist China, as well as our position with respect to Korea.

Annex

AGREED "GREATER SANCTIONS" STATEMENT

"We, the United Nations members whose military forces are participating in the Korean action support the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the UN Command to conclude an armistice agreement. We hereby affirm our determination fully and faithfully to carry out the terms of that armistice. We expect that the other parties to the agreement will likewise scrupulously observe its terms.

"The task ahead is not an easy one. We will support the efforts of the United Nations to bring about an equitable settlement in Korea based on the principles which have long been established by the United Nations, and which call for a united, independent and democratic Korea. We will support the United Nations in its efforts to assist the people of Korea in repairing the ravages of war.

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[2] See the Department of State draft paper of June 15, p. 1180; this paper subsequently became NSC 157, June 25, p. 1272.

"We declare again our faith in the principles and purposes of the United Nations, our consciousness of our continuing responsibilities in Korea, and our determination in good faith to seek a settlement of the Korean problem. We affirm, in the interests of world peace, that if there is a renewal of the armed attack, challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea."

[Attachment]

National Security Council Staff Study

UNITED STATES TACTICS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING AN ARMISTICE IN KOREA

1. If an armistice is reached in Korea, a change in the international situation may be expected to take place of such magnitude as to justify a fundamental review and reassessment of U.S. policy and courses of action with respect to Communist China. This change will arise from the reaction of our allies to an armistice rather than from any change in Chinese Communist policy or objectives. We believe, in fact, that conclusion of an armistice in Korea by the Communists on terms acceptable to the UN would not represent a basic change in Chinese Communist policy, but would merely represent a tactical shift designed to create "an atmosphere in which resistance to Communism and Soviet imperialism will be weakened".‡ An armistice in Korea would signify merely that the Communists have found it unprofitable to continue the war there, but the danger of renewed aggression would be unrelieved, particularly in Southeast Asia, where Chinese Communist-backed military operations against duly constituted authority continues in Indochina and Malaya. Cessation of hostilities in Korea, while encouraging, would not in itself constitute sufficient evidence that Communist China has abandoned its basic objectives nor, even more importantly, its willingness to seek these objectives by armed force.

2. The change anticipated in the international situation will be in the nature of an intensification of differences between the United States and its major allies over policy toward China. It is our estimate that only the continuation of hostilities by the Communists against the UN in Korea has prevented a serious breach between the United States and its

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‡ Conclusion of SE–42, "Current Communist Tactics", April 24, 1953. [Footnote in the source text; SE–42 is not printed.]

allies over this issue. After the cessation of hostilities in Korea the major allies of the United States will be increasingly unwilling to support the United States in maintaining political and economic pressures against Communist China. As a result, the United States will be confronted with a new international situation.

3. Thus it must be estimated that there is a real danger that the United States will find itself diplomatically isolated in its posture towards Communist China, in the event there is an armistice in Korea. Chinese Communist intervention in Korea and the continuing hostilities there have assisted us in developing and maintaining political and economic isolation of the Chinese Communists, and have provided in the eyes of many of our allies justification for the United States policies of protection for Formosa, economic and military assistance to the Chinese Nationalists, and continued insistence on Chinese Nationalist representation in international organizations. The termination of hostilities in Korea will undoubtedly bring increased pressure from many of our allies for relaxation of restrictions on trade with Communist China, for further development of political relations with Communist China, and for admission of Communist China into the UN or other international organizations. Under these circumstances, we must estimate that there will be increasing opposition on the part of our allies to United States insistence on continued representation for the Nationalists in the UN, and in particular to any Chinese Nationalists interference with the China trade or any type of Chinese Nationalist military action against the mainland.

4. But the United States must find ways and means of overcoming this expected opposition to its policies. In the face of our current estimate that Chinese Communist agreement to an armistice would be calculated to weaken resistance to Communism and Soviet imperialism, the United States must make every effort to see that such resistance is not weakened. In the absence of further evidence that the Peiping regime has changed its standards of international conduct, any relaxation of pressures against it would only serve as an encouragement for further aggression, while restoration of full trade with the Chinese Communists would serve to increase their capabilities for further military activities. For the immediate post-armistice period, therefore, the United States faces the problem of devising tactics toward Communist China that will maintain and develop political and economic pressures against Communist China without creating too serious a breach between the United States and its major allies.

5. While the maintenance and development of political and economic pressures against Communist China will undoubtedly encounter serious opposition from our allies, we believe that for the short run at least this line of action can be adhered to without permanent damage to relations with our major allies, and must be adhered to if we are not to play into

Communist hands. In order to do this, a major effort should be made at the highest levels to convince our allies that to relax our guard against Communist aggression in the Far East, merely because the Communists have agreed to stop killing UN soldiers, would display weakness on the part of the free world which the Communists could be expected to exploit to the utmost. It should be emphasized to our allies that while we believe it would be folly to relax our defenses against the Communists, neither do we have any intention of renewing hostilities with the Communists so long as they respect the terms of the armistice and refrain from all other aggression. We should explain to our allies that our continued support of the Chinese National Government does not have the objective of building on that Government's military strength for a reconquest of the mainland, but is based upon the strategic necessity of keeping Formosa out of Communist hands, as well as the need for maintaining a rallying point for non-Communist Chinese essential for the political struggle against Communism in the Far East, which we believe will continue indefinitely regardless of the armistice. We should point out to our allies that while we do not desire the indefinite perpetuation of the "cold war" struggle with the Communists, there is no safe or honorable alternative so long as they are dedicated to its perpetuation. All of the evidence which we are able to obtain demonstrates beyond doubt that they are so dedicated, and that they will unhesitatingly resort to force whenever and wherever they estimate their objectives can best be obtained at feasible cost and risk. Under these circumstances, we should explain, we now see no tenable basis for an over-all peace settlement in the Far East. On the other hand, we intend to maintain a posture of willingness to call off the cold war if adequate bases are provided for a sound belief that the Communists are ready to do so.

6. One of these bases would be a satisfactory peace settlement in Korea. It is our intention, therefore, to seek a political settlement in Korea in the political conference provided for by the armistice terms. This conference must be confined exclusively to Korean matters Chinese Communist agreement to get out of Korea and allow the Koreans freely to choose their Government must not be bought at the price of concessions elsewhere. It must be made a test of the willingness of the Chinese Communists to abandon aggression and respect the rights of their neighbors. Failure of the Communists to meet this test would in our opinion demonstrate that they have not yet given up the policies which led to their aggression in Korea, and confirm the necessity of maintaining pressures against them designed to weaken their ability to break out in renewed aggression.

7. A high-level United States diplomatic campaign along the foregoing lines would seem to afford the best chance of maintaining essential free world pressure against the Chinese Communist regime in the immediate post-armistice period.

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 118 Series

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 15, 1953.

Subject: Additional United Nations Forces for Korea

References:
- A. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 1, 1953[1]
- B. NSC 118/2 (paragraphs 2–*a* (3) and 2–*b* (7))[2]
- C. NSC 147 (paragraphs 168–180)[3]
- D. NSC Action No. 759–*b*[4]

The enclosed views from the Department of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget with respect to the letter on the subject from Ambassador Lodge which was transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 1 are circulated herewith for the information of the National Security Council in connection with its consideration of Ambassador Lodge's letter at its meeting on Thursday, June 18.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nash) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 11, 1953.

Subject: United States Government Policy With Regard to the Acceptance of Offers for Military Assistance in Korea

United States Government policy with regard to the acceptance of offers for assistance in Korea from the very beginning has involved not only the question of logistic support, but also the consideration of military effectiveness of the unit. In particular, a homogeneous unit of appropriate size capable of operating under the flag of the nation concerned, has been regarded as militarily acceptable. On the other hand, the thought that the United States should attempt to organize, train and equip units composed of unorganized volunteers from foreign nations has been consistently opposed on the grounds of the command difficulties involved and the fact that such action would give credence to possible charges of the use of mercenary troops by the United States. With regard to the principle of reimbursement, the United States position has been that participating nations should provide manpower, matériel and the financial costs of their participation in the United Nations action in Korea insofar as possible, not only because of the principle of equity involved, but also because of the precedent-setting implications as to the financing of possible future United Nations collective action. This policy has included recognition of valid practical aspects by providing that where participating nations cannot provide matériel support, the United States would do so with the understanding that an obligation for payment was recognized by the country concerned, the mode and time of settlement to become the subject of later discussions between official governmental representatives. It was further recognized that in properly justified cases, the President could exercise his emergency powers to eliminate the requirement for an obligation on the part of an individual country.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 1129.

[2] For text of NSC 118/2, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1382.

[3] Dated Apr. 2; for text of paragraphs 168–171 and 173–180, see pp. 850–857.

[4] For NSC Action No. 759, see the memorandum of discussion at the 139th meeting of the NSC, Apr. 8, p. 892.

U.S. policy and procedure concerning reimbursement, referred to above, were established after consultation between the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury, and approved by the President. On the basis of this action, the Department of Defense issued a directive dated 1 September 1950, which provided that "the military departments of the United States will make available necessary supplies or services on a basis of immediate reimbursement in United States dollars. To the extent that the foreign government cannot make prompt reimbursement in United States dollars, the United States Government and the foreign government will negotiate the terms of settlement." In other words, we have been operating under a procedure whereby the recognition of an obligation to reimburse the United States has constituted adequate grounds for the furnishing of logistic support, leaving the details of reimbursement for negotiation at a later date, and we have, in fact, been providing logistic support to all the United Nations forces participating in the Korean war. In each case, with the exception of India, which was specifically exempted by executive action, the nation receiving logistic support recognized an obligation to reimburse the United States. This obligation was usually referred to in an exchange of notes with the foreign government. The extent of the obligation was not spelled out at the time, details being left for further discussions. The usual procedure has been to approach each of the countries concerned some time after their troops arrived in Korea and submit for their consideration a draft agreement calling for reimbursement on a quarterly basis. A few nations have signed such agreements. Two have been making current payments without agreement, and some have not been approached with a proposal for reimbursement at all. Most nations, however, have neither accepted the agreements nor made counter proposals. As of 31 December 1952, we had advanced the equivalent of approximately two hundred million dollars in logistic support to foreign nations in Korea and had been reimbursed in the neighborhood of only forty million dollars.

At the time that the existing policy was approved, it was recognized that it did not represent the final answer and was regarded only as an interim emergency measure. Consequently, the problem has been under almost continuous review by various agencies of the Government. These studies have invariably ended on the horns of a dilemma between the possibility of generating increased participation and the probable future long-term consequences to the United States and the principles of collective security if the reimbursement requirement were withdrawn. As recently as 8 April 1953, the National Security Council addressed itself to this problem in its consideration of NSC 147 and decided that the current practice regarding reimbursement for logistic support of United Nations forces in Korea should be continued for the time being. This action notwithstanding, the National Security Council now has under consideration a letter dated 19 May 1953 on this subject, addressed by Ambassador Lodge to the President.[5] This letter contains the proposal that the United States should initiate a renewed and vigorous campaign for increased participation in Korea and as a step to enable the achievement of this goal, the United States should revise the reimbursement policy now in force. In the course of NSC consideration of this letter the entire problem, as outlined above, will again be subject to re-examination.

It is possible that some nations not now having troops in Korea could be induced to send troop increments, and some nations with units in the theater might possibly increase the size of their present commitments were they informed that the United States would not require reimbursement for logistic support furnished these units. However, consideration of such a policy involves two distinct questions. On the one hand, there is the consideration of willingness to participate and assume responsibility in United Nations collective action, and on the other hand, ability to pay. To waive completely the reimbursement obligation would encourage nations with the ability to reimburse not to do so, and would at the same time, undermine the growth of the United Nations as an effective mechanism for collective action since the spirit of full collective responsibility would be lacking. In those cases where a nation's participation is dependent upon receiving financial assistance, the problem can be solved through procedures such as deferred or other settlement and possibly economic aid, or military assistance. Also, in justifiable cases, the President can waive the reimbursement obligation as he has done in the case of India.

FRANK C. NASH

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[5] Printed as an attachment to a memorandum by Lay to the NSC, p. 1130.

[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum by the Chief, International Division, Bureau of the Budget (Macy) to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Cutler)

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 8, 1953.

Subject: Additional UN Forces in Korea

The above subject was discussed at the Planning Board session of June 3 and it was agreed that agencies wishing to submit comments for Council consideration should do so by June 10.

The Bureau of the Budget addresses its comments only to that portion of Mr. Lodge's proposal which concerns the policy of securing reimbursement for logistic support furnished by this country to UN forces engaged in Korea.

In our view the action of the Council on April 8 was a correct one and should not now be reconsidered. To have the United States accept the full responsibility for the costs of the Korean war would be to establish a precedent, the ultimate implications of which have not been sufficiently analyzed either as respects Korea itself nor, possible of greater import, future areas of UN activity.

The U.S. has been receiving repayment in full from a number of countries. We should not voluntarily release those countries able and willing to pay from the obligation they have to do so as UN members.

To date we have borne the costs only of supplementary logistic support. Under a policy in which we relieved the other UN countries of responsibility for the logistic support of their troops, the costs merely of maintaining the present level would be considerably greater. It has not been shown that these additional expenditures if applied to ROK forces would not in fact make a greater contribution toward the desired objective.

R. M. MACY

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 154 Series

Draft Paper for Submission to the Planning Board of the National Security Council [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 15, 1953.

Problem: To determine the basic U.S. objective with respect to Korea.

Assumption: An armistice is concluded.

Discussion: *Background*

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[1] A note attached to the source text, from Scott to Smith, June 16, 1953, indicated that Dulles had approved the submission of this position paper to the NSC Planning Board. A note in Smith's writing on this note by Scott read as follows: "Noted—but what do the J.C.S. say? W.B.S." This paper was discussed with the JCS on June 16; see the memorandum, *infra*.

1. The armistice terms call for a political conference on Korea within 90 days after the signing of the armistice. The conference will be between the Communists and the UN with the Republic of Korea associated with the latter. U.S. tactics should be determined in the light of what the U.S. basic objective is with respect to Korea within the limits of the feasible. The achievement of a unified Korea under the Republic of Korea tied into the U.S. security system and developed as a military ally is not a practical possibility under present circumstances. This objective could be achieved only by the forceful expulsion of the Communists from Korea and was in effect relinquished when the present armistice was accepted.

2. *Alternative Feasible Objectives:*

a. A Korea divided for an indefinite period on the present demarcation line with the Republic of Korea tied into the U.S. security system and developed as a military ally.

b. A unified, neutralized Korea under a substantially unchanged ROK. (Such an objective would entail Communist agreement to a unified Korea with a U.S. political orientation in exchange for U.S. agreement to remove U.S. forces and bases from Korea and to exclude Korea from the U.S. military sphere. This objective should also involve guarantees for the territorial and political integrity of a unified Korea under the ROK and its admission to the UN and possibly would involve limitations on the level and character of the ROK defense forces.)

3. *Communist Position:*

The Communist acceptance of the present armistice indicates that they would be prepared to acquiesce in the first alternative which would in effect represent a continuation of the *status quo*.

The Communists might conceivably regard the second alternatives as preferable to the first. The Communists have little to fear from the Koreans themselves, who occupy a small country disorganized and weakened by war and entertain no irredentist aspirations at the expense of China or Siberia. The Communists fear Korea primarily as a base or jump-off place for U.S. or perhaps ultimately Japanese power. Even though the unification of Korea on a neutralized basis would mean the sacrifice of the satellite North Korean regime and of considerable prestige, the Communists might possibly be prepared to accept this sacrifice as a means of preventing the establishment of U.S. bases within a few hundred miles of Manchurian and North Chinese industrial, transportation, and port facilities. Moreover, the Communists would rid themselves of an economic liability which North Korea, as a result of the war, would represent for some time to come. From the global point of view the Communists might conceive of a Korean settlement of this kind as providing an opportunity for "deeds" of a peaceful nature which might not be of net disadvantage to themselves.

4. *The Position of U.S. Allies:*

Most of the nations of the free world, both European and Asian, would probably be strongly in favor of the neutralization of Korea both because such a settlement would appear to remove an area of dangerous friction between the U.S. and the Communist world and thus reduce the danger of general war and because the creation of a strong U.S. position in South Korea would result in a drain on U.S. resources which otherwise would be available for investment elsewhere. Nationalist China, which tends to fear any relaxation of tension between Communist China and the U.S., would doubtless regard unfavorably the neutralization of Korea. The Japanese, on the whole, would support such neutralization.

5. *The Position of the ROK:*

The strong and highly emotional objections of President Syngman Rhee and the people of the ROK to any continuation of the division of Korea have been made abundantly plain. A settlement providing for a united and independent Korea under the ROK could be expected to appeal to them in meeting their primary objectives. It is possible that President Rhee would rather be the liberator and unifier of his country than President of a truncated Korea, even though this Korea were allied with the U.S. He might consider that a guarantee of Korea's integrity by both the U.S. and the Communist bloc would compensate Korea for giving up a bilateral security pact with the U.S.

6. *U.S. Interest as Between the Two Feasible Alternatives:*

An independent and united Korea has been a constant U.S. objective. This objective can now feasibly be achieved only through the neutralization of Korea. The relinquishment of its military position in Korea which would result from neutralization would not be critical for the U.S. In the event of general war, the desirability of attempting to defend Korea would be problematical. With respect to the danger of local aggression against Korea it would in any case be only the prospect of retaliation by the U.S. forces that would deter such aggression. The danger of internal subversion or indirect aggression in Korea could and should be countered by adequate Korean security forces and economic assistance. On the positive side, the security of Japan would be favored by the withdrawal of Communist military power (including air forces) beyond the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. The savings made possible for the U.S. by its being relieved of the necessity of supporting U.S. bases in Korea and large, heavily-armed Korean forces would make possible a strengthening of the military position of the free world in other areas. The unification of Korea would probably be generally regarded as a significant accomplishment by the United Nations, to the enhancement of its prestige. The unification of Korea under the ROK, even on a neutralized basis, would probably also be widely regarded as a more constructive result of the war and more to the credit of the U.S. than the restitution of the *status quo ante.*

7. *Conclusion and Recommendation:*

It is in the interest of the U.S., and should be the U.S. objective, to secure a unified and neutralized Korea.

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 16, 1953—2 p. m.

Timing of NNSC Teams

Mr. Johnson: We should get a message out to Clark on the question of the lapse of time between the date of the cease fire and the probable arrival of the NNSC team. We have word that the Swiss will leave on the 25th from Zurich. The Swedes tell us that their team will leave on the 21st from Stockholm. The Swedes have asked the Poles as to when the Communist teams would leave. From the report we have, they have heard from the Poles that the Swedes are quite a bit ahead of them. I think the draft telegram you have here is all right.[2] I do think it is important that we have skeleton teams there just as early as possible.

Admiral Fechteler: The telegram says that the period of the lapse is "acceptable". I should think the word should be unavoidable.

Mr. Matthews: That is in response to Clark's view that too long a period of lapse would present an unacceptable risk.

General Twining: What worries me about not having the teams there is that the Communists will go ahead and build up their airfields.

Mr. Matthews: There is no provision in the armistice to keep the Communists from repairing or building up their airfields. You may remember that we gave up the restriction about repairing airfields in connection with the agreement of our Allies to issue the Greater Sanction Statement.

Admiral Fechteler: I think this telegram is OK if nobody has objections.

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[1] A note on the title page read: "Draft. Not cleared with any of participants."

Admiral Fechteler and Generals Shepherd and Twining attended for the JCS. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent, while Nash represented the Department of Defense, General Cabell the CIA, and General Gerhard and Gleason the NSC. Korea was the sole topic discussed at this meeting, at which 21 persons were present.

[2] This draft was transmitted as telegram JCS 941491 to Clark, June 16, 1953, not printed. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

Diplomatic Immunity for Armistice Teams

Mr. Johnson: We should also get an answer out to Clark on the question of diplomatic immunity for the armistice teams. I had a draft which, unfortunately, I don't have with me. We can call and have it sent over right away. In general what it says is that although these people will not have actual diplomatic immunity, the UNC will accord them the same privileges as in practice people with diplomatic immunity are accorded. We don't think, however, that we should take this up with Rhee at the present time.

Possibility of a Neutralized Unified Korea

Mr. Matthews: As we approach the possibility of an armistice, we have been considering the question of what our own objective really should be with regard to Korea and in particular what we should be working toward in the political conference which is due to follow the armistice. We discussed this with our own Secretary. He thought that it was a most important question and one which should be put up to the NSC. We thought it would be helpful to get your preliminary reactions on the question today. In general it seemed to us there were two feasible alternatives. The first one is what, in effect, we will have at the time of an armistice and that is a divided Korea with South Korea allied to the U.S. and developed by the U.S. as a military partner. The second alternative would be a unified Korea but one which was in effect neutralized.

Admiral Fechteler: What do you mean by neutralized?

Mr. Matthews: In essence it would mean that we do not have any military bases in Korea and we would maintain no U.S. forces in Korea. We might give guarantees to Korea against external attack but we would not have an alliance with Korea.

Admiral Fechteler: Would it mean that Korea would be demilitarized?

Mr. Bowie: No, it wouldn't necessarily mean that, although I should think we would have to expect that the Communists would insist there be some limit on the number of the ROK forces.

Admiral Fechteler: How about U.S. logistic assistance to Korea?

Mr. Bowie: We haven't thought that through in detail but we have thought that possibly we might continue to supply the Koreans with some military equipment.

General Shepherd: What would the North Koreans think of the idea? Why should they go along with it?

Mr. Matthews: It might be more important to estimate what the Russians would think of it. By and large I should think the North Koreans would be apt to do what they are told to do by the Russians.

Admiral Fechteler: From the military point of view I don't see how the alternative you described in this draft paper[3] as alternative B of a unified neutralized Korea would work out. We would have to pull all our men and equipment out. The Chinese Communists would go to the other side of the Yalu and presumably we would withdraw to Japan. What would keep the Communists from walking right back in again?

Mr. Matthews: The theory would be that if the Chinese came back so would we or else we would take action against them elsewhere.

General McAuliffe:[4] It would be much harder for us to get back in if the Chinese should come back than it would be to stay there.

Mr. Bowie: Would we visualize keeping U.S. forces there for any length of time after an armistice or would we visualize trying to keep forces there in case of general war?

General Twining: We really haven't had a chance to talk this over. Personally, although I don't know what the other Chiefs think, it seems to me that this idea of neutralizing Korea would create a military vacuum. I would like to take a look at it and talk it over with the other Chiefs.

Mr. Bowie: The basic theory is that it is possible that the Communists might be willing to give up their position in North Korea in return for our withdrawing from our military position in South Korea.

Admiral Fechteler: What would the tactics be?

Mr. Bowie: We would probably try to make it look as if we really didn't want a neutralized Korea so that there would be more chance the Communists might be willing to accept the idea.

Mr. Johnson: The basic question is whether or not we would think it to our advantage to have Korea united under such terms.

Mr. Matthews: If general war broke out, would you want to retain our present position in Korea?

Admiral Fechteler: No, we wouldn't, but as I read the description in your paper of why the Communists might agree to a neutralized Korea, I can't follow it. For example, it says here that the Communists fear Korea as a jumping off place against Manchuria or Siberia. I just don't think the Communists have any fear of Korea. It also says they would rid themselves of an economic liability but I don't think they would let North Korea be a liability. They would just let them starve. This whole paragraph, it seems to me, is pleading a case for the alternative of neutralization.

Mr. Matthews: It's not pleading a case, it is just pointing out what the reasons might be that might lead the Communists to accept such a proposal. Obviously we don't know whether or not they would go along with such a scheme.

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[3] *Supra.*

[4] Lt. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration.

Mr. MacArthur: My worry would be as to whether or not the ROK could maintain an army if we couldn't provide them with military assistance and support.

Mr. Johnson: I think that is a perfectly valid question and one that we would have to think about.

Admiral Fechteler: Would you visualize Korea as being something like Switzerland?

Mr. Bowie: Yes, to some degree. The Koreans would have forces for their own defense and there might be guarantees from us and from the Communists, but the Koreans wouldn't have any military alliance with anybody.

Mr. Johnson: The question is whether we could live with such an arrangement and whether it would be to our advantage.

Admiral Fechteler: The only difference between alternatives A and B is that our forces will be moved out of Korea but in any case they will still be pinned down in a general area near Korea.

Mr. Matthews: This paper is based on the assumption that there is an armistice and that there is no more shooting. If the Communists did violate the armistice or violate the Korean neutrality, our sanction against it would still be our general strength rather than the level of our forces in Korea.

General Eddleman: Wouldn't this be a complete reversal of U.S. policy? We have been trying to build the strength of anti-Communist forces—this would be really leaving the Koreans weaker than they are now. What would other nations think of that?

Mr. Matthews: We feel that most other countries would be glad to see lessening of the possibilities of tension or conflict over Korea.

Mr. Bowie: Doesn't part of the question depend on whether or not we ourselves really want to keep U.S. forces and bases in Korea.

General McAuliffe: We would only want to keep them there to the degree it was necessary to implement the mutual security treaty we have been talking about. But we have read that sentence of this paper that says "Korea excluded from the U.S. miltiary sphere" as meaning that we would not be able to give any support to the Koreans for their army. It seems to me this would create an impossible military situation for the Koreans.

Mr. Bowie: There may be an internal inconsistency in this plan since we have thought that even though Korea should be neutralized it would still have an army for its own defense. It may be this just isn't possible without U.S. military assistance. That is one of the things we should look into very carefully.

General Shepherd: What would be done about the North Korean Army and people?

Mr. Johnson: That is a real problem and it is not spelled out at all. All we say is that we would insist there be a non-Communist government in Korea, but it is obvious that such a unification would involve real problems.

Admiral Fechteler: My own feeling is that we should stick to our present position and see what happens.

Mr. Nash: The NSC paper that is before the Council [5] now calls for urgent consideration of the position the U.S. should adopt in the political conference, so I think we do have to consider this right away. Personally I think if we could get a neutralized Korea that I would buy it. I do worry though as to whether we would be able to help a neutralized Korea sufficiently so the ROKs wouldn't go Communist in a fairly short time. But we do have to have a position for the political conference which has to be something either that the Communists will not accept or something we can live with if they do accept it.

Mr. Bowie: If the suggestion of a neutralized Korea were to be put up by Rhee, is there any interest that we have that would make us say no to such a suggestion?

Mr. Nash: I think it would make a difference what the source of the suggestion was. I personally would like to explore this further and think it over a little more.

Mr. Robertson: I came in late so I have missed much of what has been said before. I don't want to repeat what you have already discussed, but we are now committed to give Rhee a security guarantee and to try and assist in getting a unified Korea. I think the question of military judgment which we need help on is whether from a military point of view we would be better off by having our forces and bases outside a unified neutral Korea or forces and bases in a divided Korea.

Admiral Fechteler: The President didn't say to Rhee that he would work for a neutralized Korea.

Mr. Robertson: No, but he did say we would work for a unified Korea and how we can get a unified Korea without neutralization is a very real question. If anybody has the answer, I wish they would let me know since I have to start off for Korea in a couple of days.[6]

Admiral Fechteler: I don't know what the merits of the alternative of neutralization are, but it seems to me that this involves a new step and I think we should stick with what we have got which is a divided Korea under alternative A. Actually to my way of thinking neither alternative A or alternative B is worth a good God damn.

Mr. Matthews: I think we have covered about as much ground as we can today. We know that you will want to think over this question and talk among yourselves. We just thought it would be useful to have this

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[5] The reference was to NSC 154, June 15; for text, see p. 1171.

[6] Robertson was going to Korea as Dulles' emissary; see the letter from Dulles, *infra*.

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preliminary discussion. We will all have our chance to express our views on this when it goes through the NSC machinery.

795.00/6–1653

The Secretary of State to the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee)[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 16, 1953.

MY DEAR PRESIDENT RHEE: I greatly appreciate your prompt and cordial response to my note of June 12 [*11*]. I am sorry that you cannot now leave your country, but I quite understand your reasons.

You suggest that I might visit you. I had hoped that it would be possible for me to do so as I would like to talk to you face to face. Indeed, I suggested to the President that he let me go and he was sympathetic. However, as you know, our Congress is now approaching the end of this session and is considering much important legislation including our mutual assistance programs. This legislation is of vital importance to our foreign policy objective of resisting Communism throughout the world. Therefore, the President regretfully concluded that I should not leave Washington at this time.

However, it is urgently important that we immediately agree on the positive measures that we will take together to obtain the results we both want from the political conference which will follow the armistice. I have ideas which I want to communicate to you by trusted emissary. I therefore propose that the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Mr. Walter S. Robertson, promptly go to Korea. Mr. Robertson has the full confidence of the President and myself, he has a long record of solid opposition to Chinese Communism and would be able fully and frankly to discuss these matters with you. I feel that he could be helpful in clearing up any misunderstandings as to our post-armistice policies and that his journey and its results would emphasize before the whole world that the United States and the Republic of Korea want to work together. It will be our joint policies, I hope, that more than any other influence will determine the future of your country. Certainly we shall not fail you in this respect. I hope that this suggestion about Robertson may meet with your approval[2] as I would like him to leave at once to see you.

With best regards I am

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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[1] This letter was transmitted in telegram 1 to Seoul, also sent as 785 to Pusan and 2926 to Tokyo, June 16, 1953. It was drafted by Dulles and Johnson.

[2] In telegram 5 from Seoul, June 17, 1953, Briggs reported that he had delivered this letter to Rhee, who asked the Ambassador to say in reply that he understood the obstacles preventing Dulles from visiting Korea, and was delighted to receive Robertson on the Secretary of State's behalf. (795.00/6–1753)

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S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 154 Series

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 17, 1953.

Subject: United States Tactics Immediately Following an Armistice in Korea

Reference: NSC 154 [1]

At the request of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) the enclosed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the reference report on the subject are transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council in connection with its consideration of NSC 154 at its meeting on June 18.[2]

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 17, 1953.

Subject: United States Tactics Immediately Following an Armistice in Korea (NSC 154).

1. In response to the request contained in your memorandum dated June 16, 1953, subject as above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views on the draft statement of policy by the National Security Council Planning Board entitled "United States Tactics Immediately Following an Armistice in Korea" (NSC 154).

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that NSC 154 does not reflect the position taken in instructions issued to General Clark and Ambassador Briggs on May 30, 1953 [3] with approval of the President to the effect that the United States is willing to enter into a mutual defense treaty with the ROK Government subject to receiving assurances from President Rhee that his Government will refrain from opposition to an armistice, cooperate in its implementation, and maintain forces under the control of the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC). This position was restated in a letter of June 6, 1953 to President Rhee [4] in which President Eisenhower stated that he was prepared after the conclusion and acceptance of an armistice to negotiate a

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[1] Dated June 15, p. 1171.

[2] For a report of this meeting, see the memorandum of discussion at the 150th meeting of the NSC, June 18, p. 1200.

[3] In telegram DA 940241, p. 1122.

[4] Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1148.

mutual defense treaty. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that in the absence of satisfactory assurances by the ROK Government that it will cooperate with the United Nations Command in carrying out the terms of an armistice, an offer to conclude a mutual defense treaty with that Government would result in a commitment on the part of the United States without any advantage in return. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, believe that paragraph 14 of NSC 154 should reaffirm the position adopted by the President in his letter of June 6, 1953 to President Rhee to the effect that acceptance by the ROK Government of an armistice agreement and cooperation in the implementation of its terms is a condition precedent to conclusion of a mutual defense treaty.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that one of the Interim Courses of Action proposed in NSC 154 is that the United States conclude a treaty with the Republic of Korea (ROK) "guaranteeing its political independence and territorial integrity." It is proposed that such a treaty cover the territory now or hereafter brought peacefully under the administration of the ROK. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the language in which this course of action is couched is undesirably broad and could be interpreted to provide for numerous and unpredictable contingencies. It might well constitute an over-commitment of United States military forces and, in any event, would enlarge appreciably the current gap between the forces being maintained and their ability to meet United States commitments. Moreover, by implication, this course of action involves no requirement for a defense effort on the part of the ROK.

4. In his letter to Mr. Rhee of June 6, 1953, President Eisenhower offered to negotiate with the ROK "a mutual-defense treaty along the lines of the treaties heretofore made between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, and the United States and Australia and New Zealand." In effect, these two treaties bind the Parties to consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the Parties is threatened. Further, each Party recognizes that an armed attack on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, regard a mutual-defense treaty of this nature as preferable to one which guarantees the political independence and territorial integrity of the ROK. Accordingly, they recommend that subparagraph 14*b* of NSC 154 be modified to bring it into consonance with the President's proposal to Mr. Rhee.

5. Subject to the foregoing proposed modification, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you concur in the draft statement of policy contained in NSC 154.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
F. F. EVEREST
Lieut. General, USAF
Director, Joint Staff

S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 118 Series

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Sandifer) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 17, 1953.

Subject: Additional United Nations Forces for Korea.

Discussion:

At the President's direction the attached letter from Ambassador Lodge [2] which proposes that the United States "start a renewed and vigorous campaign to get more troops from other members of the United Nations for service in Korea" has been circulated for consideration by the NSC.

Recommendation:

It is recommended the Secretary take the following position at the NSC meeting:

1. Regardless of the outcome of the armistice negotiations, forces must be maintained in Korea for an indefinite period. We believe that additional forces from other UN Members can be secured if the present reimbursement policy is retained, except that the Department of State,[3] rather than the President and the NSC, in consultation with the Defense and Treasury Departments shall be authorized (a) to waive, in appropriate cases, part or all of the cost of the logistic support provided to forces already participating in the Korean operation, and (b) to offer equipment, training and maintenance at no cost or at partial cost in appropriate cases in order to retain present forces or obtain new forces. The three Departments should take into account the political, military, and economic factors involved in each case, including the effect on the financial obligations already undertaken by other countries to reimburse the U.S. The cost of grant aid for logistic support should be charged to existing Defense appropriations, if available, or it may require separate

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Joseph J. Sisco of UNP.

[2] Dated May 19, not attached to the source text; printed as an attachment to a memorandum by Lay to the NSC, p. 1130.

[3] The words "Department of State" were underlined and the marginal comment "no" appeared on the source text; presumably this was Dulles' comment.

legislation, in which case Congressional consultations will be necessary before a final NSC decision.

2. The United States has sought units which are readily usable in combat, (regimental combat team). However, the Unified Command has accepted smaller units when over-riding political considerations were involved. Ambassador Lodge recommends that "the Defense Department should also determine what would be the smallest unit that would be militarily *bearable* rather than *desirable.*" In light of the impending armistice, after which forces would be used for non-combatant duties, it may be feasible for the Unified Command to accept units as small as a company. The Department would favor such a policy.

3. If the reimbursement policy is adopted, as indicated above, the Department could undertake bilateral approaches on a selective basis with a view to getting increases in certain countries and new forces from other UN Members which heretofore have not contributed.

Editorial Note

On June 17, President Rhee called in Ambassador Briggs and handed him a letter replying to President Eisenhower's communication of June 6. Rhee informed Briggs that he would make the letter public on June 19. Rhee then made an oral statement amplifying a reference he made in the letter to the proposed mutual defense pact. Believing that these observations were inappropriate in the letter, Rhee asked Briggs to transmit their gist to Washington. The following excerpt from telegram 8 from Seoul, June 17, 1953, was Briggs' description of the points made by Rhee:

> "1. US responsibility shortly after turn of century for Japanese domination of Korea. Rhee said that in 1904 in contravention US–Korea treaty of 1882 and in exchange for free hand from Japan in Philippines, US Government had agreed not to interfere with Japanese ambitions in Korea.
>
> "2. In 1945, US agreed with Russia on arbitrary division of Korea at 38th Parallel. US was doubtless acting in good faith and had not foreseen refusal of Communists to leave North Korea, but nevertheless US Government by acquiescing in establishment that arbitrary line had created situation which to this day has prevented unification of Korea.
>
> "3. In 1950 by such statements as declaring Korea outside US defense perimeter, American Government responsible for encouraging Communists to attack South Korea. Those statements, Rhee repeated, had led directly to attack of June 25, 1950.
>
> "4. US has entered into defense pacts with Australia and New Zealand, Philippines and Japan, wherefore Korea is entitled to benefits of similar pact with US.
>
> "5. Korea needs defense pact today for protection against Communists but may need it tomorrow for protection against Japan. Rhee declared Japan has abandoned none of its aspirations of ultimate domi-

nation of Korea and that fact explains campaign he said is now being waged by Japanese press against negotiation of Korea-US defense pact." (795.00/6-1753)

For text of the letter from Rhee to Eisenhower, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 6, 1953, pages 13-14.

795.00/6-1753

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 17, 1953.

Subject: Various Matters Concerning Korea

Participants:
Mr. Paek Tu Chin, Korean Prime Minister
Dr. You Chan Yang, Korean Ambassador
Mr. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

Prime Minister Paek Tu Chin called on the Secretary at 3:00 o'clock today. After a brief exchange regarding the Secetary's trip to Korea in June 1950 just before the Communist invasion, the Prime Minister asked the Secretary how it was possible to continue negotiations with such unreliable and unfriendly people as the Communists.

The Secretary replied that he did not believe the Chinese Communists would remain in power for a long time. It might take five or ten years, but ultimately the Chinese Communists would fail. Any dictatorship rests on terrorism, which generates hostile and uncooperative groups in the population, which in turn requires ever larger armed security forces, until eventually even some of these become unruly and untrustworthy. At that point a dictatorship such as the Chinese Communists begins to disintegrate from within.

Mr. Paek interjected that such a prospect for Communist China seemed too indefinite, and he wondered how long it would take and what would happen to Korea in the meantime. He described the efforts of the Koreans to resist the Communists and the terrible suffering of the people in North Korea. He told the Secretary that now would be the best opportunity to get the Communists out of Korea, unite the country, and liberate the people in North Korea from Communist tyranny. Otherwise, Mr. Paek said the Communists would rebuild their air fields, create strong military forces, and soon infiltrate South Korea. He said that his Government and his people very much feared Communist infiltration and attack after an armistice, if the Chinese are left in North Korea. He pointed out that the Korean people do not understand the Political Conference, what it will attempt to accomplish, or what procedures will be used. It is all completely vague, but the Korean Government and people do fear that no good can or will come of it.

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was approved by Robertson and Dulles.

The Secretary replied that the infiltration should work just the other way—that is, from the South to the North. He said that the economy of South Korea should be rapidly built up so that South Korea would soon become a strong attraction to the people under Communist domination in the north. Since North Korea would be so much worse off after an armistice, as the Communists probably would not put much into restoring it, the people will wish to move south where conditions will presumably be much better. The Secretary pointed to the parallel example of Germany and Austria, where refugees continually flee from the East to the West and not in the reverse direction. The Secretary referred to the situation in South Korea in 1950 when efforts of the Koreans and the Americans had restored the economic conditions there to such an extent that the Communists found war the only way to try to get control of all Korea. The Secretary said that we should attempt to repeat the process, but do even better. However, he pointed out that in 1950 we only did part of the job. While we were building up the Korean economy, we made no adequate provision for its protection against aggression. In fact, the United States Government made the great mistake of indicating to the Communists that it would view with indifference any attack on South Korea.

The Secretary suggested to Mr. Paek that the future of Korea would be greatly influenced by a long-term trend in world affairs. If that trend goes in one direction it will help Korea, if it goes in another it will hurt Korea. The Secretary said that it was his considered view, which he had indicated in his writings and in his speeches in the past few years, that Soviet dictatorship may have reached the maximum limit of its power and its expanse. He felt that a new trend was beginning in which Communist power was starting to ebb and would begin to contract. It was possible, the Secretary said, that in five or ten years Russian power would have pulled back to its historic boundaries. In that event, countries like Germany, Korea and those in Eastern Europe would be fully restored as unified countries. One reason for eventual contraction of Soviet power was that the Kremlin has apparently taken over too many people to control effectively for a long time. He referred to the recent difficulties in Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The Secretary said that it has always been his conviction that launching open warfare against Communist dictatorship would be one of the most effective means of strenthening it internally, whether in China or in Russia. Attacks against innocent people would unify the population behind the regime for they would fight in defense of their homes. The military would obviously have to rally behind the Communist leaders. The Secretary felt that Communist authorities feared the military. They had to use them in war, but in peacetime they had to take every precaution to keep them under control. For all these reasons, the Secretary felt that the strategy of internal disintegration rather than open assault would be more likely in the long run to reduce or eliminate Communist power in the world.

In this context, the Secretary told the Prime Minister that he had reason to hope[2] the reunion of Korea could be brought about. He pledged to the Prime Minister that the United States will do all the things necessary after an armistice to obtain the unification of Korea. He explained that we could use a combination of negotiating tactics, threats, and real pressures to induce the Communists to agree to Korea's unification. The Secretary pointed to the recent developments in Germany, where the Soviets appear to be moving towards agreement on Germany's unification. They might also do the same in Korea.

The Secretary said that he had just been discussing the question of the unification of Korea with his associates here in the Department and that he had told them that we intend to collaborate fully with the Korean Government, the first and fundamental step in this matter. He proposed to Prime Minister Paek that the United States and Korea work together in full partnership to develop a joint strategy for the reunion of Korea. The Secretary said that he felt the United States must first work with the Koreans before discussing this whole matter with our friends in the United Nations. However, after the United States and Korea have worked out this strategy, it would be necessary to discuss it with our allies, which might require a few changes.

Mr. Paek then said that in his view a prospect more likely than the reunion of Korea was the buildup of North Korea and South Korea militarily and economically until perhaps at some time they would be fighting again. He wondered if there was any real hope of bringing Korea together. The Secretary replied that he thought there was a very real possibility, provided the United States and Korea could work together, as he had said, on the strategy for the reunion of Korea. The Secretary pointed out that President Rhee's suggestion for the simultaneous withdrawal of United Nations forces and Chinese Communist forces would weaken our negotiating position. The Secretary felt that we should use the presence of United States and United Nations forces in Korea for all of the bargaining power with the Communists that it contained. If we stand squarely with the Republic of Korea, as we have said we would, if we continue to build up Korean forces, if we help the Koreans restore their economy, if we keep United States forces in Korea and in the general area, and if we give the Communists the impression that Korea might become a threat as a jumping-off place for American power, then the Communists might prefer a unified Korea if it meant the withdrawal of this threat. In addition, there would be a security pact between the United States and Korea, as well as the Greater Sanction Statement. The Communists will know that both would mean instant retaliation if they again attack Korea, and they know that this retaliation could mean atomic attacks on Vladivostok and Port Arthur. Therefore, the Secretary concluded that the Communists might be reluctant to use what resources they have, which are relatively meager, to rebuild their military position in North Korea and risk continuing the expansion of South Korea and American power on the peninsula.

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[2] Dulles made two corrections in this memorandum of conversation: he changed the phrase "reason to believe" to "reason to hope", and deleted the word "every" before "reason".

Ambassador Yang commented at that point that it was particularly important for the Americans and Koreans to consult and work together closely on all of these matters. He said that President Rhee and other Koreans greatly regretted the tendency of ignoring the Korean Government in major and minor decisions regarding it. He cited the Korean desire to be a member of the UNKRA Advisory Committee as an example of lack of adequate collaboration. He also mentioned the tendency of UNKRA to make the decisions regarding Korea's economy without consulting with the Koreans.

Mr. Robertson then asked the Prime Minister if Korea would not be in a much more secure position after an armistice than it had been in early 1950, in view of the provisions of the armistice itself, the development of the Republic of Korea armed forces which are the strongest anti-Communist forces in Asia, the President's pledge to conclude a defense treaty with the Republic of Korea right after an armistice, our intention to continue economic and military assistance to the Republic of Korea, and the international guarantee in the Greater Sanction Statement.

The Prime Minister then thanked the Secretary for the courtesy of this visit and concluded by saying in effect that he hoped that Korea and the United States would remain friends, although the Korean people were facing difficult decisions.

Editorial Note

Between midnight and dawn on the morning of June 18, approximately 25,000 nonrepatriate North Korean prisoners of war escaped from United Nations Command camps at Pusan, Masan, Nonsan, and Sang Mu Dai, Korea. In a press release it quickly issued, the United Nations Command stated "that the action had been secretly planned and carefully coordinated at top levels in the Korean Government" and that there was "every evidence of actual collusion between the Republic of Korea Army guards and the prisoners." In Clark's succinct description, "All hell broke loose at Rhee's order." A few escapees were recaptured, but most melted into the Korean population.

On the same day at Panmunjom, staff officers of both sides had just reached complete agreement on all paragraphs of the armistice. The immediate reaction of the Communist side to the escape was to suspend any further work on the remaining final details of the armistice and call for a senior liaison meeting that afternoon. At this meeting, Harrison formally notified the Communist side of the mass escape and, in a statement based on the earlier press release, squarely placed the blame on Rhee's shoulders. Numerous telegrams describing the breakout and the immediate measures taken by the United Nations Command at the prison camps and at Panmunjom are located in Matthews files, lot 53 D 413. See also, Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pages 279–282; Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pages 451–452; and the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 29, 1953, pages 905–908.

Mark W. Clark Collection, Archives-Museum, The Citadel

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) [1]

SECRET SEOUL, June 18, 1953.

DEAR GENERAL CLARK: Enclosed herewith please find a copy of my statement issued this morning relating to the release of the loyal Korean prisoners of war. I know your personal view regarding this matter and I know also that you could not do anything about it on account of the international complications. Under this circumstance, if I had revealed to you in advance my idea of setting them free, it would have only embarrassed you. Furthermore, the plan would have been completely spoiled. As I have spoken to you about this matter, more than once, I do believe that these innocent boys should not have been detained in stockades so long.

What is uppermost in my mind is the fear that if the Indian armed forces, a thousand or more, come to guard these boys to help the Communist brainwashers grill them and indoctrinate them for two or three long months, urging them to go back to the Communists, the Korean people will not let them alone. There will be a clash of a serious nature between the Communist or pro-Communist Indians and the anti-Communist Koreans. No one will be able to stop it.

In this connection, I suggested several plans which might be agreeable to all concerned. None of these having been heeded, however, I felt I had to take this final action. Consequently, I took my own responsibility and ordered the Korean military police to release them at once. If there is any difficulty arising from it, please kindly let me know and I shall be only too glad to settle this question, like all other questions, in a friendly way.

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[1] This letter was transmitted to the JCS for their information in telegram C 63182, June 19, 1953; a copy of this radio telegram can be found in Matthews files, lot 53 D 413.

There is, however, one danger; there are always some people on both sides who try to take advantage of such a situation as this, making trouble for any one and everyone. Please advise them not to make a bad situation worse. Though my share of the job may be too much for me, I am trying my utmost with a hope of success. I believe it is the best way out, under the present circumstances.

Meantime I wish to assure you that it is not the beginning of what we referred to as a "unilateral action." I am glad to say that we have not come to that as yet, and I still hope that we shall not have to come to that at all.

One thing that worries me, however, is that when the armistice is signed, you and General Taylor will be, of course, ordered to carry out the terms of armistice, right or wrong. According to the terms, the armies on both sides shall drop back two kilometers, within a specified number of hours after the signing of the armistice. The ROKA may not be allowed to draw back along with their friendly forces and that is where the question comes in. While I still hope such may never be the case, we must see what we should do in case we have to take a stand. Personally I hate it like a poison to tell you that I shall have to withdraw the ROKA from your command, but things standing where they are now, there seems to be no alternative. You know, General, we are all creatures of circumstance and we have to come to some understanding about the ways we shall have to severally go.

The next serious point is that when you order the U.N. forces in the front line to withdraw two kilometers from it and the ROKA refuse to do so, there will be open gaps somewhere along the front which may give the enemy a chance to break through. For the sake of our mutual safety, there must be some definite understanding about it. I wish you would enlighten me on this point.

Let us keep our official duties and our personal friendship separate. You and I are not our own masters. We are trying to discharge our duties which we owe to our respective nations and certain things we cannnot escape, much as we want to.

Please keep this confidential. The enclosed copy of my cable message to our Embassy in Washington [2] had better be destroyed after you have a look at it.

Sincerely yours, SYNGMAN RHEE

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[2] In the enclosed cable, not printed, Rhee instructed the Korean Embassy in Washington to investigate the origin of a story that Clark had threatened to withdraw aid from South Korea if the armistice was not signed and to report if any Koreans were responsible. Otherwise, the Korean Ambassador was to make no comments and not commit himself in the controversy over the release of the prisoners.

[Enclosure]

Press Release of the Office of Public Information, Republic of Korea

S–61

Seoul, June 18 (OPI)—President Syngman Rhee today issued the following statement in connection with the release of anti-communist Korean prisoners this morning:

"According to the Geneva Convention and also to the principles of human rights, the anti-communist Korean war prisoners should have been released long before this. Most of the United Nations authorities with whom I have spoken about our desire to release these prisoners are with us in sympathy and principle. But due to the international complications we have been unjustly holding these people too long.

"Now the United Nations agreement with the communists is making the complications worse than ever, which will lead to a serious consequence and result in something to the satisfaction of our enemy and misunderstanding among our own people.

"In order to avoid the grave consequences which might result, I have ordered on my own responsibility the release of the anti-communist Korean prisoners on this day, June 18th, 1953.

"The reason why I did this without full consultation with the United Nations Command and other authorities concerned is too obvious to explain.

"The Governors and police officers in the various provinces have been instructed to take care of these released war prisoners to their best ability.

"We trust all our people and our friends will cooperate in this so that there will be no unnecessary misunderstanding anywhere."

Editorial Note

The mass escape of North Korean nonrepatriate POWs occasioned a number of high-level communications which were either made public at the time or which have been released subsequently. Foreign Minister Pyun set forth the militant South Korean position in a letter to Clark, June 18, a copy of which is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin,* June 29, 1953, page 906. Also in that same *Bulletin,* page 907, is the text of a message from Clark to Rhee, which was written on June 18, but is dated by the *Bulletin* as June 20. President Eisenhower sent Rhee a message, drafted with the assistance of Dulles and other major foreign policy advisers, which is printed verbatim in Eisenhower's *Mandate for Change,* pages 185–186. Both Eisenhower and Clark in their respective messages berated Rhee for abrogation of his promise not to take unilateral action without first consulting the United Nations Command. Eisenhower stated that unless Rhee accepted United Nations Command authority to conduct the hostilities and bring them to a close, "another arrangement" (unspecified) would be necessary.

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 150th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, June 18, 1953 [1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 150th meeting of the Council were the following: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; Admiral Fechteler for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Lewis L. Strauss, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

1. *Agenda for 150th NSC Meeting*

The opening of the Council meeting was delayed three-quarters of an hour while the President conferred with the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chief of Naval Operations and Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Nash, with regard to the contents of a message from the President to Syngman Rhee. When the President entered the Cabinet Room at 10:45, Mr. Cutler suggested that, in view of the recent developments in Korea, the President might wish to postpone Council consideration of the regular agenda, since the agenda was largely concerned with items on the Far East which could not be considered until there was a clarification of the situation in South Korea.

The National Security Council:

Agreed that, in view of the developments in Korea and East Germany, action on the items scheduled for consideration at this meeting should be deferred.

2. *President Rhee's Release of North Korean Prisoners of War*

The President's first remark concerning the release by President Rhee of North Korean prisoners of war, was that we seemed to have acquired another enemy instead of a friend. President Rhee had welched on his promise not to take unilateral action without consultation with the UN Command. Moreover, his action in freeing some 25,000 North Korean POW's was deliberate, carefully planned in advance, and carried out in defiance of the UN Command and of Rhee's own promise. Of course, said the President, it left us in a most difficult position, and he and his advisers had been composing a message[2] which, by implication, informed Rhee that if he continued in this course it was "goodbye" to Korea. General Clark, said the President, cannot undertake to fight Rhee. Moreover, we are almost obliged to publish to the world what we are going to say in this message to Rhee. The whole free world is puzzled and dismayed. They realize that Rhee is in no position to carry on long by himself, and therefore they blame us, however unjustly, for what has happened. He had just heard, said the President, that there had been an uproar in the House of Commons when the news broke in London six hours ago. The President invited any suggestions from members of the Council as to how to handle this terrible situation. He said that he had not himself wholly realized the scope and magnitude of this release of prisoners, but he was now concerned lest the possibility of an armistice be completely destroyed. The only possible mitigating circumstance in Rhee's behavior was the fact that our own people had a few weeks ago considered such a move as Rhee had now actually made. In any case, said the President, they were drafting a very blunt telegram to President Rhee, telling him that if he did not behave himself we might have to move out.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Gleason on June 19.

Secretary Humphrey inquired how it would be possible to withdraw our forces from Korea without inviting a military disaster in the course of the move.

The President, however, said that if it proved necessary we could probably withdraw without serious loss to our own forces.

In response to a question from Mr. Stassen, the President made clear his conviction that Rhee's move was in no way related to the recent heavy Chinese Communist attacks, but it obviously had been planned weeks in advance. He then pointed out that the Council must not misunderstand his proposed message to Rhee. He was not going to say that we would actually pull out of Korea, because, for one thing, we do not want the enemy to imagine such a possibility, but in certain circumstances we might have no option but to do so.

. . . .

Mr. Cutler observed to the President that what he was really saying to the Council was that the whole Korean venture was over and that we were getting out. If that was indeed the President's view, Mr. Cutler stressed the necessity of a clear and forceful statement by the

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[2] The reference was to the message printed in Eisenhower's *Mandate for Change*, pp. 185–186.

President that the ROK Government had broken faith with the United States. Otherwise, any U.S. withdrawal would have terrible repercussions both among our allies and among our own people.

Secretary Dulles asked to be heard, and stated his belief that the disaster was not irreparable if from now on it were correctly handled. It seemed plain to the Secretary of State that President Rhee was engaged in a last desperate effort to torpedo the armistice and to force the hand of the United States. If he realizes that his attempt won't work, Rhee may well feel compelled to give up. It will then be our task to find out whether the Communists really want an armistice so badly that they will be willing to overlook the release of the 25,000 prisoners. Certainly they had reacted violently to our own earlier proposal to effect the release of the North Korean prisoners, and of course it was a question how they would react to what was now an accomplished fact. It was Secretary Dulles' guess, however, that they were so anxious for an armistice that they would overlook what had happened. Nevertheless, we must take the strongest possible line with Rhee so that he will not imagine that he can actually run the show.

The President commented that the simple fact was that President Rhee and his supporters wanted to keep on fighting. That was the long and short of it.

Mr. Jackson said that it was important to tie in what had happened in South Korea with the uprisings in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Together, all these events provided a real chance to assay Communist strength and weakness. While we should certainly be stern with Rhee, it would be wrong not to push ahead for the armistice rather than to make any suggestion of withdrawal. The Communists themselves must be very agitated by the grave difficulties that they were confronting in East Germany and among the European satellites. We ought not ease this pressure, therefore, by any withdrawal from Korea which would provide a victory.

The President replied, facetiously, that if we were to play the game that Mr. Jackson suggested, it might be better to send a message of congratulation to President Rhee.

Mr. Stassen, agreeing with Mr. Jackson, said that it seemed to him vital to keep on stepping up pressure on the Communists. This pressure, which had begun to be applied by the President and Secretary Dulles five months ago, was really beginning to hurt, and cracks in the Soviet edifice were beginning to be visible. Of course, added Mr. Stassen, we will have problems to contend with as regards our allies, but we must not relax this pressure.

While agreeing with this point of view, the President nevertheless pointed out that the United States must either assume responsibility for President Rhee's action in releasing these prisoners, or else it must strongly repudiate that action. If we accept what has happened without protest, our allies would regard it as tantamount to abandoning the coalition. The Communists, too, would be quick to exploit our weaknesses, for what had happened in Korea was certainly no victory. It could be interpreted to mean that we could not even control the ROK. Communist propaganda would shout that either the United States had no influence on the Republic of Korea, or else that the United States was really responsible for what President Rhee had done.

Secretary Dulles pointed out that the actual release had occurred simultaneously in four separate POW camps, and he anticipated that it would be followed up in two more such camps. Obviously, therefore, the whole thing had been planned in advance.

The President emphasized the terrible situation which this posed for General Taylor and General Clark. They could not conduct the defense of South Korea while ignorant of what the ROK forces in their rear would do next. How could we continue to provide ammunition for the ROK forces when we had no idea what their next move would be?

The Vice President interposed to state with great emphasis that the United States must find some way to remain in Korea. If we got out, he insisted, it would constitute a great Communist victory, no matter what we said in explanation of our withdrawal.

Both the President and Mr. Stassen expressed agreement with this sentiment, but the President reverted to his offer of June 6 [3] and again emphasized the violation of the promise by Syngman Rhee not to take unilateral action without consultation. Rhee had broken his word, and the President pointed out that our national self-respect was involved in what had happened.

Mr. Stassen said that it was barely possible that Rhee's action was really evidence that his Government was going to accept the armistice and that the freeing of the prisoners was simply a move to save face in the course of capitulating.

The President said this might be true *if* there were an armistice.

Secretary Dulles warned that if Rhee managed to get away with this move, and unless he wholly accepts the authority of the UN Command, we could not go on, and we would certainly get no armistice. Either Rhee accepts our authority or we shall be obliged to go our separate ways. However, added Secretary Dulles, if we hit him hard now in this message, Rhee will probably elect to save face and accept an armistice.

The President then expressed his concern again as to the repercussions on our allies, and suggested to Secretary Dulles the advisability of calling in two or three of their Ambassadors in Washington in order to inform them of the contents of the private message he was sending to

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[3] The reference was to the offer of a mutual defense treaty in return for South Korean acceptance of an armistice; for the text of Eisenhower's letter, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 377–380.

President Rhee. Over and beyond this message, of course, we must make a public announcement that we are repudiating Rhee's action.

Mr. Stassen questioned again, as he had earlier in the discussion, whether we could properly accuse Rhee of breaking his word, in view of the fact that he had never actually agreed to the proposed processing of the North Korean prisoners of war as anticipated in the forthcoming armistice.

Secretary Dulles and the President explained again to Mr. Stassen the commitments which President Rhee had made and broken with respect to the unilateral action, and the President warned that unless we repudiated what Rhee had done we would go down as the biggest frauds in history. After all, we had been negotiating on this prisoner-of-war issue for a good many months, and we could not jeopardize our good faith in these negotiations.

. . . .

The President again stated that he was not, in his message to Rhee, telling him that we were going to get out if he did not capitulate, nor even that he must return the released prisoners; but we were telling him bluntly that he had broken his word and that if he would not agree to behave himself in the future we had no alternative but to make other arrangements in Korea.

Mr. Cutler queried the wisdom of putting any faith in Rhee's future promises, especially since to do so involved risking the lives of American soldiers.

The President replied that there seemed no clear alternative to trusting Rhee, and besides, he felt reasonably sure that if it came to a showdown, a very large part of the armed forces of the Republic of Korea would elect to stay in the lines with our own forces or to stay with us in sufficient numbers so that we could at least withdraw and create a defensible perimeter around Pusan.

Secretary Wilson observed that it seemed that the ROK prisoner guards who had permitted the release were not actually responsible to the Chief of Staff of the ROK Army, but were responsible to the Provost Marshal, who was in effect the head of the internal police and directly under President Rhee.

This statement was questioned by Mr. Allen Dulles, but Admiral Fechteler pointed out that the ignorant guards had probably in fact carried out orders from Rhee's man whether they should have done so or not.

There then ensued a discussion of the probable allied reaction, and especially the British reaction, to what had happened. The President said facetiously that it would probably be similar to the behavior of some of his opposition in Congress. They would curse us, but they would offer no constructive suggestions for how to meet the problem.

Mr. Stassen suggested that we tell the British that our Rhee is like their Mossadegh—they would certainly understand that.

The President then summed up the discussion by stating that if no one had any better suggestion, he proposed to go ahead with the present plan for issuing a public repudiation of Rhee's action and sending a very tough private message to President Rhee. By and large, he added, he was doubtful if it would be actually necessary to contemplate a withdrawal of our forces to Pusan, because Rhee wanted to advance, not to retreat.

Mr. Cutler again expressed his great anxiety over the possibility that the ROK forces could endanger our own men by further unilateral action, either by pulling out of the line or else by involving us in all-out war in Korea.

. . . .

[Here follows discussion on item 3. "The Riots in East Germany and Czechoslovakia."]

Secretary Wilson, reverting to the problem of President Rhee, expressed his own personal opinion that perhaps the "Rhee business" wasn't really too bad.

The President replied with some asperity that if Secretary Wilson felt that way, he had better get busy and say that we approve of what Rhee has done. Certainly we couldn't ride two horses at one time.

Mr. Stassen then said he wished to point out to the Council the ever-mounting pressure by our allies to relax the existing controls on trade with Communist China the moment the armistice was signed. He wondered, therefore, whether this was not the time to tighten control over trade with China, and perhaps to institute a naval blockade prior to the armistice.

[Here follows discussion on item 4. "U.S. Actions Regarding the Near East" and item 5. "Proposals for Solution of Current Issues Affecting National Security."]

S. EVERETT GLEASON

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file, Dulles-Herter Series

Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] June 18, 1953.

In the course of our communications with President Rhee, I think that we should suggest to him the following thought:

> "One of the primary purposes of the Communists throughout the Korean war and throughout the world is to create dissension among the nations of the free world. Whenever any act of an individual nation flouts the desire and purposes of the vast majority, there is automatically created a situation that furthers the Communists' interests and purposes. The safety and reuniting of Korea can never be assured

except through the entirety of the free nations. If our collective structure disintegrates, Korea is doomed; on the other hand, if it is strengthened and perpetuated, there is no slightest doubt that, in the long run, Korea will be a complete and unified nation."

If you think well of this idea, it could be transmitted in many ways, verbally or otherwise, to our friend President Rhee.[1]

[DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER]

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[1] The editors have found no evidence that this idea was expressed to Rhee in the words specifically suggested here; in his conversation with Paik Tu Chin, Dulles did make this general point. For a report of that conversation, see memorandum of conversation by Young, June 18, *infra.*

695A.0024/6-1853

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 18, 1953.

Subject: ROK Unilateral Release of North Korean Prisoners.

Participants:
- Mr. Paek Tu Chin, Korean Prime Minister
- Dr. You Chan Yang, Korean Ambassador
- Mr. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
- Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, Far Eastern Affairs
- Mr. Frank C. Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense
- Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
- Mr. Charles A. Sullivan, Office of the Secretary of Defense

The Secretary asked Prime Minister Paek Tu Chin to come in to see him today at 2:30 in regard to the unilateral action of President Rhee in releasing Korean prisoners. The Secretary summarized the President's message to President Rhee which had just been sent out.[1] The Secretary particularly stressed that unless President Rhee was prepared immediately and unequivocally to accept the authority of the United Nations Command to conduct the present hostilities to bring them to a close, it would be necessary to effect another arrangement.

The Secretary then explained the whole situation as follows:

1. President Rhee's action would only benefit the Communists. We completely fail to understand how President Rhee could plot and carry out such a plan behind our backs. It was obvious that the release had been carefully prepared and timed, and what made it so difficult was President Rhee's public statement authorizing it.

2. This unilateral action not only challenged the integrity and authority of the United Nations Command, but it violated several assurances

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[1] For text, see Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change,* pp. 185–186.

which President Rhee had given General Clark during the past few weeks that he would not take any unilateral action without prior consultation. The Korean armed forces had been placed under the Command at the wish of President Rhee soon after the invasion began in 1950. This had worked very well up to the present time. If President Rhee decided that he no longer could agree with us on an armistice and cessation of hostilities, we fully recognized his freedom to tell us that he had decided that he could no longer cooperate with the Command and that he was therefore withdrawing his forces from it. That would have been the proper and suitable way to have handled the situation. We would have known where we stood and would have been able to take the necessary actions. He would have been free to continue the hostilities if he desired, although in the Secretary's opinion that would have led only to disaster for Korea.

3. Instead, President Rhee had chosen to plot secretly behind our backs and to defy the authority of the Command. This created a most difficult and untenable position for us because we do not know where it will lead to; we do not know whether he intends to break completely with the Command or whether it is possible for the United Nations Command to continue to function with its authority challenged by the Republic of Korea Government itself. The Secretary emphasized that we must either have unity and cooperation under the Command or some new arrangements will have to be put into effect by the United States Government. It will be impossible to continue partly divided and united at the same time.

4. Rhee's action had obviously created a most embarrassing, difficult and perhaps explosive situation. Our allies find it hard to believe that in some way the United States authorities have not connived in this unilateral release of prisoners, or that we are so naive that we could not have known of this plotting ahead of time. It is too early to tell yet what the reaction of the Communists may be, but it is possible that it may lead to real difficulties regarding the armistice and the cessation of hostilities. American public opinion will probably react so strongly to Rhee's action that many Americans will fail to see any reason why American soldiers should go on fighting and dying for Korea. It is a situation which could well divide us when we should be united and strong to continue the many tasks that have to be done in Korea.

5. Only the Communists will profit by such division. It plays right into their hands. We know they are our common enemy and we should work together against them not against each other. The first victim of disunity will be Korea, and perhaps even ultimately the United States will suffer. That is why the United States Government has felt it so urgent that we develop the closest possible relations and understandings between our two governments and people.

6. As he had pointed out in his conversation yesterday with the Prime Minister regarding the Political Conference and the general world situation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union,[2] the Secretary again reiterated this Government's intention to work closely with the Republic of Korea to build its economic, military and political strength so that it will rapidly become an effective attraction to the people in North Korea. He again told Paek that we hoped we could work closely with the Koreans in developing a strategy of pressures and inducements to bring about the reunion of Korea which the Secretary felt was possible but only if we worked in close partnership. He told Paek that he had always felt that forceful unification of Korea to its historic boundaries with China and Russia would be dangerous and unsuccessful. The United States and Korea together do not have the forces to guard a frontier of over 600 miles, even if they could push the Communists entirely out of Korea. Furthermore, the deployment of such strong American and Korean forces near sensitive base areas of the Soviet Union as Vladivostock and Port Arthur could provoke strong Soviet counteraction. The same situation was true in Germany where an attempt at forceful unification might provoke the Soviet Union to moving at least 200 divisions against Western Europe. They could also move superior forces into Korea if they so desired. An offensive had been attempted early in the war in Korea to move to the Yalu, but it failed. Therefore, the Secretary felt strongly that we should use every possible political and economic means to obtain Korea's unification. This meant the strengthening of the Republic of Korea economy and military establishment and we hoped to do it. However, we could only proceed if we know that we have the confidence and cooperation of the Korean Government.

7. Unfortunately President Rhee's action has shaken the confidence that we can continue together, for his action shows that he has no confidence in us despite all of the assurances and efforts that we have recently made. His unilateral action was not carried out just to release the prisoners because they were to be released anyway. The extraordinary and incomprehensible thing about his action was that it occurred after fifteen months of negotiating and fighting to uphold the principle of nonforcible repatriation. After thousands of casualties and great effort, we had won the struggle. The Communists had conceded. The Korean prisoners would be released after a short time under the Repatriation Commission. Just at that point President Rhee plotted behind our backs to upset all this work. However, it was clear that his purpose was not so much to release the prisoners as to frustrate and overturn the possibility of an armistice. The United States Government could not under-

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[2] For a report of this discussion, see the memorandum of conversation, by Young, June 17, p. 1193.

stand why he had waited until this very last moment when he had many an opportunity to talk this matter over with this Government and to follow the course of action which he considered right and proper for his country.

8. Accordingly, the question of whether we continue united or whether we shall have to separate is not entirely up to President Rhee. We cannot decide how to go forward until we know what his determination is in response to the President's letter. This is an extremely serious situation and the United States will be forced to reconsider the Command relationships with the Republic of Korea if we cannot count on President Rhee's cooperation any longer.

9. Since the Communists will be the only ones to profit by such disunity, the President continues to hope that it will not come about since every evidence of our disagreement only gives the enemy aid and comfort. Therefore, the President will not make public his letter to President Rhee. Our two governments are fighting the same enemy and should do so together rather than apart. Ambassador Yang said he and the Prime Minister had been talking about the situation at some length today and that they were in agreement with what the Secretary had said. They both felt that their immediate departure for Korea for discussions with President Rhee could turn the tide and help work things out. Neither was specific but they both professed agreement with the general principle that our two countries must continue united rather than to proceed separately. Ambassador Yang also said that he and the Prime Minister strongly felt that Mr. Robertson's trip should not be cancelled and in fact was more urgently needed than ever. They both hoped that the United States Government would reconsider its decision to defer this trip. The Secretary replied that he would give consideration to their suggestion in the light of developments. However, it was impossible for Mr. Robertson to proceed with his trip at this time until President Rhee's intentions were clarified.[3]

Speaking on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Nash told the Prime Minister that United States military authorities are gravely concerned over the military implications of President Rhee's unilateral action. In view of Intelligence reports of a big buildup of Communist forces and supplies in North Korea, giving the Communists capability of launching a major offensive, any disunity, division of Command or cross-purposes between the United Nations Command and the Republic of Korea would only benefit the Communists. They might seize the opportunity to launch this offensive. If the authority of the Command is challenged and the Korean forces are not to cooperate with the United

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[3] A message to this effect, drafted and signed by Dulles, was sent to Briggs in Seoul for immediate delivery to Rhee in telegram 3 to Seoul, June 18, 1953, not printed. (795.00/6-1853)

Nations Forces, a Communist offensive might successfully exploit the situation. However, if the Korean and United Nations forces stay united under the authority of the Command they can hold against any Communist offensive.

In conclusion, the Secretary told the Korean Prime Minister that the coincidence of his visit to Washington with critical developments in Korea had afforded a helpful and useful opportunity to discuss fully and frankly with him these vital matters to both governments. The Secretary said that he hoped the Prime Minister would be able to do everything he could on his return to Korea to help the situation.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET FLASH TOKYO, June 19, 1953—10:26 a. m.

CX 63170. 1. I have talked with Herren this morning, who has only fragmentary reports of the new outbreak which occurred last night. Factual info will be passed as soon as received. Preliminary reports indicate that approx 9,000 prisoners of war remain in Korean non-repatriate camps housing about 35,000 before current escapes began. It is known that some 30 prisoners of war were killed and 107 injured by mob action in an escape attempt.

2. Yesterday US trps immediately available in the vic of POW camps were moved to the Korean non-repatriate camps to take over where ROK security units are disaffected, and to supplement US control at other places. (See mymsg CX 63138.)[1]

3. Today Herren is concentrating remaining non-repatriated Korean POWs in compounds within enclosures where US trps by nightfall will have taken over the entire security of the remaining POWs. Riot tactics, heavy concentration of non-toxic irritants are continuing to be employed in an effort to restrain the remaining POWs. Instructions still stand for reasons which have been passed to you in previous msgs, that mass killings will not be resorted to.

4. I am informed by Herren that the Provost Marshal, Gen Won Yung Dok, has issued orders to ROK security units still in the vic of these camps to attack US forces who are preventing the release of Korean POWs. I have issued instructions to Herren to resist such attacks with all force at his disposal. He has also informed Gen Paik, Chief of Staff of the ROK Army, of his intentions. Gen Paik understands, but Won Yung Dok, who acts directly under Pres Rhee, apparently is issuing separate instructions which in many cases will be obeyed.

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[1] In this telegram, Clark to the JCS, June 18, 1953, Clark also summarized available information on the magnitude of the mass escape and ROK collusion in the operation. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET FLASH TOKYO, June 19, 1953—1:03 p. m.

C 63176. Ref A CX 63170,[1] B CX 63138,[2] C HNC 1678,[3] D DTG 250610Z.[4]

1. I have just received information that there is every indication that the Korean non repatriate POWs will attempt further escapes tonight, with continued direct connivance of ROK authorities.

2. I have repeatedly given to you my appraisal of the capabilities of Rhee and the ROK Government to instigate the release of Korean non repatriate POWs. I have also repeatedly indicated to you my feeling that maximum force, including rifles and machine guns, against a mass outbreak of these POWs should not be employed for reasons previously stated. Having received no instructions to the contrary, I assume that my course of action has your approval.

3. As I have indicated to you in my message CX 63170 this morning, US troops today will have taken over complete charge of the remaining approximately 9400 Korean non repatriate POWs at 8 mainland camps. Their present orders are to use every effort short of shooting to kill, to prevent escape of these POWs.

4. I realize a different situation is presented by the replacement of ROKA troops by American troops as full responsibility now rests squarely with the latter. I feel strongly, however, that in spite of the changed situation, I should not change the course of action indicated in cited messages. In view of the world wide repercussions on armistice negotiations and the added propaganda value accruing to the Communists when POWs make further escapes with US troops in charge, I feel I am entitled to your approval and support of the action to avoid use of fire arms with inevitable bloodshed and high loss of life, or clear cut instructions to the contrary directing the use of maximum force. In this connection, an additional factor to consider is that the use of maximum force may lead to open armed conflict between ROKA troops and US Security Forces. (See para 4 ref A).

5. As I have pointed out before, the escapes which have recently taken place and those that may occur again tonight are bringing embarrassment to the UNC and are having an undetermined influence upon the Communists willingness to proceed with armistice negotiations.

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 1, *supra.*

[3] Dated May 12, p. 1008.

[4] Dated May 25, p. 1098.

6. In view of the urgency of the situation, request that I be advised immediately in order that I may issue appropriate instructions before 1800 hours I tonight. In absence of receipt of such instructions, I will assume my proposed course of action has your approval and support.

7. In this connection Briggs has just phoned me that he has delivered the President's message; that Rhee indicated plainly that if an armistice is signed he will remove ROK forces from the United Nations Command; that he will refuse to withdraw ROK forces from the demilitarized zone; and that he is making a demand upon me to turn loose the remaining Korean non repatriate POWs. I am more than ever convinced that it would be tragic to use maximum force against these non repatriate POWs under these conditions.

795.00/9–1953: Telegram

The Political Adviser for the Armistice Negotiations (Murphy) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET TOKYO, June 19, 1953—2 p. m.[1]
PRIORITY

3958. No distribution. From Murphy. As Department may be aware, there remain in camps approximately 9,400 North Korean non-repatriate prisoners of war after mass outbreaks of June 18 plus escape during last night of some 900 prisoners of war.

Up to present General Clark, having fully informed Department Army, adopted policy of using all means, including toxic gas, short of use of firearms in preventing escape of non-Communist prisoners of war, suppressing disorders, et cetera. This was policy in force at times of mass outbreak and I believe was generally known to Republic of Korea personnel making up bulk of guards.

Clark has now raised with me question whether he should continue that policy now that Republic of Korea personnel has been replaced exclusively by United States personnel if, as it is entirely possible, further mass outbreak should be attempted. He expressed concern over effect on public opinion abroad in event use of arms including machine guns would result in large scale mortality among non-Communist prisoners of war.

I offered opinion that it is essential under circumstances that United Nations Command maintain its authority. United States personnel having assumed responsibility for guarding prisoners of war camps to permit Republic of Korea forces to permit prisoners of war to escape in collusion with Republic of Korea authorities would create impossible situation for future and would definitely give rise to opinion that there is active collusion between United States and Republic of Korea in permitting escape as has been suggested in London and perhaps other places. We are as yet unaware of Communist reaction which we hope to ascertain this afternoon. If, in order to avoid loss of life by prisoners of war in clear-cut defiance of United Nations Command authority, we lose sight of our objective to conclude an armistice, loss of life involved in continuance of war would make prisoner of war incident very small in contrast.

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[1] This telegram was received at the Department at 3:53 a.m., June 19.

I, therefore, urged Clark firmly to assert his authority even at risk of substantial casualties among prisoners of war if further attempts at outbreak occur. There is also possibility of increased incidents involving Republic of Korea personnel as there are reports of United States soldiers being fired upon individually and threats of attacks on United States personnel such as that attributed to Republic of Korea Provost Marshal.

I consider particularly unfortunate that my recommendation for inclusion of other United Nations personnel in contingents assigned to prisoner of war camps has not been implemented and that United States under circumstances if [*is*] obliged to bear brunt, whatever criticism and risk are involved, and have so informed General Clark (see my telegram 3859, of June 10 [2]).

[MURPHY]

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[2] This telegram contained Murphy's recommendation for inclusion of other UN military personnel, especially the British Commonwealth troops, in contingents guarding prisoner of war camps. (795.00/6-1053)

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 19, 1953—11 a. m.

Korea

Mr. Johnson: We met with Congressional leaders this morning and went over the Korean situation. The alternatives that were discussed were either going ahead with the armistice now or of not entering into an armistice agreement at present until we could bring the ROK Government around to cooperating in an armistice. The general sentiment among the Congressional leaders seemed to be for continuing attempts to change the policy of the Korean Government without entering into an armistice. In the discussion with the President the general decision seemed to be not to enter into an armistice now and to hope that the present difficulties could be ironed out. I think that is about the sum of the results of the discussions both with the Congressional leaders and with the President.

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[1] A note on the title page read: "State Draft. Not cleared with any participants."

Admiral Fechteler attended for the JCS as well as Vice Chiefs Generals Twining and Hull and Admiral Duncan. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent, while Nash represented the Department of Defense, General Cabell the CIA, and Gleason and General Gerhard the NSC. In all 23 persons were present at this meeting; Korea was the sole topic of discussion.

Mr. Nash: There was also the point made that if the offer of concluding a security pact before an armistice would be effective in making Rhee change his mind, we should go ahead and do it.

Mr. Robertson: Rhee has already talked to the point in his reply to the President. He said that a security pact in itself would be a fine thing but that he could not accept it as the price of an armistice settlement which he could not agree to.

Mr. Johnson: Congressional opinion seemed to be fairly general against taking any direct action against Rhee.

Admiral Duncan: What are the possibilities that if we went ahead with an armistice and signed it that Rhee would back down?

Mr. Johnson: He has made it perfectly clear to Clark that he wouldn't back down but has notified Clark he would withdraw his forces from the UNC Command and order the ROK forces not to withdraw the 2 kilometers which the armistice calls for.

Admiral Duncan: We really only have one way of finding out, in fact, whether Rhee would actually torpedo an armistice and that is to go ahead and sign one. This is the only way of really testing Rhee's position.

Admiral Fechteler: If the Commies should come up and say they would agree to sign an armistice and we don't sign one, we can be sure that fact will be on the Peiping radio in 15 minutes—and what effect will this have on the soldiers of the Eighth Army?

General Hull: There might be a possibility that the Communists may drag their feet on the armistice negotiations, although if they were smart they would have probably asked us if we are ready to sign.

Mr. Robertson: The only good thing that has happened in the past few days on this whole thing is the change that took place in the Korean Prime Minister, Paek, while he was here. The President talked with him for 50 minutes and at that session he was adamant in supporting Rhee's position on the armistice. The Secretary talked to him that evening and he was still adamant in supporting Rhee's position, but yesterday when he went off he was really a changed man. We don't know how much influence Paek has on Rhee, but Paek says very clearly he is going to try his very best to get Rhee to change his position on an armistice.

Admiral Duncan: Now on the question of going ahead with an armistice it seems clear to me that no representations that anybody makes to Rhee before an armistice is actually signed will bring any change in Rhee's attitude. If an armistice is actually signed and Rhee then does what he says he is going to do, that is the only way he can really be tested. In that case the blame for violating the armistice and making it inoperable will rest very clearly on Rhee.

Mr. Robertson: I can't quite see how in good faith the UNC can sign an armistice agreement when they are on notice from Rhee that 350,000 troops will be withdrawn from UNC Command and won't obey the armistice terms.

Admiral Duncan: Clark is operating under instructions from the United Nations with the U.S. as executive agent for the United Nations. He doesn't really know for sure that Korean forces won't abide by armistice terms until an armistice is actually signed.

Admiral Fechteler: There is another unknown. We won't know until an armistice is signed what Rhee will do and we won't know until then whether or not the Korean Army will obey Rhee.

Mr. Matthews: The question of what the Koreans will do seems to me to be the crucial question. Is there any way that we can find out what the attitudes of the Korean Commanders will be?

Admiral Duncan: When the Chief of Staff was here he said pretty clearly that he would have to obey orders from his own government. If Rhee remains in authority, Paek will obey him.

General Ruffner: Rhee has a very good intelligence system, and I think he must be pretty sure of his Army, Navy, and Air Force backing him or else he wouldn't be so adamant in his position.

General Hull: It really boils down to the problem of what we are going to do about Rhee, whether we are going to accede to his wishes, fight along without an armistice, or whether we are not.

Mr. Matthews: And if we don't accede to his wishes, what do we do then, pick him up?

General Hull: That certainly is one possibility.

Mr. Johnson: We do have the immediate problem of getting some instructions out to Harrison not to sign.

General Hull: Harrison won't agree to sign anyway. It will take 5 or 6 days and Clark is under instructions already not to go ahead and sign the armistice without clearance from Washington.

Mr. Matthews: If it's going to be a week before the armistice is signed anyway and if the armistice terms have to be referred back here before any signing, why do we have to instruct Harrison to say that we are not prepared to sign an armistice?

Mr. Johnson: It probably is not a question of signing an armistice but it might be a question of setting the date for signing an armistice.

Mr. Bowie: Setting a date for signing the armistice is different from actually signing an armistice. What would there be against setting a date.

Admiral Duncan: I think we should proceed on the basis that we are going to sign an armistice, otherwise there will be no pressure on Rhee to change his position.

Mr. Robertson: I would like to ask if any of you think that it will be desirable to give Rhee a security pact before the armistice is signed.

Admiral Duncan: I don't see how we can. The security pact is something that we will have to discuss at some length with the Koreans. Some of the points that Rhee has already asked for, such as a provision that we will undertake to keep our forces within a certain distance of Korea, are clearly unacceptable so that we will have to talk out the terms of the security pact very carefully. It seems to me that the best course for us to follow would be to sign an armistice and have our plans ready as to just what we will do if Rhee actually goes ahead with what he says he is going to do.

General Hull: Clark will have to have very clear instructions as to just what he is to do in that event. It seems to me that if there is no possibility of bringing the Korean Government around to our wishes, that then we will just have to dissolve our partnership.

Mr. Matthews: What would dissolving our partnership consist of?

General Hull: I should think it would mean we had no business in Korea and we should be prepared to pull out. It is not just the U.S. or Korea that is concerned in this thing, Rhee has actually defied the whole Western world. The question really is whether we are going to accede to his whims, or are we going to get out, or are we going to break him.

Admiral Duncan: If we say that we are not going to sign an armistice we are going to be in no position to make Rhee change his mind.

Mr. Bowie: I think we must be clear before we sign an armistice that if we do sign it there are really only two possible alternatives. The first is that the policy of the Korean Government is changed so that they agree to the armistice and the second is that we get out of Korea.

Admiral Duncan: I think that is about it.

General Hull: If we knuckle down now and accede to Rhee's wishes we are going to be in Korea indefinitely.

Admiral Duncan: I don't think it will be helpful if we say we are not going to sign an armistice.

Mr. MacArthur: We wouldn't be able to hold our Allies on the position that we won't sign an armistice.

Mr. Bowie: We also wouldn't be in a position to bring pressure on Rhee if we say we aren't going to sign an armistice.

General Twining: It seems to me the only thing to do is to go ahead and sign the armistice. If Rhee blocks it then we should take him into custody, go on ahead with an armistice, and then get our forces out.

Mr. Nash: It was the Congressional reaction that there were two unacceptable alternatives—the alternative of deposing Rhee and the alternative of armed conflict betwen American forces and the ROKs.

General Everest: I don't see why there should be armed conflict between the Americans and the ROKs. If the Communists attack on the line they will be too busy handling the Commies. There might possibly be some trouble in the rear areas if we start sorting out the ROKs from our troops but by and large I should think there was relatively little danger of armed conflict between the ROKs and ourselves.

Admiral Duncan: There is the present possibility that there might be fighting between our troops and the Korean security forces around the prison camps. Won Yung Duk has issued statements that his men should shoot anybody that attempted to detain or resist the escape of Korean prisoners, so we may face the possibility of having to clap Mr. Won Yung Duk in jail.

Mr. Johnson: Won Yung Duk is Rhee's man. Would it be possible for us to take action against Won Yung Duk without having first made the decision that we were prepared to take action against Rhee.

Admiral Duncan: I think it would be possible purely on grounds of the security of our own forces. There probably would have to be an overt action. I should think that authorization should be given Clark along the lines that in the event there were an open attack against our forces by Won Yung Duk's people Clark was authorized to take him into custody.

General Eddleman: Wouldn't it be better if the ROKs took such action?

General Hull: It would put the ROK Army men in a very difficult position because in their case it would be an open declaration of hostility to Rhee.

Mr. Matthews: I think in a case like that it would probably be better if we did it ourselves.

Mr. Nash: In the discussion with the Congressmen they made a very real point of the question as to whether Van Fleet might not be able to do something with Rhee in this situation. We told them that Van Fleet had been in communication with Rhee urging him to go along with the armistice terms but Senator Knowland felt that it might be possible that because of Rhee's personal friendship for Van Fleet it would be a good idea to send Van Fleet out to see if he couldn't persuade Rhee to be reasonable. The question wasn't raised with the President, but I have the feeling that support of Congress is going to be very important in this situation and since this suggestion was strongly urged by them we should consider it carefully. Do you have the feeling that Van Fleet's going out would undercut Clark?

General Hull and General Twining: Yes it would.

Mr. Bowie: Nevertheless it is important to give not only Congress, but also the American public, evidence that we are leaving no stone unturned in attempting to find the satisfactory solution for these problems. I think the suggestion has some merit.

Mr. Nash: Wouldn't it be advisable to ask Clark for his views on Van Fleet coming out? You could put it in the framework which we have just been discussing, that of a suggestion which has been strongly urged by Congressional leaders and of the necessity of doing everything possible to secure Congressional and public support.

Mr. Matthews: I would like to raise another question. Are there any military steps in terms of dispositon of his forces which Clark could take without weakening his front line position which would serve to give the impression that we were preparing to pull out our forces.

General Hull: He does have a division in reserve that could conceivably be moved about or it might be possible merely to alert a division that they should be prepared to move to an embarkation point and the word of that would get around immediately.

Admiral Duncan: It would have a pretty grim moral effect on our troops if they expect to be embarked and then it turned out that this was just a rumor. It might work the wrong way and it might make our forces pretty sore at the ROKs.

Mr. Bowie: Unless we are prepared to go along with Rhee and continue fighting along the present line, don't we really have to make a decision that we will in the last analysis be prepared to withdraw from Korea? We have to think in terms of other Koreans as well as Rhee in this situation. The only convincing alternatives that we can present to the other Koreans would be based on a willingness on our part to accept the necessity of withdrawal if worse comes to worse. We will have to be able to present them with the alternatives of our getting out or of there being a change in the policy of the ROK Government which would make it possible to have an armistice on present terms. We can't expect any action either from Rhee or from the Korean military to change the policy of the ROK Government so long as they think we may be prepared to continue fighting along the present line. If however, we can say the two alternatives that we face are: first, our getting out with the obvious almost immediate consequence of a Communist takeover, or second, a change, by whatever methods, in the policy of the ROK so that it will support an armistice, there might be a chance that as patriotic Koreans they will prefer to change their policy or the military might prefer to take action against Rhee rather than to face national suicide.

General Hull: From the military point of view the only part of Korea that is important is the southern part. The Russians already are strongly positioned in the North above Hokkaido. If the Communists occupy Southern Korea, they would be looking down the Japanese throat.

Korea is like a dagger right at Japan. For this reason we would hate like the devil to withdraw, but under the circumstances we might have to face that decision.

Mr. Johnson: Don't we have to think about the position we would be in if we actually sign an armistice and then because of the ROK position found ourselves unable to carry out the armistice. If we went on fighting then we would be doing it in the worst possible position as the Commies would have signed an armistice agreement and we would be the ones who would be responsible for the shooting going on.

Mr. Bowie: Isn't the question of whether to go ahead with the signing of the armistice really secondary to the question of whether in the last analysis we would be willing to withdraw. If we are not willing to withdraw then we have no maneuverability in our position. We would really have to decide that question before we decide whether to go ahead with signing an armistice.

Admiral Gardner: It seems to me that the Korean Army is the key to this situation. As far as we know the majority of the Korean Army leaders are willing to take UNC orders. They naturally worry about doing anything contrary to Rhee's orders. Isn't the question therefore what action we should take against Rhee?

Mr. Johnson: I am worried about the accuracy of our assessment of the loyalties of the ROK Army officers in the light of what happened at POW camps. The American Commanders of the POW camps, all of them reported just the night before the outbreak that they felt that the Korean guards were responsive to their orders. There just seemed to have been a real failure of intelligence on what was going to happen and a mistake in assessment of who the Korean guards would take orders from. We can't really test the Korean Army leaders until we have made a decision on whether or not we are willing to get out of Korea if worse comes to worse.

General Hull: Our allies will get out whether or not we do.

Mr. Johnson: I think the important difference between our discussion here this afternoon and that which we had with Congressional leaders and with the President hinges on the question of whether or not we are willing to get out of Korea. In the discussions of the Congressional leaders and with the President it was almost taken as a starting point that we were not willing to get out of Korea.

Mr. Matthews: One immediate important point that has come out of our discussion is that it would be inadvisable for the Secretary this afternoon to tell the 16 Ambassadors that we have adopted the position that we will not now sign an armistice.[2]

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[2] A report on what the Secretary told the Ambassadors of the 16 nations with troops in the United Nations Command at a special briefing on June 19, is in circular telegram 1221, June 19, 1953, not printed. (795.00/6–1953)

General Hull and Admiral Duncan: We agree. That would play right into Rhee's hands. It is just what he is looking for.

Mr. Matthews: We should get back to the Department so that we can talk with our Secretary. Is it your general consensus that if there is an armistice and if Rhee does go ahead and do what he says he is going to do and if no other Koreans succeed in changing his mind or in changing the policy of the ROK Government, that it would be better for us to withdraw from Korea?

Admiral Duncan: That is one important part of the questions that we have to look at in making our decisions as to what we do if Rhee actually is not bluffing. It is not something that we can decide this afternoon and it is something we would want to think about very carefully. Personally I can say however that if we sign an armistice and Rhee goes ahead and there is no change in the Korean Government, then I would think we would have to pull out.

General Hull: The only alternative would be to go all out to drive the Commies out of Korea.

Mr. Robertson: Which would you prefer?

General Hull: That's a $64 question. If we were forced by the Commies to take more drastic military action, we would do it. We would have to put in more forces and we would have to step up production here at home, but if the Commies forced us to it we would put in whatever was necessary to do the job. But if we were forced into more drastic military action purely because Rhee was not willing to go along with an armistice, it would put the question in an entrely different light. I, personally, have the feeling that under those circumstances we should pull out.

Mr. Robertson: Unless the President changes what he has expressed so far, we will not be ready to pull out.

General Hull: Is there any point in going ahead with the political conference first?

Admiral Duncan: I don't see how it would work with fighting going on.

Mr. Bowie: On the other hand if our decision is that we are not ready to pull out there may be something in the question of an immediate political conference. We won't have any maneuverability either with Rhee or with the Communists in the present situation and it might be the only tack we could take would be to open political negotiations on the basis that we can't settle the question with our own Allies in the present framework of the armistice terms.

Mr. Nash: Before we break up could we decide on whether we are going to ask Clark about the possibility of Van Fleet going out. Robertson is going out there. If Van Fleet went out with him as a civilian, would that undermine Clark's position?

General Hull: That might not be so objectionable if Van Fleet went out together with Robertson, but there is one thing which I feel I should tell you which has a real bearing on this and that is simply that Van Fleet hates Clark. The feeling isn't quite as strong on Clark's side, but there is real personal difficulty between the two men. We should certainly ask Clark's opinion.

General Eddleman: I have a telegram drafted which will have to be changed to make the point of Van Fleet's coming out with Robertson,[3] but we can take care of revising it.

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[3] Sent as telegram JCS 941571, June 19, exclusive to Clark, not printed. (JCS records, CCS files, 383.21 Korea (3-14-45))

Van Fleet did not accompany Robertson; see the editorial note, p. 1237.

795.00/6-1953: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT SEOUL, June 19, 1953—6 p. m.[1]

13. Repeated information niact Pusan 11, niact Tokyo 11 for Ambassador Murphy and General Clark. Reference Deptels 3[2] and 4.[3]

Supplementing message despatched via Army communications,[4] following report is submitted on forty-five minute meeting with President Rhee this noon, Acting Prime Minister Pyun present.

On delivery President's message, Rhee asked Pyun to read it aloud and at end he said "if it becomes necessary for your country to go your way while I go mine, then let us at all events part as friends". We thereupon embarked on long restatement of Korean position approximately as set forth his June 17 letter to President Eisenhower.[5] He requested me to emphasize that Korea is permanently and profoundly grateful to US Government and people for aid and comradeship in arms but that he cannot accept armistice leaving Chinese Communists in Korea because "that would be death warrant". Rhee declared only history can tell whether he is right but "even if it is suicide, that is our privilege".

Rhee next referred to General Clark's letter delivered to him last night[6] and declared that only assurance he had given was that if he contemplated removing ROK Armed Forces from UNC, he would ("not because I have any obligation to do so but as matter personal friendship") inform General Clark in advance of such action. Pyun then took over for several minutes in usual argumentative vein, amplifying Rhee's point and asserting that commitment to discuss in advance was limited to event of removing ROK forces and did not refer to "general unilateral actions".

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[1] This message was received at the Department of State at 7:07 a. m., June 19.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 1209.

[3] In this telegram, the Department instructed Briggs to deliver an enclosed message from Eisenhower to Rhee; for a text of the communication, see Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, pp. 185-186.

[4] The reference was to an unnumbered telegram from Seoul, June 19, 1953, in which Briggs reported that he had delivered the messages of Eisenhower and Dulles to Rhee, who remained opposed to the armistice and went so far as to declare that "signing of the armistice will automatically mean withdrawal of ROK forces from the UNC". (795.00/6-1953)

[5] Not printed, but see the editorial note, p. 1192.

[6] For a text of this letter, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 29, 1953, p. 907.

Furthermore, Pyun said, there is nothing in July 1950 agreement that calls for advance notification, and anyway, action taken was by Korean forces acting under Provost Marshal General who is not subject "anybody's orders except President Rhee". I told Pyun I unable agree with his statements but saw no point in arguing further.

Rhee said that both he and Pyun had written letters to General Clark yesterday,[7] before receipt of Clark's message, and that he would give me copies for information my government. (He did so but I did not have opportunity read them until later.) Rhee added that he would prepare further letter to Clark, answering Clark's of yesterday "and setting record straight about misunderstanding over advance notification".

After several attempts to pin Rhee down in regard to unequivocal assurance requested in President Eisenhower's message and after several vague replies, Rhee suddenly said "Please inform President that I cannot change my position. Signing of armistice will automatically mean withdrawal of ROK Forces from UNC".

With reference to Secretary's message, Rhee's only comment was to effect that Assistant Secretary Robertson would be "very welcome" whenever Secretary Dulles might see fit to send him to Korea.

Conversation conducted by Rhee in "more in sorrow than in anger" vein and he referred repeatedly to "two friends who seem to have reached parting of ways but who must remain friends". I received impression that Rhee had carefully considered result of action before embarking on freeing prisoners, and also that he and Pyun had decided well ahead with reference to "misunderstanding" over Rhee's assurance.

During course of his remarks, Rhee made very bitter denunciation of India and declared that even if he allowed Indians to enter ROK territory, it would be impossible to keep ROK people from attacking them as "Communists and enemies". However, he said, question now academic because he will not permit "even one Indian soldier to enter ROK territory in connection with POWs".

When I rose to depart, I reminded Rhee that President's message is not now to be made public. I added with view preventing Pyun from rushing into print that if questioned by correspondents I would confirm fact of my call on President but would withhold further comment. Rhee said he would be guided accordingly.

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[7] For the text of Pyun's letter, dated June 18, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 29, 1953, p. 906; for Rhee's letter, also June 18, see p. 1197.

BRIGGS

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET TOKYO, June 20, 1953—4:30 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX 63227. Ref: CX 63170.[1]

1. Information considered reliable has been received that an attempt will be made tonight or as soon as ROK is ready to initiate action to release the remaining Korean non-repatriates POWs by use of force if necessary.

2. In all probability this action will be initiated by a demand on the Camp Commander for their release. At the present time there is one U.S. Inf co in control of each of the eight (8) camps involved. The ROK Security battalions who disaffected are presently in the immediate vicinity of the camps and other ROKA forces are capable of reinforcing these units promptly. At each location ROK forces presently outnumber U.S. forces three (3) to one (1).

3. Current instructions to Herren are contained in para 4 of ref msg in which I directed him to resist such attack with all the force at his disposal. These instructions were issued at a time when the situation was considerably more obscure than it is at present.

4. In view of the overriding importance at this critical time when we are still faced with powerful Communist forces in the battle zone, we must avoid to the best of our ability any armed clashes between US and ROK troops, the results of which would be tragic.

5. In view of above I have instructed Herren as follows:

a. If demands are made upon him to release the POWs he will refuse.

b. To warn the opposing commander making such a request that it should be apparent to him that it is in the best interest of all concerned to avoid an armed clash.

c. Based upon the individual estimate of the situation by each camp commander and when he has determined in his own mind that the forces opposed to him are in sufficient strength to overwhelm his forces, that it is apparent that the ROK forces will attack and that his mission cannot be accomplished even with considerable bloodshed, the Commander is authorized to withdraw his forces from his current mission of guarding the POWs and retire in such a manner as to maintain the integrity of his forces.

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[1] Dated June 19, p. 1210.

d. Each situation must be evaluated on the spot and complete authority given each camp commander to determine the proper course of action under the particular circumstances.

e. This guidance is designed to bring about a situation whereby each commander can, for a time, indicate a definite show of force with the hope that this action will be effective, but when faced with actual combat, bloodshed will be kept to the minimum.

6. At this delicate time, faced with the continuing Communist capabilities for offensive action anywhere across the front, I can not afford to utilize more UN combat troops at these widely scattered POW camp locations. It would be impractical, if not impossible, to move these troops now with any expectation that they could be in place in time to insure a superior UN force at any of the POW locations. Likewise it is still impractical to attempt to concentrate the POW's in fewer camps.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET TOKYO, June 20, 1953—5:37 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX 63228. Refs: A. CX 63214 (HNC 1791).[1] B. CX 63138.[2] C. Eighth Army 250610Z May.[3] D. 1CX 62727.[4]

1. In ref A the Communists have asked the fol ques:

a. Is the UNC able to control the South Korean Gov and Army?
b. Does the armistice in Korea include the Syngman Rhee clique?
c. If it is not included, what assurance is there for the implementation of the armistice agreement on the part of South Korea?

2. In light of the curr sit as reptd to you in ref B and subsequent msgs on same subj, to which you were alerted in ref C, and in view of Rhee's additional capabilities as set forth in ref D, I believe it must be clear to you as it is to me that the ans to the first two ques asked by the Communists must at this time be an unqualified no. I am also certain that you must realize any ans to ques three above must be qualified and could only state that the UNC will make every effort to secure ROK cooperation and support for an armistice.

3. The Communists statement to the effect that if the armistice includes the Syngman Rhee clique, then we must be responsible for re-

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[1] In this telegram, June 20, 1953, CINCUNC relayed the text of a letter from Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai to Clark, posing the questions described in CX 63228. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413) Text of this letter is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 29, 1953, pp. 906–907.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1210.

[3] Dated May 25, p. 1098.

[4] Dated May 29, p. 1112.

covering all POWs who are at liberty, might be construed to mean that if Rhee is not included then the UNC is relieved of the responsibility of recovering the POWs. There might also be the implication that they would consider concluding a separate agreement with the UNC. I am inclined to believe the second implication does not exist, rather they recognize our difficulties in admitting that Rhee cannot at this time be considered as being included in the armistice, and anticipating that we may be forced to make a statement to the effect that he is included, have immediately placed responsibilities on the UNC for recovering the prisoners who have been released.

4. In view of the national and international implications involved in any ans to the ques asked by the Communists, I rqst guidance from governmental level in preparing my reply to the Kim-Peng ltr as contained in ref A.[5]

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[5] In a joint State-Defense message, JCS 942083, June 23, 1953, Clark was informed that it was undesirable to answer the questions posed by the Communists prior to clarification of the situation with the ROK; furthermore, the Departments of State and Defense felt no compulsion to answer them at this time. Therefore the guidance which Clark requested was withheld.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark)[1]

TOP SECRET SEOUL, June 20, 1953—9:13 p. m.
EMERGENCY

201213Z. Defense pls pass State. I have been considering actions we might take to meet situation posed by Rhee's attitude on armistice. Since they involve important military considerations I am forwarding them to you initially and suggest that you, Gen Taylor, Murphy, and I meet at earliest possible moment to agree on joint recommendations to Washington. It would seem best for us to meet at some relatively unfrequented place, for example K-8 since news of our meeting in Seoul, Pusan, or Tokyo, could hardly be kept quiet. Following are my views.

Rhee's principle aim is to torpedo armistice which fails to provide for withdrawal of Chinese Communists. Goal of our government and those of other UN countries supporting us in Korea is to obtain armistice which leaves problem of unification of Korea for future political negotiation. Since these views are opposed, show-down with Rhee over armistice seems unavoidable and should in my opinion take place before our position vis-à-vis Korean people is further weakened by Rhee's appeal to Korean nationalism. Release of Korean anti-Communist prisoners had very widespread support among ROK people, and Rhee is capitalizing on this.

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[1] This telegram was also addressed to Murphy and an information copy was sent to the Counselor of the Embassy at Pusan.

Rhee's unilateral action in releasing Korean POWs and his statements, orally to me and in writing to you, that he will withdraw ROK forces from UNC upon signing of armistice pose immediate question of exactly how far we should go in countering him in order to keep control of situation. Parenthetically I note that this general problem is also raised by letter from Communist delegation delivered at Panmunjom today.[2]

Our alternatives include trying to bring Rhee into line or, if he is adamant (as now seems probable), trying to effect his removal. (I am aware from DA 940238 [3] and DA 940242 [4] that plan "EVER READY" has been prepared in your headquarters and considered in Washington.[5] I am not familiar with that plan but agree with JCS that establishment of UNC Military Government in ROK should if possible be avoided).

There may be certain other possibilities, feasibility of which would depend ultimately upon our military capability to carry them out. In connection with most immediate aspect, implementation of armistice if signed, believe determination should be made of specific action which ROK Corps and Division Commanders would take if ordered to comply with armistice by UNC and ordered to contrary by President Rhee. In order to follow through on armistice implementation if certain or all ROK Army Commanders refuse to obey UNC command, UNC would presumably have to be capable of taking over frontline positions from such ROKA units and at same time of carrying through military take-over of ROK Government. If our mil, combined with such of ROK forces as would obey UNC over Rhee, is not considered sufficient, we should clearly not undertake them and should investigate other means of influencing situation.

Above all, I believe it would be ruinous to imply threat of extreme measures and then not be prepared and able to follow through if this becomes necessary.

Although I am convinced Rhee's motivation is sincere and from his point of view patriotic, I have come to conclusion we have reached point in our relations with him at which we must be prepared to take drastic measures to remove his opposition if he does not give in, or else let Rhee win ball game. Alternative of picking up armistice fragments only to have Rhee once again run out on us (as he yesterday declared he will do) would be intolerable. Our knowledge of elements in Korean political life upon which we can successfully erect new and cooperative government is incomplete, but dependable elements undoubtedly exist.

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[2] For text of this letter, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 29, 1953, pp. 906–907.

[3] Dated May 29, p. 1119.

[4] Dated May 30, p. 1123.

[5] The JCS, in telegram JCS 941567, June 17, 1953, not printed, informed Clark that the final review of Outline Plan EVERREADY (see p. 965) had been completed in Washington; they considered that the instructions furnished by telegrams DA 940238 and DA 940242 and Clark's reply in telegram CX 62756, June 1 (not printed), constituted the final JCS action on EVERREADY. (JCS records, CCS files 383.21 Korea (3-19-45))

I have just read Deptels 5 and 6 (2974 and 2937 to Tokyo).[6] Although I hope Paek's intervention with Rhee will be helpful, I am not in the least confident he can dissuade Rhee from present course.

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[6] In the first telegram, dated June 19, the Department of State summarized Paek Tu Chin's discussion with Dulles together with Robertson and Nash (see p. 1206). In the second, also June 19, the Department of State reported the confidential and personal views of the South Korean Prime Minister, which were to the effect that Rhee had been badly misled by inflammatory advisers. Paek was therefore cutting short his U.S. visit to return to Seoul to use whatever influence he had to calm down Rhee. Paek assured U.S. officials that he understood the gravity of the ROK unilateral release of Korean POWs and that he agreed that Korea and the United States must work together. (Both 795.00/6-1953)

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, June 21, 1953—9:34 a. m.

C 63236. The following message from Gen Taylor is quoted for your information.

"Called on Rhee 1600 hours as you directed to discuss 2 points affecting ROKA.[1] As I reported by phone, Rhee agreed to your position on both points. In course of conversation following facts developed:

"A. He is writing you letter expressing regret over your 'misunderstanding' that his promise of advance notice of unilateral action covered the release of non repatriate Korean prisoners. He says that his letter will include statement that signing of armistice will automatically free him for unilateral action. Asked whether this meant withdrawal of his forces from UNC, he said he hoped it would not come to that. If he were to withdraw his forces, he indicated that he had in mind giving a few hours notice in advance. I stressed point that ROK and UN Forces are so intermingled that it would take as least 3 months to disengage them in an orderly manner. He volunteered that if we ever separate he will plan jointly with us the most painless way of effecting the separation.

"B. He referred back to our conversation reported to you in G 5812, 9 June 53,[2] and the 4 points which he had discussed as representing his requirements for acceptance of armistice. He indicated surprise that he had never received any reaction from our side on these points. I reminded him that although he had discussed them with me he indicated that he was not yet ready to present them as a formal position. He apparently had forgotten that point and had expected them to be transmitted, semiofficially at least, for consideration in Washington. However, he did not want me to do anything further at this time. I suggested he discuss the matter with you next time you visit Seoul.

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[1] These two points were Clark's request that Rhee or his subordinates take no unilateral action to release the nonrepatriate Chinese POW's and that Rhee refrain from action at the nonrepatriate Korean POW camps which might bring ROK and U.S. forces into conflict until Clark could discuss the matter with him. (Telegram C 63237, Clark to JCS, June 21, 1953; Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

[2] *Ante*, p. 1159.

"C. Rhee has received petition from non repatriate Chinese on Chejudo requesting liberation. Signed Taylor."

795.00/6–2153: Telegram

The Political Adviser for the Armistice Negotiations (Murphy) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

TOKYO, June 21, 1953—4. p. m.

3973. No distribution. From Murphy. In my daily discussions with General Clark on the subject of Rhee's attitude towards armistice agreement and his defiance of UNC authority in unilaterally ordering ROKA personnel to organize escape North Korean PW's, there is evident a point of view which I am not certain you may fully understand.

It is Clark's stated opinion that the balance of approximately 9,000 North Korean PW's will escape. He believes Koreans are determined to achieve this result. Clark is equally determined, he says, to avoid clashes between US and ROKA personnel which would result in substantial loss of life. He tells me that if further outbreaks occur US troops will not use firepower against PW's or against ROKA personnel. Defense informed of his plan and approves. As soon as it becomes evident to Rhee that firepower is not to be employed it is no doubt true, as Clark believes, that balance of PW's will escape.

Reason for Clark's attitude is practical rather than political. He says simply that US does not possess adequate strength in Korea to risk large scale opposition of ROK's behind the lines and danger to security our forces which would accompany active disaffection and hostility of ROK's, an inevitable concomitant to loss of life if firepower were used against ROKA and PW's.

It has been my opinion stated to Clark that if Rhee and his associates had been convinced *ab initio* of our firm intention to use firepower to maintain UNC authority, they would not have undertaken to go as far as they did. As long as they realize they can disregard UNC authority with impunity they will be tempted to flaunt it further in their opposition to an armistice agreement. In saying this, I realize it is comparatively easy for the layman to suggest a stronger line in the absence of intimate knowledge of the detailed military situation.

General Clark's opinion, in which I am told General Taylor concurs, is based on military considerations of a practical nature relating to relative strengths of forces involved and situation where limited United States and United Nations forces are dependent on ROK Government which has overwhelming ground force strength in the area.

That being the position, I have pointed out to Clark what seem to me consequences which may flow from current evolution of situation.

(1) Deterioration of United Nations Command authority and increasing domination by Rhee of situation.

(2) Unfavorable impact on allied governments and world opinion if knowledge that, contrary to general assumption that UNC is in command, actually Rhee is in command in Korea.

(3) Effect on morale of United Nations forces of knowledge that armistice agreement about to be signed is being deliberately sabotaged by Rhee and a few associates. Similar effect on world opinion.

(4) Announcement has been made that United States troops alone without mixture other United Nations forces are now responsible for security remaining North Korean PW's. If latter now permitted to escape because United States troops cannot employ firepower, further deterioration United States authority and prestige inevitable.

(5) Communists, of course, will be convinced of cynical collusion our part believing, as they seem to, that ROK is puppet government and Rhee United States creature.

(6) In all of this United Nations major objective of conclusion armistice agreement, text now completed, is of course jeopardized, and United Nations might be obliged to withdraw from Korea without an armistice.

After discussion ways and means of extricating ourselves from this inevitable situation, Clark plans to propose to JCS that he offer to meet personally in executive session with Kim Il-Sung and Peng Teh-huai for frank exposition United Nations position outline of which Clark is sending JCS. This would be in reply to Communist letter delivered to Harrison yesterday [1] and, of course, subject to requested governmental guidance as to reply. I concur this idea which seems certainly worth exploring but I believe if the meeting does occur it should be limited to exposé of situation relating to ROK attitude, and presentation of United Nations determination to conclude armistice agreement but devoid of anything in nature of threat of type of military action which might follow failure to sign. Clark had thought of some, perhaps mild, reference to greater sanctions agreement. I feel that would not only be inconsistent with purpose of meeting but doubt United Nations governments would approve.

[Murphy]

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[1] For a text of that letter, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 29, 1953, pp. 906–907.

FE files, lot 55 D 338, "Korean Political Conference, June 1953"

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Department of the Army

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, June 21, 1953—5:16 p. m.

C 63250. Exclusive for the Acting Chairman JCS [Fechteler]. Ref CX 63228.[1]

1. In the event that ROK action in releasing North Korean POWs and Rhee's public statements in connection therewith prove to be a definite and prolonged stumbling block in the armistice negotiations, I propose for your consideration the folg:

a. Depending on the nature of your reply to ref, I will include in my reply to Marshal Kim Il Sung and Gen Peng Teh-huai's ltr the offer that I meet with them in an exec session at Panmunjom with only Harrison, Nam-Il and interpreters present.

b. The purpose of this meeting would be a frank discussion by the comds concerned of the armistice sit and to determine, if possible, whether the Communists intend to go ahead with an armistice under present conditions of our inability to control the actions of Rhee and the ROK Government.

c. Full explanation would be given to the Communists as to the reasons for the Korean POW escapes, which no doubt would lead to a frank discussion of other methods by which Rhee could subsequently violate the terms of the negotiations to which both sides have agreed.

d. I would outline to the Communists the courses of action open to the UNC in the event of ROK action to sabotage the armistice agreement, namely, our ability to control any offensive action on their part by withholding tactical and logistical support.

e. If I get the impression they are interested in going ahead with the armistice under the conditions which I will have fully explained to them, and after assuring the Communists of our earnest determination to implement its provisions to the best of our ability, I will propose that we come to agreement and sign at an early date, with the provision that supervisory pers would be in place by an agreed date.

2. I will refrain during this discussion with the Communists Comds from making any implied threats, for to do so would nullify the purpose of the meeting which is to determine, if possible, their intentions to go through with an armistice agreement. If a subsequent meeting develops, and it becomes apparent that the Communists are going to cont indefinitely to use the POW break for propaganda and psych purposes, I recommend I be authorized to make a statement that, in the event they cannot see their way clear to conclude an armistice under the present conditions, the UNC has no alternative but to discontinue further discussions, and to resume hostilities without being able to guaran-

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[1] Dated June 20, p. 1224.

tee that in the future the hostilities could be confined to the Korean Peninsula.

3. I fully realize the advantages and disadvantages of the course of action indicated above, but the overriding principle involved in the sit in which we find ourselves is that we are being blackmailed by Rhee into continuation of a war which the United States Government apparently does not intend to prolong. If an armistice could be signed under present conditions with the understanding by both parties that Rhee has the capability of violating some of its provisions, we would confront Rhee with a *fait accompli,* and proceed as best we can thereafter.

4. For this plan to be eff, if it is adopted,[2] it is essential that it be closely held. It is rqstd that every possible precaution be taken to prevent speculation on the subject or inadvertent disclosure of the fact that such project is under consideration.

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[2] In a joint State-Defense telegram, DA 942048, June 22, 1953, Collins to Clark, CINCUNC was advised as follows:

"Feeling here is that your meeting personally with Communist commanders is undesirable, particularly at this time. We consider substance of approach outlined to be overtaken by your message DTG 221100Z from Army Eight." (FE files, lot 55 D 338) See *infra.*

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

TOP SECRET SEOUL, June 22 1953—8 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

DTG 221100Z. Refs: A. G 5812 KCG.[2]B. GX 6228 KCG.[3]

1. I have just finished an hour and ten minute conversation alone with President Rhee. I found him extremely nervous. He explained that he had not slept most of the night and he seemed under considerable strain and tension. Taylor, who has seen him recently, has the same impression that I do—that perhaps the impact of world reaction to his unilateral actions is having an effect upon him. We may be wrong. He was extremely friendly and asked me to tell President Eisenhower that he is still trying to work together with him.

2. I stated that he must accept two premises as basic to the discussion at hand. First, that it was the firm determination of my government to secure an armistice under honorable terms. Second, that he must accept the fact that my government was not prepared to eject the Chinese Communist troops from Korea by force nor attempt to inject this issue

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[1] This telegram also was sent to Harrison and Briggs for their exclusive information.
[2] Dated June 9, p. 1159.
[3] This telegram was passed to the JCS in telegram C 63236, June 21, p. 1227.

into the terms of the armistice itself; we looked to the political conference to solve this issue.

3. I told him I was particularly concerned with the possibility of clashes between US and ROK troops at Korean non-repatriate POW camps. I indicated to him it was my overriding concern that there never be physical violence between ROK troops and the UN troops. He expressed the same concern and agreed that he would exert every influence to avoid such incidents. I am sure he will take no action, at least for the present, to demand the release of the remaining Korean non-repatriate POWs by force. How long this will last depends upon future developments.

4. He also promised that his troops on the island camps would cooperate in maintaining the security of camps holding both pro-Communist Korean and all Chinese POWs.

5. I next told him of the necessity of our finding some common ground upon which to reach agreement for cooperation under the armistice terms. I then brought up the 4 points which Rhee had raised before, reported to you in refs A and B.

a. With reference to the first point, I told him that any time limit that might be set for a political conference would be dependent upon mutual agreement between the parties to that conference, but that naturally I considered there should be some time limit specified. He gave no indication as to the time limitation he had in mind, as he has in the past. He indicated that, at the end of whatever time limit was finally set, the armistice should come to an end and the US could decide at that time either to cooperate further with the ROKs in whatever action seemed appropriate or to withdraw US forces from Korea.

b. With reference to the second point—the mutual security treaty—he indicated intense interest in reaching agreement on this subject, saying that it would not have to be lengthy document, but merely provide the usual terms by which the US would come to ROK aid. I pointed out clearly that my government could never agree, in such a treaty, to come to this assistance if ROK were the aggressor. He replied he would not expect US to do so, but would expect US to condemn him.

c. With reference to the third point—the buildup of the ROK forces—I told him he should have had ample reassurances on that subject. He indicated he should be assured that the buildup would include the ROK Navy and Air Force, as well as the Army.

d. The last subject, which he had mentioned twice in refs A and B, had to do with ROK inability to tolerate the presence of pro-Communist Indian troops and Communist representatives of the NNRC in his backyard. I then told him that I would, in complete sincerity, give him my views on this subject and, although I was speaking without the authority of my government, I had in mind a possible solution which might relieve him to some extent. I again stressed at this point in the discussion that he might as well accept the fact that my government was not prepared to eject Chinese Communist troops from Korea by force and also accept the fact that we look to the political conferences to solve this issue. I indicated again the firm determination of my government to secure a suitable armistice. I told him, however, that there might be some slight modifications to the present POW agreement that could be worked out. I suggested the following, again reiterating that it was merely a suggestion, not to be discussed with anyone, and I had no idea whether my government or the Commies would accept it. My ideas follow:

(1) That the 8600 Korean non-repatriate POWs must remain under UN custody, that I could not submit to ROK demands for their release.

(2) I asked his cooperation, with the understanding that, while these POWs are in UN custody, his representatives would have full opportunity to explain to the POWs the manner in which the terms of reference applied to non-repatriates; they could urge the POWs to understand that it was their own individual determination which would decide whether they return to Communist control or not; that with a little patience and a few more months the ROK could guarantee that they would be released in South Korea.

(3) I would be willing, if he accepted this condition, to attempt with his cooperation and after an armistice, to move these 8600 remaining prisoners to the demilitarized zone where they would be taken over by the NNRC; while they were in the hands of the NNRC and subjected to the efforts of the Communists to persuade them to return to Communist control, ROK members of the UNC would be present as our representatives and could sit in and act as observers to make sure no force or intimidation were used.

(4) I would recommend to my government that we be authorized to attempt to obtain agreement from the Commies that the 14,000 Chinese non-repatriate POWs be moved to, and delivered into the custody of, a neutral state for final disposition.

(5) If these conditions are acceptable to all concerned, the result would be that no Indian troops, no Communist indoctrinators, and no Communist members of the NNRC would be in South Korea rear areas.

Rhee was interested but did not commit himself. He stated that he would give my comments his careful consideration and would give me an answer tomorrow (23 June). At this time he indicated that it would be impossible for Korea to sign the armistice agreement because that would be tantamount to accepting the division of his country; however, he could support it. This latter statement I consider significant. In this connection of course, there is no requirement that he should sign it.

6. There were many other subjects discussed having to do with provocative statements by individuals alleging that ROK was not cooperating. He seemed very sensitive to what the press had said about him of late. He stressed the necessity of mutual cooperation between the ROK

and the US. During the conversation I had an opportunity to explain to him my military analysis of the impotency of the ROK Army, that it had no chance whatsoever of standing alone, defensively or offensively at the present time; that through an armistice, he would be given the time and the means to build up his Army. He probably would be given economic support by my country. During this post-armistice period his country would enjoy a real opportunity to develop economically. The standard of living of his people would undoubtedly be raised to the point at which they would be in much better position to combat the Communists infiltration which he fears.

7. I purposely avoided raising any question about the functions of the inspection teams of the NNSC. However, I did raise with him the absolute necessity of ROK forces remaining under the UN Command, and he replied that under an arrangement of this kind, if it were worked out, that issue would not arise. He asked me to tell my press that he decried the alarming stories which have suggested that actions on the part of ROK troops might lead to clashes with those of the UNC. I asked him what, if anything, I could tell the press about our conversation. There were correspondents waiting outside. We agreed that we should describe our discussion as "friendly and encouraging".

8. Prior to proceeding further with Rhee, it is essential that I receive your guidance. Although my suggestions in para 5*d* above would require some minor modification in the terms of reference it would eliminate an overwhelming obstacle in the mind of Rhee—that of having Indian armed troops and Communist NNRC representatives in South Korea. In this connection I saw Harrison today and discussed this new POW angle with him. He believes there would be reasonable chance of securing Communist agreement. In my discussion with Rhee I made it crystal clear that these suggestions were my own and had not been discussed nor approved by my government. It is therefore essential that I be advised ASAP of your thinking along these lines.

9. This is dictated hurriedly at Seoul in order to get it to you expeditiously. I invite your attention to the comment Rhee made that, under the proper conditions, he could support an armistice without being a party to it.

795.00/6–2253

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 22, 1953.

Subject: Chinese Communist Questions Concerning North Korean Prisoners of War

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was drafted by Nicholas G. Thacher of SOA.

Participants: Mr. I. J. Bahadur Singh, Chargé d'Affaires, Indian Embassy
Mr. J. C. Kakar, First Secretary, Indian Embassy
Mr. Johnson, FE
Mr. Thacher, SOA

Mr. Singh said that he had received a message from Prime Minister Nehru containing some questions which the Chinese Government had raised with the Indian Embassy in Peiping concerning the present situation in Korea. The Chinese Communist Government has heard that *all* the North Korean prisoners have now been released and further that the former prisoners are now being impressed into the ranks of the Republic of Korea army. Mr. Singh said that the Chinese were very much disturbed about these matters and were very anxious to receive assurances on these points, feeling that they bore directly on the good faith of the UN and on its ability to abide by the terms of an armistice.

Mr. Johnson stated that all the North Korean prisoners had not been released, that there were some 8,000 to 9,000 still held, all of whom were now under American guard. Mr. Johnson said that all steps were being taken to hold these prisoners, short of mass firing, that is to say riot control methods, involving the use of shotguns and tear gas would be employed. Regrettably some firing had taken place between South Korean and UN troops. Active efforts were also being made to round up the North Korean prisoners who had escaped.

Mr. Johnson stressed that the release of the prisoners of war had created a most difficult situation for us and one that we could not possibly have wanted to create ourselves. He pointed out that the Unified Command has made every effort to observe the rules of the Geneva Convention in treatment of the prisoners and that this policy was in direct contrast to the course of the North Korean Government which had openly freed ROK prisoners and immediately forced them into the North Korean armies.

Mr. Singh declared that the Chinese also had noted a statement by President Rhee that some UN spokesmen (other than South Koreans) had voiced approval of the prisoner releases. Mr. Johnson referred to the statement of General Mark Clark which had appeared in the morning papers positively denying the complicity of the Unified Command in the release of the prisoners. Mr. Johnson stated that he did not know of any one on the UN side who had endorsed the release of the prisoners and to whom Rhee might have been referring.

As to the possibility of any of the released prisoners being enlisted in the Republic of Korea forces, Mr. Johnson said that he very strongly doubted that this was taking place. He emphasized that manpower was not a problem for the Republic of Korea and thus that there would be no compelling reason for the released prisoners to be drafted into the ROK army.

Mr. Singh inquired as to whether the UN command would have any direct control over the recruiting, enlistment, etc., for the ROK army. Mr. Johnson replied that the control over such matters lay with the ROK forces themselves and that UN control did not become effective until units were organized and ready to be used in battle positions. Mr. Johnson pointed out the difficulties of rounding up the escaped prisoners since there was obviously very little means of differentiating them from the populace of South Korea.

UAJ

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins) to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 22, 1953—6:34 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

DA 942047. From CSUSA for CINCUNC. This is a joint State-Defense message. Reur message DTG 221100Z from Hq ArmyEight.[1]

Believe that you should make no commitment to Rhee at your next meeting on suggestions for changes in POW agreement contained in para 5*d* of reference message but listen to what he has to say. In general believe Rhee should not be encouraged to think we are prepared to renegotiate armistice agreement. However, we are interested in Rhee's reaction to your suggestion. Suggest you submit summary of Rhee's reaction and follow up with such additional comments as result from discussion of this and other aspects of situation with Robertson and Collins.

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[1] Dated June 22, p. 1231.

FE files, lot 55 D 338, "Korean Political Conference, June 1953"

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 22, 1953.

Assuming President Rhee is willing to accept the substance of President Eisenhower's letter of June 6, 1953,[2] there are the following three aspects to be negotiated in detail with the ROK Government:

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[1] This memorandum is a report of instructions which Dulles gave Robertson prior to his mission to Korea.

[2] For text of the letter, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 377–380.

1. *A Mutual Defense Treaty:*

(*a*) The Secretary believes we should only negotiate a treaty of the ANZUS or US-Philippine treaty type. He definitely opposes the NATO formula because that gives the President certain extra powers to consider territory attack similar to the territory of the United States. Instead, the general formula in the other defense treaties is of the Monroe Doctrine type.

(*b*) The Secretary also stressed the necessity for making clear that the treaty would cover only territory peacefully under the jurisdiction and authority of the ROK.

2. *Economic Assistance:*

(*a*) The Secretary agreed that it would be all right to show President Rhee and the Prime Minister a synopsis of the Tasca Report [3] provided discussions are conducive. Both the Secretary and the Under Secretary felt that the President would be able to approve a request for $300 million and that Congress would accept it provided things go well in Korea.

(*b*) The Secretary agreed that every effort should be made to seek the President's approval so that Mr. Robertson would have the authority to inform President Rhee that the Executive Branch had approved Tasca's recommendations and was submitting them to the Congress.

3. *Political Conference:*

(*a*) The Secretary particularly emphasized that Mr. Robertson should make clear to President Rhee that we are not going to allow the U.S. to become so entangled with the United Nations regarding the Political Conference that we cannot stand shoulder to shoulder with the ROK in the future. Mr. Robertson is to convey the Secretary's views as outlined for a joint US–UK strategy for obtaining Korea's unification. The Secretary feels that in time we can get Korea's reunion. It will be wrong and foolish to accept any permanent division of Korea. That does not have to be even considered if Rhee has the U.S. and other friends working constantly with him for Korea's reunion. It would be foolish to take out our troops before we can use all of their presence in Korea for bargaining purposes and pressures, along with inducements, and a strengthened economy. We must work away together and wait for this to come.

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[3] See enclosure 2 to NSC 156, June 23, p. 1247.

Editorial Note

On June 22, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson left Washington National Airport for Korea via

Tokyo. Accompanying Robertson were Carl W. McCardle, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs; Kenneth Young, Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs; and General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, whose role was to discuss the military situation in Korea. There had been some consideration of having General James Van Fleet, United States Army (retired), go to Korea with Robertson, but President Eisenhower, at the desire of General Clark, decided not to send Van Fleet for the time being. (Department of State *Bulletin*, July 6, 1953, page 14; summary of Eisenhower telephone calls, June 20, 1953, Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file; telegram DA 942008, Hull to Clark, June 22, 1953, FE files, lot 55 D 338)

While in Korea Robertson, as President Eisenhower's personal envoy, used the communication channels available in Seoul; therefore telegrams from him carry his bracketed signature rather than that of Ambassador Briggs.

795.00/5-2253

The Secretary of State to the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, June 22, 1953.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I speak to you as a friend of your nation. As you know I have long worked for a free and united Korea. In 1947, and again in 1948 in the United Nations, I initiated for the United States steps which led to the establishment of your government, and international acceptance of the proposition that Korea ought to be free and united. On June 19, 1950, almost 3 years ago to this day, I stood at your side and addressed the Korean National Assembly. I spoke of a Korea which would peacefully achieve unity, freedom and strength. I pledged our nation's continuing support of that goal. Also, because aggression was an ever-present threat and because your people felt alone, I asserted that free world unity was a reality, and I concluded: "You are not alone. You will never be alone so long as you continue to play worthily your part in the great design of human freedom".

That pledge of unity was hailed throughout South Korea. It was quickly put to the test, for within six days the aggressor struck. Within a few hours the brave army of the Republic of Korea was overwhelmed by superior forces and the territory of the Republic was overrun. Then you pleaded for the help of the free world. It came. The United Nations acted, and the United States responded quickly and largely to its appeal on your behalf. We responded because we believed in the principle of free world unity.

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[1] This letter was delivered by Robertson to Rhee in a meeting on June 26; see telegram 28 from Seoul, June 26, p. 1276.

The principle of unity cannot work without sacrifice. No one can do precisely what he wants. The youth of America did not do what they wanted. Over one million American boys have left their homes and families and their peaceful pursuits, to go to far away Korea. They went because, at a dark hour, you invoked the sacred principle of free world unity to save your country from overwhelming disaster. Of those one million American boys who have gone to your land, 24,000 died, another 110,000 were wounded. The cost to us in money is counted in the tens of billions of dollars. That was part of the price *we* paid for loyalty to the principle of unity when *you* invoked it.

You know full well that we did not come to fight and die in Korea in order to unite it by force, or to liberate by force the North Koreans. We do not subscribe to the principle that such injustices are to be remedied by recourse to war. If indeed that were sound principle we should be fighting all over the world and the total of misery and destruction would be incalculable. We came to Korea to demonstrate that there would be unity to throw back armed aggression.

That has been done. The enemy has offered an armistice which restores the authority of the Republic of Korea over territory somewhat larger than that which preceded the aggression. No prisoner of war will be forcibly repatriated. There will be a political conference at which your government and mine will work shoulder to shoulder on measures which I am convinced will ultimately lead to the unification of Korea. In the meantime your Republic can share with us a mutual security pact and would enjoy a program of economic aid which of itself will set up a powerful attraction upon the North Koreans.

The Government of the United States, and indeed the governments of all the free nations of the world, have expressed the opinion that these terms can honorably be accepted. Our Declaration of Independence said that we owed a decent respect for the opinion of mankind. No one who has invoked and received the help of mankind can decently ignore its opinion.

It is at this moment that you are apparently considering rejection of the principle of unity. Because the fighting has not given you all that you had hoped, you seem to be on the verge of wrecking allied unity. You have already taken unilateral action in defiance of the authority of the United Nations Command, and I hear reports that you have even suggested attempting to withdraw the Republic of Korea forces from the United Nations Command.

Do you have the right to take this action? It is you who invoked the principle of unity and asked us to pay the price. We have paid it in blood and suffering. Can you now honorably reject the principle which, in your hour of need, you asked us to defend at so high a price?

You know that for your Republic now to attempt to go its separate way would mean a horrible disaster. It would give the Communists their greatest victory and it would elate them, when they face grave internal unrest. For they know full well that the free world cannot exist if it operates in accordance with the principle that unity exists only so long as each gets 100% his own way.

The principle of interdependence involves sacrifice. It will involve sacrifice on your part as it has involved sacrifices on our part. Your nation lives today not only because of the great valor and sacrifices of your own armies but because others have come to your side and died beside you. Do you now have the moral right to destroy the national life which, at your plea, we helped to save at a great price? Can *you* be deaf when *we* now invoke the plea of unity?

I have asked my Assistant Secretary, Walter Robertson, to bring you our thoughts because the hour is too grave to risk the lack of understanding which can come from merely cabled exchanges. He has the complete confidence of President Eisenhower and myself.

Sincerely yours, JOHN FOSTER DULLES

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET SEOUL, June 23, 1953—9:20 a. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

Unnumbered, DTG 230020Z. Re DTG 221100Z[1] after considering further the proposal suggested in para 5*d* (4), reference message, an alternate which would probably avoid difficult negotiations and possibly complicated political factors would be to move the Chinese non-repatriates to the D/Z and turn them over the NNRC in the same manner as the Korean non-repatriates. This would be a difficult logistical task, but am sure it could be overcome.

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[1] Dated June 22, p. 1231.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET TOKYO, June 23, 1953—5:38 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX 63282. CGArEight exclusive for Taylor. CINCUNC Adv exclusive for Harrison. AmEmb Seoul exclusive for Briggs.

There follows a draft *aide-mémoire* handed me by President Rhee just prior to my departure from Seoul about noon today. This memorandum is forwarded for your information and your attention is invited to the fact that it is a rough outline. I plan to provide Robertson and Collins copies and will discuss it in detail with them on their arrival in Tokyo tomorrow.

Kyung Mu Dai
June 22, 1953
CONFIDENTIAL

Aide-mémoire (rough outlines)

"If and when the conditions set below be satisfied, the government of the Republic of Korea will review its present position on the Panmunjom armistice in the following manner.

"*a*) It will not withdraw its armed forced from the United Nations Command for a unilateral action.

"*b*) It will have nothing to do with the armistice, and therefore, will have no person of Korean nationality sign it as a member of the United Nations delegation to the armistice.

"*c*) Any troop movements ordered by the United Nations Command and related to the implementation of the armistice terms will be carried out by the ROK units not because the armistice terms have been accepted by this government, which is not the case, but because the units are under the United Nations Command and have to obey its orders.

"*Conditions*

"(1) The political conference after the signing of the armistice sit no longer than 90 days. If the period expires without the conferees agreeing upon the means of evacuating the Chinese Communist troops from Korea, to be completed within 60 days from the breaking up of the political conference and of effecting the reunification of Korea, to be implemented immediately after the evacuation of the Chinese from Korea, the armistice will become null and void. In that case, the ROK forces will advance north with the Air and Naval support by the United States.

"(2) Before signing the armistice, the United States will enter into a mutual defense pact with the Republic of Korea, as I have already done with other nations of the Pacific Area.

"(3) The United States will give this government an adequate military aid so as to build up the ROK Land, Sea and Air defense strength as well as economic aid required to rehabilitate the war-torn economy of Korea and set it on a self-sufficiency basis.

"(4) No foreign armed force shall enter the Republic of Korea with a view to guarding prisoners of war, nor shall any Communist indoctrinators. This government agrees to the repatriation of those Communist Korean prisoners of war with the last minute screening to be participated in by official ROK representatives. This government will not concern itself with the disposition of the Chinese prisoners of war, except that no alien guards and Communist indoctrinators intended for them will be admitted into any part of this country. As regards the loyal (anti-Communist) Korean prisoners of war, who were fully entitled to a release by the Presidential order of June 18, 1953, the civilian status thus conferred will, under no circumstances, be tampered with. Those of them who are still in detention are left open for a short period questioning, say 3 days, by an international body of inquiry as to their real intentions regarding their repatriation. Care should be taken not to pressure them in any manner, not to speak of indoctrination. They should be questioned where they are. The questioning should be as early as possible to ensure their earliest possible release.

"*Additional suggestions*

"No international agreement or understanding open or secret, without consultation with ROKA or participation of ROK.

"Industrialization of Korea so as to make Korea self-sufficient.

"Defense strength in Land, Sea and Air sufficient for its defense, equal to that of Japan. No foreign power to be allowed to encroach upon ROK sovereignty.

"When attacked, US would come in automatically to defend ROK even at risk of World War.

"When Korea attacks any neighbor nation unjustly or without cause US will not help Korea.

"During the political conference Communists are not to take any aggressive measures, false propaganda, ideological infiltration underground guerrilla activities.

"No Chinese or any other Communist reinforcements to be tolerated during political conference.

"The mutual defense pact should include an amity clause that when third party threatens the welfare of one of the contracting parties, the other contracting party will exercise its good offices in settling the issues amicably in favor of the former."

USUN files

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

TOP SECRET [NEW YORK,] June 23, 1953.

DEAR CHARLIE: Many thanks for yours of the 17th [1] referring to our conversation on the *Williamsburg* on the problem of getting more foreign troops for service in Korea. I am delighted that you are taking such a keen personal interest in this matter.

Mr. Nash's memorandum [2] seems to be a good statement of the policy regarding logistical support which existed under the previous Administration and the arguments for that policy. The arguments seemed inadequate to me then and the march of events here and abroad, beginning with the election, make the arguments seem even less valid today.

Incidentally, the memorandum appears to draw the conclusion that I am talking about waiving *completely* the reimbursement obligation. This is not my position. We should certainly try to get governments taking part in a collective security action to pay as much as possible of their own way, as well as supplying men.

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[1] Not printed.

[2] For text of this memorandum, see enclosure 1 to the memorandum by Lay to the NSC, June 15, p. 1177.

But when it comes to financing in dollars, we cannot assume that there are in fact many nations which have dollars which they are unwilling to furnish. Most nations simply have not the dollars. But they have the men. And if a nation without dollars is willing to put up the men, we should certainly take the men every time and save the equivalent in our manpower.

In the previous Administration, the Defense Department, on September 27, 1952, in an argument against facilitating the bringing in of more foreign troops, referred to the fact that there was no longer "the atmosphere of urgency prevailing in 1950 and in early 1951". It was the very failure of the last Administration to sense the urgency about Korea which aroused such public criticism and caused it to be so discredited. This is a position which our Administration must not maintain.

The United States has, in effect, wisely adopted the general policy that it is profitable to the United States, which has only six percent of the world's population, to provide munitions of war, so that, while we must inescapably provide most of the munitions, we would not also be required to provide most of the men. Certainly one of the ideas inherent in NATO is that it is a sound practice for us to provide weapons so that the Europeans may provide some of the men—and that we will not then have to provide *all* the men. Having taken an active part both in the drafting of the Vandenberg Resolution which underlay the North Atlantic Treaty and in the debates on both measures, I feel sure that this was the intent of Congress.

Indeed, if a major purpose of foreign military aid is *not* to lessen the drain on American manpower, there is very little point in it. We are spending huge sums of money on aid to Latin America, for example, which is creating political enmity for us by laying us open to the charge of supporting would-be military dictators and, except for Colombia, we have not had one single Latin American soldier helping us out in Korea. If the policy continues to provide no more Latin American troops in Korea we should seriously consider the economies which could be effectuated by very drastically reducing military aid to those countries.

I cannot see how the policy which I advocate in any way justifies the raising of what Mr. Nash calls "possible charges of the use of mercenary troops by the United States". This charge can only be raised effectively if the United States does not provide its own share of manpower, *and* if the foreign troops have no great cause for which to fight. In the case of NATO, and in the case of Korea, the United States contributes its fair share of troops and the foreign troops have the inspiring cause of repelling the Communists.

Nor do I follow Mr. Nash's inference that acceptance of troops without dollars would "undermine the growth of the United Nations as an effective mechanism for collective action". Actually it would be just the other way around. The effectiveness of the United Nations depends on the extent to which member governments are willing to make their *manpower* available to repel aggression by force if necessary.

The United Nations will not fail because of dollars. But it may very well founder because of inadequate manpower. This is the very heart of the United Nations problem.

I very much hope that you will continue taking a vigorous personal interest in this matter so that we can get more forces from more United Nations countries to assist in Korea. The American public, I am sure, expects this Administration to make a constructive and imaginative change from the policy of the preceding Administration so that, in the words of the General's speeches last fall, the drain on American manpower may be drastically reduced.

Sincerely yours, HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR.

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 156 Series

Note by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council

SECRET
NSC 156

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1953.

STRENGTHENING THE KOREAN ECONOMY

References:
- A. NSC Action Nos. 711 and 741[1]
- B. NSC 154,[2] paragraph 14
- C. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject "Settlement of Republic of Korea Advances of Korean Currency (Won) to the United States Forces", dated February 9, and March 10, 1953[3]

At the direction of the President the enclosed report to the President on the subject by the mission headed by Mr. Henry J. Tasca, Special Representative of the President by Korean Economic Affairs, is referred herewith for the consideration of the National Security Council.

The enclosure consists of the following parts of the complete Tasca Mission report:

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[1] For NSC Action No. 711, see the memorandum of discussion at the 131st meeting of the NSC, Feb. 11, p. 769; in NSC Action No. 741, the Council noted an oral summary of a memorandum by Humphrey, dated Mar. 20, 1953, which reported on the activities of the committee established pursuant to NSC Action No. 711. A record copy of NSC Action No. 741 can be found in S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95. For the memorandum by Humphrey, Mar. 10, see p. 813.

[2] Dated June 15, p. 1170.

[3] Neither printed, but see footnotes 1, pp. 747 and 813.

Letter of Transmittal to the President
Glossary of Abbreviations
Foreword
A Synopsis of the Report
    A. Achievement of U.S. Security Interests
    B. Ways and Means of Strengthening the Korean Economy
Mission Recommendations
    A. Amounts and Types of U.S. Assistance
    B. Efficient Utilization of U.S. Assistance
    C. Coordination of Economic Programs

The complete report [4] has been furnished directly to interested agencies by Mr. Tasca. A copy of the complete report is also available for reference in this office.

Mr. Cutler will report on the proposed procedure for handling the enclosed report at the Council meeting on June 25.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

[Enclosure 1]

The Special Representative for Korean Economic Affairs (Tasca) to the President

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 15, 1953.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In accordance with your letter of April 9 [5] asking me to investigate ways and means of strengthening the Korean economy in the light of the security objectives of the United States and the United Nations, I have the honor to transmit to you the attached report of my findings. The preparation of this report was only possible because of the fine cooperation of the interested agencies of the U.S. Government. General Mark W. Clark and the United Nations Command rendered invaluable assistance at every stage during my visit to the theater.

The report deals with military requirements, production, investment and consumption in relation to defense posture, imports, and external aid, the prevention of inflation, and ways and means of making U.S. aid effective at lowest cost to the U.S. The following are highlights which may be of special interest to you.

The Republic of Korea has been making a magnificent contribution to the military effort of the free world in Korea. As of the first of April the Government of the Republic of Korea had the equivalent of 14 divisions in combat status. Since then two more divisions have been activated and four more are scheduled to be activated before the end of December. As of April, ROK forces held two-thirds of the front line.

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[4] A copy of the complete report can be found in FE files, lot 60 D 330.

[5] Not printed. (FE files, lot 60 D 330, Tasca Report)

Over the past year the ROKs generally have suffered over 50 percent of the casualties each month and in several months over 70 percent.

This superb military contribution of the Republic of Korea must be viewed against the economic background and the devastation and hardship which has struck that country. There are an estimated 2,500,000 refugees, 5,000,000 more destitute, and approximately 600,000 houses have been destroyed. War damages are calculated to be $1 billion, and about 1,000,000 human lives have been lost since the invasion in June 1950. Production of rice, a basic crop in Korea, last year was only two-thirds of the 1945/50 average. Per capita daily food consumption is below 1500 calories. Income per capita in the last year was about $60 compared to about $75 in 1948/49 and $90 in 1949/50. The entire visible export trade of Korea during the past year was little more than twice the value of the used clothing and similar items given to Korea by private American charities during the same period of time. There has been continuous inflation in Korea, wholesale prices having increased 20 times from June 1950 to June 1953.

It is my considered view that unless the total volume of resources available to the Republic of Korea increases substantially, it cannot maintain the present level of forces without further inflation and increased hardship. However, our present plans provide for the increase of the presently activated 16 divisions to 20 divisions during the course of the next year. Further inflation and economic hardship could undermine the morale of the civilian population. Deterioration of morale and the consequent damage to the ROK military effort could seriously affect the U.S. position in Asia.

In the light of the foregoing, I strongly recommend a new three-year integrated economic program of military support, relief and reconstruction. The amount of additional U.S. aid required for the Fiscal Year 1954 would be $300 million in addition to that already contained in the MSA (proposed $71 million for UNKRA) and Department of Defense budget ($75 million for civil relief) or a total slightly under $450 million. For the following years the comparable total is estimated at about $348 and $275 million respectively. Such an aid program would provide the necessary economic support for Korea's military effort as well as enable that country to regain its pre-invasion standard of living. Reconstruction and recovery cannot be achieved by a series of stopgap measures.

Such a program would achieve the following objectives:

a. Support the ROK armed forces both logistically and in terms of morale.

b. Release U.S. armed forces from present assignments in Korea by substitution with ROK forces.

c. Strengthen the morale of the Korean people and increase their support of U.S. objectives.

d. Provide an example to the rest of free Asia and the free world generally that resistance to aggression will bring forth effective moral and material assistance from other nations of the free world.

e. Provide strong collateral support to the Japanese economy and Japanese economic orientation toward the free world by developing increased trade between Japan and Korea at a time when potential reduction in U.S. military procurement in Japan and continued loss of a large export market in China may tempt Japan to seek additional markets in Communist areas.

It has been a great privilege and pleasure to undertake this mission to Korea. The truly heroic quality of the Korean people in their struggle against Communist aggression will remain ever a source of inspiration to me.

Respectfully yours, HENRY J. TASCA

[Here follows a glossary of abbreviations.]

[Enclosure 2]

Excerpt of Tasca Mission Report on Strengthening the Korean Economy

SECRET [WASHINGTON, June 15, 1953.]

FOREWORD

Pursuant to a recommendation of the National Security Council, President Eisenhower on 9 April 1953 appointed Dr. Henry J. Tasca as Special Representative of the President for Korean Economic Affairs and requested that he head a Mission to investigate ways and means of strengthening the Korean economy in light of the security objectives of the United States and the United Nations. The President directed that the Mission's recommendations include the amounts and types of United States assistance desirable in support of the Korean economy; proposals as to the manner in which the United States can best be assured that any resources it may contribute are utilized in the most efficient manner possible; and the formulation of measures to be adopted to ensure the coordination of all economic programs in Korea. The results of the Mission's investigation are embodied in this report.

The Mission arrived in Korea on 17 April 1953 and headquarters were established in Pusan in the offices of the United Nations Civil Assistance Command, Korea. A series of meetings was held with United Nations Command agencies in Korea, with the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, with each of the Ministries of the Republic of Korea, with the Chairmen of National Assembly Committees, and with the Korean Chamber of Commerce. Each of the above prepared extensive material on the Korean economy for consideration by the Mission. In addition, the Special Representative visited most of the important industrial plants and agricultural and mining areas in South Korea including Seoul, the capital.

The Mission is deeply indebted to General Mark W. Clark, Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command and his staff for their cooperation and invaluable assistance. Assistance furnished by all commands including Eighth Army, Korean Communications Zone, Korean Military Advisory Group, Army Forces Far East, and especially the United Nations Civil Assistance Command is appreciatively acknowledged. The support and cooperation of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency was also invaluable.

United States Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs and his staff were especially helpful in supplying political guidance at all stages in the preparation of the report.

The Mission wishes to thank all Republic of Korea Government agencies with which it came into contact for their excellent cooperation. The Mission is especially grateful for the cooperation rendered by Prime Minister Paik Too Chin.

STRENGTHENING THE KOREAN ECONOMY

A SYNOPSIS OF THE REPORT

(Sections A and B)

A. *Achievement of U.S. Security Interests*

The security interests of the United States require the strengthening of the economy of the Republic of Korea. An economic policy for Korea must (*a*) strengthen the Korean economy to provide maximum support to the military effort of Korean and United Nations forces in Korea; (*b*) ensure living standards for the Korean population which will make Korea safe against starvation, disease, unrest and subversion; and (*c*) develop the Republic of Korea into a self-defending and self-supporting nation as early as possible and to the maximum degree feasible.

The achievement of United States military plans in Korea requires the immediate expansion of the Korean armed forces by increasing the number of Army divisions from the present 16 divisions, of which two were only recently activated, to 20; and the development by the end of US FY 56 of an economic base in Korea which will provide maximum support to armed forces of the above magnitude, in addition to making possible restoration of the pre-invasion standard of living.

The above goals cannot be achieved with Korea's own resources. The proposed number of ROK combat divisions, for example, approximates the number of combat divisions in the U.S. Army at the present time. To support armed forces of this magnitude the Republic of Korea has a population of only 21.5 million, of whom nearly a quarter are presently receiving some form of government relief and of whom approximately three million are in a refugee status. The reconstruction problem is staggering; war damage to property has exceeded $1 billion and nearly one out of every six homes has been destroyed. Further, the armed forces and the civilian population must be rebuilt on the basis of an economy of dwarf-like proportions. The total national income of Korea, for example, is smaller than the income of the population of San Francisco. The power generation capacity of all South Korea is less than that of the battleship *Missouri* alone. The entire visible export trade of the Republic of Korea during the past year was little more than twice the value of the used clothing and similar articles given to Korea by private charities during the same period of time. Per capita gross national product during the current year is only $60, compared with $200 in Japan, and over $2,000 in the United States. Food consumption amounts to less than 1,500 calories per person per day.

The six-fold expansion of the Korean forces since June 1950 has been largely financed by inflation, which has raised retail prices today more than twenty times their level of three years ago. In view of the enormous gap between resources available and resources required, it will patently be impossible, unless the total volume of available resources is increased substantially, to maintain even the present level of forces without further inflation and mounting hardship. Continued build-up to 20 divisions would be catastrophic from an economic point of view unless additional resources were quickly made available.

The root of this difficulty is the extreme, acute, and widespread shortage of food stuffs, raw materials, equipment, and technical skills, in relation to the war demands of the Republic of Korea armed forces and the minimum subsistence needs of the civilian population. Unbalanced budgets, inflationary gaps, perverse prices, miscontrols, black and barter markets, premiums on speculation to the detriment of productive effort, pervasive graft and corruption in government, shortages in transport, industry, agriculture, housing, and consumption, as well as large scale unemployment and nonutilization of natural wealth, have already derived from the fundamental shortage of material resources in general. The major deficiency of assistance programs to Korea since 1950 is the fact that all such programs combined were and are of inadequate size and scope to close the resources gap. It is imperative to narrow—rather than to widen—this basic gap between the sum of prescribed military and essential civilian requirements on the one hand and of resources made available from Korean production and external assistance on the other. Unless this gap is narrowed, the economy will be entirely incapable of sustaining both the civilian population and the proposed defense forces. The budget proposed by the ROK Government as immediately necessary to support the augmented forces, for example, would require annual expenditures of nearly two and a half times annual revenues. Further inflation of the currency and eventual economic chaos would be inevitable. The result would be to undermine the ability of the ROK to maintain a defense posture and would pave the way for subversion of the civilian population through exploitation of the inevitable disease, starvation, unrest, and lack of economic opportunity.

Such collapse of the ROK war effort and morale, with its attendant threat to the survival of the state itself, in addition to posing problems of the gravest magnitude in regard to the conduct of military operations in Korea, would seriously prejudice the U.S. position of international leadership as well. It could effectively create the belief that support of U.S. security objectives could be disastrous to countries still free to choose sides. Protracted resistance to Communist aggression is imposing acute and visible hardship on the Korean population. If the people of the free world, particularly of the Far East, were led to believe that comparable resistance to aggression might mean only similar future hardships for them, the present defense of the U.S. could be gravely affected in other parts of the world by a deterioration of the will to resist and the desire to remain free.

B. *Ways and Means of Strengthening the Korean Economy*

The Mission's principal terms of instruction require recommendations as to ways and means of strengthening the Korean economy in the light of the security interests of the United States. In simplest terms, the requirement is for an economic base which will provide maximum feasible support for the build-up and maintenance of a 20 division army and modest air and naval forces for an indefinite period subsequent to February 1954; which will eventually provide maximum feasible support for a 10 division army and small air and naval forces for an indefinite period subsequent to the program period; and which will provide a standard of living high enough to ensure resistance to the blandishments of Communist subversion.

Despite Korea's present appalling lack of visible resources, and the omnipresent possibility of an accelerated inflationary spiral, it is the judgment of the Mission that with necessary external assistance the above objectives can be met in three years.

To meet the objectives, it will be necessary to restore Korean consumption levels to those prevailing in FY 50 and to increase Korean production sufficiently to make this increase in consumption and the greater defense effort economically feasible. This means specifically that per capita consumption should increase from $50 in FY 53 to $70 in FY 56. This increase is feasible. Analysis of production possibilities indicates that during the program period food production could increase by 60 percent, mineral output by 140 percent, industrial output by 160 percent, and that the shortages of fertilizer, fuel, power and transport could be eliminated.

In order to make the Korean economy closer to viability, it will be necessary to decrease imports and to increase exports. Military imports will decline as the ROK economy begins to produce more of the requirements of the ROK Armed Forces. Civilian imports follow a downward trend as food production and fertilizer production increase. Dollar earnings from services and supplies to the UN forces will gradually decline but the increase in commercial exports will overbalance this decline.

The economic expansion implied in these goals must go together with the achievement and maintenance of internal financial stability. Although the annual defense expenditure by the Republic of Korea in dollar equivalents should rise from $90 million in FY 53 to $280 million in FY 56, the rising level of gross national product, together with improvements in tax administration, should progressively narrow the deficit in Government accounts.

The basic concept underlying the above plan is that an integrated Korean relief, reconstruction and defense program of adequate size, composition and timing, carried out with skill and vigor, and appropriately blending external assistance with internal performance by the ROK government, can lead the Korean economy out of its present state of dangerous weakness and to a position of strength great enough to enable the Republic of Korea to carry a substantial share of the necessary defense burden as well as to support its population at pre-war standards of living.

Economic progress in Korea will also permit the elimination of the refugee camps and the relief dole for the millions dislocated and made destitute by the war. These millions will be needed and will find gainful and useful employment in new and expanded production activities. The morale benefits alone of such an accomplishment will be of incalculable value.

The proposed plan also recognizes that the aggregate cost of supporting the defense effort by outside assistance will be less if part of the assistance is devoted to economic reconstruction and to investments increasing Korea's productive resources.

In developing its plan the Mission has examined in detail the consumption requirements of the Republic of Korea and production and investment possibilities and programs in all sectors. The recommendations are grounded in large measure on a ROK five year program, which, however, has been revised to assure principal concentration on key production areas essential to a reconstruction and recovery program. The report assumes, in this connection, that an armistice will be negotiated at the beginning of the three year period, that the guerrilla threat will become negligible by the middle of the first year, and that there will be no substantial change in the current geographical area of the Republic of Korea.

The Mission's optimism that the Korean economy can expand to the degree indicated in the program, while at the same time achieving and maintaining internal financial stability, rests on certain dominant features of the economy which may be summarized as follows:

1. A substantial number of economic problems in Korea are simple, visible, and tangible. A mine is not connected with the national railroad network. Build a short connecting link and this problem is solved. Coal is piling up at pit heads for lack of freight cars. Import freight cars and the coal can be moved. Output of minerals is low, because there are no pneumatic drills. Import these and output will increase tenfold. Priorities in any low level economy are brutal: eat more, heat less, or vice versa; have one pair of shoes a year or repair the roof, but not both. But brutal priorities have the one redeeming feature that they are simple and certain and easy and speedy to administer. And this, of course, holds true for all phases of economic life with a low degree of diversification.

2. In a war-damaged economy completing investments of the simple repair and replacement type abound. There are innumerable instances where "for the lack of a nail the horse was lost." Relatively small repairs and replacements will bring whole industrial aggregates back into production. A little dollar and local currency capital, together with arrangements giving individual initiative the right of way, will rapidly clear up these waste pockets in the industrial structure.

3. In the recent past, large amounts of potential production have been lost due to the interruption of, or the stretch out of, industrial production resulting from actual or anticipated lack of raw materials. Potentially substantial quantities of foodstuffs have been lost as a result of delayed arrival and insufficient quantity of fertilizer. In the early part of the program period large increases in production will result from importing fertilizer and raw materials to capacity levels and by building up stocks that enable an optimum timing and flow of production.

4. Bringing modern equipment into an undeveloped economy provokes production increases far above those normally expected in developed countries. The shift from hand methods and human power to machine methods and mechanical power goes beyond the realm of marginal increments and results in a discontinuous upsurge.

5. In the second part of the program period, the fixed installations, the construction of which was begun in the early program period, will be ready for production. Since in many important production fields, it is a matter of breaking virgin ground, production returns on investment will be high.

6. With returning monetary stability, all the innumerable sources of sloth, waste, and misapplication of human energy, labor, goods, and materials which are now prevalent as a natural consequence of the long drawn out inflation, will come to an end. The vicious spiral of universal speculation, diversion, and corruption will be arrested and a cumulative healing process will set in.

7. Manpower will be brought nearer full utilization but will not become a bottleneck during the period. In FY 56 an estimated available labor force of 9.5 million will meet a calculated manpower requirement of 9.2 million. As regards technical talent, liberal foreign exchange allowances will be made in order to acquire technical personnel from

abroad and vocational training in Korea will proceed at maximum speed.

8. The known deposits of tungsten, columbite, manganese, beryl, gold, anthracite, and graphite in Korea are very valuable and a proper geological survey would probably disclose many more. Even small investments in these opportunities will show very quick and very large returns. As a matter of actual experience, for example, tungsten production in Korea expanded from 1,154 tons in 1951 to 3,789 tons in 1952 and to an annual rate of 5,050 tons in early 1953.

9. In all countries which enter into the early phases of the modernization, industrialization, and commercialization of their national life, large intangible human productivity reserves exist at the outset. These can be mobilized by experts who generate a cumulative process of imitation. No development of new technical or managerial research is needed in Korea. The vast reservoir of knowledge available in Western civilization need only be tapped. And the Koreans, like the Japanese a hundred years ago, have the will and the ability to do so, and are not inhibited by irrational traditions and institutions.

MISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter VIII (Sections A, B and C)

A. *Amounts and Types of United States Assistance*

If the United States is to achieve the stated objective of augmentation of the ROK armed forces around an army of 20 divisions, and if the necessary economic base in support of such forces is to be developed in Korea, Korea must have additional aid and must have it immediately. It is the recommendation of the Mission that the United States institute without delay a new three year program of military support, relief, and reconstruction in Korea. The total amount of such aid represents a blending and a balancing of requirements for economic support of the ROK armed forces, for consumption, for investment in productive facilities, and for the generation of counterpart funds to meet unavoidable budgetary deficits and the local currency costs of investment projects. In consideration of all of these factors the total requirement for external economic assistance to the Republic of Korea for FY 54 is estimated at $533 million, of which $75 million would be supplied by CRIK, $118 million by UNKRA ($71 million U.S.), $300 million based on the present survey, and the balance accounted for by other voluntary and UN contributions. CRIK, the new aid program, and the U.S. share of UNKRA would amount to $446 million in FY 54. It is the estimate of the Mission that total ROK requirements for economic assistance from the U.S. in FY 55 will be $348 million out of a total proposed aid, including UNKRA, of $368 million, and in FY 56 $275 million out of a total of $280 million. The Mission believes that the assistance should be made available over a three year period as the minimum time required to achieve the investment and production goals.

The proposed assistance program is a basic supporting element in an integrated plan designed to lead to balanced development of the ROK economy. The Mission's three year plan is based on a ROK five year plan but concentrates on the key production areas essential to a reconstruction and recovery program. The Mission's plan emphasizes investment in agriculture, mining, industry, transportation, and power, and assumes that mining, agriculture and possibly the cottage industries are those with the greatest export potential. Stress is placed on projects which can achieve the following results: Provide for reconstruction and development of basic services and utilities; rapidly produce increased supplies and essential goods and services; contribute to the attainment of self-sufficiency in food stuffs, fuel, and consumer goods; improve and maintain public health and safety; restore minimum levels of housing and education; and make a beginning on flood control, land reclamation and reforestation. The Mission also recognizes that the long range interests of Korea will be served by establishing technical and vocational schools and using foreign advisors to train Koreans to assume the managerial and technical responsibilities formerly exercised by Japanese.

The Mission has been deeply impressed by the mineral potential of Korea and by the fact that mineral exports are and may well continue to be the greatest dollar earner in commercial trade. In addition to substantial investment in developmental and rehabilitation project, the Mission recommends initiation of a geological survey.

With respect to agriculture, the Mission supports the general recommendations of a FAO team which recently completed a study of Korean agriculture. Principal recommendations included a sharp increase in the application of fertilizer and pesticides; acceleration of the repair and extension of the irrigation systems; a shift in land use so as to increase the production of potatoes and sweet potatoes with a reduction of rice acreage on land not suited to rice; and increased emphasis on land reclamation. In the administration of the economic assistance program, the Mission recommends that domestic grain collections and grain imports be pooled so that cross hauling and local shortages can be avoided.

Imports of consumption goods, added to domestic production, will provide consumption levels by FY 56 approximately equal to those of 1949–50. Grain imports will remain at a fairly high level during FY 54 to enable the Government to meet its grain obligations and replenish stock levels. Grain imports will drop sharply in FY 55 and cease entirely in FY 56, at which time the ROK should have achieved a precarious self-sufficiency in staple foods. There will remain, however, continuing requirements for certain types of food to supplement the Korean diet, deficient in fats and proteins. Certain U.S. surplus commodities, notably butter, dried skim milk, cotton seed oil, and peas and beans, are admirably suited to fill this deficiency. The recommended FY 54 assistance program, therefore, includes U.S. surplus butter, cheese, dried skim milk, cotton seed oil, and peas and beans, valued at $29,000,000, for utilization by ROK armed forces, by institutions and for relief distribution.

Against the cost of the proposed economic assistance program must be measured the substantial reduction in U.S. support of the ROK armed forces which would be effectuated during the same period of time estimated as a reduction in U.S. military assistance from $1,655 million in FY 53 to $660 million in FY 56. Additional savings to the U.S. will accrue from the replacement of U.S. divisions in Korea by ROK divisions. On the basis of present combat support arrangements, the annual saving to the U.S. for each U.S. division replaced by a ROK division is in the magnitude of $100 million. U.S. plans call for withdrawal of a substantial number of U.S. troops in the near future and their replacement with ROK personnel. Pay, allowance, and personnel costs for each increment of 100,000 U.S. troops are in the magnitude of $375 million annually and in a ratio of approximately 8-1 to comparable ROK costs under the new ROK armed forces pay bill approved in April.

With respect to types of U.S. assistance, the Mission recommends continuation of present U.S. appropriations for CRIK and UNKRA, as well as initiation of a new appropriation to accelerate recovery and reconstruction and to provide additional economic support to Korea's defense effort.

The requirement of a Theater Commander for funds for emergency civilian relief in support of his military mission is a recognized aspect of modern military operations, and it is the judgment of the Mission that the CRIK concept should be continued until termination of hostilities permits the elimination of such a peculiarly emergency funding requirement.

Although the military situation in Korea has not eventuated as anticipated at the time of UNKRA's establishment, the Mission does not recommend that UNKRA be phased out of the Korean picture at the present time. The war is based on collective UN action and the concept of rehabilitation has been grounded on the assumption of a UN effort; a move to make the economic assistance program a unilateral U.S. program would undermine the whole concept of collective action. In the long run it would also require the U.S. to assume one hundred percent of the expenditures now borne by UNKRA as opposed to the sixty-five percent to which the U.S. is pledged at present. Furthermore, if there is to be assumed a continuance of the cold war in the future, there must be recognized the serious disadvantage of creating a precedent in Korea which might then require unilateral action by the U.S. in similar situations in the future. Overall, however, it should be noted that although the CRIK, UNKRA, and new economic defense support programs are considered separately, in view of their diverse funding sources, in economic terms they should be considered to represent a single integrated program of economic assistance to Korea.

The Mission has given serious consideration to the question of assimilation of the military assistance program with the economic aid program, as for example, is done in MDAP countries. It has concluded, however, that while such accommodation is undoubtedly desirable, and should be initiated when feasible, substantial additional examination of the matter would be necessary before it could be deemed practicable during the current period of military operations, since potential combat exigencies require the fullest possible flexibility with regard to the extent of direct logistic support furnished the ROK armed forces, including the right to commit from military stocks whatever support is deemed necessary by the combat commander.

It is the opinion of the Mission, in view of the comparability of the proposed new aid program to defense support programs elsewhere, that appropriations for the new program should be sought through MSA and that funds for the UNKRA should be requested through MSA as a part of the same appropriation. It is further the view of the Mission that as long as the military situation continues to require that the Theater Commander have immediate access to funds for emergency civilian relief, funds for CRIK should continue to be requested, as at present, from the military budget.

With regard to requisite appropriation language, it is believed that the CRIK language should remain substantially as at present. Language for the proposed economic defense support program should be designed to provide the greatest possible flexibility in the use of funds, language such as that authorizing European aid programs being considered appropriate. It is believed that the U.S. contribution to UNKRA should be appropriated as part of the economic defense support appropriation, with the legislative language providing for transfer of funds to UNKRA to meet the U.S. pledge to UNKRA. It would also be desirable for the language to permit transfer of funds to UNKRA additional to those actually pledged to date by the U.S. This would serve not only to avoid duplications of personnel and effort in the reconstruction field but could also serve to solicit further contributions to UNKRA from other nations on the basis of the existing 65/35 sharing of UNKRA costs between the U.S. and other nations.

B. *Efficient Utilization of United States Assistance*

The Government of Korea necessarily has sovereign authority over all economic matters in Korea. However, it does not have command over sufficient resources to meet the minimum requirements of the civilian population, let alone the needs for larger military forces or for reconstruction. United Nations agencies have no sovereign or occupational authority in Korea, but they do possess, or can be provided with, sufficient resources to meet the above requirements. Solution of Korea's economic problems, therefore, demands not only proper coordination between United Nations agencies and the ROK but binding assurances by the Government of Korea that it will take such steps as are necessary to guarantee the most effective use of resources made available under external assistance programs.

UNC economic coordination with the Republic of Korea is presently achieved through the Combined Economic Board. Although the provisions of the UC-ROK Economic Coordination Agreement provide that the Board will consider all pertinent aspects of the economy of Korea, in practice the Board's actions during the past year have been limited to matters specifically involving United Nations Command economic relationships with the Republic of Korea, e.g., pricing of CRIK aid goods, repayment for United Nations hwan drawings, determination of a new military conversion rate, etc. It is the considered judgment of the Mission that the Combined Economic Board should devote a far more substantial proportion of its time than at present to the development of internal financial and economic policies in Korea which will strengthen the economic structure of the Republic of Korea and its capacity for self-support and self-defense. A new aid agreement between the United States and the Republic of Korea, or basic amendments to the existing Agreement on Economic Coordination, will be required as a means of assuring positive ROK action on necessary economic and financial measures. The initiation of a defense support program which will sharply change the emphasis from furnishing aid to prevent disease and unrest to furnishing aid to stabilize, rehabilitate and develop the economy requires significant modifications in the Agreement. Furthermore, the existing agreement, as do ECA/MSA Agreements, describes in general terms the economic policies to be followed. Experience has shown that such agreed generalities are not effective in obtaining the decisive economic action required in Korea. Specific policies of the following nature to be added to the more general policies now in the Agreement are therefore recommended:

1. The establishment of a single valid exchange rate as soon as practicable which would be applicable to all transactions between hwan and foreign currencies.
2. The pricing of imported goods into the economy at the single valid exchange rate, except as may be agreed by the Board in special circumstances and for a temporary period.
3. The development of a comprehensive plan for promoting the sale or long-term leasing of state-owned industries and other productive enterprises to private buyers and the encouragement of private enterprise. The transfer of foreign trade from governmental to private channels having due regard to ROK constitutional requirements.
4. The adjustment of the price structure, i.e., the rate of exchange, prices and wages, to monetize income and make unnecessary hidden subsidies.

5. The coordination of economic and financial policies in the Combined Economic Board including particularly those concerning budgetary, tax, investment and credit policies.

It would be possible to achieve all the necessary modifications described above by an amendment to the Agreement on Economic Coordination. This would have the advantage of avoiding possible difficulties in renegotiating an agreement already in force. The amendments, however, would be so numerous that the Mission recommends the recasting of the existing agreement plus modifications in a new aid agreement. In this connection, however, it should be noted that in ROK eyes the development of a 20 division army is the Korean *quid pro quo* for the proposed assistance program. Since the Republic of Korea even prior to receiving any formal assurance of additional U.S. aid has already begun the augmentation of its armed forces in accordance with U.S. desires, the Government may well take the position that the U.S. assistance is being granted only with unwarranted conditions, whereas the ROK share of the compact is being carried out freely and unconditionally.

In addition, it would be highly useful to provide that the new agreement will become effective upon ratification by the ROK Assembly. The Agreement on Economic Coordination was not ratified by the Assembly and the Government has been hampered, especially in the pricing field, by actions taken by the Assembly which prevent full compliance with the agreement.

Later implementation of the agreement will require that the Republic of Korea take a number of politically unpalatable but nevertheless imperative steps to normalize the country's financial structure. These include but are not limited to:

1. Strenuous efforts to balance the Government's budget notwithstanding the military build-up, including reduction in proposed FY 53/54 government expenditures to the extent noted in this report. Development of a phased schedule of government expenditures consistent with revenue income.
2. Stringent credit policies, particularly with respect to loans to governments and government-sponsored enterprises.
3. Use of counterpart funds to promote monetary stability and recommended investment programs, within the framework of the general efforts of the Republic of Korea to avoid inflation.
4. Initiation of a study of the existing system of controlled prices with a view to moving as rapidly as possible to a free market price basis.

The Mission finds that the financial weakness of the Republic of Korea represents a most serious threat to the accomplishment of U.S. objectives in Korea. Without additional external assistance the outlook is for more inflation in Korea. Even additional external assistance will not be fully effective unless the ROK Government modifies current financial policies and operations. Some changes may require legislative action but much of the work can be accomplished through the machinery of the Combined Economic Board where the joint nature of the decisions will provide desirable support to ROK actions. The United States member should also be enabled to lend the necessary technical experts available in the United States—tax experts, administrative specialists, accountants, etc.

In connection with Government spending, the Mission finds that proposed FY 1953/54 budgetary expenditures can be safely reduced without damage to the objectives of military strength and economic recovery. The Mission recommends that the ROK Government adopt as a working figure the suggested amount in this report and further that an exhaustive reexamination of the budget be undertaken as soon as possible with a view toward achieving more economies in expenditures. The Mission is convinced that vigorous efforts in the tax collections field will yield substantial increases in government receipts and recommends a tax investigation under CEB auspices. Where U.S. and UN military and civilian establishments can assist tax efforts, as by income tax deduction from salaries, such arrangements should be instituted without delay. Although it regards adequate government pay scales as indispensable for efficient government operation the Mission urges postponement of pay increases and other deferrable expenditures until significant improvement in the government's financial position is achieved. Finally, the Mission recommends that the closest coordination be achieved between government disbursements and aid arrivals.

The Mission finds that in principle existing credit controls provide adequate machinery for limiting expansion of the money supply through bank lending but that the controls are ineffective in practice because of the Monetary Board's inability to limit borrowing by Government and Government-sponsored enterprises. The Board must be strengthened and given greater authority in making and controlling implementation of monetary and credit policy. The Mission believes that great progress can be made in this direction by arranging for Board members to participate in CEB deliberations as representatives of the monetary policy authority of the Republic of Korea, since credit policy is of strategic importance on questions affecting the control of the money supply. The mission further recommends that the Monetary Board engage an experienced banking and monetary advisor to be made available by the U.S. Government to render policy and technical assistance to the Board in decisions affecting loans and credit policy.

The Mission finds that the existing extensive government ownership and control of industry has acted as an obstacle to developing a healthy economy. Government enterprises are financially weak, poorly managed and suffer from government restrictions, red tape and arbitrary price policies. The Mission recommends the development of a comprehensive plan to promote the sale or long-term leasing of vested properties to private buyers.

The operating losses of the large Government enterprises constitute a continuing pressure for bank loans to cover the losses. The Mission recommends that CEB direct an investigation into the financial position of these enterprises. The Mission further recommends that such an examination include study of Government monopoly operations and transportation with the view toward increasing revenue derived by the government from these activities.

The Mission believes that the United States Government should assist Korea in determining the feasibility of establishing banking facilities to mobilize domestic capital for long term investment purposes and should use a portion of counterpart derived from the aid program to support this purpose. The Mission further recommends that the Republic of Korea Government be urged to implement the General Banking Act to give the Monetary Board greater supervisory authority over the bank institutions of the country.

With regard to the use of foreign exchange resources of the Republic of Korea, the Mission finds that present regulations and procedures governing exchange transactions preven the most effective use of available exchange. The Mission feels that full control in determining foreign exchange policy should be shifted from the Ministry of Finance to the Monetary Board to permit the Board better to integrate the use of available exchange with fiscal and credit policies. The Mission recommends that the CEB request the Monetary Board and Bank of Korea to develop recommendations designed to simplify existing foreign trade and foreign exchange procedures including steps to permit authorized commercial banks to deal in foreign exchange. The Mission further recommends a foreign exchange budget be developed in consultation with the CEB to coordinate foreign exchange policy with external assistance.

The Mission has found that the existing system of controlled prices has proved to be ineffective in treating the economic problems of the country and regards the system as an obstacle to economic recovery. The Mission recommends that the CEB direct a study of the existing system and recommend changes in the direction of moving as rapidly as possible to a free market price basis. The Mission urges that adjustment of prices and wages be made not later than six months after the aid program. The Mission also feels that the Government should accept as an objective the monetization of incomes and the elimination of payments in kind as rapidly as possible.

The Mission recommends a devaluation of the official rate of exchange to a level established in consultation with the CEB. The Mission feels that agreement by the Republic of Korea to the military conversion rate of 180–1 provides a basis for consultation leading to the establishment of a single rate of exchange. The exchange rate adjustment and the price wage adjustment referred to above must be made together and the Republic of Korea Government should accept as an objective the establishment of a new rate not later than six months after the initiation of the recommended aid program. In the interim period the Mission recommends that ROK agreement be sought on a policy of pricing aid goods at free market prices.

Korean membership in both the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development should be supported by the United States Government. The Mission further recommends that the United States Government encourage the Republic of Korea to consult with and seek technical assistance on its financial problems from the Fund and the Bank.

Rationalization of the price structure and development of a valid exchange rate will be of extreme importance in opening the way to Korean participation in the U.S. offshore procurement program. Offshore procurement in Korea of small arms, ammunition, vehicle maintenance, etc. will serve to stimulate defense industries and provide a source of dollar earnings. Further, permitting Korean bidding for items now normally purchased in Japan would have a stimulating and rehabilitating effect on Korea out of all proportion to the amount involved. It would have the further healthy effect of exposing segments of Korean industry to international competition.

An important aspect of the proposed new assistance program would be greater Korean participation at all levels than is true with respect to present programs. It is recognized that possibly the most serious factor limiting ROK economic development may well turn out to be a shortage of professional and technical skills, which can only be overcome step by step. As rapidly as possible, however, it is proposed to increase Korean participation in programming and procurement for all aid programs, supporting such participation as necessary, with foreign advisors employed and paid by the ROK Governments and industry.

The political importance of such measures can hardly be overestimated. Considerable resentment exists in the ROK Government regarding the UNKRA method of procurement which excludes the ROK from operational participation. Desire to be treated as an equal partner is one of the strongest factors in Korean morale, fully understandable in view of the political subjugation of Korea in recent times. Furthermore, as a practical matter, it is desirable that the U.S. pursue a policy of permitting the Koreans to stand on their own feet in such matters as these as soon as possible. Finally, in view of the Government's greater familiarity with Korean needs and conditions, a primary Korean role in procurement is deemed essential to assure the most effective use of U.S. aid in meeting basic Korean requirements.

The development in the CEB of the annual investment program will naturally involve judicious consideration of dollar and hwan costs and availability for investment programs and will probably require some revision of the current concepts under which UNKRA funds are considered to be available only for UNKRA sponsored projects and CRIK only for U.S. sponsored projects.

The Mission further recommends that as soon as practicable discussions leading to a comprehensive civil affairs agreement be initiated. The stability of the military situation no longer justifies the continuation of the emergency arrangements under which U.S. Forces now obtain the use of facilities and services. An agreement independent of the aid agreement is preferable because of the nature of the subject matter and of the time element; the civil affairs agreement negotiation will be lengthy, and it is necessary to initiate an expanded aid program with as little loss of time as is possible.

C. *Coordination of Economic Programs*

The absence of central authority for economic assistance to Korea cannot be corrected absolutely, because of the division of responsibility which must inevitably persist between the Republic of Korea and the US/UN. There must, however, be complete coordination on the US/UN side and it is imperative that all external economic assistance to the Republic of Korea, including relief, rehabilitation, and assistance for defense support be coordinated, integrated, and implemented under one head now and in the post-hostilities period for all economic activities in Korea, as has been done in the military field, including positive operational control over UNKRA. Such delegation of over-all economic responsibility to the UC and UNC would only recognize facts based on the needs of the situation, for there can be only one effective and authoritative voice for all United Nations economic activities in Korea.

It would further be anticipated that subject only to overriding military consideration UNC operational responsibilities in the economic field would in effect be concentrated in a special U.S. representative with headquarters in Korea, who would represent both the President and CINCUNC, who would serve as the CINCUNC Representative on the Combined Economic Board, and who would direct and coordinate the over-all economic assistance program. This would not only provide the necessary program integration but would also ensure Korean support of the UNKRA program in a measure that has been and is conspicuously lacking. In addition it would provide a bridge to the post-hostilities period in anticipation of the eventual phasing out of the UNC.

It is anticipated that the internal organization of the UNKRA Mission in Korea could be maintained substantially as at present except that certain general functions common to all aid programs would be transferred to the Office of the Special Representative. UNKRA responsibilities would be essentially those of project development and implementation in the rehabilitation and reconstruction fields with funds available to that agency, or with such other funds as might be made available. It is also anticipated that UNKRA would be assigned such other responsibilities as appropriate and that UNKRA personnel would be freely seconded to KCAC, as is true at the present time, and to the Office of the Special Representative. By and large it is considered that KCAC will continue most of its present responsibilities with regard to the operational aspects of civilian relief programs and will also assume such operational responsibilities with regard to other aid programs as experience may indicate to be desirable.

To assure appropriate consideration in the Combined Economic Board of all aspects of the over-all assistance program, it is recommended that both the Commanding General of KCAC and the UNKRA Mission Chief in Korea be appointed Deputy CINCUNC representatives on the Combined Economic Board.

A program of the nature herein proposed is also of concern to several of the departments and agencies of the United States Government, including the Departments of Defense, State, and Treasury, the Mutual Security Agency, and the Bureau of the Budget.

Over-all responsibility for economic assistance to Korea should be assigned to the Director of Mutual Security or his successor, who would finalize annual programs, justify them to Congress, and direct the expenditure of funds. This would not necessarily preclude the administration of CRIK funds by the Department of the Army or of funds appropriated to UNKRA by appropriate UNKRA officials, but would assure that all available funds were expended as part of a single over-all program.

In view of the diversity of interests involved during the continuance of hostilities, it is also believed that it will be necessary to continue to maintain a forum for inter-departmental cooperation at a senior and policy-making level. To assure this, it is recommended that the present National Security Council Subcommittee on Korea be continued in existence. In the event that this is not feasible, it is considered essential that there be established a committee of senior departmental and agency representatives outside of the National Security Council framework to provide the necessary forum.

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, Telephone Conversations

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the President [1]

[WASHINGTON,] June 24, 1953—6:26 p. m.

The President called with reference to the cable to Clark,[2] which Wilson and Fechteler brought to him, and which he understands was prepared in State. The President thinks that Clark is in a better position than we are here to figure out what will influence Rhee, we sent Robertson and Collins out, and they are capable men. This message says "If ROK government remains completely intransigent you would not actually sign an armistice"—how are we going to find out what he will do. The President said he is frightened by the message as it stands. The Secretary said he understood that it was a joint message worked out by Defense and State.

The Secretary said he thought it was important that Clark understand that he should begin to do something about the "new arrangements" and if he does so it might make Rhee stop and think. The President repeated that we were too far away to be sending long directives, let's support Robertson and Clark since we have them out there. He thought we could send out a short message telling Clark to begin thinking in practical matters and prepare for it, and we think it wise to let Rhee know that we are preparing. He said Defense was frightened at this message and brought it to him. They can all meet at 8:30 Thursday morning and go over it, but just send a short one out tonight.[3]

The Secretary said we should also discuss the further point as to whether we should attempt to sign an armistice without Korea. The President said we won't know until that time, the Secretary said we know now we cannot carry it out—we don't have the POW's. After consultation with Defense the President said that militarily we would be in a better position if we sign the armistice and then get out than if we don't and have to get out anyway. The Secretary said that such an armistice would not last 24 hours. The President thought it might help preserve the integrity of our own troops. The Secretary said that if we made any deals at the expense of South Korea, we would have a terrific public reaction in this country. The President said we must recognize that the Communists are still "the enemy". Defense then raised the question of whether any message need go out tonight in view of the morning meeting, but the Secretary said he didn't think any action would come about until Clark begins to talk about what we are going to do, which will develop a feeling of chagrin in Korea.

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[1] Although there was no indication on the source text, this memorandum was probably drafted by Burnita O'Day, Dulles' personal secretary.

[2] The reference was to a draft of what was finally transmitted as telegram JCS 942368 to Clark, June 25, p. 1271.

[3] At 6:55 p.m., June 24, the JCS sent Clark the following message in telegram JCS 942260: "Ref President's letter to Rhee of 18 June. Please advise of any action initiated or contemplated in the direction of 'another arrangement'." (FE files, lot 55 D 338, "Korean Political Conference, June 1953")

General Collins replied to JCS 942260 from Tokyo on June 25 (telegram C 63320 to the JCS):

"I have discussed with Clark possible plans in event 'another arrangement' must be made in lieu of armistice. Clark informs me he instructed Taylor some time ago to develop such plans. I discussed this morning with Clark and key members his staff necessity of prompt completion of such plans. With Clark's concurrence, I will follow up with Taylor this evening at Taegu. I will be prepared on my return Washington to outline specific details of plans which will be developed under two or three sets of assumptions." (JCS records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45))

The President said he would talk to Defense some more and have them call the Secretary when they had something. The Secretary said that would not be necessary if the President talked to them.

Seoul Embassy files, lot 61 F 98

Memorandum of Discussion of a Meeting Held at Tokyo on the Korean Situation [1]

TOP SECRET

Present: General Clark
General Collins
Assistant Secretary Robertson
Assistant Secretary McCardle
Ambassador Briggs
Ambassador Murphy
General Milburn
Colonel Throckmorton
Colonel Conine
Mr. Kenneth Young
Mr. John A. Calhoun

Date: June 24 and 25, 1953

The conferees met in General Clark's headquarters Wednesday afternoon, June 24 and again on Thursday, June 25. Mr. Robertson summarized the points that he had emphasized in his meetings with President Rhee and showed General Clark a copy of Secretary Dulles' letter to President Rhee [2] which General Clark read to the meeting. General Clark also read and the conferees discussed at length Rhee's draft *Aide-Mémoire.*[3] At the end of the second meeting the conferees drafted a radio to State, Defense and JCS summarizing the conclusions of the conferees.[4] The following is a summary of the principal subjects discussed:

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[1] The source text did not indicate a drafter. Clark described this meeting in his *From the Danube to the Yalu,* p. 285.

[2] Dated June 22, p. 1238.

[3] For text, see telegram CX 63282, Clark to JCS, June 23, p. 1240.

1. *Military Situation.* General Clark began the conference with a report on the casualties which the UN forces had sustained during the past two weeks. He also described the Communist capability for renewed military pressure.

2. *Mr. Robertson's Discussions with Rhee.* Mr. Robertson informed General Clark of the views of President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles regarding President Rhee, his opposition to an armistice and the desirability of eliminating any possible misunderstandings and making clear our desire to work closely with the ROK following an armistice. The essential point is President Rhee cannot dictate the global policy of the United States or the basic decisions of the UN. Mr. Robertson outlined his view that an armistice puts Rhee and the ROK in a much stronger position than it had in 1950 because now it can benefit from a treaty with the United States, increased economic aid, the greater sanctions statement,[5] and a political conference in which the United States is pledged to the ROK in full support. Mr. Robertson stated that the Secretary wants him to stress to President Rhee that he should realize the United States does not conceive of itself as just another member along with several other UN members in a political conference. Rather the US will work closely with the ROK to develop a joint strategy for a political conference. The Secretary believes there is a good chance to get a unified Korea if we work closely with the ROK. Mr. Robertson also pointed out to General Clark that he had come to supplement all the efforts that General Clark and Ambassador Briggs had been making during the past few weeks with President Rhee.

3. *Korean Draft Aide-Mémoire.* Both meetings went over the draft *Aide-Mémoire* in considerable detail. General Clark read it in full. On the four conditions listed in the draft *Aide-Mémoire* the conferees agreed as follows:

(a). The first one would be completely impractical. The United States Government could not commit itself to undertake to get an agreement with the Communists on a time limit for the conference. The US Government could only again tell the ROK that it would try to proceed promptly and vigorously in a political conference to obtain the objectives which both the US and the ROK want.

(b). The second condition on military aid would be no problem, in Mr. Robertson's opinion. If the situation develops satisfactorily he could talk in general terms about a mutual defense treaty. Mr. Robertson said that he had brought along a draft which he might discuss with the Korean officials. General Clark said he had seen this draft.

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[4] Sent as telegram CX 63325, *infra.*

[5] For text of the statement, see the Annex to NSC 154, p. 1173.

(c). The provision of economic and military aid would also not present any problems. Mr. Robertson pointed out that Tasca's recommendations[6] were under urgent consideration in Washington.

(d). The conferees discussed the question of prisoners at some length.

4. *The Problem of Remaining Non-Repatriates.* General Clark pointed out that Rhee is extremely firm on opposing the entry into the Republic of Korea of any indoctrinators or Communist members of the N.N.R.C. He also reported that unless conditions were changed in some way the remaining 8600 Korean non-repatriates would sooner or later, and probably sooner, break out of their camps. General Clark described at some length his strong views against using force to prevent such break-outs which, he said, had received immediate and complete support of Washington. Accordingly, General Clark was extremely concerned to find some way of getting around Rhee's opposition and the probability of break-outs. He told the conferees that he had discussed this matter frankly with President Rhee and had asked him for time to work the problem out. Rhee gave him his word of honor that Korean security units still under the UN Command would cooperate on Cheju-do Island in so far as the Chinese prisoners were concerned. The only way to avoid the break-out of the remaining 8600 Korean prisoners is to obtain Rhee's cooperation on some compromise. General Clark said that he had proposed to Rhee, as he had informed Washington, that the 8600 Koreans be moved to the demilitarized zone and processed there by the N.N.R.C. and that the Chinese non-repatriates be sent to a neutral country. A variation of this would be to get Rhee's agreement to retain the Chinese on Cheju-do and let the N.N.R.C. process them there. General Clark has not proposed this yet to Rhee but he thought that Rhee might agree to it. General Clark also mentioned the last possible course of action of moving all of the non-repatriates to the demilitarized zone. He stated that he had the logistical capability of doing that though it might be difficult. Mr. Robertson and General Collins pointed out that moving the Chinese to a neutral country or to the D.Z. would face considerable opposition in the Congress and in the United States.

General Clark believed that the Communists would accept these arrangements and would accept such textual modifications in the prisoner agreement as might be necessary. He did not feel that these changes in the agreement would be material. He feels that the Communists definitely want an armistice. Ambassador Murphy strongly concurred in General Clark's opinion regarding the Communist attitude.

5. *Prompt Signing of Armistice and Reply to Communist Letter of June 19.*[7] General Clark and Ambassador Murphy both strongly recommend-

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[6] For an excerpt of the Tasca report, see enclosure 2, p. 1247.

[7] Text of the letter is printed in Department of State *Bulletin,* June 29, 1953, pp. 906–907. The questions contained in the letter were summarized in telegram CX 63228, Clark to JCS, June 20, p. 1224.

ed that a reply be sent promptly to the Communists in response to their four questions of June 19. General Clark read a draft reply which his staff had done up.[8] He said it was going to be sent to Washington on June 25 or 26. The general sense of the draft reply was to the effect that the ROK is a sovereign state, and the UNC has control over ROK forces now; the ROK Government had violated this control by orders unknown to CINCUNC; the armistice is between the two military commands which involves the ROK on the UN side but does not require ROK signature; the cooperation of ROK civil authorities will be needed to implement the armistice and the command will attempt to obtain such cooperation; the Command will institute necessary military safeguards for the personnel of the N.N.R.C.; the escape of the prisoners was regrettable and resulted from the collusion between ROK security guards and the ROK civil authorities; and the UNC will continue to seek the escapees. It was agreed that whatever the final nature of a reply to the Communist letter, reply should await developments of Mr. Robertson's mission.

It would be desirable to get the armistice signed as soon as possible, the conferees agreed, particularly with a view to bringing Rhee's opposition to a head and to take the necessary measures during the next few days regarding this opposition. General Clark and Ambassador Murphy stressed the urgent desirability of getting an armistice in order to terminate the high casualties of recent weeks. On the assumption that the armistice is signed and Rhee withdraws his forces for continued action, General Clark pointed out that he would undertake redeployment of UN forces so that ROK forces alone would hold the eastern part of the line and UN forces a shorter line on the west. General Clark outlined the various military possibilities that might theoretically occur if the Communists moved against the ROK part of the line.

There was some feeling that if an armistice could not be obtained as a result of the ROK opposition thereto, the UN should work out an alternate arrangement with the Communists. Some of the difficulties involved in this course were discussed. There was some discussion of the difficulties which ROK intransigence would present if we went ahead and signed an armistice.

6. *Possible Courses of Action.* There was considerable discussion of three possible courses of action:

(a). Defer the armistice and continue the hostilities along with the ROK,

(b). Conclude an armistice despite ROK opposition,

(c). Some other arrangement permitting our ultimate withdrawal from Korea.

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[8] In joint State-Defense message, JCS 942083, June 23, Clark was instructed not to answer the questions posed by the Communists. This telegram is not printed, but see footnote 5, p. 1225.

The first course of action is considered unacceptable particularly in terms of American public reaction. The second course of action seemed impractical because the Communists would probably insist on assurances of ROK cooperation in implementation of the armistice which we would not be able to provide. While the Communists might nevertheless conclude an armistice under such conditions ROK capabilities for frustrating or preventing the execution of the armistice make it highly doubtful that we should go through with this course of action. The foregoing points were all brought out by various participants but no consensus of views was reached.

The third possibility General Clark explained his "think piece" about a meeting with the top Communist leaders. Some strong doubt about the advisability of such an approach was expressed around the table. By way of an alternate General Collins expressed the opinion that we should not sign the armistice if Rhee will not cooperate in its implementation. In that event we should make an arrangement with the Communists in lieu of an armistice under which the Communists would permit our withdrawal and return our prisoners in their hands.

All the conferees agreed that the time had come to tell Rhee the blunt truth that the United States will have no other alternative but to get out if he pursues his present policy. This conclusion led to long discussion of how it should be done and what the military and political effects would be. Ambassador Murphy pointed out that it would require the consultation with the 15 other governments with forces in Korea. The reaction of the ROK military leaders was canvassed but no firm or final evaluation came out of the matter as to the possibility that they might take matters into their own hands if Rhee remained adamant and if the ROK leaders were convinced that the US meant business about withdrawal. On the question of positive measures by us against Rhee it was the feeling of the conferees that that would be impractical because that would be extremely difficult to carry out and would consume a lot of time in preparation.

7. *Decision Needed.* All of the conferees unanimously agreed that a decision was needed in Washington within the next three or four days regarding the question of withdrawal and authorization to put this matter bluntly to Rhee and the ROK military leaders, during the course of Mr. Robertson's and General Collins' visit to Korea.

795.00/6–2553: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

TOKYO, June 25, 1953—4:34 p. m.

CX 63325. (Army Message) To Department Army Washington, information American Embassy Pusan (exclusive for Ambassador Briggs). This is a joint Robertson–Collins message for State, Defense and JCS.

The following conclusions reached at a conference 24 June, attended by General Clark, Ambassador Murphy, Ambassador Briggs, Mr. Robertson and General Collins: [1]

1. All here are convinced that signing an armistice as soon as possible is most desirable.

2. A reply should be made to the Communists' letter of 20 [2] June as soon as possible after Robertson has completed his talks with Rhee.

3. Clark and Murphy believe that there is a chance of the Communists accepting an armistice even though we cannot specifically guarantee that Rhee will live up to all of its provisions, provided we assure Communists we will do everything practicable to insure compliance.

4. Clark and Murphy believe that Communists will agree, without material change in text of present agreement to an armistice under conditions proposed by CINCUNC in his DTG 221100Z,[3] as modified by his DTG 230020Z,[4] re removal of POW's to demilitarized zone, thus obviating necessity for presence of Indian troops and NNRC personnel in South Korea. Provided agreement with Rhee can be reached on other conditions, he might finally agree to allow Chinese anti-Communists to remain on Cheju-Do and Indian troops and NNRC to take over their control there.

5. Clark is convinced that remaining Korean POW's (approximately 8,600) not desiring to return to North Korea will eventually escape unless agreement can be made with Rhee for their eventual removal to demilitarized zone; however, Clark feels even their escape would not bar the acceptance by Communists of an armistice. (See CINCUNC messages DTG 250610Z [5] and DTG 221100Z).

6. All conferees agree that final decisions on UN plan in event of Rhee intransigence should be reached within a few days.

7. All agree that if Rhee remains intransigent, Robertson should be authorized to inform Rhee that UN will get out of Korea. In this event we should be prepared to make an agreement with the Communists, in-

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[1] See memorandum of discussion, *supra.*

[2] For a text of this letter, see Department of State *Bulletin,* June 29, 1953, pp. 906–907. The *Bulletin* dated this letter June 19.

[3] Dated June 22, p. 1231.

[4] Dated June 23, p. 1240.

[5] Not printed.

dependent of Republic of Korea for withdrawal of UN forces. Provision would also have to be made for release by Communists of our POW's remaining in their hands.

8. Feeling here is that if Rhee is convinced that we mean to withdraw he might change his attitude.

General Clark feels that the only conditions under which there might be a possibility that the Republic of Korea Army would take action to replace present Republic of Korea Government would be after Rhee had been informed categorically that we intend to withdraw from Korea unless he agrees to armistice and the Republic of Korea Army is convinced that we mean business.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 25, 1953—6:23 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 942368. From JCS for CINCUNC. This is jt State-Defense msg.

1. In accordance with para 1 of ur CX 63325,[2] you are authorized at time considered appropriate by you to proceed with negots toward conclusion armis. You are further authorized widest latitude in specific terms of armis and handling problem ROK attitude toward armis. You may negotiate such changes in present draft armis agreement as you may consider nec or desirable in light of situation provided you adhere to principle on non-forced repatriation and undertake no obligation to the Commies, express or implied, legal or moral, to use force against ROKs to insure their compliance with armistice terms.

2. Rhee shld be informed of ur intentions to proceed with conclusion of armis. Method of doing this is left to ur discretion.

3. In view of broad authority granted you in para 1 above, reply to Commie questions in their letter of 20 June is left to ur discretion.

4. Re para 7 of CX 63325, you shld make no commitment, agreement or action which would require total UNC withdrawal from Korea. However, this need not prevent you from taking any action which might lead ROK polit and mil leaders to believe that if ROK compliance with armis is not forthcoming UNC is prepared to withdraw from Korea. Tactics in this regard are left entirely to ur judgment.

5. We will be prepared promptly to authorize you to sign armis agreement if Commies are willing to sign under foregoing conditions.

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[1] Sent exclusive for Clark. On an amended draft of this telegram there appears the following handwritten note: "Approved by JCS and submitted to State with the understanding it will be submitted further to Sec Def and President for clearance." (JCS records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)) For a discussion of the initial draft on June 24, see the memorandum of telephone conversation, p. 1264.

[2] *Supra.*

However, if assurance of ROK compliance with armis is not forthcoming prior to signature, it will not be possible to obtain simultaneous issuance of "Greater Sanctions" statement as previously agreed by sixteen participating govts, and may not be possible at all.

6. It is expected that foregoing instructions will be coordinated with Robertson and that you will continue to coordinate with Murphy and Briggs as appropriate.[3]

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[3] Clark replied to the JCS in telegram C 63347 on June 26:

"1. I am grateful for the auth and responsibility you have given me in JCS 942368. I am flying to Korea tomorrow to coordinate my future actions with Robertson and Briggs and expect to see Rhee with Robertson tomorrow afternoon. Murphy will go with me. For your info I am sending within a few hours the text of my reply to the Commie letr of 20 Jun. This will be strengthened or altered depending upon any reassurances which may be obtained from Rhee tomorrow. In any event I intend to have my reply dlvr by Harrison to the Commies, probably the fol day, with a view to resuming negotiations leading towards the conclusion of an armistice. This is my preliminary thinking. I am convinced that the sooner we sign an armistice, with or without Rhee's support, the better our psn will be to handle Rhee when we are not worried about a Commie atk. I will keep you advised of my plans based on further dev[elopments]." (JCS files)

S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 157 Series

Report by the National Security Council Planning Board Submitted to the National Security Council[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 25, 1953.

NSC 157

U.S. OBJECTIVE WITH RESPECT TO KOREA FOLLOWING AN ARMISTICE

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the basic U.S. objective with respect to Korea.

ASSUMPTION

2. An armistice is concluded.

DISCUSSION

3. *Background.* The armistice terms call for a political conference on Korea within 90 days after the signing of the armistice. The conference will be between the Communists and the UN, with the Republic of Korea associated with the latter. U.S. tactics should be determined in the light of what the U.S. basic objective is with respect to Korea, within the limits of the feasible. The achievement of a unified Korea under the Republic of Korea, tied into the U.S. security system and de-

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[1] This report was transmitted to the NSC under a covering note by Lay, June 30, in which the Executive Secretary of the NSC explained that the report, prepared by the Department of State and reviewed by the Planning Board, would be submitted for consideration at the July 2 meeting of the NSC. For a draft of this paper as prepared by the Department of State on June 15, see p. 1180.

veloped as a military ally, is not a practical possibility under present circumstances. This objective could be achieved only by the forceful expulsion of the Communists from Korea and was in effect relinquished when the present armistice was accepted.

4. *Alternative Feasible Objectives.*

a. A Korea divided for an indefinite period on the present demarcation line with the Republic of Korea tied into the U.S. security system and developed as a military ally.

b. A unified, neutralized Korea under a substantially unchanged ROK. (Such an objective would entail Communist agreement to a unified Korea with a U.S. political orientation in exchange for U.S. agreement to remove U.S. forces and bases from Korea and not to conclude a mutual security pact with Korea. This objective should also involve guarantees for the territorial and political integrity of a unified Korea under the ROK and its admission to the UN and possibly would involve limitations on the level and character of the ROK defense forces.)

5. *Communist Position.* The Communist acceptance of the present armistice indicates that they would be prepared to acquiesce in the first alternative which would in effect represent a continuation of the *status quo.* The Communists might conceivably regard the second alternative as preferable to the first. The Communists have little to fear from the Koreans themselves, who occupy a small country disorganized and weakened by war and entertain no irredentist aspirations at the expense of China or Siberia. Communist concern over Korea arises primarily from the fact that it could serve as a base or jump-off place for U.S., or perhaps ultimately Japanese, power. Even though the unification of Korea on a neutralized basis would mean the sacrifice of the satellite North Korean regime and of considerable prestige, the Communists might possibly be prepared to accept this sacrifice as a means of preventing the establishment of U.S. bases within a few hundred miles of Manchurian and North Chinese industrial, transportation, and port facilities. Moreover, the Communists would rid themselves of an economic liability which North Korea, as a result of the war, would represent for some time to come. From the global point of view the Communists might conceive of a Korean settlement of this kind as providing an opportunity for "deeds" of a peaceful nature which might not be of net disadvantage to themselves.

6. *The Position of U.S. Allies.* Most of the nations of the free world, both European and Asian, would probably be strongly in favor of the neutralization of Korea both because such a settlement would appear to remove an area of dangerous friction between the U.S. and the Communist world and thus reduce the danger of general war and because the creation of a strong U.S. position in South Korea would result in a drain on U.S. resources which otherwise would be available for investment elsewhere. Nationalist China, which tends to fear any relaxation

of tension between Communist China and the U.S., would doubtless regard unfavorably the neutralization of Korea. The Japanese, on the whole, would support such neutralization.

7. *The Position of the ROK.* The strong and highly emotional objections of President Syngman Rhee and the people of the ROK to any continuation of the division of Korea have been made abundantly plain. A settlement providing for a united and independent Korea under the ROK could be expected to appeal to them in meeting their primary objectives. It is possible that President Rhee would rather be the liberator and unifier of his country than President of a truncated Korea, even though this Korea were allied with the U.S. Even though Rhee might place little value on any Communist guarantees, he might consider that a guarantee of Korea's integrity by both the U.S. and the Communist bloc would provide Korea with adequate security.

8. *U.S. Interest as Between the Two Feasible Alternatives.* An independent and united Korea has been a constant U.S. political objective. This objective can now feasibly be achieved only through the neutralization of Korea. The relinquishment of its military position in Korea which would result from neutralization would not be critical for the U.S. In the event of general war, the desirability of attempting to defend Korea would be problematical. With respect to the danger of local aggression against Korea it would in any case be only the prospect of retaliation by the U.S. forces that would deter such aggression. The danger of internal subversion of indirect aggression in Korea could and should be countered by adequate Korean security forces and economic assistance. On the positive side, the security of Japan would be favored by the withdrawal of Communist military power (including air forces) beyond the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. The savings made possible for the U.S. by its being relieved of the necessity of supporting U.S. bases in Korea and large, heavily-armed Korean forces would make possible a strengthening of the military position of the free world in other areas. The unification of Korea would probably be generally regarded as a significant accomplishment by the United Nations, to the enhancement of its prestige. The unification of Korea under the ROK, even on a neutralized basis, would probably also be widely regarded as a more constructive result of the war and more to the credit of the U.S. than the restitution of the *status quo ante.*

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

9. It is in the interests of the United States and should be the U.S. objective, to secure a unified and neutralized Korea, as outlined in paragraph 4–*b.*

795.00/6-2653: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 26, 1953—9:51 a. m.

822. Personal from Secretary for Robertson and Briggs. I acquiesced in last night's State-Defense message [2] feeling that you on the spot were entitled to large discretion and that your unanimous judgment in favor reopening armistice negotiations must be given great weight. However, without in any wise qualifying the authority given you by joint message, I want to be sure you consider:

(1) What becomes of President's demand for immediate and unequivocal acceptance by Rhee of authority UNC to conduct and conclude hostilities? Presumably, you intend to renegotiate without Rhee having accepted that authority.

(2) If so, does the negotiation constitute the "another arrangement" contemplated by the President's message, so that you are in effect negotiating a separate armistice on behalf of UNC not binding on ROKs?

(3) Is there any reasonable chance that UNC can get a separate armistice which will not require it to withdraw wholly from Korea, a result which is excluded on highest authority from your discretion, as indicated State-Defense joint message.

(4) If you are not negotiating a separate armistice but attempting to renegotiate the present agreed terms so as to make them acceptable to ROKs, (a) will you have firm agreement from Rhee that he would accept armistice on modified terms; (b) will you not get bogged down in interminable negotiations which we will have to break off, leaving situation as before except that Rhee will then be clearly in command of UNC situation, our allies will be alienated, U.S. morale weakened in support of Korean effort and enemy morale enhanced?

(5) Have you estimated possibility that enemy may now feel their chance of military victory increased and risk of military defeat diminished and consequently any armistice changes may be used as pretext for them to drag on negotiations until they are in position to launch serious offensive?

No doubt you have thought of all these matters and I have confidence in your combined judgment.

DULLES

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[1] This message, drafted by Dulles, was repeated to Tokyo as telegram 3034.

[2] The reference was to telegram JCS 942368, June 25, p. 1271.

795.00/6–2653: Telegram

The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT
SEOUL, June 26, 1953—11 p. m.[1]

28. Repeated information niact Pusan 24, niact Tokyo 24 for Ambassador Murphy and General Clark. For the Secretary from Robertson.

I called on President Rhee with Briggs this morning, finding President accompanied by Prime Minister Paik, Foreign Minister Pyun, Defense Minister Shin and Admiral Sohn, Chief of Staff ROK Navy. Although Briggs had arranged for private conversation, after formal introductions, it seemed advisable to take advantage of this opportunity of presenting American views in general not only to Rhee but also to members of his official family present.

Following opening statement in which I conveyed personal greetings from President and Secretary of State and described background and objectives my mission, I delivered Secretary's letter[2] which President Rhee slowly read aloud. After I had described unfortunate impressions created in Washington and throughout free world by unilateral ROK action releasing POWs, there ensued nearly two hours of discussion during which Rhee reiterated already familiar views concerning his opposition to armistice terms especially in connection with (1) prisoners, (2) the fact that armistice instrument would not require withdrawal Chinese Communists from North Korea, and (3) political conference would involve period of endless discussions providing Communists with unlimited opportunities for concentrated infiltration and covert subversive propaganda in Southern Korea. I in turn presented American views emphasizing advantages accruing to ROK from American assurances already indicated, Allied unwillingness to continue fighting to unify Korea by force and the Secretary of State's intention of collaborating particularly with ROK in political conference to attain the objective of a free, united, independent Korea.

Feeling that purposes of large meeting had been served I then suggested to Rhee that he and I might withdraw for private conversation. President agreed and we therefore continued conversation alone in his office for approximately 50 minutes. During this time his mood was strikingly different than that exhibited in larger meeting. He agreed that division at this time was unthinkable and that we should make every effort for continued cooperation. Without repudiating his fears of the situation which would develop following proposed armistice, he finally indicated his acceptance of the truce with following modifications, already referred to in *aide-mémoire* to General Clark:[3]

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[1] Received at 12:43 p. m. on June 26.
[2] The reference was to the Secretary's letter of June 22, p. 1238.
[3] Transmitted in telegram CX 63282 to JCS, June 23, p. 1240.

(1) Moving remaining 8600 Korean anti-Communist POWs to demilitarized zone for take-over by NNRC, allowing Chinese POWs to remain in Chejudo under NNRC as now contemplated;
(2) Placing time limit of say 90 days on political conference discussions. I stated I thought this impossible condition but would present it to you;
(3) Economic aid and build-up of ROK Army to approximately 20 divisions as previously promised;
(4) Immediate guarantee of mutual defense pact which I indicated would follow general lines of pact with Philippines.

Following meeting I telephoned General Clark who advised me of reply to CX 63325.[4] He is flying to Seoul tomorrow and we have arranged meeting with President at 2:30 p.m.

Consider it inadvisable to publish your letter at this time. It also appears unnecessary to send contemplated envoy at this stage.

[ROBERTSON]

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[4] The reference was to telegram JCS 942368 to Clark, June 25, p. 1271.

795.00/6-2653: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 26, 1953—5:30 p. m.
NIACT

19. Embtel 26.[2] President and I appreciate your report and agree that it is encouraging.

With reference numbered points raised by Rhee President agrees with point one if it is logistically feasible. President also agrees with points three and four although "guarantee" of mutual defense pact is of course subject to Senate advice and consent accordance US constitutional processes.

With respect to point two it is the view of the President that we cannot impose a time limit upon other countries who may be participating in the conference but if at the end of 90 days it is clear that the conference is not making progress and is being abused by the Communists to provide an opportunity to infiltrate and propagandize or otherwise embarrass the ROK he would be prepared to act in concert with the ROK with the view to US and ROK retiring jointly from the conference. We would be prepared to make clear our intention in this regard following the joint consultations between ourselves and the

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[1] This message, drafted by Dulles and Johnson, was repeated to Pusan as telegram 826 and to Tokyo as 3042.

[2] In this telegram, June 26, Robertson informed the Department that he had had an encouraging conference with Rhee and a report of the meeting would follow. (795.00/6-2653) Undoubtedly, the reference was to telegram 28 from Seoul, *supra.*

ROK regarding the political conference which would follow promptly after the entry into effect of the armistice.

DULLES

795.00/6-2753: Telegram

The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET SEOUL, June 27, 1953—1 p. m.

29. Personal for Secretary and Johnson from Robertson. Reference Embassy telegram 28 [1] and Department telegram 19.[2]

Regarding mutual defense pact, word "guarantee" is inaccurate terminology. Rhee thoroughly understands that pact must be ratified by Senate. What he is asking is that negotiations begin immediately and not await signing of armistice.

Delighted to get Department telegram 19 before meeting this afternoon. Would appreciate immediate advice status Tasca's economic recommendations.

Rhee's violent and unequivocal statements make it extremely difficult for him to change front. As late as the day of our arrival he scorned acceptance of present armistice pact in an impassioned speech to gigantic war anniversary rally of some 500,000. Toward end of our private conversation late that same afternoon he said with considerable emotion, "you are like a hand extended to a drowning man. Please help us find a way out." I am convinced he now seeks an out which will save his face and at same time will make reversal of his position seem logical to people. We should help him do so with such modification of details which will not compromise our position and which Clark considers possible of negotiation within framework of present pact without delaying or endangering Communists signature.

This is no time for table-pounding, name-calling, or threats. British and Allied castigations have caused deep bitterness. Americans friendly approach is apparently warmly appreciated.

In reading Secretary's letter [3] at meeting, Rhee's voice at times quivered with emotion. At end he made no comment but it was obvious that letter's devastating logic made profound impression upon him as well as upon the other Koreans present. Press has speculated that letter contained new proposals. It appears to suit Rhee's face-saving strategy for Korean people to believe this to be true. I, therefore, strongly feel that publication at this time would be premature and would make Rhee's reversing process more difficult.

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[1] Dated June 26, p. 1276.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Dated June 22, p. 1238.

From conversations in Tokyo I am convinced that personal services of contemplated envoy should not be used except as last desperate resort and after concurrence by Clark. Such situation does not now exist. Press reports today that Rhee might be given opportunity to talk further with some other envoy at point outside Korea come at particularly inopportune time. We are emphasizing to Rhee that time is running out and that immediate decision by him is imperative. We believe he is on the point of a very reluctant but favorable decision unless we inadvertently furnish him with an excuse for further delay.

I had another long conversation after dinner last evening at which he again reiterated his earnest desire to cooperate with us.

We are resuming conversations this afternoon at 2:30 p.m.

[ROBERTSON]

795.00/6–2753: Telegram

The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, June 27, 1953—7 p. m.

31. Repeated information niact Pusan 25, niact Tokyo 25 for Ambassador Murphy and General Clark. Personal for the Secretary and Johnson from Robertson.

After conference which General Clark and I had this afternoon with President Rhee, following *aide-mémoire* drawn up and delivered at Rhee's request. Clark and I are meeting with Rhee at 6:30 to receive his confirmation of *aide-mémoire.* I will report results of that meeting later.[1] Text of *aide-mémoire* follows:

"With reference to the conversation held today between President Rhee, Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson and General Mark Clark, there are confirmed the following points upon which President Rhee requested clarification:

"(1) That the Government of the ROK, among other things, will direct its armed forces to carry out the orders of the UNC in maintaining the security of the remaining Korean non-repatriated POWs who are now in the custody of the UNC; and will cooperate with UNC in moving these POWs to the demilitarized zone where they will be turned over to the NNRC in accordance with agreed terms of reference; and that in case of Chinese non-Communist POWs now in custody of the UNC the Government of ROK will cooperate in turning them over to the NNRC in their present location on Chejudo in accordance with agreed terms of reference;

"(2) That the US Government cannot impose any time limit upon any other governments who may participate in the political conference to follow the armistice, but that if at the end of 90 days after opening of political conference it becomes clear that conference is not making progress and is being exploited by the Communists to infiltrate and propagandize or otherwise embarrass the ROK the US Government would be prepared to act in concert with the ROK with a view of retiring jointly with the ROK from the political conference;

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[1] See unnumbered telegram from Clark, *infra.*

"(3) That after the signing of armistice agreement US Government would be willing to have a high-level conference with President Rhee or his representative at some intermediate point to confer on all aspects of our common objectives at political conference to follow within 90 days after effective date of armistice;

"(4) That US Government is prepared to provide economic assistance to the ROK and logistical and other support for the strengthening and maintenance of the armed forces of ROK including ROK Army up to the level of more or less 20 divisions; and

"(5) That the US Government is prepared immediately to begin negotiations with ROK looking towards conclusion of a mutual defense treaty along general lines of present mutual defense treaty between Governments of US and Philippines.

"The above assurances from the Government of the US are dependent upon agreement of Government of ROK;

> (*a*) To accept the authority of the UNC to conduct and conclude the hostilities,
>
> (*b*) To support the armistice entered into between CINCUNC and the commanders of the Communist forces, and to pledge its full support and collaboration in carrying out the terms thereof, and
>
> (*c*) That the armed forces of the ROK will remain under the operational control of CINCUNC until Governments of US and ROK mutually agree that such arrangements are no longer necessary.

"It would be appreciated if Government of ROK would confirm the above agreement.[")]

[ROBERTSON]

FE files, lot 55 D 338, "Korean Political Conference, June 1953"

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET SEOUL, June 28, 1953—11:28 p. m.

Unnumbered 281528Z. This is a joint message for State and Defense (JCS) from Robertson and Clark.

1. In joint conference with Rhee afternoon 27 June, we presented answers given in Departmental telegram nr 19[1] to the four questions raised by him in first conference with Robertson. As reported in Embassy telegram nr 28,[2] Rhee has stated that if these questions could be satisfactorily resolved he would support an armistice. After presentation of your answers, Rhee remarked "Well, the President has met all of my

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[1] Dated June 26, p. 1277.

[2] Dated June 26, p. 1276.

views" and requested that we confirm our position in writing. *Aide-mémoire* confirming our answers, reported to you by Embassy telegram nr 31,[3] was prepared and sent him for later discussion that afternoon.

2. When we saw Rhee, together with Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, at 1839 hours, 27 June, prior to dinner, he seemed disturbed over our *aide-mémoire*, indicating that it did not fully express all the thoughts he had in mind. Our inquiries failed to reveal the nature of his misgivings but we were soon interrupted by the arrival of other dinner guests.

3. Rhee indicated he would give us a reply in writing 29 June. We indicated the delay as too lengthy and requested he clarify his misgivings earlier, preferably Sunday morning, 28 June.

4. Robertson had a conference alone with Rhee at 0930 hours, 28 June in which Rhee confirmed his contention that full understanding could be reached and that he would deliver his reply to our *aide-mémoire* in writing in time for examination by us for a further meeting with him that afternoon.

5. We waited all day for his reply and at 1810 hours, 28 June, Rhee replied in the form of an *aide-mémoire* which was delivered by messenger. It has been dispatched to you under DTG 281330Z.[4] Reply was accompanied by a letter in longhand from Rhee apologizing for delay, giving as reason lack of secretarial help on Sunday to do the typing sooner and stating his readiness to "talk it over" upon notice.

6. Our comments follow:

a. Dilatory character of his reply is obvious.

b. The *aide-memoire* does not represent the understanding reached between Rhee and Robertson.

c. It is our considered opinion that we have made the maximum effort possible at this stage to enlist Rhee's cooperation in the implementation of an armistice. Rhee is apparently still convinced that we will not withdraw from Korea. Since we are not yet prepared to implement a threat of withdrawal the only chance of obtaining Rhee's cooperation depends upon convincing him that we have gone as far as we can go toward meeting his position and that we are proceeding with the conclusion of the armistice along lines presently contemplated.

d. Our thinking as to desirability of obtaining an armistice at as early a date as Commies will agree is confirmed by his latest *aide-mémoire* with its injection of extraneous matters not previously discussed with Robertson with apparent view of prolonging negotiations.

e. We invite your attention to the fact that while Rhee has been deliberately impeding the conclusion of an armistice for reasons best known to himself, the UNC has suffered during the past 20 days approximately 17,000 battle casualties, of which 3,333 were killed and almost 2,000 MIA, many of whom without doubt are dead.

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[3] *Supra.*

[4] Telegram DTG 281330Z is not printed; text of the *aide-mémoire* is *infra.*

f. A reply to the Commie letter of 20 June has been delayed too long. We are more than ever of the opinion previously stated that we should not delay longer but deliver to the Commies the letter furnished for your information in C 63348.[5] Clark therefore intends, with Robertson's complete concurrence, to have the letter delivered to the Commies, through liaison officers, on 29 June.

7. We intend to meet with Rhee morning 29 June at which time Clark proposes to inform Rhee pursuant to instructions contained in par 2, JCS 942368,[6] that he intends to initiate action looking to the conclusion of an armistice.

8. Murphy, Briggs and Collins concur.

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[5] Not printed. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413) For a text of the letter as it was released on June 29, 1953, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 13, 1953, pp. 46–47.

[6] Dated June 25, p. 1271.

795.00/6–2953

Aide-Mémoire From the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) [1]

TOP SECRET SEOUL, June 28, 1953.

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

This *aide-mémoire* is intended to convey the understanding reached in the course of the conversation between the President and Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson: Special Representative of President Eisenhower, this morning and to be response, mostly appreciative, to the American *aide-mémoire* [2] received yesterday afternoon. The chief points are as follows:

The main purpose of the United States in strengthening the Republic of Korea forces is to build up a sufficient military power to defend democracy against communism in Korea, which largely means, in turn, the defense of the common cause. In other words, the United States is to make democratic Korea strong enough to defend its own strategic peninsula, part of the free world's bulwark, against Communist aggressors without depending upon the United States manpower. This should be the final objective of the proffered mutual defense arrangement.

The arrangement for a mutual defense pact between the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Korea and the continuation of economic aid and military assistance in building up the Republic of Korea defense forces as outlined in the letter of President Eisenhower dated June 7 [*6*], 1953,[3] are accepted by the Republic of Korea Government with appreciation and gratitude.

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[1] This *aide-mémoire* was received by Robertson on Sunday, June 28, and sent to the Department of State from Seoul in Army message 281330Z that same day.

[2] Transmitted in telegram 31, dated June 27, p. 1279.

In connection with the suggested mutual defense treaty, it is the hope of the Republic of Korea Government to conclude such a pact prior to the signing of the armistice. As regards the military aid, sea and air-force must be built up sufficiently for the support of the land forces.

The United States Government is prepared to provide economic assistance to the Republic of Korea towards its economic goal of self-sufficiency and logistical and other support for the strengthening and maintenance of the armed forces of the Republic of Korea including the Republic of Korea army up to the level of twenty divisions. If necessary, further build-up of the Republic of Korea forces will be carried out with the United States assistance, with matching them against [those?] of an immediate neighbor in view.

Regarding the question of the prisoners of war and the time limit of the political conference, the government of the Republic of Korea makes following suggestions.

The Government of the Republic of Korea will cooperate with the United Nations command in moving the Communist Korean prisoners of war, and the Chinese prisoners of war now in the custody of the United Nations command from their present location to the demilitarized zone. Those loyal Korean prisoners of war still in detention are to be questioned in presence of the United Nations command and the Republic of Korea Government representatives. The questioning is to be finished in a few days, not longer than one week in any case, with the understanding that, when the questioning is finished, those who desire to go back to the Communist camps or country should be at once removed and those loyal ones who want to remain in South Korea should be released at once.

The political conference to be convened after the signing of the armistice should conclude its discussions or talks within 90 days from the date of the signing of the armistice with the hope of accomplishing the common objectives of reunifying under its only legal government and evacuating the Chinese Communists from Korea. If the concrete procedures, to be immediately implemented, of achieving those objectives fail to be agreed upon at the end of the time limit, the United States delegates together with the ROK delegates will withdraw from the political conference and immediately resume the military operations jointly without consulting with any other nation or organization for the purpose of accomplishing the original objective by military means.

As suggested in the United States *aide-mémoire*, the United States will cooperate with the Republic of Korea in checking the Communist infiltration into and their subversive and other disturbing activities in the latter during the period from the signing of the armistice to the end of the 90 day session of the political conference. During the same period, the United States will strengthen the ROK forces to counter balance the unimpeded build-up of the Communist forces in the north.

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[3] For a text of this letter, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 377–380.

As likewise suggested in the United States *aide-mémoire*, after the signing of the armistice agreement between the two military commands, the United States will sponsor a high-level conference with the Government of the Republic of Korea to be held at some intermediate point to confer on all aspects of our common objectives at the political conference to follow the armistice.

The ROK agrees to continue the present arrangement with the United Nations Command as stated in the President's letter to General MacArthur dated July 15, 1950 [4] so long as the UNC cooperates and supports the ROKG in its efforts to promote the common cause by settling the war with victory.

It is also agreed that when the ROKG should ever decide to take its forces out of the UNC, the President, as Commander-in-Chief, will notify it to the UNC in advance.

The Republic of Korea Government wants to have the following doubts cleared as far as possible through written clarifications:

a) How soon will the political conference be opened after the signing of the armistice?

b) What will be the composition of the political conference?

c) Will North Korean Communist puppet participate in the political conference?

d) What will they do with the Chinese non-Communist prisoners of war who will persist in their opposition to repatriation to the end?

e) Will the Republic of Korea be invited to take part in the political conference?

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[4] President Rhee had assigned operational command of ROK ground, sea, and air forces to General MacArthur as CINCUNC in a letter of July 15, 1950. (UN document S/1627; printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 7, 1950, p. 206)

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 28, 1953.

Subject: Korea

Today's news from Korea is not good. Robertson and Clark thought that Rhee was in agreement with an *aide-mémoire* which they gave along the lines of the points which you and I discussed just before you left on Friday afternoon. However, Rhee has now come back with a reply which indicates that his basic position is unchanged and which demands that, if the political conference does not, within 90 days of the signing of the armistice, "accomplish the common objectives of reunifying under its only legal government evacuating the Chinese Communists from Korea", the United States and ROK "will withdraw from the political conference and immediately resume the military operations jointly without consulting with any other nation or organization for the purpose of accomplishing the original objectives by military means". Rhee also states that the ROK will continue its forces under the United Nations Command only "so long as the UNC cooperates and supports the ROK Government in its efforts to promote the common cause by settling the war with victory".

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[1] A copy of this memorandum drafted by Dulles can also be found in file 795.00/6-2853.

Clark advises that he now plans tonight to deliver a letter to the Communists, replying to their letter of June 20 with a view of resuming negotiations and attempting to conclude the armistice with the Communists. This was within the discretion which it was agreed they should have. However, it is apparent that Clark and Robertson feel that their instructions about not withdrawing do not leave them in a position to exert adequate pressure on Rhee. I am inclined to agree on this point and think we might usefully discuss it sometime on Monday with Defense.[2]

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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[2] The following typed note appeared at this point on the source text:

"Note, 6/29/53. Following the receipt of this letter, Conference was held in Executive Office on Monday [June 29] between Sec. of State, Under [*Deputy*] Secretary of Defense, and the President. It was decided to suggest to Clark that he increase pressures on Rhee and to give him a clear appreciation of just what his present actions might mean to the future of his country."

795.00/6-2953: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET SEOUL, JUNE 29, 1953—3:45 p. m.

DTG 290645Z. (Army message) From Robertson and Clark (at Army Eight) to DeptAr for JCS and State info CINCUNC Tokyo exclusive for Clark and Murphy (passed AmEmb Seoul exclusive for Robertson and Briggs). This is joint message from Robertson and Clark.

We met with Rhee, Prime Minister Paek, and Foreign Minister Pyun at 0930 June 29. Robertson reviewed Korean *aide-mémoire* of 28 June [1] point by point explaining carefully that it did not as expected, represent "an agreement reached" between Rhee and Robertson. Robertson then handed Rhee the original of the Korean *aide-mémoire* with the remark that as it contained so many inaccuracies and so much of it is irrelevant, it could not provide a basis for discussion and therefore was returned as unacceptable.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 1282.

Rhee went over much familiar ground discoursing on his favorite theme of the world struggle against communism; his desire to continue the struggle in Korea by force of arms (we will throw our men and women too into the battle with or without weapons—we will commit suicide, et cetera; his lack of faith in the efficacy of a political conference to unify Korea or protect it against Communist penetration. Et cetera.)

After careful and explicit review by Robertson of President's and Secretary Dulles' offers of support and assistance, explanation of US ideas regarding development of political conference, Rhee said he would revise *aide-mémoire* in effort to bring it into line with our ideas. Robertson stated that his *aide-mémoire* [2] accurately outlined the points on which Rhee has requested clarification and urged that it be taken as basis for further elaboration. Rhee said there were a number of other points not referred to in our *aide-mémoire* which he now felt it necessary to outline.

Clark then informed Rhee that UNC is proceeding with armistice negotiations and that it is now necessary to reply to Communists letter. He expressed hope that we could count on ROK for its cooperation and support. Rhee said that he wanted to work with us but he felt a number of points should be clarified before he could give such assurance. He said he would make every effort to give us immediately a revised and more satisfactory version of his last *aide-mémoire* and Robertson agreed to wait for it.

We appreciate that this conversation is unsatisfactory and as disappointing as the contents of their *aide-mémoire* are misleading and irrelevant. Our interlocutors registered some shock, which we believe healthful, over our rejection of their *aide-mémoire* and the vigorous explanation given them by Robertson. This plus the effect of Clark's statement regarding intention to proceed with Panmunjom negotiations we believe may exercise a sobering and helpful effect on Rhee, who now seems fully conscious of the trend of affairs.

Robertson hopes later today to report further concerning whatever version of ROK memorandum may be received.

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[2] For text, see telegram 31 from Seoul, June 27, p. 1279.

FE files, lot 55 D 338, "Korean Political Conference, June 1953": Telegram

The Deputy Secretary of Defense (Kyes) to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 29, 1953—10:40 p. m.

DEF 942613. Exclusive for Gen Clark, pass exclusive for Robertson. From OSD sgd Kyes. This is a Joint State-Defense msg.

1. During high level meeting held today there was general discussion of Rhee's attitude toward armis as reported in recent msgs from you and Robertson up to and including ur DTG 290645Z.[1]

2. It was recognized that Commies remain real enemy and this fact must not be lost sight of in planning our own strategy.

3. There is no intent to modify ur existing discretion re conclusion of armis and handling ROK sit as contained in JCS 942368.[2]

4. Security ur forces continues to be overriding consideration.

5. There is no intention of withdrawing from Korea.

6. However, in thought that some of ideas expressed at mtg might prove useful or at least provide atmosphere our own thinking there is given below for ur consideration and comment ideas put fwd by one or more of those present.

a. It is probable that Rhee will continue to bluff and to temporize so long as he thinks there is chance of wringing from us any add concessions of forcing change in our pos.

b. Most promising line of action now open seems to be to cause Rhee and his advisers to believe that we will withdraw from Korea in event he sabotages armis. If no change results in Rhee's attitude, it would be our hope that influential ROK polit and mil elements would themselves take steps to bring about sit in ROK Gov which will assure ROK cooperation with armis.

c. Within broad latitude already given you there may be possibility of quietly and adroitly creating impression among Rhee and ROK leaders that UNC is preparing to withdraw if ROK attitudes remain unchanged. Such measures shld speak for themselves rather than require making of overt statements to Rhee and ROK leaders. However, this shld not preclude using indirect and covert channels to give Rhee and ROK leaders impression we are preparing for withdrawal.

d. Although impossible from here to assess extent to which tactical sit would permit you to implement them, such measures might include quietly beginning to effect concentration of United States and other UN forces, strengthening of base defenses, consolidation of some depots and increasing their security, movement of any excess supplies from Korea to Japan, and even halting introduction into Korea of United States replacements. It was fully recognized that any or all such moves would be entirely subj to ur own estimate of local sit and overriding consideration of security of ur forces. However, thought was that if you found such moves practicable they might be successful in bringing about

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] Dated June 25, p. 1271.

ROK acceptance armis, and, if not successful, would place UNC in better pos meet any future contingency.

7. If and when you take action on any moves such as those outlined above, it will be important that you keep Wash fully informed so that support may be given from here in such matters as dealing with press and forn gov reptvs.

8. Would also appreciate ur est on capability and probability of ROK Army taking action to prevent Rhee from sabotaging armis.

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 157 Series

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 30, 1953.

Subject: NSC 157, U.S. Objective with Respect to Korea Following an Armistice.[2]

1. In response to the request contained in the memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) dated June 26, 1953, subject as above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views on a report, prepared by the Department of State and reviewed by the National Security Council Planning Board, entitled "U.S. Objective with Respect to Korea Following an Armistice" (NSC 157).

2. The report sets forth what it terms as two alternative feasible objectives to be pursued in the political conference on Korea following the signing of an armistice:

a. A Korea divided for an indefinite period on the present demarkation line with the Republic of Korea (ROK) tied into the United States security system and developed as a military ally; and

b. A unified, neutralized Korea under a substantially unchanged ROK.

The report concludes that it is in the interests of the United States, and recommends that it should be the United States objective, to secure a unified and neutralized Korea.

3. It appears that the concept of a neutralized Korea is predicated upon two assumptions: first, that the North Koreans would acquiesce in such an arrangement; and second, that the Communists would observe the provisions of an agreement or political settlement of this nature. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that both of these assumptions are unrealistic. The Communist element in North Korea have an intense hatred for President Rhee and his Government. Further, an assumption

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[1] This memorandum was submitted to the NSC at the request of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs under a covering memorandum by Gleason on June 30, 1953.

[2] Dated June 25, p. 1272.

that the Communists would abide by the spirit as well as the letter of such an agreement is open to serious question.

a. Neither an armistice agreement nor a political settlement based on a unified, neutralized Korea should be viewed as an indication that the Communists have changed or abandoned their objective of bringing the Korean Peninsula under their domination. It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Communists will seek to fill the vacuum created by a neutralized Korea. Communist agreement to a neutralized Korea would provide them with an ideal situation in which to infiltrate and gain control, much as they did in Czechoslovakia. In effect, the Communists would have agreed to a temporary concession in exchange for the prospect of an ultimate gain;

b. Moreover, United States and United Nations prestige would suffer materially if U.S.–U.N. forces were withdrawn from Korea, with Chinese Communist forces merely withdrawn beyond the Yalu River, to achieve no more than the establishment of a "neutralized" Korea. A withdrawal of this nature would be regarded as a concession to the Communists and would be viewed throughout the world, particularly in Korea and elsewhere in the Far East, as evidence that the United States is unwilling to continue to oppose Communist aggression with military force. Under such circumstances, the Communists would realize a decided strategic advantage through the withdrawal of U.S.–U.N. forces from a relatively unarmed Korea in exchange for a scarcely comparable withdrawal on their part, compensated for by the retention of the threat consisting of strong Communist forces deployed in close proximity to the Korean-Manchurian border.

4. A neutralized Korea would appear on the surface to permit a reduction of United States military commitments through the withdrawal of United States forces from Korea. Actually, United States military commitments would be materially increased by virtue of the proposed provision that the United States guarantee not only the territorial but also the political integrity of a unified Korea under circumstances which render Korea so susceptible to Communist infiltration and subversion. Moreover, this extension of United States commitments would be entered into under conditions wherein Korean armed forces might be so limited, both numerically and in their composition, that they would be of no appreciable or immediate assistance in the event of United States military operations in the area. With respect to such possible operations, the possession of bases in Korea would, from a military point of view, offer no particular advantage to the United States vis-à-vis Communist China, other than the value of those bases as they would contribute to the peripheral defense of the Japanese islands. On the other hand, the passing of these bases to Communist control would pose a threat to the security of the Japanese islands. In the absence of greatly augmented United States air and naval forces in the Far East, the position of the United States in Japan could become serious if the Chinese Communists were to be in a position to exploit their air offensive capabilities from bases in Korea.

5. As long as the Communists adhere to their determination to dominate the Far East, continued United States support of ROK forces is believed essential to United States security interests. Moreover, the ability of the ROK to contribute to or provide for its own defense under the terms of any political settlement, both in the immediate future and in the long-term, must be carefully considered so that the ROK will not become a prey to renewed aggression from without or subversion from within. The United States should not have as its stated and primary objective the neutralization of Korea, an objective which if implemented would almost surely lead to a fatal impairment of the ability of the ROK Government to provide for its own defense or would deny the ROK that capability entirely. Although the principal deterrent to renewed aggression against Korea lies in the prospect of retaliation by United States forces, the existence of relatively strong Korean armed forces in the area adds considerably to this deterrent.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the establishment of a unified but neutralized Korea would be to the strategic disadvantage of the United States. Moreover, the precedent which it would set would constitute a serious hazard if applied, for example, to Germany. It might eventually involve cumulative injury to United States security interests if the application of such a precedent were extended to Australia, or even to Indochina.

7. In addition to the considerations set forth above which indicate the undesirability from a military point of view of a "neutralized" Korea, recent developments in relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea Government with regard to an armistice would appear to be inconsistent with the proposal for a neutralized Korea.

8. In the light of the foregoing considerations and from the military point of view, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the basic United States objective with respect to Korea be the attainment of a unified, independent, and non-Communist Korea. Until this objective is realized, the United States should maintain a strong military posture in the Far East, thus enabling timely and effective support to the Republic of Korea. This posture should include the retention and support of adequate Republic of Korea armed forces. Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest, as a means of making progress in the attainment of the above objective, that overt and covert programs be developed, which in conjunction with the maintenance of military security in the Republic of Korea, would serve to

a. Establish the Republic of Korea as an example, economically and politically, of the advantages of association with the free world, and *b.* Create dissatisfaction and unrest in North Korea, toward the end that the North Korean people will be encouraged to take part in the attainment of a unified, independent, and non-Communist Korea.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
W. M. FECHTELER
Chief of Naval Operations

795B.00/7–153: Telegram

The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET SEOUL, July 1, 1953—noon.
NIACT

1. Eyes only for the Secretary from Robertson. Please pass full text to Secretary as written. The following personal opinions and observations are submitted for what they are worth:

1. Rhee in addition to being a shrewd, resourceful trader is also a highly emotional, irrational, illogical fanatic fully capable of attempting to lead his country into national suicide.
2. He believes with deep conviction that the present armistice pact is a skillful Communist device to win by negotiation what they have failed to achieve by military action.
3. He is not likely to be influenced by public opinion alone. He has already been subjected to continuous US and Allied arguments as well as invectives and he is keenly aware that he has lost the support of public opinion in the US as well as the rest of the world.
4. Our only hope of obtaining his cooperation is to convince him that working with us is the best way of achieving the objective to which he has dedicated his life.
5. His cooperation is still possible but he must be led, as well as pushed.
6. Rhee has aroused his country to a determination and will to fight Communism, probably unmatched by any other country in the world including ourselves. Such spirit and fortitude should be preserved, not destroyed. In addition, his army equipped by us, is largest and most effective anti-Communist army in Asia and we badly need it on our side.

I am expecting a final position paper from Rhee this morning of which you will be advised later.[2] In the meantime, I suggest that you have a joint message sent to Rhee signed by Senators Knowland, Smith, Congressman Judd, General Van Fleet and any others known to Rhee as his friends as opposed to critics.[3] Message obviously should

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[1] A marginal notation on the source text by O'Connor indicated that the Secretary of State saw this telegram on July 1.

[2] See the letter from Rhee to Robertson, July 1, p. 1292.

[3] In telegram 2 to Seoul, drafted by Dulles, the Secretary of State informed Robertson that the persons mentioned in this paragraph were sending Rhee a communication which

Continued

contain statement that signatories have carefully considered latest proposals submitted by President and strongly advocate Rhee's acceptance and his support of the Armistice as being in the best long range interests of Korea. Such a statement, in my opinion, would be infinitely more effective than further castigations from whatever source.

[ROBERTSON]

Dulles hoped would be generally helpful. The Secretary also added that there was in Washington agreement with Robertson's diagnosis of Rhee and widespread respect and support of the job which the Assistant Secretary was doing in Korea. (795.00/7–153)

Editorial Note

In a telegram sent through commercial cable, Senators William Knowland and Alexander Smith, Congressman Walter Judd, and General James Van Fleet urged President Rhee to use his good offices to reestablish close cooperation and friendship between the Republic of Korea and the United States. Such partnership and cooperation, they stated, were better ways to assure a united Korea after the political conference than "fixed conditions." A text of this telegram was transmitted in telegram 5 to Seoul, July 1, 1953, not printed. (795.00/7–153)

Another friend of President Rhee in the United States, former Ambassador William C. Bullitt, advised Rhee against making demands for an alliance with the United States to unify Korea by force if the political conference was not successful. Bullitt did raise the idea of a limited offensive to the waistline of Korea, but Secretary Dulles, with whom Bullitt discussed his communication to Rhee, cautioned the former Ambassador not to give Rhee the impression that even a limited offensive would have United States support under existing conditions. (Telegram 30 to Seoul, June 30, 1953; 795.00/6–3053)

795.00/7–153

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) [1]

SECRET SEOUL, July 1, 1953.

DEAR MR. ROBERTSON: Since your arrival here as President Eisenhower's personal envoy and Secretary of State Dulles' personal representative, we have earnestly endeavored to overcome many difficulties in order to comply with requests of Korea's two best friends—the President and Secretary of State of US.

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[1] This letter was transmitted to the Department of State for Dulles by Robertson in unnumbered telegram DTG 010935Z, July 1, 1953. Robertson's comments on this letter, delivered to him by Pyun, followed in telegram 2 from Seoul, *infra.*

Your friendly and frank discussions with us have cleared up a lot of doubts and misunderstandings. As a result of our discussion, we will not insist on Chinese evacuation preceding armistice, and are ready to make a partial basis of our overall agreement of your President's generous offers of mutual defense treaty and of continued aid and assistance in increasing our defense strength and effection [?] our economic rehabilitation and reconstruction.

[Here follows a paragraph in which Rhee reminded Robertson of what he considered to be a joint agreement between the United States and Korea to walk out of the political conference if the question of Korean reunification was not resolved within 3 months. Rhee also stated that he expected the United States to join the Republic of Korea in a military campaign to reunify the peninsula after political means had been exhausted.]

Regarding the POW question, we are ready to compromise and cooperate with UNC in moving all POWs including several thousand anti-Communist Korean prisoners to a neutral zone between the opposing battle lines. This will obviate the occasion of bringing Indian or any other pro-Communist armed force into ROK and thus ward off a great potential international tragedy. Of course, they must go directly to their destination without landing in any part of South Korea. As to the disposition of the last-named prisoners, as I said before, those who refuse to be repatriated should be released in South Korea. At this point, I wish to state that, in accordance with justice and human rights, the anti-Communist Chinese POWs, too, should be released and sent to Formosa where they wish to go.

At our last meeting but one, I was reminded that the political conference will begin sometime within 90 days after the signing of the truce and sit another 90 days. How can we manage to detain so many thousands of anti-Communist Korean prisoners for 180 days, when public sentiment is so strong for their immediate release?

As I told you when we were alone by ourselves, that, if our major points are accepted, some minor details can be worked out somehow. We were so hopeful of success that we publicly said so. Indeed, a powerful hope bore me on that I brushed aside many objections raised by my Ministers. Let me repeat, that, if the chart of our common course is agreed on, I will do my best to overcome some minor difficulties.

Though our experience with the Communists little induces us to believe that Korea can be unified through political negotiations, we may yet take your suggestion, if only for the sake of cooperation, and attend the political conference. But we are naturally more interested to know what we will do afterwards.

[Here follow two paragraphs in which Rhee reiterated his request for support for unification of Korea after the failure of the political conference, but noted that if the United States chose not to join in the military campaign, it should at least provide air and naval cover for the Republic of Korea effort.]

When President Truman decided to defend Korea on military means, we thought that the US had at last stood up for the survival of democracy even at risk of another world war. At that time, we heard it repeatedly declared that it was the common objective of US and UN to establish a united, independent, democratic Korea and to punish the Communist aggressors, to the lasting triumph of the principle of collective security. In those days, no one said that it was the intention of anybody to unify Korea by political means and we all, our Communist enemies included, believed that our set purpose was to fight on to accomplish it.

Since the Chinese Communists poured into Korea, however, the tone has changed. The UN now says that we never intended to unify Korea by war and that to drive the Communists above the three [*thirty*]-eighth parallel is sufficient punishment to the aggressor. In the eyes of the oriental peoples, this does not make for dignity of the UN.

We are not asking, though, our friendly nations who do not want to continue fighting to stay and bleed for us. They, nor must we be denied our one last desire to continue fighting by ourselves, if necessary, for our original goal.

The fundamental question at this critical juncture of world affairs is whether the US Government commits itself to a definite policy of defending world democracy against the world Communist aggression even at the risk of another global struggle. We are prepared not only to defend our own country but also to contribute our full share, if the US asks us to, to the defense of the free world as a whole, we welcome the idea of our army being expanded sufficiently for defense, accompanied by a commensurate build-up of both our navy and air arm. We hope, however, that the further strengthening of the ROK forces may be found desirable with a view to fitting the Korean military build-up into the American plan of global strategy. We have tasted the benefits of collective security, and we feel it our duty to subscribe to it not merely in words but in deeds.

Against this background, you can easily judge yourself how disappointed we are and now we are about to be disillusioned altogether. I want you to help us come to a correct conclusion as to whether US is prepared now to defend the American principles of democracy even at the risk of a world war or it will remain appeasing the Communists until it will be forced to fight its global enemy singlehanded with its back to the wall.

We are very near to an agreement not to obstruct the armistice, provided the US definitely pledges to resume fighting with us, in case of a failure of the political conference, until the unification of Korea is accomplished. If this cannot be done, I do not see how I can comply with your request in the armistice, for I have no means to convince the Korean people who are definitely opposed to the truce terms as they are now.

Sincerely yours, SYNGMAN RHEE

795.00/7-153: Telegram

The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

SEOUL, July 1, 1953—midnight.[1]

2. Department pass Defense Tokyo 1 (Tokyo pass information CINCUNC for General Clark); repeated information niact Pusan 1. For the Secretary from Robertson.

Referring Rhee's letter July 1[2] already transmitted, the only real issue now facing us is what are we going to do if and when we are convinced that political conference is only a stalling process and we walk out of conference together. This fundamental question is set forth in the last paragraph his letter as follows:

> "We are very near to an agreement not to obstruct the armistice, provided the US definitely pledges to resume fighting with us, in case of a failure of the political conference, until the unification of Korea is accomplished. If this cannot be done, I do not see how I can comply with your request in the armistice, for I have no means to convince the Korean people who are definitely opposed to the truce terms as they are now."

I propose see Rhee tomorrow and reiterate that my Government is unable to give him desired promise to resume fighting; that we can make no commitment for military action beyond the mutual defense pact but that we would of course consult with ROK Government at the time as to the best course of action which seemed indicated by circumstances then existing. If you reply promptly, there will be time to receive your guidance before my interview. If Rhee remains obdurate and inflexible on this issue it would seem that my mission will have terminated. However, I shall defer informing Rhee to this effect until so advised by you.

[ROBERTSON]

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[1] Received at 12:50 p.m. on July 1.

[2] *Supra.*

795.00/7-153: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 1, 1953—1:16 p. m.
NIACT

4. Robertson from Secretary. Your #2.[2] Please explain to Rhee that not only is Rhee's proposal beyond the scope of authority you have from the President but that President even if he wanted could not constitutionally give the pledge which Rhee seeks. This would in effect be war which President could not conduct without authorization by Congress. The present fighting was never expressly authorized by Congress because it was taken by US as member of UN pursuant to Security Council resolutions. Even so, there has been much criticism and allegation that war was illegal. War under circumstances Rhee suggests unless perhaps under fresh UN sanction, could not be pledged by President except subject to Congressional declaration of war.[3] If the political conference failed, this would present an issue which would have to be faced at the time in the light of surrounding circumstances.

DULLES

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[1] This telegram was drafted and signed by Dulles.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] This sentence originally read: "War under circumstances Rhee suggests would not have UN sanction and could not be pledged by President except subject to Congressional declaration of war which would be highly problematic." According to revisions on the source text initialed by Smith, it was changed to read as it does here.

FE files, lot 55 D 338, "South Korean Attitude Toward Armistice, July 1-15, 1953": Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) [1]

TOP SECRET TOKYO, July 2, 1953—7:53 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX 63449. Exclusive for Kyes. CGArmy Eight exclusive for Taylor. US Ambassador Seoul exclusive for Asst Secy of State Robertson. Ref DEF 942613.[2]

Appreciate the ideas expressed therein. My comments, based on prior study and on full consideration of views given in conference referred to in paragraph 2*a* below, follow. I also requested Robertson to give me his views on paragraph 6*a*, *b* and *c*. They are included in appropriate paragraphs of this message.

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[1] An information copy of this telegram was repeated to the JCS and passed to the Department of State.

[2] Dated June 29, p. 1287.

1. *Comments on 6a.*

a. It is my firm conviction, and has been for some time, that Rhee will continue to bluff, to delay, to embarrass and impede the conclusion of an armistice by all means at his disposal until it is made firmly and irrevocably clear to him that my government has made its maximum concessions. Though there is a considerable element of bluff it is not possible to predict how far Rhee may recede from his position, or to what extent he will go to obstruct the implementation of an armistice, but you can be certain that he will continue to embarrass us to the best of his ability both prior to and following an armistice if his major demands are not satisfied. How far he will go beyond that, Rhee himself is the only one who knows. I feel the President of the United States has made maximum concessions. The sooner Rhee knows this the better. I am convinced that as long as Rhee feels he can demand and obtain acquiescence from Washington that more authoritative emissaries be sent out, the more he is able to sabotage our efforts.

b. Robertson has been of inestimable value on his present mission. He has ably and courageously presented the position of our government. In this connection the ROKs are leaking to news channels, for purposes best known to them, that he has not been given sufficient authority. A UP dispatch today carries the following items: "It seems obvious that the Robertson mission is not sufficiently empowered to decide such important matters as the Korean Government's demands, one pro-Rhee Korean official said. Another said that too many things are being referred back to Washington and complained that this makes the consultations drag on and consume time. These complaints were accompanied by indications the Koreans may be hoping Mr. Eisenhower will send a higher level delegation to confer with Rhee. Thus far there has been no hint as to whom the Koreans might like to see head such a delegation." Additionally, a summary of information here indicates that Rhee has gained "much face" with the Korean masses for the way he has handled negotiations and the manner in which he has forced America to listen to his wishes.

c. Robertson's comments on 6*a* are as follows: "It is my opinion Rhee is not bluffing, but is serious in his demands. I will advise more fully upon receipt of his message on morning July 1 regarding his latest 'final position' as described in my message No. 36 to Secretary of State, No. 27 to CINCUNC June 30." [3]

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[3] In this telegram, Robertson strongly advised against publication of Dulles' June 22 letter to Rhee for the time being because it was referred to in the press as a "secret" letter. To publish it would do more harm than good. The United States had nothing to lose and perhaps something to gain, Robertson argued, by waiting for Rhee's statement of his final position promised for July 1. Briggs, Murphy, and McCardle concurred. (795.00/6–3053)

2. *Comments on 6b and c.*

a. I concur in the action proposed therein. I feel such course of actions should follow our indications to Rhee that we have made the maximum concessions possible to his demands. I believe if he becomes aware through various actions of the UNC that it is contemplating withdrawing from Korea, Rhee will be tremendously impressed and such action may produce in the minds of the senior ROK Army officials the neçessity of their doing something about it. In this connection, I called a conference of commanders at my headquarters 1 July. Among those attending were Weyland, Taylor, Briscoe and Kendall. Collins was also present. This conference served three important purposes: (1) The psychological effect of such a conference in Tokyo, at this time, upon the ROKs, (2) Obtained the benefit of General Collins' presence during the conference, and (3) Thorough consideration and analysis of plans for initiating the action authorized me in the second sentence of paragraph 4, JCS 942368.[4]

b. Further details of the plan referred to above will be furnished you as they are formulated and prior to any implementation. I already have discussed this matter with Overesch of CIA, who will assist. The detailed development of this plan will be greatly influenced by the events of the next few days, If we obtain an armistice we are only over the first hump with Rhee. He will continue to be a troublemaker and we should continue our efforts to counteract his obstructionist tactics.

c. Here are Robertson's comments on *6b*: "I consider it inadvisable to make a threat of withdrawal unless willing to carry out threat. Rhee is a zealous, irrational and illogical fanatic and might well call our bluff." I concur in Robertson's conviction that it is dangerous to threaten without being able to follow through, but in spite of my government's repeated decision that there is no intention of withdrawing from Korea, I still feel that the threat to do so, properly disseminated and coordinated with overt actions may be an advantageous course to pursue.

d. Robertson has indicated agreement with me that no action should be taken to implement suggestions in your paragraphs *6b* and *6c* until thorough preparation and coordination of plans.

3. *Comments on 6d.*

We had already given considerable thought to these suggestions, several of which are considered both appropriate and feasible. I have already moved the 187th Combat Team from Japan to Korea, the 34th Combat Team of the 24th Division is about to close in Korea, and the remainder of the 24th Division will follow. The 24th Division's troops are available to Herren in the Communications Zone to tighten up security on critical installations. I have already indicated my intent to consolidate non-repatriate Korean POWs. US guards at these camps have been strengthened. As you know, in anticipation of an armistice, the movement of supplies and personnel to Korea has been stepped up in order that our strength on the effective date of the armistice would be 100% and that all available supplies would be on hand to assist in the equipping of the additional ROK divisions. It would be quite a reversal of trend to start the supplies back to Japan. However, we are giving this thought and I will keep you advised. Consideration has been given to concentrating UN forces on the battlefront. At present all but 2 US divisions are concentrated on the western portion of the front and I do not consider it advisable at this time to replace these 2 divisions with new ROKA divisions and weaken the eastern portion of the front along the critical avenue of approach in the X US Corps sector. This is a possibility, however, I have in mind for implementation when conditions permit. The plans for the activation of the additional 4 ROK divisions have been developed and some ROK Army officers have been involved in the plans. I am withholding announcement of the paper activation of these divisions and may be able to exploit psychologically the fact that consideration is being given to cancelling these plans.

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[4] Dated June 25, p. 1271.

4. With reference to paragraph 8 of reference message, I have partially covered my estimate above. I had already discussed this at length with Taylor and did so again today. Taylor's opinion is that such action is possible but improbable. He feels, and I concur, that the ROK commanders we could trust are not willing to risk their necks unless there is a much stronger underwriting on the part of the US than we can provide at our level. In order to plant the thought that we may, by reason of ROK attitude, be forced to withdraw from Korea, I plan a series of 3 coordinated actions in Korea. The first action which is being taken is a tri-service meeting of US commanders in Korea to discuss course of action and plans to inject this thought. The second course of action is a high-level meeting of key US and ROK military commanders in Korea at which time Taylor will indicate frankly and confidentially to the ROK service representatives, that based on President Rhee's oft expressed thought that the UNC may have to withdraw, they should have in mind the necessity of formulative plans for ROK to take over the entire front in the event of UN withdrawal from Korea. The third action will be conferences between the individual US and ROK service commanders, with other key personnel if appropriate. The manner in which we will proceed during these separate service conferences will be dictated by the developments at the preceding conferences.

5. With respect to your paragraph 7, I will keep you informed as to the steps I am taking along these lines.

a. I think it highly important that our efforts here be fully supported by high level statements from Washington and by keeping our government and appropriate foreign representatives informed.

b. With reference to State message 3072 and my message CX 63391,[5] I strongly recommend that if Robertson's mission is terminated without result Secretary Dulles' letter be published, together with statements from other top governmental representatives. The publicity covering the recent negotiations has been one-sided, most of the information slanted and coming from Rhee. I think it high time that our side of the picture be told from Washington. In addition to the Secretary's letter the statements should include the concessions we have made to Rhee's demands, his unreasonable reply contained in his *aide-mémoire* of 28 June and Rhee's obvious dilatory tactics designed to prolong negotiations and prevent an armistice. I think it might also be well to include in these statements an indication of the heavy casualties UNC has suffered while these negotiations have been stymied.

c. Consideration should also be given to withholding information on the recommendations of the Tasca mission or leaking information that his report will not be considered until developments in Korea justify further consideration. It may well be that the greatest pressure on ROK can be applied in the economic field.

6. Courses of action I plan to take under paragraph 3 and 4 above will follow as soon as they are thoroughly coordinated.

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[5] In telegram 3072 to Tokyo, June 29, the Department of State proposed to release Dulles' letter of June 22 at the Secretary of State's press conference on June 30 unless Robertson and Clark objected. (795.00/6–2953) In telegram CX 63391, June 30, Clark stated that although his personal inclination would be to publish, he was deferring to Robertson's judgment and not advocating release of the letter at the time. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 152d Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, July 2, 1953 [1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

The following were present at the 152nd meeting of the Council: The President of the United States, Presiding; The Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; the Director for Mutual Security; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 1); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the United States Representative to the United Nations (for Item 6); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence;

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Gleason on July 3.

Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the Military Liaison Officer; the Acting Executive Secretary, NSC; and Hugh D. Farley, NSC Special Staff Member.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows discussion on item 1. "Port Security" and item 2. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security."]

3. *The Situation in Korea*

The National Security Council:

Discussed the subject in the light of an oral briefing by the Chairman, JCS, in the military situation in Korea and the truce negotiations.

Note: A copy of the memorandum which General Bradley read to the Council, with regard to recent developments in the truce negotiations,[2] is filed with the minutes of the 152nd NSC meeting.

4. *United States Tactics Immediately Following an Armistice in Korea* (NSC 154; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 17, 1953[3])

Mr. Cutler asked permission to read the interim courses of action proposed in NSC 154, in the course of which he indicated the amendments proposed by the Department of State and the Bureau of the Budget, either with or without the support of the Planning Board. With respect to paragraph 7, on the subject of continued controls on trade with Communist China, he asked Secretary Smith to explain this proposed State amendment, with which the Planning Board could not agree.

Secretary Smith replied that the proposed amendment was made simply in the interests of realism. Of course, he said, we would all like to see the embargo and controls on trade with Communist China extended, but the truth of the matter was that we would be very fortunate if we could induce our allies to hold the present line if a cease-fire materialized. Indeed, said Secretary Smith, he was now worried about the likelihood that some of the UN participants would try to wriggle out of joining in the so-called "greater sanctions" statement.

Mr. Stassen expressed agreement with Secretary Smith's anxieties, and said he was sure that there would be a flood of trade by the Western powers with Communist China as soon as the truce occurred. The only way to stop this would be to institute a blockade.

The President expressed the view that as long as the Chinese remained in any part of Korea they were plain and simple aggressors. Despite the troubles he was causing us, the President said, he thought there was a lot to be said for Syngman Rhee. The real reason why we sought an armistice and why we do not wish to continue to fight, is that we know we cannot win a military decision in Korea without expanding the war beyond Korea. Nevertheless, as long as the Chinese are in Korea as aggressors, the President believed we were in a position to bring terrific pressure on our allies not to relax their controls on trade with China. He hoped we would be quite heavy-handed in exerting such pressure.

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[2] A copy of this memorandum has not been found.

[3] *Ante*, p. 1189. For text of NSC 154, see p. 1170.

Mr. Stassen said that it still seemed to him a problem which could be solved only if our Navy intercepted ships carrying strategic materials.

The President disagreed, and said that this seemed to him an act of war, but Mr. Stassen replied that on the contrary it seemed to him merely a measure to carry out the UN resolution.

The President then inquired how our allies expect us to get the Chinese Communists out of Korea if we cease to bring any pressures on them.

Secretary Smith answered that the real truth was that our allies "didn't give much of a damn."

Mr. Cutler then suggested that in place of the language proposed by the State Department for a new paragraph 7,[4] the Council adopt the language which it had agreed upon in dealing with this same problem at an earlier meeting.

General Bradley and Secretary Kyes pointed out that if this were adopted the Council would be choosing the weakest of the three possible statements.

Secretary Smith, however, summed up his own view that the Council was now engaged in semantics. We were all going to do the best we possibly could to keep the maximum control on all trade with Communist China. It therefore didn't matter very much what form of language was chosen to express this objective.

Mr. Cutler then resumed discussion of the remaining courses of action. . . .

The National Security Council:

Adopted the interim courses of action contained in NSC 154, subject to the following amendments:

Page 2, paragraph 7: Delete the entire paragraph and substitute the following: "Continue intensified efforts to persuade our allies to refrain from relaxing their controls on trade with Communist China in the event of a Korean armistice."

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[4] The Department of State language was as follows:

"Make every feasible effort to induce other free world countries, pending a settlement regarding Korea: (*a*) to maintain their current levels of controls and restriction of trade and shipping with Communist China and North Korea, including, where possible, extension of their embargo lists to include such items as are essential to maintain effectively current multilaterally agreed levels of controls; and (*b*) to tighten enforcement of such restrictions." (Amendments Proposed by the Department of State to NSC 154, July 1, 1953; S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 154 Series)

Page 4, subparagraph 14–b: Delete the entire paragraph and substitute the following: "Undertake with respect to the security of Korea, commitments (with or without reciprocal undertakings on the part of the ROK) similar to those undertaken by the U.S. under the treaties with the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand." [5]

Page 4, subparagraph 14–c: Delete the entire paragraph and substitute the following: "Working in and through the organs of the UN where feasible, continue to strengthen the government and democratic institutions of the Republic of Korea and continue to contribute to the economic recovery and rehabilitation of the Republic of Korea." [6]

Page 5, paragraph 15: Delete the entire paragraph and substitute the following: "Assure ROK representation at the political conference, and full consultation with the ROK before and during the conference; and endeavor in the UN to obtain agreement to the establishment of a UN Delegation so composed as to give adequate recognition to the predominant U.S. and ROK interests." [7]

Page 5, paragraph 17: Delete the entire paragraph.

Note: NSC 154, as amended, subsequently approved by the President and circulated as NSC 154/1.[8]

5. *U.S. Objective With Respect to Korea Following an Armistice* (NSC 157;[9] Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 30, 1953 [10])

In explaining the background of the reference report, Mr. Cutler called attention to the emphatic views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff against the proposal for a unified and neutralized Korea which was recommended in NSC 157. He accordingly asked Secretary Smith if he wished to speak to the JCS objections.

Secretary Smith said that he had given these objections very careful thought, but believed that since his would be a rebuttal, General Bradley should be asked to speak first.

General Bradley admitted at the outset that it was conceivable that a neutralized and unified Korea might prove to be the only alternative open to us in the way of a political settlement. But in any case, he believed that it would be very bad tactics for the United States to go into the political conference with this proposal as its opening gun. General Bradley then proceeded to summarize and comment on the JCS written views.[11] He said that he assumed, as did the Chiefs, that the proposed unified and neutralized Korea would be a disarmed Korea.

This assumption was immediately challenged by the President, who pointed to other instances, like Switzerland, of neutralized countries which were quite effectively armed. The President added that he felt there was a great advantage in countries like Sweden who were "neutral on our side". The President said, however, that of course he would agree with General Bradley if NSC 157 actually contemplated that Korea would be a disarmed neutral state.

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[5] This amendment was proposed by the Department of State.

[6] Proposed by the Bureau of the Budget.

[7] Proposed by the Department of State.

[8] For text of NSC 154/1, July 7, see p. 1341.

[9] Dated June 25, p. 1272.

[10] Not printed, but see footnote 1, *ibid.*

[11] The reference was to the memorandum by the JCS, June 30, p. 1288.

On the other hand, General Bradley replied that if Korea, though neutralized, was armed, many of the objections of the Joint Chiefs to this proposal would disappear.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that NSC 157 intended that the Korean state should indeed be armed, though the level of armament might have to be considerably lowered from its present status because of the economic difficulty of supporting an army of more than six or seven divisions.

Secretary Kyes expressed his concern lest the actual creation of a neutralized Korea serve as a precedent in other parts of the world. This might prove very dangerous to us in the long run.

The President stated that the essence of the problem was to see that any neutralized country had armed forces sufficient to provide it with a reasonable defense.

General Bradley again expressed the view that it would be very poor tactics for the United States to go into the political conference and bring up this proposal in the first instance, since the Communists would then take it as a point of departure to wring further concessions from the United States.

Secretary Smith then addressed himself to a discussion *seriatim* of the objections to this proposal which had been raised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the first instance, he said, he was quite sure that Syngman Rhee was more than competent to handle the problem of Communist subversion if he were allowed any reasonable size police or paramilitary force. Rhee himself was quite adept at using the methods which the Communists used. The situation might differ after his death, but Secretary Smith felt that this was a good gamble.

As to the second point raised by the JCS, with regard to the damage which such a proposal would do to the prestige of the U.S. and the UN, Secretary Smith expressed the view that this argument had no validity. On the contrary, a unified Korea was the ultimate objective of the U.S. and the UN, and even if Korea were neutralized the achievement would redound to the credit of our side.

On the third objection, as to the danger that this move would create precedents which the Soviets might cite for Germany, Austria or Indochina, Secretary Smith observed that Korean neutralization would only become a precedent if we permitted it.

On the fourth point, as to the loss to the United States of bases in Korea which were desirable for the defense of Japan, Secretary Smith again expressed doubts as to the validity of the argument, and pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not themselves always considered Korea to be a strategic area for the United States.

As for the fifth point made by the Joint Chiefs, viz., that the removal of our forces from Korea would increase rather than diminish our military commitments by adding to the forces we would have to maintain in Japan, Secretary Smith also expressed strong doubts, and noted that the removal of our forces would help to correct the current maldeployment of American forces in the Far East.

After Secretary Humphrey had noted how difficult it seemed to him it would be to keep Korea secure without a powerful army, the discussion shifted to the likelihood that the Communists would accept any such proposal as that recommended in NSC 157. On this point Secretary Smith noted the traditional Soviet sensitivity to the presence of alien military forces in areas adjacent to their borders. It was possible, accordingly, that they would buy such a proposal as this, though it would have to be made to them through devious channels rather than forthrightly and in the first instance by the United States. The proposal would, of course, involve free elections in both North and South Korea, and as a foregone result of such elections the appearance of a non-Communist government which would be anything but tasteful to the Chinese and Russian Communists. Still, for the reasons he suggested, Secretary Smith thought that there was a chance that this would be acceptable.

Mr. Dodge expressed anxiety as to the repercussions of the neutralization of Korea on a Japan which seems itself to desire the status of neutrality. Would the Japanese, he asked, use our action in Korea as an excuse to avoid rearming?

Secretary Smith replied that while this was certainly a possibility, he believed that Japanese pride alone would ultimately lead that country to rearm itself. He further pointed out the problem of arming the neutralized Korean state. Obviously the Communists would do everything in their power to prevent adequate armament for a neutralized Korea. The best we could hope for was a state with sufficient armament to be able to defend itself against internal subversion, although, added Secretary Smith, the limits of adequate forces against subversion could conceivably be stretched.

The President expressed the view that the Communists were quite likely to accept a certain level of armament in the neutralized state if we guaranteed to abandon and destroy our air bases there. He didn't believe that the Communists had any concern whatsoever about the presence of infantry divisions and light armed forces in Korea. What they really feared was air attack and air attack only.

After further discussion of the question of arms for a unified and neutralized Korea, the President suggested that the policy state that the unified Korean state should possess armed forces "without offensive capabilities".

To General Bradley, however, the important thing was a defensive capability for Korea sufficient to prevent a *coup d'état.* In other words, he added, a defensive capability sufficiently great so that if the Russians intended to seize control of the Republic of Korea they would be compelled to do so by open military aggression in violation of the commitments which they would have undertaken when the state was set up.

The President then suggested still another wording to deal with this problem: "A force capable of defending Korean territory short of an attack by a major power." If, nevertheless, continued the President, the Chinese Communists did decide to attack the new state, they would be compelled to concentrate a considerable number of troops in order to carry out their intentions, and we would be forewarned as this concentration developed.

General Bradley then inquired again as to whether NSC 157 proposed that the United States go into the conference with this proposal as a starter, or whether it was, so to speak, a proposal to which we would retreat or seem to retreat in the course of the negotiations.

Secretary Smith replied that our position would be the latter, but the President added that you can say "retreat to it", but this proposal actually offered the only real possibility of a political as opposed to a military settlement of the Korean problem.

Mr. Stassen inquired whether under this arrangement the United States could continue to supply a moderate level of military aid to the new Korean state.

The President pointed out the analogy of the Swiss, who purchase their own military equipment. It would come down, he thought, to what the Korean state could purchase in the way of military supplies, and that was certainly not going to be enough to scare the Russians or the Chinese.

The Vice President followed this with an inquiry as to the possibility of continued economic aid to Korea. Would all economic aid in a neutralized Korea have to be handled by the UN?

Secretary Smith replied to these inquiries by stating that it was the intent of NSC 157 to provide economic aid as well as some measure of military aid.

At this point in the discussion, Secretary Kyes said he wished to have the advice of the Council on a message which had just been received from Korea.[12] It involved the actions which it was proposed we should take in order to suggest to President Rhee that the United States would withdraw from Korea if he continued his present course of action. The immediate question, said Secretary Kyes, was whether Secretary Robertson should come home. While such a move might have its effect on Rhee, Secretary Kyes questioned whether Robertson should come home if in fact we were not proposing to get out of Korea.

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[12] Telegram CX 63449, July 2, *supra.*

Secretary Smith observed that there was some hope that the Communists would prove so intransigent that we would be placed in a position to blame them for a break in the armistice negotiations rather than to confess our failure to control Rhee and accept the blame for the break ourselves. Accordingly, he would advise against Robertson's coming home at this time.

The President remarked that the toughest aspect of the situation is that if the armistice fails and we did have to resume fighting in Korea, we could no longer look upon Rhee as a reliable ally.

Apropos of Rhee, Secretary Smith inquired whether members of the Council would be interested in hearing Secretary Robertson's personal summation of the assets and liabilities represented in Mr. Rhee.[13] In response to the show of interest in the Council, Secretary Smith read Robertson's very discerning study of the character of Rhee, indicating the curious mixture of obvious virtues and serious shortcomings.

The President then went on to suggest that we can *do* all sorts of things to suggest to Rhee that we might very well be prepared to leave Korea, but the truth of the matter was, of course, that we couldn't actually leave. We must never say these things in words; we must only take actions which imply the possibility of our leaving, such actions as, for example, shifting military units or supplies, which might have some effect on the Korean people if not on Rhee himself. These were desperate moves to influence Rhee, but nothing else that we had done seemed to give any promise of influencing him.

The National Security Council:

a. Agreed to the following change in NSC 157, recommended by the NSC Planning Board:

> *Page 3, paragraph 8, line 13:* After the words "security forces" insert the following: "and U.S. covert activity".

b. Adopted the conclusion and recommendation contained in paragraph 9 of NSC 157, amended to read as follows:

> "9. It is in the interest of the United States and should be the U.S. objective to secure a unified and neutralized Korea under a substantially unchanged ROK. Such an objective would entail Communist agreement to a unified Korea with U.S. political orientation, in exchange for U.S. agreement to remove U.S. forces and bases from Korea, and not to conclude a mutual security pact with Korea. This objective should also involve guarantees for the territorial and political integrity of a unified Korea under the ROK, the admission of the ROK to the UN, and ROK military forces suffi-

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[13] The reference was to telegram 1 from Seoul, July 1, p. 1291.

cient for internal security and capable of defending Korean territory short of an attack by a major power."

c. Noted the desirability of continuing for the time being the mission of Assistant Secretary Robertson in Korea.

Note: NSC 157, as amended, subsequently approved by the President and circulated as NSC 157/1.[14]

6. *Additional United Nations Forces for Korea* (Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 1 and 15, 1953;[15] NSC 147 (paras. 168–180);[16] NSC Action No. 759-*b*[17])

In introducing this subject, Mr. Cutler referred to the action of the Council on April 8 [NSC Action No. 759-*b*],[18] and called attention not only to Ambassador Lodge's letter circulated on June 1, but also to the counterarguments set forth by the Department of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget. He then invited Ambassador Lodge to comment on his position.

Ambassador Lodge opened his discussion by reading paragraph 12 of NCS 154, which the Council had just approved, which called for "a vigorous campaign to secure additional armed forces from other UN members for service in Korea." It seemed obvious to him, said the Ambassador, that you couldn't hope to conduct this vigorous campaign if you were going to insist on the dollar reimbursement policy now in effect. He furthermore doubted that there was any legal obstacle which prevented remitting actual payment by other nations as long as the principle of nominal reimbursement for logistic services was maintained. He then recapitulated the points that he had made in his letter in favor of a change in the reimbursement practice. He noted that he had received a quite unsolicited hint from Colombia that they were prepared to send additional forces if the United States would pay for their maintenance. He also noted that the Truman Administration had initiated the policy which required reimbursement, but had on September 27, 1952 indicated that it was not a matter of urgency to get additional UN forces. For the sake of political appearance, if for no other, the present Administration should change this. The two main reasons, however, for the course of action he was urging were (1) to lessen the burden on the manpower of the United States, and (2) to enhance the sense of collective responsibility. Many countries, the Ambassador insisted, could send men, but were wholly unable to support them in the field. It seemed to him shocking that only one of the Latin American countries had actually sent troops to Korea, and he queried whether this was not cause for a re-examination of our whole policy toward Latin America.

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[14] For text of NSC 157/1, July 7, see p. 1344.

[15] *Ante*, pp. 1129 and 1177, respectively.

[16] Dated Apr. 2; for text of paragraphs 168–171 and 173–180, see pp. 850–857.

[17] For NSC Action No. 759-*b*, see the memorandum of discussion at the 139th meeting of the NSC, Apr. 8, p. 892.

[18] Brackets in the source text.

As for the argument that if we paid all the bills for the support of contingents of other countries we would be accused of employing mercenaries, Ambassador Lodge pointed out that this had no validity as long as we ourselves were involved in the military effort. After all, we were fighting for a cause and not for money.

Ambassador Lodge's proposal seemed to him completely consistent with our foreign policy and our foreign situation generally. We have a very large preponderance of the world's wealth, but only one sixth of the world's manpower. Accordingly, it was nothing more than good sense to base our actions on this fact. Beyond this, the issue which he had raised seemed to Ambassador Lodge to be at the very heart of the whole problem of collective security. This was a political as well as a military war in which we were all engaged. For all these reasons, Ambassador Lodge insisted that his proposition needed a hard look by the Council.

The President then said he would like to hear from the Director of the Budget, since he had been somewhat surprised at the stand they had taken in opposition to Ambassador Lodge's proposals.

Mr. Dodge replied that these proposals seemed to him to raise very difficult practical problems. Do we refund money to countries which have thus far paid the expenses of their forces in Korea? Do we cancel the commitments of nations which have obligated themselves to pay at some future time for the support of their forces? Certainly, he insisted, we have no legal authority to do this in the event of an armistice. Accordingly, Ambassador Lodge's proposal would almost certainly require legislation.

After listening to these and other objections from Mr. Dodge, the President stated that he agreed with Ambassador Lodge that the significant cost in Korea is the cost in men and not the cost in money. The President then referred to the analogy of Lend-Lease during the second World War, when, he said, the United States provided the weapons and other nations for a long time provided the men. He added that he assumed that we would find a formula which would solve the legal and legislative problem.

Ambassador Lodge then addressed a question to the Council as to whether the reimbursement agreements between the United States and other nations had not all been drawn up on a separate and distinct basis in each case. The answer was in the affirmative, and Ambassador Lodge went on to point out that he was not advocating abolishing all reimbursement by nations which could pay, but merely not asking for reimbursement for other nations which could not pay.

The President expressed a complete willingness to contemplate going to Congress with a request for legislation if that were necessary to get over this hurdle. If we couldn't trust Congress on a point so significant as this, we were in a very tough situation. He would argue before Congress in favor of Ambassador Lodge's proposal on three very clear grounds: (1) It would help us financially because it would cost so much less to maintain foreign soldiers than American; (2) it would help us manpower-wise by enabling us to bring some of our forces home; and (3) it would help the solidarity of the United Nations by involving more nations in the common cause.

After Mr. Cutler had given the statistics as to those countries which had paid up in part or in full and those which had not, Secretary Smith read from a statement which presented the view of the Department of State. State in general wished the present policy to be modified in such a way as to give greater flexibility and authority to the Secretaries of State, Defense and Treasury, who jointly negotiated the reimbursement agreements. Essentially he desired more latitude in order to secure more manpower. The present agreements and practices were too rigid. Secretary Smith admitted that the desired change might require legislation, but was sure that it would not be difficult to obtain such legislation from Congress, and concluded by expressing hearty agreement that the human commodity was by and large the most expensive commodity which we provided in Korea.

Secretary Humphrey then inquired whether there was any objection to making separate deals with separate countries.

Mr. Dodge replied that he could see no objection except the political one. Wouldn't Canada be very angry if we let off certain countries from payment when Canada herself had paid up virtually in full for the support of her forces?

The President manifested impatience with this argument and said that if Canada objected to this proposal she could very well pay some of these people herself. Canada was in a position to help and ought to be willing to do so.

Ambassador Lodge called the Council's attention to the President's right to waive payment in certain cases, as he had done, for example, with India.

Secretary Kyes said of course the President had authority to make an exception, but the whole Defense Department position was not to make exception the policy rule.

With this argument the President likewise showed impatience. He said he felt the Department of Defense had every right to put in their oar on the question as to whether the troops which other nations might offer were good troops and in feasible units. Beyond this the matter was not primarily one for consideration by the Defense Department.

General Bradley replied to the President by citing two points: He admitted that the issue raised by Ambassador Lodge was primarily a political and fiscal issue, but he insisted that it nevertheless had military implications. If we pay the whole bill, he inquired, will we not be accused of converting the action in Korea from a UN to a U.S. action? That was a point which greatly worried the military.

The President replied that it need not worry the military as long as contingents from all these different nations were bleeding and dying under their own flags in Korea.

Ambassador Lodge added that after all, he was not proposing that the United States pick up the whole check, but that exceptions to reimbursement be made and that in general our policy in this matter be more lenient. As for the UN, it is only good as long as it is vigorously supported on a wide scale. He therefore was not greatly concerned with the fears expressed by General Bradley.

Secretary Humphrey then asked whether in point of fact we were not now dealing with a theory rather than a practice. He pointed out that we are not likely ever to collect from the U.K., from Turkey, Thailand, the Philippines, and many other nations. The truth of the matter, therefore, was that we were already making all kinds of exceptions.

As for General Bradley's fear that the change proposed by Ambassador Lodge would lead to the conversion of the UN action into a U.S. action, the President inquired what would we do if these contingents from other nations walked out and went home. This would surely convert the Korean war into a U.S. war. In any case, said the President, we have talked enough about this problem, and he believed that Mr. Cutler should be asked to get together a group of representatives to work out a new formula which would meet the problem successfully.

The National Security Council: [19]

a. Discussed the subject in the light of Ambassador Lodge's letter with reference to obtaining additional UN forces for Korea, transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 1, and his oral remarks at the meeting.

b. Agreed in principle that the present practice regarding reimbursement of the United States for logistic support of other UN forces in Korea (NSC Action No. 759-*b*) should be modified in the direction of Ambassador Lodge's proposals.

c. Directed that a committee composed of representatives of the Secretaries of State, Defense and Treasury, and of the Director, Bureau of the Budget, with Ambassador Lodge's assistance, should prepare a new formula in accordance with *b* above with respect to the practice regarding reimbursement of the United States for logistic support of other UN forces in Korea, for early consideration by the National Security Council.

[Here follows discussion on items 7. "Report to the President by the President's Committee on International Information Activities Dated

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[19] The following three paragraphs constituted NSC Action No. 835; a record copy of which is in S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.

June 30, 1953"; 8. "Security of Strategically Important Industrial Operation in Foreign Countries"; 9. "United States Objectives and Policies With Respect to the Near East"; and 10. "NSC Status of Projects".]

S. EVERETT GLEASON

795.00/7-253: Telegram

The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL
NIACT

SEOUL, July 3, 1953—2:50 a. m.[1]

021750Z. (Army Message) Repeated information CINCUNC for General Clark AmEmbassy Pusan. For the Secretary and Alex Johnson from Robertson.

After receiving letter from Rhee of July 1,[2] I met with him this morning and emphasized points in Deptel 4.[3] I greatly appreciate your prompt reply. As a result of conversation I propose to give him following letter and *aide-mémoire* on morning of July 3. Their purpose is to summarize our final position upon which we are endeavoring to obtain agreement. Would appreciate your comments niact.

Text *aide-mémoire* follows as concurred in by Briggs and Murphy:

"This *aide-mémoire* is intended to confirm the understandings which it is hoped can be reached by President Rhee and Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson, special representative of President Eisenhower, as a result of their conversations.

For its part the United States Government is prepared to take the following steps to assist the Republic of Korea:

1. In order to help defend the security and independence of the Republic of Korea from attack, the United States Government will undertake the conclusion of a mutual defense treaty with the Republic of Korea along the general lines of the present mutual defense treaty between the Governments of the United States and the Philippines. The United States Government is prepared immediately to begin negotiations to draft a mutual defense treaty. The ratification of such a treaty would be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States.

2. The United States Government will aid the Republic of Korea in strengthening and maintaining Republic of Korea armed forces to defend the security and independence of the Republic of Korea against attack. It is understood that Republic of Korea armed forces will include ground forces of approximately the level of 20 divisions, as well as supporting air and naval forces.

3. The United States Government will undertake an integrated program of economic assistance and logistical and other support to help the Republic of Korea in its efforts to improve the standards of living

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[1] This telegram was received at the Department of State at 5:02 p.m. July 2.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1292.

[3] Dated July 1, p. 1296.

of the people of Korea, to sustain Republic of Korea armed forces and to progress towards the goal of economic self-sufficiency. It is recognized that such a program would be subject to Congressional authority and appropriations.

4. After the signing of the armistice agreement the United States Government would be willing to have a high level conference with the President of the Republic of Korea or his representative at some intermediate point to confer on all aspects of our common objectives at the political conference to follow within 90 days after the effective date of the armistice agreement.

5. The United States Government agrees that the political conference to follow within 90 days after the effective date of the armistice agreement should seek promptly and vigorously to obtain the common objectives of a unified Korea and the withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces from Korea. If, at the end of 90 days after the opening of the political conference, it becomes clear that all attempts to achieve these objectives have been fruitless and that the conference is being exploited by the Communists mainly to infiltrate, propagandize or otherwise embarrass the Republic of Korea, the United States Government would be prepared together with the Republic of Korea to withdraw from the political conference; and thereafter the United States Government would consult immediately with the Government of the Republic of Korea to determine what courses of action should be taken in the light of the circumstances then existing to seek the unification of Korea.

In consideration and acceptance of the foregoing, the Government of the Republic of Korea would agree to take such measures as may be necessary on its part for the implementation of the above proposals of the United States, including the following measures:

a. The Government of the Republic of Korea will cooperate with the United Nations Command in moving non-Communist Korean prisoners of war now in the custody of the United Nations Command from their present locations to the demilitarized zone, where they will be turned over to the neutral nations repatriation commission in accordance with agreed terms of reference and where they will be questioned in the presence, among others, of representatives of the United Nations Command and the Republic of Korea. Any Korean prisoners of war who desire to go back to Communist control shall be free to do so in accordance with the agreed terms of reference. Non-Communist prisoners of war who desire to reside in the territory of the Republic of Korea shall be released according to the agreed terms of reference and thereafter shall be free to proceed to any destination of their own choosing. In the case of the Chinese non-Communist prisoners of war now in the custody of the United Nations Command, the Government of the Republic of Korea will cooperate with the United Nations Command in turning them over to the neutral nations repatriation commission for disposition in accordance with the agreed terms of reference.

b. The Government of the Republic of Korea will agree to continue its forces under the United Nations Command, which has the authority to conduct and conclude the hostilities, and is prepared to support the armistice agreement entered into between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and the commanders of the Communist forces. In the interests of the continued security of the Republic of

Korea, the Government of the Republic of Korea agrees that Republic of Korea armed forces will remain under the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, following the armistice, during the period of a political conference and as long thereafter as it is mutually agreed that such an arrangement is necessary."

Text of my letter to Rhee follows:

"July 2, 1953.

My Dear Mr. President:

I wish to thank you for your letter of July 1. I greatly appreciate the opportunities you have afforded me for frank and friendly discussions with you and the Ministers of your Government. I earnestly hope that our conversations have eliminated many doubts and misunderstandings.

Your letter indicates that there is one major problem blocking agreement, and that if this problem is satisfactorily resolved, there should be little difficulty in reaching agreement on the other points at issue. I refer to the political conference to be convened within 90 days after the effective date of the armistice, to your request that its discussions be limited to a period of 90 days, and to your proposal for action in the event the conference fails to reach agreement upon a unified, independent Korea within the time limit specified.

I have already advised you upon the authority of President Eisenhower that, while we cannot impose a limit upon the discussions of other nations, we are prepared to agree with you that, if at the end of 90 days, our attempts to achieve agreement on an independent, unified Korea have been frustrated, and it has become clear that the conference is being used by the Communists to infiltrate, propagandize and otherwise embarrass the Republic of Korea, the United States Government would be prepared together with the Republic of Korea to withdraw from the conference and thereupon to consult immediately with the Republic of Korea to determine what course of action should be taken in the light of the circumstances then existing to achieve the unification desired.

In the last paragraph of your letter of July 1, you ask that under such conditions the United States give definite 'pledges to resume fighting until the unification of Korea is accomplished.'

As I explained in our discussion this morning, President Eisenhower cannot legally make such a commitment. We are now in Korea as a member of the United Nations forces fighting aggression under authority of United Nations resolutions. The independent action by the United States Government which you propose would require a declaration of war. As you know, under our constitution only Congress has authority to declare war.

I urge you to consider the undertakings which President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles have authorized me to make to you. They are sent forth in the enclosed *aide-mémoire*. I am well aware that the situation now confronting us is not ideal either from your standpoint or from ours. However, I earnestly hope that it will be obvious to you that you would be in a much stronger position to achieve your objective for a unified, independent Korea working with us as your ally than you could possibly be in carrying on the struggle alone.

Sincerely yours, Walter S. Robertson."

[ROBERTSON]

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Kyes) [1]

TOP SECRET
EMERGENCY

TOKYO, July 3, 1953—12:11 p. m.

CX 63459. Ref AmEmb Seoul msg DTG 021750Z (030250I).[2] Signed Clark.

1. The *Aide-Mémoire* contained in reference message appears to be one, should Rhee agree to it, under which the UNC could implement the basic provisions of the draft armistice agreement. It is believed, however, consideration should be given to the comments in the following paragraphs in effecting either minor modification of the *Aide-Mémoire* or clarification in conference to insure a proper understanding of its provisions by the participants.

2. It is noted that second sentence of para 2 of *Aide-Mémoire* obligates the US to maintain a Republic of Korea Army at the approximate level of 20 divisions with supporting Air and Naval forces. This is the present concept under wartime conditions but does not reflect the US concept of ROK forces for post-hostilities as contemplated by JCS which provides for a ROKA of 10 divisions with strength of 250,000 and corresponding reductions in Air and Naval forces. It might thus be well to modify the obligation which we are assuming in this respect as being applicable until such time as a peace treaty or a political settlement replaces the present proposed armistice agreement. This obligation might be further qualified by a sentence to the effect that such a program would be subject to Congressional authority and appropriations, in the same manner as expressed in para 3 of reference.

3. Para "*a*" of *Aide-Mémoire* implies that representatives of both United Nations Command and the Republic of Korea will be permitted to witness the questioning of non-Communist Korean prisoners of war after they are turned over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Para 8c of terms of reference states "all explanations and interviews shall be conducted in the presence of a representative of each member nation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and a representative from the detaining side." So long as the ROKs remain under command of the UNC, the representative from the UNC could be a representative of the ROKA. It is suggested that subject para of *Aide-Mémoire* be modified so as to eliminate the concept of having both a UNC and a ROK representative present and further to indicate the representative will be a member of the UNC.

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[1] Copies of this telegram were sent to the JCS and Robertson for their information.

[2] *Supra.*

4. The last sentence of para "*a*" of *Aide-Mémoire*, supported by para "*b*" of *Aide-Mémoire*. is considered adequate to insure that the non-Communists CCF prisoners of war could be turned over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at Cheju-Do. It would be helpful if verbal assurance could be obtained that this transfer can take place at Cheju-Do.

795.00/7-253: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 2, 1953—8:07 p. m.

9. Reference your 021750Z.[2] Suggest following modifications in *aide-mémoire:*

1. Para 2 delete "supporting" in last sentence. Use of word "supporting" in connection with 20 divisions may imply balanced forces which would greatly exceed present US plans for Korean air and naval forces as well as Korean ability to support and maintain such forces.

2. Para 5 amend last sentence to read as follows: "If, at the end of 90 days after the opening of the political conference, it becomes clear that all attempts to achieve these objectives have been fruitless and that the conference is being exploited by the Communists mainly to infiltrate, propagandize, or otherwise embarrass the Republic of Korea the United States Government would be prepared together with the Republic of Korea to withdraw from the political conference and thereafter the United States Government would consult immediately with the Government of the Republic of Korea to determine what steps might properly and reasonably be taken in the light of the circumstances then existing to seek the unification of Korea".

Corresponding change to be made in third paragraph your letter to Rhee. Believe suggested language less likely to be capable of subsequent misinterpretation by Rhee.

3. Paragraph *a*, third sentence appears confusing. If it refers only to Korean POWs do not perceive necessity of inclusion of phrase "and thereafter shall be free to proceed to any destination of their own choosing". If it refers to both Korean and Chinese believe phrase can also be deleted as terms of reference speak for themselves in this regard.

4. Paragraph *b*, last sentence, unless there are reasons not perceived here believe preferable retain language of your previous *aide-mémoire* regarding retention ROK forces under CINCUNC, that is "armed forces of ROK will remain under operational control of CINCUNC

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[1] This telegram, drafted by Johnson, was sent to Seoul for Robertson and repeated to Tokyo for Clark as telegram 30.

[2] Dated July 3, p. 1312.

until Governments of US and ROK mutually agree that such arrangements are no longer necessary".

SMITH

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 3, 1953—11 a. m.

Briefing by General Collins

General Collins: I was in Tokyo at the time of the meeting between Clark, Briggs, and Robertson, which resulted in the message Clark sent back here.[2] That message was fully concurred in by everybody concerned—Clark, Briggs, Robertson, and myself. The people out there said that up to now nobody had told Rhee that we would get out. Everybody out there was agreed that unless Rhee was told that we were willing to withdraw from Korea and convinced that we meant it, he would continue to oppose the armistice and to act in his present manner. I am personally convinced that this estimate is correct, but I understand the decision has been made that we are not prepared to withdraw [3] and so that is that.

After my time in Tokyo I went to Taegu. I wanted to keep out of Seoul because I didn't want to complicate Clark's mission. He, after all, is our military representative and I thought that it would be harmful for me to be in Seoul while Rhee's negotiations were going on. In Taegu I discussed with Herren the steps that we could take to make the zone of communications adequately secure in the event of trouble with the ROKs and also the steps that we could take to plant seeds of doubt in Rhee's mind as to whether we were not planning to withdraw. I had already recommended to Clark that we move a regiment into the old Pusan bridgehead in order to bolster our position there. With Herren I discussed steps to increase the guards of the Chinese prisoners on Cheju-do against the possibility that Chiang Kai-shek's urging of Rhee to release Chinese prisoners also might be acted on. Herren was also busy with measures to increase the American guards in the Korean camps. Before I left, Clark had decided to take steps to consolidate the

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[1] A note on the source text read: "Draft. Not cleared with any of participants."

Of the JCS, Generals Bradley, Collins, and Admiral Fechteler attended as well as General Shepherd and Vice Chiefs Generals Hull and White. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent. Sullivan represented the Department of Defense, Amory the CIA, and General Gerhard the NSC. In all, 21 persons were present at the meeting, where Korea was the sole topic of discussion.

[2] Presumably the reference was to the meeting of June 27 and the message was joint State-Defense unnumbered telegram 281528Z, June 28, p. 1280.

[3] See Eisenhower's comments during the discussion on NSC 157 as reported in the memorandum of discussion at the 152d meeting of the NSC, July 2, p. 1300.

POW Camps and this was going to be moved on about yesterday. Clark was somewhat nervous that Rhee might react in some way to measures to consolidate the camps, but since this was supposed to take place in the last couple of days and since Rhee has taken no action, I guess it will proceed without a hitch. From Taegu I went up to the front. I visited all the ROK Divisions except for the two which are in the corps on the northeast coast. I couldn't get to them because of bad weather, in fact I was lucky to visit the divisions I did get to. On the front I saw absolutely no change in the relationship between ROK Divisions and our forces or between the ROK troops and our troops in the U.S. Divisions to which some ROKs are attached. They were going ahead in exactly the same friendly cooperation that has been the rule in the past. In Taegu, Herren had said that he noticed some slight change in the attitude of the civilian population. He didn't think they were quite as friendly towards us as they had been before, but I personally didn't notice any change and particularly at the front the ROKs are going ahead with us in the same way as they use to.

Herren says—and he, as you will remember, has been out in Korea before—that Rhee has consolidated his influence more than ever was the case before. Herren believes that Rhee has now complete control over the Korean people. I saw General Paek several times. Clark and Taylor both feel that although Paek is strongly pro U.S. that he is now completely circumscribed in his actions and that there is little that he could or would do to help us.

Mr. Matthews: Does that mean that he would obey Rhee's orders no matter what happened?

General Collins: Yes, it probably does, except that I personally feel that he wouldn't carry out orders to undertake hostile acts against U.S. forces. From the front I went down to Seoul. Rhee had asked me to come to dinner and everybody thought that I probably should go. After the dinner, Rhee came over and chatted with me and asked me how things were going at the front. I told him that I thought the ROK Divisions were doing very well but that some of the divisions had been under very heavy pressure and had given ground. Rhee said that the trouble was that the morale of the troops was poor as long as they just kept standing still, that if we really started moving forward they would have the spirit of victory. I didn't see any point in arguing with him. I did mention to Pyun, . . . one thing that I had noticed was that one of the ROK Divisions is only 85 percent of strength and most of them are quite a ways under strength. Taylor told me there are 300,000 draft dodgers in Korea and that the ROKs have great deal of difficulty in keeping 16 divisions up to strength. I told Pyun that the ROK divisions were not up to strength and his answer was the same as Rhee's, that it was difficult to keep them up to strength as long as the battle line stood still, that when we started moving forward there would be lots of volunteers. From Seoul I went back to Tokyo. In the meantime we got your message which authorized Clark to resume negotiations for an armistice but said that we could not get out of Korea. Both Clark and Murphy are convinced that there is a real probability that the Communists still want an armistice and they have some hopes that the Commies will go ahead with one. We were all agreed that it would be a good thing to go ahead with an armistice largely because if we did get an armistice it might serve in some way to protect our forces if the Commies had agreed to stop fighting. On the point of trying to convince the ROKs that we might withdraw, Clark thought it would be useful to call a meeting of the Senior Commanders. For psychological reasons we thought it would have a good effect if I was there too. It might give the Koreans occasion to worry about what we were talking about. At the meeting Clark agreed to send the rest of the 24th Division from Japan to the zone of communications in Korea. The suggestion was also made and agreed to that we should stop construction work on airfields and on the new military headquarters which we have been working on. The suggestion was made but decided against that we should stop shipping ammo to the ROK reserve depots. The reason for deciding against it was because of the effect such a move might have on ROK morale. It was also agreed that Taylor would call in the heads of the ROK Army, Navy, and Air Force and start talking with them about getting plans for a ROK takeover of the whole front in the event that there was no agreement with Rhee. It was also decided that after this Taylor would call in all his Corps Commanders, including two ROK Commanders, and talk with them along the same lines. This should give ROKs some pause, since it would really be impossible for them to take over and hold the whole front. Clark will be sending in a message[4] which should get here probably today or tomorrow, outlining the other plans which they have gotten up.

The military situation in the front puts limits on what Clark can do. The Commies originally hit hard at our 3d Division, but although we took heavy casualties they didn't get anywhere. After that they started hitting at the ROK Divisions which are on the boundary of the IX and X Corps. The X Corps consists of the 12th, 20th, and 5th ROK Divisions and 45th and 40th U.S. Divisions. The 12th and 20th ROK Divisions are new divisions. The 12th Division did pretty well for a new division, but the Commies hit it pretty hard and they hit the 20th Division even harder. The 20th Division had to give considerable ground and the Commies actually got into the main defensive positions. The supply difficulties for the X Corps are considerable and there is also difficulty in supplying the divisions on the eastern boundary of the IX Corps. Nevertheless the X Corps is on a line now which provides it a pretty good position. The Chinese are using two Armies against the ROK Divisions in the IX and X Corps already and there is pretty good intelligence they have another Army, the Sixteenth, which they could throw in. If they did put in a third Army, they might have a pretty good chance of exerting such pressure that they could force back the ROK Divisions and possibly break through to the Chun Chon Reservoir. This would have bad effects both militarily and psychologically. For this reason Taylor just isn't in a position to pull out the 45th and 40th Divisions from the X Corps sector. He will need them there in case the Commies really attack in strength. What's more Taylor now has only two divisions in reserve, the Marines and the 11th ROK. He is trying to bring in some replacements from the new ROK Corps which is on the northeast coast and he may have to put in some airborne elements as reserve. From the military point of view, therefore, there just is no possibility now of pulling out the U.S. 40th and 45th Divisions and probably there won't be for some time. In summary, our military situation on the front is solid except for the general area of the boundary between the IX and X Corps. Here a situation could develop which would be not too good. The Communists' artillery fire is heavier than it has ever been before and it is getting more accurate. I looked into the accuracy of their counter battery fire and it seems to be getting better and better. So we have to face heavy and accurate Communist fire which, as a matter of fact, very frequently is put down right on top of their own troops. Fortunately Commie tactics are just plain lousy. They put in one battalion right after another in a frontal assault with absolutely no deception or no imagination. They send one battalion, when it is wiped out they send another battalion against exactly the same position. Sometimes they send as many as 5 battalions in, one right after the other. They suffer extremely heavy casualties this way, although of course sometimes they eventually just overpower the ROKs by sheer force of numbers.

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[4] Reference was to CX 63500, July 5, p. 1332.

Mr. Matthews: Has the business with Rhee had any effect on the morale of our own troops?

General Collins: No, I don't think so. I didn't see any particular evidence of bad morale. Of course you see accounts in the press, but I think that is because our reporters over there are about as lousy as they come. The press has been overplaying our losses consistently. If we lose one outpost they talk about our losing the heights which dominate the road to Seoul and that kind of stuff. By and large the only things we have lost are outposts except in the Tenth Corps area. What's going on here at home in the press is also dangerous. We obviously have to convince Rhee that nobody else is going over to talk to him if Robertson doesn't get an agreement, otherwise Rhee will just figure he will get something out of whoever else is coming and won't do business with Robertson. So, the report which our newspapers played up that there was going to be a further high-level mission certainly did no good.

Mr. Matthews: Has the Rhee business had any noticeable effect on the Korean labor forces which we use? Does there seem to be intimidation to keep them from working for us?

General Collins: So far there doesn't seem to be anything much different. There have been no overt acts, but I asked our Port Commander at Inchon, who has 5,000 Korean laborers, whether he could count on them in case of a real showdown with Rhee. He said that he thought he couldn't count on them and probably he would have to depend on using U.S. troops.

There is one point that has occurred to me that I don't think you have made enough of. Rhee actually had no moral right and he had no legal right to release the POWs. The POWs were captured by the UNC, were in the custody of the UNC, and were prisoners of the UNC. When Won Yung Duk took action to release them he was really interfering in a military chain of command. I personally thought that if I had been there and in command, I would have pinched Won Yung Duk. I asked Clark whether he shouldn't grab him even now. Clark said that he thought it would be a mistake because in the first place Won Yung Duk would be hard to get since he spends most of his time with Rhee at the Presidential Palace, but also arresting him would probably upset the applecart very badly in the rear areas. I do think, however, that when we are making statements about this thing that we should hammer very strongly on the point that Rhee and Won Yung Duk have no legal right to release POWs.

Mr. Johnson: If we assumed that within the next week or so the Commies should sign the armistice, how would the people out there foresee how the situation would develop?

General Collins: No one really thinks they can predict what will happen, but they are all in favor of signing an armistice. For one thing the fighting now is taking place on our side of the agreed line of demarcation. If the Commies signed an armistice, they would actually have to pull back from positions they now hold, so that unless they demand a completely new negotiation of the armistice line, they would have to give up all the territory they have taken.

Mr. Matthews: There are some areas, aren't there, where the ROKs would have to withdraw?

General Collins: Yes, there are in the extreme northeast of the line but they are not important militarily and the Communists might not worry about it too much.

General Bradley: What happens if there actually is an armistice?

General Collins: The first thing I should think we would do would be to move the 40th and 45th Divisions over to the West so that we would have a solid U.S. front and possibly move the ROK Division from the present U.S. sector over to the East. Paek would then have to take over the right hand part of the front. If the ROKs attacked after an armistice they couldn't get anywhere and the Commies know it.

Mr. Johnson: What if the Commies really counter attack and roll the ROKs back and keep on going?

General Collins: Clark has plans against almost every contingency. I don't think I should go into them here because I imagine you gentlemen would just as soon know as little about them as possible, but he does have a whole variety of plans against almost anything that may happen. On some points he will need instructions from here, for example in the eventuality of complete withdrawal he would need instructions as to what percentage of equipment he was authorized to sacrifice. They figure that if he sacrificed 75 per cent of U.S. equipment it would take a minimum time of 45 days to withdraw. To get everything out would take between 6 and 9 months. There is, after all, only one port and that is Pusan. Inchon is not much use since everything has to be lightered.

Mr. Johnson: Are our reserve supplies concentrated about Pusan and Inchon?

General Collins: There are considerable dumps at Pusan and Inchon but we have other supply points quite a ways forward. The two most important of these are Chung Chon and Wonchu. There are only four important ammunition points which are under ROK control. Two of these are on the East coast right close to the shore and in case of emergency our Navy could cut them off very easily. One of the other two we probably also could grab if worse came to worse, so there really is only one ammunition point which is clearly under ROK control. All in all the ROKs probably don't have more than a 10 day supply within their immediate control.

General Bradley: Some people have said that the ROKs are beginning to put stuff away in hiding. Do you think there is anything in that?

General Collins: I doubt it very much. I think we would know about it if they were doing it and I have heard no such indications. After all we still have American advisers with ROK units and I think we are in a pretty good position to know what is going on.

Mr. Matthews: Are the South Korean police interfering with our supply operations?

General Collins: Not so far, but they are after all under Won Yung Duk and we might run into trouble eventually.

Mr. Johnson: Going back to the assumption that we did sign an armistice. I take it that the thinking there is that we could probably handle the situation after an armistice. I am personally worried about the fact that an armistice would mean we would have to call off air and naval action and about what this would mean to our military position.

General Collins: I don't think anybody is over optimistic but they do think they can handle what happens immediately after an armistice. If the Commies really hit hard after an armistice there would then be a new situation.

I should also say that Clark is not optimistic about the chances of the ROK Army taking action against Rhee. He and Taylor think there might be somewhat more possibility of the new Minister of Defense Sohn being more political minded and more apt to take a leading role if there were a showdown. But the very fact that Rhee has made him Minister of Defense may mean that Rhee is nervous about what he might do and wants to have him where he can watch him.

Admiral Fechteler: There might be something in that. Sohn was at the Coronation and was supposed to return to Korea by way of the U.S., but Rhee evidently ordered him to go back to Korea early and not to come by way of the U.S.

General Ruffner: Along the line of impressing the Koreans with the possibility of our withdrawal, has there been any thought of assembling amphibious and airlift capabilities?

General Collins: Yes there has and I think they are going to do something about moving some of the teams from Japan over to Korea.

The question was raised in one of the messages about the possibility of retaining a bridgehead. This would be very difficult. Actually the old Pusan bridgehead would have a longer front than the Kansas line. At present the battle line is about 150 miles long. The Kansas line is about 135 miles long. The old Pusan bridgehead was actually 150–155 miles long. The bridgehead would have to be held with our 7 divisions and the Commonwealth Division. This would mean that we would have 8 divisions for a 150 mile line. Against the level of forces that the enemy now has in Korea, it would be very difficult to hold a bridgehead, particularly since in the smallest perimeter that might be held at Pusan there would be no air base. The enemy would be free to move around and we would be exposed to air attack.

General Bradley: Does anybody have any further question?

Mr. Matthews: I don't think we do. It's been very helpful to us to get this fresh first-hand picture from Joe and we are grateful for it.

General Collins: I am afraid it isn't very optimistic.

Mr. Matthews: What we need is not optimism but realism.

795.00/7-353: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 3, 1953—7:05 p. m.
PRIORITY

13. If Rhee's reply to your July 3 *aide-mémoire* and letter [2] is still unsatisfactory the time has probably come for you to leave if you feel that your continued presence will serve no useful purpose.

Would appreciate your judgment and recommendations as to line of action be taken at time of your departure in connection with following:

a. Coordination your departure and action taken connection therewith with actions being taken by CINCUNC accordance his CX 63449 [3] so as to produce maximum impact upon Rhee and ROK political and military leaders.

b. How and to what extent you should make clear to Rhee that in event of his continued refusal to agree to the conditions upon which they were predicated, the offers which have been made to him to obtain his cooperation are to be considered as withdrawn when you depart.

c. How and to what extent you should make clear to Rhee that his present course action makes it necessary for UNC plan for the "another arrangement" indicated in President's June 18 letter [4] and that CINCUNC has been authorized take necessary steps this regard.

With regard public relations aspects at time your departure would appreciate your views concerning issuance of public statement by you and to what extent it should cover following points:

a. Detail extreme lengths to which US has been prepared go to meet Rhee viewpoint while Rhee remaining intransigent and refusing give assurances cooperation in conclusion and implementation armistice.

b. While Rhee made concession on minor points he has insisted US commit itself resume hostilities for purpose achieving unification if political conference following armistice fails achieve unification within ninety days. Rhee's proposal means armistice not firm and binding conclusion hostilities which UNC has consistently demanded of Communists but only temporary ceasefire which can be broken at will by either side. Conclusion armistice would mean successful achievement UN military objectives in Korea by repelling aggression. If ROK cooperation forthcoming US resolves to work with ROK by all peaceful means to effect unification. However US not prepared commit itself resort to war to achieve this purpose. It is up to ROK to decide whether it wishes receive cooperation US this great endeavor.

c. Generous and far-reaching offers of US having been rejected by Rhee these offers now withdrawn.

d. UNC will continue seek armistice with Communists on basis Clark's letter June 29.[5]

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[1] This telegram, drafted and cleared by Johnson, was repeated to Tokyo for Clark as 39.

[2] Transmitted in Army message 021750Z, July 3, p. 1312.

[3] Dated July 2, p. 1296.

[4] Not printed, but see footnote 3 to telegram 13 from Seoul, p. 1221.

[5] For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 13, 1953, pp. 46–47.

e. Release Secretary's letter June 22[6] to Rhee and such of your communications you consider useful.

f. Foregoing possibly to be supplemented by background press conference in as much detail you consider desirable.

In addition views on foregoing would appreciate any other views and recommendations you may have so that appropriate recommendations may be submitted to President and any action required here can be coordinated with that to be taken by you.

SMITH

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[6] *Ante,* p. 1238.

795.00/7-353: Telegram

The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET SEOUL, July 3, 1953—11 p. m.
PRIORITY

10. Eyes only for Secretary from Robertson. Re Deptel 1 to Seoul.[1] Briggs feels it inadvisable to sound out Rhee on neutralization guaranteed by US and other great powers for following reasons:

(1) Rhee would interpret such indication of interest as sign US planning to desert Korea at first opportunity;
(2) Rhee might regard our raising subject as indication we seek to exchange specific major guarantees contained in defense pact for diluted minor guarantee representing US share of multilateral commitments;
(3) The fact that neutralization would also involve reducing Korean armed forces from present substantial level to that of mere police force would unquestionably represent added irritant.

My personal opinion is this subject could be explored in ordinary conversation without damage to our relations. Rhee in his conversations with me has often expressed fear of being sacrificed to some other great power as happened to Korea in 1905. Advantage could be taken of one of these moods to ask if he would prefer neutralization guaranteed by US and other great powers to a mutual defense pact by US as now being considered. If from our standpoint such neutralization would seem best solution I can see no reason for not sensing his attitude. However, if you decide to sound him out it should be done before he reaches decision on defense pact.

[ROBERTSON]

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[1] In this telegram, July 1, drafted by Dulles, the Secretary of State asked Robertson if he had any impression as to the attitude of Rhee to a unified Korea neutralized and guaranteed by the United States and perhaps other great powers with armament limited to domestic security requirements. Although Dulles was not proposing such a plan at the time, he believed it should be explored in Washington if Robertson believed Rhee was receptive. (795.00/7-153)

795.00/7–453

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) [1]

SECRET [SEOUL,] July 4, 1953.

Subject: Meeting with President Rhee on July 4.

Participants: President Syngman Rhee
Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Paik Tu Chin, Korean Prime Minister
Mr. Pyun Yongtae, Korean Foreign Minister
Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

We met with President Rhee today at 2:30 to find out his decision on my *aide-mémoire* of July 2 [2] which I left with him yesterday.

After stating that I hoped our conversations had cleared up many misunderstandings and doubts, I repeated all the assurances that President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles had already conveyed to President Rhee and which they had asked me to reaffirm. I again told President Rhee that he should have no doubt as to the good faith and determination of the United States Government to work closely with the Republic of Korea as a friend and ally. I stated to him frankly that our *aide-mémoire* represented our final position. In summing up, I said that Korea and the United States must establish a common front to meet the common enemy in order to advance our common objectives. I again expressed my opinion that Korea had so much more to gain by working with the United States than in veering off on an independent unilateral course of action. I again cited the advantages of support for the ROK military build-up, the program of economic aid, the Greater Sanctions Statement, a Mutual Defense Treaty, and the pledge of the United States to work shoulder to shoulder with his government in the political conference. While this support and assurance would only be possible, I pointed out, if the ROK accepted the armistice, the ultimate decision on whether Korea would work with us as we hoped was entirely one for him and his government to make. We had gone over this ground many times and seemed so close to agreement, that I now urged him to reach a final understanding with me that we could announce today.

Rhee expressed warm and friendly appreciation for the assurances from President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles and myself. He said that my mission had done a great deal to clear up many of his doubts and fears. The conversation then revolved around two principal questions: the period after the political conference, and Senate treatment of a Mutual Defense Treaty. Rhee discussed at some length Korea's desire for reunification. He kept saying that the main difficulty was in knowing what would happen after a failure of the political conference. He expressed again his great desire for a pledge from the United States for joint military action in the post-conference period. I again carefully explained why the President could, for constitutional reasons, give no such pledge beyond that included in my *aide-mémoire* of July 2. Rhee then stated that he could understand why American statesmen and the American people did not wish to resume the war, since they believed it would bring on the "holocaust" of a third world war. He said he did not want that to happen any more than President Eisenhower or anyone else in America. He said he understood the difference between the United States carrying on the war as a member of the United Nations and acting alone. He again expressed his hope that the United States at least could give him moral and material support in fighting alone for Korea's reunification. However, he said that he also understood why American statesmen were reluctant to give such support if it also meant a risk of large-scale hostilities. He kept saying "then what" and told me frankly that this was a terribly difficult problem for him and his people.

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was drafted by Young.

[2] The reference was to the *aide-mémoire* transmitted in telegram 021750Z, July 3, p. 1312.

It was because of the constitutional limitations upon the President's action that made him doubt whether the Senate would approve a Mutual Defense Treaty. He told me that he would have nothing with which to reassure the Korean people of Korea's protection in supporting an armistice if he could not be sure that such a treaty would pass the Senate. Since he knew the Senate sometimes failed to approve treaties, he wondered if the Senate leaders would support this treaty. He said it would be helpful if he could receive from the President and the Secretary assurances that the Senate leaders would act speedily on the treaty. I replied that the President and the Secretary had necessarily consulted several times before my departure with the Senate leaders on a Mutual Defense Treaty, since the President would make no such offer without referring the matter first to Senate leaders of both parties. They were aware of the offer of a treaty along the lines of the Philippine Treaty and had indicated their general approval. Since the publication of the President's letter of June 6,[3] there had been no register of protest in the Congress against such a treaty with the ROK.

Rhee said his people had been working on a draft treaty, and he would be very interested in seeing the text of any treaty we might have brought along with us. He said he would like to have us send up one today, if we could. I told him that we would.

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[3] For text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 377–380.

I then appealed to him again to agree with me today along the lines of my *aide-mémoire* of July 2, since we had cleared up so many doubts and misunderstandings. For several minutes Rhee reflected seriously and appeared to be laboring on the point of making a decision. When he began to speak, it seemed that he was about to agree. Suddenly Foreign Minister Pyun intervened to ask that the armistice be held up until the Senate acted on the treaty, since the ROK would have no assurance after an armistice that the Senate would approve a treaty. Therefore, he asserted, the ROK would have no guarantee of protection following an armistice, if the ROK now acceded to our request not to interfere with its implementation. He insisted that before the armistice the ROK Government needed full assurances on the treaty in order to have something with which to satisfy the Korean people. I replied that it was entirely out of the question for us to hold up the armistice pending ratification of the treaty. As we were willing to accept the good faith of the ROK regarding the armistice and other matters, so the ROK should accept our good faith that the United States Government would proceed as quickly as possible with the ratification of the treaty. Mr. Pyun further interjected the comment that the treaty would not get through the Senate this year since it would adjourn at the end of July, which would mean that the treaty would not even be considered by the Senate until sometime in 1954. He complained quite acidly that apparently the United States did not hesitate to leave the ROK for many months in indefinite and vague circumstances.

Mr. Young then pointed out to President Rhee and the Foreign Minister that such was not the case at all, in view of the fact that the Greater Sanctions Statement would be issued on or about the time the armistice would be concluded, and would be of tremendous importance not only to the United States but also to the ROK as a warning to the Communists in case of their breach of the armistice, of prompt reaction which might not be confined to Korea. He said he could well understand the Foreign Minister's concern over lack of any concrete evidence of assurances against renewed Communist aggression, if none was at hand. However, he himself was convinced that the Greater Sanctions Statement would provide that assurance, while the United States Government would be processing a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea. It was Mr. Young's opinion that the Greater Sanctions Statement was such an unprecedented undertaking and guarantee benefiting the ROK that the ROK Government could safely leave to the post-armistice period the negotiation and ratification of a Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States. Both President Rhee and Foreign Minister Pyun, who apparently had not thought of the Greater

Sanctions Statement in this respect, seemed to be somewhat relieved of their concern.

I again suggested to President Rhee that we conclude our understandings today. However, he indicated that he was not quite in a position to do so and repeated his request to see a draft of a Mutual Defense Treaty and to receive such assurances as could be obtained from the Senate leaders regarding Senate action on the treaty.

Comment: This was the most productive and businesslike talk that I had held with President Rhee since my arrival in Korea. I felt that this friendly and encouraging meeting had brought Rhee nearer agreement than he has ever been.

Note: A brief summary of this meeting is contained in Embassy telegram No. 13 from Seoul of July 4.[4]

WALTER S. ROBERTSON

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[4] Not printed. (795.00/7-453)

795.00/7-453: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 4, 1953—2:49 p. m.

15. From Acting Secretary. Embtel 13.[2] President is away from Washington and will not return until Sunday night or Monday morning.[3] Key leaders of Senate are also away and probably not available until Tuesday.[4] It is my personal view President as well as Secretary has already given every assurance on Mutual Defense Pact honesty and decency require. Rhee's apparent desire for additional assurances call into question dignity and honor US Government. Rhee should realize Senate ratification any Mutual Defense treaty more dependent on what he does than on any further assurances at this time by President and Senate leaders. Rhee must himself take those steps necessary reestablish that confidence between our two governments essential for conclusion and effective operation Mutual Defense treaty. Rhee should also realize that unless by his words and actions he restores now-shaken confidence it is very problematic whether allied agreement to Greater Sanctions Statement can be maintained. This statement not only unprecedented international undertaking on behalf of Korea but of great importance se-

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[1] This telegram, drafted by Johnson and cleared in substance with Smith, was sent to Seoul for Robertson, to Pusan as telegram 13, and to Tokyo as telegram 42 for Murphy and Clark.

[2] Not printed; in this telegram Robertson briefly summarized the meeting reported upon in his memorandum of conversation, *supra.*

[3] July 5-6.

[4] Secretary Dulles was also spending the 4th of July vacation away from Washington on Duck Island.

curity UNC forces. Even now we are holding others in line with greatest difficulty.

SMITH

795.00/7-553: Telegram

The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Department of State

SECRET SEOUL, July 5, 1953—3 p. m.
PRIORITY

16. Repeated information Pusan 9, Tokyo 7 (for Ambassador Murphy). For the Secretary from Robertson.

Department telegram to Seoul regarding *aide-mémoire* [1] received in garbled form after I delivered *aide-mémoire* to Rhee Friday and not serviced until several hours later.

In addition to restating our position, purpose of revised *aide-mémoire* was to adopt as much of Korean language as possible that they had used in their *aide-mémoire* (which I returned to Rhee for reasons I have already stated) so as to make form more acceptable to them without altering substance our views.

We had given careful consideration to all points raised in reference telegram and following are my comments on them:

1. We added general phrase "supporting air and naval forces" in paragraph 2 because Rhee has shown particular sensitivity to any implication we will ignore Republic of Korea air and naval units and it indicated no commitment as to size. Concept of "balanced" forces is not intended to be implied. I doubt that Rhee and his officials place any such interpretation on it.
2. I do not believe suggestion on paragraph 5 changes sense. I have carefully indicated such steps could only be reasonable ones.
3. Point in paragraph *a* was designed to eliminate strong Korean fear Korean prisoners of war would somehow not be free to return to South Korea from demilitarized zone. Koreans consider terms of reference ambiguous on this point. General Clark stated to Rhee he would write him letter guaranteeing this result.
4. Last sentence *aide-mémoire* drafted following discussions with Collins, Clark, Briggs, Murphy and Taylor. Rhee and his Ministers reacted violently to language in my first *aide-mémoire* on logical grounds it turned Republic of Korea forces over to command of Commander in Chief United Nations Command permanently, as no change in arrangement could be made without our assent. We all agreed language needed modification to meet Republic of Korea views since it would have created a major issue endangering negotiations. In my opinion Rhee would never agree to placing his forces under United Nations Command for indefinite time. Present language provides safeguards against precipitous Republic of Korea withdrawal for about six months after

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[1] The reference was to telegram 9 to Seoul, July 2, p. 1316.

armistice and possibly longer. Critical time would be a joint withdrawal from political conference when Republic of Korea Government might wish resume hostilities alone if necessary. We should by then have arranged our military and political positions to meet that contingency.

[ROBERTSON]

795.00/7-553: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 5, 1953—3:06 p. m.

16. From Acting Secretary. Embtel 14.[2] While Philippine formula preferred, if agreement could quickly be reached with Rhee and confidence restored some alternative termination language such as Article 4 Japanese Treaty should be possible. Further comment on other possible alternatives will follow.

However, I am impressed with fact that if we are to get best for Korea we cannot allow present situation be protracted much longer. Whereas, three weeks ago overwhelming support could have been obtained from Congress for almost any program for Korea proposed by the President, growing sense of frustration and lack of confidence in Rhee is causing support to diminish. Longer present situation continues greater feeling impossible depend in long term on ROK Government.

You can within your discretion tell Rhee my conversations last few days with Senator George [3] and other influential senators on whom we will have to depend strongly for support for any program for Korea have convinced me of this growing lack of confidence. This applies with equal for [*force*?] to attitudes U.S. public. Rhee ought to realize that while Congress and public are sympathetic with him, this does not compensate for lessening confidence in ROK for future. "Hope long deferred maketh sick the heart." More than ROK confidence in US is involved. Confidence is two way street that requires ROK as well as US action.

You can also, in your discretion inform Rhee that as I have read his messages and your reports of conversations with him, I have been increasingly impressed by lack of realism of some of his advisers. It would be folly for them to be misled regarding real US attitudes by a few vocal but essentially not influential persons. The most articulate members of Congress are not necessarily the most influential. Therefore, Rhee should fully realize that every day possibility armistice further delayed because attitude ROK Government our chances for best possible solution for Korea diminish.

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[1] This telegram, drafted by Smith and Johnson, was sent to Seoul for Robertson and repeated to Pusan as telegram 14 and to Tokyo for Murphy and Clark as telegram 43.

[2] In this telegram, dated July 5, Robertson noted that the final article of the draft security treaty with Korea allowed for one-year termination on the notice of either party (as in the Philippine Treaty of August 1951). This, in Robertson's view, might give Rhee concern and he asked for guidance on alternative language, citing the Japanese Treaty of September 1951 as an example, where the treaty could be terminated when, in the opinion of Japan and the United States, satisfactory individual or collective security arrangements would provide for the peace and security of the Japan area. (795.00/7-553)

[3] Walter F. George of Georgia.

Embtel 15.[4] You can categorically assure Rhee that no further envoys are contemplated if your mission fails. Will do best prevent further damaging rumors this regard.

SMITH

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[4] In this telegram, July 5, 1953, Robertson reported that the press in Seoul carried stories that Eisenhower was being urged by Republican Senators to send another envoy to Korea such as Generals MacArthur or Van Fleet. Robertson stated he knew of no better way to insure failure of what he and Clark were trying to do than to allow such reports to persist. He asked Dulles and Johnson to "try to persuade our Congressional friends to let me keep the rug under my feet until I myself am ready to throw in the towel. That time has not arrived." (795.00/7–553)

795.00/7–553: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

TOP SECRET TOKYO, July 5, 1953—6:21 p. m.

CX 63500. (Army message) To Secretary of Defense information DeptAr for JCS, CG AFFE Yokohama exclusive for Kendall, COMNAVFE exclusive for Briscoe, COMFEAF exclusive for Weyland, CGArmEight exclusive for Taylor, AmEmb Seoul exclusive for Assistant Secy of State Robertson (ArEight pls pass), Secy of Def exclusive for Kyes (DeptAr pls pass) Defense pls pass to State.

Reference: A. DEF 942613, dated 30 [*29*] June 1953,[1] B. CX 63449, dated 2 July 1953.[2]

I. To accomplish the aims set forth in paragraph 6*b* of reference A, I have already taken certain actions. In summary, these are:

a. Conferences of high level US Commanders.

b. Movement of the 187 AB RCT and elements of the 24th Division to Korea.

c. Consolidation of the Korean non-repatriate POWs.

d. Slowdown of supplies and equipment to Korea so that only normal levels are maintained.

e. Suspension of shipment of equipment for activation of last four ROK divisions.

II. Other courses of action which I propose to take are:

a. Continued slowdown on 20th Division ROK program.

b. Conduct surveys of new installations on routes from combat zone to Pusan area.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 1287.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1296.

c. Diversion into relief channel, for distribution by KCAC, relief goods which normally have been made available for sale by ROK Government to generate hwan for its use.

d. Issuance of instruction to substantially reduce hwan accounts, and effect a reduction in the use of indigenous labor to fullest extent possible.

e. Suspension of civilian construction which the military has sponsored for civilian economy.

f. Suspension of certain military construction which would not prejudice combat operations.

g. Contingency planning, in covert and clandestine fields, for withdrawal.

h. Induce, through covert means, speculation as to UNC intentions at high ROK Government level.

i. Release of certain indigenous persons currently employed in clandestine activities.

j. Deployment to Inchon and Pusan, as standby station, certain task force 90 ships, and movement of the naval beach group and second amphibious shore brigade from Japan to Korea.

k. Initiation of conferences, by Taylor, with ROK Chiefs of Staff and Defense Minister during which plans for the following contingencies would be discussed:

(1) In event Communists reject current armistice proposals.
(2) In event satisfactory armistice is arranged.
(3) In event ROK abstains from armistice agreement and pursues independent course.

l. Initiate discussions at the level of chiefs of ROKA, ROKN, and ROKAF concerning plans which will lead to the eventual turnover of training responsibilities from the advisory groups to the ROK services (to include logistical as well as tactical).

(*Note*)—Conference will be handled to avoid any implication that UNC definitely plans a withdrawal.

III. I consider all of these actions consistent with security of UNC forces and with calculated ROK reaction. They are actions which can be logically explained or plausibly denied. Collectively, over a short period of time, they should have a definite impact on Rhee, and influential ROK military and political elements. I do not feel that any of these actions will have an adverse effect on Robertson's negotiations, and I plan to take these actions, in desirable sequence, at the appropriate time. Planning for any logical steps to be taken in the future will continue and you will be kept informed. Signed Clark.

795B.00/7-653: Telegram

The Political Adviser for the Armistice Negotiations (Murphy) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, July 6, 1953—11 a. m.

49. From Murphy no distribution. Personal for Acting Secretary Smith eyes only. Robertson asked me to stay on with him at Seoul where I had gone to accompany Clark on his last trip. I remained until after Robertson's July 3 meeting with Rhee which I attended. I returned to Tokyo after that having taken occasion to bid Rhee and his Prime Minister and Foreign Minister goodbye in a way to convey to them that I personally felt no useful purpose would be served by protraction of the conversations. I hoped this might help stimulate them to cooperate.

Most of July 3 meeting was absorbed by Rhee's exposé of his reasons for opposing armistice and his standard review of Korean history with emphasis on his accuracy of judgment in past with ample reference to American mistakes in 1904 and 1945. While this record has been well grooved with constant repetition, it is more recently endowed with an overtone of doubt regarding American future reliability—"How can we know what the US will do, Americans change their minds so often"? Rhee scarcely read Robertson's letter and the *aide-mémoire* it enclosed [2] which outlines present US position.

My purpose in this telegram is to give you my personal slant for what it is worth. I think Robertson dealing with difficult subject has done first class job of gentle persuasion. It is hard for Robertson to decide that he should depart because at end of each meeting there is neat formula that requires another talk or another exchange. Following a classic pattern of seeming to settle or temporarily waive differences except one and in stating present final condition that US promise to resume hostilities to military victory after eventual breakdown of political conference, Rhee, who had specialized in political science in the US for many years, knew he was stating condition US could not possibly fulfill. In my opinion that is only cover plan for his determination to defeat armistice. I believe Rhee's inflated ego causes him to project himself into historical future in shining mail and on white horse, the hero who alone was right and who singlehanded slew Communist Goliath using Korea as stage. He wants record to show his reasons for opposition.

That is why he is deaf to details like UNC casualties during June. Fact that UNC suffered 4861 killed and some 16,000 wounded in action and 2300 missing in action most of whom ROK's leaves him undisturbed as to arguments about economic and military assistance. Our present error he says will inevitably lead to millions of casualties. He is convinced he has us over barrel and that we won't dare to quit Korea and can't let him down. That was part his philosophy in releasing North Korean prisoners of war after verifying US would not use fire power. He knows we have made no effort to undermine his personal position in Korea and he is doing what he can to consolidate it. As I analyze it, Rhee's attitude towards us is disdainful because he feels we have made mistakes in past, are making grave one now, but he is cynically confident his ability manipulate US representatives. Supremely assured he alone knows how to deal with world communism, Rhee doubts US ability to do so and even suspects we may sell out. In connection these talks regarding armistice he even finds it necessary to accuse us of rearming Japan so that it may eventually attack Korea. His attitude apparently has developed over long time during which he has become overconfident US support and it has been bolstered by individual Americans. I am sure he feels Robertson's mission is fairly low level and later will be succeeded by something more important and also that Clark will be removed before long and replaced by someone perhaps more amenable to his views.

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[1] A marginal note on the source text indicated that Dulles saw this telegram and Smith's initials appeared on the source text indicating he also saw it.

[2] For texts, see telegram 021750Z from Seoul, July 3, p. 1312.

During these talks at Seoul our mission has been disinclined to utilize the press in support of our objective although Rhee–Pyun and company use it freely following their custom. Robertson asked why concurrence in his objection to publication Secretary's letter June 22 [3] for period 24 to 36 hours which I gave reluctantly as I believed it might be useful to publish letter promptly. I see no earthly reason why letter should not be published and why effort should not be made to inform Korean people of the issues. There was also unwillingness to use any form of hint of withdrawal or independent action.

Present moves by CINCUNC and Taylor to indicate planning for independent action with hint of withdrawal are salutary. It has not mattered much whether Robertson stayed few days longer as it filled in time we are waiting for Communist reply to Clark's June 29 letter.[4] As we kept Communists waiting for reply their letter about 9 days no doubt they would feel we should be kept waiting about same length time. Fact their engineers 2 days ago had look at Panmunjom building foundation where signature to take place, construction having been arrested after POW escape, may be encouraging sign.

My conclusion is that best now obtainable from Rhee is position where he will reserve his freedom of action and will only passively oppose armistice agreement. That may not be unhappy. Once battle is off our backs we should be much better position cope ROK problem.

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[3] *Ante*, p. 1238.

[4] For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 13, 1953, pp. 46–47.

For longer term I believe that really serious study should be given question what support we could give Rhee's successor and what aid might fairly be provided whatever spontaneous Korean movement may develop to replace him. I do not intimate any disrespect for ROK sovereignty but merely protection for extremely important American equity resulting US investment blood and treasure, together with strategic needs.

[MURPHY]

795.00/7-653: Telegram

The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT SEOUL, July 6, 1953—midnight.

19. Repeated information Pusan 11, Tokyo 9, (for Ambassador Murphy and General Clark). For the Secretary from Robertson. Reference Department telegram 15 to Seoul (repeated Pusan 13, Tokyo 42).[1]

Rhee does not question good faith of President and Secretary. In fact he considers them among the few friends left to him. He does, however, have a deep fear that armistice would leave Korea not only divided but that in future Korea might be sacrificed to some great power as happened in 1950. United States role in that bitter event is not one to give him comfort.

Rhee has thorough knowledge of American history. He well knows that Senate does not always ratify treaties negotiated by President. He realizes that he has lost popular support in America and for this reason he feels there may be some doubt that Senate would give its consent for defense pact. Without defense pact Rhee greatly fears that Korea would become prey to some other power. From his standpoint he considers his present position stronger than it could possibly be in the future without the pact. Rhee has backed down one by one on points he previously stated in strongest language he would never accept. He now indicates he would support armistice on terms of *aide-mémoire* immediately upon Senate ratification of defense pact and urges that such pact be rushed through Senate at this session.

I have stated unequivocally that we could not delay signing of armistice for this purpose. It is my suggestion, not Rhee's that President confer with Senate leaders of both parties obtain promise of support of treaty when submitted, advising Rhee through me to this effect. If this could be done without loss of dignity, it would be powerful weapon in preventing possible catastrophe. Philippine treaty and our rough draft for Korean pact submitted by us[2] has been under study by Rhee and Cabinet over weekend.

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[1] Dated July 4, p. 1329.

We are having another conference this morning and will continue to press for immediate agreement along lines Department telegram 16 to Seoul[3] just received. In meantime, I urge your reconsideration my suggestion made herein.

[ROBERTSON]

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[2] For the text of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines, Aug. 30, 1951, see TIAS 2529; 3 UST 3947-3952. A U.S. draft copy of the security treaty submitted to Rhee by Robertson is located in S/S files, lot 60 D 627, "Dulles-Rhee Talks, 1953," CF 160.

[3] Dated July 5, p. 1331.

795.00/7-653: Telegram

The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT SEOUL, July 7, 1953—1 a. m.[1]

061600Z. (Army message) Sent Department repeated information Tokyo, for General Clark and Ambassador Murphy, Pusan and CINCUNC. Personal for Secretary from Robertson.

When I called upon Rhee this morning I found him in a highly emotional and indignant state over what he termed "broadcasts out of Tokyo last night and General Taylor's broadcast here this morning". He raged that the military were trying to cause dissension among his troops and that these broadcasts were attempts to intimidate and frighten him with threats. He said "I have some face too, and if I go out to people announcing agreement on President Eisenhower's and Secretary of State's program they will think it is because of these threats by military". (General Taylor made no broadcast.) Following is transcript of broadcast from Tokyo this morning relating to General Taylor and heard by Rhee:

> "General Maxwell D. Taylor called corps commanders and advisors to the ROK Army in a conference at Eighth Army headquarters this morning, as a South Korean decision on boycotting or accepting an armistice hung in the balance.
>
> The Eighth Army commander was known to be making separate plans for the withdrawal of American and British divisions from the battle line, with or without the cooperation of the 16 division ROK Army, if a truce is signed with the Communists.
>
> The military conference came shortly before President Syngman Rhee and American envoy Walter Robertson met again at 11:00 a.m. at the Seoul Presidential Mansion."

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[1] This telegram was received at the Department of State at 3:32 p.m. July 6.

Rhee then began recital of all the things he did not like about the armistice and of the concessions he had made in order to arrive at settlement with his friend the US. He stated that he was writing a reply to our *aide-mémoire.* I pointed out that no reply was needed, that our *aide-mémoire* was a statement of our final position and that if we exchanged notes indefinitely there would be nothing substantive to add to what we had already offered. For first time since our initial conference he raised again the question of Chinese POWs. He suggested that they, too, be delivered to demilitarized zone for take-over by NNRC. I replied that this was a point on which he had already indicated agreement as confirmed in my first *aide-mémoire.* He stated that he had not intended to make such agreement and went over again his pledges to his people that he would never allow Communist troops in South Korea. He said he saw no reason why General Clark could not make same arrangement for Chinese POWs as he had agreed to make for Korea POWs. He then came to principal sticking point—the mutual defense pact—which he said offered the only "security" he could hold out to his people to justify his support of the armistice. He again urged that the pact be rushed through the Senate so that he could present it to his people as a "*fait accompli*". I reiterated that we had negotiated armistice in good faith and could not under any circumstances delay signing when the Communists were ready to sign. He then asked if we could not give him some evidence of Congressional support. I replied that President would not have offered pact in consideration of his agreement to certain actions if he had not felt that the Senate would support him. I further stated that President Eisenhower had no more assurance that Rhee would carry out his commitments than Rhee had that President Eisenhower would carry out US commitments, that each of us would have to accept as fact the good faith of the other. All of this being true it would rob Rhee of his biggest argument if the President would do what I suggested for consideration in Embtel 19[2] this morning; namely to call in Congressional leaders of both parties, obtain their promise to support pact and then advise Rhee to this effect through me. I earnestly hope that the President will not consider such a procedure beneath his dignity. I assure you that his personal good faith has in no way been questioned.

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[2] *Supra.*

795.00/7-653: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 6, 1953—7:02 p. m.

19. Following is suggested draft of security pact approved by the Secretary. You will note changes from working level draft [2] relate principally to simplification of language and fact ROK not yet member UN.

Verbatim text.

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area,

Desiring further to strengthen their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Purpose of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of either of them the political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific. They will also, in consultation and agreement, take administrative steps to implement this treaty and further its purposes.

ARTICLE III

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now, or hereafter brought peacefully, under their respective administrative control would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

ARTICLE IV

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of Korea in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at ———.

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[1] This telegram, drafted by Johnson, was sent to Seoul for Robertson and repeated as telegram 16 to Pusan and telegram 50 to Tokyo for Murphy and Clark.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1337.

ARTICLE V

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.

DULLES

795.00/6–2353: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, July 6, 1953—7:37 p. m.

20. For Robertson from Secretary. Have carefully considered your #19 [2] and 061600Z.[3] President's June 16 [*6*] letter [4] offering security pact was informally cleared with Senate leaders and received general public approval. Any present uncertainty as to Senate action is slight and results from feeling in some quarters that President Rhee desires to commit US to a reckless suicide pact. We are trying to eliminate this fear and I shall be meeting early Tuesday with bipartisan Senate leaders and will then cable further. What is needed most of all is for Rhee to give assurance that ROK is dependable partner not committed to rash adventures.

DULLES

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[1] This telegram, drafted by Dulles, was repeated to Tokyo for Murphy and Clark as telegram 51 and to Pusan as telegram 17.

[2] Dated July 6, p. 1336.

[3] Dated July 7, p. 1337.

[4] Not printed; for text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953,* pp. 377–380.

795.00/7–743: Telegram

The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT SEOUL, July 7, 1953—8 p. m.

26. Repeated information niact Tokyo 14 for Ambassador Murphy and General Clark, Pusan 15. For the Secretary and Alexis Johnson from Robertson.

I have just received late this afternoon from President Rhee an *aide-mémoire* of July 7 replying to mine of July 3.[1] Many points he raises require no further instructions. As regards defense pact he comments as follows:

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[1] As transmitted in Army message 021750Z from Seoul, July 3, p. 1312.

"If the drawing up of a new mutual defense treaty is too time-consuming to be readied in time for the Senate ratification before its present session closes, may I suggest that it be fashioned on the ready-made pattern of the security pact concluded between US and Japan, including clause permitting US Armed Forces 'in and around Japan'. This treaty has been signed and ratified with Japan and there seems to be no reason why it cannot be ratified in case of Korea. US forces will remain there until the Japanese Government has increased its own forces sufficient for its own defense. These US forces will be there and they are near enough to Korea so that no additional US forces will be required for Korea. If this idea is adopted, all that is needed is to replace the word 'Japan' with the word 'Korea' ".

While he does not mention it specifically, I believe Rhee may be referring primarily to Article 1 of our security treaty with Japan. My question to you is whether or not you would agree to add new article to Department's revised text of a draft mutual defense treaty, (Deptel 19 to Seoul, repeated information 16 to Pusan, 50 to Tokyo)[2] which would contain language similar to Article 1 of the US–Japan security treaty. It seems Rhee does not understand difference between our treaty with Japan and mutual defense treaty. However, I believe that addition of article mentioned above is worth considering.

I am seeing him tomorrow morning which gives time for your comments before our conversation.

[ROBERTSON]

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[2] Dated July 6, p. 1339.

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 154/1

Statement of Policy by the National Security Council[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 7, 1953.

NSC 154/1

UNITED STATES TACTICS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING AN ARMISTICE IN KOREA*

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. An armistice in Korea would not indicate that Communist China had abandoned its basic objectives or its willingness to seek these objectives by armed force. The danger of aggression would continue, par-

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[1] In a covering memorandum to the NSC, July 7, Gleason explained that the NSC; the Secretary of the Treasury; and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, approved this paper at the 152d meeting of the NSC, July 2, 1953. The President approved it on July 3 and directed implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies under the coordination of the Secretaries of State and Defense.

*This statement of policy is based on the assumption that the Republic of Korea will cooperate satisfactorily with the UN in carrying out the terms of the armistice. [Footnote in the source text.]

ticularly in Southeast Asia, while the Communists would attempt to exploit the armistice as a tactical device to weaken and divide the free world.

2. After an armistice the major allies of the United States would be increasingly unwilling to support the United States in maintaining political and economic pressures against Communist China. As a result, existing differences between the United States and its major allies over policy toward China would be intensified, and this might lead to a serious breach between the United States and its major allies over the Far East.

3. It is important to our national security, as well as to the objective of obtaining an acceptable settlement in Korea, that political and economic pressures against Communist China be developed and maintained during the immediate post-armistice period, and that the expected opposition of our major allies to such pressures be overcome.

INTERIM COURSES OF ACTION

(To be pursued during the political negotiations for a peace and until a review of basic U.S. policies toward China and toward Korea is completed.)

Pressures Against Communist China

4. Continue to recognize the Government of the Republic of China on Formosa as the Government of all China, and as the sole representative of China in the UN and all other international organs; continue to extend economic and military aid to the Republic of China on Formosa.

5. Use all feasible means to prevent seating of the Chinese Communist regime in the UN and related bodies.

6. Continue the U.S. total embargo on trade with Communist China, prohibition of U.S. shipping to Communist China, and current financial controls with respect to Communist China.

7. Continue intensified efforts to persuade our allies to refrain from relaxing their controls on trade with Communist China in the event of a Korean armistice.

8. Together with the other 15 co-signatories, issue the "greater sanctions" statement† immediately after an armistice is signed, in order to demonstrate that the 16 UN members now participating in the Korean action will again be united and prompt in resisting a renewal of armed attack, and to warn the aggressor that in all probability it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea if there is a renewal of armed attack.

9. Issue, with France, the UK, Australia and New Zealand, and as many other co-signatories as possible, a supplemental statement to the

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†For text of statement, see Annex. [Footnote in the source text. The text in the Annex is identical to that in the Annex to NSC 154, June 15, p. 1173.]

effect that any communist aggression elsewhere in Asia, following the armistice, would be considered inconsistent with its terms and purposes.

10. Continue a program of covert operations designed to assist in the achievement of U.S. objectives vis-à-vis Communist China and Korea.

UN Military Strength in Korea

11. Maintain UN military strength in Korea at a level consistent with U.S. objectives and with the terms of the armistice.

12. Carry on a vigorous campaign to secure additional armed forces from other UN members for service in Korea, with a view to possible limited redeployment of U.S. forces.

Security of UN Forces

13. Continue in effect all pertinent instructions to the UN Command involving the maintenance of the security of UN forces in the Korean area.

Aid to the Republic of Korea

14. On the assumption that the Republic of Korea will cooperate satisfactorily with the UN in carrying out the terms of the armistice:

a. Continue to develop and equip dependable ROK military forces in accordance with the present program, with a view to the assumption by the Republic of Korea of greater responsibility for the defense of Korea.

b. Undertake with respect to the security of Korea, commitments (with or without reciprocal undertakings on the part of the ROK) similar to those undertaken by the U.S. under the treaties with the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand.

c. Working in and through the organs of the UN where feasible, continue to strengthen the government and democratic institutions of the Republic of Korea and continue to contribute to the economic recovery and rehabilitation of the Republic of Korea.

Political Conference

15. Assure ROK representation at the political conference, and full consultation with the ROK before and during the conference; and endeavor in the UN to obtain agreement to the establishment of a UN Delegation so composed as to give adequate recognition to the predominant U.S. and ROK interests.

16. Adhere firmly to the UN interpretation of the armistice agreement that only Korean problems will be discussed at the political conference to follow the armistice.

Persuasion of Allies

17. Conduct a high-level diplomatic campaign to persuade our allies to accept U.S. courses of action.

18. Make an inventory of economic measures we could take, if necessary, to induce our allies to accept U.S. courses of action.

Review of Policy

19. Undertake, in the light of the post-armistice situation, a fundamental review and reassessment of our basic policy toward Communist China, as well as our position with respect to Korea.

S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 157/1 Series

Report by the National Security Council[1]

TOP SECRET
NSC 157/1

WASHINGTON, July 7, 1953.

U.S. OBJECTIVE WITH RESPECT TO KOREA FOLLOWING AN ARMISTICE

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the basic U.S. objective with respect to Korea.

ASSUMPTION

2. An armistice is concluded.

DISCUSSION

3. *Background.* The armistice terms call for a political conference on Korea within 90 days after the signing of the armistice. The conference will be between the Communists and the UN, with the Republic of Korea associated with the latter. U.S. tactics should be determined in the light of what the U.S. basic objective is with respect to Korea, within the limits of the feasible. The achievement of a unified Korea under the Republic of Korea, tied into the U.S. security system and developed as a military ally, is not a practical possibility under present circumstances. This objective could be achieved only by the forceful expulsion of the Communists from Korea and was in effect relinquished when the present armistice was accepted.

4. *Alternative Feasible Objectives.*

a. A Korea divided for an indefinite period on the present demarkation line with the Republic of Korea tied into the U.S. security system and developed as a military ally.

b. A unified, neutralized Korea under a substantially unchanged ROK. (Such an objective would entail Communist agreement to a unified Korea with a U.S. political orientation in exchange for U.S. agreement to remove U.S. forces and bases from Korea and not to conclude a mutual security pact with Korea. This objective should also involve guarantees for the territorial and political integrity of a unified Korea under the ROK and its admission to the UN and possibly would involve limitations on the level and character of the ROK defense forces.)

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[1] In a covering memorandum to the NSC, July 7, Gleason explained that the NSC; the Secretary of the Treasury; and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, adopted the Conclusion and Recommendation contained in paragraph 9 of this report. President Eisenhower on July 3 approved the Conclusion and Recommendation and directed its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies under the coordination of the Secretary of State.

5. *Communist Position.* The Communist acceptance of the present armistice indicates that they would be prepared to acquiesce in the first alternative which would in effect represent a continuation of the *status quo*. The Communists might conceivably regard the second alternative as preferable to the first. The Communists have little to fear from the Koreans themselves, who occupy a small country disorganized and weakened by war and entertain no irredentist aspirations at the expense of China or Siberia. Communist concern over Korea arises primarily from the fact that it could serve as a base or jump-off place for U.S., or perhaps ultimately Japanese, power. Even though the unification of Korea on a neutralized basis would mean the sacrifice of the satellite North Korean regime and of considerable prestige, the Communists might possibly be prepared to accept this sacrifice as a means of preventing the establishment of U.S. bases within a few hundred miles of Manchurian and North Chinese industrial, transportation, and port facilities. Moreover, the Communists would rid themselves of an economic liability which North Korea, as a result of the war, would represent for some time to come. From the global point of view the Communists might conceive of a Korean settlement of this kind as providing an opportunity for "deeds" of a peaceful nature which might not be of net disadvantage to themselves.

6. *The Position of U.S. Allies.* Most of the nations of the free world, both European and Asian, would probably be strongly in favor of the neutralization of Korea both because such a settlement would appear to remove an area of dangerous friction between the U.S. and the Communist world and thus reduce the danger of general war and because the creation of a strong U.S. position in South Korea would result in a drain on U.S. resources which otherwise would be available for investment elsewhere. Nationalist China, which tends to fear any relaxation of tension between Communist China and the U.S., would doubtless regard unfavorably the neutralization of Korea. The Japanese, on the whole, would support such neutralization.

7. *The Position of the ROK.* The strong and highly emotional objections of President Syngman Rhee and the people of the ROK to any continuation of the division of Korea have been made abundantly plain. A settlement providing for a united and independent Korea under the ROK could be expected to appeal to them in meeting their primary objectives. It is possible that President Rhee would rather be the liberator and unifier of his country than President of a truncated Korea, even though this Korea were allied with the U.S. Even though Rhee might place little value on any Communist guarantees, he might consider that

a guarantee of Korea's integrity by both the U.S. and the Communist bloc would provide Korea with adequate security.

8. *U.S. Interest as Between the Two Feasible Alternatives.* An independent and united Korea has been a constant U.S. political objective. This objective can now feasibly be achieved only through the neutralization of Korea. The relinquishment of its military position in Korea which would result from neutralization would not be critical for the U.S. In the event of general war, the desirability of attempting to defend Korea would be problematical. With respect to the danger of local aggression against Korea it would in any case be only the prospect of retaliation by the U.S. forces that would deter such aggression. The danger of internal subversion or indirect aggression in Korea could and should be countered by adequate Korean security forces and U.S. covert activity and economic assistance. On the positive side, the security of Japan would be favored by the withdrawal of Communist military power (including air forces) beyond the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. The savings made possible for the U.S. by its being relieved of the necessity of supporting U.S. bases in Korea and large, heavily-armed Korean forces would make possible a strengthening of the military position of the free world in other areas. The unification of Korea would probably be generally regarded as a significant accomplishment by the United Nations, to the enhancement of its prestige. The unification of Korea under the ROK, even on a neutralized basis, would probably also be widely regarded as a more constructive result of the war and more to the credit of the U.S. than the restitution of the *status quo ante.*

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

9. It is in the interest of the United States and should be the U.S. objective to secure a unified and neutralized Korea under a substantially unchanged ROK. Such an objective would entail Communist agreement to a unified Korea with U.S. political orientation, in exchange for U.S. agreement to remove U.S. forces and bases from Korea and not to conclude a mutual security pact with Korea. This objective should also involve guarantees for the territorial and political integrity of a unified Korea under the ROK, the admission of the ROK to the UN, and ROK military forces sufficient for internal security and capable of defending Korean territory short of an attack by a major power.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
EMERGENCY

TOKYO, July 8, 1953—10:20 p. m.

CX 63548. Refs: A. HNU 7-1 (Z 37098).[1] B. JCS 941491.[2] C. CX 63109.[3] D. CX 63162. E. C 63161. F. CX 63169.[4] G. Eighth Army msg DTG 221100Z, sgd Clark for JCS, dated 22 June.[5]

1. I am directing Harrison to arrange for plenary meeting 10 July to be held in exec session for the purpose of contg with the negotiations as requested in ref A.

2. *a.* I will see Rhee tomorrow in company with Robertson for two purposes viz.:

(1) To dlvr a ltr to Rhee explaining the terms of ref in connection with disposition of Korean non-repatriates, in ans to ques raised by Rhee and Pyun during my last conversation with them.

(2) To discuss with Rhee the possibilities of moving the Chinese non-repatriates, as well as the Korean non-repatriates, to the demilitarized zone or an area immediately adjacent thereto.

b. With ref to para (2) above, Rhee again raised this ques with Robertson today. From my prev conversation with Rhee he is fully aware of the fact that mvmt of non-repatriates into the demilitarized zone will require Communist concurrence for I explained this to him as reptd in para 5*d* of ref G. I will also point out an alternate solution and its advantages of moving POWs into an area adjacent to the DZ; specifically into an area south of route 1 and west of the Imjim River, where there is presently no civ population, where all activities will be out of Rhee's hair and also out of the DZ, in order to avoid raising the ques with the Commies. Of course I will also try to persuade him to permit the Chinese non-repatriate POWs to be turned over to the NNRC on Cheju-Do.

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[1] Telegram Z 37098, CINCUNC to JCS, July 8, transmitted the text of a letter from Marshal Kim Il Sung and Gen. Peng Teh-huai to Clark received through the UNC liaison officers at noon on July 8. The concluding paragraph of the letter read:

"To sum up, although our side is not entirely satisfied with the reply of your side, yet in view of the indication of the desire of your side to strive for an early armistice and in view of the assurances given by your side, our side agrees that the delegations of both sides meet at an appointed time to discuss the question of implementation of the armistice agreement and the various preparations prior to the signing of the armistice agreement. The date for the meeting will be discussed and decided by the senior delegates of both sides through the liaison officers." (JCS files)

[2] In this telegram, dated June 16, the JCS pointed out to Clark the need to minimize the time lag between the signing of the armistice and the positioning of NNSC teams to not more than 20 days. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

[3] In this telegram, dated June 16, Clark assured the JCS that he would press for functioning of the NNSC and NNITs as soon as possible after the signing of the armistice and the inception of the coincidental cease-fire. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

[4] In these three telegrams Clark submitted to the JCS the final agreement reached at Panmunjom on wording of the draft armistice agreement as of June 19. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

[5] *Ante*, p. 1231.

3. Obviously the move of these non-repatriate POWs to the DZ will require agreement by the Communists whereas the move to an area adjacent thereto will not require such an agreement. As I view it, the Communists can be approached for the nec agreement in one of three ways:

a. By acquainting them with the sit in plenary session and proposing an amendment to the present agreement which would be signed at the same time that the present armistice agreement is signed. The amendment would contain provisions which would permit a specific portion of the DZ to be utilized as one of the locations at which non-repatriates would be dlvrd to the cust of the NNRC and would prov for essential pers to have access to the specific area for the purpose of implementing the provisions of the terms of ref.

Comment: This method has the advantage if agreement is secured with the Communists of insuring that we are able to implement any understanding along this line which might be reached with Rhee. It has the disadvantage of possible delaying the signing of an armistice and thus being unable to face Rhee at the earliest possible date with the *fait accompli.*

b. Inform the Communists of the sit at a plenary session letting it be known to them that the UNC component of the MAC will present to the full MAC orgn the proposal contained in para 3*a* above to permit the admission of pers to DZ, in accordance with the auth delegated to the MAC in para 11 of draft armistice agreement.

Comment: The basic disadvantage of this approach lies in the fact that the Communists, for ulterior motives, may fail at meetings of MAC to approve admission to the DZ of the nec pers to permit implementation of possible understanding as pertains to nonrepatriates which we may reach with Rhee. It has the distinct advantage of facile signature of the armistice agreement with the resulting saving in cas of UNC pers.

c. The final approach is to avoid any mention of this to the Communists until after the armistice is signed and then raise the ques at an early meeting of the MAC.

Comment: This approach might result in an armistice being signed at the earliest possible date but involves considerable possibility of misunderstanding which I believe we should avoid and has the same disadvantages outlined in para 3*b* above.

4. If Rhee insists on utilizing the DZ I propose to have Harrison adopt the approach set forth in para 3*b* above and to secure in plenary sessions Communists assurances that they would be willing to give early favorable consideration to such an agreement at meetings of the MAC. If the Communists fail to give these assurances, I feel that we

must then adopt the approach set forth in para 3*a*. In presenting the proposal to the Communists Harrison will point out how this arrangement for turning non-repatriates over to the NNRC in the southern portion of the DZ would simplify the implementation of the terms of ref, would make it easier for the Indian trps, easier for the explaining pers, and much easier for the ROKs, as there is far less opportunity for trouble. I can foresee no basic objection on the part of the Communists to acptg the provs of this proposal, other than ulterior ones possibly designed to cause UNC further embarrassment. Logistical difficulties and some opposition by the POWs themselves will be encountered in moving the non-repatriate POWs to the same gen locs concurrently with the mvmt of the POWs to be repatriated, but these can be overcome and I will meet the nec deadlines.

5. I will have Harrison ask the Commies concerning the time their nominees to the NNSC will be in a psn to function. If their response indicates that they can be in psn within a reasonable length of time as indicated in ref B, I will push for the effective date of the armistice to be the same as for the cease fire. If deemed aprop, Harrison would make the declaration indicated in para 3 of ref C.

6. I will also have Harrison make it plain to the Commies that my ltr of 29 June is the basis for contd negotiations and that the conditions as they curr exist must be acptd as a basis for the implementation of an armistice agreement. Harrison will give the Communists assurances, as we have in the past, that the UNC will make every effort to strictly carry out the terms of the armistice but that they must understand it is being done without specific assurances of cooperation from Rhee.

7. Sec State msg nr 35, July 3, 6 PM to Tokyo,[6] indicated additional Swiss contingents to NNSC were being delayed pending further dev. In view of ref A, recm the mvt to FEC of both the Swiss and Swedes main bodies for the NNSC be expedited.

8. In view of instr from my govt to conclude an armistice at an early date I assume that I have the auth to sign the armistice as presently developed (draft armistice agreement revision of 29 Aug 52, as revised by refs E and F, and as may be further modified as indicated in para 3*a* above) under the existing conditions without dir assurances of Rhee's cooperation, and with the full realization of Rhee's capabilities not only to interfere with the UNC efforts to carry out the armistice terms but also to threaten the scty of my forces by various actions with which you are familiar.

9. I must be sure that these important and concluding steps in connection with the armistice, as outlined above, have full approval of my govt. I therefore rqst reply ASAP indicating such approval or any instr to the contrary.

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[6] Not printed. (795.00/7-353)

10. Bob Murphy concurs in this msg except feels that para 3*c* offers our best course of act.

795.00/7-853: Telegram

The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY SEOUL, July 8, 1953—9 p. m.

29. Repeated information priority Tokyo 15 for Ambassador Murphy and General Clark, Pusan 16. For the Secretary and Alexis Johnson from Robertson.

I am transmitting below text of Rhee's *aide-mémoire* of July 7. We are convinced entire document drafted by Foreign Minister Pyun who apparently has been making every effort to block agreement between US and Rhee.

Text follows:

As this is to clarify this Government's position on points involved in present talks on basis of the proposals made in United States *aide-mémoire* dated July 2,[1] it is thought to be necessary to go over said document item by item.

Item 1 of said *aide-mémoire* is acceptable except that promise of mutual defense treaty is not an assurance of complete and effective nature for simple reason that it is so dependent upon ratification of Senate to be effective at all. It may be desirable for President Eisenhower to consult with the Congressional leaders to find out the possibility of pushing it through Senate before end of present session which is said to be around end of July. This is simple matter whose urgency must be well known to all United States Senators. On assurance that Senate will enact treaty under consideration before present session expires, Korea may well consider it more acceptable.

If drawing up of new mutual defense treaty is too time-consuming to be readied in time for Senate ratification before present session closes, may I suggest that it be fashioned on ready-made pattern of security pact concluded between United States and Japan, including clause permitting US armed forces "in and around Japan". This treaty has been signed and ratified with Japan and there seems to be no reason why it cannot be ratified in case of Korea. The US forces will remain there until Japanese Government has increased own forces sufficient for own defense. These US forces will be required for Korea. If this idea is adopted, all that is needed is to replace word "Japan" with word "Korea".

Items 2 and 3 are in accordance with our previous understanding. In reference to building up of ROK Army to level of 20 divisions, which also accords with our previous understanding, however, it is felt necessary to permit target be more flexible so as to make further expansion of ROK forces possible, in view of reliable report that Red China is about to move its 32nd Army Corps into Korea from Manchuria. In fact, the 20-division level has been almost accomplished and no further assurance is needed. The stronger the outposts become the safer it will be for US and at same time eliminate the necessity of depending on its own manpower for the defense of this peninsula.

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[1] For the text of the *aide-mémoire,* see telegram 021750Z, July 3, p. 1312.

Item 4 is perfectly acceptable as it is.

We are agreed, too, to what is stated in Item 5, viz., that if political conference scheduled to follow signing of armistice fails to adopt, in three months from its opening, concrete measures of evacuating Chinese Communists from Korea and effecting unification of Korea, only lending chances, as suggested in the American *aide-mémoire,* to the Communists to infiltrate, propagandize or otherwise embarrass Republic of Korea, the United States delegates will withdraw from conference along with the Republic of Korea delegates. As to remainder of Item 5, we suggest that United States and Republic of Korea will conjointly and immediately resume fighting against the Communist aggressors. However, if that is not agreeable, the United States will, at least, give us moral and material support in our fight for unification.

Another point worth your consideration is that, during period from signing of armistice to break-up of political conference, the Communists will reinforce their military installations, including airfields, UN [*in*] preparation for another all-out attack on us. The United States should help us in preparing ROK forces to counteract this extra enemy build-up.

In regard to measure A, we suggest that, with some deletions and emendations, it be rewritten as follows:

> "The Government of the Republic of Korea will cooperate with the United Nations command in moving all the non-Communist Korean and Chinese prisoners of war from their present locations to the demilitarized zone, where they will be turned over to the Neutral Nation's Repatriation Commission in order to obviate the necessity of bringing in pro-Communist foreign armed force to Korea. Those anti-Communist Korean prisoners of war who persist in desiring to reside in territory of Republic of Korea shall be released in South Korea immediately after the persuasion period. The anti-Communist Chinese prisoners of war should be sent to Formosa as they desire."

We sincerely believe that this suggested rearrangement would bring results satisfactory to all parties concerned.

In reference to measure B, it is to be recalled that in 1950 this Government committed its armed forces to United Nations command for purpose of prosecuting war until attainment of our original objective, unification of Korea, not to stop short and leave Korea divided perpetually. It should like to reserve its sovereign right to pursue the original objective single-handed, if forced to.

So long as the United Nations command and the Republic of Korea pursue same common objective, they will remain in same relationship as hitherto. But suppose they do not, the existing relationship will automatically undergo a definite change.

End text.

Report of day's discussion of this *aide-mémoire* with Rhee will follow by separate telegram.[2]

[ROBERTSON]

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[2] *Infra.*

795.00/7–853: Telegram

The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY SEOUL, July 8, 1953—11 p. m.[1]

31. Repeated information priority Tokyo for Ambassador Murphy and General Clark 17, Pusan 18. For the Secretary and Alexis Johnson from Robertson.

Briggs, Young and I met with Rhee this morning at 10:30 for over an hour. I went over his *aide-mémoire* [2] point by point in relation to all the points in my *aide-mémoire* of July 2.[3]

I began the meeting by reading the first three paragraphs of Deptel 21 to Seoul,[4] the timely arrival of which I greatly appreciate. The remaining paragraphs I gave him in substance. Rhee seemed to welcome these assurances.

I then went over all the points in his *aide-mémoire* (Embtel 29) accepting or rejecting them according to my instructions. Rhee asked that my oral statements regarding Senate consideration, Japanese security treaty language and movement of Chinese anti-Communist prisoners to the DZ be put in writing to him. Accordingly I have prepared and delivered letter quoted below.

Regarding crucial paragraph B of my *aide-mémoire* of July 2, Rhee stated that he "never had in mind" to pull out ROK forces from UNC, which he said would be "childish", and never would want to "wreck ourselves or our friends". He indicated he wanted present arrangement to continue after armistice, but felt ROK as sovereign country had right to make different arrangement at some later time if there were disagreement with UNC regarding Communist intentions and ways to meet them. I read him our paragraph B and pointed out that language was designed to carry just what he had said. After several unhelpful Pyun interjections, Rhee indicated he wished to get these matters down on paper and not go on talking.

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[1] Received at 3:03 p.m. on July 8.

[2] For text of Rhee's *aide-mémoire,* July 7, see telegram 29, *supra.*

[3] See footnote 1, *supra.*

[4] In this telegram, July 7, Smith informed Robertson that at Eisenhower's personal direction Dulles had met with Senate leaders of both parties. The Senators declared themselves still willing to support ratification of a security treaty and confident of favorable action by the Senate provided there was no further deterioration of their confidence in the willingness of the Korean Government to cooperate in an armistice and the subsequent political conference. (795.00/7–753)

After re-stating our position, I said I was preparing to leave Friday[5] and hoped he and I could reach agreement before then.

Text of my letter of July 8 follows:

"My Dear Mr. President: In the discussion of your *aide-mémoire* and letter of July 7 at our meeting this morning, we expressed agreement with certain of your suggestions and explained why it was not possible for us to accept others. I am pleased to confirm in this letter the statements made to you, which together with our *aide-mémoire* of July 2, represent the understandings upon which I hope we can now reach full and immediate agreement.

1. Senate consideration of the proposed mutual defense treaty. At the personal direction of President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles yesterday consulted with Senate leaders of both parties, who associated themselves with him in a message which was read to you this morning in its entirety. The point of the message was that the Senate leaders would support ratification of a security treaty and that they were confident of favorable action by the Senate, provided there is no further deterioration of confidence in the willingness of the ROK Government to cooperate in armistice and in our subsequent efforts in political conference to produce solution which will give Korea peace, security, economic rehabilitation and ultimately political unity.

2. The American Government is prepared to proceed with negotiation of treaty independently of political conference to follow armistice, and President and leaders of Senate will press for prompt ratification when Congress reconvenes unless during this period the attitude of Korean Government has made this impossible. Acting majority leader, Senator Knowland, advises that due to time factor there is no possibility of action by Senate during few remaining weeks of present session.

3. With respect to your suggestion that treaty incorporate certain language from US-Japanese treaty, Secretary Dulles advises that there should be no difficulty in including in proposed treaty, rough draft of which has been submitted to you, language similar to Article 1 of Japanese treaty, which I read to you this morning.

4. Disposition of anti-Communist Chinese POWs. I have consulted with General Clark, and he advises that he is confident he can obtain consent within present agreed terms of reference to move anti-Communist Chinese POWs to DZ to be released to NNRC in same way he has previously advised he would undertake to do for anti-Communist Korean POWs. Paragraph *a* of our *aide-mémoire* of July 2 is hereby modified accordingly. General Clark will write you a separate letter confirming his undertaking with reference to these Korean and Chinese anti-Communist prisoners.

I again wish to make clear that arrangements involving action by American Government as set forth in numbered paragraphs one to five of my *aide-mémoire* of July 2 are contingent upon actions of your government as stated in paragraphs *a* (as modified by this letter) and *b* of that document.

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[5] July 10.

I greatly appreciate the courtesy and friendly consideration you have shown me in all of our discussions. I have endeavored to convey to you on behalf of your friends President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles their deep interest in your problems, their sympathy for your concern about future of your country, and their earnest desire that our two governments continue to work together as friends and allies in the attainment of your objective for a unified, independent Korea, an objective for which your country has already sacrificed so heavily and for which you have striven over the years with such singular devotion.

Very sincerely yours, Walter S. Robertson".

[ROBERTSON]

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, July 8, 1953—7:15 p. m.

25. Personal from Secretary for Robertson. Have just left White House conference reviewing situation to date, particularly your #31[2] representing latest word from you. President authorized you, if you deem appropriate and useful, to transmit following personal message from him to President Rhee:

"Mr Dear President Rhee: Mr. Robertson's reports encourage me to believe that we can continue to go forward side by side. I hope you share my feeling that recent conversations have clarified many misunderstandings and have brought about an intimacy of understanding and purpose between us which has been too long deferred. I deeply sympathize with your future goals and am sure that they can best be achieved by measures which will not sacrifice the achievements of the past and the friendship and confidence of the American people. This friendship and confidence can, if you will it, be a dependable reliance and support of your people for a future which, in a world of danger, will yet realize your legitimate hopes and aspirations. Throughout these days I have been profoundly sympathetic with you. My own position as the President of the United States has been formulated not out of a lack of sympathy but out of a realization born of hard experience that great goals are seldom realized by desperate measures. Your illustrious place in history as a great patriot is due to patient and sober striving. We want to be allied with you in such endeavors. With every good wish, I am, Sincerely, Dwight D. Eisenhower."

DULLES

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[1] This telegram, drafted by Dulles, was sent to Seoul for Robertson and repeated for information to Pusan as telegram 23, to Tokyo for Murphy and Clark as telegram 70, and to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Nash and the JCS.

[2] *Supra.*

795.00/7-953: Telegram

The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT TOKYO, July 9, 1953—8:25 p. m.

DTG 091125Z. Repeated information CINCUNC Tokyo. For Ambassador Murphy and General Clark and AmEmbassy Pusan. For the Secretary from Robertson.

At suggestion Prime Minister Paik I saw Rhee alone this morning for over an hour. Paik's inference was that it would be best for Foreign Minister Pyun not to be present. It was first time I had seen Rhee since Communists requested truce meeting.[1] Rhee was tense and nervous. He immediately protested my anticipated return home tomorrow. He said he believed we were nearing and could reach agreement, that we had agreed on many points but there were still several points that needed clarification. When I pressed repeatedly to learn points on which we were disagreed he finally went into a long tirade about the activities of the military, State Department and "psychological warfare people" trying to break down the morale of his people, alientate them from the government and cause defection among his officers and troops. He went into many details which I shall not repeat in this message. The purpose of the long recital was to explain why he could not agree to keep troops under UN Command for a specified period of time, regardless of other conditions. He stated he had not rejected the truce and that he contemplated leaving his troops under UNC so long as command did not engage in activities which he considered to be against interests of Korea. I reiterated, of course, that our proposals to him were conditional upon his acceptance of the terms outlined in paragraphs *a* and *b* of our *aide-mémoire* of July 2.[2] We terminated the discussion by Rhee's agreeing to clarify his exact position in writing which he promised to let me have this afternoon if possible. It now appears Rhee is seeking avoid issue which would provide us with clear-cut basis for ending talks in non-agreement.

Clark is strongly of the opinion that if we could get a commitment out of Rhee not to violate truce or to take other action to obstruct armistice, and to leave ROK army under his command without specifying a time limit, that such an agreement would be "worth a million dollars" to Clark. He pointed out that what we need is a breathing spell of a few months, that once armistice is implemented he believed it would be extremely difficult for ROK to make up its mind to renew fighting alone. If Rhee will not give unequivocal commitment of his army to UNC for specified time, and it is decided his temporary cooperation is needed so urgently that a conditional commitment will not be rejected by, [*sic*] we shall have to decide.

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[1] See footnote 1, p. 1347.

[2] Transmitted in Army message 021750Z from Seoul, July 3, p. 1312.

(1) What kind of deal could be made on this basis with reference to our proposed program on a contingency basis, and (2) What kind of statement should be made in Washington and here upon my departure. I assume that we would refrain from public statement which would inflame Rhee, however just they might be from our standpoint. I emphasize again my opinion that Rhee is not bluffing and is capable of the most irrational and damaging action. You might consider the advisability of a joint statement to the effect that

(*a*) We had cleared up many differences and misunderstandings in our discussions,
(*b*) I was returning to Washington to report to my government,
(*c*) ROK would continue its cooperation with UNC on the present basis,
(*d*) It is hoped ROK and US can soon clarify all other points at issue. Request your comments and guidance.

President Eisenhower's personal message[3] was received upon my return from Rhee's office. I sent it to him immediately so that he would have the chance of reading it before our meeting soon to follow with Clark, Briggs, Murphy, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. Clark and I have already reported in joint message (GX 6799)[4] result of that meeting.

Rhee's letter[5] referred to above just received. Text follows by separate telegram. Defer action this message until letter received.

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[3] Transmitted in telegram 25, *supra.*
[4] *Infra.*
[5] Dated July 9, p. 1357.

795.00/7–953: Telegram

The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Department of State

SECRET SEOUL, July 9, 1953—1:45 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

GX 6799. 090445Z. (Army Message) Sent DeptAr (for JCS) and State Department, repeated information CINCUNC Tokyo; Seoul exclusive for Robertson. From 8th Army. This is a joint message to State and Defense from Robertson and Clark.

1. Robertson, Murphy, Briggs and Clark just concluded a half-hour meeting with Rhee. Robertson had had a private meeting with him earlier.

2. Clark explained to Rhee his willingness to undertake the movement of both the Korean and Chinese non-repatriate PWs from their present location to the demilitarized zone in order to obviate the necessity of having Indian troops, NNRC and Communist indoctrination personnel in South Korea. Clark explained to Rhee, as he did on 22 June

(para 5*d*, DTG 221100Z from Army 8[1]) that the movement of these individuals to the demilitarized zone required Commie concurrence but he saw no valid reason why Commies should not agree. But, in the event that they did not accept this proposal, Clark showed him on the map the area he proposed, described in para 2*b* of Clark's message CX 63548.[2] He was told of the terrific logistical problems involved but that we would try to overcome them. Rhee was particularly insistent that Indian troops not enter into nor be based in South Korea. Clark told him that possibly it could be arranged to fly the Indian troops involved in this project directly into the demilitarized zone for a suitable airfield is planned for that area. Rhee gave us the impression that this solution was reasonable and, in answer to Clark's question of his cooperation, Rhee gave us the impression that he could cooperate in this project.

3. Robertson will report his earlier conference in a separate message.[3] Signed Clark and Robertson.

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[1] Dated June 22, p. 1231.
[2] Dated July 8, p. 1347.
[3] In telegram DTG 091125Z, July 9, *supra*.

795.00/7-953

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, July 9, 1953.

MY DEAR MR. ROBERTSON: Let me say again that since your arrival in Korea we have had many intimate and cordial exchanges of views which have emphasized the close and deep friendship existing between our two peoples and which have done much to achieve mutual agreement on the troubled questions which had arisen in connection with the arrangements for a truce.

In particular, we have agreed to hold in abeyance our original demand for the withdrawal of Chinese Communist troops and for reunification of Korea prior to signing of an armistice. In order to demonstrate our determination to cooperate with USA and other nations which have fought by our sides during this fateful struggle for our national survival, we have agreed not to insist upon these conditions pending an effort to secure them in political conference which is to follow signing of a truce. Since experience indicates that polite discussions with Communists have tended to be protracted and without results, we have agreed that representatives of ROK and USA will withdraw from conference at expiration of ninety days after its commencement.

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[1] This letter was transmitted to the Department of State by Robertson in Army message 091315Z, July 9, 1953, for Dulles and Johnson. It was repeated to Tokyo for Clark and Murphy.

In regard to question of POWs, it was our determination to release all remaining Korean prisoners who refuse to return to Communist control. However at your request, we have agreed to retention of these prisoners in captivity and to cooperate with UNC in transporting them, along with all other POWs into DZ where they may be subjected to three months of indoctrination prior to their release.

In order to make this procedure possible, it is understood that no troops from India or from any other foreign power will be landed in South Korea to guard these prisoners. It is further understood that at expiration of the three-month period of questioning and screening, all Korean prisoners who desire remain in South Korea will be released south of neutral zone, and all Chinese prisoners who refuse to return to Communist control will be transported to Formosa, according to their will.

In regard to mutual defense pact to be ratified between our two governments, we understand the difficulty of securing immediate ratification by US Senate, and we agree that it may be ratified, if not at this session of Congress, then at next session. We have not hesitated to accept assurances of President Eisenhower and of Secretary Dulles that we may depend upon its ratification by Senate.

A rough draft of this projected treaty is enclosed [2] for consideration and discussion.

In your communication of July 8, you indicate that ratification of treaty may depend upon lack of "further deterioration of confidence in willingness of Korean Government to cooperate in armistice" and in subsequent political conference. I am sure we both realize that terms of this statement are undefinable, but I am confident they will stand the test of sincerity, goodwill, and depths of friendship which have characterized relations of our two governments and sentiments of our two peoples. Although we cannot sign truce, we shall not obstruct it, so long as no measures or actions taken under armistice are detrimental to our national survival.

We shall endeavor to cooperate fully and earnestly in political and peaceful achievement of reunification of our nation, which is our most fundamental national objective and necessity. The fullness of our determination to achieve reunification is a sufficient guarantee of our intentions in this matter. However, this promise of cooperation should not be interpreted as binding us to forego our unquestioned sovereign right to interpret our position freely, to reply to Communist or pro-Communist propaganda, or to deal internally with Communist subversion.

Most vital to survival of Korean nation is question of how reunification of Korea is to be achieved should political conference fail to accomplish it. When our talks began, we asked that forces of UN or of

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[2] *Infra.*

US should join with ROK forces to achieve joint objectives of reunifying Korea. However, if this proposal is not agreeable to US, we should like to have specific assurances of moral and material support for an effort with our own armed forces to repel aggressors from Korea.

I am sure there is no question between US and ROK concerning urgent necessity for taking every feasible step to accomplish reunification and to maintain independence of our nation. With deep gratitude for assistance which we have received from US, I have sought every available means of cooperating most unreservedly in plans which you have presented and in surmounting difficulties which you described. I am confident that spirit of accord in which our talks have progressed, and large areas of agreement which have resulted, will be followed by continuing mutual consideration and by spirit of mutual accommodation which will lead most certainly to our common objective of a secure and lasting peace in the Far East.

Sincerely yours, **SYNGMAN RHEE**

795.00/7-953

Republic of Korea Draft of Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea [1]

SECRET PRIORITY SEOUL, July 9, 1953.

The ROK and USA, the parties to this Treaty, reaffirming their faith in purposes and principles of Charter of UN and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, desiring to strengthen fabric of peace in Pacific area,

Remembering with deep satisfaction that earliest formal relations between our two nations commenced with Amity Treaty of 1882,

Recalling with mutual pride the close relationship which brought two nations together in a common bond of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side by side against Communist aggression in Korea,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their common determination again to defend themselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under illusion that either of them stands alone in Pacific area,

Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense for preservation of peace and security pending development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in Pacific area,

Agreeing that nothing in this present instrument shall be considered or interpreted as in any sense or in any way altering or diminishing any existing agreements or understandings between USA and ROK,

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[1] This draft treaty was transmitted by Robertson to the Department of State in Army message 091320Z from Seoul, July 9, 1953.

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The parties undertake, as set forth in Charter of UN, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with purpose of UN.

Article II

The parties reaffirm their recognition of fact that lawful jurisdiction of ROK extends throughout traditional area of Korea and specifically northward to Yalu and Tumen Rivers.

Article III

In order more effectively to achieve objective of this treaty, the parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. If the US should find it desirable to station its land, sea, or air forces in or about Korea, arrangements for this purpose can be readily effected.

Article IV

The parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies will consult together from time to time regarding implementation of this treaty and whenever in opinion of either of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of either of the parties is threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific.

Article V

The parties agree that an armed attack against one shall be considered an attack against the other; and consequently the parties agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in the exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of Charter of UN, will assist the party so attacked by taking forthwith and immediately such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to resist armed attack. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the UN. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article VI

For purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack on metropolitan territory of either of the parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in Pacific.

Article VII

This treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the parties under Charter of UN or the responsibility of UN for maintenance of international peace and security.

Article VIII

This treaty shall be ratified by ROK and USA in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them.

Article IX

This treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the Government of ROK and USA there shall have come into force such UN arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by UN or otherwise of international peace and security in the Korean area.

In witness whereof the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty, etc.

795.00/7-953: Telegram

The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT SEOUL, July 10, 1953—1 a. m.[1]

091600Z. July 9 (Army message). Repeated information CINCUNC for Murphy, Pusan. For the Secretary and Alexis Johnson from Robertson.

The following are my comments on Rhee's letter[2] and draft treaty[3] of July 9. Rhee's letter indicates retreat from many of his previously declared positions as follows:

1. He has given up condition that withdrawal of Chinese Communist troops and unification of Korea take place prior to conclusion of armistice.

2. He has given up demand that all non-Communist POWs be immediately released to countries of their own choosing.

3. He has agreed that anti-Communist Korean and Chinese POWs will be transported to DZ and turned over to NNRC.

4. He has given up his refusal to submit unification of Korea to political conference and has agreed to cooperate in "peaceful achievement" of unification of Korea with certain reservations.

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[1] This message was received at the Department of State at 4:28 p. m., July 9, 1953.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1357.

[3] *Supra.*

5. He has given up demand treaty be ratified prior to conclusion of armistice. He accepts assurances of President and Secretary of State that treaty will be ratified.

6. He has abandoned request that United States agree to resume hostilities after 90 days of political conference if it fails achieve objectives.

7. For the first time in writing he has formally agreed not to obstruct the armistice. Among the points now apparently still at issue are:

(*a*) Our commitments following the 90 day political conference (last sentence penultimate paragraph his letter),
(*b*) Article II of his draft treaty,
(*c*) Article V of his draft treaty which follows NATO language instead of Philippine treaty and
(*d*) The lack of any agreement in his letter leaving ROK forces under United Nations Command, except by implication in following language:

> "Although we cannot sign the truce we shall not obstruct it, so long as no measures or action taken under the armistice are detrimental to our national survival."

Rhee's letter omits qualifications we had put on joint withdrawal from political conference (last sentence of his second paragraph his letter). I also call your attention to second sentence Article III and Article VI of treaty.

[ROBERTSON]

795.00/7–953: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, July 9, 1953—7:46 p. m.

31. Reference your DTG 091600Z [2] and previous. While Rhee's letter is not entirely satisfactory it represents great progress from situation that existed at time you undertook your mission and probably is about all we will be able obtain from him at this time. Rather than negotiating and exchanging further correspondence on unsatisfactory portions his letter, subject views yourself and Clark, believe we should tacitly consider his letter satisfactory basis for entering into armistice, leaving detailed problems which it raises for future discussion and negotiation.

However concur on desirability joint US–ROK statement at time your departure along lines suggested your DTG 091125Z,[3] and suggest efforts now being directed at obtaining Rhee's agreement to as satisfactory joint statement as possible. Transmit text to Department prior release time so that public relations aspects can be coordinated.

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[1] This telegram, drafted by Johnson and cleared with Smith and Dulles, was repeated to Pusan as telegram 31 and to Tokyo for Murphy and Clark as 90. It was passed to the Department of Defense for Nash and the JCS.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Dated July 9, p. 1355.

With regard to Rhee's draft mutual security treaty suggest you inform him Department immediately undertaking careful study his draft and will be prepared conclude negotiations at high level meeting with him to follow armistice.

DULLES

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET TOKYO, July 9, 1953—10:17 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX 63567. References: A. JCS 943398.[1] B. GX 6799.[2] C. CX 63548.[3]

1. Appreciate promptness with which you dispatched reference A.

2. In conference with Harrison today at Seoul I directed him to endeavor to arrange a meeting with the Communists for tomorrow, meeting to be in executive session, at which he will develop the Communist intentions regarding the implementation of the Armistice Agreement and be prepared at an appropriate time to present UNC views along the following lines:

a. We assume that ROKA forces presently under the command of the UNC will remain so after an armistice and that they will carry out the instructions of the UNC and withdraw from that part of the demilitarized zone in which they are now deployed, in accordance with the Armistice Agreement.

b. As stated in my letter of 29 June,[4] the UNC will make every effort to abide by the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. We cannot guarantee that ROKG will lend full support to it, but the UNC shall continue to do everything within our power to cause them to cooperate.

c. The UNC will furnish police protection to the NNRC, NNSC and Joint Red Cross teams and will take all feasible precautionary measures to insure their safety. However, the UNC will not undertake to use force against ROKA to insure ROK compliance with Armistice.

d. In order to have maximum assurance that the NNRC will be free to operate unmolested, we consider it highly desirable and advantageous to both sides to move both the Korean and the Chinese POWs not repatriated direct, to the southern portion of the demilitarized zone and there turn them over to the custody of the NNRC. This will impose a serious logistic burden on the UNC but it is one we are willing to assume to reduce the possibility of incidents. However, this is a detail that can properly be discussed by the Military Armistice Commission, and the UNC will not comment further on it at this time.

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[1] In this joint State–Defense message, July 8, 1953, the JCS informed Clark that authority granted to him to conclude an armistice without assurances of cooperation from Rhee remained in effect. However, he should undertake no obligation at Panmunjom, expressed or implied, legal or moral, to use force against the ROK to ensure compliance with the armistice. Finally, Clark was authorized to sign the armistice agreement without the previous requirement that the final text be approved at the government level. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

[2] Dated July 9, p. 1356.

[3] Dated July 8, p. 1347.

[4] The text of CINCUNC's letter to Marshal Kim Il Sung and Gen. Peng Teh-huai was transmitted to the JCS in an unnumbered telegram, DTG 290607Z June 1953 (HNC 1796), not printed. (JCS files) For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 13, 1953, pp. 46–47.

(*Comment:* After discussing this with Harrison, believe it preferable to eliminate step outlined in para 3*a*, ref C, since it might cause unnecessary delay. If, when the question of referring matters to the Military Armistice Commission is raised, Communists object, Harrison will drop further discussion in Plenary Sessions and reserve the right to raise it during an early meeting of the Military Armistice Commission with UNC MAC applying maximum pressure for acceptance of this solution. If, however, the Military Armistice Commission cannot agree on the use of the demilitarized zone, I will move non-repatriates to an area adjacent to the demilitarized zone as discussed in para 2*b* of ref C. As pointed out in ref B, I explained what area I had in mind to Rhee and he indicated no objection. It was at this time that he commented that while he would not object to CCF non-repatriates moving thru South Korea (from Mosulpo) to the demilitarized zone, he could not accept the Indians and Communist representatives moving thru South Korea.)

3. Since the Communists requested meeting for purpose of "discussing implementation of the Armistice" it is highly probably that they will pose direct questions on what we will do to establish military safeguards to prevent or minimize violations of the armistice by ROKG. Harrison will volunteer nothing, but if these questions should be raised, he will cover, among others, the following items in a general manner:

a. The UNC will immediately withdraw all logistical and military support from any ROKA unit that takes any aggressive action which would constitute a violation of the armistice.

b. Violations of the armistice will be matters for the Military Armistice Commission to consider.

4. After further consideration of our conference with Rhee this morning, I feel that there is no longer any doubt in his mind that we intend to have an armistice with or without him. Should negotiations proceed without delaying tactics on the part of the Communists, Harrison estimates we may be able to sign the armistice in approximately one week or less.

5. I outlined the above course of action to Robertson this afternoon.

Editorial Note

The plenary sessions at Panmunjom reconvened on July 10. In his opening statement, Delegate Nam Il insisted that the United Nations Command was responsible for recovery of the prisoners released by

Rhee and he demanded to know what measures were being adopted to prevent such releases in the future. Nam also asked whether the armistice would include the Army of the Republic of Korea and what guarantees the United Nations Command would give to insure that South Korea would go along with the terms of the agreement. Harrison could only counter by stating that the United Nations Command assumed the Republic of Korea forces would remain under the command of the United Nations Command after the armistice and would abide by the provisions of the agreement. As stated in General Clark's letter of June 29, Harrison continued, the United Nations Command would do all in its power to cause the Republic of Korea to cooperate with the armistice, although it could not guarantee that the Republic of Korea would fully support it. Harrison stated that the United Nations Command was prepared to provide police protection to the members of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and he suggested that all nonrepatriate prisoners be moved to the demilitarized zone where they could be turned over to the Commission with a lesser chance of hindrance or incident. A record of this session can be found in telegram C 63574, Clark to JCS, July 10, 1953, not printed. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

[Extract [2]]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 10, 1953—11 a. m.

. . . .

Korea

General Collins: We have a message in from Clark [3] this morning in which he asks for instructions with regard to what he can tell the Communists about ROK participation in an armistice. There are two questions really—the first is whether he can use any part of Rhee's statement to Robertson as an assurance to the Communists that the ROK will go along with an armistice. The second question is whether he can tell the Communists that the UNC would cut off logistic support to the ROK if the ROKs violate the armistice.

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[1] A note on the title page read: "Draft. Not cleared with any of participants."

Of the JCS, General Collins and Admiral Fechteler attended. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent, while General Gerhard and Gleason represented the NSC and Amory the CIA. In all, 20 persons were present.

[2] In addition to Korea, NATO and Indochina were discussed at this meeting.

[3] This reference presumably was to telegram CX 63583, Clark exclusive to Collins, July 10, 1953, in which Clark argued that the Communists, who had been reasonable and calm at the plenary meeting of July 10, deserved concrete assurances as to what the UNC would do if the ROK forces should violate the armistice. (Department of Defense files)

Mr. Johnson: I think that Rhee's statement in his letter[4] to Robertson that he will not obstruct an armistice might be useful as an assurance to the Commies that the armistice will include the ROK. On the question of telling the Commies that we will cut off supplies from the ROK if they violate the armistice, it seems to me that there are two objections, even though I realize that it may be necessary. The first is that it limits our freedom of action and the second is that the Commies may leak any statement we make in a distorted form.

General Collins: Before I left for Korea I had a talk with Secretary Dulles on this specific point. He thought that the question of cutting off logistical support from the ROK was one which merited very careful consideration. He cited the precedent of the Russians refraining from coming to the assistance of the Polish Underground in Warsaw and the unhappy public opinion repercussions that might eventually come. Personally, however, I don't see how we can duck the question that the Commies have asked as to what we would do. Perhaps if we could get a public statement from Rhee that he would go along with the armistice, it might conceivably do the trick.

Mr. Johnson: (At this point Mr. Johnson read statement which Mr. Rhee had made in his letter to Robertson.)

Mr. Matthews: Couldn't the statement of Rhee that he will not obstruct an armistice be used with the Commies?

General Collins: Of course Rhee puts qualifications on his statement which leaves him considerable latitude which the Commies would be quick to seize on.

Mr. Bowie: Rhee's letter also really puts us on notice that he has the intention of reopening hostilities if the political conference doesn't succeed.

General Collins: I do think we have to take up this question of what we can say about logistic support. I think that your Secretary's worries about saying that we will cut it off are completely valid, but on the other hand how will the Commies sign an armistice unless we make a statement to the effect that we are willing to deprive the ROKs of logistic support if they violate an armistice.

Mr. Johnson: I have some question whether the Commies won't sign the armistice anyway, even though we don't answer their questions.

General Collins: Our negotiators on the spot think differently and I think to some degree we have to go on their opinion.

Mr. MacArthur: We are going to have some trouble in working out time to talk with the Secretary since he has meetings this afternoon with the British and French.

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[4] Dated July 9, p. 1357.

Mr. Johnson: It is my feeling that the Secretary is quite firm in his views that we should not say we will cut off logistic support. I personally don't think we can say much more than Harrison has already said.

General Collins: If Harrison can't say any more than he has said, I think there is real question whether or not we will get an armistice.

Mr. Amory: This may be butting in to what is none of my business, but are we really sure we want an armistice now. With this Beria business and the Russians in such a stew, maybe this is a bad time to have an armistice.

General Collins: If Harrison doesn't have anything more to say than he has already said, perhaps we should think about having a recess in the talks. I think Clark and Harrison need to have instructions as to whether or not they can commit themselves.

Admiral Fechteler: Actually it seems to me that any commander in the field, if the ROKs started violating the armistice, would in fact go ahead and cut off supplies.

General Collins: But Clark is entitled to know where his Government stands on the question and whether or not he is authorized to make his position known to the Communists.

Mr. Bowie: Another point to consider is that of our relationship with Rhee. We are now standing on the position that we will reconsider our courses of action after 90 days of the political conference. Rhee has put us on notice that he may want to reopen hostilities if the political conference doesn't succeed. He has asked for moral and material aid from us. Although we have not committed ourselves to give him such aid, it would be somewhat inconsistent if we now undertake with the Commies to cut off all aid.

General Collins: It seems to me that there are two questions that we need the answer to. The first is whether we can use a statement from Rhee that he will not obstruct an armistice and the second is the question of what Clark can say about cutting off supplies for the ROK.

Mr. Bowie: I should think there would be some difficulty in getting usable quotations from Rhee which he would not couple with his reservation on freedom of action after the political conference.

General Collins: The Commies might buy the statement from us to the effect that Rhee has told us that he would not obstruct an armistice even though we wouldn't quote him directly.

Mr. Johnson: I should think they might buy that because after all an armistice does have military advantages for them in stopping air and sea attack. I agree, however, that Clark should have specific instructions.

Mr. MacArthur: If we want to talk to the Secretary about this we should set up a meeting right away. (At this point arrangements were made by phone for a meeting of General Collins and the Secretary at 12:15.)[5]

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[5] No record of this meeting has been found. However, Clark was sent specific instructions in telegram JCS 943567 informing him that although he had the power to withdraw logistical support from ROK forces, he should offer the Communists a more general answer at Panmunjom. The JCS suggested the following language: "UNC will not give support during any aggressive action of units of ROKA in violation of the armistice. In saying this we do not imply that we believe any such violation to be probable." (Department of Defense files)

Editorial Note

At the plenary meeting of July 11 at Panmunjom, Delegate Nam Il dismissed Harrison's assurances of the previous day as unsatisfactory and pressed for a definite "yes" or "no" answer to his questions. As per his instructions from the Joint Chiefs, Harrison stated that the United Nations Command would not give support to any aggressive action by Republic of Korea Army units in violation of the armistice, but this answer failed to satisfy the Communist side. Records of this session can be found in telegrams C 63608 and CX 63617, both July 11, 1953, neither printed. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to President Eisenhower[1]

SEOUL, July 11, 1953.

MY DEAR PRESIDENT EISENHOWER: As Mr. Robertson is now about to depart from Korea, I want you to know how pleased I have been with the fine spirit of consideration and understanding he has shown in all our talks together. Even if we have differed on certain matters, I have never found him lacking in a most sympathetic spirit of accord which has helped us to keep clearly in mind the fundamental and vital unity which so happily binds our two governments and peoples together. I am very glad that Mr. Robertson will report, in person, to you on the points over which we disagreed, with a view to settling them. I earnestly hope that the solutions worked out will be favorable to us.

So long as our two nations can conduct our negotiations in the spirit of mutuality demonstrated so well in these discussions, I am confident there never will arise a question which cannot be solved in friendship and to the advantage of our two countries and to the peace and security of the Far East.

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[1] A copy of this letter was initially transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 128 from Tokyo. Robertson was handed this letter just before he departed from Seoul and he dispatched it from Tokyo, his first stop en route home. Dulles saw the telegram copy and Eisenhower saw the original.

What I should like most earnestly to recommend is that in the future formulations of American policies in the Pacific area, Korea should be accorded consideration as a strategic power center and as a loyal and effective Ally. As you know, in the past there has been a marked concentration of American policy upon Japan as the keystone around which events in northern Asia should be shaped. Your Administration can effect a wholesome change in the course of Asian-American relations by demonstrating the closeness and the mutual value of the interdependence of the United States and the Republic of Korea. As we have shown at such tragic cost, we shall not bow before any aggressor, nor shall we develop any policy which is antithetical to the peace-structure which you are planning for the Pacific area.

On the other hand, American development of renewed power in Japan cannot but be regarded by all Oriental peoples as hastening the time when they must once again prepare to resist or to be victimized by a resurgence of Japanese imperialism. Korea, re-united and rehabilitated, can be as strong as Japan and will enjoy a greater degree of prosperity. Our people have a natural inclination toward individualism and genuine democracy. For scores of centuries our tradition has been one of peace, and we never once have waged an aggressive war or fought against any nation outside our own boundaries. These facts create great confidence among the peoples of Asia. Meanwhile, our strategic location is such that unless we are clearly and unquestionably strong, there will always be a temptation for Russia, Japan, or China to encroach upon us as an avenue of attack upon the others. These principles which I am citing are all documented again and again by historic events, and they lead to the conclusion that a genuine security system for Asia must rest upon the solid foundation of Korean independence and Korean strength. I hope, Mr. President, that you will give to these considerations your most thoughtful attention.

As you know, I have decided not to obstruct, in any manner, the implementation of the terms, in deference to your requests. In my view, however, it simply cannot eventuate in a political settlement which will benefit either Korea or the free world. I have yielded to your representations as an evidence of the friendship we Koreans bear for the United States, and as a mark of the confidence I have in your leadership of the free world.

My prayers are with you for the success of your plans. My most solemn hope is that you may never forget that while the communists believe you to be strong, they will never dare to advance. Once they detect or suspect weakness, either of military power or of will, the world will be pushed over the brink of general war.

With the highest expressions of friendship and esteem I am

Sincerely yours, SYNGMAN RHEE

795.00/7-1153

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to the Secretary of State

SEOUL, July 11, 1953.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The people (who call me a strong-willed man) do not realize the anguish endured during this dreadful time or the hours of prayer which I have devoted to the problems and decisions of these past weeks. If I have not answered immediately your letter of June 22,[1] you must understand that what has restrained me has been my sense of the overwhelming importance of saying nothing and taking no step which would in any way weaken the bonds of warm cordiality between us. Our comradeship is far too precious to be lost.

Mr. Robertson, who has well represented President Eisenhower and you, has informed you from day to day of the earnest efforts I have made to satisfy the requirements of your Government and of the United Nations, even at the heavy expense of the sacrifice of what all Koreans conceive to be the very hope for the existence of our freedom. You know what has happened to Korea and I need not elaborate for you the fact that unless our people can hold fast to a real hope for the future, what they now endure must be finally insupportable.

You and I, Mr. Dulles, are friends, as our nations and our peoples are friends. We have endured everything together and we have learned together the meaning of the comradeship that comes only through the greatest of suffering and the deepest of unity. What we must not do is to commence arguing with each other, for no matter how determined would be our efforts to express always our real cordiality, arguments grow thorns which sometimes hurt.

Please believe me, then, when I tell you that I am doing my very best to explain our position to you without any degree of argumentative spirit. I cannot doubt that you know that your letter represents certain facts which lead to one conclusion while omitting certain other facts, which would lead to a different conclusion. I suppose this is inevitable whenever there is a policy to be carried out, but in all humaneness it is also necessary that we keep our minds pure and clear by reminding ourselves not to forget the facts which for reasons of policy we may leave out of a particular statement.

As I reread your letter, and I assure you it has had my most earnest attention, its text seems to indicate that I have little regard for anything except the narrow self-interest of our own people. I cannot think that this is a true representation of your feelings. It is true, of course, that you have given and given, and that we have received and received. But as I look out from my windows over the desolate ruins of Seoul and recall the millions of ruined refugees and the hundreds of thousands of our own people who have died, I cannot think that you are unaware of the awful price our nation has paid in our own endeavor to stand as worthy Allies in the common struggle against communist tyranny.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 1238.

What I feel with most unshakable certainty, Mr. Dulles, is that the entire free world is facing a dreadful threat of extinction by a ruthless power that has the cunning and the strength of complete devotion to evil. The communist enemy is not restrained, as we and our Allies are restrained, by feelings of gentlemanliness and a decent regard for the opinions of mankind. Our enemy is not constrained, as we are, by pledges and treaties and guarantees. I am sure that few know better than you—though my people and I have learned at terrible cost—the perfidiousness and utter heartlessness with which the communists will use any means, the hope of peace, the longing for the return of loved ones from prison camps, the cunning exploitation of differences of opinion among Allies, as additional means to their preconceived goal of dragging the entire world down into their own mire of terroristic tyranny.

You have described with the eloquence of sincere feeling the efforts that have been made by you and by your nation to help Korea during the past years. In the very depths of our hearts and our souls we feel the genuine comradeship of this help and we know that the friendship of the United States is nearly all we can rely upon on this earth.

But, Mr. Dulles, we also believe that the best return we can make is to do our little best to help the United States to understand the nature of the communist threat so you may lead the free world—all unwilling as it may be—in a way that will succeed in overcoming the danger.

Korea has often been described as a laboratory in which the United Nations could try out the method of dealing with communist imperialism which is implicit in its Charter—that is, the method of peaceful conciliation and political negotiation. This principle led to our not being equipped with an armed force sufficient to match that of the communists in the north, in the period before the attack. The United Nations, of course, rectified that error of leaving us weak by immediately and courageously coming at once to our aid. We may all praise God that the opportunity existed because of the boycott of the Security Council by the Soviet Union. For the sake of the security of the free world, however, we should never forget that it is not the nature of the United Nations which made such quick action possible, but the very fact that for that period of time the United Nations was freed from the impediment of the Soviet veto.

Now we face the future, with the past of no consequence except to serve as our teacher. The communists have won the kind of victory in

Korea which they are already exploiting to the full; that is, they have met in battle with a portion of their satellite armies the direct power of the mightiest enemy they confront, the United States, and the result is no worse for them than a draw. They naturally are ready—not for peace, which would mean an abandonment of their plans of conquest—but for a truce, which means only a breathing space and a chance to renew their strength.

Our intentions are not to oppose peace, but to try to achieve it. It is my most solemn conviction that very little time will elapse before you and President Eisenhower will regret that you have not determined to press in Korea for a limited but decisive military victory, as a deterrent to further communist advances and eventual world war.

The enemy now is weak: in Korea, in China, in Eastern Europe, and inside Russia. Your own analysts, I am sure, have accumulated information showing this to be the case. In the face of this weakness of the enemy, the Western Allies can choose either to take advantage of the opportunity to enjoy a temporary surcease from the struggle, or they could take bolder advantage of it (not by any preventive war) by winning such an unquestioned victory in this limited sphere as to encourage all the endangered and occupied countries and to post an unmistakable warning of disaster for the communist master strategists. In my view, it is a tragic mistake to choose the weaker of these two courses.

For Korea itself, the indecisive ending of this war is our ultimate disaster. You know, as I do, that our nation cannot long survive such a truce as is contemplated. For me to explain all the economic and political and psychological reasons would be only to repeat what you already well understand. Of course, if the truce should be followed by a political agreement with the communists to reunite Korea, the victory not only for Korea but for the free world would be immeasurable. But we both know full well that such a result is absolutely impossible.

Several times you and President Eisenhower and Mr. Robertson have intimated that the United States is prepared to take some kind of effective measures to achieve our re-unification following the expected failure of the political conference. I do not have any indication of what plans you may have in mind, and much as I have searched my mind to try to discover an effective method, I have been unable to grasp a reasonable possibility. We are asked to hope, but we do not know for what.

All of this I am telling you with the frankness and consideration of true friendship and with the earnest hope that you may never reach the point of doubting the sincerity of my concern not alone for Korea but for all the friendly nations whose fate is finally involved with ours.

Despite the absolute certainty in my mind that the United States will have grave cause to regret the position it has taken in regard to the truce, I have yielded my convictions to the endless persistence of your settled policies. In my talks with Mr. Robertson, and in my letter to him of July 9, I have granted almost every request that has been made upon me. My only qualification is that if the means which you have chosen do not prove to be successful, we must be allowed the final right to do what we can to retrieve our nation from the situation that will exist when the communists refuse to grant in peace what the Allies have refrained from accomplishing in war.

The truce will now be signed. We shall abide by our agreement to give the United Nations yet another chance to try out in our nation its prescribed method of political negotiation. I pray to God that my forebodings may prove groundless and that a genuine peace may emerge. If such should not be the case, I hope the United States will stand by us firmly, as we shall stand with you, in seeking to regain once more an opportunity to win a limited victory which will postpone or eliminate the final catastrophe of world war.

With all friendliness and personal good wishes, I am

Sincerely yours, SYNGMAN RHEE

795.00/7-1153

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) [1]

SECRET [SEOUL,] July 11, 1953.

Subject: Meeting with President Rhee on July 11, 1953.

Participants: President Syngman Rhee
Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
Ellis O. Briggs, American Ambassador to Korea
Paik Tu-chin, Prime Minister of Korea
Pyon Yongtae, Foreign Minister of Korea
Kenneth T. Young, Director of Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

Ambassador Briggs, Mr. Young, and I met with President Rhee and his two Ministers at 12:15 today.

I stated that President Rhee and I had reached such a wide area of agreement that it now seemed to me that it would be best for me to return to Washington and make a personal report to President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles. President Rhee said that he thought that was a "good idea" and suggested that I should also see the Senate leaders to clarify some of the matters on which we had not reached final understandings.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Young.

I then suggested that it would be desirable, if he agreed, for us to issue a joint public statement recording our mutual understandings.[2] It seemed to me it would be better to have one statement rather than two different statements that might lead to misinterpretations in the press. President Rhee immediately agreed that it was "most important" to issue a single joint statement. He said he recognized my difficulty in explaining the U.S. position to the American people and he hoped I recognized his difficulty in not saying too much or too little to the Korean people. He felt that what we both said should jibe completely. He agreed that what was said in Seoul and Washington should be uniform. He told me that he had the same idea in mind this morning and had already jotted down some notes for such a statement.

I then gave him and his Ministers a copy of our suggested draft statement. After reading it President Rhee said that he would study it together with his own ideas so that we could agree on a joint statement today.

I then handed President Rhee a copy of my letter to him.[3] He read it aloud, but made no comment on it other than to thank me for it.

He asked me when I intended to depart. I told him tomorrow, at which he shook his head. In an entirely personal manner he turned to me and said that he very much appreciated my coming to Korea and working so hard and patiently to reach the understanding which he, too, wanted as much as I. He then told me: "Mr. Robertson, you have come to Korea and it is you who have conquered. I am left in a ditch. Please pull me out. Go back to Washington and tell the President, the Secretary of State, and the Senate leaders about all these things we have discussed. Tell them I want to work with the United States."

The meeting ended in an atmosphere of complete personal cordiality on President Rhee's part towards us. When I asked him what to tell the correspondents waiting down the hill, President Rhee suggested saying that they would "soon see a joint statement from us, perhaps this afternoon".

Note: Embtel 39 from Embassy Seoul of July 11[4] contains a brief summary of this meeting.

WALTER S. ROBERTSON

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[2] For a text of the joint statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 20, 1953, pp. 72-73.

[3] Not printed; a text of this letter, which was essentially a courtesy reply, was transmitted in Army message 100910Z from Seoul as modified by telegram 36 to Seoul, both July 10, 1953. (795.00/7-953)

[4] Not printed. (795.00/7-1153)

795.00/7-1153

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)

SEOUL, July 11, 1953.

DEAR MR. ROBERTSON: This is my personal note, suggesting to you certain matters not connected with our talks, which I hope you may take up with President Eisenhower at some convenient time.

(1) I must tell you that we have considerable uneasiness about the way Korean aid funds have been handled. The several agencies which are operating here get in one another's way and cause confusion and lack of coordination. They maintain large staffs here in Korea, housed in scarce buildings and occupying scarce office space. The salary and expenses paid to any one of them would maintain ten Korean families. They have large offices and personnel in Geneva, Tokyo, Washington and New York. They conduct surveys and draw up plans. But very little concrete reconstruction has been accomplished, and our people complain that many foreigners are maintained in luxury on funds which are described to the world as being spent for Korean relief. Our original understanding with the ECA was that not more than three per cent of its funds should be spent for overhead, but we are informed that some of these later reconstruction agencies spend as much as sixteen per cent for overhead and that their budgets now call for nine per cent for their own expenses.

In order to eliminate all the needless waste of the aid funds, we suggest the closing of the Korean aid fund offices in Geneva, Japan, and the United States, and that all the administration over the aid funds be centralized in the Combined Economic Board, which represents the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Korea.

Both the ECA and UNKRA have, as much as possible, purchased goods in Japan, thus building up Japanese industries, even though the money was appropriated explicitly for the aid of Korea. Japan has been well satisfied, but the aid reaching Korea has been largely in the form of consumers goods, which means it has been only a form of partial relief and has not built up our capacity for long-range self-support.

The only remedy for this is to centralize the control over the aid funds in the Combined Economic Board, located in Korea, and composed of people who really know and are sympathetic with the needs of Korea. If this cannot be accomplished, we would rather receive no aid at all, but would prefer to secure an adequate sum of money in the form of a loan.

(2) A definite policy must be adopted to stabilize the Korean currency. Since VJ-Day this stabilization has been impossible. Our dollar exchange rate at first was fifteen won to a dollar. Then the ECA and UNKRA people began doubling up the rate, demanding that the rate be

"realistic" until it became as high as 23,000 won to the dollar, thus making our national currency practically worthless. No Governmental budget system is possible, and commerce and industry are unthinkable. How can anyone invest his money or secure long-term loans, when it is certain that the value of the won will be quickly and considerably devalued?

As the only practical remedy for this problem, it is our determination to establish a fixed ratio of exchange and then to maintain it. When our people can count with confidence upon the maintenance of a fixed rate of exchange for a prolonged period of time, the deterioration in the value of the hwan will cease. In order to stabilize the long-range value of our currency, we need more available consumers goods, greater production, and a reduction of the amount of paper money in circulation. These are all problems that can be dealt with and solved. The contrary method of continued and repeated devaluations of the currency solves nothing and only makes the problem worse. Since the present state of inflation makes it almost impossible for our people barely to live, I am hopeful that you will find it possible to give this matter considerable attention and to help us put the solution into effect very soon.

(3) I want very much to establish friendly and helpful relations with the State Department. For many years I was called "a thorn in the side of the State Department," all through misunderstandings. Of course I have criticized State Department policies when I thought them to be harmful. But some of the Department personnel worked with and built up certain pro-communist Koreans, like Kilsoo Han, Kim Yong Jeung, and Park Sang Ryup. The Department has said to newspapermen and others that these men are all Korean patriots and statesmen and that I ought to cooperate with them. This policy has been most harmful and has created a false impression in many quarters. The United States does not allow communists and pro-communists in its own Government nor does it permit them to carry on public campaigns in the United States against your people and your policies. These Koreans in America do not represent anybody in Korea and it is most harmful to us and to our friendly relations with the State Department when they are allowed to represent themselves as being against us and to be supported by State Department personnel in their criticisms. It would be most helpful if these people could be deported and end their campaigns of communist smearing once and for all.

I am sure that after our most friendly and helpful talks here you will carry back to Washington a much better understanding of our motives and of our policies. We will do all we can, and I know you will do all you can, to assure an atmosphere of genuine understanding and cordiality. There will always be problems to be solved, and we will not always be in agreement as to how to solve them. But we cannot drift far apart if we do not permit trouble-makers to stir up ill-will and to exaggerate or invent stories that are presumed to have some shadowy sort of official sanction.

With appreciation for your time and effort spent here with us, and with all personal good wishes, I am

Sincerely yours, SYNGMAN RHEE

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

TOP SECRET
EMERGENCY

TOKYO, July 11, 1953—7:40 p. m.

CX 63627. Reference: AmEmb Seoul DTG 091315Z.[2]

1. Info aval here indicates that the Robertson–Rhee joint statement is to be published shortly. As soon as joint statement is published, I feel that there is no reason why we should not use at Panmunjom that portion of Rhee's ltr dated 9 Jul 53 contained in ref, which indicates that ROK will not obstruct the armistice.

2. I propose to instruct Harrison to make use of this info to give assurance to the Communists that the UNC, which includes the ROK forces, is prepared to carry out the terms of the armistice.

3. Rqst concurrence ASAP in order that Harrison may take this action at next armistice meeting scheduled for 1100I 12 Jul.[3]

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Harrison and Robertson for their information.

[2] This telegram contained the text of Rhee's letter of July 9, 1953, to Robertson; for text, see p. 1357.

[3] In telegram JCS 943663, a joint State–Defense message, July 11, 1953, not printed, the JCS approved Clark's suggestion subject to any objections Robertson might have. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413) For Robertson's objections, see telegram 44, *infra*.

795.00/7–1153: Telegram

The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, July 11, 1953—11:34 p. m.

44. Sent CINCUNC for Gen. Clark, information CINCUNC Adv for Gen. Harrison and DeptAr, information Secretary of State. From Robertson. Your CX 63627.[2] There will of course be no objection to General Harrison's utilizing joint statement and, if desired, making same part of tomorrow's record. I also agree to your proposed instructions to Harrison to inform Communists that suitable assurances have been re-

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[1] Source text was Department of State information copy.

[2] *Supra.*

ceived from ROK Government concerning attitude of that Government toward armistice.

However, I do not believe use should be made of President Rhee's letter to me of July 9, first because various statements as they stand are subject to qualifications rendering them unsuitable for proposed use, and secondly because it was agreed today between Rhee and me that our *aide-mémoire* of July 2 and his communications would not be made public pending negotiation of the points at issue. Even though Panmunjom session executive, any textual quote or other utilization of letter would almost certainly become known through Communists with unfavorable effect upon our relations with Rhee.[3]

[ROBERTSON]

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[3] Because of Robertson's opinion expressed here, Clark instructed Harrison to give the assurance in much more general terms. (Telegram CX 63635, July 12, 1953; Matthews files, lot 55 D 413) The wording suggested by Clark and used by Harrison at the July 12 plenary meeting at Panmunjom was as follows:

"In consequence of negotiations just completed with the Government of the Republic of Korea, we have received suitable assurances from the Republic of Korea Government that it will during the post hostility period work in close collaboration for our common objectives. During this period provisions of the present draft armistice agreement will be implemented. You are assured that the United Nations Command, which includes the Republic of Korea forces, is prepared to carry out the terms of the armistice."

After Harrison made this statement, the Communist side asked for a short recess. Upon returning, Nam Il noted that while Harrison's assurance was helpful and good, definite pledges were still required. Harrison was not prepared to go beyond his general statement and the meeting ended without resolution. Records of the sessions at Panmunjom for July 12 can be found in telegrams CX 63640 and CX 63643, both July 12, 1953. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
EMERGENCY

TOKYO, July 14, 1953—6:45 p. m.

CX 63690. My CX 63671 (HNC 1823).[1]

1. Harrison has reptd as fols on todays meeting, ref msg:

"Perusal of the transcript of todays meeting will show that the meetings in their present stage are farcical. The Communists obviously are merely delaying act while they try to embarrass us with ques intended for propaganda and to stir up trouble with the ROK. It may be that they are waitng to see what happens to their offensive.[2] This morning they seemed to be enjoying their advantage. Replies to their statements are worse than wasteful since they only prov basis for further repetition of Communists propaganda. After any statement is made by me, the Communists have staff offs who immediately prepare frivolous ques apparently designed solely for delay. In the absence of discretion in negotiation the del furn both opportunity and audience for the Communists."

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[1] In this telegram Clark transmitted to the JCS and Briggs Harrison's report on the July 14 plenary session in which the Communists pressed for further clarification of the specific answers Harrison had given to most of their questions during the plenary session the day before. Both the reference message and telegram CX 63652, Clark to JCS and Briggs, July 13, 1953, which reported on the plenary meeting on July 13, are located in Matthews files, lot 53 D 413.

[2] The reference was to the major Communist offensive, aimed at the ROK Capital Division and three other ROK divisions, which began on the night of July 13 and continued for a week.

I concur in Harrison's comments.

2. The Communists present tactics of challenging the sincerity of the UNC, as expressed in our assurances to comply with the terms of the armistice, has impugned the good faith and impaired the dignity of the US and the UNC. We cannot afford to permit the Communists to cont these humiliating tactics. It should be apparent to all who have negotiated with the Communists that little progress can be anticipated unless we are prepared to take a firm and positive stand. A course of act which might convince the Communists of the firmness of our psn is contained in folg para.

3. Harrison at tomorrow's meeting (1100I 15 Jul)[3] would review the UNC assurances for implementing the armistice, and the UNC psn, in regards to the recovery of the escapees and again in positive terms, would inform them that it is time for them to realize the armistice which we seek, is a mil one between mil comd, and includes the mil forces of both comd. Should the Communists cont their curr tactics of ques the good faith of the UNC and insisting that the UNC recover the 27000 escapees, Harrison would then suggest, and take unilaterally if nec, a recess up to three or four days at his discretion, suggesting the Communists utilize this period to reexamine our repeated assurances to comply with the armistice and our psn on recapture of the escapees. Harrison would further state that the UNC is prepared to have the staff offs or liaison offs meet at any time, with a view to resolving the few admin matters remaining before an armistice can be sgd.

Comment: Except for unilateral recess of indefinite duration, I believe this course of act would, as result of its prev use by the UNC, help convince the Communists that we were firm in our psn. It might be nec to rpt the same procedure, but it does put the decision dir up to the Communists as to whether or not they will sign an armistice, and acpt the loss of the 27000 escapees. This course of act might unduly delay an armistice, resulting in additional UN cas, and afford Rhee an opportunity to take other act within his capabilities designed to obstruct an armistice. I consider, however, that this course of act offers, under the present conditions, the best possibility of securing Communist concurrence to an armistice in a reasonable period of time.

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[3] A summary of this meeting, in which Harrison did not choose to call for an extended recess, can be found in telegram CX 63702, Clark to JCS, July 15, 1953. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

4. I recm that I be auth to adopt immediately the course of act outlined in para three above and rqst reply[4] ASAP in order to permit Harrison to implement this act at meeting scd for 151100I July.

5. We, of course, must have in mind the next step, should the act outlined in para three above fail to produce the desired results. This matter is under consideration and suitable recm will be submitted at an aprop time.

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[4] In telegram JCS 943836 to Clark, a joint State-Defense message, July 14, the JCS approved this course of action. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET TOKYO, July 15, 1953—6:55 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX 63715. Refs: A. CX 63702 (HNC 1824).[1] B. AmEmb Seoul DTG 091315Z.[2]

1. A careful study of the ref A permits the conclusion that the Communists may have narrowed their basic questions down to one pnt which is included in the fol ques: "We would like to know whether your side assures that the South Korean Government and forces will abide by all the provisions of the armistice agreement for the entire period when the armistice will be effective in accordance with the agreement or only assume that Syngman Rhee will only temporarily abide by the armistice agreement within a certain time limit." The Communists have rqstd that we give explicit and definite ans to this ques and I consider they are entitled to such an ans.

2. I propose at tomorrows session, 16 Jul 53,[3] to have Harrison ans this ques substantially as fol: "Your side has rqstd assurances that the Republic of Korea Government and forces will abide by all the provisions of the armistice agreement for the entire period when the armistice will be eff and not for a temporary period until a certain time limit. Such assurances have already been given to your side, but I now restate the official assurances of the UNC that the terms of the armistice agreement will be observed by the UNC including the ROK forces, for the period stipulated in para 62 of the draft armistice agreement unless abrogated earlier by the action of your side. I can also assure you that we have written assurances from President Rhee that

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[1] Not printed, but see footnote 3, *supra.*

[2] In this telegram, Rhee's letter of July 9 to Robertson was transmitted to Washington; for text, see p. 1357.

[3] A summary of this session can be found in telegram CX 63731, Clark to JCS, July 16, 1952. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

the ROK Govt will not obstruct the armistice. There is no reason why you should not, here and now, accept these assurances from the UNC commander, in lieu of the misrepresentations appearing in the press to the effect that the ROK Govt would support an armistice for only a limited period; if not the UNC proposes a 2-day recess to permit you to fully study the contents and meaning of this statement."

3. This ans is based largely on the qualified assurance contained in Rhee's ltr to Robertson on 9 Jul ref B and my recollection of Rhee's ltr to the President of the United States which Robertson is delivering. The contents of this ltr were transmitted to the President by radio by Robertson prior to his departure from here.

4. The principal purpose of Robertson's msg was to secure assurances from Rhee to the effect that Rhee and the Republic of Korea would not oppose an armistice. He obtained such assurances, yet we have failed completely to capitalize on them in our effort to achieve an armistice and have not taken full advantage of the material aval to us. In view of the fact that Rhee has taken no steps to elaborate on the press misrepresentation of his interview on the exchange of views between Robertson and Rhee (and I doubt if he will) I feel it essential that we must take the lead in clearing up these press misrepresentations with the Communists. The material contained in the joint statement of Robertson–Rhee is expressed in far too general terms to use effectively in replying to the Communists ques posed in para 1 above. If I am authorized to use the statement quoted in para 2 above, it would appear appropriate and extremely helpful if the President of the United States could fol with a statement which includes the assurances given him in Rhee's ltr.

5. If the Commies cont their stalling tactics tomorrow in spite of Harrison's reassurances he will unilaterally recess for 2 days.

6. If you do not concur in the ans I have proposed in para 2 above, rqst I be furnished one which can be effectively used to reply to the Communists ques. I do not recall the exact wording of the assurances given to President Eisenhower in President Rhee's ltr to him and we must be certain that the ans given does not lay us open to later repudiation by Rhee.

7. Rqst reply [4] in time for use at tomorrows meeting at 1100 hours.

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[4] See telegram JCS 943913, *infra.*

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 15, 1953—3:51 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 943913. From JCS for CINCUNC re CX 63715.[1] This is jt State–Defense msg.

Desire you have Gen Harrison use folg statement in lieu of that contained in para 2 ur CX 63715:

Ur side has requested assurances that ROK Govt and forces will abide by all provisions of armistice agreement for entire period when armistice will be effective and not for temporary period until certain time limit. I want to point out again that we are discussing mil armistice between opposing cdrs. I also want to reiterate what I said on July 11, that is, what measures each side will take to discharge its responsibilities under armistice agreement, once it is signed, are matters for that side to determine. The UNC has clearly and unequivocally stated to you that it is prepared to enter into and abide by all provisions of that armistice agreement including Art 62. UNC would not enter into such an agreement unless it was satisfied that it was able to carry it out. This should be sufficient assurance for ur side and there is no valid reason for you further to obstruct and delay conclusion of this armistice. On July 12 I stated: "You are assured that UNC which includes ROK forces is prepared to carry out terms of armistice." Although it is entirely internal matter for our side, I told you that we had received suitable assurances from ROK that will enable us to carry out this obligation. Form and contents of such assurances as have been received from ROK Govt are not properly matters for concern by ur side. However, I again assure you we have received from ROK Govt necessary assurances that it will not obstruct in any manner the implementation of terms of draft armistice agreement. I will have nothing further to say on this. If you sincerely desire armistice, there is no reason why you should not, here and now, accept these assurances from UNC commander instead of attempting further to delay armistice upon basis of misinterpreted press accounts which have no official standing whatever and prolong needlessly fighting and dying. Unless you are prepared proceed immediately, UNC proposes two-day recess to permit you fully to study contents and meaning of this statement.[2]

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] In fact, the Communist side was first to ask for a recess of 2 days at the July 16 session at Panmunjom. (Telegram CX 63731, Clark to JCS, July 16, 1953; Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET MUNSAN-NI, July 17, 1953—10:57 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C 63749. HNC 1828. Ref: JCS 943913.[1]

1. This is being sent from Munsan-Ni where I am in conference with Harrison.

2. There are 2 possible courses of action which the Communists may take when the meetings are reconvened tomorrow 18 July:

a. The Communists may accept the assurances given in reference message and proceed to the signing of an armistice. If they do, we have no problem. On the other hand, they are just as likely not to accept the assurances in view of the successes they are having on the battlefield and for other reasons, and it is for this contingency that we must be prepared.

b. When the delegation reconvenes, the Communists' concrete views which they have stated will be presented at that time may include, among others, the following demands:

(1) Recapture and return of the 27,000 POW escapees.

(2) A written statement from Rhee to the effect he will abide by the terms of the armistice.

(3) Assurances that the UNC will use force if necessary to make the ROK Government conform to the terms of the armistice.

(4) A renegotiation of the military demarcation line. If this occurs, I have authorized Harrison to categorically reject any questions related to the first 3 demands as having been adequately answered in my letter of 29 June and/or Harrison's statement of 18 June[2] and previous thereto. We would, of course, agree to renegotiation of the military demarcation line. Harrison would then propose and take unilaterally, if necessary, a 4-day recess.

3. The 4-day recess which Harrison will take unilaterally, if necessary, under the second course of action, is necessary in order that you will have sufficient time to study and make decisions on the next course of action which I propose be taken to bring things to a head with a minimum delay and which I feel should prove decisive. This course of action will be in your hands within 24 hours.

4. If you have contrary views, I must be informed immediately as it is essential that Harrison have sufficient time to prepare his presentations which must be translated into both Korean and Chinese.

5. I am returning to Tokyo this afternoon.[3]

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] For text, see Department of State *Bulletin,* June 29, 1953, p. 905.

[3] In telegram JCS 944074 to Clark, July 17, 1953, a joint State–Defense message, the course of action Clark proposed in paragraph 2*b* was approved, provided the UNC made it clear that it would agree to renegotiate the demarcation line only after the Communists committed themselves to a specific date for signature of the armistice, and then if the Communists proposed and insisted on renegotiation. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 431)

S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 156/1 Series

Report by the National Security Council Planning Board to the National Security Council[1]

TOP SECRET
NSC 156/1

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1953.

STRENGTHENING THE KOREAN ECONOMY

BACKGROUND

1. The current policies of the United States with reference to this subject are:

a. *NSC 118/2, 12/21/51*

2–*d* "*Whether or not an armistice in Korea is achieved;* (2) develop and equip dependable ROK military units, as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength with a view of their assuming eventually responsibility for the defense of Korea." (6) "working in and through the organs of the UN where feasible, continue to strengthen the government and domestic institutions of the Republic of Korea, and continue to contribute to the United Nations' effort for economic recovery and rehabilitation in the Republic of Korea and in areas of Korea liberated from Communist control."

b. *NSC Action No. 787, 5/13/53*

"*d.* Noted that the President in accordance with NSC Action No. 765–*b,* authorizes the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to activate additional Republic of Korea divisions, over and above the 16 already activated, to a total of 20."

"*e.* Noted a report by the Secretary of Defense that, within existing authorization, he has approved the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations for the following personnel increases in Republic of Korea forces:

(1) Marine Corps—19,880 to 23,500
(2) Navy—9,402 to 10,000
(3) Air Force—7,034 to 9,000"

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[1] According to a covering note by Lay, this report and the recommendations contained in paragraphs 5–7 were being submitted by the Planning Board to the NSC for consideration at its 156th meeting on July 23, 1953. For a report of that meeting, see p. 1420. This report was prepared in response to NSC Action No. 828–*b,* June 25, 1953, which referred the Tasca Report (NSC 156) to the Planning Board for preparation of recommendations based upon study by a Special Committee consisting of representatives of the Director for Mutual Security, the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, and Defense, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget. A Financial Appendix and an Annex containing the report of the Special Committee were attached for the Council's information.

c. *NSC Action No. 828, 6/25/53*

"*a*. Noted the report made to the President on 'Strengthening the Korean Economy', dated June 15, 1953 (NSC 156), by the mission headed by Henry J. Tasca, Special Representative of the President on Korean Economic Affairs."

"*b*. Referred the report to the NSC Planning Board for preparation of recommendations relative thereto, based upon study by a Special Committee consisting of representatives of the Director for Mutual Security (Chairman), the Secretaries of State, Treasury and Defense, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget."

"*c*. Agreed that any implementation of the Report should be deferred until the Korean situation could be clarified."

d. *NSC 154/1, 7/7/53—United States Tactics Immediately Following an Armistice in Korea.*

"*Aid to the Republic of Korea*

14. On the assumption that the Republic of Korea will cooperate satisfactorily with the UN in carrying out the terms of the armistice:

> *a*. Continue to develop and equip dependable ROK military forces in accordance with the present program, with a view to the assumption by the Republic of Korea of greater responsibiity for the defense of Korea.
>
> *b*. Undertake with respect to the security of Korea, commitments (with or without reciprocal undertakings on the part of the ROK) similar to those undertaken by the U.S. under the treaties with the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand.
>
> *c*. Working in and through the organs of the UN where feasible, continue to strengthen the government and democratic institutions of the Republic of Korea and continue to contribute to the economic recovery and rehabilitation of the Republic of Korea."

2. The Korean situation is now sufficiently clarified so that the U.S. Government is justified in proceeding on the assumption that the Republic of Korea will cooperate in an armistice. President Rhee, in letters to the President and to Mr. Robertson, has stated in writing that he would not obstruct an armistice on the terms which have hitherto been tentatively agreed with the Communists.

3. On this assumption, an expanded program of economic assistance should be initiated promptly for that portion of Korea controlled by the Republic of Korea and the United Nations Command, whether or not the Communists sign an armistice. If an armistice is promptly forthcoming, such a program would be necessary to achieve the objectives laid out in, and for the reasons given in, NSC 156. If an armistice should be delayed by Communist action, such a program of assistance would become even more urgent for purposes of military support, although in some particulars the program would require modification.

4. The United States has already warned the Republic of Korea that economic aid is dependent upon cooperation in connection with an armistice. Furthermore, an important factor in deterring the Republic of

Korea from taking action to frustrate or violate an armistice will be the immediate undertaking of an enlarged program of economic assistance. If, however, despite its assurances, the Republic of Korea takes action to frustrate or violate an armistice, or fails to cooperate with the United States in developing and carrying out satisfactory economic and financial programs, the United States should reconsider the program of additional economic aid, and should be prepared to cut off such aid if it is deemed advisable to do so.

RECOMMENDATIONS

5. The Tasca Report should be noted as an excellent statement of the Korean economic problem and as a basis for the development of an expanded program of economic assistance to the Republic of Korea under the conditions specified in the following paragraphs.

6. An expanded program of economic assistance should be initiated in that portion of Korea controlled by the Republic of Korea and the United Nations Command, conditioned upon a satisfactory understanding with the Government of the Republic of Korea with respect to internal measures required to achieve economic stability.

a. Pending an armistice, the expansion of the program should be subject to the following conditions:

> (1) The Republic of Korea does not obstruct the arrangement of an armistice.
>
> (2) The armed forces of the Republic of Korea should be built to and maintained at approximately presently approved levels.
>
> (3) Economic stabilization for the Republic of Korea should be the overriding objective in order to provide maximum support for the military effort of United Nations forces in Korea.

b. When a satisfactory armistice is arranged in Korea, the expanded program should be subject to the following conditions:

> (1) The Republic of Korea satisfactorily cooperates in carrying the armistice into effect.
>
> (2) The armed forces of the Republic of Korea should be built to and maintained at approximately presently approved levels, unless and until a political settlement makes possible a reduction.
>
> (3) A standard of living approximating the 1949–1950 levels should be the goal toward which the program should contribute.
>
> (4) The investment component of the program should be stepped up. Initially, however, investment should be confined to projects for reconstruction rather than new construction.
>
> (5) Investment in areas which would be most affected by renewal of hostilities should proceed at a limited rate until an assessment can be made of the likelihood of such renewal.
>
> (6) Investment in those projects which would be subject to reconsideration in the event of unification should proceed at a limited rate until an assessment can be made of the likelihood of such unification.

7. The Bureau of the Budget, in consultation with interested agencies, should submit to the President an organizational plan for the effective administration of present and future economic assistance to the Republic of Korea.

[Attachment 1]

FINANCIAL APPENDIX

1. Consideration should immediately be given to submitting to the Congress at its existing session proposals for new legislation to provide additional funds for an expanded program of economic assistance for the Republic of Korea, or to provide for the transfer of existing appropriated funds for such expanded program of economic assistance.

2. In the event that no new funds or new authorization are obtained from the Congress during this session, funds appropriated for other purposes, but legally authorized for possible use in Korea, should be utilized to initiate an expanded program. The size of such a program should be determined in the light of fund availabilities as a result of pending appropriations and competing global requirements.

3. Because of the many uncertainties involved, it is difficult to estimate the ultimate cost of an economic program. The following appear to be reasonable cost estimates:

a. If only South Korea is involved, it would appear that an expenditure of between $700 million and $1 billion would be required during a four- or five-year period in addition to economic programs totalling about $190 million in expenditures from FY 1953 obligations and from programs now before Congress. These estimates do not include payments made to the ROK's for military local currency requirements or the costs of military civil construction. A program for a unified Korea would be larger.

b. Additional expenditures during FY 1954 over and above the economic programs now approved by or before the Congress involves many uncertainties, such as the time required to get the program underway, but under the most favorable circumstances probably would not exceed $165 million.

c. Maximum expenditures in any fiscal year during the four or five years of the program probably would not exceed $300–$400 million.

d. U.S. expenditures under this program may be reduced to the extent that other countries can be induced to make additional contributions to South Korean rehabilitation.

U.S. Expenditures for Economic Aid to Korea

	1954	1955–57	Total 1954–57
Additional Economic Assistance	$165	$540–840	$895–1195
Existing Programs Before Congress (including carryover)	$190		
Total Expenditures not to exceed:	$355	$540–840	$895–1195

4. It is the view of the Director for Mutual Security that in light of the reduction, by Congressional Action, of the President's request for funds for the Mutual Security Program, it will be impossible to finance an expanded economic assistance program for Korea through the reduction or elimination of lower priority country programs within the present authorization provisions for Mutual Security Program. The carrying out of an expanded Korean program would therefore require additional Congressional appropriations, or authority to utilize funds authorized and appropriated for general expenditure by the Department of Defense and the Mutual Security Program.

5. It is the view of the Secretary of the Treasury that additional resources for Korean relief and reconstruction in fiscal year 1954 should be provided from funds already requested from the Congress for security programs and planned for expenditure in fiscal year 1954, such as savings in the expenditures of the armed forces as a result of the cessation of combat in Korea or savings in aid programs for other areas. It may, of course, be necessary to obtain Congressional approval for transfer of funds from other uses to the Korean program.

Annex

Memorandum by Norman S. Paul, Chairman of the Special Committee to the Chairman of the Planning Board (Cutler)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 13, 1953.

Subject: The Tasca Report on "Strengthening the Korean Economy"

Attached hereto is a report by the Special Committee established in accordance with NSC Action #828(*b*) for the purpose of studying and reporting to the Planning Board on the Tasca report. This report reflects the agreement of the Special Committee members, but does not represent final agency positions on the recommendations contained therein.

You will note that the Special Committee report contains no estimate as to the amount of new obligational authority required to carry out an expanded program of economic assistance to Korea. Other agency views have not as yet crystallized on this figure, and the Bureau of the Budget does not agree that such a figure should be included in a report which is to be submitted to the National Security Council for approval.

I am authorized to state, however, that the Director for Mutual Security is prepared to support a new obligational authority request for $280 million for an expanded program of economic assistance to Korea during FY 1954, based on the assumption indicated in the attached report. This figure, which is $20 million less than the recommendation made in the Tasca report, was arrived at after taking into account the basic factors involved. A factor which tends to reduce the amount of new obligational authority required is the likelihood that two months of the current fiscal year will have elapsed before a program could be effectively initiated. On the other hand, account had to be taken of the fact that the Tasca report assumed the availability of $75 million from army appropriations for civilian relief in Korea, which has now been reduced by Congressional action to $58 million. Maximum contributions by other UN-member countries for Korean relief and rehabilitation were assumed. A major factor in the estimate arrived at by the Director for Mutual Security was the considered need for a substantial move of consumer goods into the Korean economy to avert runaway inflation during the coming crucial months. Apart from purely economic considerations, it is the view of the Director that such a program would have an important psychological effect on both the Koreans and the rest of the world as concrete evidence of United States determination to help revive an economy shattered by the ravages of war against the Communist aggressor. To the extent that South Korean forces do not attain the 20 division level assumed in the attached report, it is believed that aid requirements could be reduced at a rate of $15 million per division. In other words, if the program were based on a security assumption of a 16 rather than a 20 division force level, the estimate of the need for new obligational authority could be reduced to $220 million.

In conclusion I should like to emphasize on behalf of the Special Committee the absolute necessity of rapid action on the recommendations contained in paragraphs 19 and 20 of the attached report. The imminence of Congressional adjournment permits no delay in reaching a basic judgment as to the manner or timing of an approach to the Congress.

For the Special Committee:
NORMAN S. PAUL

[Attachment 2]

REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON TASCA REPORT

Objectives

1. As long as hostilities continue in Korea, it is essential that our military position not be jeopardized by civilian unrest or internal subversion. In the event of a truce and in the absence of unification of Korea,

it will be important to our security to have a friendly government in South Korea with an economy able to maintain armed forces in accordance with the NSC-approved program, with a view to the assumption by the Republic of Korea of greater responsibility for the defense of Korea. Under a political settlement and unification of Korea on terms acceptable to the United States, it will be desirable to have an economy able to maintain forces sufficient for internal security and capable of defending Korean territory short of an attack by a major power.

Background

2. Economic assistance is now being provided to the Republic of Korea in several forms. The Department of Defense provides an emergency civilian relief program (CRIK). The United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), pursuant to a UN-approved initial budget of $250 million, has been implementing a program of reconstruction and rehabilitation during FY 1953, and has proposed a program of $130 million for FY 1954. In addition, substantial economic aid has been provided in the form of dollar payments to the South Korean government for local currency requirements, at the rate of approximately $50 million per year, employment of South Koreans by various U.S. agencies, and substantial military construction by U.S. army engineers that has civil as well as military value. Included are such items as roads, bridges, power plants and railroads.

3. The war has created conditions in Korea which must be improved if a dangerous economic and political crisis is to be avoided. There have been widespread damage and destruction of homes and factories. Millions of people have been displaced. The Seoul–Yung Dung Po and Inchon areas, where most of South Korea's industry was located, has been completely gutted by the four military shifts of control since 1950. Lack of transport capacity has retarded the import and internal movement of essential commodities. Impaired domestic production, greatly expanded military expenditures, and inadequate anti-inflationary steps have all contributed an inflationary situation that continually threatens to get out of hand.

4. The projected increases of the armed forces to a level of 20 divisions will place a further burden on the Korean economy whether hostilities cease or not, and even the maintenance of the present 16 division level will involve a severe economic strain.

5. Because of the precarious economic situation, and its potential effect on our security objectives, an economic mission was sent to Korea by the President under the following terms of reference:

"It is desired that you make a full investigation of the ways and means of strengthening the Korean economy in the light of the security objectives of the United States and the United Nations. Your mission will include, but is not limited to, a recommendation as to the amounts and types of U.S. assistance desirable in support of the Korean economy; proposals as to the manner in which the United States best can be assured that any resources it may contribute are utilized in the most efficient manner possible; and the formulation of measures to be adopted to insure the coordination of all economic programs in Korea."

The Tasca Report

6. The Mission headed by Dr. Henry J. Tasca has issued a report which contains a comprehensive analysis of South Korean economic problems. No attempt was made to analyze the economic problems involved, and the aid requirements of a unified Korea. It recommends a three year funding of a program of economic aid, military support, relief and reconstruction, involving U.S. expenditures (including UNKRA and CRIK) in excess of $1 billion. These expenditures probably would be spread over a period of four to five years. Although the economy of South Korea as a result of the expenditures of these funds would be in reasonably sound condition, it is expected that the need for some additional assistance would continue to exist.

7. The program recommends imports of $1.5 billion of which $.5 billion would be financed by South Korean trade and invisibles (principally United States payments for local currency needs) and by aid from countries other than the United States. Of the $1.5 billion total, about $1 billion is for raw materials and other consumable goods while $.5 billion is for investment. Proposed major fields of investment are public health, education, agriculture, transportation, and general industry. Significant investment would also take place in electric power, mining, public works, communications and fisheries.

8. The report also recommends that, coordinate with increased aid, the ROK make major changes in policy relating to the exchange rate, prices, economic controls, banks and credit, sale or lease of Government-owned enterprises and steps to monetize the economy. This would involve a basic shift from a policy of trying to suppress inflation through rigid controls in certain sectors and currency reforms to one of restoring market prices, increasing taxes and moving towards a balanced budget. Such a shift requires additional consumable goods to succeed. But it also requires legislative action and strong executive leadership on the part of the Republic of Korea.

Assumptions of Tasca Report and Analysis

9. The Tasca report assumes (a) political and security conditions which will permit the initiation of an expanded economic assistance program immediately, (b) effective administration of aid and full cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Korea, (c) a divided Korea during the three to five-year period, (d) absence of hostilities during the period, (e) an immediate build-up of ROK Army forces to 20 divisions and retention of this strength for a three-year period, phasing down to a security force of 10 divisions thereafter, (f) restora-

tion of approximately the 1949/50 standard of living, and (g) continuation of an UNKRA program as an instrument of collective UN action, at least through the completion of its initially authorized $250 million program.

10. On the basis of these assumptions, the report recommends all possible speed in both the investment programs and the import of consumable goods. It points out that domestic production cannot increase without aid to agriculture, investment in repair parts, additional machines to replace those lost in war damage, and rebuilding. The sooner production is increased, the sooner outside aid can be reduced. In addition, the psychological impact of rapid reconstruction would be of tremendous advantage in showing the world that the United States cares about restoring the damage suffered by the Republic of Korea in the fight against Communist aggression, and in creating confidence in the Koreans that they can survive economically in the future.

11. There are reasons for a policy of slower investment in certain industries and geographical areas in the period between a truce and a political settlement. Furthermore large investment now in South Korea would cause further inflationary strains, particularly if the Government of the Republic of Korea does not make the necessary economic reforms before such a large investment program is begun. Until pricing policies are changed, it is difficult to know what industries might be most economical. There are also impediments to the rapid expansion of the level of imports generally, due to inadequacies of transportation and distribution system.

12. Should an assessment of the political situation following the signing of the truce indicate the strong possibility of unification, an immediate review of the composition and extent of aid would be required.

13. The experience in Korea of four years of military government, a year of ECA, and several more of active war, has demonstrated that bottlenecks of supply, inexperienced staff and Korean institutional and political conditions may place a limitation on the speed with which a program can be carried out.

Organization Problems

14. The Tasca mission recommends (a) a continuation of the concept of Presidential Representative for Korean Economic Affairs, serving under CINCUNC as long as South Korea remains a military theater; (b) "positive operational control" by the U.S. over UNKRA, to be obtained by General Assembly action; and (c) principal backstopping in Washington for Korean economic aid matters by DMS, in consultation with other agencies. These recommendations, which involve the interests of several agencies, are under review by the Bureau of the Budget, in consultation with other agencies.

Recommendations

15. An expanded program of economic assistance should be initiated promptly for that portion of Korea controlled by the Republic of Korea and the United Nations Command, subject to the understanding that its implementation will continue only so long as the Republic of Korea cooperates with the United States during the armistice and post armistice developments. The following should be accepted as planning assumptions for economic assistance:

a. ROK army forces will be built to 20 divisions in accordance with present plans.

b. An ultimate reduction to a 10 division force basis for the Republic of Korea.

c. A standard of living approximating 1949/50 levels.

16. Certain parts of the program should be somewhat restricted pending further clarification of the Korean political situation. Investment in areas which would be most affected by renewal of hostilities should proceed at a limited rate until an assessment can be made of the likelihood of such renewal. Investment in those projects which would be subject to reconsideration in the event of unification, should proceed at a limited rate until the possibility of unification as a result of the political conference can be assessed.

17. The provision of additional aid should be conditioned on an understanding with the Government of the Republic of Korea with respect to internal measures required to achieve economic stability.

18. Since provision for this program has not been made in cost estimates of existing approved security plans and programs, the appropriate agencies should immediately complete the steps necessary for a request of funds from Congress.

19. An immediate Executive decision should be made as to whether, or in what manner, an approach should be made to Congress during this session.

20. In the event that no new funds or new authorization are obtained from the Congress during this session, funds appropriated for other purposes, but legally authorized for possible use in Korea, should be utilized to initiate an expanded program. The size of such a program should be determined in the light of fund availabilities as a result of pending appropriations, and competing global requirements.

21. Because of the many uncertainties involved, it is difficult to estimate the ultimate cost of an economic program. If only South Korea is involved, a reasonable estimate would involve the expenditure of between $700 million and $1 billion during a four or five-year period in addition to economic programs totaling about $150 million in expenditures now before Congress. These estimates do not include payments made to the ROK's for military local currency requirements or the

costs of military civil construction. A program for a unified Korea would be larger. Additional expenditures during FY 1954 over and above the economic programs now approved by or before the Congress involves many uncertainties, such as the time required to get the program underway, but under the most favorable circumstances probably would not exceed $175 million. U.S. expenditures under this program may be reduced to the extent that other countries can be induced to make additional contributions to South Korean rehabilitation.

22. Concurrently with the steps described above, the Bureau of the Budget, in consultation with interested agencies should prepare, for submission to the President, an organizational plan for the effective administration of an expanded program of economic assistance to Korea. The details of such a plan, unless basic security policies are involved, should not be submitted to the National Security Council for approval.

S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 118 Series

Report by the Special Committee to the National Security Council [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 17, 1953.

ADDITIONAL UN FORCES FOR KOREA

References:
- A. NSC Action No. 759-*b*, dated April 8, 1953 [2]
- B. NSC Action No. 835, dated July 2, 1953 [3]
- C. NSC 118/2, pars. 2-*a*(3) and 2-*b*(7), dated December 20, 1951 [4]
- D. NSC 147, pars. 168–180, dated April 2, 1953 [5]
- E. Memo for NSC, dated June 1, 1953, enclosing letter from Ambassador Lodge to the President, dated May 19, 1953 [6]
- F. Memo for NSC, dated June 15, 1953, enclosing memo from Assistant Secretary Frank C. Nash to the Secretary of Defense, dated June 11, 1953, and memo from Bureau of Budget to Mr. Cutler, dated June 8, 1953 [7]
- G. Estimate of "Approximate Costs of Equipping and Maintaining U.S. and Foreign Infantry Division (Division Slice)" [8]

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[1] The report was transmitted to the NSC under a covering memorandum by Lay, July 17, 1953, for consideration at the NSC meeting on July 23, 1953.

[2] For text of NSC Action No. 759, see the memorandum of discussion at the 139th meeting of the NSC, Apr. 8, p. 892.

[3] See paragraph 1 below.

[4] For NSC 118/2, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1382.

[5] For text of paragraphs 168–171 and 173–180, see pp. 850–857.

[6] *Ante*, p. 1129.

[7] *Ante*, p. 1177.

[8] Not printed.

H. Memo from Bureau of the Budget to Mr. Cutler, dated June 18, 1953[9]

I. Position of Department of State on Additional UN Forces for Korea, dated June 30, 1953[10]

1. On July 2, 1953, the National Security Council (NSC Action No. 835):

b. "Agreed in principle that the present practice regarding reimbursement of the United States for logistic support of other UN Forces in Korea (NSC Action No. 759–*b*) should be modified in the direction of Ambassador Lodge's proposals."

c. "Directed that a committee composed of representatives of the Secretaries of State, Defense and Treasury and of the Director, Bureau of the Budget, with Ambassador Lodge's assistance, should prepare a new formula in accordance with *b* above . . ."

2. The Committee referred to in Action No. 835–*c* considered the following:

a. The current policy of the United States with reference to additional United Nations forces for Korea, as stated in NSC 118/2:

> 2–*a*(3). *In the event an armistice is achieved:* "Exert vigorous efforts to continue the contribution by UN members of forces to the UN Command in Korea so long as UN forces are required in Korea."
>
> 2–*b*(7). *In the event that armistice negotiations clearly fail:* "Exert vigorous efforts to obtain increased military forces from those countries already participating, as well as to obtain contributions from UN countries which have not yet contributed military forces."

b. The existing directive of the Department of Defense, September 1, 1950, relative to reimbursement to the United States for logistical support furnished to foreign nations participating in the Korean hostilities. This directive provides that:

> "the military departments of the United States will make available necessary supplies or services on a basis of immediate reimbursement in United States dollars. To the extent that the foreign government cannot make prompt reimbursement in United States dollars, the United States Government and the foreign government will negotiate the terms of settlement."

Under this directive, memorandum receipts are obtained from the foreign nations (except the Republic of Korea and India) to which logistical support is furnished by the U.S. Where foreign governments have not signed agreements to reimburse, it is not current U.S. practice to insist on payment. This practice was confirmed by NSC Action No. 759–*b*.

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[9] Not printed.

[10] For the Department of State position as presented to the Secretary of State, see the memorandum by Sandifer to Dulles, June 17, p. 1191.

c. The reasons advanced by Ambassador Lodge in his letter of May 19, 1953 for now undertaking a renewed effort to secure additional forces from UN members for service in Korea and for modifying the above-mentioned directive of the Department of Defense.

d. The other documents and actions referenced above; especially the doubt raised by the Bureau of the Budget as to whether, after the conclusion of a treaty of peace in Korea (and perhaps even in the period between an armistice and the conclusion of such a treaty of peace), a legal justification would exist for continuing the existing policy referred to in 2–*b* above or for carrying into effect the new formula outlined below.

3*a.* The Committee recommends to the National Security Council the approval of a new formula, as set forth in the attachment, for obtaining additional United Nations forces for Korea and for financing their logistical support. This new formula would replace the Defense directive stated in 2–*b* above.

b. The Committee, being in doubt as to the legal situation, believes the President should request from the Attorney General an expedited opinion as to:

(1) Whether there now exists any legal basis which would support the above-mentioned new formula after the conclusion of a treaty of peace in Korea, and also in the period between an armistice and the conclusion of such a treaty of peace.

(2) What new legislation, if any, should be enacted to provide a legal basis for support of the above-mentioned new formula during the periods indicated.

c. If new legislation must be sought in support of such new formula, the Committee suggests the advisability of a Joint Resolution broader in terms than the Korean action; for example:

"The President may transfer United States military equipment, supplies, and services to any government allied with the United States in any effort by the United Nations to enforce measures to repel aggression, in proportion to the effective manpower furnished by any such nation and upon such terms and conditions, if any, as he may determine."

4. When approved, the new formula should be carried into effect as follows:

a. The Department of State should undertake discussions on a selective basis with the governments of United Nations members, excepting the Communist bloc, to make clear (1) that the United States desires the maximum contribution from each member state in the Korean undertaking; and (2) that the prestige of the United Nations and the fundamental idea of collective security are bound up in effective contributions by member states to support decisions of the United Nations.

b. The United States Representative to the United Nations, through his personal contacts with the Chiefs of Missions to the United Nations should do everything practicable to encourage member states to make contributions of military forces.

c. When a nation has signified the contribution of military forces which it considers itself capable of making, the Department of State would determine the desirability of such troop contribution from a political and psychological standpoint and the Department of Defense would determine the effectiveness of the troop contribution from a military standpoint. As a practical policy, the Department of Defense will normally give favorable consideration to units of battalion size or larger provided that they meet other existing criteria as regards homogeneity and training and, in cases where special circumstances exist, will give sympathetic consideration to smaller offers.

Concurring:

Department of State—Mr. Robert R. Bowie
Department of the Treasury—Mr. Elbert P. Tuttle
Bureau of the Budget—Mr. Paul L. Morrison

The Department of Defense representative on the Special Committee, Mr. Frank Nash, did not join in the report since the views of the Secretary of Defense are attached.

Attachment

REVISED FORMULA FOR REIMBURSEMENT FOR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

1. The United States desires to obtain and retain the maximum contributions of effective manpower from the nations allied with it in the effort of the United Nations to repel aggression in Korea.

2. To that end, the Department of Defense will furnish United States military equipment, supplies, and services to any such nation, in proportion to the effective manpower furnished by such nation, at such cost, if any, as the Department of State, in consultation with the Departments of the Treasury and Defense, may determine such nation is willing and able to pay.

3. A nation deemed capable of contributing money as well as manpower should be encouraged to pay for the military equipment, supplies, and services furnished to its own troops and also to contribute toward the logistical support of the troops of other nations.

4. Except when the manpower furnished by any such nation is additional to forces already furnished by it, the contribution should be in effective military units as determined by the Department of Defense.

Annex

ADDITIONAL UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN KOREA

VIEWS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ON THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY NSC ACTION 835–C

1. The Secretary of Defense is unable to concur in the proposed recommendation to the National Security Council for a new policy for re-

imbursement for logistic support furnished to foreign governments engaged in a common undertaking such as the action in Korea. NSC Action No. 835–*b* reported the Council's agreement "in principle that the present *practice* regarding reimbursement of the United States for logistic support of other United Nations forces in Korea (NSC Action No. 759–*b*) should be modified in the direction of Ambassador Lodge's proposals." NSC Action No. 835–*c* directed that the Committee "prepare a new formula in accordance with *b* above with respect to the *practice* regarding reimbursement." In discussions concerning this subject, it has been strongly implied that the present policy insists, to the exclusion of all other considerations, on immediate payment in full for logistic support furnished, whereas, actually this has not been the case either in policy or practice. It is not the understanding of the Secretary of Defense that the National Security Council intended to reverse completely the present policy regarding reimbursement or to direct the drafting of a new policy, but rather that it was the Council's will that the Committee explore existing procedures regarding reimbursement and recommend such modifications to them which might, insofar as possible, accommodate the views of Ambassador Lodge advocating greater leniency and flexibility in excusing nations which cannot pay from so doing. The Department of Defense considers that the present policy, when modified as proposed below, supported by enabling legislation if necessary, and properly applied, can achieve the desired result, and that the drafting of a wholly new policy is neither necessary nor desirable.

2. The proposed new policy contains language originally intended as a draft of possible enabling legislation, and was not intended as a statement of policy. Taken as a statement of new policy, its provisions are so broad as to make it undesirable for a number of reasons:

a. It would establish an undesirable precedent for the present and all future United Nations actions in its implications that the United States would be willing to support all costs of logistic support furnished. Any practical attempt to carry out such a policy would certainly spread such a connotation throughout the world.

b. Such action would have an undesirable effect on the settlement of obligations previously undertaken by other nations to reimburse the United States. Countries previously paying would probably stop making payments and countries that have recognized an obligation to be settled at a later date would refuse to negotiate the terms of such settlement.

c. If the United Nations is eventually to grow into an effective mechanism for collective action and be in a position to deal with future situations involving collective action, it must do so through the spirit of participation in, and assumption of, responsibility by each of its members. Application of the proposed policy would negate this principle.

d. If the United States were generally to make available logistic support without insistence on obligation to reimburse, it would give credence to possible charges of employing mercenary forces in the interest of the United States, thereby erasing in practice the principles underlying the concept of United Nations collective action.

3. The scope of the present policy, as contrasted with the proposed policy, has not been fully taken into consideration in previous discussions. The policy is presently broad enough to accommodate the objectives which motivate the proposed change. The present policy contains the following essential elements:

a. "The several Services should seek arrangements under which the Foreign Governments will completely equip and supply their forces."

b. "To the extent that such complete support is not practicable, but the offer is otherwise desirable, the military departments of the United States will make available necessary supplies or services on a basis of immediate reimbursement in United States dollars."

c. "To the extent that the Foreign Government cannot make prompt reimbursement in United States dollars, the United States Government and the Foreign Government will negotiate the terms of settlement." (This policy has not acted to delay provision of logistic support, since only agreement by the foreign country to recognize an obligation to the United States has been initially required.)

d. We believe that the phrase "the terms of settlement" is sufficiently broad to comprehend any negotiated basis of settlement in terms of time, kinds of currency, commodities, rights, etc.

e. In properly justifiable cases, the President can exercise his emergency powers to eliminate the requirement of that country to reimburse the United States, in whole or part.

4. It is the opinion of the Secretary of Defense that in order to avoid a disastrous weakening of the United Nations as a mechanism for collective action and the prestige of the United States participation in such action, the principle of recognition of obligation to reimburse must be understood in all cases. Such an understanding would enable the United States and the United Nations to prove to the world that the action was truly a collective effort involving equitable relationships among all the parties. In order that the varying ability of nations to provide financially for the logistic support furnished may be appropriately recognized, the United States should, as a separate though related matter, provide for appropriate economic, financial, or other assistance to foreign countries on an individual basis in order to assist them in discharging their obligations.

5. The Department of Defense believes it imperative that all manpower be furnished in effective units. Rotation of forces in the field would, of course, not necessarily involve effective units, but in any event, forces provided on a rotation basis would not involve a contribution of additional manpower. Consideration of the military effectiveness of the units offered involves two and distinct problems; first, the effectiveness of the unit per se and secondly, a point of major importance in the light of a probable armistice, the effect of the acceptance of such a

unit in terms of the over-all efficiency of the Unified Command. It must be borne in mind that the provisions of the armistice provide an over-all ceiling on the size of the Unified Command. Any forthcoming offers of assistance generated would, in a post-armistice situation, have to replace existing forces already in the field. To the extent that these new forces were inferior to those relieved, the operational capability of the United Nations Command would suffer. The wisdom of maintaining a combat-ready force in the post-armistice period cannot be questioned. As a practical policy, the Department of Defense will normally give favorable consideration to units of battalion size or larger provided that they meet other existing criteria as regards homogeneity and training and, in cases where special circumstances exist, will give sympathetic consideration to smaller offers. In the light of these considerations, the Department of Defense must reserve the right to pass on the acceptability of the contribution from a military standpoint in each and every case in order that the various factors existing and anticipated at the time of each individual offer may be properly weighed.

6. In view of the considerations enumerated above, and the fact that the present policy is not fully and completely stated in any one document, it is recommended that, in lieu of the statement of new policy contained in the Committee's report, the formula requested by the National Security Council be drafted as follows:

a. The United States should seek arrangements under which the Foreign Government offering forces in support of United Nations collective action will completely equip and supply these forces.

b. To the extent that such complete support is not practicable, but the offer is otherwise desirable, the military departments of the United States will make available necessary supplies or services on a basis of immediate reimbursement in United States dollars.

c. To the extent that the Foreign Government cannot make prompt reimbursement in United States dollars, the United States Government will furnish necessary support provided the Foreign Government will recognize at once an obligation to the United States, settlement of which would later become the subject of negotiation.

d. In cases where individual foreign countries assisting in United Nations action are determined to be financially unable to provide for logistic support, arrangements may be made, under appropriate legislation, for the United States to separately provide essential economic, financial, or other aid as required to enable that nation to discharge its obligation.

e. The contribution of military forces should be in effective military units as determined by the Department of Defense.

7. The Department of Defense position with regard to legislation to implement the policy set out above is as follows: To the extent that any negotiations looking toward deferred settlement by a foreign country, as described in paragraph 6–*c* above, do not fall within the terms of Section 408(e) of the Mutual Security Act, these negotiations would

have to be based on the exercise of the President's emergency powers. It seems clear that legislation should be obtained to eliminate the necessity for reliance on these powers. The need for legislation is particularly urgent in view of the fact that it is hoped that most future offers by foreign countries of military units for use in Korea will be made after a truce or armistice. It is recommended that this legislation be developed by the Departments of State and Defense, and by the Foreign Operations Administration.

8. The Department of Defense position contained in paragraph 6–*d* above may also require legislation to permit the provision of economic, financial or other assistance to enable foreign countries participating in United Nations actions to settle their obligations.

9. With regard to the portion of the Committee's draft report concerning the carrying into effect of the policy, the Department of Defense has made certain changes and additions of non-substantive nature and recommends the following language to be substituted for this portion of the report:

When approved by the National Security Council, and supported by appropriate legislation, this policy should be carried into effect in the following manner:

a. The Department of State will undertake bilateral negotiations with the government of each United Nations member state, excepting the Communist bloc, from which effective contributions would be desirable from a political standpoint. These negotiations should make clear (1) that the United States desires the maximum participation from each member state in the Korean undertaking; and (2) that the prestige of the United Nations and the fundamental idea of collective security are bound up in effective contributions by member states to support decisions of the United Nations.

b. The United States Representative to the United Nations, through his personal contacts with the Chiefs of Missions to the United Nations, will do everything in his power to encourage member states to make contributions.

c. When a nation has signified the contribution which it is willing to make, the Department of Defense will determine the acceptability of the contribution from a military standpoint.

d. The bilateral agreements for military contributions should continue to provide for recognition of an obligation for logistic support furnished by the United States. In appropriate cases separate agreements might be negotiated covering arrangements under which the United States may provide essential economic, financial or other aid required to enable a nation to discharge its obligation.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, July 17, 1953—5:07 p. m.

CX 63766. Ref: C 63753.[2] This msg in two parts.

Part I. 1. This supplements the rept contained in ref msg.

2. Yesterday afternoon Taylor and I visited the fwd areas of recent large-scale Communist atk.

3. I had an opportunity to talk with Jenkins, White, Chung (the II ROK Corps Comd), Williams[3] (who is actually running the II ROK Corps at the present time), and some of the div commanders involved, as well as United States advisors with several ROK divs. The sit is not good.

4. I have been sending you Taylor's daily summary of these oprs but, in view of speculative press accounts resulting from nec censorship of units involved in this opr which may have led you to the conclusion that the II ROK Corps units had performed well, I desire to clarify this sit. My observations are as fol:

a. The II ROK Corps in general did not perform well. Three of its four divs in line behaved rather badly, withdrawing to a depth considerably beyond the line they were ordered to form upon. Leadership at corps and div level was, in general, far from what it should have been, which emphasizes the fact that due to their performance under static conditions perhaps we have been too optimistic in expecting too much of these ROK gen offs whose level of proficiency is nearer the bn or, at most the regt level.

b. Some units withdrew without much pressure from the enemy. Some came back by regt; others in smaller units; and some as stragglers.

c. To close the gaps created by this disorganized withdrawal, Taylor had to use most of his reserve, including the 3rd US Div, together with the 8th and 11th ROK Divs. The 187 Abn RCT had been committed the day before to strengthen a critical portion of the IX Corps front.

d. Through Taylor's, Jenkins' and Williams' splendid leadership, together with Gen Paik, Chief of Staff ROK Army, on the ground, the Capital, 3rd and 5th ROK Divs are being assembled and reorganized to prov res. The 7th ROK Div in the X Corps is being replaced by the 5th US RCT and will go into res where it will be aval to the II ROK Corps. These are the only combat experienced units Taylor has aval at the moment except for the 25 US Div which must be kept on the more critical western part of the front.

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[1] A marginal note on a copy of this telegram in the Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file, indicated that the President saw this report.

[2] In this telegram, Taylor reported on the tactical situation at the affected front as of 1700 hours, 16 July (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413).

[3] Lt. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins, IX Corps Commander; Lt. Gen. Isaac D. White, X Corps Commander; Maj. Gen. Samuel T. Williams, Commanding General, 25th U.S. Division and Deputy Commanding General, II ROK Corps; and Lt. Gen. Chung Il Kwon.

e. I was also impressed with the lack of info aval to the II ROK Corps Commander as to the disposition of his own units, of the enemy, and of the amount of air support he was getting.

f. If the enemy cont to push in strength within the next day or two further withdrawals on the part of the II ROK Corps to the Wyoming line may be nec. This, of course, would entail readjustments by the corps to the east and west.

g. I have ordered the 24 US Div, which has closed in Korea, less one regt of inf required on PW work, to move to the Eighth Army area. The first elms start their mvmt today.

5. For the past two days the press has been reporting optimistically that the UNC is undertaking a counter-offensive. Nothing could be farther from the facts. The II ROK Corps after having withdrawn far below the line which they were ordered to occupy, has been ordered to adv to that line and at last rept was slowly moving to that line against sporadic and minor resistance.

Part II. 6. As you know the 24 Div was sent to Korea to increase the scty of the PW camps and other vital rear area insts as well as to permit me to relieve the Eighth Army of the rqmt for maintaining a regt on this duty. I also desired to provide some combat res to KCOMZ in case ROK's initiated action to interfere with our essential log oprs. The sit both in the PW camps and in KCOMZ has improved and I now feel the need for this div in the combat zone the more urgent, though I am fully aware of the calculated risk involved with the PWs, particularly in the camps on Koje-Do, in making this decision.

7. I met with Rhee late yesterday fol my return from the front. I explained to him the true conditions in the II ROK Corps, as Taylor had done the day before. I felt it essential that he know the actual conditions. His immediate reaction was to state that this condition would never have occurred if the UNC had launched an offensive long ago designed to destroy the Communist Forces in North Korea.

8. Among other subjects discussed I let him know of my decision to remove United States trps from scty missions at many of the PW camps and other rear area insts. I asked for his assistance in supplementing the PW Comd with reliable ROK forces and he stated he would take aprop action to see that this was done.

Editorial Note

The delegates returned to Panmunjom on July 19. Although not completely satisfied with United Nations Command assurances, the Communist side was prepared to proceed with the final arrangements for the armistice. Nam Il reserved the right to raise the problem of the released prisoners at the political conference, where the Communists wanted the resolution of the problems of handing over the remaining nonrepatriates to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission to take place. Finally, the Communist side asked for renegotiation of the line of demarcation. Both sides agreed that it was now time for the plenary sessions to be suspended so that the staff officers could iron out the unresolved details. (Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front,* pages 483-484 and Vatcher, *Panmunjom*, pages 199-200)

795.00/7-2153: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT SEOUL, July 21, 1953—2 p. m.[1]

46. Repeated information Pusan 24, CINCUNC. Department pass Defense.

This morning I called on Prime Minister Paek at his request, Pyun also present, and listened to attack on General Harrison's alleged references to Republic of Korea at Panmunjom, followed by threat to denounce armistice unless satisfaction (as described below) is received from US Government.

Their point of departure was Communist statement made at 36th Panmunjom meeting on July 19 last,[2] quoting answers attributed to General Harrison in reply to Communist questions. The Ministers' objections primarily concerned Harrison's alleged statements regarding maintenance of armistice by UNC if armistice violated by Republic of Korea, and concerning NNRC (Indian troops in South Korea). Pyun did most of talking but on all substantive points Prime Minister supported Pyun. In substance they demand "immediate clarification by General Harrison" of points to which they object in abovementioned Communist statement, plus information and/or assurances concerning the following:

1. Information whether Robertson has obtained from President Eisenhower assurances sought by Rhee "of moral and material support for effort with our own armed forces to repel aggressors from Korea." Quotation is from Rhee letter on July 9,[3] Paek stating that although Robertson informed Rhee that US Government is unable go beyond assurances in US July 2 *aide-mémoire*[4] that on withdrawal of US and Korean delegations from political conference "thereafter US Government would consult" with Republic of Korea to determine what next, Robertson had nevertheless informed Rhee that latter's desire for addi-

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[1] Received at 3:31 a.m. on July 21.

[2] A text of that statement is in telegram ZX 37213, Clark to JCS, July 19, 1953, not printed. (Matthews files, lot 55 D 413)

[3] *Ante*, p. 1357.

[4] For text, see Army message 021750Z from Seoul, July 3, p. 1312.

tional more specific assurances would be discussed with President Eisenhower. Rhee now desires to know whether any assurances will be forthcoming from President Eisenhower on this point. Parenthetically, Department will recognize that Harrison's alleged statement to effect that UNC will not support Republic of Korea army in violation of armistice, to which alleged statement Pyun and Paek object, is closely related to Rhee's desire for assurances of US support precisely in the circumstances of violation of armistice by Republic of Korea Government after withdrawal from political conference. This was stressed by Prime Minister and Pyun as "most important point of all," implication being that unless US commitment to help Korea go back to fighting is now forthcoming, Rhee government will tear up results of Rhee-Robertson conversations.

2. *Mutual Defense Treaty.* Paek declared Robertson promised to find out whether "Rhee draft" that is, text accompanying Rhee's letter of July 9, would be acceptable to US. In that connection I reminded them of statement in Robertson's letter of July 11 [*10*] [5] that it would probably be better to follow draft which had already been shown to and had received support of Senate leaders. Nevertheless, two Ministers said Rhee "prefers his draft" and they desire to know whether further discussion in Washington can encourage Rhee to expect favorable results.

3. *Activities of NNRC and Objection to Entry of Indian Troops Into Republic of Korea.* According to aforesaid Communist July 19 statement, General Harrison was quoted as stating that NNRC would function in accordance with armistice agreement and that "any personnel thereof authorized to enter Republic of Korea in conformity with armistice agreement will be protected." Two Ministers desire clarification by General Harrison to make clear NNRC will not enter Republic of Korea, but that prisoners will be sent to demilitarized zone. They also complained that letter from General Clark (referred to in numbered paragraph 4 of Robertson's letter of July 8) [6] has not been received with reference to Korean and Chinese anti-Communist prisoners.

4. *Economic Aid.* Prime Minister made lengthy statement complaining that Tasca mission recommendations have not been implemented and that with Congress shortly adjourning no appreciable aid will be forthcoming. Paek implied that is in contravention of US commitments.

As Department will readily understand, atmosphere of meeting was far from pleasant and Pyun's remarks on several occasions appeared deliberately insulting with respect Robertson's good faith and latter's alleged statements to Rhee. Pyun's threats to torpedo armistice were unequivocal and reflect not only his deep-seated opposition to armistice per se but his apparent eagerness to engage in reckless last-minute attempt make armistice impossible. Unfortunately, this morning it was Pyun rather than Prime Minister who was calling shots although latter finally agreed that public Republic of Korea statement (which Pyun and OPI director Karl Hong-ki were apparently drafting on my arrival) repudiating Rhee commitment not to obstruct armistice would be deferred until reply received to their four-point inquiry. They also wish to know whether "clarifications" will be made by Harrison.

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[5] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 1374.

[6] Transmitted in telegram 31 from Seoul, July 8, p. 1352.

I did not permit Pyun's statements to go unchallenged and I likewise sought to bring Prime Minister to realization of where following Pyun is likely to lead Republic of Korea Government and people. Throughout most of the conversation however, Pyun seemed to have upper hand over Prime Minister and at end of meeting which lasted 90 minutes they went to call on Rhee, who is reportedly indisposed.

BRIGGS

795.00/7-2153: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET SEOUL, July 21, 1953—8 p. m.
NIACT

49. Repeated information Pusan 27, CINCUNC. Pass Defense. Reference: Embtels 46 [1] and 47.[2]

Issues raised this morning by Prime Minister and Foreign Minister are probably in part caused by pique at certain statements by General Harrison at Panmunjom which they apparently think create impression ROK Government is more closely and explicitly bound by assurances re armistice than exchange of Robertson–Rhee letters might justify, and in part by sentence quoted in my telegram 47 from Saturday Washington broadcast.

I am convinced, however, that fundamentally Rhee and his advisers (Pyun in particular) have never relinquished conviction armistice and political conference will fail to achieve their primary objective of Korean national unification and they are consequently still unwilling to have hands tied re resumption of war if conference fails within 90 days to achieve political settlement satisfactory to Rhee. Importance Paik and Pyun placed on "moral and material support" of US if ROK tries in these circumstances to break armistice (and their sensitivity to Harrison's statements indicating the contrary) suggest ROK Government may now seek to use qualifying language of Rhee's July 9 letter either to block armistice altogether, or if not, to extort maximum possible additional concessions from US on four points listed my telegram 46. Blackmail aspects of Paik references to appropriations based on Tasca recommendations seem all too evident.

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] In this telegram from Seoul, July 21, Briggs reported that Pyun took occasion during their conversation reported in telegram 46 "to make disparaging remarks concerning Secretary's broadcast Saturday with Assistant Secretary Robertson." For a text of relevant portions of the broadcast, delivered on July 17 over television and radio to the nation, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 27, 1953, pp. 101–102.

I assume Department will instruct me to call on Rhee with reference to demands made by Paik and Pyun. I do not advocate for one moment acceding to threats such as Pyun's but since we are in vulnerable position especially until armistice signed, I believe we should urgently examine points raised by ROK Government. Without sacrifice of principle or surrendering position, there may be some items to which we can respond. For example, I note that at July 19 plenary Panmunjom session UNC representative reserved right to comment on lengthy public Communist statement. Again, ROK questions concerning POWs in my opinion have either all been settled or else should be susceptible of satisfactory explanation. Perhaps there is also some statement that could be made regarding economic aid.

At same time I believe I should express to Rhee astonishment on Secretary's and Robertson's behalf over this apparent last minute ROK effort to block armistice in face of agreements made in good faith by Robertson, as President Eisenhower's special representative. I assume you may also wish me to state that following the further consideration mentioned in Embtel 46, our government must reiterate that no assurances of US support, moral or material, can be made in event ROK unilaterally renews hostilities following withdrawal from political conference.

BRIGGS

795.00/7-2153: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 21, 1953—1:14 p. m.
NIACT

50. Reference your conversation with Paek and Pyun (your 46 [2]) deliver soonest personally to Rhee following personal message from the Secretary and Robertson:

"1. Harrison was speaking on behalf of the United Nations Military Command making an armistice. He did not undertake to make political commitments binding governments and his remarks should not be construed in that sense. As the UN military commander in the field signing an armistice, CINCUNC has a duty to try to live up to the armistice. Obviously, no military officer in the field can bind the United States as to policy for an indefinite period of time. Notably, he has no power to make what is in effect a treaty which would preclude Congress from exercising its constitutional power to declare war. The U.S. Government's commitment with reference to the political conference and consultation stands. Of course, the United States is bound by the provisions of the United Nations Charter with particular reference to Article 2 and the fact that it cannot make war except through its constitutional processes.

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[1] This telegram, drafted by Dulles and cleared by Johnson, was repeated to Pusan as telegram 59 and to Tokyo for Clark as 189.

[2] Dated July 21, p. 1404.

2. The Planning Board of the NSC has completed its study of the Tasca report and it is expected to receive the approval of the NSC in the next few days, and the President will request necessary legislation for its implementation from this session of the Congress. This envisages greatly increased expenditures for economic assistance to Korea following an armistice. It contemplates a program of approximately $1 billion over a four- or five-year period not including payments to the ROK for military local currency requirements or the costs of military civil construction. It also contemplates an enlargement of the program if a unified Korea is achieved.

3. With reference to the treaty, Robertson has fully discussed this with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His impression is that it will be necessary to adhere rather closely to the draft previously discussed with Senate leaders and submitted to Rhee on July 4, although some modifications of language such as inclusion of an article along the line of Article 1 of the Japanese Treaty can be considered. We are prepared to begin promptly negotiation of the treaty and we would expect to invite to the negotiations two Senators—for example, H. Alexander Smith and John Sparkman, both of whom are sympathetic to a strong anti-Communist position in Asia.

4. In line with Robertson's suggestion, Secretary Dulles is prepared, promptly upon conclusion of the armistice and preferably prior to any United Nations Assembly to meet with President Rhee to decide on the policy and tactics to be pursued jointly by our governments at the political conference. Secretary suggests intermediate point so as to avoid complications in relation to Formosa and Japan, which places he is committed visit on his next trip to Orient. He cannot combine those visits with this trip as purpose is to have quick exchange of views with President Rhee and then get back in time to present agreed program to UN Assembly which will be convening."

DULLES

795.00/7-2153

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 21, 1953.

Subject: Joint Policy Declaration[1] in Connection with the Korean Armistice.

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[1] President Rhee's attitude toward the armistice raised serious doubts among the British, Canadian, and Australian Governments as to the timing and appropriateness of the Greater Sanctions Statement; these concerns are documented in numerous memoranda of

Participants: Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
Mr. Hume Wrong, Canadian Ambassador
Sir Percy C. Spender, Australian Ambassador
Mr. G. R. Laking, Counselor, New Zealand Embassy
Mr. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Robert J. G. McClurkin, Deputy Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

At the conclusion of a discussion of the status of the Commonwealth forces in Japan, which had been the original purpose of their appointment with the Secretary, the Commonwealth representatives raised the question of the Joint Policy Declaration.

Ambassador Wrong commented that there are several alternatives which might be adopted with respect to the warning statement, ranging from issuing it as originally drafted immediately after the conclusion of the armistice to suppressing it entirely in view of the recent communiqué issued by the three Foreign Ministers.[2] Ambassador Spender then said that, as he had told Mr. Robertson the day before,[3] his Government's view was that the Declaration should be made publicly and promptly after the armistice, with the French addendum. Despite the issuance of the communiqué by the Foreign Ministers, the Declaration would have considerable additional deterrent value, in part because it would come from all sixteen participating nations. Ambassador Makins then said that the Secretary knew the British position from the recent talks and stressed that there is real need to give the whole question more thought, especially since there is a possibility of a breach of the armistice from either side.

The Secretary said that since the Foreign Ministers meeting we have been giving a good deal of thought to this question and have had an opportunity to talk it over with Mr. Robertson in the light of his discussions with President Rhee. In our view, it is not necessary to change the language of the Declaration except to make the French addition,[4]

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conversation among the three nations' Embassy staffs and Department of State officials during June and early July (located in the 795.00 decimal file). The change in working terminology to the "Joint Policy Declaration" was a manifestation of this uneasiness.

[2] For the portion of the final communiqué relating to the Far East and Korea, Section V, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 27, 1953, pp. 105–106. For further documentation on the Foreign Ministers meetings in Washington, July 10–14, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1582 ff.

[3] A report of this meeting can be found in a memorandum of conversation by Robertson, July 20, 1953, not printed. (795.00/7–2053)

[4] The addition read as follows: "Finally, we are of the opinion that the armistice must not result in jeopardizing the restoration or safeguarding of peace in any other part of Asia."

which we understand has now been accepted by all of the participating countries. One feature of the language which is particularly important is the reference to the fact that if hostilities should be resumed it is doubtful whether they can be confined to Korea. In the armistice discussions, our military had been considerably concerned about the lack of restrictions on rehabilitation of airfields in North Korea and had receded on this point only in consideration of the Joint Policy Declaration. This Declaration balanced the possibility of attacking the Communist rear bases on the other side of the Yalu if hostilities were resumed against the possible Communist development of forward bases in North Korea. We therefore think that the agreement should be completed and signed as soon as possible.

The Secretary went on to say that we have a somewhat open mind as to what to do with the statement. It may be best not to brandish it quickly in an inflammatory manner. In the tense situation which exists and will exist, there is a real question as to whether such a public announcement, made in the manner in which we had originally conceived it, would be conducive to maintaining the armistice. However, the fact of this Declaration is known to some extent already, and will certainly come out at least at the time of the meeting of the General Assembly. Mr. Robertson talked about it with President Rhee. Since we cannot finalize a Mutual Security Treaty with the Koreans until next year, Mr. Robertson assured President Rhee that the Declaration would cover the gap. If the Declaration is not made, President Rhee will clearly feel defrauded. However, we are prepared to reconsider on the question of the immediate release in sixteen capitals within twelve hours.

Ambassador Spender said that some of the point would be lost if issuance were delayed too long. In addition, governments would be criticized for secret diplomacy if public knowledge of the statement came about through leaks by the Communists or others.

The Secretary then suggested that it might be useful to consider sending the Declaration to the Secretary General as a part of the formal transmission of the armistice by the Unified Command to the United Nations. This would have to go forward as promptly as possible, but it is an important matter and it will take at least a week to prepare, since it must carefully establish the background and perhaps a good deal of the interpretation of the armistice.

All of the Commonwealth representatives expressed their personal opinions that the Secretary's suggestion might be a useful solution. They promised to communicate with their Governments and let us know as soon as possible what their official Government views might be.

Ambassador Spender then asked whether there could be some arrangement under which they could receive advance notice of the signing of the armistice. Mr. Johnson said that we are satisfied that arrangements of this sort can be made.

795.00/7-2153

The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 21, 1953.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: My two and one-half weeks in Korea gave me new understanding of Korea's problems and concern for the future. Our frank and friendly conversations had, I felt, removed many misunderstandings which marred our relationship. I was therefore particularly shocked and distressed at the new misunderstanding arising on the day of my departure.

You and I had agreed that, in order to avoid the confusion and misinterpretations which might arise from separate statements, we would issue a joint statement to be released simultaneously in Seoul and Washington and which would represent our respective official public comment on the result of our negotiations. After agreeing on the text, Foreign Minister Pyun advised that in order that there be time for translation into the Korean language for release to the Korean press you requested that this joint statement not be published by either government before ten o'clock Sunday morning, July 12, Korean time. I was therefore greatly shocked upon being advised by newsmen as I left your residence after our warm and friendly farewells that you had issued a separate statement through Mr. Lucas, of the Scripps-Howard newspapers, which had already been published in America in Saturday afternoon's newspapers. You were quoted as saying you would observe the truce for only 90 days. Such a limitation meant that you would not even wait for the convening of the political conference to negotiate the peaceful unification of Korea. Of course I realized from your assurances to us that Lucas had misunderstood and misquoted you,[2] but the world did not. This separate statement of yours, with its misquotation and being published as it was the day before, completely vitiated whatever good effects might have resulted from our official joint statement. It also caused the widest confusion and speculation, and gave rise to a flood of statements attributed to officials of both governments regarding what each had gained from the other. The tenor of these statements was completely at variance with the spirit of our conversations and the avoidance of all vain claims in our joint statement. I have been embarrassed at some of the statements attributed to US official sources as well as worried by some of those attributed to yours. I feel sure there must be some explanation of Foreign Minister Pyun's binding me to a release date at a time when your separate statement had already been issued.

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[1] This letter was transmitted to Seoul for delivery to Rhee in telegram 52, July 21, 1953, 8:10 p.m., and repeated to Pusan as telegram 61 and to Tokyo for Clark as 199. It was drafted by Robertson.

[2] Philip Han, the Counselor of the Korean Embassy in Washington, called on Robertson on the morning of July 21 to explain that, according to Rhee, Lucas had been "unethical" in publishing an article based on an interview given for background purposes before the joint communiqué was released. (Memorandum of conversation, by Robertson, July 21, 1953; 795.00/7-2153)

Upon arriving in Washington I reported immediately to President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles. They were both very much pleased with our wide area of agreement and with the friendly relationship established as a basis for our discussions. I also reported to the Foreign Relations and the Foreign Affairs Committees of the Congress. I later made a report to the American people. In all my reports regarding Korea, I have endeavored to discuss your problems with the sincere sympathy of a friend who had learned of them at firsthand. I have received in return only friendly responses.

The Tasca recommendations for economic aid have received the approval of the Planning Board and are now before the National Security Council. With the approval of President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles already expressed, there is no reason to doubt NSC approval within the next few days.

The President stands by the US commitment to withdraw from the political conference under the circumstances set forth in my *aide-mémoire* of July 2.[3] He does not wish to curtail his liberty of action to take whatever steps may be indicated by the conditions existing at the time of withdrawal. As you have already been advised in a separate telegram,[4] Secretary Dulles is ready to meet with you at an early date to shape joint plans for the political conference to come. It is desirable that this meeting take place before a meeting of the General Assembly is called to consider the political conference.

The text of the mutual defense treaty is now under consideration here. A new draft will be submitted for your consideration. As previously indicated, the treaty will follow the line of those now outstanding with the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, with modification of language to correspond in some respects with our Treaty with Japan.

I deeply appreciated the heartwarming courtesies extended me on the day of my departure and I sincerely trust we can continue our full collaboration as friends and allies in the achievement of our common objective.

With warm regards for you and Madam Rhee,

Sincerely yours, WALTER S. ROBERTSON

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[3] Transmitted in Army message 021750Z from Seoul, July 3, p. 1312.

[4] See Dulles-Robertson message to Rhee, July 21, transmitted to Seoul in telegram 50, p. 1407.

FE files, lot 55 D 338, "Korean Political Conference, July 16-31, 1953": Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, July 22, 1953—2:52 a. m.

CX 63870. Refs: A. AmEmb Seoul msg 8 Jul sent Dept 31 rptd info Tokyo 17.[2] B. AmEmb Seoul IN 24, 21 Jul (Clark from Briggs) (passed to Def via State).[3] C. CX 63556 (GX 6799).[4] D. SecState msg 9 Jul sent Tokyo 90.[5] E. ZX 37213 (HNU 7-4).[6]

1. I assume you have seen the msg (ref B) in which Briggs reports on his conference today with Prime Minister Paik and Foreign Minister Pyun.

2. In addition to numerous press stories of yesterday and today which speculate that Rhee may issue a statement "disputing some of the assurances of South Korean cooperation which the Communists said they had recd from the UN truce delegation," I have info (as yet unconfirmed) that INS and possibly other agencies have embargoed story from Rhee commenting on the extent of his assurances and time limit he places on ROK cooperation with armistice. It is reported that these stories are embargoed for release tomorrow.

3. Any statement released by Rhee which in any way undermines the assurances given the Communists at Panmunjom might well delay or even wreck the armistice, give the Communists an enormous propaganda victory, and cause acute embarrassment to my government, since it has been widely reported in the United States press that Mr. Robertson reported to Congressional Committee that he had Rhee's assurances "in black and white."

4. Briggs report, ref B, indicates that Rhee will probably stress 4 major pnts. These are:

(1) Maintenance of the armistice by the United Nations command if violated by ROK. Rhee may indicate that he has assurances from the United States that we will support aggressive action by ROK armed forces to repel aggressors from Korea in event the political conference, after 90 days of deliberation, has not produced a peaceful unification of Korea.

(2) That he desires assurances from the United States that his draft of the Mutual Def Treaty is acceptable. He may well make statement that

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Briggs and Harrison for their exclusive information.

[2] Dated July 8, p. 1352.

[3] The reference was to telegram 46 from Seoul, July 21, p. 1404.

[4] Dated July 9, p. 1356.

[5] Printed as telegram 31 to Seoul, July 9, p. 1362.

[6] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1404.

he will not observe an armistice until such time as he recs positive info from Washington indicating favorable action of the proposed treaty.

(3) That the United States is not fulfilling its commitments as pertain to economic aids to Korea.

(4) That South Korea will forcibly oppose entry of Indian trps or Communists pers into South Korea.

5. I consider that the first 3 pnts must be ansd by Washington as they are beyond the scope of my authority as a mil comd. The fourth pnt, however, which I am quoting below is of dir concern to me and I will discuss it in some detail:

> "Activities of NNRC and objection to entry of Indian trps into ROK. According to aforesaid Commie Jul 19 statement, Gen Harrison was quoted as stating that NNRC would function in accordance with armistice agreement and that 'any pers thereof authorized to enter ROK in conformity with armistice agreement will be protected.' Two ministers desire clarification by Gen Harrison to make clear NNRC will not enter ROK, but that prisoners will be sent to DZ. They also complained that ltr from Gen Clark (referred to in para nr 4 of Robertsons ltr of Jul 8 [7]) has not been recd with ref to Korean and Chinese anti-Commie pris."

6. As indicated in above quote, Paik and Pyun are now telling Briggs that Rhee never agreed to the mvmt of non-repatriated Korean and Chinese PWs to an area immediately south of the demilitarized zone in the event the Communists would not agree to our proposal that these PWs be moved into the southern half of the demilitarized zone. It is true that Rhee has never agreed in writing to this proposal, however, as reported in ref C, a joint msg to State and Def from Robertson and myself fol our conversation with Rhee, at which Murphy and Briggs were present, he gave all of us the impression that the solution of moving the non-repatriates to an area just south of the demilitarized zone was reasonable and that he would cooperate in this subject. I further discussed this matter with him on the 16, indicating that this ques had been raised with the Communists that we hoped to move the PWs into the demilitarized zone; however, failing to secure Communist concurrence they would go into an area north of the Imjin where Indian trps could be landed by helicopter or small boats without passing through South Korea. I asked Rhee if he understood, and he said "yes" categorically, and he understood that the PWs might be moved into that area.

7. In ref A, Robertson obligated me to write a separate ltr confirming my plans to secure Communist concurrence to mvmt of anti-Communist PWs to the demilitarized zone. On 9 Jul, as reported in ref C, I, in company with Robertson, Murphy and Briggs, called on Rhee and discussed this subject. Following receipt of ref D from Sec of State

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[7] Robertson's letter was transmitted in telegram 31 from Seoul, July 8, p. 1352.

Dulles in which it was suggested that the exchange of further correspondence be discontinued, I reviewed the actions I had taken on this subject and concluded that my explanation to Rhee as reported in ref C was sufficient and that a separate ltr confirming my plans on this subject was not essential.

8. On 16 July, I had another discussion with Rhee covering this and other subjects. In order to make my conversation on this subject a matter of record and to insure timely arrangements for the cooperation he had pledged in moving these PWs, I delivered to Rhee the following day, 17 Jul, a ltr pertinent extracts of which fol:

> *a.* "In recent conversations, you indicated that you would support a proposal of the United Nations Command to the Communists that all Korean and Chinese prisoners of war, not repatriated directly, be transferred to the southern half of the demilitarized zone. As I informed you at the time, such arrangements would require concurrence of the Communists, and, if for some reason, they refuse to agree, it would be possible to select an area adjacent to the southern boundary, as indicated to you on the map, to which such prisoners of war could be moved. You indicated no objection to this alternate solution.
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> *b.* "I am sure you realize that an opn of this kind, involving the construction of an extensive installation and the mvmt of over 23,000 prisoners of war imposes a tremendous logistic burden on this command. However, in order to relieve your mind of the anxiety which you have expressed over the temporary location of the NNRC within South Korea, I am willing to expend these efforts."

9. It should be noted that this ltr covered the requirements of the ltr Robertson referred to in ref A and also that it had been in Rhee's possession for 4 days prior to the discussion reported in Briggs msg, ref B. It is crystal clear that Rhee has been informed many times of our alternate plans for moving the non-repatriates to an area adjacent to the demilitarized zone in event the Communists fail to agree to utilization of the demilitarized zone for this purpose. The staff officers meetings at Panmunjom, in an effort to secure Communist concurrence to an amendment to the armistice agreement which would permit us to use the southern portion of the demilitarized zone for the non-repatriates, have not as yet resolved this ques. I have directed Harrison to cont efforts towards securing Communist concurrence at earliest possible time.

10. During recent weeks we have been constantly on the defensive in our dealings with Rhee. A great portion of our time has been spent anticipating what the UNC counter-action could be to his efforts to interfere with an armistice. I believe it is time we paid less attn to saving Rhee's face and more time in protecting our own interests.

11. In the event the statement referred to in para 2 above is released by Rhee and proves to be an abrogation of his written assurances then I am firmly convinced that the time has come when somebody must challenge Rhee's unscrupulous misrepresentations. As indicated previously

in my msgs, I am convinced that we are not using the ammunition we have in the form of written assurances from Rhee. I consider it imperative that my government make a strong statement which will clarify the sit and refute any further misleading statements made by Rhee or his spokesmen. This can be done effectively only at governmental level as I am sure that you realize that if I categorically refute these statements, with the evidence aval to me, I will have seriously impaired my usefulness as UNC commander which includes the ROK forces. In this connection, I have prepared a full and factual release on what has transpired during executive sessions of the armistice delegations. I have refrained from issuing any portion as a response to the Communist release (ref E) in which they took extracts from the executive record. I will cont to hold this release until I am no longer under the obligation of respecting the executive nature of these sessions.

795.00/7–2253: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY SEOUL, July 22, 1953—6 p. m.[1]

52. Repeated information priority Pusan 39, priority Tokyo (for CINCUNC) 23. State pass Defense. For the Secretary and Robertson.

Message contained Deptel 50[2] delivered this morning to President Rhee in presence Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. Upshot of meeting was expression by President of disappointment at message, followed by statement that communication would receive immediate careful study, and that Rhee would be in touch with me later concerning it.

After reading text of Dulles–Robertson message Rhee embarked on a rambling but generally accurate account of his discussions with Robertson during which Rhee said he had "retreated" from initial stand demanding expulsion of Chinese Communists at time of armistice, to agreement to withdraw with us from an unfruitful political conference. He mentioned his subsequent demand for renewal of hostilities by US and ROK if Korea still divided, and his "reluctant acceptance" of US thesis that our Government cannot commit itself in advance to what we said would in effect be declaration of war (Rhee said at this point that it would not be declaration of war but solely resumption of existing interrupted war). Finally said Rhee he had considered, albeit with great reluctance, accepting in lieu of US commitment to resume fighting, US "assurances of moral and material support" when Korea unilaterally should resume fighting. Robertson, however, had declared his inability to provide "even this minimum commitment" but had agreed to take up question with Secretary and President and if necessary with Congressional leaders immediately on return to Washington. President then asked if statement paragraph 1, of today's message met his "minimum requirement" to which Prime Minister replied that the sentence "US Government commitment with reference to political conference and consultation stands" clearly implied Robertson failed in Washington to obtain assurances of moral and material support for Korea if Korea resumes fighting.

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[1] Received at 7:49 a.m. on July 22.

[2] Dated July 21, p. 1407.

Rhee nevertheless indicated that in other respects communication helpful and encouraging and he inquired whether information contained therein could be used in "pacifying" Korean people allegedly aroused by rumors that in Robertson discussions President Rhee had "surrendered too much".

I pointed out that Dulles–Robertson communication is labelled "confidential" and that it should not be released without specific agreement of American Government. I also pointed out that there would be immediate publicity concerning any message President Eisenhower might send Congress on implementation on Tasca recommendations. With reference to treaty, announcement of initiation of negotiations could be made at any time agreement had been reached to start such negotiations. Concerning proposed meeting with Secretary Dulles, an announcement in that connection also could be made following armistice, as soon as specific arrangements for meeting made. In other words, I said, there is a great deal in Department's communication directly responsive to Prime Minister's questions yesterday, and that message likewise demonstrates that since his return to Washington last week, Robertson has worked sincerely and wholeheartedly to solve questions that were still outstanding on his departure from Korea.

Rhee conceded that might be so but again referred to alleged eagerness of Korean people for additional news and his duty to supply it. I infer therefrom that public statement mentioned by Paik and Pyun yesterday may now be imminent unless Rhee decides whether to seek further US concessions or that present situation is after all very far from so unfavorable to ROK Government as he is trying to give impression.

Having in mind Pyun's propensity for publicity I told President that I proposed to inform correspondents inquiring about today's meeting that I had discussed with Rhee Korean-American collaboration in the armistice and post-armistice period. Rhee made no comment. Our meeting lasted approximately 30 minutes and was conducted by Rhee with restraint, and without participation by Pyun or except as mentioned above by Paik. President's attention wandered on several occasions and he seemed tired and old. He is suffering from ear infection and said it bothered him greatly. Rhee is nevertheless the one still making Korea's final decisions.

Since dictating foregoing I learned that within minutes of my departure from Rhee's house, Pyun was busy informing correspondents that ROK still required "clarification" and that his Government is "surprised and disappointed" at difference between what Robertson told Rhee and what Harrison told Communists. Pyun reportedly added that unless ROK gets "satisfaction" it will no longer be bound by promise not to obstruct armistice. In other words, Pyun is still doing everything in his power to torpedo armistice.

It is also reported (without confirmation) that ROK public statement may be issued late this afternoon.

BRIGGS

795.00/7-2253: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 22, 1953—3:14 p. m.
NIACT

55. Reference your 52 [2] and Departmental statement being transmitted separate message.[3]

Immediately inform Rhee there is no objection our part to release by him in consultation with you suitable portions message contained our 50 [4] and we regret you were not previously instructed so to inform him. Purpose of message was to reassure Rhee, his Ministers, and Korean people of active steps we were taking carry out assurances we had given. Statement issued today by Department also has this purpose and we hope Rhee will find it useful in reassuring Korean people this regard. Rhee will note statement covers all points mentioned in message our 50 except paragraph 1. With respect paragraph 1 Rhee will understand that while this is US position, relationship with our allies, General Clark's position, domestic US public opinion, and necessity of not publicly revealing to Communists all elements our position this regard requires adroit handling in public statements. Therefore we would concur in general statement in consonance with that made by Secretary July 17 broadcast in which he stated "the armistice does not guarantee the future conduct of any government."

With respect paragraph 2 request that any statement by Rhee omit one billion figure so as not to prejudice Congressional action on program.

DULLES

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[1] This telegram, drafted by Johnson, was repeated to Pusan as telegram 63 and to Tokyo for Clark as 202.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] The reference was to telegram 54 to Seoul, in which the Department of State enclosed the text of Dulles' statement of July 22 (795.00/7-2253). For a text of the statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 3, 1953, p. 141.

[4] Dated July 21, p. 1407.

795.00/7-2353: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY SEOUL, July 23, 1953—7 p. m.

60. Repeated information priority Tokyo 30 (for CINCUNC) pouched Pusan. Pass Defense. Re Deptels 54 [1] and 55 [2] July 22.

President Rhee having left early this morning to visit front with General Taylor, it was not until his return that I was able to deliver text of Secretary's statement. Foreign Minister Pyun was present.

I explained statement intended be helpful and assist Rhee with reference to preoccupations expressed by him and his Ministers in conversations during last few days. I also pointed out that statement, like joint message given Rhee yesterday, is directly responsive to Korean representations.

President read statement attentively. His initial comment was that it is "one-sided" and "full of what President Rhee promised but where does US promise anything in return?" Rhee talked heatedly and at times irrationally along that line for several minutes, apparently working himself in direction of regarding statement as "provocation" to which Rhee can now consider himself entitled to reply "in order to tell Korean side of story". In this connection Rhee also referred to commitments (which he did not define) which he said had been made to him by Robertson, implying that Rhee might now feel free to make them public also with reservation concerning vagueness with which Rhee often expresses himself (perhaps at times intentional).

Position toward which President now seems to be moving is that on Robertson's departure all Korean commitments were contingent on Robertson's obtaining for Rhee US promise of "moral and material support" of ROK unilateral action following withdrawal from political conference. Pyun's present line, which I have no doubt he is making every effort to have Rhee adopt, is in effect "since US has failed provide those promised assurances, ROK is now automatically relieved of commitments provisionally given Robertson". This may represent oversimplification, but it has been implicit in all my conversations since my return to Seoul on July 20, and equally in Pyun's series of newspaper interviews, "leaks" to press et cetera.

It is my conclusion that Rhee has not made up his mind and that he is accordingly likely to continue present cat and mouse tactics, meanwhile harassing us through series of further interviews and statements. Toward end of 45 minute discussion this afternoon, President expressed regret at having spoken at time heatedly, and he declared Secretary's statement would receive most careful consideration in connection with exposition he intends to make of Korean point of view. In circumstance of precarious balance such as now existing, speed in concluding armistice obviously is all important.

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[1] Not printed, but see footnote 3, *supra*.

[2] *Supra.*

Comments on certain other aspects of today's conversation transmitted separately.[3]

BRIGGS

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[3] In telegram 62 from Seoul, Briggs reported that Prime Minister Paik had issued a "singularly unpleasant" statement giving the impression that the United States was using economic aid to force Korea to accept an armistice and disclosing that such aid would amount to over a billion dollars. When Briggs saw Rhee pursuant to telegram 55 to Seoul, he had asked Rhee not to disclose the billion dollar figure for fear of prejudicing Congressional action. Rhee failed to mention that his Prime Minister had already released the figure, but did observe that he deplored efforts to connect the armistice with economic aid—a statement Briggs believed was probably calculated to disassociate himself if Paik's public statement backfired. Also during the Rhee-Briggs conversation, according to telegram 63 from Seoul, Rhee referred to Dulles' letter of June 22 for the first time thus: "Yes, Secretary Dulles is our great friend, but nevertheless he was unjust in his letter of June 22 and he made statements causing resentment." (Telegrams 62 and 63; 795.00/7-2353) For text of the Secretary's letter of June 22, see p. 1238.

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 156th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, July 23, 1953[1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 156th Meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Director for Mutual Security; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary of the Interior (for Item 1); the Secretary of Commerce (for Item 1); the Secretary of the Navy (for Item 1); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the United States Representative to the United Nations (for Item 5); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Mr. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Col. Carroll, Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Coordinator, NSC Planning Board Assistants. Also present, for Item 1 only, were: J. A. LaFortune, Petroleum Administration for Defense; W. G. Donley, Petroleum Administration for Defense; Robert B. Murray, Jr., Department of Commerce; Louis S. Rothschild, Maritime Administrator; Commander J. J. Mooney, Maritime Administration; Robert L. Finley, Office of Defense Mobilization.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Marion W. Boggs, Coordinator, NSC Planning Board Assistants, on July 24.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows discussion on items 1. "A National Petroleum Program", 2. "Continental Defense", and 3. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security".]

4. *The Situation in Korea*

General Bradley briefed the Council on the changes in the military situation in Korea. He noted particularly, in concluding his briefing, that it was difficult to assess the significance of the recent Chinese Communist attacks in strength against United Nations forces.

The President then said he wished to discuss the possibility of a general offensive by the Chinese Communists. He felt that U.S. forces in Korea and in Japan should be reinforced at once. If we continued the U.S. build-up in the Far East, all we could lose would be the cost of transporting the reinforcements, and we might save a good deal if the Chinese Communists decided to attack.

Secretary Dulles said we would be in trouble if we didn't move reinforcements fast, because the armistice would probably be concluded in 24 or 48 hours, and thereafter we would be unable to reinforce our armies in Korea. He was worried about the situation because the Chinese Communists could so easily provoke an incident, even after the armistice, and could launch a strong attack against us. Secretary Dulles added that if there is no armistice, the fighting will continue; if there is an armistice, fighting may be resumed, so that in any event it would be to our advantage to build up our military strength in the Far East.

General Bradley said that ships were being assembled for moving a Marine division from the United States.

The President said that we should start the Marines for Japan and other reinforcements for Korea this afternoon if possible. He said he would put two divisions in Japan right away. He thought it would be foolish to pinch pennies in a matter of this kind. He added that we might ask the British to send an additional brigade from Suez to the Far East.

Secretary Kyes asked whether the President was under the impression that the Department of Defense did not want to send reinforcements to the Far East. The President answered in the affirmative.

The President then turned to the question of sending an airborne division, and asked, what do we have troops for?

General Bradley said he would be opposed to taking the 82nd Airborne out of the United States. He said other divisions in the United States were under strength, and it would be difficult to maintain rotation if they were sent.

The President felt we should send at least one of the under-strength divisions, on the theory that the fighting will stop and that the training of that division could be completed in the Far East. He also felt that the period of service before rotation should be increased after the fighting stops.

Mr. Cutler said that the record would show what the President was directing.

The President said he was not directing anything; he detested the idea of a person twenty thousand miles away running a war. However, he did think the armistice might be a dangerous hoax, and he felt we should tell General Clark that the Marine division would proceed to the Far East immediately, and that another division would be embarked soon. We should also tell General Clark that in our view he should, without violating the terms of an armistice if one was achieved, have the strongest possible force deployed in South Korea or make his forces in Japan ready for prompt transfer to Korea. General Clark could be relied upon to do the rest.

Secretary Kyes inquired about publicity in connection with these moves.

The President said it would not be necessary to announce these moves, because the newspaper men could find it out for themselves.

Secretary Kyes and Mr. Stassen then asked about a build-up in air strength in the Far East.

. . . .

Secretary Kyes agreed that our atomic capabilities must be used against the Chinese Communists if the armistice is violated.

Mr. Allen Dulles said that recent intelligence supports the President's apprehension as to the possibility of a Chinese Communist offensive.

The Secretary of State said that the Chinese Communist build-up which had been observed could be for any one of three purposes: One, to strengthen the Chinese Communist position in the armistice negotiations; two, to enable them to attack if the armistice is not signed; three, to enable them to attack later on the basis of a manufactured incident if they so desire. However, Secretary Dulles' conclusion was that the Chinese Communists would probably sign the armistice and not attack just now.

Both Secretary Kyes and Mr. Allen Dulles noted that some intelligence indications pointed to August 26 as the date of a general offensive by the Chinese Communists.

The President said he had not heard anything like this before.

Secretary Humphrey asked whether U.S. reinforcements en route to Korea could continue to their destination if an armistice was signed.

General Bradley said if they did continue to their destination the Chinese Communists would maintain that we had violated the armistice.

The President said the best course might be to get our reinforcements in Japan ready to move to South Korea in case of need.

The National Security Council:[2]

a. Discussed the subject in the light of an oral briefing by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the military situation in Korea.

b. Noted the President's desire that the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, be informed of:

> (1) The Council's apprehension as to possibilities of an enemy offensive if an armistice is not promptly achieved or of incidents leading to further hostilities in the event of an armistice.
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> (2) The Council's view, in the light of (1) above, that General Clark should, without violating the terms of an armistice if one is achieved, have the strongest possible force from his command deployed in South Korea, or make his forces in Japan ready for prompt transfer to South Korea.
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> (3) The reinforcements which are being dispatched to the Far East from the United States.
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> (4) The President's request for a general estimate of the situation by General Clark, with especial reference to any required augmentation of forces.

c. Noted the President's view that we might attempt to obtain an additional British brigade for Korea.

d. Noted the President's desire that there be no publicity regarding the above actions.

Note: The action in *b* above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for implementation. The action in *c* above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for information.

5. *Additional United Nations Forces for Korea* (Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 1, June 15[3] and July 17, 1953;[4] NSC Actions Nos. 759–*b* and 835[5])

Mr. Cutler introduced the subject by presenting a report prepared by the Special Committee constituted pursuant to NSC Action No. 835–*c*, with the assistance of Ambassador Lodge. Mr. Cutler noted that the report contained a new formula for reimbursement for logistic support, but that the Department of Defense has entered a dissent and proposed an alternate formula.

Ambassador Lodge said the new formula proposed by the Committee was entirely satisfactory provided it was implemented enthusiastically. He agreed with the Department of Defense view that the military units sent to Korea should be effective units, but felt that many of the Defense arguments were unsound. He believed U.S. troops fighting in Korea should get as much support from other nations as possible.

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[2] The following paragraphs and note constituted NSC Action No. 857, a record copy of which can be found in S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.

[3] *Ante*, pp. 1129 and 1177, respectively.

[4] This memorandum transmitted the report of July 17 by the Special Committee constituted by the NSC; for text, see p. 1394.

[5] For NSC Action No. 759, see the memorandum of discussion at the 139th meeting of the NSC, Apr. 8, p. 892; for NSC Action No. 835, see paragraph 1 of the report of the Special Committee, p. 1395.

In answer to the argument that the present policy was already broad enough, Ambassador Lodge remarked that nothing had happened; that is, we had not obtained enough troop contributions from other members of the United Nations. As a result, the United Nations as an organization was being subjected to severe criticism in certain quarters in the United States.

The President felt that paragraph 3 of the new formula should refer to nations not able to provide for logistic support rather than to those not willing to provide for logistic support.

Mr. Cutler asked, what if a nation is able but not willing to provide for logistic support?

The President said that such nation would not be doing its duty under the UN Charter.

Secretary Dulles asked whether the new formula was to be applied retroactively.

The President said he would not mind applying it retroactively if the problem was thereby simplified. However, we might have protests from some nations if we made the new formula retroactive.

Mr. Cutler suggested that State, Treasury and Defense might decide whether the new formula would be retroactive in such case, and might also establish the effective date of the new formula.

The President said he would ask the Attorney General for a legal opinion, in accordance with paragraph 3–*b* of the reference memorandum of July 17. However, the President wanted the Attorney General to find legal support for the new formula after the conclusion of a treaty of peace in Korea, and also in the period between an armistice and the conclusion of such a treaty of peace. He did not want a legal opinion which said that we couldn't do anything under the new formula. He did not want other UN forces to be pulled out so that we would be compelled to put additional U.S. troops in Korea as replacements.

With reference to paragraph 4, on page 4 of the Special Committee's report, the President noted that Ambassador Lodge would have no means of determining the capabilities of troop units which other nations might furnish. His job would be to needle people. The President also felt that the Department of Defense should have the principal responsibility for determining the desirability of a troop contribution which another UN member proposed to make. All we have to do is say to Defense, "Don't be hardboiled; there is a little flexibility in this policy." The President also felt that the last sentence of paragraph 4–*c* was unnecessary and should be deleted.

Secretary Dulles said that consultation between the Departments of State and Defense would be necessary on the desirability of proposed troop contributions, and the President agreed with this view.

The National Security Council:[6]

a. Discussed the subject in the light of the reference memorandum of July 17, 1953.

b. Adopted the following new formula regarding reimbursement for U.S. logistic support of other UN forces in Korea:

> "1. The United States desires to obtain and retain the maximum contributions of effective manpower from the nations allied with it in the effort of the United Nations to repel aggression in Korea.
>
> "2. In principle, each such nation should, to the extent that it is able, either equip and supply its own forces or pay for such military equipment, supplies and services as may be furnished to it by the United States.
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> "3. The overriding consideration, however, should be the maximum contribution of effective manpower. When any such nation is willing to contribute effective manpower but not able to provide for logistic support, the Department of Defense should furnish to such nation military equipment, supplies, and services; without requirement of payment to the extent that the Department of State, in consultation with the Departments of Treasury and Defense, may determine such nation cannot be reasonably expected to pay.
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> "4. A nation capable of contributing money beyond the support of any forces furnished by it, should be encouraged also to contribute toward the logistic support of the forces of other nations.
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> "5. Except when the manpower furnished by any such nation is additional to forces already furnished by it, the contribution should be in effective military units as determined by the Department of Defense."

c. Agreed that the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, and Defense should jointly fix the effective date of the above new formula and decide whether it should be made retroactive in any case.

d. Noted the President's desire that Colombia should not at this time be pressed for payment for U.S. logistic support furnished to date.

e. Noted that the President would request the Attorney General for a legal opinion in accordance with paragraph 3–*b* of the reference memorandum of July 17, 1953.

f. Adopted the procedures for implementation of the new formula contained in paragraphs 4–*a* and –*b* of the reference memorandum of July 17, 1953, and revised the procedure proposed in paragraph 4–*c* to read as follows:

> "When a nation has signified the contribution of military forces which it considers itself capable of making, the desirability of such troop contribution will be determined by the Department of Defense in consultation with the Department of State."

Note: The above actions, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated by memorandum to the Council and referred to the appropriate departments and agencies for implementation.

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[6] The following paragraphs and note constituted NSC Action No. 858, a record copy of which can be found in S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.

6. *Savings in Defense Expenditures in the Event of a Korean Armistice*

Mr. Cutler read a report by the Department of Defense, dated July 10, 1953,[7] which indicated that $1.2 billion in Defense expenditures might be saved during the twelve months following a Korean armistice. These savings were divided as follows: Personnel, $125 million; Maintenance and Operation, $500 million; Procurement (mostly ammunition), $565 million. These figures, it was indicated, were very rough estimates.

Ambassador Lodge hoped that no publicity would be issued on the money saved and the men not drafted as a result of a Korean armistice.

The President agreed, and went on to indicate that he was opposed to any attempt by Congress to reduce expenditures by one billion or a half billion dollars because our expenses in Korea would be less after an armistice. He hoped to get through Congress a resolution authorizing the President to use any savings resulting from the Korean armistice for mutual security expenditures. The President said that we must get the Korean people to believing in us and not quite so much in Mr. Rhee.

The National Security Council:[8]

Noted a report by the Department of Defense, July 10, 1953, as read by Mr. Cutler, stating a rough estimate of annual financial savings which might result from a Korean armistice.

7. *Strengthening the Korean Economy* (NSC 156[9] and NSC 156/1;[10] NSC Action No. 828[11])

Mr. Cutler introduced NSC 156/1, consisting of recommendations by the NSC Planning Board based on the appended report by a special committee on the Tasca Report.

Mr. Stassen said that the Department of Defense and MSA could probably cooperate in providing funds for the expanded program of economic assistance to Korea recommended in NSC 156/1.

Secretary Kyes thought it was important to get moving at once on this problem.

The President said he would like to use any money actually saved in Defense expenditures as the result of an armistice, to expand economic assistance to Korea. He remarked that all the world would be watching Korea after the armistice, so we should set a purposeful objective for ourselves, quit dallying, and go forward rapidly.

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[7] Not printed.

[8] The following paragraph constituted NSC Action No. 859, a record copy of which can be found in S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.

[9] NSC 156 is attached to a note by Lay to the NSC, June 23, p. 1244.

[10] Dated July 17, p. 1384.

[11] In NSC Action No. 828, June 25, 1953, the Council noted the Tasca Report, referred it to the NSC Planning Board for preparation of recommendations based upon study by a Special Committee, and agreed that implementation should be deferred until the situation in Korea was clarified. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95)

Mr. Stassen suggested that the President might go to Congress and ask for the authority to use savings resulting from an armistice for the purpose of expanding our assistance to Korea.

The President said this was a good idea. Moreover, he would like to start distributing food in Korea immediately upon the signing of an armistice.[12]

Secretary Dulles said he would like to be able to tell President Rhee that President Eisenhower would recommend to Congress immediately upon the conclusion of an armistice, the initiation of an expanded program of economic assistance to Korea along the lines of the Tasca Report. The President said this was OK.

Mr. Stassen asked whether we intended to support 20 ROK divisions or 14. He asked this question because the number of Korean divisions had an important impact upon the Korean economy.

The President said that in view of the need for military strength in the Far East, he thought we should aim for 20 ROK divisions, although, of course, if confidence grew after a period of time, this number might be reduced. But for the present, he said, it would be indefensible to send more U.S. troops to the Far East and not obtain the maximum number of Korean divisions.

The National Security Council: [13]

a. Adopted the recommendations contained in paragraphs 5 through 7 of NSC 156/1.

b. Agreed that the Director for Mutual Security, the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, and Defense, and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (utilizing the Special Committee established under NSC Action No. 828–*b*), should work out the legislation and financing to carry out these recommendations within currently projected appropriations for FY 1954, including:

> (1) A Presidential request, immediately following an armistice, for Congressional authority to utilize savings resulting from the armistice for an expanded program of economic assistance to the Republic of Korea.
>
> (2) A plan to provide for the immediate distribution of food to the Republic of Korea in the event of an armistice.

c. Noted that the President authorized the Secretary of State to advise the President of the Republic of Korea that the President will recommend to Congress, immediately upon the conclusion of an armistice, the initiation of an expanded program of economic assistance to the Republic of Korea along the general lines of the recommendations of the mission headed by Mr. Henry J. Tasca.

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[12] According to a letter from Dulles to Stassen, July 25, 1953, Mutual Security Program funds of $9 million (to be subsequently repaid by Defense) were to be earmarked to provide emergency food relief in South Korea, thus covering any gap between signature of the armistice and enactment of legislation on aid to Korea by Congress. (895B.49/7–2553)

[13] The following paragraphs and note constituted NSC Action No. 860, a record copy of which is in S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.

Note: The above actions, as approved by the President, subsequently referred to the appropriate departments and agencies for implementation.[14]

[Here follows discussion on items 8. "Transfer to the Chinese Nationalist Government of Light U.S. Naval Ships", 9. "Project Solarium", and 10. "NSC Status of Projects".]

MARION W. BOGGS

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[14] In telegram 58 to Seoul, July 23, 1953, Dulles (who drafted the message) asked Briggs to advise Rhee that he had just come from a conference with President Eisenhower and his principal advisers where it had been agreed that, immediately upon signature of the armistice, Eisenhower would ask Congress for authorizations necessary to get started along the lines of the Tasca Report. Dulles anticipated favorable Congressional action before adjournment. (895B.00/7-2353)

795.00/7-2453

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to the Secretary of State [1]

SEOUL, July 24, 1953.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: We understand that truce is about to be signed. Before deciding the position of my government, it is of utmost importance to have your answers to two vital questions which at present remain in an uncertain status:

First, in proposed mutual security pact, may we count upon inclusion of a provision for immediate and automatic military support in case ROK should be attacked by an external enemy? As you know, a pact that is sufficient for a nation not in our position would not be adequate to our needs.

Second, when the political conference fails in 90 days, may we count upon US joining with us to resume military efforts to drive the Chinese Red invaders from our land? If this joint effort to achieve our common objective is beyond your present ability to promise us, can we count upon US for moral and material support, in addition to general economic assistance, for our own military efforts to eject the invaders from Korea?

In our conversations with Mr. Robertson, he promised to send me answers to these questions after his return to Washington, but thus far we have not received any assurances on these points.

When we have received your replies to these questions, we shall be enabled fully to formulate our own governmental policies in regard to the truce.

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[1] This letter was transmitted to Washington in telegram 73 from Seoul, July 24, 1953, 11 p.m. Earlier in the evening Pyun phoned Briggs to say that Rhee had just written a letter "of utmost importance" to Dulles, which Rhee would like forwarded by cable. The text was received at the Embassy an hour later. In the estimation of Briggs, the letter was a last minute effort to find a pretext for rejecting the armistice, which Rhee had just learned was imminent.

With sentiments of high esteem, I am, sincerely yours,

SYNGMAN RHEE

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, Korea file, box 54

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State [1]

[WASHINGTON,] July 24, 1953.

Upon receipt of a telegram from Rhee, indicating the truce signing was imminent, the Secretary telephoned the President and read to him a copy of the message.[2]

The President said that with regard to the first point the answer was yes as long as we ourselves know it was a clear case of aggression. The Secretary said, in connection with this point that in the case of all treaties, for instance the North Atlantic Treaty, our action must be taken through constitutional processes. The President said, of course, he understood that we had to say that. The Secretary said that actually the provision in the so-called "Greater Sanctions Agreement" does not contain that qualification.

The Secretary said that Rhee's saying he hadn't been informed was inaccurate. In connection with point 2—the question of giving moral and material support—we have to maintain freedom of action. The President said that to set an arbitrary or fixed limit on the number of days it would take to get anything done would be foolish. The Secretary said we could not make an advance commitment without Congressional action. He added that it appeared to him as if Rhee at the last minute was trying to run out on his commitment to us.

The President said we should say in reply that we were astonished at the questions he brought up in view of a number of developments and quote his letter. This is what we can do and beyond that we cannot constitutionally go.

The President said that he was planning to go to Quantico to the Defense gathering,[3] but that if something demanded his presence here, he would cancel that. He said that before he left for Quantico, he would telephone the Secretary to see what the situation was.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted in the Office of the Secretary of State.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] President Eisenhower addressed a session of high-ranking military and civilian Defense officials during a July 23-26 conference at the U.S. Marine Corps base at Quantico, Virginia.

795.00/7-2453

The Secretary of State to the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 24, 1953.

MY DEAR PRESIDENT RHEE: I have your message of July 24.[2] I have read it to President Eisenhower. We are both surprised at your statement that "before deciding on the position of my government it is of utmost importance to have your answers to two vital questions which at present remain in an uncertain status." Our surprise is twofold. We thought you had decided and we thought you had the answers.

First, in your letters of July 11, 1953, to President Eisenhower and to me,[3] you gave explicit assurances with reference to the position of your Government. Thus, in your letter to President Eisenhower you said "as you know, I have decided not to obstruct in any manner the implementation of the terms, in deference to your request." In your letter to me, you said with reference to the truce "I have granted almost every request that has been made upon me. My only qualification is that if the means which you have chosen do not prove to be successful, we must be allowed the final right to do what we can to retrieve our nation from the situation that will exist when the Communists refuse to grant in peace what the allies have refrained from accomplishing in war. The truce will now be signed. We shall abide by our agreement to give the United Nations yet another chance to try out in our nation its prescribed method of political negotiation."

The "only qualification" to which you referred is recognized. Thus, we believed, and were surely entitled to believe, that the attitude of your government toward a truce was already decided.

Second, the position of our Government on your questions was set forth in Assistant Secretary Robertson's *aide-mémoire* of July 2, 1953.[4] Upon his return to Washington, he discussed both questions with President Eisenhower, myself and Congressional Committees, and you were advised under date of July 21, when I communicated with you through our Embassy and when Mr. Robertson through the same channels wrote you personally.[5]

If in violation of the armistice the Republic of Korea is subjected to unprovoked attack you may of course count upon our immediate and automatic military reaction. Such an attack would not only be an attack upon the Republic of Korea but an attack upon the United Nations Command and U.S. forces within that Command.

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[1] This letter was transmitted to Seoul in telegram 62 for immediate delivery to Rhee, repeated to Pusan as telegram 71 and to Tokyo for Clark as telegram 238. It was originally drafted by Young, but then revised and cleared by Dulles. Briggs was instructed at his discretion to inform Rhee that the letter had been read and approved by Eisenhower.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1428.

[3] *Ante*, pp. 1368 and 1370, respectively.

[4] Transmitted in telegram 021750Z, July 3, p. 1312.

[5] The references were to a letter from Dulles and Robertson transmitted in telegram 50 to Seoul, p. 1407, and Robertson's letter to Rhee, July 21, p. 1411.

So far as concerns a military security pact, as Mr. Robertson explained to you at Seoul and as was confirmed in the two July 21 communications above referred to, the pact in order to secure ratification would in our opinion have to adhere rather closely to the draft which was submitted to you on July 4[6] and which as you were then advised had been discussed with Congressional leaders. This provides that our action must be in accordance with our constitutional processes. Of course, the President would within his executive powers act instantly to aid a friendly nation with whom we had a security pact which was the victim of unprovoked aggression. But under our Constitution only Congress can declare war. We believe that your country can feel confident that the treaty we propose will deter aggression.

With reference to your inquiry regarding moral and material support of your possible military effort which might follow a collapse of the political conference, this is not a matter where the President can give any blanket commitment in advance. As pointed out in Mr. Robertson's letter of July 21 the President does not wish to curtail the liberty of action to take whatever steps may be indicated by the conditions then existing. But as Mr. Robertson also said in his letter to you the U.S. commitment to withdraw from the political conference under the circumstances set forth in Mr. Robertson's *aide-mémoire* of July 2 still stands.

I promised you that, upon the signing of the armistice I would promptly come and talk with you to settle a common policy in relation to the political conference. I eagerly look forward to seeing you again and I have every confidence that we shall be able to arrive at an agreed program which will embody every honorable means of accomplishing the unification of your country.

I believe that the many assurances of cooperation which have been given you and which go to the limit of our governmental power should be a complete demonstration of the sincerity of our purpose and the strength of our determination. Never in all its history has the U.S. offered to any other country as much as is offered to you.

During recent days many people and many countries have been slandering you and alleging that such promises as you have given the President and me could not be depended upon. We have indignantly rejected these insinuations and have insisted that we had complete confidence that you would adhere to the position which you communicated to us. As I said in a public statement day before yesterday these are times when we must have confidence in our friends and when our friends can have confidence in us. My final plea is that you should share this sentiment. You did not find us lacking in the past and you can I believe trust us for the future.

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[6] Not printed.

From your good friend, FOSTER DULLES

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
EMERGENCY

TOKYO, July 25, 1953—1:35 a. m.

CX 63963. Refs: A. CX 62932.[1] B. C 63854.[2] C. DA 91688.[3] D. CX 63926.[4]

1. Harrison reports that all outstanding matters have been settled with the exception of the signing procedures.[5] During the Liaison Officers meetings yesterday and today concerned with the signing procedures, the Communists have proposed as counter proposals to our method contained in ref A three different methods of accomplishing this signing. Each of these Commie proposals is listed below as a course of action:

a. Course A—The essential elements of this course are:

(1) After all versions of the armistice agreement are ready, they are delivered to Supreme Commanders of both sides to be signed at their respective headquarters.

(2) The signed documents are sent to Panmunjom where the senior delegates of both sides preside over the signing and countersign the documents.

(3) This completes all procedures for signing the armistice agreement.

b. Course B—The essential elements of this course are:

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[1] This telegram, June 9, 1953, contained the UNC outline plan for operation FINALE, arrangements for signing the armistice which envisioned signature by the supreme commanders of each side at Panmunjom. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

[2] According to a summary of this telegram prepared by Scott for the Secretary and Under Secretary of State on July 21, Clark reported that the Communists had proposed course A (see paragraph 1, herein) on July 20 on the grounds that since Rhee had violated the POW agreement, the presence of the supreme commanders at the signing ceremonies was unsuitable. In Clark's mind, the Communist argument was weak, the legality of the armistice should not be diminished, and its importance was such that the supreme commanders should sign it together at Panmunjom. Therefore, he instructed Harrison to reject the proposal. (795.00/7–2153)

[3] In this telegram, dated Jan. 10, 1952, G–3 forwarded guidance, premature as it turned out, for concluding the armistice. (FE files, lot 55 D 128)

[4] In this telegram, June 23, 1953, Clark expressed concern, *inter alia*, about possible second thoughts by the Indians on their role in the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, but stated that he would go ahead with the signing unless informed otherwise. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

[5] The staff officers of both sides were able to settle three of the four outstanding details concerning the armistice. In the early morning of June 23, both sides agreed to a line of demarcation and the demilitarized zone. Two days later the two sides agreed upon a procedure for each side to turn over its nonrepatriate prisoners to the Repatriation Commission in its own half of the demilitarized zone. The functioning of the Military Armistice Commission was left to the Commission itself. In its first meeting, the day after the armistice was signed, the Commission would begin to determine its own method of operation. (Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 484–487)

(1) The commanders of both sides authorize their senior delegates to hold the signing ceremony first.

(2) The documents will then be delivered to the commanders of both sides for their signatures at their respective headquarters.

(3) The armistice will become effective 12 hours after the signing of the agreements by the senior delegates at Panmunjom.

c. Course C—The essential elements of this course are:

(1) To have the signing performed at Panmunjom with the commanders present under the following restrictions:

(*a*) That no ROK representatives be present.

(*b*) No press witness the signing other than 10 official photographers from each side, although press could be in the immediate area outside the building.

(*c*) 100 official observers from each side.

(*d*) Not to exceed 350 people from each side in the conference site area. This total would include press.

(2) Although there is no expressed agreement to this effect, in the record of today's Liaison Officers meeting the implication is clear that the Communist commanders will be present if the above listed conditions are met and Murray (Senior Liaison Officer) and Harrison accept it as a fact.

2. My comments on course A follow:

I commented on this procedure in para 3 of ref B. Course A, when compared with the other two, would delay the cease-fire 24 hours to 48 hours (time required to move documents back and forth on UNC side; time required for Communists not known), resulting in inexcusable casualties and additional time for Rhee to attempt to obstruct the armistice. When compared with course C, however, it has the distinct advantage of allowing the press to observe, witness and report the signing of the necessary documents. In addition, it permits the press, subject to final concurrence by the Communists (and I do not consider objection likely) to observe the countersigning of the documents at Panmunjom. As the press interest in the signing is tremendous, the press reaction to the course of action would be highly favorable.

3. My comments on course B follow:

a. Advantages:

(1) Could be effected in consonance with instructions contained in para 1*c* and *d* of ref C.

(2) Would permit signing of armistice with an absolute minimum of delay, thereby preventing needless UNC casualties and elimination public criticism that would arise out of casualties suffered during longer period required by course A.

(3) Would reduce the possibility of Communist propaganda implying that the UN commander was forced to journey to Korea to ask the Commies for a cease-fire, with resulting loss of prestige for the UNC and the United Nations throughout the world and particularly in Asia.

(4) Though this has not been determined the Communists would probably offer no objection to complete coverage of original signing of documents by senior delegates at Panmunjom. The press interest might be sustained and the world wide interest continued by the additional press coverage of the CINC, UNC, actually signing the documents in Tokyo, thus making them official and binding. However, this latter signing will be somewhat an anticlimax as it will occur after the signing on which the cease-fire is based and may not evoke much press interest.

b. The disadvantages of this course of action are somewhat similar to those listed under course A and include:

(1) Reasons given by the Communists are extremely weak and insufficient to escape the moral obligations of the commanders to sign in person.

(2) Denies the UNC and the world the opportunity to witness Communist commanders signatures to this vital document thus leaving in doubt the legality of the signatures of these commanders.

(3) It is an indication that they still have mental reservations concerning the definite assurances given them.

(4) The document to be signed is of such importance that it warrants simultaneous signing by the commanders themselves.

(5) The absence of the senior commanders would preclude attendance by Senior Military Representatives of national components of the UNC, since the latter would prefer not to participate in a signing ceremony where the Communist participants were junior to them.

4. My comments on course C follow:

a. Before considering this course, it was necessary that I first determine whether Pres Rhee desired to have a ROK observer present to witness the signing. Failure to give Rhee an opportunity to express his desires in this matter would provide him with an opportunity to castigate the UNC with charges of non-confidence and non-cooperation which would be difficult to refute and which would find considerable acceptance in the United States and elsewhere.

b. Therefore, in order to determine Rhee's desires, I had Taylor contact him in Seoul this evening. Taylor informed me that, after considerable delay, Rhee declined the invitation to send a representative to the signing ceremony, alleging that he had not received from Washington answers and assurances which he considers satisfactory. A major obstacle to course C was thus removed as Harrison reported that the Communists were adamant in their demand that no ROK representatives be present.

c. Course C is generally in accordance with the principles advocated by the UNC and has the following advantages:

(1) It would indicate complete sanction and whole hearted support by the opposing commanders who must assume the moral responsibility for carrying out the terms of the armistice.

(2) Would result in no delay in the signing and effective date of the armistice, thereby preventing casualties which could give rise to public

criticism. This has the added advantage of shortening the time during which Rhee could implement many of the obstructive tactics of which he is capable prior to the signing of an armistice, and which we hope will be largely dissipated once an armistice is presented to him as a "*fait accompli.*"

d. Course C has the following disadvantages:

(1) The absence of ROK representatives at Communist insistence will enable Communists further to exploit in their propaganda the differences they allege exist between UNC and ROKG and accentuate the actual existing differences.

(2) It will place UNC in the disadvantageous position of having once again accepted Communists conditions in order to achieve an early armistice.

(3) It will lay us open to strong protest and criticism from entire press corps. This course of action will provide no press coverage whatever except such pictures as photographers may shoot of official participants entering and leaving conference hall, and short statements they could extract from participants outside the conference hall and a few color stories. Press has anticipated this as biggest story of war and has assigned additional personnel and equipment. Press corps has been informed, although with qualification that all plans are subject to modification depending upon agreement between the two sides, of extensive arrangements made for press coverage, including special military communications facilities. An attempt will be made to justify this course of action with the press by emphasizing that: First, the Commies have insisted upon it as a condition to an immediate signing; second, that by accepting this condition and signing immediately, rather than insisting upon course A, above, which would entail a delay of at least two days while fighting continues, lives undoubtedly will be saved and that certainly the UNC press would concur in any course of action which would save UNC lives. It is highly doubtful, however, whether above explanation will satisfy the press corps.

5. In the absence of information to the contrary, I assume that Rhee has received all the assurances that my government intends to give him. I also assume that there is no reason to delay signing the armistice for the reasons discussed in para 6 of ref D, your comments on which have not as yet been received.

6. In summary:

a. It seems to me, and Harrison concurs, that the best procedure to follow is course C. It is the course nearest to the one we have pressed the Communists to accept. It permits consummation of an armistice at the earliest possible date. It is the logical and natural course, for it permits the commanders to sit face to face around the table and sign this important document in the presence of the principal US commanders and United Nations military representatives.

b. In view, however, of the highly unfavorable press reaction which may result from course C, I am willing to adopt course B.

7. Would appreciate your comments immediately,[6] for we should resolve this matter with the Communists Saturday morning, 25 July, if we are to meet target signing date of 1400I—26 (Sunday) July which Harrison feels the Communists can meet. However, will delay this meeting until receipt of your reply.

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[6] In telegram JCS 944601, a joint State–Defense message, dated July 24 due to the time difference between Tokyo and Washington, the JCS authorized Clark to agree to a signing procedure along the lines of course C, but with a strong effort to include members of the press as observers. If unable to obtain this modification, Clark should proceed to sign the armistice. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

795.00/7–2753

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, July 25, 1953.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I should like to reply in this one communication both to your message of 21 July [2] and to Mr. Robertson's of 22 July.[3] I know that President Eisenhower and you must be disturbed by the fear that I may not be abiding strictly by the spirit and the letter of the pledge I have given to you not to obstruct an armistice. I want you to understand fully what has been in my mind and why I have found it necessary to make certain public statements about our problems and our situation. I am particularly desirous of insuring your fullest understanding of my position, for the full success of our mutual programs depends upon the maintenance of a high degree of trust.

As you know, the release by the Communists on 19 July of a summary statement of what had been agreed upon between them and General Harrison concerned me because in some important respects it contradicted understandings I had reached with Mr. Robertson. My concern, of course, was not deep, for it did not occur to me there could be any question of the validity of the agreements Mr. Robertson and I had attained. Still, on two or three important matters, Mr. Robertson had said further consideration would have to take place in Washington; whereas, the Communist summary of agreements made with them was precise and definite. The most natural course, in our view, was for our government to make direct inquiry of yours on this matter; consequently, Prime Minister Paik and Foreign Minister Pyun asked Ambassador Briggs to ascertain the status of the matters upon which the Communist summary had cast doubt.

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[1] Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 93 from Seoul, July 27, 1953. In reference telegram 91 from Seoul, July 27, 1953, Briggs suggested that a copy of this and Rhee's other letters of July 24–27 be made available to Clark. (795.00/7–2753)

[2] Transmitted in telegram 50 to Seoul, July 21, p. 1407.

[3] The reference was to Robertson's letter of July 21 to Rhee, received by Rhee at midnight, July 22; for text, see p. 1411.

When your reply of 21 July was brought to me, I confess I was worried by the first paragraph. When you wrote that General Harrison "did not undertake to make political commitments binding governments," I puzzled over the language for a long time but I could not imagine how the commitments he was alleged by the Communists to have made, and which your letter did not repudiate, could fail to be binding. Your further assurance that whatever he might agree to could not bind the United States "for an indefinite period of time" again does not seem to solve the problems that confront us, for the agreements generally relate to armistice procedures which in themselves will be completed within a limited time.

Try as I might, and I assure you that I tried very hard because of my earnest intention to fulfill in every iota my commitments made to President Eisenhower and to you, I could not discover any intimation that the statement issued by the Communists was repudiated either in whole or in any part by your government. The only solution I could devise was the issuance of my statement outlining the common points of agreement between your government and mine. I must say that I should certainly not have issued such a statement if I had been able to secure in private an assurance that General Harrison would not be permitted to make promises to the Communists in the name of the United Nations which ran contrary to my understandings with you.

As to your generous comments on the economic aid to be extended to us by the United States, we are most humbly and deeply grateful for this great humanitarian spirit of the American government and people. At the same time, I know you concur with my view that this question must be kept separate both governmentally and in the public mind from the political and military policies we are discussing. The chief point I wish to have clarified is that the aid program should be administered through the Combined Economic Board, without having to be handled by all the overlapping, duplicating and in some respects conflicting agencies. Only in this way can we avoid the confusions, delays and ineffectiveness which have marked the economic programs of the past. Our only desire is that the money appropriated should be used for the purpose for which it is intended.

I am rather disturbed by the view you express that the mutual defense pact may have to follow rather closely the draft you have previously submitted, with only the "possibility" that something akin to Article I of the Japanese treaty "may be considered". As you know, a treaty similar to that you have signed with the Philippines will not suffice for us, in our exposed situation, with a large enemy force already on our soil; for what we must fear is another attack as sudden as that of 25 June, 1950, but backed next time by the far greater land force of the Chinese reds and by considerable air power based on the airfields the Communists are to be allowed, under the truce terms, to build. There will be no time for consultation or for Senate debate, for the entire issue could be decided in a matter of hours. Moreover, we are deeply concerned about the eventual re-activation of Japan's imperialistic designs against us, well-knowing that Japan has not abandoned the conviction that its own aggrandizement cannot be accomplished except by conquest of Korean resources and of the Korean avenue to Manchuria. A treaty which does not meet these manifest needs would not be of sufficient force to assure our national survival. All of these are very real considerations which were in my mind when I agreed to postpone our plans to deal as best we might with the aggressors before they have a chance to build airfields and reinforce their armies.

I welcome most cordially the suggestion that you and I may have a meeting at a mutually agreeable location for a talk in the near future in order to coordinate our policies for the political conference and on other matters. I may just as well tell you, however, that, as things stand now, I may find it hard to leave this country. If it can be arranged to your satisfaction, I would be glad to entertain you for this meeting at Seoul.

This letter is an attempt to convey to you both the friendly feelings which I entertain for you and to make clear to you why I am so uneasy about the lack of precision or confirmation of some parts of my agreement with Mr. Robertson. If I should comply strictly with every concession which I have made (and which, as you know, I feel have been so great as to endanger the security both of Korea and of the free world), while on the other hand the concessions made to meet our needs should somehow be interpreted in a way detrimental to our minimum security, I should be subject to very heavy blame both from myself and from my people. I am, accordingly, extremely hopeful of hearing from you with assurances which will eradicate the fears conjured up by the Communist statement of 19 July and by the first and third sections of your letter of 21 July.

With personal good wishes, I am,

Yours sincerely,

SYNGMAN RHEE

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, July 25, 1953—10:35 p. m.

CX 63997. Refs: A. CX 63963.[1] B. CX 63969.[2]

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[1] Dated July 25, p. 1432.

[2] In this telegram, July 25, 1953, Clark informed the JCS that he had no intention of banning ROK and Chinese Nationalist correspondents from the conference site as the Communists demanded. If the Communist side refused to allow the ROK and Nationalist newsmen to be present, Clark would settle for senior delegates signing first at Panmunjom, with the commanders countersigning later. (Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 488)

1. Important developments in today's meeting were:

a. At an early afternoon meeting of the Liaison Offs the Communists stated that Vice Marshal Choe Yong Kum, Deputy Comd of the Supreme Hq of the Korean People's Army (understood to be Min of Def), representing Marshal Kim Il Sung, Comd of the Supreme Hq of the Korean People's Army, would attend the armistice signing ceremony and sign the armistice agreement, together with Gen Peng Teh Huai, Comd of the Chinese People's Vol.

b. The Communists proposed that the signing ceremony be held at 1000 hours, 27 Jul, Korean time.

c. Harrison, in conformity with ref B, pressed for admission of the press, including ROK and Chinese to the signing ceremony. As result, the Communists apparently acceded to allowing press pers other than ROK and Chinese to obsr the signing ceremony.

2. Although the record of the meeting shows that the Communists were at times quite adamant in their insistence that no press would be permitted to obsr the signing if any ROK and Chinese were included, Gen Harrison feels that the Communists are on a time scd and are committed to a signing of the armistice by their comds (Choe for Kim Il Sung), and that at tomorrows meeting there is a possibility that they may accede and permit ROK and Chinese press representatives to be included within the "pooled" group to obsr the signing and be present in the conf site area.

3. In view of the foregoing, Harrison at tomorrows meeting will cont to press for our course C (ref A), with demands for press pers, including ROK and Chinese, to obsr the signing ceremony. I have instr him, however, to resolve the matter tomorrow, going to course B, if nec.

4. Signing procedure is apparently the only unresolved issue.

795.00/7-2753

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, July 26, 1953.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Your letter of July 25 [2] is both reassuring and a little bit disturbing. I am sorry to have given President Eisenhower and you any reason to doubt to any degree the integrity of pledges which I have made to you. As my letter of July 25 [3] indicates, I have had some uneasiness lest the conditions upon which my pledges were founded were somehow being undermined. Had it been possible to secure an early and clear reassurance that General Harrison was not empowered to enter into any agreements with Communists which would negate or circumvent our mutual understandings, there would have been no necessity for my message of July 24.[4] I trust you will convey to President Eisenhower the sense of my letter of July 25, so that he, as well as you, may know that I am a man of my word, and that my only effort has been to regain ground which unrepudiated official reports indicated had been lost.

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[1] This letter was transmitted to Washington in telegram 94 from Seoul, July 27, 1953.

[2] Printed under date of July 24, p. 1430.

[3] *Ante*, p. 1436.

Your assurance that "if, in violation of armistice, ROK is subjected to unprovoked attack, you may of course count upon our immediate and automatic military reaction" meets question I have raised about this aspect of mutual defense treaty. I trust that this same principle may be extended to include contingency of an attack upon Korea by Japan or another external power.

The question of whether your armed forces will join with ours, or of whether moral and material support will be extended to us for our own undertaking to re-unify our nation, in the event of failure of political conference, is, I understand, left for consideration in my talks with you, and also in the consultations between our two governments at conclusion of 90 days after political conference convenes. I am heartily in accord with your expressed confidence that we shall be able to arrive at a mutually agreeable program for achieving our common objective of liberation and reunification of Korea.

I am humbly grateful for splendid spirit of accord and mutual cooperation which have marked our recent negotiations. I cannot express adequately how deeply all Koreans feel the complete accuracy of assurance that "never in all its history has US offered to any other country as much as it has offered to you". I think no one knows better than you that we have tried our best to fulfill our own obligations of our close alliance to very utmost of our abilities. As you know, the great and unfortunate drawback to our mutuality of relations in past has been fact that my government was never consulted concerning decisions made regarding our status and our future. No matter how excellent may be motivation, when one power or a group of powers simply tell another nation what is to be done to it, or what it must do, the results can lead only to impairment of confidence. President Eisenhower and you have notably eliminated this grave disability through the new emphasis you have given to full mutuality of consideration of our common problems. This forward-looking development in international relations will forever redound to the credit of US, in Korea and around the world.

I am sadly aware that my motives and my position have been given the worst possible interpretation by some governments and in some press accounts. President Eisenhower and you have done much to counteract these harmful reactions and have never to the slightest degree permitted yourselves to be affected by them. Your expression of confidence is appreciated, and your request for confidence is worthy of our utmost concurrence. In this fine spirit we may together look forward confidently to greatly improved circumstances in all problems of our common concern in the Pacific area.

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[4] The reference was to Rhee's letter to Dulles, July 24, p. 1428.

With warm assurances of my friendship, I am, sincerely yours,

SYNGMAN RHEE

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET FLASH TOKYO, July 26, 1953—3:19 p. m.

C 64007. 1. The Armistice Delegation, represented by the liaison officers, completed agreement on the Armistice at 1405I hours today. The Armistice will be signed by the senior delegates acting for their respective commanders at Panmunjom at 1000I hours on 27 July 53.[1] I will sign immediately thereafter at my advance headquarters at Munsan-Ni. Ceasefire and effective date will be simultaneous at 2200I hours on 27 July 53.

2. In accordance with agreement reached with Communists, there will be a simultaneous press release issued here and at Munsan-Ni at 1600I hours today. Imperative that no information on this matter be given to press prior to that time.

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[1] According to telegram CX 64028, Clark to JCS, July 27, 1953, at the morning meeting of liaison officers on July 26, the Communists refused to agree to signing at Panmunjom by supreme commanders on the grounds that the UNC had refused to exclude Chinese Nationalist and ROK correspondents. The UNC maintained that these press observers would constitute no threat to the security of the Communist commanders, but agreed to the Communist side's proposal for initial signing by senior delegates at Panmunjom with the supreme commanders signing later at their own headquarters. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413) There was still a final problem, Clark's insistence that the UNC senior delegate should not sign the armistice in a building adorned with two copies of Picasso's "Dove". For the resolution of this issue, see Clark's *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pp. 294–295.

795.00/7-2653: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 26, 1953—5:08 p. m.
PRIORITY

70. Personal Briggs from Secretary. Assuming armistice signed, please promptly communicate with Rhee re possible conference with me to precede special meeting of UN Assembly which will probably be

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Dulles.

held around mid-August. Suggest week of August 3. Have heretofore suggested meeting some intermediate place such as Guam in order to avoid Japan. But if President Rhee finds this difficult would come to Korea. Would probably invite two Senators, one Republican and one Democrat to accompany me to conclude negotiation of security pact, if Rhee desires to handle this concurrently with discussions about political conference. However, my stay would have to be limited to three or four days in order to get back in time to reflect our conclusions in UN Assembly.

DULLES

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
EMERGENCY

MUNSAN-NI, July 27, 1953—10:35 a. m.

GX 7452. Following amplifies my Flash message: [1]

1. Yesterday when I received word that agreement had been reached, I directed Taylor to notify Rhee of this fact in advance & that the armistice would be signed today. I asked for an appointment for early this morning, since Briggs also had one or two matters to discuss. We went together with Taylor.

2. Pyun and Prime Minister Paik were present. The meeting was extremely satisfactory, and there was a pleasant atmosphere throughout. Rhee congratulated me on having finally obtained an armistice.

3. During the conference I raised the following points with Rhee:

a. I explained reason why the commanders did not meet at Panmunjom to sign the armistice was because we would not be a party to Communists demands made upon us restricting Koreans, including the Korean press, from the conference site and signing area. I told Rhee my government would not be a party to such an unreasonable demand. He seemed to appreciate this.

b. He was told that I would sign at 1300 hours at Munsan-ni where my senior commanders and representative of UN countries having forces in Korea would be present; that the UN flag, the US flag, and the Korean flag would be displayed. I again extended an invitation for him to provide a military observer of General Officer rank. He is to advise me without delay if he accepts.

c. I again impressed upon the President the necessity of his personally appealing to the Korean non-repatriates to have patience and confidence in the UNC pledge that no forced repatriation or duress or intimidation would be used against them. I told him speed was important in getting this message to these prisoners. He told me he would do so, but first he had to get a message to the Korean people immediately following the signing of the armistice telling them the course of action his government would take. He added he will tell them that "we will cooperate with the armistice". He said immediately following his message to the people he would prepare a message to be read to the Korean non-repatriate POWs.

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[1] Presumably telegram C 64007, Clark to JCS, July 26, p. 1441.

d. Rhee was told that I had received instructions from the President of the US indicating his desire that at this time approximately 10,000 tons of food be made available to the civilian population. I told him this information was classified at the present moment for we had not yet worked out exactly what types of food would be made available. I told him I had recommended C-Rations because they were available and there would be no loss from spoilage and that as soon as I receive approval on this item from Washington, I would commence implementation through KCAC in cooperation with the ROK Government. He was told that this information was being given to him now so that he would know of it before any release might come out of Washington or from me. He said he would be glad to have his people receive this food.

e. For some time Rhee has indicated his desire that some temporary shelter be provided for the National Assembly in Seoul when the government officially moves north. I have always indicated that at the proper time I would do what I could. He raised the question again with Taylor a couple of days ago. At that time a message was sent to Rhee to the effect that if he would let me know his requirements we would do our best to be of assistance. Today I told him again to give his requirements to my representative and we would do everything in our power to assist him.

f. There are some salvaged trucks which were being publicly auctioned which the Prime Minister asked me recently to turn over to the ROK Government. I stopped the auction, told them I was looking into it, and today informed Rhee I would take necessary steps to have these turned over to the ROK Government.

4. Rhee expressed great interest in the 200 million dollars which our government is arranging to be furnished ROK in the near future. Briggs will comment on that. Rhee also expressed an interest in the coordinated direction of all economic rehabilitation for Korea in the future; he is particularly hopeful that UNKRA and extraneous units would be coordinated through our representative and his on the CEB. I told him it was my desire and the desire of my government that such coordination be effected.

Editorial Note

At 10:12 a.m. Korean time on July 27, Generals Harrison and Nam Il finished signing the armistice documents at a building especially constructed at Panmunjom for the ceremony. They did not exchange words. Later that afternoon at Munsan-ni, General Clark, with his top military advisers and a representative of the Republic of Korea Army in attendance, countersigned the document. For 12 hours after the signature at Panmunjom, artillery and mortar fire continued at the front, United Nations Command planes attacked North Korean targets, and the United States Navy continued its offshore shelling of the North Korean coast. Then, at 10 p.m. the fighting stopped and the armistice began. For accounts of the signing ceremonies and other events on that last day, see Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pages 489–491, and Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pages 295–296. Because of the time difference between Korea and Washington, President Eisenhower delivered a television and radio address to the nation at 10 p.m. on July 26, announcing the signature of the armistice. For a text of that statement and a similar one by Secretary Dulles, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 3, 1953, pages 131–132. Also included in that Department of State *Bulletin* is a text of the Armistice Agreement and the Supplementary Agreement on Prisoners of War, pages 132–140.

795.00/7–2753

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to President Eisenhower[1]

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, July 27, 1953.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have much for which to be grateful to you, and much cause to rejoice that in these desperate days our beleaguered nation has found so good a friend. Your great generosity in rushing through this last week of the Congressional session an immediate appropriation of two hundred million dollars to speed our reconstruction is appreciated from the depths of our hearts. Your considerate understanding of my position during these most difficult days has been a heart-warming experience for me. But above all, I want to thank you and to congratulate you for the statesmanlike vision with which you have brought the relationships of your powerful nation and of our weaker one onto a basis of honest mutuality and two-way cooperation. Nothing could do more to reassure the disillusioned peoples of the Far East that there may be dawning a new day when they need no more fear the revival of the old and hated era of Western Colonialism.

With the signing of the truce, one phase of our problem ends and another begins. I am looking forward with hopefulness to my meeting soon with Mr. Dulles. We will have many trials in the future and there is much to be accomplished. You have labored with great patience and great skill to bring about the signing of the truce. I pray with all my soul that your hopes from it may be fulfilled and your statesmanlike objective of the unification of Korea may be obtained in peace. Never in all my life have I hoped so much that my own judgment should prove to be wrong.

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[1] This letter was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 92, from Seoul, July 27, 1953.

With assurances of renewed appreciation and cordial friendship I am

Sincerely yours, SYNGMAN RHEE

795.00/7-2853

President Eisenhower to the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 27, 1953.

DEAR PRESIDENT RHEE: Thank you very much for the cordiality of your letter. Permit me to say also that I have been most deeply appreciative of your agreement not to obstruct the implementation of the armistice in spite of your misgivings as to the final outcome.

In the hope of doing something to facilitate future cooperation between your country and mine and between you and me, our Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, presently plans to leave for Korea within a matter of days. As you know, he enjoys my full confidence and will be able to expound upon my sentiments of admiration and respect for you personally, as well as to outline those directions in which we hope to be of immediate assistance to the government and people of the Korean Republic.

With assurances of my continued friendship and esteem,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

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[1] This letter was drafted by Johnson and cleared by Dulles; it was transmitted to Seoul in telegram 80, July 28, 1953.

VIII. JULY 27, 1953–FEBRUARY 18, 1954: POSTARMISTICE ISSUES

KOREAN RECONSTRUCTION; THE DULLES TRIP TO KOREA AND THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY; PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE KOREAN POLITICAL CONFERENCE—THE DEAN MISSION; THE NIXON VISIT TO KOREA AND RHEE'S PROMISE NOT TO ACT UNILATERALLY; FORMULATION AND CONSIDERATION OF NSC 167 AND 170 SERIES; FAILURE OF THE DEAN NEGOTIATIONS; SOUTH KOREAN-INDIAN FRICTION AND THE RELEASE OF THE REMAINING NON-REPATRIATE POWS; BERLIN CONFERENCE AND THE SHIFT FROM PANMUNJOM TO GENEVA

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 27, 1953.

Subject: Assistance to Korea

As I see it, there will be many ways in which help, during the coming months, can be rendered to the Republic of Korea.

(a). We are committed to a policy of helping to train, equip and organize at least four more divisions, and to give some help in organizing other forms of military units.

(b). The MSA Bill will contain some funds for direct help of that country.

(c). We expect the Congress to authorize the use of some two hundred million dollars out of savings brought about by the cessation of hostilities to help in economic rehabilitation.

(d). With the cessation of fighting, there will be available in Korea certain technical formations of the Army, Navy and the Air Force, whose services as technical advisers, overseers, and in certain cases, actual constructors of needed facilities, would be invaluable. The cost will be little, because in any case we must maintain these troops in that region so long as we must keep fighting divisions there. I speak of the various classes of engineers, single [*signal*] troops, quartermaster troops, motor vehicle experts, medical organization, and so on. In many ways help rendered in this fashion could be almost more valuable than under any other authorization, and certainly will be important enough to indicate at once the vital need for real coordination.

I believe a way to secure coordination would be to put this whole business under the authority of the theatre commander. Because of the special political and psychological conditions existing in Korea, there is added reason not only for doing this through a single office, but of charging the military with this responsibility.

If you think well of this idea, I believe we should promptly have a conference between you, Stassen and Wilson—and any others directly concerned. We could have it in my office, at your convenience.[1]

D.D.E.

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[1] Presumably this meeting took place on July 29; see the memorandum of conversation, by Hemmendinger, p. 1453.

795B.13/7-2953

Memorandum for the Record, by the Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs (Emmons)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 29, 1953.
NO DISTRIBUTION

Subject: Conversation Between Mr. Walter S. Robertson and the Korean Ambassador Concerning the Korean Foreign Minister

In the course of a general conversation between Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and the Korean Ambassador, Dr. Yang You Chan (see memorandum of conversation July 29, 1953, prepared by Mr. Emmons [1]), Mr. Robertson stated that speaking in a personal capacity and off the record, he believed Dr. Yang should have his views concerning the part played by the Korean Foreign Minister, Dr. Pyun Yong Tae, in the recent discussions with President Rhee.

Speaking very frankly, Mr. Robertson told Ambassador Yang that whereas his talks with Rhee were conducted in a friendly and cordial atmosphere, Dr. Pyun constantly sounded a discordant note and at every stage attempted to influence the President adversely with respect to our proposals and to dissuade him from placing faith and reliance upon our offers of assistance. At times Dr. Pyun was openly insulting and at one point even challenged General Clark's good faith to his face. Through his statements to the press and to other Korean officials, Dr. Pyun had done everything possible to sabotage the conference with President Rhee and the Foreign Minister throughout had displayed a strong anti-American bias. He had been truly a thorn in the side of Mr. Robertson's mission during his visit to Korea.

Mr. Robertson recalled the difficulties created by Dr. Pyun's attitude at the Seventh Session of the General Assembly in New York and pointed out the damage which the Foreign Minister had done to ROK relations with other allied and friendly United Nations members. Mr. Robertson was at a loss to understand how the President could afford to permit Dr. Pyun to continue to influence so adversely the foreign relations of the ROK at a time so critical in its history.

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[1] Not printed. (795.00/7-2753)

The Ambassador was clearly uncomfortable during this discussion. He took no exception to what Mr. Robertson had to say, nor did his reaction appear to be one of disagreement. Dr. Yang indicated that there had been a number of occasions when he had attempted to moderate the Foreign Minister's approach, particularly at the General Assembly at New York last fall, but without success. The Ambassador, however, offered no comment as to what might be done to correct the situation.

895B.00/7-2953

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 29, 1953.

Subject: Organizational Arrangements for Economic Assistance to Korea

Discussion

The decision of the National Security Council of July 23 on assistance to Korea directed the Bureau of the Budget in consultation with interested agencies to submit to the President an organizational plan for the effective administration of present and future economic assistance to the Republic of Korea. The Budget Bureau has completed its consultations and forwarded a paper to the President under date of July 28 (Tab A). The paper has been concurred in at staff levels by all interested agencies, but final clearance has not been given.[2]

The proposed organization provides for assignment of primary responsibility for Korean assistance in Washington to the Foreign Operations Administration and in the field to the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Forces. The responsibilities of CINCUNC are to be delegated to an Economic Coordinator, who will be economic adviser to the CINCUNC, and representative of the Foreign Operations Administration with communications with that Administration. An understanding will be reached with the Agent General of the United Nations Korean Reconstructon Agency for the coordination of its activities by the Economic Coordinator. The concurrence of the Agent General in an understanding as set forth in the Budget Bureau's memorandum to the President is virtually assured.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Hemmendinger with the concurrence of UNA, E, and S/MSA.

[2] A signed note by Dulles attached to a copy of the Bureau of the Budget paper indicated that Dulles and the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration signed the paper on July 29 and delivered it to Dodge, who was to obtain the signature of the Secretary of Defense and transmit it to the President. (895B.00/7-2953)

For the President's reaction, see his draft memorandum, July 31, p. 1457.

The paper provides that the assignment of responsibilities to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration is subject to the responsibilities of other departments as set forth in the President's letter to agency heads of June 1, 1953.[3] It does not define the relations of the Economic Coordinator to the United States Ambassador to Korea, because the relations of the CINCUNC to the Ambassador have never been formally defined. It is assumed that as a staff officer of CINCUNC the Economic Coordinator's relations will be the same. So long as Korea is an active theater, it does not appear possible for Executive Order 10338 [4] as amended to be applied.

In a memorandum to you of July 27, 1953 (Tab B) [5] the President set forth certain ideas with respect to economic assistance to Korea, notably for rehabilitation activities in this period by use of our military resources in Korea and the securing of coordination by placing the whole responsibility in the theater commander. The Budget Bureau paper is consistent with these thoughts of the President.

Recommendations

1. That you approve the draft memorandum on the organization of economic assistance to Korea.

2. That you consult with Mr. Wilson, Mr. Stassen and Mr. Dodge with a view to rapid interagency approval of the organizational plan, and reply accordingly to the President's memorandum of July 27.

[Tab A]

Memorandum by the Director, Bureau of the Budget (Dodge) to the President

[WASHINGTON,] July 28, 1953.

Subject: United States organization for economic aid activities in Korea

Concurrently with National Security Council consideration of economic aid for Korea, the Bureau of the Budget has been developing recommendations for the organization for United States and United Nations economic assistance activities in Korea. The attached memorandum prescribing the United States organization for all economic aid in Korea, including the proposed program which would use savings resulting from the truce, was developed by the Bureau with the assistance of the agencies concerned and has the concurrence of those agencies.

The Tasca Mission recommended the continuation of the concept of a Presidential representative for Korean economic affairs, serving under the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command as long as Korea remains a military theater. Although the Economic Coordinator provided for in the attached memorandum would not be a Presidential representative, the other agencies concur with us in the belief that he would have adequate authority, responsibility, and prestige to mold the several assistance activities into an effective program.

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[3] For text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 351–354.

[4] For text, see 17 *Federal Register* 3009.

[5] *Ante*, p. 1446.

The proposed organizational arrangements are designed to give effect to the following conclusions:

1. The present responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations forces for the security of Korea requires that he have overall responsibility for all United Nations and United States activities in that country, including economic programs for relief and rehabilitation.
2. There will remain in Korea United States military units whose services and facilities can be used in Korean reconstruction. Such resources, insofar as they are available, should be utilized for relief and rehabilitation wherever this is feasible and is advantageous in terms of an efficient or economic operation.
3. A clear-cut division of activities should be established to the maximum feasible extent among the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, civilian relief and United States rehabilitation, so that wasteful duplication are avoided and the operations are closely coordinated.
4. In order to achieve integrated planning and execution of all economic activities in Korea, a single individual, under CINCUNC, should be delegated the function of programing for and supervising the implementation of such activities. This officer should be delegated the function of providing assistance to the Republic of Korea on fiscal and economic matters, and should represent the Foreign Operations Administration in Korea.
5. For these purposes he should have staff and authority to utilize employees of FOA and Defense, and such UNKRA personnel as may be provided on a non-reimbursable basis.
6. The Foreign Operations Administration, through the Unified Command, should backstop Korean relief and rehabilitation programs in Washington, and should develop integrated programs for submission to the President through the Bureau of the Budget. This is consistent with the recommendations in the Tasca Report.
7. United States procurement should be handled through the existing channels—agency or otherwise—deemed most favorable. Particular emphasis should be given to developing Korean commercial channels.
8. The United States should support the UNKRA program. It is agreed by the agencies concerned that coordination of United States economic activities and UNKRA activities can be achieved best by United States representatives seeking an understanding with the Agent General of UNKRA that the Unified Command, in consultation with UNKRA, will be responsible for:

    a. Determination of overall requirements and priorities;
    b. Allocation of responsibility for appropriate fields of activity and projects to the various implementing agencies;

c. Determination of policies on pricing and credit and on local currency and its allocation;

d. Negotiations with ROK on broad policy and program matters, and such other matters, as may be agreed, on behalf of UNKRA;

e. Deployment of persons made available by UNKRA to avoid duplication in the planning or operation of assistance programs;

and that the Agent General of UNKRA will accept and implement such determinations and negotiations to the maximum extent consistent with the fulfillment of the UNKRA mission as determined from time to time by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The term "supervision as appropriate" in the attached memorandum is not intended in any way to limit the theater commander's supervision over United States relief and rehabilitation programs. The term is used to encompass the relationship between CINCUNC and the UNKRA program as described above.

It is recommended that you approve the attached memorandum.

[JOSEPH M. DODGE]

[Attachment]

MEMORANDUM ON THE UNITED STATES ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC AID ACTIVITIES IN KOREA

1. In the field the development and supervision as appropriate of an integrated program of economic aid as a basis for Korean relief, rehabilitation, and stabilization is a responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command (CINCUNC) until such date as the Unified Command may determine. During this period, CINCUNC will be responsible for the coordination of military activities with the economic aid operations of the United States Government in Korea, those of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, and donations from voluntary agencies, and he will, in turn, assure the coordination of the foregoing activities with the activities of the Government of the Republic of Korea pursuant to existing or future agreements. (It is understood that during this period a significant portion of the program will be provided through the utilization of services and facilities of United States military units.)

2. An Economic Coordinator will be established on the staff of CINCUNC in Korea, as his senior economic staff member.

3. The Economic Coordinator, who will carry the personal rank of Minister, will be appointed by the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and CINCUNC. The salary of the Economic Coordinator will be paid by the Foreign Operations Administration.

4. In the execution of his responsibility, CINCUNC will look to the Economic Coordinator as his economic adviser, and will delegate to

the Economic Coordinator functions including, but not limited to, the following:

a. Development and supervision as appropriate of integrated programs of relief, rehabilitation, and stabilization, and coordination between military and civilian assistance programs.

b. Representation of CINCUNC on international or joint bodies dealing with Korean economic matters.

c. Representation of CINCUNC in consultations and negotiations with UNKRA and other appropriate UN bodies.

d. Representation of CINCUNC and, as may be agreed, the UNKRA in consultations and negotiations with the Republic of Korea on economic matters.

e. Development of United States proposals for economic stabilization, including those which may be necessary conditions to the provision of expanded United States aid to Korea.

f. Collaboration with the Republic of Korea in the implementation of agreed stabilization measures.

g. Development and negotiation of policies for controlling the use of local currency in all aid programs, including priorities and allocations of such currency for the various projects and operating agencies, and the sale of local currency-generating commodities.

h. Development, jointly with appropriate military staffs, of an agreed allocation plan for the use of available transport facilities.

i. Coordination of the procurement channels and delivery schedules for the various commodities and projects. (It is understood that all procurement, funds allocation and expenditure, project, and contractual methods inherent in appropriations language or procedures of the various United States and international agencies will apply as prescribed.)

j. Development of policies for the payment of all United States and United Nations local employees, and for any non-monetary assistance given them.

5. The Foreign Operations Administration is designated as the agency of principal interest within the Unified Command for Korean rehabilitation and stabilization, and is assigned the development and direction in Washington of Korean rehabilitation and stabilization policy and programs, subject to the responsibilities of other departments and agencies as set forth in the President's letter of June 1, 1953. Consistent with paragraph 6, below, FOA also will operate FOA-financed activities under its current instrumentalities and procedures.

6. The Economic Coordinator will be the representative of the Foreign Operations Administration for projects undertaken by that agency in Korea. He will have: (1) the legal responsibility of assuring performance of operations in accordance with the provisions of the Mutual Security Act; and (2) authority to make administrative determinations normally required by FOA of its field representatives.

7. The Foreign Operations Administration will have communications with the Economic Coordinator, using Unified Command channels, except that CINCUNC may comment on any such message.

8. The responsibilities of the Secretary of State and the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration regarding UNKRA and its assistance program shall be those set forth in sections 2 and 4(c) of Executive Order No. 10458,[6] of June 1, 1953, as amended.

9. The Economic Coordinator, in carrying out his responsibilities, shall have full authority to deploy Foreign Operations Administration and Department of Defense staff, and persons made available by UNKRA, in a manner designed to avoid duplication in the planning or operation of economic assistance programs.

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[6] Code of Federal Regulations, Title 3, 1949–1953, p. 944.

895.00/7-2953

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Economic Affairs (Hemmendinger)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 29, 1953.

Subject: Korean Assistance Problems.

Participants: Secretary John Foster Dulles
Mr. Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Charles Wilson, Secretary of Defense
Mr. Frank Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense
Mr. Harold Stassen, Director of Mutual Security
Mr. Joseph Dodge, Director of the Bureau of the Budget
Mr. Noel Hemmendinger, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

The memorandum on the United States organization for economic aid activities in Korea which was circulated by the Bureau of the Budget under date of July 28, 1953,[1] was considered and approved for submission to the President by Mr. Dodge.

In the course of discussion it was indicated that General Taylor is in command as CINCUNC during General Clark's absence from the theater, but that General Clark was expected to resume his command in Tokyo. Mr. Robertson suggested that it was highly desirable that the activities of the United States of a civil character with respect to Korea be centralized in Korea, because the Koreans are extremely touchy with respect to domination from Japan. It was also pointed out that General Taylor is particularly well qualified to deal with President Rhee. Accordingly, the possibility of a delegation of responsibility for economic assistance matters from CINCUNC in Tokyo to General

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[1] For text, see Tab A, *supra.*

Taylor was discussed. It was pointed out in this connection that the greatest possible simplicity of channels was desirable and it was agreed that Mr. Wilson would discuss the organization with General Clark upon his arrival with a view to possible delegation of responsibility to General Taylor perhaps with a direct channel of communications on matters of a civil affairs character to this Government in Washington.

The Secretary indicated that it probably would not be useful for him to take up matters relating to economic assistance in his forthcoming meeting with Rhee but that he should be prepared to reply to matters on economic assistance which President Rhee might raise. It was agreed that the Secretary should tell him that the President's message to the Congress represented approval in principle of the Tasca report and that this Government intended to proceed with all speed in its implementation. The Secretary pointed out that the situation between this Government and the Republic of Korea was going to be quite difficult over the months to come and that President Rhee continued to hold good cards in his relations with us by reason of his power to disrupt the armistice. He emphasized that we must do everything we can both of a military character and of an economic character to gain and hold control of as many aspects of the situation as possible. On the economic side this meant control over the disbursement of funds and over any stockpiles of supplies in Korea. Mr. Dodge called attention to the necessity of reaching a firm understanding with the Republic of Korea with respect to the internal measures which must be taken for a program to succeed.

It was agreed that it is essential that a representative of the United States go soon to Korea as Economic Coordinator, but not in connection with the Secretary's forthcoming meeting with President Rhee. Mr. Stassen said that it was not possible for Tasca to go back for family reasons and that he was considering sending Tyler Wood out as Economic Coordinator. Mr. Robertson pointed out that Tasca had developed a unique knowledge of the problems and a unique relationship with the Koreans, and that it would be desirable to send him out at the outset if only for a few weeks. It was agreed that the possibility of sending both, Tasca to stay only a few weeks, should be explored.

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

[Extracts]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 31, 1953—11 a. m.

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[1] A note on the title page read: "Draft. Not cleared with any of participants."

Of the JCS, General Bradley and Admiral Fechteler as well as Vice Chief General

Korean Negotiations

Mr. Robertson: In general I think the important thing is that we have neither retreated from nor added to the position with respect to Korea which we presented to President Rhee in our *Aide-Mémoire* of July 2.[2] There was, to be sure, in addition to that some particular commitments which we undertook with Rhee to [*regarding*] the handling of the POWs. These are the positions which General Clark presented to President Rhee about the handling of the Chinese as well as the Korean POWs. On POW questions I meticulously avoided getting mixed up in them since I did not want to infringe on General Clark's authority as United Nations Commander. So that on these questions Clark personally handled them with Rhee. In general it is only fair to point out that the Koreans are completely distrustful of the armistice and that they are distrustful as to the ultimate fate of the POWs under the present armistice terms. In view of the statements that have been in the Press, I think we should make it clear that we have made absolutely no commitments to or held out any inducements to the Koreans beyond those which are in the documents which you gentlemen have already seen. Rhee continually pressed us to say that we would renew fighting if the political conference failed or that we would give the South Koreans moral and military support. I repeatedly explained to Rhee that even if President Eisenhower desired to he could not bind the U.S. to reopen hostilities. This would require action by the Congress. I also repeatedly told Rhee that we would have to preserve complete liberty of action as to what we did if the political conference should not succeed. President Rhee asked me to present his views to President Eisenhower when I came back. I did that. I described Rhee's views to the President, to the Secretary of State and to the Foreign Affairs Committees of the Congress. I then telegraphed Rhee that the positions I had presented to him were those which were supported by all the people I had talked to. Rhee has created considerable confusion by his interviews with the Press, but the fact of the matter is that our position is exactly the same as the one that was presented in the *Aide-Mémoire* of July 2.

General Bradley: Have we talked with Rhee about the question of getting a unified Korea through neutralization?

Mr. Robertson: Senator Knowland made a statement on the Senate floor about the desirability of the neutralization of Korea and President

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Hull attended. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent. Sullivan and Nash represented the Department of Defense, General Cabell the CIA, and Page Smith, Lay, and General Gerhard the NSC. In all, 22 persons were present. In addition to Korea, the Chinese offshore islands and the shooting down of a USAF plane over the sea of Japan by aircraft of the Soviet Union on July 29 were topics of discussion.

[2] Text transmitted in telegram 021750Z, July 3, p. 1312.

Rhee was very much disturbed by it, but I didn't get into the question with him at all.

General Bradley: Will the question come up at the political conference?

Mr. Robertson: Almost anything is apt to come up at the political conference.

Mr. Johnson: The Secretary has been discussing our ideas about the political conference with our Allies. He is going to have a meeting with 16 countries that have provided forces for Korea tomorrow morning. One difficulty is that everybody wants to get into the conference. The Colombians have said they would like to be in, the French said as long as there was any question of Indochina coming up they feel they must be represented. The Philippines told us they want to be represented. The Secretary's feeling is we should try to keep the conference as small as possible and we should try to limit it to the nations that had armed forces in Korea. His feeling is that the important thing is to face the Communists with an alternative which is more distasteful to them than that of a unified, neutralized Korea. Our counters are the strength of U.S. forces in Korea, the strength of ROK forces in Korea, the economic restrictions that we are applying to the Chinese Communists and the fact that they want to get into the United Nations. This doesn't mean that we have any intention of using Communist membership in the U.N. as a trading point. The Secretary has made that clear, but nevertheless their desire to get into the U.N. is a pressure point on our side. Our feeling is that the question of a neutralized Korea might come up in the later stages of this political conference or that perhaps it might not come up at all at this conference but be discussed later through diplomatic channels. In connection with the question of keeping up our bargaining position I have received telegrams from Clark which I haven't gone through carefully which dealt with the possibility of redeployment of U.S. forces from his command to the zone of the interior. Is there any intention now of withdrawing U.S. forces at this time?

General Hull: Clark is just discussing plans to effect a redeployment of forces if and when he is ordered to redeploy them. We have no intention of withdrawing forces at this moment. Our general plans call for no withdrawal of forces until a political settlement has been achieved.

Admiral Fechteler: As a matter of fact the Third Marine Division is just now going out so we are increasing the forces rather than redeploying them.

Mr. Johnson: I just wanted to make sure that that was the case since we are pressing our Allies not to withdraw any of their forces.

General Hull: There might be some readjustment of forces as between Korea and Japan but these would be relatively minor.

Mr. Nash: I might mention in this connection that Secretary Wilson said that yesterday the President in the course of discussing our NATO commitment had said something of the possibility of bringing back one Army division from Korea when the Marines got out there.

Generals Bradley and Hull: That is news to us. The President was the one who was most keen on getting extra strength out to Clark. We have heard nothing about the possibility of bringing any division back.

Mr. Robertson: Our Secretary was asking whose responsibility it was to make protests to the Communists about violations of the armistice. The question came up in connection with the reports that the Communists had violated the armistice by movement of aircraft into Korea.

General Bradley: We have already sent out a query about the aircraft. I should think our protests should be made through the senior member of the Military Armistice Commission.

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Greater Sanction Statement

General Lee: What is the present status of the greater sanction statement?

Mr. Johnson: It has been signed and will be issued. We have had difficulty in holding the U.K. and Canada in line on making the statement by reason of our difficulties with Rhee. We agreed with them that the statement would be included in our report to the U.N. as the Unified Command and it should come out Monday or Tuesday.[3] We agreed to make the statement part of that report and to play down the fanfare that would have accompanied it if we had put it out right after the armistice.

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[3] Aug. 3–4.

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Draft Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense (Wilson), and the Mutual Security Administrator (Stassen)[1]

[Washington,] July 31, 1953.

Subject: Assistance to Korea

Under date of July 26th [*27th*] I wrote a memorandum on the above subject to the Secretary of State.[2] He replied on July 29th[3] to the effect that all of the addressees named above have seen my memorandum and are making the necessary organizational arrangements for carrying forward the assistance work.

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[1] A separate note by Ann Whitman, the President's secretary, indicated that this draft was done in a "great hurry" and was apparently given to Dulles by Eisenhower at a meeting at 3 p. m., July 31.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1446.

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1448.

It strikes me that never before have the armed forces of the United States had a better opportunity to contribute more effectively than they now have in Korea toward helping win the cold war, just as they have done their share in the hot war in Korea. If we can develop the proper understanding of this opportunity, if we can produce the enthusiasm that leadership should be able to develop, we can not only assure the technical coordination among all agencies involved in the problem, but we can accomplish several other things.

(a) We can show the entire world that America and her allies are engaged in helping humans, not merely in asserting and supporting any particular government system or policy.

(b) We can cement the bonds of friendship between the Korean people and the American people.

(c) We can relieve the boredom that always attacks an occupying army after the fighting is over, and give our men in that region such a challenge and constructive work to do that its morale will go up rather than down.

(d) We can improve the health and living standards of the Korean people, and we can assure that that region will remain a real bulwark of freedom, rather than a helpless slave of Communistic dictatorship.

I believe that we should communicate at once with General Taylor (who, I think, should take immediate charge of the work in Korea) and ask his comments on a proposed directive to be issued to him for the initiation of this work. It could run something about as follows:

Dear General Taylor: With the cessation of actual fighting in Korea, it is of the utmost importance that economic rehabilitation of our Korean ally begin at once. Assistance from several sources for such a program is already guaranteed. The Mutual Security Administrator has certain sizeable funds that can and will be devoted to the purpose. In addition to this, the Congress of the United States is authorizing the use of some two hundred million dollars of military funds, savings realized through the cessation of hostilities, to help in the immediate work of rebuilding the Korean economy and in general rehabilitation. Beyond this, the privately sponsored and supported program known as the American-Korean Foundation is working extensively and effectively in numerous programs that will be of the utmost benefit to that nation. Finally, there is the occupying army itself—and of all these, it could, under certain circumstances, be the most effective and the most helpful. Because of this, it is our present conclusion that you personally are best suited and qualified to act as the coordinator for all these programs.

Over and beyond those just mentioned, which are purely American in origin, is the United Nations Fund provided for the same purposes. Without expressing any opinion as to the methods for coordinating the American with the United Nations effort, it seems obvious that the American activities in this regard will be so dominating as to make it logical that the United Nations program will be largely supplementary to that of this country.

I am particularly enthused over the opportunity here presented to the Armed Forces of this country to do something almost unique in all history. It is the opportunity of an army in a foreign land to contribute directly and effectively to the repairing of the damages of war; to rebuild and revivify a nation, and in so doing, to give to itself the satisfaction of constructive and challenging work, dedicated to the preservation and enhancement, rather than to the destruction, of human values.

Every field of human endeavor would invite participation by understanding friends. The restoration of productive facilities of roads, railways, lines of communications, the rebuilding of schools, restoration of hospitals and health and sanitary organizations, the training of teachers, medical staffs and establishing suitable plans for recreation, as well as a countless array of other activities, would bring into play all of the talents present in the great Army, Navy and Air Force that would otherwise become at least partially idle.

I am well aware that you will retain responsibility for maintaining the tactical efficiency of your troops, including the development of certain additional units for the Republic of Korea.

You will be responsible for the safety of your own front and required to do a number of other things in pursuance of your military mission.

But beyond all this, the task so sketchily outlined in this message would provide a memorable opportunity not only to engineers, quartermasters, medical units, motor mechanics and signal units and the like, but to qualified men from all the line branches who could participate as overseers, advisers and workmen, and as teachers in everything ranging from medical school to the most elementary forms of learning.

I am certain that if America once learned that its armies in an enemy occupied country were devoting themselves earnestly and effectively to this kind of work, that the voluntary donations through the American-Korean Foundation would be greatly enhanced and obviously, whatever amount they attain they could be expended largely for the purchase of materials and supplies, and for any highly technical services obtainable only in this country. With the actual work borne by Koreans themselves and our friends of the occupying armies working as partners, an amazing transformation could come about, within the space of months, almost weeks. The effect of this upon the world would, in my opinion, be electrical. News concerning it would gradually penetrate even the vastnesses of the remote regions behind the Iron Curtain. The whole thing would be an inspiration to all of us who are dedicated to the task of defending and advancing freedom, a task to which the Army now under your command has dedicated its efforts and its sacrifices for more than three years.

I should like at the earliest possible moment your comments upon this concept and upon the kind of document that should initiate the work if we attempt to undertake it in this spirit and on this scope. Such a document could take the form of a directive from me as Commander in Chief to you in the field, as the Commander of all this work. Alternately, it could be your directive to your own forces. We here are open to any suggestions along this line, but we do believe that we now have a chance to do something that could easily have influence on every future instance of either hot or cold war.

795.00/8–153

Memorandum of Conversation, by Elizabeth A. Brown of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 1, 1953.

Subject: Special Korean Briefing Meeting, August 1, 1953

Participants:	Australia	Ambassador Sir Percy Spender	
		Mr. Arthur Tange	
	Belgium	Mr. Georges Carlier, Chargé d'Affaires	
	Canada	Ambassador A.D.P. Heeney	
		Mr. Peter Campbell	
	Colombia	Ambassador Zuleta-Angel	
	Ethiopia	Mr. A. Tesemma, Chargé d'Affaires	
	France	Mr. Daridan, Minister	
		Mr. Pelletier	
	Great Britain	Ambassador Sir Roger Makins	
		Mr. Scott	
	Greece	Mr. Phedon Cavalierato, Counselor	
	Netherlands	Dr. J.G. deBeus, Minister	
	New Zealand	Ambassador Leslie K. Munro	
		Mr. Hunter Wade	
	Philippines	Dr. M.J. Gamboa, Chargé d'Affaires	
	Thailand	Ambassador Pote Sarasin	
	Turkey	Ambassador Feridun Erkin	
		Mr. Benler	
	South Africa	Mr. B.J. Jarvie, Chargé d'Affaires	
		Mr. Botha	
	United States	Mr. Murphy, UNA	Mr. Dulles, S
		Mr. Sandifer, UNA	Mr. O'Connor, S
		Mr. Henkin, UNP	
		Miss Brown, UNP	
		Mr. Johnson, FE	
		Mr. Lodge, USUN	
		Mr. Wadsworth, USUN	
		Mr. Allen, EUR	
		Mr. Arthur Dean, lawyer	
		Mr. White, SA–M	

The Secretary said that he had thought it might be useful to have a meeting of the participating countries before he departed for Korea. He explained that he had hoped to take with him several Senators, but in view of the delayed adjournment of the Congress, they could not have left this weekend, and he did not feel he could postpone his trip appreciably, particularly because of the importance of his returning a few days before the United Nations General Assembly reconvened on August 17.

Mr. Dulles stated that he assumed the character of the Korean problems that would concern the respective governments in future would be more political than military and more related to the United Nations as a political body than had been the case heretofore. The United States considered that political negotiations should now be centered with the respective UN missions in New York rather than through the Embassies in Washington. He asked for the views of those present on this point, emphasizing that he did not intend to exclude meetings in Washington on the development and implementation of the Korean armistice or on other questions arising in connection with the armistice, such as alleged violations. He did believe, however, that negotiations relating to the role of the General Assembly and to the calling of the political conference should be centralized in New York.

Ambassador Spender (Australia) said that, on the assumption the briefing group would continue to meet on armistice problems, he felt that it was wise insofar as other problems primarily concerned the United Nations, they be discussed in New York. Ambassador Makins (United Kingdom) expressed his full agreement, and the representatives of New Zealand, Canada, France and Turkey also concurred in this procedure.

The Secretary said that he recognized that some of those present might wish to consult their governments further on this point. The United States was disposed to move consultations to New York where Ambassador Lodge would represent this Government. Mr. Dulles noted that Ambassador Lodge would accompany him on his trip to Korea, and he thought that there would be a real advantage in Mr. Lodge's having participated in the discussions in Korea in preparation for negotiations in New York.

Mr. Dulles said that he knew there were questions in the minds of many of the participating governments as to the purpose of his trip to Korea and what he planned to do there. In order to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding, he wished to recapitulate the situation for the group as he saw it.

As all those present knew, the conclusion of the Korean armistice had been an extremely difficult operation; in fact, he regarded it as one of the most difficult which he had experienced in more than forty years of contact with international affairs. Negotiations with the Communists and with the ROK had made the situation extremely awkward. The issue had hung precariously in the balance a good many times, and, in his view, it was only by great determination and by outstanding skill on the part of our negotiators that an armistice had been achieved. In the course of these negotiations, we had been obliged to make certain promises and assurances which we had not particularly liked to make, but we had made them because of the general feeling, which he felt sure all those present shared, that we should be prepared to make considerable sacrifices if necessary to obtain an armistice. The United States seemed to be in the position where the greatest burden of making such sacrifices had fallen upon it.

The Secretary continued that, in order to get President Rhee's agreement not to obstruct the armistice, the United States had made three basic undertakings.

First, we had promised to give the Republic of Korea a substantial amount of economic aid to promote rehabilitation in South Korea. Already, as the first installment of such aid, the Congress was expected to vote a special appropriation of $200,000,000 in addition to funds already available through the Mutual Security Program. We also hoped to be able to implement in its general features—and Mr. Dulles expressed the hope that other governments would also help—the so-called Tasca Report which called for a three to four year reconstruction program with a total cost of $800–900,000,000 over that period.

Second, we had indicated our willingness to negotiate a security pact with the ROK along the lines of the security treaties which we already had with the Philippines and ANZUS. The Secretary pointed out that the ROK has desired such a pact for several years but said that the United States had not been willing to accede to this desire because of our reluctance to assume such commitments on the Asiatic mainland and also because of the divided position of Korea which made the risk of war an abnormal hazard, as was not the case with the island countries. However, we had set aside our own preferences and agreed to negotiate such a treaty with the ROK. Mr. Dulles said that this would be one of the matters that he would discuss with President Rhee next week. He emphasized that the United States did not have in mind a treaty which would in any way make it impossible to carry out the mandate of the political conference with respect to the unification of Korea.

President Rhee has suggested that the treaty should contain certain provisions with regard to the right of the United States to maintain forces and bases in the ROK along the lines of the first article of our security treaty with Japan. The Secretary commented that, as he had already pointed out at his press conference, the Japanese treaty and any comparable provisions that might be negotiated with the ROK simply gave the United States a right, an option to maintain troops and bases and would not obligate it to do so. Any security treaty we might negotiate would not be an obstacle if the political conference should achieve some agreement with respect to withdrawal of foreign troops in Korea. The treaty would not in any way embarrass the freedom of the political conference to explore all possibilities with reference to the unification of Korea. Mr. Dulles said that he would have much preferred not to negotiate such a treaty, but we had accepted it as one of the prices that we thought we were justified in paying in order to get the armistice.

Third, Mr. Dulles said, it had been agreed that if the ROK did not obstruct the armistice, he would confer personally with President Rhee with respect to the policies and positions that might be followed at the political conference in the hope that we would find that the position of the ROK was one with which we could be in accord and with which the other governments that might participate would also agree. Mr. Dulles emphasized that he had not undertaken to come to any agreement about these matters but simply to explore them together. He assured the group that the United States would not assume any commitments to work with President Rhee in any particular way except subject to the further full exploration of the matter with other governments that might be concerned and discussions in the United Nations. The discussions, the Secretary continued, were designed to allay the great fears that Rhee has had that, if there were an armistice, the United States and other United Nations Members would consult and fix their positions without regard to the ROK. President Rhee felt that his country had made great sacrifices. The ROK was the subject matter of the conference, and it should not be ignored. In the past President Rhee felt there had been a tendency to proceed without consulting the ROK. This point had become an obsession with him so great that this Government felt that it had to make the concession of promising to consult first with the ROK. Mr. Dulles repeated that his talks would be exploratory in character, and that he would not make any commitments with respect to the positions to be taken in the political conference merely as a result of these talks. He would return in a position of flexibility, able to reach decisions that would involve consultations with other governments whose views might be relevant to the political conference.

The Secretary remarked that he hoped everyone would appreciate that these commitments which the United States gave the ROK were not things which we wanted to do but represented a sacrifice on our part to achieve an armistice. He thought the world was gratified that there was an armistice, but he pointed out we could not expect to get an armistice and not pay the price which seemed inevitable. He concluded that he did not think any commitments had been made that were in any way incompatible with our close relations with other governments in the United Nations Command or with our obligations to the United Nations.

Turning to the political conference, the Secretary said that the United States did not have any firm views regarding it. There were a good many perplexing problems to be resolved. Our own feeling was that, if the conference were to succeed, it was probably preferable to limit the participation. A very large conference would be less likely to accomplish results than one with rather limited participation. However, except for this consideration, the Secretary said that as yet we had no specific views respecting the composition of the conference.

The Secretary expressed the hope that the other participating governments would maintain their forces in Korea and said that, as a matter of fact, we hoped that some other Members of the United Nations who had not previously sent any forces might still do so. The importance of maintaining the United Nations front in Korea had by no means ended.

Our military authorities considered that our forces must remain on the alert against the possibility of a resumption of hostilities. We knew that the enemy has in no way relaxed his vigilance and the combat readiness of his forces. As a matter of fact, the latter had probably been increased in violation of the terms of the armistice; he referred to the reports based on radar findings that the Communists had flown a number of planes to Korean airfields. At any rate, there was a very large build-up of enemy strength, and there was always the possibility that, through some provocation, an incident could be created that might be alleged to be a violation of the armistice and used as an excuse to break it. The United Nations forces must remain ready to meet this possibility. Mr. Dulles stated that the United States had taken steps to move additional forces into the Korean area just before the armistice on the basis that it was important to build up rather than subtract from our strength. Mr. Dulles said that of course the United States would also welcome any additional troops, although these could only come in on a rotation basis as provided in the armistice agreement.

The Secretary said that the United States was extremely anxious to start the economic rehabilitation of South Korea in a way that would be impressive not only in Asia but throughout the world as an example of what the free nations can do. In many ways this was the best chance of bringing about the peaceful unification of Korea as it would make Korea an almost irresistible force attracting the North Koreans. We had already seen one demonstration of how this force operates in Berlin and in Germany. The Secretary said that President Eisenhower was extremely interested in this matter. At an hour's meeting yesterday with Secretary Wilson and Mr. Stassen,[1] the President had outlined his views; they constituted a very exciting, imaginative vision of what might be done. The President had commented that the one thing he would like most to do would be to go over to reconstruct Korea. Something could be done there, he believed, that would capture the imagination of the free world, and that would do more than all our other activities to break down the solidarity of the Communist world. The President planned to utilize our armed forces in Korea as economic missionaries building bridges, roads, hospitals, factories, schools, etc. He believed that at this time the soldiers could serve as missionaries in a spectacular demonstration of what the free world stands for. Our military people are being instructed to make such arrangements as quickly as possible.

The Secretary pointed out that the funds available for Korean rehabilitation would include the immediate $200,000,000 appropriation, plus MSA funds already allocated, UNKRA funds and the assistance of private relief organizations. By putting our armed forces into this great peacetime effort, we could do something which might be a great contribution not only to the peaceful unification of Korea but to the free world. He requested the other governments to consider the extent to which they would be willing to have their forces participate in such a program, noting that President Eisenhower believed it was better for our armed forces to have something to do rather than remain idle in circumstances which might lead to problems with the local population.

Ambassador Makins thanked the Secretary for his comprehensive and interesting statement. He said that all those present recognized and appreciated very much the efforts which the United States Government had made in order to obtain an armistice and also the part which the Secretary and his colleagues had played in that effort. He recognized the very difficult and arduous tasks involved in the negotiations and expressed his own appreciation for the results achieved.

Mr. Dulles replied that he knew that all those who had been meeting with us on these problems over the past years appreciated better than outsiders what a really difficult task this has been. There could be no doubt as to the sincere efforts of the United States to bring about an armistice in Korea.

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[1] See footnote 1, *supra*.

Editorial Note

On August 2, 1953, Secretary Dulles, accompanied by Ambassador Lodge, Assistant Secretaries of State Robertson and McCardle, Consultant to the Secretary Arthur Dean, Assistant to the Secretary O'Connor, Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs Young, and Secretary of the Army Stevens plus his party of seven departed Washington National Airport for Seoul. Secretary Dulles had hoped to take along a bipartisan group of Senators, William Knowland and H. Alexander Smith for the Republicans and Lyndon Johnson and Richard Russell for the Democrats, but the Democratic Senators pleaded that the press of legislative business, particularly the President's debt limitation request, prevented their accompanying the Secretary. Senators Knowland and Smith also decided that they could not go to Korea as long as Congress was in session. Information on the disinclination of the Senators to go to Korea can be found in the Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, Korean file, box 54, memoranda of telephone conversations, July 31 and August 1, 1954.

A series of briefing papers dealing with the important aspects of the talks was prepared by officers in the Bureaus of Far Eastern Affairs and United Nations Affairs and is located in FE files, lot 55 D 338, "Korean Political Conference, July 16–31, 1953." Dulles and his party arrived in Seoul on August 4, and, after discussions with President Rhee and Korean officials, left Seoul on August 8 for a short overnight stay in Tokyo. The next day, Dulles and his colleagues departed Japan for the United States.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young)

SECRET [Seoul,] August 5, 1953—10:30 a. m.

Subject: First Meeting Between President Rhee and Secretary Dulles.

Participants: *ROK*
President Syngman Rhee
Prime Minister Paik
Foreign Minister Pyun
Defense Minister Sohn
Minister Kim [1]

United States
Secretary Dulles
Ambassador Lodge, United States Representative to the United Nations
Ambassador Briggs, American Embassy Seoul
Assistant Secretary Robertson, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

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[1] Presumably Kim Bop Rim, Minister of Education, Republic of Korea.

Assistant Secretary McCardle, Public Affairs
Mr. Arthur Dean, Consultant
Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
Mr. Niles Bond, Counselor of Embassy

The Secretary stated that he was very glad to return to Korea and that his coming with his associates was an important new event since it was the first time that the United States had consulted with the Republic of Korea before consulting with other nations involved in important Korean matters. The Secretary also pointed out the significance of the fact that his mission had overflown Japan. President Rhee replied that he and his people would be most grateful for the Secretary's visit to consult with him and his Ministers. As to the Secretary overflying Japan, President Rhee remarked that "The Korean people will love you for it. It will mean a great deal to them."

The Secretary conveyed to President Rhee the best regards of President Eisenhower, and stated that the President not only had great regard but also affection and admiration for President Rhee and the Korean people. President Rhee thanked the Secretary and asked him to convey to President Eisenhower his great respect for him. President Rhee then discussed his desire for all people in Asia to know that the United States stands for the liberty and freedom for all countries in Asia, including the smallest. He said that 100 years of Western imperialism and communist propaganda against the West had done much to hurt the standing of white man in Asia. However, the United States was not seeking territory or special concessions. He felt that it was necessary for him and Korea to correct the false impression of America which the communists were spreading through Asia. He hoped to set up a powerful radio transmitter to spread this message in Chinese, Russian, Japanese and other languages.

The Secretary asked President Rhee how he wished to proceed with their talks and whether he had any suggestions to make on the listed topics which had been sent up this morning by Ambassador Briggs.[2] President Rhee replied that he had no set ideas as to procedure. He thought the suggested agenda was well conceived and he had nothing to add. He thought it would be advisable to try to complete the list before the Secretary left Seoul.

The Secretary stated that he wished to concert our ideas with President Rhee's in order to have the foundation of our joint ideas for discussion with other interested governments. We cannot disregard their ideas about the political conference, nor world opinion. For this reason, it was not correct to think that the United States and the Republic of Korea had the final say about this conference.

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[2] In telegram Dulte 7 from Seoul, Aug. 5, 1953, not printed, this agenda was transmitted to the Department of State; it was divided into four topics: "Political Conference", "Unification of Korea", "US-ROK Security Treaty", and "Economic Rehabilitation of Korea" which were further broken down into subtopics. (795.00/8-553)

Political Conference

After accepting the outline of topics to be discussed, President Rhee and the Secretary then talked about the five points regarding the political conference, as follows.

1. *Date.* The Secretary suggested October 15 as the possible opening date for the conference. He pointed out that that would be approximately 80 days from the date of the armistice and would allow an additional 10 days in case of delays before the expiration of the three-month period. President Rhee said that he thought we should try to get the conference opened earlier than 80 days. He said that the communists would try to delay the conference and therefore we, on our side, should try to advance the date. Ambassador Lodge suggested October 1st, which President Rhee said would be all right. The Secretary told the President that we would aim for October 1st, but that other governments might have different plans which could delay the actual opening of the conference until October 15. President Rhee indicated approval.

2. *Place.* The Secretary inquired of President Rhee as to whether he had any views on the place for the conference to be held. President Rhee replied that he would like to have it in the United States, and suggested Honolulu. The Secretary said that the communists would probably object to Honolulu, any place in the United States, or the Philippines, since the communists would prefer some more neutral location. Ambassador Lodge suggested the possibility of some place in Latin America, such as Rio de Janeiro, which President Rhee said would also be all right. He also suggested Manila or the Danish hospital ship, the *Jutlandia*. He then stated that Ceylon would not be acceptable to him because he wanted to keep British and Indian influence entirely out of the conference. He explained that his strong objection to Ceylon was not because he opposed the government or the people of Ceylon but because he wanted to avoid any British influence at the conference. He also mentioned Singapore as a place unacceptable to him for the same reason. The Secretary remarked that Ceylon was not entirely favorable but that it was also not a bad place to consider. He pointed out that the Ceylonese delegation at the Japanese peace conference had been the strongest Asian anti-communist delegation there. He also said that Ceylon had split with India regarding communism. While Ceylon might not be desirable, the Secretary felt it should not be excluded from consideration. President Rhee then asked if we had considered Bangkok and whether it was "quiet enough there". The Secretary replied that the situation would be pretty precarious in Thailand, par-

ticularly if the communists launched a major offensive during the dry season in Indo-China. In that event, he felt that Bangkok would not be a safe place for such a conference. He informed President Rhee that we had thought of Bandung Java, but had decided that would not be a suitable place, in view of the strong communist influence in the present Indonesian government. President Rhee suggested that we first propose San Francisco, and if that is not acceptable, any place in South America. The Secretary and Ambassador Lodge generally indicated that we could proceed on some such basis. Finally, President Rhee said that his government would not yield on its opposition to holding it in Peiping.

3. *Agenda.* The Secretary suggested that the agenda should be confined to Korean questions. He pointed out that the French might wish to introduce the question of Indo-China, but that would require a new group of participants. If it appeared useful to take up other than Korean questions, then it might be necessary to have a separate conference. But the Secretary said he did not wish to mix the two together. President Rhee implied that since the Korean war had been localized, we should also localize the political problems. He felt that it was only fair to limit the conference to Korean questions.

4. *Participants.* President Rhee's first suggestion was to limit the participants to the United States, the Republic of Korea, Communist China, and North Korea. Then he said that on the United Nations side there might be included the United States, the Republic of Korea, and the other fifteen nations with forces in Korea. But he felt that it would be impossible to include all fifteen, because it would make too large a group. He said that everyone would want to join the conference, including India and possibly Czechoslovakia, which he strongly opposed.[3] The Secretary agreed that we should try to keep the number of participants down to as few as possible. He pointed out, however, that the United States cannot control the number on the communist side, since that is entirely up to them. On our side, the Secretary suggested that the conference be limited to the United States, the Republic of Korea, and some of the fifteen nations with forces in Korea. If the communists invite the Soviet Union, we cannot prevent it.

President Rhee said that the United States should "control" the delegation from the United Nations side just as the Soviet Union controls its side. However, he said that that does not mean that the United States control will be contrary to democratic principles. He felt that there should be a single command at the conference table just as there had been on the battlefield. Since the communists will have absolute control of their three delegates, they will succeed at the conference if there is lack of control on the United Nations side. He felt very strongly that the "democratic side" must speak with a single voice. And he particularly opposed having any "pro-communist or satellite countries" such as India on the United Nations side.

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[3] The following addition was written in at this point in an unidentified handwriting: "He very forcefully expressed his objections to India and strongly criticized Prime Minister Nehru as too sympathetic to Communism."

The Secretary said that he had to disagree with the President on this question of United States control and some of President Rhee's remarks about India. The United States cannot control other sovereign governments because that would be contrary to all our principles as President Rhee had just described them at the beginning of this meeting. He did agree that there should be unity of purpose and as much of a single front on the United Nations side as possible. As to India, the Secretary stated that the government of India was anti-communist and faced a very serious internal threat of communism. The difference between the United States and the Republic of Korea on the one hand and India on the other with regard to communistic imperialism was one of tactics and not objectives. The Indians believe that methods of appeasement rather than strength would weaken the communist world. President Rhee replied that what Nehru says is one thing but what he does is another, and that the Koreans can judge him only by what he does. In the view of President Rhee, the Indians are pro-communist, pro-Russian and anti-American. The Secretary pointed out that there would undoubtedly be strong pressure in the United Nations to include India. He thought that we might try to limit the participants on the United Nations side to those who were fighting in Korea.

Ambassador Lodge suggested that the resolution to be taken up at the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly should only set forth the participants on our side. Any neutrals should be included in another resolution. He also pointed out that the United Nations cannot determine communist participation in the political conference. The Secretary said that President Rhee was absolutely right in wanting to keep the participants small in number and well organized in their handling of the conference because it would be a mistake to speak with too many voices. The nearer to one voice we can reach, the better it will be. He said that there is a tendency in the United Nations to turn to the United States for leadership, which would be in our favor. Ambassador Lodge noted that the United States could not be bound by a caucus or a majority vote within the United Nations delegation.

President Rhee remarked that the United Nations is always weak because it brings in the neutral side and compromises its objectives. He said that we are fighting communism, not democracy. Since we are confronting our enemies, he inquired how could we seek neutral nations to join the United Nations side. That could only be done if we and the enemy agreed to have the neutral countries participate in the discussion. Otherwise, we are only defeating ourselves, he said. He thought we should keep that constantly in mind. The test, in his view, is who is standing "out and out for democracy." That nation will stick to principle. In our sentiments and principles, we have to stick together, he believed. For these reasons, he felt that the selection of participants was very important and requested that any neutrals not be included. Ambassador Lodge asked President Rhee what he would say when India points to the fact that it has had a medical unit in Korea for three years, which will be a convincing argument in the United Nations favoring India's participation in the political conference. President Rhee suggested that India be told to take its medical unit out of Korea.[4] He said that some governments are fighting in Korea just for show and often follow practices contrary to our principles. On the other hand, the individual soldiers of these countries are fighting in Korea for freedom and democracy against communism. President Rhee appealed to us to appreciate "our spirit". He said that he and his people had gone far to accept our proposals but that the people "are boiling" and want only to live and maintain their independence. While the people of Korea are fighting communism everywhere, Indian troops would be coming in to force anti-communist prisoners to go back to communism. President Rhee stated that this was unimaginable. The Secretary replied that the situation regarding the prisoners was not quite so bad as President Rhee alleged, since there would be no brainwashing, nothing could be done in secret, and the ROK would have its representatives to watch over the whole process.

5. *Duration.* The Secretary suggested that the conference would last at least 90 days. President Rhee nodded approval and made no comment.

Mutual Defense Treaty

The Secretary asked President Rhee if he wished to proceed with a draft treaty during the present talks. President Rhee responded that "our whole life and hope depend on it". He said he regretted the Senators had not come. The Secretary pointed out that he was not in a position to move ahead conclusively with the treaty in the absence of the Senators. He suggested that it might be possible to initial a treaty during his visit to Korea and in order to get ahead with the drafting of a treaty, he suggested that President Rhee and himself set up a working party representing both sides. The Secretary selected Mr. Dean and Mr. Young for the United States side. President Rhee selected Foreign Minister Pyun and Minister Kim as the ROK representatives of the working party.

President Rhee said that "the whole thing" depends on the treaty. He noted that he had given a draft to Mr. Robertson which he and his

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[4] The following addition was written in at this point in an unidentified handwriting: "He thought it would be wrong for India and the United Kingdom to be at the conference."

Ministers thought was pretty good. He wanted to make the treaty as strong as possible. The Secretary replied in some detail that the strength of a treaty depends on the spirit behind it, since fine words alone can not bind governments if the spirit disappears and is lacking. He asked President Rhee to bear in mind when suggesting stronger language that the strength of a treaty between the United States and the ROK will not lie in the written word but in the spirit of the two countries. We should make this treaty depend on what would happen anyway, since a treaty should say only what is true, the Secretary said. A treaty puts the enemy on notice that we will not stand idly by. We have already treaties with Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines. There will be nothing different in a treaty with the ROK. The world will know that if the Soviets attack any of these countries we will be in it. The treaty will record the fact that Korea will not stand alone and give clear notice to the enemy that we will do what we expect to do anyway. The purpose of a treaty is to announce to the world that fact—as long as we are working together in cooperation, for Korea is the forefront of liberty in this part of the world. At the same time, the Secretary emphasized that we must draft a treaty that can get ratified, since it would make no sense to draft a treaty which the Senate would reject. Any such rejection would be tragic for it would appear to the world as a repudiation by the American people of the ROK. The Secretary asked President Rhee to realize the great importance of having the kind of a treaty which could receive the overwhelming consent of the Senate. The Secretary asked President Rhee not to press the United States to add language which would not really add to the security of Korea but which would cause trouble with the Senate.[5]

President Rhee said he fully knew how strong the sentiment was in the United States to help Korea. He had several points he wished to tell the Secretary. First, he said, it was necessary for him as their President to tell the Korean people that the stand of the United States is strong and just for the Korean people to follow. Second, before the communist invasion in 1950 some "distinguished gentlemen in Washington" said Korea was of no strategic value and that they were not interested in Korea. These statements had a great influence in the mind of the war-makers. Third, the Korean people are worried more about Japan than the Soviet Union. The American people know little about the masked face of Japan. At the moment, Japan is unmasked and says that it is democratic, which means a good deal. Korean fears are that Japan is aiming at its old colonial ideas. He noted that the Japanese wanted to participate in the political conference because of its "special interest" in Korea. If the United States says that Korea will be defended against any attack, it will mean much to the Korean people. Therefore, President Rhee said, he would insist on teeth in the treaty. At the same time, he said that he was not asking the United States to protect Korea "if the ROK starts aggressive war". However, some people are so friendly to Japan, he went on, that Japan must have many things and receive large aid. He felt that it was not wise to build up Japan militarily and economically and that Japan should be forced to abandon the idea of re-occupying Korea.

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[5] The following addition was written in at this point in an unidentified handwriting: "The Secretary and Ambassador Lodge pointed out that an acceptable treaty and Senate consideration of it even over a period of several weeks would be useful in creating the solid backing of the American people on which the spirit and purpose of the treaty would depend."

To all these points, the Secretary replied that the treaty has the advantage of protecting the ROK against Japan as well as the Soviet Union. As for Japan, the Secretary pointed out that the maximum military program contemplated for its internal security is 10 divisions and that it will be a long time before Japan's forces reach that strength. At the present time, Japan has only 4 divisions partially equipped and organized. He assured President Rhee that the United States does not want Japan again to become a dominant power any more than the Koreans do. On the other hand, the Secretary emphasized that it was necessary for the safety of the Western Pacific to have a close and cooperative relationship between Korea and Japan. He pointed to the United States position on Okinawa, our relationship with the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, and our concern over Indo-China. If Southeast Asia fell to the communists, the effect on Japan would be serious. The Secretary warned President Rhee that the communists could cause great trouble by coming through the back door. Therefore, the Secretary stressed the importance of holding solid the two peninsular positions of Korea and Indo-China, and the island group in between. As assurance to Korea, the United States is not building up Japan as a dominant power, Japan will have no sea or air power, Japan will be allied to the United States, which will have bases in Japan, and the United States will have a treaty with the Republic of Korea. For all these reasons, Korea should be able to cooperate with Japan without too much fear. Rhee replied that he was not against aid to Japan as such, but he felt that the Japanese were extremely clever in handling western psychology. The Japanese would persuade the Americans that Japan needs Korea back, which would build up sympathy in America for Japan.[6]

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[6] The following addition was written in at this point in an unidentified handwriting: "The Secretary said that the American people were not that simple or so easily taken in. President Rhee and the Secretary agreed to meet again at 10:00 AM August 6."

795.00/8-1053

Draft Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Subject: Private Conversation between President Rhee and the Secretary of State, August 5, 1953, on the Unification of Korea

Following the general conversation at President Rhee's home, I retired into another room and talked with him privately.

I said that if the political conference was to achieve the unification of Korea we would have to use tactics that would be concerted between us. The principal obstacle to unification of Korea was that the northern area was close to Port Arthur and Vladivostok and was economically pertinent to Manchuria. For this reason I doubted that it would be possible either by war or by peace to achieve a unification which would expose this area to attack by the Republic of Korea, possibly in alliance with the United States, and thus carry a grave threat to vital portions of Russia and China. I felt that some demilitarization would be essential to unification. President Rhee said that he recognized this fact but suggested that any buffer zone should include also some portion of China.

I said that in order to achieve unification there must be a trading position. That one element was the legal possibility that the Republic of Korea might resume the war with possible United States moral support. I said that the United States, and I assumed Rhee, did not, in fact, want this but that the possibility was one which might be kept alive so long as we understood each other. Also I said that the economic rehabilitation of South Korea would set up an attraction and that the possibility of the United States cooperating with the Republic of Korea to make South Korea a very powerful military and propaganda base might give a trading position.

President Rhee said that he was very much in agreement with my point of view, that he would want his delegation to keep in close touch with ours and to make moves which we felt were useful to achieve the goal of unification. He said that the Communists' delegations always worked in unity in this way, but that the non-Communist delegations seldom had well thought out tactics.

I asked President Rhee whether he expected personally to attend the conference. He said he thought not. I said I thought it of the utmost importance that he should have a delegate who had Rhee's complete confidence and in whom the United States could also have confidence. President Rhee made no response other than to ask whether I thought it would be objectionable if their delegation were headed by a military man. I said I saw no objection.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Dulles, Aug. 10, in Denver on his return trip to the United States from Korea.

According to an attached note by O'Connor, Aug. 11, 1953, both Smith and Robertson saw this memorandum, which was then returned for the Secretary's personal file.

President Rhee later said that he had hopes that Mr. Oliver would attend as an adviser to their delegation and he asked me to ask Dr. Milton Eisenhower to grant him leave of absence from Penn State for this purpose.

President Rhee expressed great appreciation over the fact that I had come to talk first with him and said that this would be symbolic of a change in attitude which he thought would greatly enhance the influence of the United States in Asia.

JFD

795B.5/8–653: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT SEOUL, August 6, 1953—10 a. m.

Dulte 13. Eyes only for Acting Secretary from Secretary. If matters here continue proceed smoothly, may desire initial draft security treaty to mark progress. Treaty would involve no United States obligations not previously discussed with the President and Senate leaders. Rhee would doubtless prefer formal signing but believe initialing will suffice. Please advise President to be sure he concurs.[1]

DULLES

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[1] According to telegram Tedul 11 to Seoul, Aug. 6, 1953, not printed, Smith showed this telegram to the President who agreed that Dulles could initial the security treaty if he thought it desirable. (795B.5/8–653)

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young)

SECRET [SEOUL,] August 6, 1953.

Subject: Second Meeting Between President Rhee and Secretary Dulles.

Economic Assistance to the Republic of Korea.

Participants: *ROK*
President Syngman Rhee
Prime Minister Paik Tu Chin
Foreign Minister Pyun
Defense Minister Sohn Won Il
Minister Kim

United States
Secretary Dulles
Secretary Stevens

Ambassador Lodge, United States Representative to United Nations
General Maxwell Taylor, Acting CINCUNC
Assistant Secretary Robertson, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs
Assistant Secretary McCardle, Public Affairs
Mr. Arthur Dean, Consultant
Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

Secretary Dulles asked Secretary Stevens to explain the United States viewpoint on various matters regarding economic assistance to the Republic of Korea. Secretary Stevens said that President Eisenhower was deeply and personally interested in Korean economic affairs. He had sent Dr. Tasca to Korea to formulate a comprehensive economic report. The distribution of 10,000 tons of food for Korean relief was the President's own idea. Secretary Stevens also mentioned the fact that the United States Army had already spent between $300 and $400 million on various civil construction projects in Korea. He also mentioned the President's decision to ask authority for the expenditure of $200 million to get an economic rehabilitation program started. President Rhee remarked that it seemed the economical way to strengthen Korea as the front line of the United States in this part of the world was by using manpower to the benefit of both the United States and Korea. He inquired whether Congress would appropriate the necessary funds at the next session to carry out Tasca's recommendations. Secretary Stevens explained that early adjournment of Congress following the armistice had created a somewhat difficult situation for obtaining authorization and appropriations to carry out Tasca's recommendations. Accordingly, authorization had been sought and obtained from Congress to allow the Defense Department to use funds saved as result of cessation of hostilities as an initial installment to implement the Tasca report. The Secretary added, to be sure President Rhee understood the matter exactly, that the $200 million fund would reduce by that much Tasca's overall recommendation of about one billion dollars, and the balance of around $800 million would be sought from future Congressional appropriations. President Rhee said that there was a good deal of confusion about the duration of the economic assistance program, since some Americans mention 3 years and some 4; some say it will be under the Army and some say it will be carried out according to Tasca's recommendation. He urged the Secretary to make a statement to clarify the matter. Secretary Stevens replied that Dr. Tasca was now in Tokyo and he and his successor, Mr. Wood, would both be in Seoul in the near future. It would be important for them to work out the details on any such statement with President Rhee and his advisers.

President Rhee complained that there were so many agencies dealing with Korean economic affairs and interpreting everything in their own way that it was "very confusing to us and we can not make head nor tail our of it". He said that the ROK Government desired to have every American dollar spent for a good purpose. He expressed his gratitude for past and future economic assistance but felt it his duty to see that the funds were not spent in the same manner as previously, that is, without coordination and each agency "standing in each other's way". He referred to his experience with ECA, which he claimed had not accomplished a single thing on the ten or twelve essential projects on which he had requested assistance. On the contrary, President Rhee said, ECA had turned back funds never used in 1949 and 1950. He informed the Secretary that he had told Mr. Jeffries, of UNKRA, that UNKRA was not properly using the money of the United States taxpayers, since it was spending 19 per cent on overhead. President Rhee thought that such a system should be immediately stopped. He also wanted to have an end put to all the surveys and surveyors who "leave us with piles of beautifully bound reports that we don't know what to do with". He said he wanted to use the United States taxpayers' money only for the best purpose, since $200 million is a large sum for which he was more grateful than he could express.

President Rhee stated that he believed the Combined Economic Board should be established as "a supreme planning body" for the coordination of all programs. He said that General Clark had told him he would fully cooperate with this. He assured the Secretary that the Koreans were not insisting on doing everything themselves. He thought that the Combined Economic Board was the proper organization, since it represented both governments. He said that General Clark had indicated that he eventually would turn over responsibility to a civilian. President Rhee did not object to this so long as the United States Government appoints someone to head it all up. He wanted to have a fertilizer plant, instead of always buying fertilizer from Japan. This was an example of the fact, in his opinion, that absolutely nothing had been done so far on the rehabilitation of Korea.

The Secretary stated that the Tasca report contemplated developing the economic program through the Combined Economic Board. He noted that President Eisenhower had approved the Tasca report in principle. However, he told President Rhee that the organization for this program on the United States side had not been finally worked out and that he could not provide President Rhee with any details today, since the President was on the point of talking this whole matter over with General Clark. At the same time, the Secretary told President Rhee that he could be confident the United States would wish to work out the economic assistance program along the lines of the principles that he had outlined.

President Rhee said that any necessary changes could be made in the Combined Economic Board, but it was essential to establish one supreme economic body and develop the necessary coordination under it. If this could not be done, he said, he would ask the United States just to loan the funds to the ROK, which then would see to it that the money would be well spent. This, of course, would require United States advisers. He then protested against the practice of ECA and UNKRA of buying things for Korea whether they were suitable or not. He said that oftentimes the goods were just not fit for use in Korea, though the warehouses were full of such things. He predicted real troubles unless this point were kept constantly in mind. Mr. Robertson assured him that the Tasca report contemplated accomplishing just what he had in mind in that respect.

The Secretary informed President Rhee that detailed arrangements could be completed next week with Dr. Tasca and Mr. Wood. He was not in a position today to say anything more definitely than that the President and the National Security Council generally had approved Tasca's recommendations, the $200 million would be spent according to those principles, the United States will do everything possible to have its funds used efficiently, and a place must be found for the use of UNKRA funds which he and General Coulter can work on.

Prime Minister Paik asked if he could meet with Secretary Stevens this afternoon to go over some immediate major problems regarding economic assistance.[1] Secretary Stevens replied that he would be very glad to hear whatever the Prime Minister had to say. Finally, President Rhee complained that more than half of the ECA program had been left in Japan. He urgently requested that the United States prevent its funds from going into the hands of people who were building up Japan. He emphasized that he wants Korea to become self-sufficient industrially.

[Here follows discussion on Korean-Japanese relations; for an extract, see volume XIV.]

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[1] For a report of that meeting, see *infra.*

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second Secretary of the Embassy in Korea (Calhoun)

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, August 6, 1953—2 p. m.

Subject: Discussion of Problems Relating to Economic Aid, Military Assistance and ROK Armed Forces

Participants: *Americans*

Secretary of the Army Stevens
Mr. Charles Sullivan, Defense Department
Mr. John A. Calhoun, American Embassy
Lt. Colonel Dwan, Defense Department

Koreans

Prime Minister Paek Tu Chin
Defense Minister Son Won Il
Gen. Paek Sun Yup, C/S, ROK Army
Adm. Park Ok Kyu, C/S, ROK Navy
Gen. Choi Yong Duk, C/S, ROK Air Force; other military officials from ROK Armed Forces

In his introductory remarks the Prime Minister requested Secretary Stevens to give final United States Governmental approval to the Memorandum of Understanding [1] on implementation of the aid program through the Combined Economic Board transmitted to Washington earlier this week by CINCUNC and the Embassy. He stressed the importance of being able to show the Korean people a concrete result with respect to the aid program and expressed the hope that before Secretary Stevens' visit was concluded it would be possible to announce such an agreement publicly. Mr. Stevens stated that this Memorandum of Understanding required consideration by various branches of the United States Government and that he could not, therefore, give any assurance that agreement could be given before his departure. He added that he would, however, discuss this problem with Secretary Dulles and suggested that it should be discussed with Tasca and Wood who would be arriving in Korea shortly.

The Prime Minister also raised the question of settling on a permanent military conversion rate of 180 to 1. He sketched briefly the background to the present situation and stated that the Korean Government considered a permanent rate as essential. Mr. Stevens pointed out that this question also involved other agencies of the United States Government, in particular the Treasury Department. He suggested to the Prime Minister that this problem should also be discussed with Tasca and Wood. In response to the Prime Minister's expressed hope that a speedy solution could be found to this question which has been outstanding so long, Mr. Stevens stated that he would do his best.

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[1] This Republic of Korea Memorandum of Understanding, dated July 31, 1953, was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 121 from Seoul, Aug. 3, 1953. In it, the Korean Government asked for U.S. concurrence and cooperation for a series of policies which were clearly designed to place the control for Korean aid under the sole direction of the Combined Economic Board. The Board, with its American and South Korean representatives as joint chairmen, would also take responsibility for directing and coordinating existing relief and reconstruction agencies and organizations in Korea. (895.00/8-353)

The Prime Minister also made a formal request for the United States to assume the 10% of the local expenditures for facilities, labor, etc. now carried by the ROK Government. He pointed out what a heavy burden this obligation was on their already seriously-weakened economy. Mr. Stevens and Mr. Sullivan pointed out some of the difficulties which such a shift would create within the United States Government, in particular with respect to Congress, which was highly sensitive on this type of question.

The Prime Minister also mentioned briefly one or two subjects which were discussed at the morning meeting with President Rhee, but there was no discussion of them. He then took up the question of the Tasca recommendations and inquired as to their status. He expressed the strong desire of the ROK Government for a commitment from the U.S. Government to support the Tasca recommendations. Mr. Stevens replied that he wasn't sure of the exact status today of the recommendations, although he understood there was an agreement in principle within the Executive Branch of the Government on them. He observed that the recommendations would, of course, be subject to approval by Congress through appropriations to implement such a program and that one could not therefore give a firm commitment for a program which covers several years.

The Prime Minister raised for consideration the payment by the U.S. Government for services and utilities provided by the ROK which have been used by the UN forces for the past three years. In this connection he cited the need for a general agreement covering such matters and mentioned that under the Japanese Administrative Agreement a large percentage of the cost is borne by the U.S. Government. Mr. Stevens pointed out again the problem of the Congressional attitude on such matters and emphasized the necessity for presenting such problems to Congress on a reasonable basis.

There followed a summary by the Defense Minister of the programs proposed by the three ROK armed services. In brief the ROK Army requested approval and implementation of the 20 division program with full logistical support by the U.S., including improved food rations for the troops. The programs for the Navy and Air Force were based on the assumption that these branches of the armed services should be built up sufficiently to give the ROK what it considered to be a balanced independent force capable of defending the country. The Prime Minister requested approval by the U.S. Government of the programs outlined by the Defense Minister, and in conclusion mentioned the problem of the ROK position following 90 days of the political conference. He referred to a "promise" by Mr. Robertson to President Rhee to build up the ROK naval and air forces. Finally, he stressed once again the urgency of reaching decisions on the matters which had been discussed.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 66 D 199

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young)

SECRET [SEOUL,] August 7, 1953—10 a. m.

Subject: Third Meeting Between President Rhee and Secretary Dulles

Participants: *ROK*

President Syngman Rhee
Prime Minister Paik
Foreign Minister Pyun
Defense Minister Sohn
Ambassador Ben Limb, ROK Observer to the UN
Minister Kim

United States

Secretary of State Dulles
Ambassador Lodge
Ambassador Briggs
Assistant Secretary Robertson
Assistant Secretary McCardle
Mr. Arthur Dean, Consultant
Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director, NA
Mr. Niles Bond, Counselor, American Embassy

With respect to various plans for the future of Korea, President Rhee stated categorically that the proposal for neutralization of Korea would be absolutely unacceptable until the situation in the Far East was settled.

Turning to the question of the political conference, President Rhee said that it would be an impossible situation for Korea if the United Nations has the role of leadership in the political conference. He insisted that the United States must assume that role, with the other free nations supporting and cooperating with the United States. He also urged that there be equal voting arrangements to represent the democratic and satellite sides, respectively. He appealed to the Secretary to understand the Korean position and to insist that the "United Nations" not control the political conference. The Secretary replied that much of what President Rhee had said was sound, and hoped that the political conference would be such that the United States would be able to take the leadership and work in close cooperation with the Republic of Korea.

President Rhee felt that "we, on our side" were weak in the United Nations vis-à-vis the communists, because they have so many votes lined up on their side. India and the United Kingdom have tremendous influence in the United Nations, whereas "our position" is comparatively weak. He urged that our side not get tied up like the satellites, but stand for common principles. He said the governments on our side should be encouraged to stand for these principles in order to make their position stronger.

President Rhee then asked Prime Minster Paik about his conversations with Secretary Stevens on economic matters.[1] The Prime Minister replied that he had given several questions to Secretary Stevens and had requested the answers to them today. Secretary Dulles told President Rhee that there were many problems and rather long processes involved in the program of economic assistance. These questions could not be answered today, he explained, because his party had not come equipped to deal with many of the detailed matters. It would be better to leave them to Dr. Tasca and Mr. Wood. At the same time, the Secretary again assured President Rhee of agreement with his basic proposition on the unified handling of economic assistance through the Combined Economic Board. President Rhee agreed to arrange for later discussions with Dr. Tasca and Mr. Wood. He said that he was highly satisfied with the Secretary's statements regarding coordination which, he felt, was the main problem. The Secretary said that it would also be important to bring about the coordination of the United Nations agencies in rehabilitation. President Rhee suggested that the United Nations agencies might participate jointly with the Combined Economic Board but he was afraid such an arrangement would hinder the work of the Board. Therefore, he suggested that United Nations participation should be separately handled.

Prime Minister Paik stated that one thing was clear to him, which was that the integrated program of one billion dollars should be approved in total by the Congress and its duration should be clearly specified. Secretary Dulles replied that the United States Government had approved the program in principle, but that no one now could tell exactly how much it would cost or how long it would take to implement. He said that the United States could not be bound by every specific date and figure. The National Security Council Planning Board had carefully analyzed and studied the Tasca report and the National Security Council had approved it as a sound basis on which to proceed. President Rhee suggested the desirability of clarifying whether the program would run for three years or more and asked for agreement that it be known as a three-year plan. The Prime Minister said that he wished to have a three-year integrated program mentioned in any public statement to be issued by President Rhee and Secretary Dulles. Mr. Robertson pointed out the undesirability of putting a time limit on the program, since no one can foresee how long it will take and obviously neither the Koreans nor the Americans would want to terminate the program at the end of three years if it had not been completed by that time. However, President Rhee said that he definitely wanted it stated how long the program would last. Secretary Dulles suggested describing it as a three or four-year program. President Rhee agreed.

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[1] See the memorandum of conversation, *supra*.

President Rhee then circulated a proposed draft joint statement [2] which he suggested could be either made public or in confidence, but he desired something in writing. Mr. McCardle stated that it was necessary for a joint public statement to be made.

The Secretary then circulated a draft letter [3] from him to President Rhee. After he had read the letter twice, President Rhee told the Secretary that, in reference to the relationship between Republic of Korea armed forces and the United Nations Command, he had told General Clark that there was no reason not to leave ROK armed forces under the Command, and had assured General Clark of continuing this relationship during the political conference "and even after that". President Rhee felt that there must be just one commander of all forces in Korea. However, he said that when the United Nations Command and the Government of the Republic of Korea are not following together the same purpose, the Government of the Republic of Korea will remove its armed forces from the United Nations Command. Otherwise, President Rhee said, "as long as we travel together it is understood we will stay together in the United Nations Command".

Then President Rhee asked the Secretary what will happen if we fail to unify Korea after 90 days of the political conference. President Rhee said that something more definite was needed, since the Korean people are vitally concerned with this question. President Rhee stressed that the aggressors are still here in Korea in great numbers. He pointed out that in the draft treaty the United States will help Korea if any outside nation attacks Korea, but in referring to the continued presence of an aggressor in Korea, he wanted to know what the United States would do to help the ROK. He again said he hoped the United States would either resume hostilities or else provide the ROK with moral and material support until it accomplishes the objective of unifying Korea. Without some such assurances, President Rhee said, he would have nothing to tell his people. On the other hand, he would be agreeing in the last paragraph of the first page of the draft letter to continue cooperation with the United Nations forces. Secretary Dulles explained that that paragraph covered the period up to the time that the United States and the Republic of Korea negotiate bilateral agreements on the stationing of United States forces in Korea. The letter meant that during this period the United States and the Republic of Korea Governments agree to maintain the *status quo.* President Rhee indicated that would be satisfactory, but he said he needed words committing the United States now to support of the Republic of Korea after the political conference. Secretary Dulles firmly stated to President Rhee that he could not commit the United States to go to war again along with the Republic of Korea at the end of six months. No President or Secretary of State of the United States could give any such commitment, as Mr. Robertson had made clear during his mission to Seoul. The Secretary said that he was prepared to go as far as the President and the Secretary can go—President Rhee interjected the phrase "constitutionally". The Secretary continued that there is a point beyond which neither the President nor Secretary of State could go because the Senate and the Congress of the United States would not accept it. The Secretary asked President Rhee not to imagine that he was in any way working against him or the Republic of Korea, to which President Rhee replied that he had no such thought. The Secretary pointed out that he did not wish to mislead President Rhee or the Korean people. The United States Senators were becoming quite worried about extending a commitment by the United States to the mainland of Asia. In particular, some Democratic Senators are not at all satisfied with the prospective treaty. The Secretary said that the United States would go the full limit of what it believes possible to help the Republic of Korea, but that the United States would not go beyond that point because it would defeat and ruin the whole program of support. The Secretary assured President Rhee that he had many friends in the Senate and that they would tell him the same thing. The United States could not make any commitments on the mainland of Asia beyond those we have already made with the Philippines, which has such close ties with the United States. If we tried to go beyond that, the treaty would be defeated in the Senate and that would be serving notice to the world and particularly the Communists that we are not really concerned with Korea. The Secretary again pointed out that it is the spirit of a treaty that really counts. The United States and Korea have become allies and close partners and the world knows that anyone who touches Korea touches the United States. It would only spell disaster to go beyond the present formulation.

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[2] For a text of the joint statement as it was issued in final form, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 17, 1954, pp. 203–204.

[3] Not found.

President Rhee then explained his position at some length. He said that the Republic of Korea was struggling for survival and that there could be no real armistice or peace in Korea as long as the Chinese Communists remained in Korean territory. If they were to remain in Korea for several years, free Korea would lose its life. Therefore, the Koreans wanted to see their way clear and find where their future hope lay. With the Russians and the Chinese Communists together on one side of Korea, the United States was the only other nation to which Korea could turn for help. Furthermore, the fate of Korea was a world problem, for if Korea were lost to the Communists, other countries would also follow. Therefore, he asked the Secretary for a definite commitment on future United States action. President Rhee explained that the situation in Korea was entirely different than in the Philippines, since the latter is an island nation, protected by water, whereas Korea is subject to constant threat and instant attack from overwhelming Communist forces a few miles away. If the United States can not give any such commitments, then Korea is lost. Unless the United States agrees to see to it that Korea will be unified and the Chinese Communists will be removed, President Rhee could not assure his people that they would be safe and that the unification of Korea would be guaranteed. For these reasons, he requested a statement of support from the United States following the political conference. If the United States could not make any such statement, he wanted it clearly to say so in order that the Republic of Korea would know where it stood. All of the aid and help from the United States would be useless, since South Korea was dying as a nation, although it wanted to live as a free and independent country. With the Chinese Communists in the north and North Korea under Communist control, South Korea can not continue to live unless Korea is unified. If the United States does not wish to help the Republic of Korea fight for the unification of Korea, then it should say so. The United States should help the Republic of Korea now so that it can survive. President Rhee believed that he and his government have gone far to meet the position of the United States. Since it had postponed the problem of unification for six months, President Rhee wanted to know what he could expect from President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles. He hoped that the United States would succeed in getting the Chinese Communists out of Korea and in unifying Korea. The armistice has been signed, leaving millions of Chinese Communists in Korea, with perhaps more to follow. President Rhee said he understood the United States desire for peace and that he and the Koreans had not complained. He recognized that the United States had rescued Korea from Communist aggression and had helped build up Korea. Now all that he asked was to let the Republic of Korea do what it could. If Korea were just divided by the Koreans alone, it would not be so difficult. However, with large enemy forces in his country, President Rhee felt that the United States could not ask the Koreans to remain silent and to keep the peace. He could not tell his people to do this or to help build up the morale of his soldiers, which was going down. They knew and heard that the Communists were celebrating a victory in Korea and that the Russians would unify Korea. However, he had no power against the Russians.

President Rhee then expressed his appreciation for the letter which President Eisenhower wrote to the effect that the United States understood the ROK situation, for that was something that President Rhee counted on. He said that he was also happy over the Secretary's letter in which he had said that the United States would take "immediate and automatic action" in Korea (President Rhee is referring to the fifth paragraph of the Secretary's letter of July 24, 1953, to President Rhee[4]). However, President Rhee said he regretted that now all of this "had been taken back" and he did not know what to expect from the United States or what to tell his people.

The Secretary stated that he had confidence that the people of Korea would have confidence in the United States, and emphasized the ties between our two peoples. He recognized that the United States faced certain problems and that President Rhee faced certain problems in Korea. The task for both of them, the Secretary said, was to express our common goals. Beyond that, the Secretary felt there would be no profit in going over old ground. Instead, it would be more useful now to combine the President's draft statement with his draft letter into a single joint statement.

President Rhee then said that the United States was one of two nations which had divided Korea at the end of the war. Whatever the intentions of the United States may have been in this action, it was thereby honor bound to help save Korea from a future Russian occupation. Accordingly, the United States Government should commit itself to something. The Secretary asked President Rhee if we should go to war for the unification of Germany, as he was suggesting we do for Korea. The Secretary stated that the United States can not undertake war as the remedy for all the injustices in the world. Otherwise, we would be in war for a hundred years or more all over the world. President Rhee countered that he wanted the United States to finish its objectives instead of leaving them half accomplished and wasting all the sacrifices that had been made. Secretary Dulles replied that it was the responsibility of the United States to decide what the American people desired. The United States could not let President Rhee or his government decide what the United States should do, nor let President Rhee or his government over-rule our judgment on what action to take, since that is an American responsibility and not Korean. We would go as far as we could, the Secretary said, but he urged President Rhee to accept our good faith and recognize our responsibility. The Secretary suggested to President Rhee that he was not expertly acquainted with opinion and developments in the United States since he had not been there for a long time. President Rhee agreed, and acknowledged the fact that the United States could not guarantee to take the action he wanted following the political conference and that such action would have to be held up pending the circumstances. President Rhee regretted that any military action of his government would be branded as aggression, particularly by India and the United Kingdom. The Secretary then emphasized that he could not say he would not support Rhee at that time any more than he could say that he would support him. President Rhee complained that the whole situation was so uncertain that he did not see how he could proceed. The Secretary pointed out that it was a most uncertain world and impossible to anticipate as much as six months ahead.

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[4] *Ante*, p. 1430.

President Rhee and the Secretary then took up the question of the mutual defense treaty. President Rhee circulated a new draft.[5] After those present had read it, the Secretary informed President Rhee that the new fourth clause in the preamble was not advisable and had no proper place in such a treaty. Instead, it would appear in some other form, either a letter or a memorandum. In any event, the Secretary pointed out the situation covered by such a statement should lapse when the treaty would take effect, which might be next February. President Rhee agreed to put it in a joint statement or letter.

The Secretary then informed President Rhee that the addition of the word "effectively" in Article 3 of the Korean draft would have to be deleted because it was not in any other treaty of the United States. The Secretary explained that if the United States were to change the formula of Article 3 from that which appears in the other treaties, the other treaty signatories would infer that the action contemplated by the similar provision in their treaties would not be effective. Accordingly, these countries might wish to have their treaties changed and it would complicate our relations with them if this were left in the treaty with the Republic of Korea. President Rhee responded that he had asked Mr. Robertson to return to Washington to explain what he desired in a mutual defense treaty. He had presented a draft treaty to Mr. Robertson but the United States had refused to accept it. He now understood that. He agreed to delete the word "effectively" from Article 3.

Prime Minister Paik then turned to the Secretary and stated that President Eisenhower's letter of June 6[6] had promised that the treaty with the Republic of Korea would be stronger than the United States defense treaty with the Philippines. The Secretary replied that no such interpretation could be put on that letter, but the Prime Minister insisted. However, President Rhee motioned to Mr. Paik to drop the matter. (When the letter was shown to Paik to find out what he was talking about, it appeared that he had misinterpreted the sentence which said that the treaty with the ROK would be "a step in the further direction" towards a comprehensive security system in the Pacific. Paik had interpreted the word "further" to mean that the treaty with the ROK would be a further strengthening and therefore different and stronger from the treaty with the Philippines. Apparently, it was a perfectly genuine misconstruction of the English.)

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[5] Not found.

[6] For text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 377–380.

Since Article 6 in the Korean draft provided for indefinite duration for the treaty and differed from the relevant article in the Philippine treaty, the Secretary informed President Rhee that this article must contain the same language as in the Philippine treaty. He said that the treaty with the ROK could be expected to continue indefinitely but it must have the same termination clause as in the Philippine treaty. President Rhee stated that he now knew where he stood and how far the United States would go. He explained that he did not want to appear to be like a "Chinese storekeeper", haggling over details. He would wish to reveal to his people what the United States could do and what it could not do.

The Secretary suggested that the advisers on both sides get together on the drafting of a joint statement. The Secretary and President Rhee also agreed to meet later that afternoon.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)

SECRET SEOUL, August 7, 1953—4 p. m.

Subject: Fourth Meeting Between President Rhee and Secretary Dulles. President Rhee's Residence.

Participants: *ROK*

President Rhee
Prime Minister Paik
Foreign Minister Pyun
Defense Minister Sohn
Ambassador Limb
Dr. Oliver (Adviser to President Rhee)
Mr. Kim

United States

Secretary Dulles
General Maxwell Taylor, Commanding General, Eighth Army
Assistant Secretary Walter S. Robertson, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

Secretary Dulles presented a draft proposed joint statement to be made by President Rhee and Secretary Dulles upon conclusion of the consultations. Secretary Dulles suggested that the Americans retire while the draft was under consideration by the Koreans. After approximately thirty minutes, we were called back into the conference. Certain minor changes in the text suggested by Foreign Minister Pyun were accepted by the Secretary without discussion.

Foreign Minister Pyun then proposed the addition of a paragraph to the effect that it was agreed that the ROK has complete sovereignty over its domestic affairs, *including* the right to drive the Chinese Communist invaders from Korean soil. Secretary Dulles stated that it would be inconsistent for him to join in such a statement, as it would violate the position America had taken in urging United Nations action in the beginning, viz., that the invasion of South Korea was not a domestic civil war but a communist aggression threatening the peace of the world. It was on this very basis that the United Nations had intervened over the opposition of the Soviet bloc's contention that the war in Korea was a purely domestic issue with which the United Nations had no concern. President Rhee and his advisers accepted this viewpoint, and the clause as now appearing in the joint statement was agreed upon.[1]

The Secretary's draft of the Mutual Defense Treaty[2] was presented and despite last ditch arguments and appeals by President Rhee for automatic military action was approved with minor changes in text.

WALTER S. ROBERTSON

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[1] For the text of the joint statement as it was issued, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 17, 1953, pp. 203–204.

[2] For the text of the Draft U.S.–ROK Mutual Defense Treaty as it was issued, see *ibid.*, p. 204.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young)

SECRET [SEOUL,] August 8, 1953.

Subject: Final Meeting Between President Rhee and Secretary Dulles.

Participants: *ROK*
President Syngman Rhee
Prime Minister Paik
Foreign Minister Pyun
Defense Minister Sohn
Ambassador Ben Limb, ROK Observer to the UN
Minister Kim

United States
Secretary Dulles
Secretary Stevens
Ambassador Lodge, US Representative to the UN
Ambassador Briggs, American Embassy Pusan
General Maxwell Taylor, Acting CINCUNC

Assistant Secretary Robertson, FE
Assistant Secretary McCardle, Public Affairs
Mr. Arthur Dean, Consultant
Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director NA
Mr. Charles Sullivan, Department of Defense
Mr. Niles Bond, Counselor, American Embassy Pusan

The Secretary and his party arrived at the Presidential Mansion at 10 o'clock for the final meeting with President Rhee. The Secretary gave President Rhee one of the two original copies of the joint statement. After they both had read it, President Rhee and the Secretary each signed an original.

The Secretary and Foreign Minister Pyun went into the State dining room which had been prepared for the initialing of the Mutual Defense Treaty. In the presence of the Republic of Korea Cabinet, the Secretary's party, and correspondents and photographers, the Secretary and the Foreign Minister each initialed and exchanged an original copy of the draft Mutual Defense Treaty Between the Republic of Korea and the United States.

After the initialing, the Secretary said to President Rhee and the Foreign Minister that the initialing of the Treaty marked a significant contribution to friendly relations between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America.[1] President Rhee, Secretary Dulles and their advisers returned to the living room for conversation of a general nature. The Secretary told President Rhee that the initialing of these two documents this morning would establish the basis for the development of really effective future relations between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea. President Rhee expressed his appreciation to the Secretary, and through him, to President Eisenhower for their interest in Korea and initiative in bringing about the initialing of a Mutual Defense Treaty, which, he said, would mean so much to his people. The Secretary then made the personal suggestion to President Rhee that he might consider visiting the United States next January or February at about the time the Senate might begin its consideration of the Mutual Defense Treaty. The Secretary suggested that President Rhee might make an address to a joint session of Congress, which could have a considerable effect, he believed, on consideration of the Treaty and the reaction of public opinion to it. President Rhee said that he would keep this possibility in mind.

After a toast appropriate for the occasion and final personal exchanges among both parties, the Secretary and his associates left the Presidential Mansion.

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[1] The following addition was written in at this point in an unidentified handwriting: "President Rhee replied that this was a most historic moment for the Korean people."

795.00/8-1053

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

DENVER, 10 August 1953.

[Subject: Secretary Dulles' trip to the Far East]

Ambassador Lodge, Mr. Robertson and I met with the President for about an hour, from 8:00 to 9:00 a.m. We showed both the communiqué signed by Syngman Rhee and the Draft Security Treaty initialed by Foreign Minister Pyun and myself.

I pointed out that the Draft Security Treaty conformed in every essential respect with the Draft which had been exhibited to and discussed with the Senate leaders and that we had successfully resisted the efforts which President Rhee had made to incorporate features which might be objectionable and enlarge US responsibility.

The President said he had a little concern about the initialing of the Treaty in the absence of the Senators but as long as the Draft conformed to what they had previously seen he thought it was OK.

We went over the Joint Communiqué, explaining briefly the essential features. The President expressed particular gratification at the last paragraph whereby it was asserted on authority of President Rhee and myself that there were no secret understandings. The President suggested that this point should be emphasized to the press.

The President asked as to the attitude of General Taylor toward use of the Armed Forces for at least technical work of reconstruction. I said that this had not been specifically discussed, but that General Taylor, in his briefing, had emphasized that the Army would be engaged for several months in reconstructing defense positions to replace those which had been abandoned by the two kilometer withdrawal under the armistice agreement. The President re-emphasized his conviction that the Army could make a large contribution to "winning the peace."

There was some discussion of the future American to head the UNC in view of General Clark's prospective retirement. The President requested me, as promptly as possible, to ascertain through Secretary Wilson whether General Taylor felt that the UNC could operate from Korea as against Japan. The President also stated that he had told the Defense Department to clear with me the question of any successor.

I reported on the unsatisfactory condition in Japan as regards their own security efforts and their economic extravagance in terms of imports. I said that I very strongly emphasized this in the same talk with Prime Minister Yoshida when I had advised him of the prospective return of the Amami Island group.

The President expressed very strongly the view that we should encourage a liberalization of trade between Japan and China in terms of non-strategic goods. He felt that trade could be a weapon on our side and that such trade was indispensable to the livelihood of Japan.

There then ensued a discussion of general character with reference to US trade policies.

The President expressed his satisfaction at the results which had been obtained.

Ambassador Lodge brought up the question of the set-up from our side of the proposed political conference and outlined his plans for holding the membership to those who had combat forces in Korea. He pointed out that this would exclude India, which has deliberately played the role of neutral, notably as chairman of the neutral commission. He pointed out that this position to exclude India would, from the standpoint of overall relations, be offset by our support of Mrs. Pandit for President of the Assembly. The President expressed his concurrence in this approach.

JFD

795.00/8-1353

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 13, 1953.

DEAR CABOT: For the guidance of the U.S. Delegation, I set down the following principles on which I think we are agreed:

1. The Korean Political Conference should represent the two belligerent sides, as contemplated by Article 60 of the Armistice Agreement. It is *not* to be a "roundtable" conference with the participation of neutrals.

2. The United Nations General Assembly can properly recommend the Governments from the anti-Communist belligerent side to participate in the Conference, but it has no responsibility to choose the participants for the other side.

3. The Political Conference will deal only with Korean problems. This does not exclude the possibility that if the Korean Conference goes well, it might with different membership be transformed into another conference to deal with other subjects. This latter possibility, however, could not be determined or agreed in advance.

4. The United States at the Conference would be entitled to act for itself, in the protection of its own interests, and would not have any

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[1] A note on the source text indicated this letter was sent to USUN at 7 p. m. via courier. Dulles drafted this letter and asked Murphy and Robertson to comment upon it; both Assistant Secretaries cleared it.

representative responsibility to others or be bound by the vote or recommendations of others. We would, of course, expect to act in a cooperative manner with our friends.

5. The participation of the Government of the Republic of Korea is so indispensable that no conditions should be attached to the Political Conference which could reasonably lead to non-participation by that Government.

8. If the action by the United Nations Assembly is seriously incompatible with the foregoing, the United States should reserve its position as to participation in the Political Conference.

Sincerely yours, JOHN FOSTER DULLES

357.AD/8-1453: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 14, 1953—5:21 p. m.
PRIORITY

52. Eyes only for Lodge. . . . Swedish information interesting but does not help us much in developing position regarding political conference. Even though time is short I feel you should ask Hammarskjold whether Swedish representative Peking might not inform Chou En-lai in strictest confidence US preference for demilitarized zone Korea or mutually acceptable alternative suitable Asian site for political conference and that we propose be guided by provisions Article 60 Armistice Agreement in respect composition and agenda.[2]

This may elicit some tentative indication regarding Chinese thinking which might be helpful.

DULLES

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[1] This telegram was drafted and cleared by Murphy.

[2] According to telegram Delga 587 from USUN, Aug. 17, 1953, Lodge made this proposal to Hammarskjold who said he would do it. (357.AD/8-1753)

795.00/8-1453

Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) [1]

SECRET EYES ONLY [NEW YORK,] August 14, 1953.

Subject: Korea

Participants: V. K. Krishna Menon, Delegation of India
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., United States Mission

Menon began the conversation by asking what our general attitude was, and I stated it to him substantially as I have done to all the others—that we favored a conference of two sides and not a round table, that we felt the conference should deal exclusively with Korea and that of course Korean participation was absolutely vital.

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[1] A marginal note on the source text indicated Smith saw this memorandum.

He started a discussion of the possible site and said that he thought it would be an excellent thing to have the conference in New York and that New Delhi had also been suggested, but he said of course India did not want to do anything which would be an embarrassment to us in our relations with the Koreans. Although this remark was made in connection with the selection of a site, I interpreted it to mean that India did not want to do anything to embarrass us in our relations with the Koreans in any respect, and said that I appreciated his spirit and that knowing how much he valued frankness and practices it himself, I would be equally frank and say that it would be a great embarrassment to us in our relations with Korea for India to be a member of the Conference because of the well-known attitude of the President of Korea. I said that we had the greatest respect and admiration for India and were delighted that India was Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. We felt grateful to India for having accepted this difficult post, thereby contributing to the ending of the hostilities. I said that we thought so much of India that we intended to support Mrs. Pandit for President of the General Assembly, and that if our own purely national views were all that were involved we might very well not have the same attitude as regards this Political Conference. But, I said, in view of the realities, it would be certainly much better if India did not participate. I pointed out that once you get away from the concept of two sides, you invite a chaotic situation because I could see no criterion that could be established. If one non-belligerent should be a member, then how could one say that Japan, who had a common frontier with Korea, should not be a member? How could one refuse the claim of Nationalist China, or even one of the large Latin American countries?

He asked what resolutions we thought would come up and what my ideas were on the procedure which should be followed. He said he felt there should be a two-day period after the Assembly opens on Monday[2] for Delegates to consult with each other and to get the views of their Governments on the other resolutions which would have been introduced.

He asked whether I thought any valid arrangements could be made in Korea without the Soviet Union. I said that we had no objection to the Soviet Union being in on the Communist side, but we did not see why we should roll out the red carpet or put a halo around their heads when they had instigated the whole aggression; that you could never convince the everyday American that the Soviet Union had been neutral or had been on our side. I added that I did not think a successful conference could be held without the Communist Chinese, or without Korea, or without the United States, and that the Soviet Union was not the only country which could play a big part in a valid settlement of the Korean affair.

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[2] Aug. 17.

He said that India would not make up its mind as to its role until they had had a chance to see what all the different factors were. He said that India would serve only if both sides requested her to, but that India would never shirk from a duty no matter how disagreeable. He said he thought that if we did not want India to be present we ought to send word through our Ambassador to India, and I told him we were doing so. He said he did not know how the Prime Minister would react.

He said that he gathered from what I said that what the Americans had in mind was just an extension of the Panmunjom system "with either you or Dulles or someone else sitting in General Harrison's place." I said that it was undoubtedly true that if the Chinese Communists and the Koreans and the United States agreed, that agreement would accomplish a great deal, but that the participants in this case would have much broader powers to deal with far more fundamental matters than was true with the military conferees at Panmunjom.

He said that as regards the repatriation of prisoners, India might be considered as neutral, but that since she had voted for the resolution condemning Communist aggression she could not be considered to be on the Communist side. He said that because India had sent a field ambulance to Korea but had not sent combat troops, although their present detachment was armed, it was rather hard for him to figure out just what India's position was. I said that it was up to him to make up his mind as to what position he wanted his country to have.

He is nervous about a leak which occurred last Spring from a State Department source so I request this report be not distributed.

611.95B/8-1453

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Under Secretary of State (Smith) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 14, 1953.

I think it important that during the United Nations Assembly [2] we keep in mind the importance of maintaining good relations with the Republic of Korea. The visit of Ambassador Lodge, Assistant Secretary Robertson and myself to Korea ended with a very good relationship. However, it cannot be maintained if the Koreans now think that we have forgotten about them and work only with the British, French, Indians, etc.

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[1] This memorandum, which was initialed by the Secretary, was also sent to Murphy and Robertson.

[2] The Seventh Session, to be resumed on Aug. 17.

Because the ROK felt this in relation to the armistice we had a narrow escape from disaster. We had to use up all the bargaining power we possessed to get President Rhee to go along with the armistice. Now we face the problem of his going along with the political conference. This will require first, the maintenance of good working relations in regard to the conference, and, secondly, ultimate decisions which will be acceptable to, even if not liked by, President Rhee.

There cannot be a successful political conference in relation to Korea which is boycotted by the ROK. On the other hand, the ROK in my opinion will not go into a "roundtable conference" dominated by the "great powers" such as UK, France, USSR, Communist China, India and U.S. The ROK feel that in the past they have always been sacrificed to such great power interests and I do not believe that they could or should be expected to go into a political conference of this type. Furthermore, I believe that those who propose this type of conference should be compelled to face up to what it means in terms of ROK participation. The U.S. cannot be expected in this matter to "sell" the conference to Rhee because it is not the type of conference which the U.S. itself believes in.

JFD

357.AD/8-1753: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations [1]

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, August 17, 1953—7:10 p. m.

68. Swedish Embassy has in confidence made available to Department report from Swedish Ambassador Peiping that following is Chinese Communist sentiment as expressed by Chou En-lai regarding political conference Korea:

Desire following 11 powers be represented: US, Soviet Union, England, France, China, India, North Korea, South Korea, Poland, Burma and Sweden. Desire conference take roundtable form but decisions of conference to require agreement of "parties to armistice" to be binding. Conference to consider questions in order appearing in Art. 60 of Armistice, i.e., withdrawal all foreign troops from Korea, peaceful settlement Korea question, and after this consider "other questions". Specifically stated did not want to discuss Indochina parallel with consideration Korean questions. Chou En-lai indicated Chinese Communists would show conciliatory attitude but this should not be interpreted as weakness. Stated Swedish participation viewed as natural consequence to role in Supervisory and Repatriation Commissions.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Alfred L. Jenkins of the Office of Chinese Affairs and by Johnson, who also cleared it for transmission.

Embassy did not know whether Swedish Ambassador received foregoing directly from Chou but implication is that third person transmitted.

SMITH

Editorial Note

On April 18, 1953, the United Nations General Assembly had adopted Resolution 705 (VII) calling for a reconvening of the Assembly session and for resumption of consideration of the Korean question upon notification by the United Nations Command that the armistice had been signed. Upon receipt of this news, the President of the Assembly informed the member states that the Seventh Session of the Assembly would reconvene on August 17.

In a brief plenary meeting on that date, the Assembly decided to refer the Korean question to the First Committee, and the 15 nations with armed troops in Korea submitted two draft resolutions. The first (United Nations document A/L.151/Rev. 1) called for United Nations participation at the political conference limited to those nations "contributing armed forces under the Unified Command" which desired to be represented plus the Republic of Korea. The second (United Nations document A/L.154/Rev. 1) paid tribute to the soldiers and nations responsible for the United Nations effort in Korea. For texts of these two resolutions and relevant statements by Ambassador Lodge, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 31, 1953, pages 284–287.

795.00/8-1853

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Sandifer) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1953.

Subject: Summary of Korean Negotiations in New York, August 15–17.

At the meetings of the delegations of the 16 nations participating in Korea on August 15 and 16 agreement was reached on two resolutions which were submitted for circulation under the sponsorship of all these delegations with the exception of South Africa, which refused to cosponsor on the ground of lack of interest in the area.

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[1] A marginal notation by Scott indicated that the Secretary of State saw this memorandum on Aug. 19.

1. The first resolution (Tab A, USUN Telegram 114[2]) on arrangements for the conference follows substantially the draft approved in the Department, with one major modification: the enumeration of the states participating on the UN side was replaced by a general clause giving all states with armed forces in Korea the right to participate. This formula was agreed upon after Canada insisted on being added to the original listing, Belgium and the Netherlands refused to cosponsor unless included and others reserved their position. Although the present text makes it possible for all states which contributed forces to participate, it is left open to private negotiations to determine which would actually participate.

2. The second resolution (Tab B, USUN Telegram 112[3]) expresses tribute to the UNC forces in Korea. It has been agreed that this resolution will be taken up last in the Assembly at the insistence of the UK and others who feel that its listing of all UN resolutions will provoke a strong Soviet attack.

3. The third resolution (Tab C, USUN Telegram 113[4]) providing for Soviet participation was developed by Ambassador Lodge and Lloyd. It represents a compromise between the UK view that the Soviets should participate in a round-table conference and our view that they should be invited by the other side since this is a conference of "both sides". In order to get the UK to agree to the clause "provided the other side desires it", Ambassador Lodge showed Lloyd your letter of August 13.[5] Lloyd agreed with the letter, except for the paragraph stressing the "two side" concept, and showed Lodge a formula "drafted by Salisbury after consultation with Churchill", calling for USSR participation as a member of the UN. The present text is sponsored by the UK, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Lodge has made it known that the United States will vote for this resolution.

4. A fourth resolution (Tab D),[6] submitted by Australia and New Zealand, provides for the participation of India.

Ambassador Lodge was unable to head off the introduction of this resolution even though he made it clear that the ROK would not participate if India were included and that if the ROK does not participate, the United States must reserve its position as to participation. Mr. Martin (Canada) and Spender challenged this view claiming that President Rhee cannot be allowed to have a veto on the selection of the participants.

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[2] This telegram, containing the draft resolution submitted as UN document A/L.151/Rev. 1, was not attached to the source text. (795.00/8-1553)

[3] This telegram, containing the draft resolution submitted as UN document A/L.154/Rev. 1, was not attached to the source text. (795.00/8-1553)

[4] Not attached. (795.00/8-1553)

[5] *Ante*, p. 1492.

[6] Not attached; the reference was to UN document A/L.153.

5. Tab E (USUN Telegrams 117, 118, 119 [7]) contains three telegrams from USUN reporting on the conversations with the 16 delegations, and indicating the general atmosphere among friendly delegations.

6. We have received through the Swedish Embassy a report on Chou En-lai's views on the political conference as transmitted by the Swedish Ambassador at Peiping. It indicates that Chou En-lai desires a "round-table" conference with the following participants: US, USSR, UK, France, Communist China, India, North Korea, ROK, Poland, Burma and Sweden. Decisions would require the agreement of the "parties to the armistice" to be binding. The Conference would consider items in the order specified in Article IV, paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement, i.e., withdrawal of foreign forces, peaceful settlement of Korean question, and then "other questions". He does not desire a discussion of Indo-China to "parallel" the talks on Korea.

7. At Monday's US Delegation meeting no disagreement was voiced over the US position as presented by Ambassador Lodge. In a perfunctory plenary Monday afternoon the Assembly, without discussion, referred the Korean question to the First Committee.

The First Committee held two meetings Tuesday, August 18. After rejecting by large majorities Soviet motions to hear the representatives of North Korea and Communist China, the Committee heard Ambassador Lodge, followed by France, the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Netherlands, and Belgium. A notable feature of the debate was the general support given by the speakers to Lloyd's hope that the concept of the "two sides" would not be perpetuated and that India would be invited to participate. The Committee then adjourned until Wednesday afternoon for lack of further speakers.

At the Monday morning meeting the USSR introduced a resolution (Tab F) [8] calling for a conference with eleven participants (as listed by Chou En-lai) and specifying that conference decisions "will be deemed to have been adopted if they have the consent of the parties which have signed the Armistice Agreement".

8. When Ambassador Allen saw Pillai in New Delhi, August 15, pursuant to your telegram of August 13 [9] concerning Indian participation in the Conference, he was told that India would not "agitate or canvass for membership". If the UK or Canada proposed Indian participation, Pillai thought the Government of India would await developments before deciding. Ambassador Allen commented that we may assume that, despite our reasoning, the Government of India will not voluntarily withdraw.

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[7] These telegrams were not attached to the source text. (795.00/8-1553 and 795.00/8-1653)

[8] Not attached; the reference was to UN document A/C.1/L.48.

[9] The reference was to telegram 49 to New York, Aug. 13, not printed. (357.AD/8-1353)

Present tentative indications as to the position of other delegations with regard to Indian participation are that (*a*) the Asian-African bloc (except for Pakistan) will probably support India's participation, although they are not overly enthusiastic about the idea; (*b*) the Latin Americans appear undecided, although there is general sentiment for India's participation; and (*c*) Norway and Denmark appear to have decided to vote for India.

357.AD/8-2653: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW DELHI, August 26, 1953—1 p. m.
NIACT

389. Repeated niact London 55. Re Deptel 216 August 24[1] and Embtel 388 August 25.[2]

I saw Nehru at 9:15 this morning to urge India's voluntary withdrawal from Korean political conference in accordance with Department's instructions. Conversation was most friendly, in sharp contrast to yesterday's outburst, and results were considerably better than I expected.

I emphasized that US had no objection to India as such, we appreciated India's valuable and possibly decisive role in achieving armistice due to fact that India was not active participant in Panmunjom negotiations, possibility that India might play similar role outside political conference, and that our genuine objective, as that of India, was to achieve success of conference, whether our views as to how this might best be achieved were similar or not. I then pointed out that if Korean conference was successful and wider discussions on Far East eventuate, US would expect India as well as other countries to formally participate in discussions of matters of direct interest to them.

Nehru said he was confident US Government was not trying to "do GOI down". He would be equally frank to say that in his personal opinion US had allowed itself to be tied down closely to ROK. He expressed appreciation for US Government's views (I read from telegram in order to emphasize their official nature) and said these views would be given full consideration. He remarked that vote was expected to be taken in GA committee today,[3] but that some time would elapse between committee vote and consideration of subject in plenary GA session. He said India was naturally in consultation with "other powers" on subject and he did not wish to be accused of going back on his word to them or acting behind their back. He would have to consult them again. He added that it was difficult in rapidly-developing situations of this kind to send categorical instructions to his delegation in NY and that certain amount of latitude was necessary.

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[1] In this telegram, Allen received instructions to see Nehru and urge India's voluntary withdrawal from the proposed Korean Political Conference. (357.AD/8-1553)

[2] In this telegram, Allen reported that he was unable to see Nehru, who was tied up in a party meeting; meanwhile he conveyed the substance of telegram 216 to New Delhi to Pillai for relaying to Nehru that night so that the Indian Prime Minister could think it over before his meeting with Allen on Aug. 26. (357.AD/8-2553)

[3] On Aug. 27 at the 625th meeting of the First Committee, the draft resolution to invite India to attend the political conference was adopted. (*Yearbook of the United Nations, 1953,* p. 126)

I then said, on my own, that one reason for serious US concern in this matter was due, in all frankness, to fact that we had large number of troops in Korea whom we did not wish to see placed in jeopardy (Usito 10, August 24[4] report was carried in today's press). Nehru asked whether our concern was over possibility of further aggression by any one. I said if political conference failed, situation would be highly unsatisfactory and tension mount, in which case any spark might set off conflagration without premeditated aggression by anyone.

I expressed confidence that GOI participated in our view that while show of hands in UN might be necessary, we would much prefer to avoid this contingency, with attendant animosities, if at all possible. Nehru said he agreed fully.

Nehru did not refer to his statement to Congress Party caucus last night, reported prominently in today's press, that India would not voluntarily withdraw under Rhee's threats and I carefully avoided subject or any reference to Rhee's attitude since such reference by me would have destroyed atmosphere of talk and merely brought forth further tirade of abuse against Rhee and against our allowing him to decide our policy.

Nehru did not explain "other powers" he would consult, but it is obvious he had Commonwealth principally in mind, although some consultation with Peking should also not be excluded. Australian High Commissioner has asked to see me this morning and I am seeing acting UK High Commissioner later.

I think it quite possible India will release Commonwealth from obligation to vote for Indian participation, Moreover, I do not believe India will participate in any case if we continue firm in our disapproval.

ALLEN

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[4] Not printed.

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Minutes of Cabinet Meeting[1]

[Extract]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 27, 1954—9 a. m.

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[1] These minutes were drafted by L. Arthur Minnich, Special Assistant to the White House Office. A note on the source text read: "(Reported by Minnich. Copies to Mrs. Whitman and Minnich.)" President Eisenhower did not attend the meeting; Vice President Nixon presided in his place.

Report on International Developments—Secretary Dulles viewed his trip to Korea and discussions with President Rhee as a fulfillment of one of the inducements for getting Rhee to sign the armistice. During their discussions Syngman Rhee fought to the last to secure commitments from the United States for the unification of Korea by whatever means possible and for material support for Korea from the United States should South Korea attempt unification by force. Mr. Dulles commented that the communiqué at the end of the conference had been misinterpreted, and that actually the United States retained a free hand in determining if it should walk out on the political conference after ninety days. It was quite clear to Mr. Rhee that the United States would confer with its other associates. Mr. Dulles stressed the last sentence of the communiqué, to the effect that there were no agreements not represented in the communiqué. The terms obtained for the United States South Korea's assurance that the ROK forces should remain under the control of the United Nations commander until at least next February. Also, there was a proviso that the United States would continue for six months to make use of Korean facilities presently available.

In regard to the debate in the United Nations on the Korean peace conference, Secretary Dulles outlined the background of the United Kingdom's commitment to India to have it participate. The bitterness between India and Korea makes it impossible for the United States to persuade Syngman Rhee to accept Indian participation, particularly since our bargaining power with him seems exhausted. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the armistice agreement called for a conference of *both sides,* and that Rhee could use Indian participation as an excuse for withdrawing and thus wrecking the conference. He stated that the United States has put the burden on the British for persuading Rhee to admit India if Britain is insistent on having India participate. He commented that Lord Salisbury understood the situation sympathetically.

In regard to Morocco,[2] Secretary Dulles commented that the present situation had developed as a result of French efforts to play one faction against another getting out of hand. He noted that the interest of the United States lies in avoiding Security Council action on this situation because of our need for continued French effort in Indo-China. He recognized that the US position in this respect would cost the votes of the Arab-Asian bloc on the Korean question.

Secretary Dulles viewed the fall of Mossadeq [3] as the presentation of a second chance for us in Iran.

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[2] For documentation on Morocco, see vol. XI, Part 1, pp. 599 ff.

[3] For documentation on the Iranian crisis, see volume X.

Secretary Dulles commented on the increase of sentiment against the Bricker Amendment among the younger members of the Bar Association, who are ready to wage a national education campaign. Following his appearance before the Bar Association in Boston, he judged that the Administration is in a much stronger position now on this question than last January.

Following the Secretary's presentation, the Vice President commented on our unfortunate position in regard to the UN Korean debate, whereby we have to take the blame for a situation which we cannot control yet cannot publicize without ruining present good relations with the British.

In response to the Vice President's query on the possibility of achieving Korean unification, Secretary Dulles stated that the possibility at this conference was small, but that there might be success in establishing forces which would work slowly to bring final good results. Such forces would be the economic development of South Korea to attract the North Koreans, and the continued presence of United States troops which would encourage the opposition to bargain unification in return for US military withdrawal. Secretary Dulles saw as the most difficult problem Syngman Rhee's desire for huge armaments which is inspired more by fear of Japan than of the Communists.

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LAM

Editorial Note

On August 28, 1953, the General Assembly considered the work of the First Committee as embodied in its report (United Nations document A/2450), which comprised four resolutions passed by the Committee on August 27. The first, resolution A, was the draft resolution introduced by the 15 nations with armed forces in Korea (United Nations document A/L.151/Rev. 1) with a minor amendment. It passed in the plenary session of the Assembly. The second, resolution B, which called for participation by the Soviet Union provided the other side desired it (originally United Nations document A/L.152/Rev. 2) also passed the Assembly. The third, resolution C, calling for India's participation at the future conference, was withdrawn when the Indian Representative, Krishna Menon, stated that the purposes of peace were best served by not forcing the draft resolution to a decision in the Assembly. Finally, the fourth, resolution D, which called for communication of the resolution of the Assembly to Peking and Pyongyang, was adopted. Together these three, resolutions A, B, and D, made up General Assembly Resolution 711 (VII); for a text and relevant statements by Ambassador Lodge, see Department of State *Bulletin,* September 14, 1953, pages 361–366.

795.00/5-453

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nash) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 3, 1953.

Subject: United States Policy in the Event of a Failure of the Korean Political Conference

1. Of increasing concern to the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in particular is the absence of any NSC policy with respect to United States action in the event of a collapse of the political conference on Korea.

2. NSC 157/1 [2] while considering the United States position to be taken at the conference did not consider the alternatives open to us in the event our minimum objectives are not achieved. This deficiency is of concern to the Department of Defense which is attempting to plan for all contingencies including that which might involve a resumption of military operations in Korea.

3. While it is generally understood that the United States would react immediately with vigorous military measures to a resumption of hostilities by the communists if the conference failed, it is less clear what our reaction would be to a ROK initiated military action under the same circumstances.

4. It does not appear to be too soon to begin the drafting of a paper dealing with United States policies in the event of a failure of the political conference. Certainly, if anything like the courses of action outlined in NSC 147 [3] is to be considered, certain preliminary action should be taken at once, not only in the military field, but in the political, as well. The difficulty already experienced at the United Nations in attempting to organize the conference plus certain statements of the Soviet delegate all point to the fact that a conference failure is more than a remote possibility.

5. I would suggest that it may be appropriate for the State Department to table a draft of their views on this problem as soon as practicable. The Department of Defense is prepared to contribute its views on all proposals advanced to the Planning Board.

FRANK C. NASH

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[1] According to a covering note by Bowie to Robertson, Sept. 4, this memorandum was an advance copy which would reach the Department of State by more formal channels later, but Bowie believed that S/P and FE should begin working on a draft paper as envisioned by Nash.

[2] Dated July 7, p. 1344.

[3] Dated Apr. 2, p. 839.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 163

United States Minutes of the Second Meeting, ANZUS Council: First Session [1]

[Extract] [2]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 9, 1953—10:15 a. m.

WAM M-1

. . . .

Agenda Item 3—Surveys of Situations Affecting Security in the Pacific

Korea

The Secretary stated that when this Administration took office the Korean armistice negotiations had been going on for a year and a half and were in a state of moribundness, if he could use such a word. We revived the negotiations, he said, by deciding on an alternative to the stalemate which was taking such a substantial toll in terms of lives and money—a more decisive effort. The decision of the President, set forth in his State of the Union message, to rescind the orders to the 7th Fleet to defend the China mainland by blockading Formosa was part and parcel of that alternative. With the Chinese Communists attacking us on the northern flank and strengthening their southern flank it was felt that there was no reason to have the 7th Fleet shielding their center for them. By lifting the orders on the 7th Fleet a possibility was opened up in the minds of the Chinese Communists which they had not had to consider before. We first felt them out by the prisoner-of-war exchange proposal. They responded to it and offered to reopen general negotiations. We refused until such time as the sick and wounded prisoners of war had actually been exchanged. The Secretary thought that the outcome had been helped by a discussion he had with Prime Minister Nehru [3] in which he explained the U.S. position and policies, which in turn he believed Nehru may have explained to the Chinese Communists, particularly since, after that talk, they had dropped their insistence on forcible repatriation.

At this point the Chinese Communists were ripe for an armistice. Our position was that an armistice on honorable terms would give an opportunity of reuniting Korea, which we believe *is* a possibility. We could not, however, continue fighting just for the Koreans' sake. The Secretary stressed that we fight for principles common to all the free world and not as a crusader trying to remedy all existing injustices. If we pursued the latter course, it might well be difficult to avoid creating new injustices.

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[1] This ANZUS Council meeting was the only time in 1953 that the signatories of the Australia-New Zealand-United States security treaty of 1951 formally consulted. This regularly scheduled meeting of the ANZUS Council was attended by the Secretary of State and the New Zealand and Australian Ministers of External Affairs along with ranking military representatives of the three governments.

[2] Preceding this extract were discussions on administrative details (item 1) and a survey of the world situation (item 2).

[3] See memoranda of conversation by Dulles, May 21 and 22, pp. 1068 and 1071, respectively.

Two principles were at stake in the Korean war: to throw back the aggressor to his original boundaries or beyond; and the non-forcible repatriation of prisoners and political asylum for those not wishing to return. We were justified in fighting for these principles but not just for the unity of Korea. The Secretary emphasized that in the past there has been too great a tendency to ignore the Republic of Korea in our planning and in our actions in the UN. Rhee had been taken too much for granted. Suddenly he jolted us by the release of the prisoners he held. However, it is important to remember that we cannot have an armistice or a peace without him. His 500,000-man army of good and loyal soldiers conducted a courageous campaign and cannot be ignored. One of the most difficult tasks we have had has been to get Rhee to go along with an armistice. The Secretary noted that we had done some things in the common interest which we did not want to do but that we had to pay the price. He referred to the security treaty with Korea, which we were reluctant to make because we do not want to assume such responsibilities in regard to the Asiatic mainland, and to our contribution to the economic reconstruction of Korea. He mentioned the closer political relationship which this country has effected with Rhee and singled out his own recent trip to Korea as an indication thereof. He also paid tribute to Assistant Secretary Robertson and the job he had done in his negotiations with Rhee.

The Secretary next turned to the political conference and Indian participation therein. He said that we felt the correct interpretation of the truce agreement was not to bring in everyone in the area who had an interest there, but that there should be two sides—the UN and the Communist. Not only had Rhee accepted the armistice reluctantly and literally, but he had a most intense and bitter distrust of the Indians. The prospects for success of any political conference would be diminished if India were sitting on our side and if we should then make any proposals which the Republic of Korea might feel had been motivated even in part by what Rhee would consider Nehru's "desire to appease Communist China".

Mr. Casey said Korea's distrust of India seemed unreal to the Australians and asked what motivations it had.

Mr. Robertson replied that this distrust arose from the Indian position on the non-repatriation of prisoners-of-war. Further, when Russia was proposed as a neutral, India had suggested Czechoslovakia or Poland instead. To the Koreans there was no difference between one

Communist country and another. He also cited the fact that when Stalin died Nehru had extolled him as "This great man of peace".

The Secretary said he had no doubt that Nehru and the Indian Government were sincerely anti-communist and look on the communists as India's enemies. They felt, however, that they must deal with the menace in quite a different way from ours. The Secretary had told Rhee that he believed he was wrong in his feelings about India.

The Secretary said that our position on India was motivated by the deep conviction that India's participation would not be for the best. He recounted a call he had made to Lord Salisbury in which he had told him that we had exhausted the possibilities of persuasion with Rhee, but that if the UK were to take on the task of reconciling Rhee to the presence of India at the conference, we would vote for India. This seemed to have impressed Salisbury. The Secretary was certain our position was correct on this matter. While away, he had become aware of the intensity of feeling on the subject, but he did not think that the situation in the UN was solely our fault. The UK had made a commitment to India long before that it would vote for India, at a time when the delicate situation in Korea was not fully appreciated. We feel that some constructive results may well come out of the conference. In response to Ambassador Spender's question as to what solutions might be considered, the Secretary mentioned the possibility of general elections in the whole area and Rhee's plan to take North Koreans into the vacant places in the presently constituted Assembly. The measure of armaments to be allowed the new Korean Government will be discussed and their effect on the sensitive northern zone would have to be considered. However, any realistic settlement would have to take into account the fact that the Chinese Communists would not accede to any build-up on their boundaries. Rhee, on the other hand was anxious to keep a big army. These two issues will have to be resolved on our side. The Secretary also said that, in the long range outlook, Rhee is as much concerned with Japan as he is with Soviet Russia and Communist China. This was one reason for our having concluded a security pact with him.

Ambassador Spender asked if it were not true that the Communists would never agree to Rhee's proposal and that Rhee would never agree to general elections. He asked if the Secretary could give any indication that Rhee might agree to such elections.

The Secretary said he did not want to make any forecasts and that we may never get to that issue if the Communists put barriers in the way of the political conference. It was not easy to see what the answer would be. The position we had taken on Indian participation was done partly to put us in a position in which we could in turn ask a concession from Rhee later on. He noted the danger from past experience of bringing the Communists into any Government. Rhee is, and we should be, wary of that. However, the Secretary did not think the situation was hopeless.

Mr. Webb asked how far the other side had been approached.

The Secretary replied that they had been approached through Sweden, the Swedish Foreign Office and the Swedish Ambassador in Peiping. We had transmitted to the Chinese Communists the proposal for the date and site of the political conference as agreed on at the 17-power meeting on August 5 [*1*?]. There had been no response yet on their part. In answer to a question on the composition of the Communist side, the Secretary said that the UN side had been determined and that the Communists could invite anyone they want. We would not exert any influence or try to dictate who should be on their side.

The First Session recessed at 12:50.

357.AD/9–1453

The Secretary of State to the Acting British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Salisbury) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 14, 1953.

The Chinese Communist reaction to the position adopted by the United Nations General Assembly for the Korean Political Conference is about as you expected. We are not surprised, of course, to find Chou En-lai taking the same line Mr. Vishinsky presented in the Assembly.

I believe you indicated previously that the Chinese reply would be preliminary in character and not their final word. Although your Government and mine differed on one of the points at issue, I am sure that you will agree that having made our decision in the Assembly a few weeks ago, we must continue on that path. Surely there can be no question of reconsidering the resolutions adopted on August 28 or of reopening the entire question in the face of Communist threats. The Assembly took this action after hearing the Communist argument from Mr. Vishinsky, and nothing which Chou En-lai has said alters the situation.

In our view the Assembly should stand firm on the action which it took on August 28 and should reject any attempts to reopen the question at this time. If this is done firmly and expeditiously, with your Government and mine, and the other participants in the Korean action, standing together, the Communists may see that further dilatory and diversionary tactics are useless and will get on with the conference. They would then find some way of saving face and respond constructively to the message concerning time and place of the conference which the United States has sent through the Swedish Government.

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[1] This message was transmitted to London in priority telegram 1381, Sept. 14, and repeated to USUN as telegram 125. It was drafted by Henkin and cleared in draft with Matthews, Johnson, Barnard, and Dulles (by Murphy) and cleared by Sandifer. A similar, although not identical telegram, was sent to Bidault in telegram 941 to Paris, Sept. 14, not printed. (357.AD/9–1453)

Because of the illnesses of Churchill and Eden, Lord Salisbury was Acting British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Our Delegation in New York will be in contact with yours to discuss tactics to achieve our common objective. Since the Assembly's action took place less than three weeks ago, I believe that we should oppose the inclusion of this question on the agenda.

357.AD/9-1553: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State

SECRET LONDON, September 15, 1953—1 p. m.

1109. Department pass USUN 16; repeated information New Delhi 22.

1. Following is abridged paraphrase telegram from British mission Peiping received Foreign Office this morning:

(*a*) Indian Ambassador Raghavan saw Chou En-lai twice before replying to UN on political conference.[1] Chou gloomy and serious. Decision send reply taken by national committee of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference which in session in Peiping last week. At conference Liu Shao-chi had advocated sending no reply whatever to UN on grounds further discussions would serve no useful purpose. Chou implied he apprehensive effect on own position if, in effort keep negotiations open and notwithstanding fact Chinese had, from their own viewpoint, already made substantial concessions to meet United States stand, Chinese reply would lead to no modification United States position.

(*b*) Raghavan tried persuade Chou at least avoid mention names additional countries, even if he insisted round-table discussion essential. Chou replied if no names mentioned, US would assume Chinese intended include Communist countries. If reply referred "other Asian countries" without mentioning which, US would assume Communists trying include Viet Minh and Outer Mongolia. Chinese preferred make plain they content with non-Communist Asian countries with which Peiping had diplomatic relations.

(*c*) Chou made great point of round table and said there would be no reason refuse this approach since USSR, which non-combatant, already included. Chou anxious establish more friendly relations with United States with which, however, negotiations almost impossible; there appeared no possibility of conference being held in more friendly spirit or having any chance succeed unless neutrals participate.

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[1] On Sept. 13 in a radio broadcast subsequently sent as a communication to the President of the General Assembly, Chou En-lai delivered his government's official reply to the Assembly resolution of Aug. 28 by suggesting a return to the "round table" conference with neutral participation and proposing that the entire matter be reconsidered at the Eighth Session of the Assembly, which was to open in New York on Sept. 15. For a text of this communication, see UN document A/2469.

(*d*) Raghavan attempted argue, in interest world peace, it preferable have conference constituted on UN terms than none at all, but Chou appeared regard inclusion neutrals as important principle which China must maintain. He repeated he "wanted truth and could not sacrifice principles".

(*e*) Chou believed if Chinese representatives participated in discussions in UN they could get acceptance their proposals. Raghavan will continue press Chinese to agree to proposals which will get conference under way. He thinks during negotiations Chinese may be willing modify their proposals to some extent if US shows willingness compromise, but if US persists in maintaining its position there will be stalemate.

2. Foreign Office remarks Chou up to his old tricks—that tactics he now using in discussions with Raghavan strikingly resemble those formerly employed in talks with Panikkar. He appears again be attempting use India bargain with United States in effort obtain yet further concessions. In inferring he risking own position and prestige in showing willingness negotiate with West, Chou using tactic already familiar to Department.

ALDRICH

Eisenhower Library, C.D. Jackson records, 1953-1956

Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Cutler) [1]

TOP SECRET BOSTON, September 21, 1953.

Memorandum in re Surrendered MIG, Sept. 20/53 [2]

1. In April, 1953, General Clark made an offer to pay to any pilot who would bring a modern operational combat-type aircraft in flyable condition to South Korea a sum of money. This offer was part of a world-wide psychological campaign, instituted in Korea as a place most likely of success. The offer as published in Korea in leaflets (in Chinese, Korean, and Russian) contained the following substantial points:

(1) offer of help to brave pilots of the enemy;
(2) guarantee of refuge and protection;
(3) names will be kept secret, on request;
(4) Far Eastern Command will reward $50,000 to any pilot who delivers a modern operational combat-type aircraft in flyable condition to South Korean territory. The first pilot who does so will receive an additional $50,000 bonus;

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[1] This memorandum was attached to a note by Cutler to Jackson, Sept. 22, in which Cutler noted that the President was "unconvinced" by the recommendations described in this memorandum. For more on Eisenhower's doubts, see his letter to Smith, *infra.*

[2] At 9:24 a.m., Sept. 21 (Sept. 20, Washington time), a MIG 15 landed at Kimpo airfield near Seoul and the North Korean pilot asked for asylum, as well as the reward offered by Clark.

(5) instructions as to how to come to Kimpo Airbase. (*Note*: the pilot who surrendered this plane came in that way.)

2. The President's original reaction to paying the $100,000 reward to the pilot was: (1) what about the technicalities of the armistice and international law; (2) we should pay the $100,000 as a matter of national honor; (3) we should withdraw the offer as to the future; (4) we might consider sending back the plane. He thought that the psychological effect of saying that we are not interested in more MIGs and offering to return the plane would be significant.

3. Radford proposed to send this message to Clark: "You are authorized to release without delay statement to the effect that Far East Command offer of payment for delivery of operational jet aircraft made on April 27 last is valid."

His reasoning was that to carry through out [*on*?] the offer will have a significant psychological effect on the Soviets, which will not be able to know hereafter which, if any, of their pilots can hereafter be relied upon.

4. Smith stated that he unqualifiedly approved of paying the money to the pilot; that it did not contravene the armistice terms; and that he did not think it ran contrary to international law.

5. Wilson, Anderson, Stevens, Smith, C. D. Jackson, Radford, Carroll all supported the position of paying the $100,000. Radford, Carroll, Anderson, Stevens, Wilson (I think) felt we should leave the offer open.

6. The President wanted to be sure that the matter had been fully thought out; doubted if more pilots would now come forward in response to leaving the offer open; wanted to be sure that the State Department was sure of its position as to the armistice and international law; said he would support the decision indicated above, if made and carried out.

7. I reported the above to Radford. He said he would check again with Undersecretary Smith, and thereafter dispatch the message.

8. Radford suggested we should review in the National Security Council the question of what our course should be in the future as to continuing the offer for more MIGs, which could be withdrawn in the future at any time deemed desirable. He will send over to me the text of the leaflet and the messages, for consideration; possibly by the Council.

9. In summary, the conflict in opinions was: (a) an opinion that while we should pay the reward, we did so only because of our honor; did not want, or for psychological reasons should say we did not want, the MIG; should be willing to return it; and should cancel the offer for the future; thus evidencing that we did not regard the matter as important, whether or not it had a bearing on the armistice; (b) an opinion that we should keep open the offer as a possible inducement to other pilots to

defect and thus have a potentially psychologically adverse effect on the enemy who would worry about *all* their pilots.

R.C.

795A.00/9-2153

The President to the Under Secretary of State (Smith)

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
EYES ONLY

BOSTON, September 21, 1953.

DEAR BEDELL: I am sorry that I was not in Washington today to discuss the MIG incident with the entire staff. I realize that the recommendations sent to me had the unanimous support of my shrewdest and most knowledgeable advisers on such matters; [1] however, I must confess I was not convinced. I have the feeling that the decision recommended to me—and which I approved—follows the ritualistic, and will likely have no other effect than just *to start an argument as to the ethics of the case.*

Perhaps I should pause to say, here, that I well realize I can be very wrong. If I didn't realize this, I would have decided according to my own instinctive reaction rather than as I did.

Having expressed this much distrust of the decision we made, I hasten to add that since we did not do anything startling or different we should expect no startling results—either advantageous or adverse. My own solution made no hit with anybody and, of course, I must make the further admission that it was merely shooting from the hip.

But my reaction was:

(a). Like all the rest of you, I agree that we had to pay the $100,000 in this case.

(b). The MIG plane is no longer of any great interest to us that I know of, and consequently we are not anxious to have this one—and certainly I cannot see why we want any more of them.

(c). Having paid $100,000, I would have withdrawn the offer.

(d). Next, I would have notified the Communists that we had no interest in the MIG plane, and if they wanted to send a pilot down and take it back, that would be all right with us.

The advantages, as I see them, of this course of action would have been to stand before the world as very honorable people, maintaining that while we had not been guilty of real violation of the Armistice, we were anxious to avoid any implication of violating its spirit. As a consequence of this desire, we not only redeemed our pledge to pay the $100,000, but we likewise were ready to return the ship to the Commies.

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[1] These recommendations were described in the memorandum by Cutler, *supra.*

Of course, someone would argue that you could not possibly explain to the American people the expenditure of $100,000 for something we did not want. My own reply to that one would have been that we were letting the offer stand until we could find out if there were any signs on the other side of someone taking up our offer, well knowing that if he did, we would get certain technical information concerning the latest types in use, and then let it go.

Over and again this disadvantage of explanation at home would have been, in my opinion, a tremendous gain in propaganda value in almost every other country.

There is, of course, no reason for writing this except to give you personally some inkling of the reasons and considerations that flashed through my mind when I heard about the matter. If we are to win the propaganda war—and I think it most important that we do—we have got to be alert for every opportunity to produce *unusual* results. The normal and the routine are not good enough, and I do not for a moment believe that the defection of this one North Korean will encourage any others to come in.

You will recall that in World War II, when we gave the French some P–40s, two of the pilots defected at once and went back to France with our planes. This did not stop us from giving more to the French. Some months ago a Polish pilot came into Denmark with a plane, and I believe one also came in to Yugoslavia. These incidents are so scattered and so infrequent as to have little significance.

Of course, if MIG planes start coming in to us by the hundreds, I will eat crow, but knowing the Communists I would gamble that there will be little if any more of this. Their methods of punishing people through torturing families are too well known and too effective to give rise to any great hope that we are going to wreck the Communist Air Force in this fashion.

If we get accused of violating the spirit of the Armistice, and this argument makes any headway with neutrals and even some of our friends, I think we will experience a defeat in this so-called psychological warfare.

This note is for no official action whatsoever. I am merely trying to put my personal thoughts before you—as my old comrade and associate—so that when next we meet we may discuss these matters in an effort to develop a sort of pattern, or at least a conviction, that will possibly help us in the future. As for the current one, we have made our decision, we will make it stick and we will do the best we can with it. I think it goes without saying that I hope you and C.D. and Radford are completely correct in your estimate.

As ever, DE

Editorial Note

On September 22, 1953, the United States Representative at the United Nations opposed the Soviet proposal (United Nations document A/2484) for inscription on the agenda of the Eighth Session of the General Assembly a reconsideration of the Assembly's resolution of August 28. In both the General (Steering) Committee and the plenary session of the Assembly, the Soviet request for inscription was defeated by large majorities. For the texts of Ambassador Lodge's statements on this question, see Department of State *Bulletin,* October 5, 1953, pages 469–470.

795A.00/9-2353

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the President [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 23, 1953.

In the matter of the MIG. So you will not think too ill of my judgment, I was consulted and expressed an opinion only in the matter of the payment of the $100,000, which, as you know, I felt should be paid, as the good faith of the United States was involved. As to subsequent procedure, I must say I agree with you, and I believe the solution we worked out this morning [2] will make the best of the present situation, considering the number of statements that have been made already.

Also, I suggested and will try to arrange to have the pilot reject the $100,000 on the basis that his action was because of his own convictions and not for money. We can then arrange to have him taken over as a "ward" by the National Committee for Free Asia, which will give him the technical education he wishes and provide for his future to the extent of the reward which he would otherwise have received. C. D. and I feel that there is real propaganda value in this.

W.B.S.

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[1] A marginal note on the source text indicated that this memorandum was delivered to the White House at 12:30 p.m., Sept. 23.

[2] According to a memorandum from Bonbright to Barbour and Thurston, Sept. 23, 1953, the question of the defection was discussed at the Secretary's meeting that morning and the consensus was that although the pilot should be paid the $100,000, the MIG should be returned. The general feeling was that paying rewards for Soviet planes was counterproductive as a psychological weapon because it negated ideological motivation. (795A.00/9-2153)

In JCS telegram 948829, Sept. 23, 1953, the Joint Chiefs instructed CINCFE to withdraw the cash reward for Soviet planes and to offer to return the MIG in question to the rightful owner. (795A.00/9-2353)

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) and the Director, Foreign Operations Administration (Stassen)

[WASHINGTON,] September 30, 1953.

As I understand it, it is now agreed that you two (keeping the Secretary of State constantly informed) will see that some individual is charged with the responsibility for the Washington end of our efforts to rehabilitate South Korea. Likewise, you will make arrangements at the Korean end so that this work can progress rapidly and efficiently.

Because it appears that a memorandum I wrote last July to express some thoughts of mine along this line was probably lost, I am attaching hereto a copy.[1] As of today it is, of course, not completely applicable, but it does show you that I consider the Korean situation to give us an opportunity even greater than is the responsibility involved.

I realize that in Korea the Army's preoccupation has been in preparation of a defense line in the rear of the neutral zone. Now, however, this work should be well along and certainly there should be available technical personnel whose enthusiastic cooperation can make every appropriated dollar do the work of ten.

I shall be glad to talk with either or both of you at any time about this problem.

D.D.E.

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[1] The attached copy is not printed. The President wrote two memoranda in July regarding assistance to Korea; see pp. 1446 and 1457.

795.00/10-253

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 2, 1953.

Subject: Korea's Unification and Assurances Against External Aggression.

Participants:
- Foreign Minister Pyun, Republic of Korea [2]
- Mr. Dulles, Secretary of State
- Assistant Secretary Walter S. Robertson, Far Eastern Bureau
- Mr. Arthur Dean
- Mr. Philip Han, Counselor of Korean Embassy
- Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Northeast Asian Affairs

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Young.

[2] Foreign Minister Pyun arrived in Washington on Sept. 30 to sign on Oct. 1 the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea. For the texts of statements made by Dulles and Pyun at the signing ceremony, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 12, 1953, pp. 484–486.

At the beginning and end of this meeting, the Secretary emphasized to Foreign Minister Pyun that, first, the United States had not reached any final decisions or conclusions regarding proposals to make at the Political Conference and, second, had not officially discussed or even "whispered" anything about any proposals with other governments. The Secretary took this occasion again to remind Dr. Pyun and Mr. Han that they need not put any stock in newspaper stories about neutralization, such as the recent story in the *New York Times*, since they do not speak for or reflect official attitudes of the United States Government. Of course, there would be articles on this subject and even statements by various persons, such as Senator Knowland's, since there is so much interest in the United States and in the United Nations in obtaining the unification of Korea. However, up to the present, most of this had all been a matter of speculation, particularly since the United States Government had not completed its various studies. In any event, the Secretary wished Dr. Pyun to know that lack of adequate consultation in the past was a thing of the past, and that this Administration would continue firm in its policy of consulting fully ahead of time with the Republic of Korea Government in any proposals regarding Korea. Dr. Pyun expressed his appreciation for these assurances and for those which he had received on September 25 from the Secretary through Mr. Dean.

The Secretary said he wished today to talk over informally with Dr. Pyun some possible ideas for unification of Korea which might be suggested at the Political Conference that the United States strongly hoped would be convened soon. In particular, he said he wished to explore with Dr. Pyun the possibility of finding some form of international guarantee for a unified Korea, or what has been described, perhaps not altogether accurately by some, as the "neutralization" of Korea. The Secretary told the Foreign Minister that the latter's letter to him of September 26 [3] appeared to be based on a complete misapprehension regarding the so-called "neutralization". In any case, the idea clearly did not involve the sort of "neutrality" to which Dr. Pyun had so strongly objected in his letter of September 26, nor did it contemplate a complete disarmament of Korea. The Secretary asked Dr. Pyun if he would object to a Soviet guarantee of Korea, and made it clear that acceptance of such a guarantee would not mean that either the United States or the Republic of Korea thereby would take for granted the reliability of any Soviet pledge. The United States had a non-aggression pledge from the U.S.S.R., but did not suppose that it alone protected the United States or might not be violated by the U.S.S.R. at any time.

Dr. Pyun at first insisted that any such guarantee would be completely worthless because the Communists could not be trusted to keep their word and because Korea could not put its security in the hands of such powerful and untrustworthy enemies who had shown in many instances their willingness to break solemn international undertakings. After the Secretary pressed him as to whether he would object to such a guarantee, since it was not a question of assuming Communist reliability, Dr. Pyun finally indicated that he might not oppose a guarantee signed by the United States, the United Nations, Communist China, and the U.S.S.R.

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[3] No copy of this letter has been found in Department of State files.

The Secretary then turned to the question of a demilitarized zone along Korea's land frontier. He said that, in his discussions with President Rhee last August, President Rhee had favored a demilitarized zone on both sides of Korea's international boundary. Dr. Pyun insisted that President Rhee could never have agreed to having part of the zone in Korea. On the contrary, President Rhee and the Republic of Korea Government desired a demilitarized area along the Chinese side of the border since aggression had always come from that direction and since Korea in its history had never attacked Manchuria. According to Dr. Pyun, a demilitarized zone such as the Secretary had mentioned would take away Korea's natural boundary which should be fortified, and most [*move*] it to the south. At first, Dr. Pyun stated that would be unacceptable.

A long discussion followed regarding various aspects of a demilitarized zone. The Secretary and Mr. Robertson repeatedly pointed out that the security situation regarding Korea would be entirely different from that of the past, because the Republic of Korea would have a mutual defense treaty with the United States which would permit United States forces to be disposed in Korea. If the Republic of Korea insisted on keeping its historic border area militarized, United States air and other forces could be stationed right next to Communist territory. This would be extremely provocative for the Communists. The Secretary said it could stir up their lingering suspicions and make them feel that vital installations, such as Port Arthur and Vladivostok, would be seriously endangered. The Secretary, Mr. Robertson, and Mr. Dean all emphasized to Dr. Pyun that it was necessary to consider the Communists' suspicions and fears of us as a real factor.

The Secretary told Dr. Pyun frankly that, if the Koreans insisted on having the right to have bases and fortifications with United States elements along the Yalu, it would be impossible ever to negotiate with the Communists on a unified Korea and that it would never come about on such terms. A deneutralized zone, with proper safeguards and assurances, might, however, be one proposal that could be used to negotiate Korea's unification. The only way of possibly getting the Communists to agree to a unified Korea would be to make a reasonable proposal which we all could accept and which world public opinion could support. If the Communists nevertheless turned that down, it would be clear that they had no intention of sincerely seeking a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

The Secretary said he had this in mind in his speech at the United Nations when he had suggested that the big powers should renounce any future interest in using Korea as a jumping off place. Since the Koreans complain so bitterly over the way the great powers have treated them in the past, the Secretary assumed that the Koreans would welcome any such renouncement and he had not heard any objections yet to his remarks from the Korean side.

Dr. Pyun kept arguing that no part of the demilitarized zone should be established in Korea. Mr. Robertson pointed out several practical advantages to having a demilitarized area, such as a shorter defensive line. Mr. Robertson also pointed out that the Koreans could have fortifications if they desired in the area just south of the demilitarized zone, though he cautioned against the development of a "Maginot-line" psychology in today's world.

The Secretary told Dr. Pyun that we were having military studies made of the various aspects of some kind of demilitarized zone. Since these studies had not been completed, the remarks made here today were entirely of a preliminary and tentative character. He himself wondered whether or not the natural frontier was defensible and had the impression that United States military authorities had considered it too long and difficult to defend. They had gained a great deal of experience and knowledge in the defense of the Korean peninsula in the last three years which would be of great assistance in determining the most suitable location for a demilitarized zone.

After the Secretary, Mr. Robertson and Mr. Dean had pointed out several advantages of the demilitarized zone on both sides of the Yalu River, Dr. Pyun said that the Republic of Korea might be willing to give assurances to the other side, that it would not build up its air bases in North Korea and might agree to some form of a demilitarized zone. He appeared to concede that it might be possible to set it up on both sides of the Yalu. As to his concern over the political effects, Mr. Dean indicated that civil administration within the zone would be the responsibility of the Korean Government. Mr. Young mentioned the need to work out some international agreement on the distribution of hydroelectric power across both sides of the Yalu as part of any arrangements for establishing a demilitarized zone in the area.

Dr. Pyun suggested several times that if the U.S.S.R would consent to the demilitarization of Vladivostok and Port Arthur, the Republic of Korea would consent to a demilitarized zone along the Yalu. The Secretary commented that he did not believe such a proposal would be at all practical, since it was unlikely that the Soviet Union would ever agree to the dismantling of important military facilities in these areas. The Secretary also pointed out that it would also be impractical to make any such proposal because of the great physical difficulties, if not impossibility, of moving or the closing up of such a large number of air, naval and military installations.

Finally, the Secretary said that the term "neutralization" was a vague expression which would have different meanings for different people. What he had in mind was indicated in his New York speech. Dr. Pyun stated that he wished to have his remarks considered as personal and not as any indication of his Government's views or any commitment. The Secretary assured him that the talk was entirely of an exploratory and informal nature, and that there would be subsequent conversations with the Republic of Korea authorities as our ideas developed.

WALTER S. ROBERTSON

795.00/10–253

Memorandum by the Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Dean) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 2, 1953.

Subject: Conversation with Dr. Pyun

Following the meetings in your respective offices this morning,[2] I went to the Shoreham and had lunch with Dr. Pyun. He told me that:

1. Dr. Rhee was terribly concerned over whether there was or was not going to be a political conference, and as to what he could do to bring about a unified Korea on the assumption there was not going to be any political conference.

2. I reminded him again of the language in the joint communiqué that "Between now and the date when the Mutual Defense Treaty can be expected to come into force and effect, our Armed Forces in Korea will be subject to the United Nations Command which will comply with the armistice terms."

3. He replied yes, but that Dr. Rhee felt that if the political conference were not held on time there would be great unrest in Korea and that he might be forced to take some action. I called his attention specifically to the fact that neither we nor the nations signing the Sixteen Power Agreement were under any obligations to resume fighting unless in their unilateral judgement there should occur unprovoked armed attack by the Communist forces against the Republic of Korea in viola-

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[1] A marginal notation by O'Connor indicated that this memorandum, also addressed to Robertson and Murphy, was seen by the Secretary of State.

As of Sept. 15, 1953, Dean had been appointed Deputy to the Secretary of State in preparation for the prospective Korean Political Conference with the rank of Ambassador. Dean was to meet with the Communist side for preliminary discussions at Panmunjom. For clarity, he will be referred to as the Representative for the Korean Political Conference.

[2] Presumably meetings with Foreign Minister Pyun.

tion of the Armistice and that it was most important that neither the UN Command nor Dr. Rhee take the slightest action to either (a) bring about such unprovoked attack or (b) take any action which might be deemed in world opinion to warrant such "unprovoked armed attack".

4. I said that we were dealing with his government and Dr. Rhee as full partners under all circumstances and that we fully expected them to live up to both the spirit and the letter of the Armistice Agreement, and that even in the face of very considerable provocation we must keep our powder dry and remain unexcited. He said that this would be very difficult for Dr. Rhee to do, and that even if we and the other 16 nations did not come to his aid, he might have to take some action.

5. I said I could not be too emphatic that if Dr. Rhee did proceed north of the 38th parallel, or start any armed attack without our full assent, he would lose the force of world opinion and of American public opinion and that it would be exceptionally difficult to help him; and that if the Communists over-ran him, he would have done his country irreparable harm and that there ought not to be any nonsense about it. I said further that all of the 16 nations were worried and concerned about this matter and we had assured them that we had every confidence that Dr. Rhee would live up to the letter and the spirit of the agreements he had entered into with us. I said that if the political conference were not held, a most difficult period would ensue and we had to be sure we could count on Dr. Rhee's complete cooperation.

6. Dr. Pyun said that public opinion in his country was running very high because of the Indian troops shooting prisoners,[3] and that he felt Dr. Rhee might have to take some action which would bring about the freedom of the prisoners. I said that he would be taking a major responsibility in his own hands and in my judgement he would be making a disastrous error if he attempted unilaterally to release prisoners entrusted under the Armistice Agreement to the Indians by armed action initiated by Dr. Rhee; that it was a time for very calm and deliberate judgement and that I was very sure that we and the other nations would support his government in any reasonable action but that there must not be military action.

7. He then proceeded to elaborate a long thesis that the next attack of the Soviets would be beyond the territory of the United States; that the Soviets would tell Japan and the European nations that they would not harm them if they did not attempt to help us and that he felt we were wasting a great deal of our time and effort in attempting to cultivate the European nations and the British Commonwealth of Nations when we might better be collaborating with Korea and going it alone as far as our foreign policy is concerned. I told him that be that as it

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[3] The reference was to the fatal shooting of three prisoners in the UN camps by Indian guards in order to prevent what the Indians considered a potential breakout.

may, it was our definite policy to cooperate with all of our allies and that we believed we could accomplish a great deal by the economic rehabilitation of Europe, Japan and Korea and that they must, under all circumstances, be not too hasty about jumping into armed action again, as I was very sure American public opinion would not support any extended military action in support of armed action initiated by Dr. Rhee. He was inclined to argue the point, but I told him I did not consider this matter debatable and he finally assured me that he believed we could count on Rhee's full support and cooperation.

If Dr. Pyun is to see the President, I believe it would be wise for the President to reiterate this.

795.00/10-553

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 5, 1953.

Participants: The President
The Secretary of State
The Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs
The Korean Chargé

The Korean Minister expressed the gratitude of his country for U.S. support, particularly economic aid. The President said this was designed to indicate the solidarity of our two countries, which now happily could be turned to channels of peace rather than war. He asked the Foreign Minister to convey to President Rhee his high regard and hopes for continued close cooperation. He said, however, that he was disturbed by the apparent tendency of Korean officials to talk in terms of war, that the world wanted peace and reacted strongly against bellicose statements. These statements tended to isolate the Republic of Korea and make it difficult for the U.S. to defend the ROK and stand with it. The President referred particularly to the October 3 statement of the Acting Foreign Minister[1] threatening to "take up our arms" against the Indian Repatriation Forces unless they changed their ways.

Mr. Dulles mentioned that we too were disturbed over some of the rules and that we had brought our concern to the attention of the five governments who had named members to the Repatriation Commission. We were trying by all means to bring about a fair interpretation and application of the armistice agreement in this respect. However, our task was not made easier by the kind of threats that were emanating from the Republic of Korea.

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[1] A text of this statement by Acting Foreign Minister Cho Chung Whan is in telegram 291 from Seoul, Oct. 4, 1953, not printed. (795.13/10-453)

The Foreign Minister said he was not able to explain fully the statement which had been made by the Acting Foreign Minister. He believed that all peaceful methods should be exhausted. However, he was unable to give any commitment on behalf of the Republic of Korea as to what might happen if, in fact, loyal Koreans were sent back to captivity.

The President said he sympathized with them, but again emphasized that Korea was not helped by public declarations which looked as though the ROK wanted to find an excuse to resume the war, which was abhorrent to all the rest of the world.

The Foreign Minister said he would report the President's views to President Rhee.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

795.00/10–653

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (O'Connor) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON?,] October 6, 1953—3 p. m.

Participants: Mr. Arthur H. Dean
R. L. O'Connor, Secretary's Office

Mr. Dean had just finished having luncheon with Krishna Menon and Mr. Dayal [2] of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations, at the latter's request. The Indians made the following three principal points:

1. They said that the recent statement of the Korean Acting Foreign Minister was in their eyes an act of aggression and raised the question in their minds whether they were duty bound as Chairman of the Neutrality Commission to bring this matter to the attention of the United Nations. Mr. Dean commented that the Secretary had taken up with Foreign Minister Pyun the bad effects of such bellicose statements. The Indians asked whether or not the Acting Foreign Minister's statement had ever been officially transmitted to the UNC or was it purely an informal statement. They would like us to inform them the answer to this question, (I am checking this now) and to make the answer clear to the press. If the Minister's statement had not been a formal protest, they felt that of course they would be under no compulsion to bring the matter to the attention of the United Nations but they would like to have this made clear in the American press in order to relieve them of their responsibility.

2. If the Indian troops were not going to be able to operate under the conditions of neutrality which had been guaranteed them, they wish to serve notice that they might have to withdraw. These conditions in-

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[1] A marginal notation on the source text indicated that Dean discussed the contents of this memorandum with Dulles. A related discussion between the Secretary of State and Indian Ambassador Mehta, Oct. 7, 1953 is located in Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199.

[2] Rajeshwar Dayal, Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations.

cluded not only the physical disposition of the U.S. and ROK troops but included also the atmosphere under which the Indian troops had to operate.

3. The Indians complained about the hostile press which they felt they were getting in this country. They felt that some responsible person should point out to the American press that on a mathematical basis no interrogator could spend more than 25 minutes with any single prisoner (I am checking the accuracy of this computation). They thought that it should also be pointed out to the U.S. press that some of the decisions of the Commission had been decided against the Poles and Czechs. The Indians were very disturbed at the hostile tone of the press in comment on the job that they were doing on the Neutrality Commission and felt it was our responsibility to correct some of these misrepresentations.

The Indians went on to say that they could assure us positively that Mao and Chou En-lai were very anxious to have this peace conference and to have it start on time; that essentially the question of participants did not bother them. They felt, however, that the tone of our statements had been peremptory; that we were sticking too much to a take-it-or-leave-it line. They did say that they were anxious to have "some" neutrals at the conference. (Mr. Dean commented that it was obvious throughout the talk that Menon did in fact feel that the Indians should be at the conference but that he carefully disclaimed having any such position.)

The Indians specifically wanted to know if in our opinion it would forward anything if they were to suggest to Peiping that we were ready to send an emissary for pre-conference discussions. They suggested that Panmunjom is the proper place. They felt that we would specifically have to say that our emissary would be able to discuss items on the agenda at such preliminary meeting, and they felt strongly that the first item on the agenda should be the subject of participants. Dean has the definite impression Menon was trying to accomplish indirectly what we had voted against in the General Assembly.

Menon wanted to know specifically if the emissary would go to Panmunjom and would discuss matters on a completely pre-conference basis so that the discussions would be completely outside the conference. Dean said, in principle, we would go anywhere other than New Delhi and Peiping.

Mr. Dean took the position that the discussion of participants could not be the first item on the agenda. He felt that we must get the conference started first on the basic Korean question and if it showed promise we could then consider the matter of additional participation.

He said that the emissary at any pre-conference discussions would have no authority to make commitments himself as to items on the agenda, and that, whereas he could discuss agenda items at such a discussion, he would have to refer back to Washington for authority before agreeing to any agenda proposals. Menon pressed Mr. Dean very hard a considerable number of times on making the first item on the agenda the discussion of participants. He felt that this was the only way to get the conference started and that we would have to give in on this point and be what he called flexible. Mr. Dean remained obdurate and said we could not in good faith take the position of voting against India publicly at the General Assembly and then secretly agree that at the discussion of the composition of the conference India would come in. Menon insisted on using the words "one or more neutrals". Mr. Dean did go so far as to say that if, once the conference started we were making reasonable progress and it looked as though a neutral would be helpful, we would be prepared to attempt to get Rhee to agree to India.

Menon was very hopeful that some responsible American official would clear the air as to India's duties and responsibilities. Mr. Dean promised to talk to the Secretary and take it up with Menon again.

Menon offered to be our emissary at Peiping. Mr. Dean replied that the Swedish Minister was handling the matter very well; if Menon wished to use his good offices, fine, but not to say he represented us.

As to their second point, Mr. Dean told them that the United Nations Command has taken every precaution in order to make sure that the South Koreans could not effect any release of the prisoners, could not molest the Indian troops and could not provide such an atmosphere in the neutral zone as to make it impossible for the Indian troops and the NNRC to perform its mission. He explained the disposition of our forces, the Marine Division, the British Commonwealth Division and the location of the Republic of Korea troops in relation to the prisoner compounds. He said further that he was sure Dr. Pyun would pass on to Dr. Rhee our attitude about his statements and he felt sure it would only add to the tension if Mr. Menon brought the matter up in the General Assembly. Mr. Dean believes that if we could get some accurate and definitive statements out of the NNRC as to their precise intentions with respect to the number of times or number of minutes a prisoner can be interviewed, if assurances can be given that no single prisoner would be allowed to undergo harsh interrogation or intimidation, and if a further statement could be made as to the matters in which the Swiss and Swedish representatives had acquiesced, it would be very helpful for some responsible person in our Government to brief the press on the exceptionally difficult nature of the role India is performing, of the necessity for keeping the tensions down, and of our intention to work closely with the NNRC in order to make sure that no anti-Communist personnel are intimidated or repatriated against their will. He feels that if we allow Dr. Rhee to become too jingoistic, it will have a bad effect upon Japan and the other fifteen nations signing the Sixteen Power Agreement. He believes that many of them would be secretly relieved if Dr. Rhee were to commit some act which would relieve them of their commitment. This would then leave us holding the bag alone with Dr. Rhee, and if we decided not to fight with Dr. Rhee it might be impossible to evacuate our forces safely before Rhee's forces and ours were overrun by the Communists.

He also points out that in addition to having a successful political conference, we wish to keep both Japan and India out of the Communist orbit and that anything we can do to promote friendly relations between the United States and India or the United States and the Republic of Korea will promote that over-all objective.

On the other hand, if American public opinion continues to be inflamed against India and Dr. Rhee undertakes some overt acts which will make it impossible to have a political conference, we may then, despite our intentions, find ourselves fighting with Dr. Rhee and American public opinion will then blame the Administration severely for not having taken every step to curb Rhee and to bring about the political conference.

695A.0024/10-753: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 7, 1953—7:17 p. m.

384. Indian Ambassador this afternoon left with Robertson *Aide-Mémoire* [2] expressing grave concern at recent developments in Korea affecting discharge of GOI responsibilities under armistice agreement. Summary follows.

In regard to "threats which have been held out on behalf of the South Korean Government" GOI would be glad have an assurance "that adequate steps are being taken by UNC to prevent infiltration and to give full protection to the camps and to the Commission's headquarters, so as to enable NNRC to discharge its responsibility".

GOI urges US Government use its influence with Government South Korea to insure that its threats and other anti-Indian activities taking place in South Korea are "discontinued immediately".

Aide-Mémoire also apparently seeks to justify NNRC message to prisoners and NNRC rules governing explanations. [3]

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[1] This telegram, drafted and cleared by Young, was repeated to Seoul as telegram 227 and Tokyo as telegram 835.

[2] A text of this *aide-mémoire* was attached to a memorandum of conversation by Robertson, Oct. 7, 1953, not printed, reporting on his conversation with Mehta occasioned by the delivery of the *aide-mémoire*. (695A.0024/10-753)

[3] It was Robertson's contention, in his discussion with Mehta, that the letter which the Commission prepared for the nonrepatriate prisoners and the rules promulgated by the Commission for explanations were slanted in favor of encouraging prisoners to return to Communist control; memorandum of conversation by Robertson, Oct. 7, 1953, not printed. (695A.0024/10-753)

Robertson informed Ambassador of deep regret US Government over developments and of strong representations already made to ROK even prior to request in *Aide-Mémoire*. Also expressed appreciation for Indian willingness undertake and continue these responsibilities, and reasonableness in requesting assurances of protection which UNC had already given India prior to its assumption its duties. Repeated US objections to letter and rules.

DULLES

795A 00/10–953: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Department of State

SECRET EYES ONLY TOKYO, October 9, 1953—6 p. m.

918. Repeated information Seoul 59.

1. . . . has received instructions to persuade North Korean who defected with MIG publicly to refuse $100,000 on grounds acceptance this reward not consistent with his defection which was purely ideological. Some part of reward would be given him secretly, but public would be given impression pilot was being taken care of through well-paying job, paid education, etc.

2. While I would not have approved offer of reward in first instance, I feel any attempt to go back on reward at this time could only be regarded at home and abroad as welching on US commitment. Further, I do not feel pilot would be able maintain consistent story that refusal was completely voluntary in view acute press interest in this project. Any disclosures of US attempts to persuade pilot to refuse reward would look like cheeseparing, and any disclosure secret, emphasize secret, payment of part of reward would make us look ridiculous. I cannot understand what purpose would be served commensurate with risks involved.

3. I feel reward should now be paid with minimum fanfare. Canceling reward offer for duration of truce, which generally interpreted locally as resulting from presidential initiative, has helped give once again ideological tenor to US policy of encouraging defections from Communist camp rather than mercenary tenor.

4. . . . and FEC sending cables reflecting in general terms concurrence this recommendation.[1]

ALLISON

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[1] In telegram 314 from Seoul, Oct. 10, 1953, not printed, Briggs also concurred with Allison's recommendation. (795A.00/10–1053)

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, Korean file, box 54

Memorandum of Telephone Conversations, Prepared in the Secretary of State's Office [1]

[WASHINGTON,] October 9, 1953—10:55 a. m.

[Subject:] Telephone Conversations re MIG Pilot

[Participants:] Secretary Wilson
Frank Wisner

Secretary Wilson called the Secretary and said he thought we would be in trouble if we did not pay it ($100,000)[;] they are getting a statement saying he did this for ideological reasons, but we still should say that our offer is good. The Secretary mentioned that the President had become excited about this. Wilson is seeing Ridgway and Stevens about it. The Secretary reminded him that the President had hoped it would be paid in some kind of a trust so that it would not be blown on "wine, women and song". Wilson then read from a cable he has, along the following general line "in accordance with instructions this agency is attempting to persuade him to say he defected for ideological reasons and is not interested in the $100,000. They will advise him that in lieu of it he will receive scientific education in the U.S. and have sufficient funds to insure his support. At the end of that period this would be given to him (any balance). They plan to take him to Okinawa and to visit Rhee. The press has displayed continued interest in the payment of the reward. Washington has announced publicly that it will be paid. Certain magazines have requested that he be allowed to give them his exclusive story. Once secrecy is removed it will not be practical or desirable to keep him from the press. If he is to be employed at Okinawa he will be free for the press to contact. They might point out that his mother is a poor refugee, or that he could turn the money over to charity in Korea, or to an anti-communist fund. It must be paid on a basis that can ["]stand inspection by the press" . . .[2]

The Secretary agreed that we must give him the money in some form. That was also the President's idea—Secretary Wilson said they would make some kind of a thing that can be completely disclosed to the press.

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[1] This memorandum was prepared by Dulles' private secretary, Burnita O'Day.

[2] Ellipsis in source text.

The Secretary telephoned his brother, who was in New York, and then spoke to Frank Wisner.

He told him of his call from Charles Wilson, who said pressure to give $100,000 to MIG pilot was so great that he did not believe that they could stand up under it. The Secretary said he had told Wilson he did not regard it as a major affair but the President [did?]—they did get him to declare he did it for ideological reasons and not for the money—and would give him the money. He suggested that Wisner keep in touch with Defense because they are going to do something in the next day or two. The President had very strong views about it, and the Secretary said he was surprised that they would act without checking back with him, but that was their affair. We do not feel strongly but it would be nice to make clear that he did not come for money and it would not be desirable to give $100,000 to spend foolishly.

Wisner said they were working on a plan for his education, etc., the Secretary advised him to get busy with Defense on it.[3]

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[3] In telegram DA 949950, Oct. 9, 1953, the new Chief of Staff of the Army, General Ridgway, instructed the new Commander in Chief in the Far East, General Hull, to work out an arrangement for a series of payments to the pilot, some in kind as for tuition, and suggested he obtain a statement by the North Korean that his defection was voluntary and for ideological reasons unconnected with the monetary reward. (795A.00/10-953)

695A.0024/10-1053

The Secretary of State to the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 10, 1953.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I want you to know that I have been closely following developments in connection with the prisoners now in custody of the Repatriation Commission and fully share your concern that they be assured freedom of choice in their decision with respect to repatriation without being subjected to intimidation or coercion. I also want you to know that in addition to the communications from the United Nations Command to the Repatriation Commission of which you are aware,[2] the United States Government has formally called the attention of the five member governments to those developments with respect to the Repatriation Commission which gave cause for concern. We intend to continue closely to watch developments and believe that the difficult problems to be faced in connection with the operations of the Commission can be resolved by non-violent means.

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[1] This letter was transmitted to Seoul in telegram 234, Oct. 10, 1953, repeated to Tokyo as telegram 862. It was drafted and cleared by Johnson.

[2] Presumably the reference was to the letter by Clark to the head of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, questioning the Commission's procedures. For a text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 26, 1953, pp. 567–569.

As you know, President Eisenhower has already expressed his grave concern over such statements as that of the Acting Foreign Minister on October 3 and has indicated the difficulties they pose for the United States. However, I have in the last few days been particularly disturbed by rumors of possible attempts at mass breakout by the prisoners. The lives that might be lost in such an attempt, not to mention the additional serious consequences, seem to me to make it essential that the prisoners be given no encouragement to undertake such an attempt nor reason to believe that it would be condoned by anyone on our side.

I must also tell you, Mr. President, that the Government of India has formally called the attention of the United States Government to the obligation undertaken by the United Nations Command under the terms of the Armistice Agreement. As you will recall, paragraph 6 of that Agreement states that ". . . the detaining side shall have the responsibility for maintaining and ensuring security and order in the areas around the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody and for preventing and restraining any armed forces (including irregular armed forces) in that area under its control from any acts of disturbance and intrusion against the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody." We have assured the Government of India we intend to meet fully our commitments under the Armistice Agreement.

It is my sincere hope, Mr. President, that our two nations can continue to cooperate in seeking peaceful solutions to the difficult problems facing us.

Sincerely yours, JOHN FOSTER DULLES

695A.0024/10-1253: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET SEOUL, October 12, 1953—6 p. m.
PRIORITY

318. Repeated information Tokyo 147, information New Delhi 9. Tokyo for Ambassador Allen, pass CINCUNC for General Hull. For the Secretary.

This morning I delivered to President Rhee Secretary's message contained Department telegram 234, October 10.[1] Rhee read letter aloud to acting Foreign Minister Cho and me and then embarked on oral statement along lines generally familiar to Department: His doubts whether any good can come of armistice; his distrust of Indians as "neutrals on Communist side"; his patience under repeated provocation (*sic*) by Nehru, including Bombay statement day before yesterday[2] to which

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] According to telegram 395 to New Delhi, Oct. 9, 1953, the Associated Press quoted Nehru as stating, *inter alia*, that developments in Korea since the arrival of the Indian

Continued

ROK Government would shortly reply; and Rhee's general discouragement over way things are going, including Secretary's "disappointing letter".

With reference Cho's October 3 statement, Rhee denounced alleged conduct of Indians on NNRC as something about which Korea cannot remain silent. However, when text of statement produced, President declared last paragraph was "blunder" and that he accordingly disassociated himself from it. As Department will recall this is paragraph containing ROK threat to take up arms against Indians; as indicated my telegram 311 [3] (to Tokyo 141, New Delhi 5) I do not think unilateral move by Rhee against Indians is actually under consideration at this time.

Rhee asked that I inform you he would answer your October 10 letter at earliest opportunity.

I then gave President copy of your October 2 letter to Foreign Minister Pyun (Department telegram 233, October 9 [4]) which evoked even longer statement by Rhee concerning Communist menace in Asia followed by plea for US to show "more leadership and less appeasement" in rallying anti-Communist world to defense of principles. Why does US keep referring to neutralization, he asked, when I explained to Secretary Dulles last August why we cannot accept it.

With regard latest Communist proposal for meeting at Panmunjom to discuss political conference,[5] Rhee reiterated that however small are prospects for political conference success, they will be further diminished if we should accede to Communist demand for so-called neutral Asiatic representation as price for buying Communist attendance. This in turn led to observations on ROK position ninety days after beginning of unfruitful political conference (or, impliedly, ninety days after date, October 27, by which conference should have started). Implication of all these remarks was that if Chinese Communists are still in Korea on January 25, ROK may feel free to resume fighting and expect US to join. Rhee spoke again of "national suicide if necessary" as preferable to "national dishonor, or slow strangulation".

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custodial force "have given one the impression that the UNC does not want peace" and that the "South Korean Government is breaking solemn understandings frequently [and] is utterly irresponsible." (795.00/10–953)

[3] Dated Oct. 9, not printed. (611.91/10–953)

[4] In this telegram, the Department of State agreed to Briggs showing Rhee a copy of the Oct. 2 letter. (695A.0024/10–953) The Oct. 2 letter has not been found in Department of State files.

[5] The reference was to a message of Oct. 10 in which the People's Republic of China reiterated that the political conference should include neutral participation, but announced that after consultations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the two governments were prepared to appoint representatives to meet with the U.S. representative at Panmunjom for discussions on place, time, and composition of the conference. For a text of the communication, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 26, 1953, p. 551.

President also sought to engage in detailed discussion of NNRC developments in demilitarized zone and alleged US responsibility therefor. I suggested that inasmuch as this subject has hitherto been treated as military matter, he consider it with General Hull, who was calling on him later today.

Rhee remained calm throughout ninety-minute interview which ended with further pleas on his part for American Government understanding of his conviction that, if we attempt to protract armistice while leaving Communists in possession northern half of his country, he would rather fight than accept that solution.

BRIGGS

795.00/10-1353

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 13, 1953.

Subject: Political Conference on Korea.

Participants: The Secretary

Krishna Menon, Delegate to the United Nations from India

Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

Mr. Menon came in to see the Secretary today at 4 o'clock at his request.

The Secretary said that the United States hoped the political conference would convene in the near future. Mr. Menon replied that it would now depend on the Chinese Communist reaction to the United States note of October 12.[2] He frankly told the Secretary that he was disappointed in the last sentence of our note, regarding exchange of views on the composition of the conference, because our language appeared to restrict the American emissary.[3] He wished that this language had been omitted. He was afraid that the Communists might react negatively to the note, either by insisting on further clarification before meeting at Panmunjom, or by rejecting the note.

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[1] A marginal note by O'Connor indicated that the Secretary of State approved this memorandum.

[2] In its note of Oct. 12, transmitted through the Swedish Government to North Korea and China, the U.S. Government stated that its representative was prepared to meet with those of the Communist side on Oct. 26 on the understanding that agreement to Panmunjom as the site for these preliminary talks did not indicate that it was suitable for the conference site. The U.S. Representative was authorized to agree on time and place of the conference and to exchange views on composition consistent with paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement and the UN General Assembly resolution of Aug. 28, 1953. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 26, 1953, pp. 550–551.

[3] The last sentence read as follows: "Our representative therefore will be prepared to deal with such questions [procedural, administrative, etc.] and will also be prepared to exchange views on composition of the political conference to the extent consistent with the basis above set forth in the preceding paragraphs [references to composition as defined in paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement and the UN General Assembly resolution of Aug. 28]."

He explained that, based on his personal experience, he felt the Communist reaction would depend on several things. First, he was sure, speaking only for himself, that the Chinese Communists really desire a political conference on Korea. He repeated his impression several times during the course of the conversation.

Mr. Menon noted that during the summer the Chinese Communists apparently had not strongly desired a conference and had taken an extremely rigid attitude that it could be held only on their terms. Mr. Menon told the Secretary that the Indian Government had persistently urged the Chinese Communist leaders not to adhere to such a rigid position and to try to find a meeting ground with the Americans in replying to our notes. He implied that the promptings of the Indian Government had persuaded the Chinese Communists to be flexible. Second, he emphasized that the Chinese Communists fear being led into a "trap" by agreeing to our note and by meeting in Panmunjom, which Mr. Menon did not explain. Third, he alluded to the concern of the Chinese Communists not to break their commitments regarding the Communist position on composition.

The Secretary asked Mr. Menon why the Chinese Communists were so insistent on having neutral nations as formal participants at the conference. The Secretary pointed out that the Communists had helped to draft and had accepted Paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement long ago. Furthermore, they had made it quite plain during the armistice negotiations that they contemplated a conference just of the countries concerned on both sides. The Secretary wanted to know if Mr. Menon had any idea as to why the Communists have reversed themselves.

Mr. Menon replied that the United States interpretation of Paragraph 60 was entirely "legalistic" and that the question of composition must be considered in much broader frame of reference. While he could only guess at the motivations of the Chinese Communists, he felt that they were probably based on a complex set of factors. His rather long and round-about answer amounted to the view that the Chinese Communists desire to have neutrals present "to facilitate" or to "smooth out" discussions between the Chinese on the one hand and the United States on the other. He said that it was not a question of numbers, since the Chinese didn't care how many nations were alongside the United States. The real point was that the Chinese felt that, since there was such wide divergence of viewpoint, such a different way of thinking, such a difficult atmosphere created by several years of warfare between both sides, it would be helpful to have at the conference some representation of some countries that were not subject to these drawbacks. Furthermore, the Chinese Communists, as the Soviets, are thinking of the

Korean conference "in the context of world unity". For this reason, they prefer to get away from the idea of two belligerent sides.

The Secretary commented that a peaceful settlement of the Korean question would not result from the persuasive oratory of any participant at the political conference but from private and confidential conversations held during the course of the conference. He did not feel that there would be any chance for the conference to succeed if it depended on just open sessions and speech-making. It would be necessary to take up with the Communists the difficult question of the unification of Korea. We would have to ask them on what terms they would agree. This would mean taking up such questions as elections, withdrawal of troops and the degree of Korea's militarization. The Secretary emphasized that these were all questions that could hardly be settled in public. They would have to be negotiated in private by a smaller group. Therefore, he did not see why the formal presence of neutrals at the conference itself was so essential. However, it might be that the contribution of another party in some appropriate way might help these private conversations. The Secretary felt that, if the presence of intermediaries would facilitate settlement of these difficult questions during the course of the political conference, we would not oppose it. But he urged the importance of getting on with the conference with the composition as now contemplated, without delaying it for a long time over the question of neutrals. That might be taken up in another way.

Mr. Menon said that he was fully aware of and understood the American viewpoint on this, as Mr. Lodge had stated it and as Mr. Dean had elaborated on it to him. He agreed entirely with the Secretary's comment on the necessity for private and confidential meetings on the real substance of a peaceful settlement in Korea. He said that it was obvious to him, and he was sure to the Chinese Communists, that there were really only two principals involved: the Chinese Communists and the Americans. The latter, of course, had to bring along President Rhee and the South Koreans, and to consider the views of the Western and South American countries, while the former had to account for the North Koreans. But, essentially, the Chinese Communists and the Americans would determine the outcome of the conference. In his view, this was the factor that made the whole question of a conference so difficult, since the Chinese Communists and the Americans had no contact with each other and had such divergent reactions. Mr. Menon felt that the Communists would be quite insistent on the question of neutrals.

The Secretary then asked Mr. Menon if he thought the reference in the Soviet note of September 28 [4] on the political conference on Korea indicated that the Soviet Government might be disposed to want the big powers to take up the political conference or to accept a different formula for the composition of the conference on Korea. In a discursive reply, Mr. Menon concluded that the Soviet note should not be considered a substitute for the political conference on Korea. He thought that the Soviets wished to keep separate a general conference on lessening of international tensions and specific conferences on Germany, Austria, or Korea.

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[4] For text of the Soviet note, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 26, 1953, pp. 548–550.

In referring again to the United States note of October 12 to the Communists, Mr. Menon said that he had had very useful discussions with Mr. Dean and he thought that Mr. Dean could be extremely effective in discussions with the Communists on these difficult matters. He hoped that it would be acceptable for him to have another discussion as soon as possible with Mr. Dean about the possible Communist reaction to the United States note of October 12. He hoped that he could discuss this with Mr. Dean in order to get some clarification for his Government as to what we actually have in mind in the last paragraph and whether there is sufficient flexibility in our approach. He indicated that he would like to be in a position to inform his Government fairly authoritatively as to the degree of latitude and authority which Mr. Dean would have in Panmunjom. The Secretary stated that the American emissary in Panmunjom would, of course, have no authority to make any decisions regarding the composition of the political conference but that he would certainly listen to any and all views which the Communists might put forward regarding this matter. The Secretary indicated that Mr. Menon could see Mr. Dean again, either here in Washington or in New York, if he cared to do so.

Mr. Menon also today disavowed any desire of his Government to participate in the political conference or to push itself forward in this matter. However, he said that Prime Minister Nehru did wish to fulfill any obligation that India might have in the cause of peace.

INR–NIE files

Special Estimate

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] 16 October 1953.
SE–48

CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA WITH RESPECT TO THE ARMISTICE IN KOREA [1]

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the capabilities of the Republic of Korea (ROK) to disrupt the Korean armistice, and to estimate probable ROK courses of action with respect to the armistice.

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[1] According to a note on the covering sheet, the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on Oct. 13, 1953, with the exception of the FBI which abstained

CONCLUSIONS

1. The prime objective of the present ROK government is control over the whole of Korea. This objective is held with fanatical intensity by President Syngman Rhee and in varying degrees by virtually all ROK leaders. The ROK government believes that the ROK can achieve neither real security nor economic viability so long as Korea remains divided.

2. The ROK has the capability, despite UNC surveillance and countermeasures, to initiate courses of armed action which would disrupt the armistice and might lead to the resumption of full-scale hostilities. We believe that despite some opposition there are enough ROK political and military leaders who would obey any orders President Rhee might issue to enable him to initiate unilateral military action.

3. We believe that President Rhee will continue to threaten unilateral renewal of hostilities to strengthen his general bargaining position with regard to international discussions of the Korean problem. Moreover, the possibility exists that President Rhee might initiate military action against the Communists at any time.

4. We believe it probable that the ROK will participate in the proposed political conference, provided that the conference is convened by the end of October or shortly thereafter, but will almost certainly withdraw from the conference after it has been in session for 90 days unless President Rhee considers that substantial progress has been made toward a settlement which would unify Korea under ROK control. However, if it appears to Rhee that the conference has reached or is reaching decisions unacceptable to him, he may withdraw the ROK delegation before the 90-day period has elapsed. In the event that the conference does not convene by the end of October or shortly thereafter, or if the conference is definitely cancelled, Rhee would almost certainly consider the 90-day commitment no longer binding on him.

5. Once Rhee has decided that continued ROK participation in a political conference is futile, or has otherwise determined that he has become free of his commitments to abide by the armistice, he will be faced with the decision whether or not to carry out his threats to resume hostilities. We believe that the principal determinant of his deci-

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on the grounds that the subject was outside its jurisdiction. The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated with the CIA in the preparation of this estimate.

sion will be his estimate as to whether he could take action in such a way that the US would be involved in a full-scale resumption of the fighting in Korea.

6. We believe that Rhee is convinced at the present time that the US does not have the capability to prevent him from unilaterally initiating military action against the Communists. Furthermore we believe that he estimates that the US probably could not in present circumstances dissociate itself from military support of the ROK in the event that his action provoked a significant Communist military reaction. If Rhee retained these convictions at the time of decision, we believe that he would probably initiate armed attack against the Communists. Even if he felt there were only a slight chance of involving the US, he might initiate such action, hoping to gain the eventual full support of the US. If, on the other hand, Rhee had become convinced that he could not hope to involve the US in a resumption of the Korean fighting, we believe that he would not initiate unilateral military action, but would seek to halt the political conference in order to forestall any agreement unacceptable to the ROK and to insure the retention of US protecting forces in South Korea.

DISCUSSION

Relationship of the Korean War and Armistice to the Objectives of the ROK

7. The prime objective of the present ROK government is control over the whole of Korea. This objective is held with fanatical intensity by President Syngman Rhee and in varying degrees by virtually all ROK leaders. The ROK government believes that the ROK can achieve neither real security nor economic viability so long as Korea remains divided.

8. The ROK takes the position that the purpose of the UN action in Korea is to unify Korea under the ROK. President Rhee has attempted to convince the US that by accepting the armistice, the UN is forsaking this objective in that an independent and unified Korea could never be achieved by negotiation with the Communists.

9. Under pressure from the US, President Rhee reluctantly agreed to abide temporarily by the armistice on the conditions that no actions detrimental to ROK national survival are taken during the armistice, and that progress towards unification is made within 90 days of the opening of the political conference. In return for his provisional acquiescence in the armistice, Rhee obtained a promise that a mutual security treaty would be presented to the US Senate for approval and was given

additional commitments for US political, military, and economic support. Moreover, the US agreed to join with the ROK in withdrawing from the political conference after 90 days if in US opinion no progress is being made.

10. In view of President Rhee's statements and actions to date we believe that Rhee considers that the agreements between the ROK and the US do not clearly limit the courses of action open to his government. In deciding whether or not to abide by the armistice agreements, Rhee must balance his intense desire for unification against his realization that without US support the ROK cannot achieve its objective of unification or even attain security and economic viability within its present territory.

Capabilities of President Rhee To Control the ROK

11. President Rhee has achieved almost complete personal control of the ROK government. The national police and para-military organizations are directly responsive to his orders. He exercises complete control over the major South Korean political party and its associated organizations, which include terrorist groups. Rhee's recent purges within his own party clearly indicate that even pro-Rhee leaders are virtually powerless to take action independently of the President. Intimidation by terrorist groups and the police have rendered the opposition parties impotent and fearful of publicly expressing opposition to President Rhee. Lastly, the President's control over the primary media of public information virtually prevents the dissemination of opposition views by radio or press.

12. Despite operational control of the combat units of the ROK Army by the United Nations Command (UNC), President Rhee now has effective control over the ROK armed forces. ROK military leaders are under intense pressure to follow the wishes of President Rhee, since they realize that to do otherwise could result in relief of command or even arrest and trial. Moreover, by creating the Provost Marshal General Command—a military police command with wide powers of investigation, arrest, and detention over both civilian and military persons—Rhee has both increased his personal powers and created a channel for by-passing regularly established UN Command channels. Since, however, the ROK military leadership has been under US tutelage and direction since 1946, since they have potential preponderance of power in the ROK, and since the extent of President Rhee's control over them has never been fully tested, they will continue to be a source of concern to President Rhee and an uncertain factor in his calculations.

13. President Rhee has great popular prestige within the ROK, and his name symbolizes the struggle for Korean independence and unification. His past successes in achieving his objectives despite seemingly

overwhelming odds, including US resistance, have confounded his critics and greatly enhanced his stature as a leader.

14. In view of Rhee's dominance over ROK institutions and policies, his prestige, and his past successes, we believe that there are enough ROK political and military leaders who would obey any orders he might issue to enable him to initiate unilateral military action against the Communists which might lead to a resumption of full-scale hostilities. However, such members of the top ROK military leadership as were convinced that US support would not be forthcoming would probably strongly urge President Rhee not to issue such orders; if the orders were given and unilateral military action initiated, they would continue their urging in an attempt to halt it, military circumstances permitting. However, we believe these efforts would be unsuccessful.

Capabilities of the ROK To Disrupt the Armistice

15. The ROK Army is an unbalanced force of approximately 580,000 men, organized into 17 infantry divisions and various supporting units. In addition there are approximately 28,000 Koreans attached to UNC units, 10,000 Security Troops, 2 separate infantry regiments, and 64,500 ROK National Police organized on a semi-military basis. The ROK Navy has a strength of 10,000 and a fleet of small naval vessels, the most important of which are 4 frigates. The ROK Air Force has an estimated personnel strength of 5,000 and a combat aircraft strength of 80 piston fighters (F–51). The ROK armed forces are deficient in artillery, vehicles, modern aircraft, and trained specialists. Moreover, they are almost completely dependent on the UNC for logistical support. They are therefore incapable of sustained, large-scale operations.

16. However, the ROK armed forces have the capability, despite UNC surveillance and countermeasures, to take one or more of the following actions which would disrupt the armistice and might lead to the resumption of full-scale hostilities:

a. Initiate and maintain for approximately three days an all-out attack against the Communist armed forces in Korea, utilizing the ROK divisions presently occupying the eastern sectors of the UNC defensive position and possibly the ROK divisions under US control in other sectors of the line. This capability would be somewhat enhanced if the ROK seized UNC supply dumps and other necessary supporting installations.

b. Launch hit-and-run air, naval, or small-unit raids against either the Communist main defensive line or rear areas, in an effort to provoke the Communists into resuming hostilities.

c. Launch covert operations designed to convince the UNC that the Communists were violating the truce by military action.

d. Attack, hinder, or obstruct the truce observation teams in South Korea or the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission personnel in the demilitarized zone, employing ROK armed forces, national police, militia, or para-military groups.

e. Attack Indian custodial forces to effect the release of anti-Communist POW's.

17. The ROK also has the capability to take a variety of political actions which might disrupt the armistice. Among these are:

a. Obstructionist tactics within the political conference.
b. Unilateral ROK withdrawal from the political conference or refusal to accept a settlement agreed upon by the other members of the conference.
c. Propaganda campaigns or political actions designed to convince the Communists that the US cannot control the ROK, such as the withdrawal of all ROK forces from the UNC.

Probable ROK Courses of Action With Respect to the Armistice

18. We believe that President Rhee will continue to threaten unilateral renewal of hostilities to strengthen his general bargaining position with regard to international discussions of the Korean problem. Moreover, the possibility exists that President Rhee might initiate military action against the Communists at any time.

19. We believe it probable that the ROK will participate in the proposed political conference, provided that the conference is convened by the end of October or shortly thereafter. If the conference is convened and the ROK attends, Rhee will attempt to make the conference an object lesson for the US on the futility of negotiating with the Communists. He will seek during the period of the conference to persuade the US that the unification of Korea under ROK control is the only acceptable solution for the Korean problem, and that this solution can be achieved only by force. Rhee will almost certainly withdraw from the conference after it has been in session for 90 days unless he considers that substantial progress has been made toward a settlement which would unify Korea under ROK control. However, if it appears to Rhee that the conference has reached or is reaching decisions unacceptable to him, he may withdraw the ROK delegation before the 90-day period has elapsed. In the event that the conference does not convene by the end of October or shortly thereafter, or if the conference is definitely cancelled, Rhee would almost certainly consider the 90-day commitment no longer binding on him.

20. Once Rhee has decided that continued ROK participation in a political conference is futile, or has otherwise determined that he has become free of his commitments to abide by the armistice, he will be faced with the decision whether or not to carry out his threats to resume hostilities. We believe that in reaching his decision President Rhee will give little consideration to the attitudes and reactions of non-Communist countries other than the US, or even to fear of initial military reverses. We further believe that the principal determinant of his decision will be his estimate as to whether he could take action in such a way that the US would be involved in a full-scale resumption of the

fighting in Korea. In reaching his estimate Rhee would have to consider possible opposition from ROK military leaders, possible warnings from the US, the effect of ROK action on pending US commitments to him, and whether Communist reaction would be such as to cause a full-scale resumption of hostilities.

21. We believe that Rhee is convinced at the present time that the US does not have the capability to prevent him from unilaterally initiating military action against the Communists. Furthermore we believe that he estimates that the US probably could not in present circumstances dissociate itself from military support of the ROK in the event that his action provoked a significant Communist military reaction. If Rhee retained these convictions at the time of decision, we believe that he would probably initiate armed attack against the Communists. Even if he felt there were only a slight chance of involving the US, he might initiate such action, hoping to gain the eventual full support of the US. If, on the other hand, Rhee had become convinced that he could not hope to involve the US in a resumption of the Korean fighting, we believe that he would not initiate unilateral military action, but would seek to halt the political conference in order to forestall any agreement unacceptable to the ROK and to insure the retention of US protecting forces in South Korea.

795.00/10-2053

Notes on a Meeting Held With the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 20, 1953—11:30 a. m.

Present:
- Ambassador Dean
- Mr. Murphy
- Mr. Robertson
- Mr. Johnson
- Mr. Sandifer
- Col. Babcock
- Mr. Young
- Mr. Henkin
- Mr. Van Hollen [2]

Indian Participation

The Secretary asked what features of the armistice agreement might make it possible to bring India into the political conference, pointing out their possible presence when they report on the activities of the NNRC. If the Indians were there in some such capacity it might be possible for the Communists to use them as messenger boys with the other side. In the Secretary's opinion, the political conference would only succeed if it were possible to exchange private and confidential views at the appropriate time. In other words, the conference itself must be a public front behind which serious, confidential talks might take place leading to a possible settlement. India might be used as an intermediary under such circumstances without there being official Indian participation in the conference.

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[1] The source text does not indicate who drafted these notes.

[2] Christopher Van Hollen, member of the staff of the Executive Secretariat.

ROK Participation

Ambassador Dean reported that during his conversations with Pyun he received the decided impression that Pyun felt strongly about ROK participation in the preliminary meetings and that Dr. Rhee himself probably desired a speaking member since the conference would be held on Korean soil and the U.S. representative would be dealing with those whom Rhee considered as "rebels." Mr. Dean felt that, on balance, it would probably be best to permit ROK attendance at the meetings but only in an advisory and non-speaking capacity. The Secretary agreed, saying that it would probably be wise to include a ROK representative in the Dean group and that, while it would probably not be advisable to tell the ROKs in advance that they could not speak, nonetheless, it should be pointed out to them that it would be quite awkward if they did speak. Mr. Robertson felt it advisable for Ambassador Dean to take the initiative on this question in his meeting with Dr. Rhee by telling Rhee that we would like to take along a ROK representative in an advisory capacity.

Duration of Meetings

In response to a statement by Ambassador Dean that he was thinking of remaining in Korea for a period of from ten days to three weeks, the Secretary replied that, while he agreed in principle, if it were discovered that the talks had become a *de facto* political conference he himself would not feel unduly concerned. He suggested that Ambassador Dean "play it by ear" and that he should endeavor to obtain as much information as possible as to the Communists' future plans on such questions as unification. If, however, the Communists engaged in time-wasting, dilatory tactics, the talks should be broken off with careful regard to world opinion.

Site of the Conference

The Secretary said that, in every respect, Geneva appeared to be a good site for the conference. While Beirut had once seemed a possible site, in view of the recent Arab-Israel disturbances, it was no longer appropriate. The Secretary said that he had always been open-minded with regard to Ceylon although the complexion of the present government should be looked into.

With regard to the possibility of New York as a site, the Secretary said that his initial opposition to New York was based primarily on the objection to having the political conference held at the same time that the UN was in session. However, should the UN adjourn before December 15 and should agreement be reached to convene the political conference on or after that date, he felt such a site might be worthy of consideration. After several comments by Messrs. Murphy and Sandifer about certain disadvantages in holding the conference at New York, the Secretary agreed that it would probably be advisable to avoid holding the conference in New York but pointed out the difficulties which would arise so far as world opinion were concerned if the Communists agreed to hold the conference in that city but we, on our part, refused. The Secretary also remarked that we should make every effort to ensure that the UN adjourned rather than suspended its sessions since, if the session were suspended, it would be easy for the GA to be called back into session thus causing the GA sessions to conflict with the political conference.

Unification

With regard to unification, the Secretary asked whether any thought was being given to the possibility of a transition status for Korea similar to that now prevailing in Austria, i.e., trade between the two areas and an arrangement under which citizens could move back and forth between the two areas. Mr. Young replied that a preliminary paper had been prepared which indicated that we would first have to start out on a barter basis, later move into a customs union, etc.

Practicability of a Fortification Line at the Yalu

In answer to a question from the Secretary, Colonel Babcock reported that the most advantageous place to fortify Korea was not at the Yalu River but rather just above the Korean waist since defense on the Yalu River would require that the defense forces be strung out thinly along a 450 mile line. Colonel Babcock pointed out, however, that the buffer zone concept created serious disadvantages from the Communist viewpoint since there was a vast network of fighter fields just on the other side of the river which the Communists would be forced to give up if agreement on a buffer zone were reached. He stated that, while the military do not like the idea of a buffer zone, such a buffer zone would not affect U.S. security.

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 21, 1953.

Subject: Korea

If the attached cable from General Hull has not otherwise come to your attention, I suggest that you read it.

I think this whole subject of Korea should be urgently considered, particularly having regard to the prospective presence there of Vice President Nixon on November 12.

If Nixon gets the same line from President Rhee that he gave to General Hull and is merely acquiescent, it will be difficult to prevent Rhee from believing that we are secretly disposed to support him.

JFD

[Attachment]

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Hull) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

TOKYO, October 21, 1953—4:20 p. m.

C 65636. Ref: A. JCS 949814.[1] B. CX 65143. C. CX 65208.[2] D. AmEmb Seoul nr 237 to State.[3] E. CX 63652. F. CX 63731.[4] G. AmEmb Seoul nr 332 to State.[5]

1. Fully recog possible eventuality stated in para 3, ref A. As pointed out in paras 4 and 5, ref B, and in ref C, there is a degree of urgency for a satisfactory arrangement between United States and ROK on mil, economic and political matters. A "package" arrangement has obvious advantages as pointed out in ref D.

2. On my recent trip to Korea I spent over an hour with Pres Syngman Rhee, there being no one else present at the conference. Pres Rhee was most cordial and our discussion was conducted throughout in a very friendly manner.

3. Pres Rhee discussed at some length the action of the Indian Govt and his objection to the presence of Indian trp on Korean soil. He stated that Nehru was pro-Communist if not a Communist in fact, that everything he had done so far had demonstrated his pro-Communist line. I told Mr. Rhee that I felt he was wrong regarding the Indian trp

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[1] In this telegram, a joint State–Defense message, Oct. 7, 1953, the JCS informed Hull that failure of the political conference might mean that Rhee would take action "prejudicial [to] UNC interests." (Department of Defense files)

[2] In references B, and C, dated Sept. 22 and 26, 1953, respectively, Allison, Briggs, and Clark warned of the dangers of letting outstanding matters between the ROK, Japan, and the UNC deteriorate any further than they already had. (Department of Defense files)

[3] Not printed. (611.95B/9–1953)

[4] References E and F contained the records of the plenary meetings at Panmunjom on July 13 and 16 in which the Communist side pressed for assurances that the South Koreans would abide by the terms of the armistice. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

[5] In this telegram, Oct. 16, the Embassy reported that Rhee had been making statements to the effect that he expected the political conference to fail and would unify Korea after the 90-day time limit for the conference expired, with or without the support of the United States. (357.AD/10–1653)

and their commanders, that I had not as yet met Gen Thimayya and Gen Thorat personally but that I had made it a pnt to check with others, Americans as well as certain foreigners, who knew them and their ability; that all the info I had rcd had led me to believe that both Gens Thimayya and Thorat were good soldiers and were trying to be impartial.

4. Pres Rhee discussed at considerable length his pessimistic views on any result coming from a political conference. He maintained that even if one were held, which he doubted, there was no ques in his mind that it would not accomplish any reasonable solution. He stated that unless there were a unified Korea, Korea would ultimately fall to the Communists. He insisted that if the political conference fails to unify Korea, and there is no doubt in his mind that it will fail to do so, he could not accept it. He would insist on adv to the Yalu and unifying Korea by force. He said that the Korean people would demand this. He has hopes that the United States would support such action, certainly to the extent of providing Nav and Air support to the South Korean armed forces engaged in such an adv, but if the United States would not support such action, he felt it essential that he do it alone with Korean trp. In replying to this I stated to Pres Rhee that he was discussing natl suicide for Korea. I told him that in my opinion unless the Chinese Communist forces had been withdrawn from North Korea and he faced only North Korean forces, he had no chance whatever of gaining a success, and further that if operations of the type he described were undertaken against the Chinese Communist forces and North Korean Peoples Army, it would bring disaster to his own mil for and result in their annihilation. I told him further that although I was not in position to speak for my govt on a ques of this nature, it was my firm personal belief that my govt would not support any such undertaking.

5. Pres Rhee spoke of the reduction in the population of North Korea from 8 million to 3 million persons and the settling by the Chinese in North Korea on what appeared to him to be a permanent basis. He stated that the remaining people in North Korea were still Koreans and "we must save them". He went on to say that it would be better for Korea to be unified under Communist rule than to be divided as it is today.

6. Throughout his conversation with me, Pres Rhee spoke with what appeared to be the utmost sincerity. Although he was emphatic in his statements, I would not say that he was emotional. We ended our conversation with the same friendly attitude which had existed throughout it, both agreeing to discuss this matter further as the opportunity presented itself in the future.

7. My estimate of the problem we face with Pres Rhee is that there must be no ques in his mind as to the attitude of our govt should he elect at some time in the future to take action along the lines indicated

in his conversation with me. I believe if he really understands that the United States will not support him in any such venture, there is a reasonable chance that he will not resort to such action. On the other hand, it would appear that he feels that the United States is committed so far in Korea that it cannot pull out. It is quite possible, and I am inclined to think it is probable, that he will make every endeavor to pull the United States into further mil action in Korea should the political conf fail to unify Korea. I believe therefore that it is very important that Pres Rhee understand the limits beyond which the US will not go should he undertake any action inconsistent with our own natl policy.

8. I have discussed this problem with Ambassador Briggs and I feel that the only effective way of influencing Pres Rhee not to attempt some disastrous plan like the one discussed above is for both Ambassador Briggs and myself to be in a position to state categorically to Pres Rhee as soon as practicable that the US will support no such action. Specifically, I recommend that I be auth to inform Pres Rhee that:

a. US air, ground and sea forces will not support mil op by South Korean forces to unify Korea by attacking Chinese or North Korean forces in or North of the demilitarized zone.

b. The US govt will not furnish any mil sup for such an operation.

c. UNC forces on initiation of such aggressive action will not only not become involved in assisting the South Korean forces, but will take any action nec to avoid becoming involved and to provide their own security.

d. US economic aid to Korea will cease immed under such conditions.

9. When Vice Pres Nixon visits Korea I believe Pres Rhee will talk to him along the same lines that he talked to me. If the Vice Pres is properly briefed on this matter before his conf with Pres Rhee and informs Pres Rhee just how far the US will go or will not go, in support of any action Pres Rhee might contemplate, it might help to solve this problem to our advantage.

10. I recommend, therefore, that Vice Pres Nixon, prior to his arr in Korea, be briefed on these matters and be prepared to inform Pres Rhee in his discussions with him of the position of the US Govt as set forth in para 8*a, b, c,* and *d,* above. I would be glad to meet Vice Pres Nixon, or send my Chief of Staff, Gen Harrison, to meet him and brief him on this problem at any place and time he desires prior to his arr in Korea.

S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 167

Report by the Planning Board to the National Security Council[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 22, 1953.

NSC 167

U.S. COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA IN THE ABSENCE OF AN ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT[2]

SCOPE OF THIS REPORT

1. This report deals with determination of U.S. courses of action to be followed in view of the contingencies that might arise should the political conference on Korea fail or be indefinitely delayed. The report does not deal with matters covered by the following NSC approved policies:

NSC 154/1, "United States Tactics Immediately Following an Armistice in Korea", approved July 3, 1953,[3] which sets forth interim courses of action on pressures against Communist China, UN military strength in Korea, the security of UN forces, aid to the Republic of Korea, the political conference, and persuasion of allies. These courses are to be pursued during the political negotiations for a peace and until a review of basic U.S. policies toward China and toward Korea is completed.

NSC 156/1, "Strengthening the Korean Economy", approved July 23, 1953,[4] which provides for the initiation of an expanded program of economic assistance for the Republic of Korea, conditioned upon certain economic, military and political requirements, including the requirement that the Republic of Korea must cooperate satisfactorily in carrying the armistice into effect.

NSC 157/1, "U.S. Objective with Respect to Korea Following an Armistice", approved July 2, 1953,[5] which states that following an armistice it should be the U.S. objective to secure a unified and neutralized (but not disarmed) Korea under a substantially unchanged ROK, oriented toward the U.S., and with guaranteed political and territorial integrity.

"Additional United Nations Forces for Korea", Memorandum dated July 17, 1953, as approved July 23, 1953,[6] which states a policy of ob-

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[1] According to a covering memorandum by Lay, this report was to be transmitted to the NSC for its consideration at an Oct. 29 meeting. Lay requested that special security precautions be observed in handling this report and it be "very strictly limited on an absolute need-to-know basis." Included with the memorandum was a table of contents of NSC 167. Annex C to NSC 167 is not printed.

[2] This report was drafted originally by Stelle of the Department of State and revised by the Planning Board. A copy of Stelle's draft, Oct. 20, is located in PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Korea".

[3] Dated July 7, p. 1341.

[4] Dated July 17, p. 1384.

[5] Dated July 7, p. 1344.

[6] Dated July 17, p. 1394.

taining maximum contributions of effective manpower from our allies in Korea and establishes a new formula for reimbursement for U.S. logistic support of other UN forces in Korea.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

2. The failure of the Communists to agree to hold a political conference, or to agree to any reasonable proposals at the political conference, would strongly indicate that the Communists have no intention of abandoning their hegemony over North Korea or their basic objective of obtaining control of all Korea by whatever means possible.

3. President Rhee has agreed that until the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea comes into force and effect, the armed forces of the Republic of Korea will be subject to the United Nations Command, which will comply with the armistice terms.[*] However, President Rhee and other authorities of the Republic of Korea have frequently stated their firm intention to resume hostilities to unify Korea by force if the Political Conference fails to achieve unification acceptable to them, by peaceful means, within a reasonable time. The Government of the Republic of Korea has requested the United States to agree in advance to assure its military or logistic support to such a resumption of hostilities. The Government of the United States has repeatedly informed the Government of the Republic of Korea that it could not and would not give any such advance commitment, and is opposed to seeking unification of Korea by force.

4. Thus, the possible failure or indefinite delay of a political conference presents the United States with the urgent problem of determining what courses of action to follow in view of the following three possible contingencies:

a. The Communist forces take the initiative in renewing hostilities in Korea;

b. Both the Communists and the Republic of Korea continue to observe the terms of the armistice and there is no resumption of hostilities in Korea from either side; or

c. The Republic of Korea takes or clearly intends to take the initiative in unilaterally renewing hostilities in Korea.

Either the Communists or the Republic of Korea, if they chose to renew hostilities, would seek to confuse responsibility therefor. It is believed, however, that the United States would be able to determine promptly the responsibility for renewal of hostilities.

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[*] Joint Statement of August 8, 1953, issued by President Rhee and Secretary of State Dulles. [Footnote in the source text; for a text of the statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 17, 1953, pp. 203–204.]

POLICY CONCLUSIONS

U.S. Courses of Action under the First Two Contingencies

5. In the case of the first two contingencies, the policies which the United States should adopt are clear:

a. In case the Communists take the initiative in renewing hostilities in Korea, the United States should invoke the Joint Policy Declaration and take military and diplomatic measures along the lines provided in NSC Action No. 794 of May 20, 1953.[7] (Urgent review of these measures is required to permit advance planning and preparation.)

b. In the case of no resumption of hostilities from either side, the United States should continue for the time being, and pending a review of its policy toward Korea, the measures set forth in NSC 154/1, 156/1, 157/1, and Memo for the NSC, "Additional United Nations Forces for Korea", July 17, 1953.†

Alternative General Lines of Action under Third Contingency

6. The third contingency—i.e., the Republic of Korea, despite our efforts to dissuade it, takes or clearly intends to take the initiative in unilaterally renewing hostilities—would pose for the United States four possible alternative lines of action:

Alternative A. Cease all economic and military assistance to Korea; refuse logistic or other support to ROK forces; maintain UNC positions; announce to the Communists that the UNC will continue to abide by the armistice terms; defend UNC forces against any Communist attack; and be prepared, if Communist counterattack against the ROK threatens the security of UNC forces, to undertake such military action as may be necessary for the security of UNC forces. (See Annex A)

Alternative B. Cease assistance and refuse support as in Alternative A above; evacuate U.S. civilians; initiate the withdrawal of UNC forces, either to a beachhead around Pusan, or completely from Korea, terminating the withdrawal only if the Republic of Korea reverses its policy, and renewing general hostilities with the Communists only if the security of the withdrawing UNC forces is jeopardized. (See Annex B)

. . . .

Alternative D. Accept renewal of hostilities and concert plans with the Republic of Korea for the most advantageous timing and strategy for combined action to unify Korea by force of arms. (See Annex D)

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[7] For text, see memorandum of discussion at the 145th meeting of the NSC, May 20, p. 1064.

†The JCS Adviser proposes the following substitute for this paragraph:

b. In the case of no resumption of hostilities from either side, the United States should build up and maintain Republic of Korea armed forces in a manner and to an extent that will permit the phased and orderly redeployment of United States armed forces from Korea at the earliest feasible date; make clear to the Communists our firm intention to honor our security commitments to South Korea and our determination to expand the war to China in the event of a Communist armistice violation; and continue vigorous efforts to rehabilitate and strengthen the economy of the Republic of Korea. The United States should continue to take such measures as are feasible and consistent with its agreements with the Republic of Korea to seek a unified and independent Korea. [Footnote in the source text. In a memorandum to Wilson, Oct. 27, p. 1563, the JCS favored retention of paragraph 5*b* rather than the substitute paragraph proposed here by the JCS Adviser.]

(If the United States should be compelled to carry out any one of the above alternatives, it may be opportune to incorporate in such action elements of other alternatives.)

Undesirability of all Alternatives under Third Contingency

7. Each of the four general lines of action open to the U.S. under the third contingency (para. 4–*c* above) carries such political or military costs and hazards that no one of them would be acceptable U.S. policy unless it were absolutely imperative that one of them be adopted.

a. Sitting tight in the present UNC positions while denying the ROK logistic or other support, would involve risks that the UNC might have to protect itself from Communist attack after Allied support had been dissipated by the initial ROK breach of the armistice and after ROK forces had been badly mauled by the Communists.

b. Withdrawal from Korea would mean loss of Korea to the Communists, and would involve grave consequences for the general U.S. position in the Far East.

. . . .

d. A decision to participate in the renewal of hostilities would be, in effect, to permit President Rhee to exercise the powers of deciding on war or peace for the United States, would encounter difficulties in U.S. public opinion, would alienate the allies of the U.S., and would risk UN action against the U.S.

Accordingly, the United States should urgently undertake all possible measures to dissuade the Republic of Korea from undertaking unilateral military action. However, the nature of these measures will be largely governed by the ultimate line of action selected by the United States for implementation in the event the Republic of Korea, despite our efforts to dissuade it, takes or is about to take the initiative in renewing hostilities. Therefore, in order to be as effective as possible in dissuading President Rhee from taking unilateral action, it is necessary to decide now which of the four alternatives (para. 6 above) to adopt as a last resort in case our efforts at persuasion fail.

8. In considering the effectiveness of these alternatives, it should be borne in mind that the principal determinant of his decision will be his estimate as to whether he could take action in such a way that the U.S. would be involved in a full-scale resumption of the fighting in Korea. At the present time Rhee is apparently convinced that the U.S. does not have the capability to prevent him from unilaterally initiating military action against the Communists. Furthermore, he estimates that the U.S. probably could not in present circumstances dissociate itself from military support of the ROK in the event that his action provoked a significant Communist military reaction. If Rhee retained these convictions at the time of decision, he would probably initiate armed attack against the Communists. Even if he felt there were only a slight chance of involving the U.S., he might initiate such action, hoping to gain the

eventual full support of the U.S. If, on the other hand, Rhee had become convinced that he could not hope to involve the U.S. in a resumption of the Korean fighting, he would not initiate unilateral military action.

Annex A

ALTERNATIVE A

CEASE ALL ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO KOREA, REFUSE LOGISTIC OR OTHER SUPPORT TO ROK FORCES, MAINTAIN UNC POSITIONS, ANNOUNCE TO THE COMMUNISTS THAT THE UNC WILL CONTINUE TO ABIDE BY THE ARMISTICE TERMS, DEFEND UNC FORCES AGAINST ANY COMMUNIST ATTACK, AND BE PREPARED, IF COMMUNIST COUNTER-ATTACK AGAINST THE ROK THREATENS THE SECURITY OF UNC FORCES, TO UNDERTAKE SUCH MILITARY ACTION AS MAY BE NECESSARY FOR THE SECURITY OF UNC FORCES

Probable Communist Reaction to Alternative A

1. If the ROK forces initiated hostilities, the Communists would certainly take action to restore their positions, and perhaps would seek to push their front forward in the areas of the attack to an extent they could plausibly justify as necessary for continuing security of their forces. Beyond this they would probably seek to inflict maximum casualties on the ROK forces, but initially probably would avoid forward movements involving any chance of large-scale contact with U.S. forces, or threatening serious envelopment of the non-ROK held sectors of the present line.

2. In the initial stages the Communists would probably observe closely the reaction of U.S. allies to the situation, and the Soviet Bloc would certainly make every propaganda effort to split the United States and its allies, and to brand the ROK as aggressors. If it appeared that the general free world reaction was hostile to the ROK, the Communists might be tempted to take increased military risks in the belief that the U.S. could not retaliate without putting itself in a most difficult situation with its allies.

Military Advantages and Disadvantages

a. At the moment dispositions of U.S. forces are such as to facilitate this course of action.

b. If the Communists were content merely to repel ROK attacks, and the ROKs did not undertake major attacks against U.S. forces controlling ROK supplies, this U.S. course of action might result in a short-lived ROK assault on the Central and Eastern sectors of the Communist lines, and an eventual cessation of ROK unilateral action after the ROKs ran out of supplies. In such circumstances, if ROK casualties and disorganization did not critically disrupt the general strength of the anti-Communist military position in the peninsula, the situation might be stabilized eventually but with a diminution of allied capabilities.

4. There would be, however, major military risks in such a course of action. If the Communists launched extensive counter-attacks which carried them deep into South Korean territory, the U.S. would have to either join the battle and attempt to throw the Communists back, in which case full-scale hostilities would almost certainly be resumed, or sit back and risk being surrounded and cut off from essential supply and port areas. The decisive defeat of the ROKs would gravely reduce possibilities that UNC forces could retrieve the situation by a general offensive against the Communists. In a situation where the ROK corps were faced with defeat by reason of UNC denial of logistical support, there would also be obvious risks that, in the course of their action against the Communists, the ROK would attempt forcible seizure of U.S. controlled supplies, with attendant possibilities of major disorganization of the situation of both the ROK and the non-Korean UNC forces. Communist air capabilities, if exercised, could, moreover, immediately complicate the situation. Communist air attack would immediately threaten the supplies and line of communications of the UNC as well as the ROK. The distinction between Communist air attack against the ROK and air attack against the UNC might be impossible to draw, and some degree of involvement might accordingly be almost immediate. The risk involved in this general course of action would be considerable since its advantages would rely upon favorable Communist reactions.

Political Implications of Implementing Alternative A

5. It is probable that unilateral military action by the ROK forces would immediately dissipate allied and UN support for the ROK, and that whatever the military outcome, the U.S. would be without further major international support for its actions in Korea. With but few exceptions most free world countries would regard themselves as relieved of all obligations, including those involved in the Joint Policy Declaration, toward the ROK if that government unilaterally breached the armistice. There would be strong possibilities of UN action, probably initiated by the neutralist bloc, to rescind UN support of the ROK and possibly to declare it an aggressor. Aside from withdrawal of the non-U.S. contingents from the UNC forces, such action might lead to difficulties with Japan over continued use of Japanese bases for support of what could no longer be characterized as a UN mission. The U.S. would be held accountable by its Allies for the actions of its Korean protegé, and the effects on the U.S.-led coalition could be seriously divisive.

6. Should the ROK breach of the armistice result in no more than a Communist repulse of the ROK attack, it is probable that the failure of the ROK action would lead to such discrediting of the leadership of President Rhee as to result in an overturn of his government or a reversal of his policies by South Korean military and political leaders. Such a result, even under these circumstances, could not, however, be firmly relied upon. For President Rhee might have such opportunities for ascribing ROK failure to U.S. non-support as to create some possibility for him to direct the animus of the South Koreans against the United States, rather than against himself. Should the ROK breach of the armistice result in major clashes between the ROK and U.S. forces, or in eventual U.S. renewal of hostilities against the Communists, the political repercussions in South Korea would be essentially unpredictable and would depend primarily upon the outcome of military events.

Utility of Alternative A as a Deterrent

7. If the United States undertakes measures to convince Rhee and other Korean leaders that it has selected and will pursue this alternative in the event that the ROK unilaterally resumes hostilities, there is a chance that these measures could succeed in deterring the ROK from initiating hostilities. Such measures would include: high level representation to reiterate categorically to Rhee that the United States will cease economic and military assistance and will not join or support ROK forces if they unilaterally resume hostilities; efforts to convince other ROK leaders of the firmness of this U.S. intent; vigorous implementation of U.S. economic assistance to the ROK; continued stress on the value to the ROK of this assistance; prompt steps to ratify the Mutual Defense Treaty; steps to so deploy U.S. forces and strengthen U.S. control of military supplies as to reduce ROK capabilities for independent action.

Annex B

ALTERNATIVE B

CEASE ASSISTANCE AND REFUSE SUPPORT AS IN ALTERNATIVE A; EVACUATE U.S. CIVILIANS, INITIATE THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNC FORCES, EITHER TO A BEACHHEAD AROUND PUSAN, OR COMPLETELY FROM KOREA; TERMINATING THE WITHDRAWAL ONLY IF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA REVERSES ITS POLICY, AND RENEWING GENERAL HOSTILITIES WITH THE COMMUNISTS ONLY IF THE SECURITY OF THE WITHDRAWING UNC FORCES IS JEOPARDIZED

Probable Communist Reactions to Alternative B

1. It must be assumed that a U.S. threat of withdrawal, even if communicated privately to Rhee, would be almost certain to become

known to the Communists, who would regard it as an indication that the United States definitely desired to avoid a renewal of hostilities.

2. Actual U.S. withdrawal, in event of ROK initiation of hostilities, would confront the Communists with the choice of permitting withdrawal, harassing U.S. forces, or engaging in large-scale hostilities against U.S. forces to inflict maximum casualties. On balance, we believe the Communists would most likely choose initially to permit U.S. withdrawal, with minimum follow-up action. Any other course would, in the judgment of the Communists, involve a greater risk of enlarged hostilities, or even general war, than we now believe they are prepared to assume. However. it must be recognized that as the withdrawal progressed, and as U.S. military capabilities in Korea diminished, the Communists would have tempting opportunities to inflict heavy casualties. Moreover, the possibilities of incidents would be great in any event.

Military Advantages and Disadvantages

3. If Rhee abandons his plans as a result of this threat, certain military advantages would accrue to the United States. Rhee's forces would avoid suicidal action, ROK–U.S. military cooperation would proceed apace, and the United States eventually could withdraw the bulk of its forces from the fighting areas as ROK army capabilities are exploited to the maximum. Since the UN defense line would remain intact, the threat of a treacherous Communist attack in violation of the armistice would be minimized. Some military advantages might be gained even if Rhee persisted in his determination and we were compelled to carry out our threat to withdraw, assuming we escaped involvement in the renewed hostilities. Once out of Korea, the United States would be in a much better position to meet the Soviet threat in Europe, the Middle East, and possibly Southeast Asia. This advantage would largely disappear, however, if the United States made the disentanglement from Korea the occasion for large-scale reductions in its military establishment.

4. The disadvantages in an alternative that might eventually result in a U.S. decision to withdraw from Korea are staggering:

a. If the United States managed to successfully withdraw its forces while avoiding involvement in the Rhee-instigated hostilities, it would be merely a question of time before the Communists completely overran all of Korea. This prospect would mean a loss of U.S. military position in Asia of great magnitude. The security of Japan would be jeopardized as the Communists took control of airfields within easy fighter range of the main islands, as well as important harbors and port facilities for naval and amphibious operations. The loss of the 600,000 ROK fighting men, now trained to a high-level of proficiency, and their equipment, would be a blow to the non-Communist military position in the Far East. This loss would be especially costly if general war occurred soon thereafter. Considerable new requirements would be immediately generated for the defense of Japan.

b. Moreover, the assumption that U.S. forces could escape involvement while withdrawing from Korea as the ROK engages the enemy is open to serious question. Since the nature of the Communist reaction to the situation could not be determined in advance it would be mandatory for U.S. forces to withdraw with sufficient equipment and in such a manner as to be prepared for immediate large-scale combat. This would take at least six months, during which the course of the ROK-Communist engagement could take many turns depending upon Communist actions. If the Communists chose to assume a defense posture until the United States completed its withdrawal, the United States would be faced only with ROK attempts to involve us. These might run the gamut from passive resistance, such as bridge and vehicle sabotage, port strikes and disturbances, etc., to actual armed resistance. A vigorous application of all ROK capabilities could make an orderly withdrawal of UN forces infeasible. On the other hand, if Communist counter-attacks successfully penetrated deep into South Korea, chaotic conditions fraught with explosive possibilities for U.S. involvement would result. If the Communists chose to press the advantage offered by a situation where UN military capabilities are seriously impaired by the loss of the ROK forces, the abandonment of prepared positions and the loss of forward fighter bases, they would possess the capability of striking a paralyzing blow at the UN forces, involving serious loss of life, and substantial loss of equipment that could be replaced only after considerable delay. In such case, the United States might be compelled to use atomic weapons to avert disaster. However, this would expose concentrations of U.S. forces to possible atomic bombing by the Communists, if they were prepared to risk general war.

c. From a military standpoint the risks inherent in this alternative depend to such a great extent upon a favorable Communist reaction for its success that it is a calculated risk of great magnitude.

Withdrawal to a Beachhead in the Pusan Area

5. To eliminate the disadvantages resulting from a complete withdrawal from Korea it might be suggested that the United States withdraw to a beachhead in the Pusan area. This course poses military problems of such magnitude as to rule out its consideration. Having eliminated the ROK resistance the Communists would in all probability speedily deploy to positions opposite those of the UN Command. The UN forces would then be faced with an enemy force in possession of virtually all the food resources and transportation facilities of Korea as well as the key naval and air bases. The denial of the major air facilities to the UN forces and their acquisition by the Communists would place an intolerable burden upon the UN air units which would be largely restricted to operations from aircraft carriers and bases in Japan. Furthermore, the length of the defense line of the beachhead would closely approximate that of the present deployment. Since the ROK forces would be absent from this line a substantially weaker defense would result. The absence of defense in depth, maneuver room, and adequate facilities of all kinds, would seriously jeopardize the UN military capability for a resumption of full-scale hostilities.

Political Implication of Implementing Alternative B

6. *General.* The obvious effects on U.S. public opinion of a clear failure to achieve beneficial results from intervention in Korea would reduce allied confidence in, and the deterrent value against local Communist aggression of, potential U.S. military intervention.

7. *Reaction in the Far East.* If the United States should withdraw from Korea even under circumstances in which the Republic of Korea initiated hostilities against the Communists, the consequences would be extremely grave for the United States position in Asia. The Republic of Korea forces alone would face certain defeat by combined Chinese Communist and North Korean armies. Were Korea to be lost to the Communists, the French would be likely to give up the struggle for Indochina and that area would fall to the Communists. Thailand in these circumstances might not hold to its alliance with the Free World, and Malaya and Burma would be seriously threatened. The morale of the Nationalist Chinese on Formosa would be undermined by what they would consider to be evidence of U.S. unwillingness to prevent Communist territorial expansion. Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea would advance Communist air and naval forces to the Tsushima Straits and would seriously affect Japan's confidence in the U.S. and cause it seriously to question, and possibly to veer away from, its western alliance.

8. *Other Reactions.* A U.S. threat to withdraw from Korea as a move to save the armistice and to avoid resumption of hostilities at Rhee's initiative would initially be welcomed by non-Far Eastern countries of the Free World. Europeans and the neutralist countries would interpret such a U.S. course of action as indicating firm U.S. intentions to avoid involvement in general war, and accordingly would be encouraged. Actual withdrawal, however, would tend to shake the general confidence of the Free World. Other countries would lose confidence in the strength of American intentions and capabilities to prevent and resist other local aggressions by the Communist bloc. There would also be an inclination toward accommodation with the Communist bloc in general, and toward increase of political and economic relationships with Communist China in particular.

Utility of Alternative B as a Deterrent

9. If President Rhee were to estimate that the U.S. would and could withdraw without becoming involved in resumption of fighting in Korea, he would be deterred from initiating hostilities. A threat of U.S. withdrawal, if convincingly made, probably would bring Rhee to this conviction. It is even more likely that such a threat would be effective with the ROK military leaders who, if faced with the danger of unsupported ROK military action, might well choose to refuse to obey an order from their President. Thus, while the prospects of success of the

threat of withdrawal are reasonably good, they hinge on the sincerity with which the U.S. presents its position, in its actions and in its public statements, and in private conversations with Korean leaders. It is doubtful that President Rhee would commit his country to what he considered a suicidal course of action; it is almost certain that many important Korean political and military leaders would not respond to orders which they considered suicidal for the nation. If, in spite of this Rhee actually initiated hostilities, it would be probable that possibilities of successful implementation of the type of coup described under Alternative C would be greatly enhanced.

Annex D

ALTERNATIVE D

ACCEPT RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES AND CONCERT PLANS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA FOR THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS TIMING AND STRATEGY FOR COMBINED ACTION TO UNIFY KOREA BY FORCE OF ARMS

1. If it is determined that the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea is not feasible or desirable, and if "preventive measures" are not considered acceptable as a means of deterring President Rhee from taking military action to unify Korea, the United States Government might consider voluntarily joining the ROK in an all-out military effort to unify Korea by force. Joining the ROK in such an action would entail deliberate planning with the ROK, together with a build-up of the necessary military force to defeat Communist forces in Korea. Military action would be along the lines of courses referred to in NSC Action No. 794 of May 20, 1953.

Probable Communist Reaction to Alternative D

2. The possibilities of Soviet intervention in the event of US–ROK effort to unify Korea by force have been estimated in NSC 147.[8] It must be emphasized, however, that under circumstances in which the U.S. and ROK took the initiative in breaching the armistice, the likelihood of Soviet intervention would be materially increased.

Military Advantages and Disadvantages

3. Assuming Rhee agrees to a delay in the initiation of hostilities, the UN Command could complete preparations for a campaign to defeat the enemy in Korea along the lines discussed in courses D, E and F of NSC 147. In the absence of USSR intervention, such a campaign would have a high probability of inflicting a crushing local defeat on the enemy. Avoiding as it does the costly loss of the excellent ROK fight-

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[8] Dated Apr. 2, p. 838.

ing forces, it would present a maximum opportunity for the United States to remove the growing threat to the entire off-shore island chain and Indochina now posed by Communist China. The successful outcome of such a campaign would not only severely damage Chinese Communist military prestige among Asiatics but conversely would reestablish the prestige of the United States as a military power. Such a course of action would provide the fighting forces with a clear-cut military objective heretofore denied them. From a long-range standpoint it would make possible the eventual redeployment of considerable numbers of U.S. forces now tied down in Korea.

4. Disadvantages of this alternative include the fact that for the period of the resulting hostilities the present degree of strategic maldeployment would be materially aggravated. There would likewise be a marked effect on our ability to meet our MDAP commitments particularly to NATO. These disadvantages are discussed in considerable detail in NSC 147. If this course of action led to a general war through Soviet intervention, the degree of involvement probably would render more difficult the redeployments made necessary by the requirements of global war, and the possible denial to the U.S. of European bases and cooperation might make more difficult the conduct of global war operations.

Political Implications of Implementing Alternative D

5. A military defeat of Communist forces in Korea would greatly enhance U.S. prestige in the Far East and in the remainder of the world, particularly if U.S. and ROK military efforts were successful in quickly unifying Korea. The growing influence of Communist China in the Far East might be slowed and possibly halted. A severe defeat of Communist forces in Korea and air and naval attacks against Communist China could so weaken the Chinese Communist regime as possibly to lead to its overthrow.

6. From a political viewpoint, however, it would border on the impossible for the United States voluntarily to join the Republic of Korea in a deliberate military move to unify Korea by force. Specifically, such an undertaking by the United States would:

a. Quite possibly result in general war under conditions where Allied support would be doubtful.

b. Probably result in the United States and the Republic of Korea being branded by the United Nations as "aggressor nations".

c. Result in a loss of political and military support in Korea from our major allies.

d. Cause a cleavage in the free world leading to possible collapse of NATO and loss to the United States of its present position of leadership in the non-Communist world.

e. Not have popular U.S. public support for a deliberate resumption of hostilities, particularly with respect to the sacrifice in American lives and wealth that would accompany such an effort.

795.00/10–2353

Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 23, 1953.

I have just read the cable from General Hull, together with your covering memorandum.[1]

Your memorandum does not indicate that the Vice President had a thorough briefing on our attitude with respect to future actions in Korea; he should be carefully warned to leave no doubt in President Rhee's mind on certain basic questions, should they come up for discussion.

I realize that our defense staffs are now studying the question as to what we should do in a military way in the event that President Rhee should initiate unilateral action to resume hostilities in Korea. I understand, however, that there is no difference of opinion as to our determination not to be involved if he should take any such extraordinary and foolish action.

In general, I agree with the recommendations contained in paragraph eight of General Hull's cable. If there is any question about the matter, I think you and I should have a talk about it soon. If you do not think such a talk is necessary, I hope you will take prompt steps to see that Vice President Nixon is briefed along these lines.[2]

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[1] Dated Oct. 21, p. 1542.

[2] In a memorandum to President Eisenhower, Oct. 23, Dulles assured the President that the Department of State would brief Vice President Nixon, who had left Oct. 7 for an extensive trip to the Middle and Far East, before he got to Korea. (795.00/10–2353)

795.00/10–2453: Telegram

The Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Dean) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET SEOUL, October 24, 1953—noon.

358. Repeated information Tokyo 174, New Delhi 16. For the Secretary from Dean; Tokyo for General Hull and Allison. Arrived Tokyo Friday October 23 at 1:30 Tokyo time and was briefed by Ambassadors Allison and Briggs.

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[1] In a memorandum to the President, Oct. 27, Dulles enclosed a copy of this telegram and suggested that Eisenhower might wish to read it before the NSC meeting on Oct. 30. Although Dulles thought it somewhat long, he recommended it for its "atmosphere and flavor" and noted that it was reassuring on the likelihood of Rhee reopening hostilities. (795.00/10–2653)

At 3 o'clock met General Hull and his staff and had excellent briefing on relations to NNRC and military situation. Substance of briefing as follows: As far as anyone can gauge situation at present time, while unilateral military action by ROK is possible, it is not regarded as probable in near future and disposition of our troops and logistics such that (a) ROK troops would not have more than six days supply, (b) our troops could make other supplies unavailable, (c) our troops could be disposed in Korea in such manner as to make serious troop loss improbable, and (d) while opinion varies, consensus seems to be that without enabling action by US, ROK military could act on Rhee orders to proceed unilaterally with the greatest of reluctance though they would probably accept orders to proceed against Communists rather than face removal from command or firing squad. Our relation with ROK military continues excellent and situation has not deteriorated since your visit early August.

Spent considerable time exploring relations NNRC and General Thimayya in particular. Refer to wire from Ambassador Allen[2] for more details those relations. Explored whether our attitude possibly too rigid and whether possible prisoners could be persuaded to accept explanation quietly and then decide against repatriation. Explained this was out of my province except as it bore on general question of success of political conference and possibility of there being one, and inadvisability of permitting Indians to throw whole question into General Assembly for debate. General Harrison accompanied us to Seoul this morning and is exploring that situation with General Thimayya today. Believe top command doing everything possible to promote harmonious relations Indians. Explained to Allison and General Hull wanted to maintain very close liaison. General Harrison gave us excellent briefing on dealing with Communists.

Arrived Seoul noon today and had satisfactory talk with Dr. Rhee. US representative is to be sole emissary from our side but I volunteered to accept as observers Vice Minister Cho and Colonel Li. I made clear there must be only one spokesman for our side. Assured Rhee no change in our ideas as to composition of conference and that we would maintain closest possible liaison with him. Informed Rhee my instructions were to agree on time and place, administrative details, and I was not authorized to change on composition. Rhee urged that we should walk out if composition even discussed but I advised I would listen but make no agreements. Rhee reaffirmed his absolute objection to India at conference and inquired several times how many governments would be at political conference and I explained General Assembly resolution of August 28 was invitation to sixteen UN nations contributing troops plus Republic of Korea and that any of them could decline and that some might do so.

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[2] Not printed.

After first obtaining explicit approval General Hull and Ambassador Briggs that it was wise to discuss subject at this time I made clear to Dr. Rhee that belligerent statements on his part or statements that if he proceeded unilaterally to renew hostilities he had commitments from us, were seriously hurting chances ratification defense pact and possibility of obtaining further appropriations for economic rehabilitation, and that both President Eisenhower and you were very insistent that political conference should be given every chance to bring about free independent and united Korea by negotiation.

Dr. Rhee insisted there was only one way to do that, namely by force, and that neither defense pact nor gold was of possible use to him if there were still a million Chinese Communist troops in Korea. He related Chinese fable about fish gasping on the sand, moribund for pail of water while the Chinese philosopher promised to rescue victim by bringing entire eastern sea. I countered this with Aesop fable of fox who lost cheese in his mouth by mistaking reflection of cheese in water for substance of cheese. I reminded him again of the specific wording of your joint communiqué of August 7. He reiterated his extreme skepticism as to the utility of political conference and his great faith in unification by force. I referred him to statements by both President Eisenhower and you including particularly your *Herald Tribune* forum speech that the release of modern weapons was too horrible to contemplate and that we must use every reasonable effort to negotiate peace at the conference table. I again made explicitly clear United States has no commitment beyond August 7 joint communiqué. Rhee suggested our refusal accept his view that unification could only be achieved by force and that if we did not support him, this, in his opinion, constituted indication our intention to desert him, which I emphatically assured him was not the case. I cannot in all honesty say that he seemed particularly impressed by my arguments or by my new status.

Following conference with Dr. Rhee, I had very satisfactory talk with General Taylor. General Taylor pointed out that there is a wide range of unilateral action possible from merely shooting a gun to the north across the line in violation of the armistice to the actual ordering of ROK troops to proceed north. All here are agreed that there seems little likelihood that Rhee has any intention of taking any major unilateral action in the near future. Inquired of him at some length on military situation. General Taylor reported (1) his relations with ROK military commanders have improved over situation existing in August, (2) seemed somewhat doubtful of automatic obedience and expressed view that if ordered to proceed ROK military would not do much more than lean forward in their foxholes, although they could always take action which would constitute a violation of the armistice, (3) did not seem to believe that there was any evidence that Dr. Rhee was prepared to proceed unilaterally in the near future. In fact he cited a number of matters to the contrary in which Dr. Rhee had readily agreed or advocated recently, including a substantial reduction in the draft, his insistence on rebuilding buildings in the capital, etc., which apparently indicates he has no present intention of proceeding unilaterally. General relations and military relations seem excellent and neither General Hull nor General Taylor seemed anywhere near as alarmed about possibility unilateral action as some thought expressed in Washington just before I left. In view of fact Indians apparently not going to use force with respect to prisoners and this situation seems to be improving somewhat, none here see any instance immediately on horizon which might cause him to act in a manner inimical to safety our forces or in a manner threatening peace. However, opinion given me in meetings Tokyo and Seoul that we should soon inform Rhee we will not support any unilateral action, and that we will be remiss not to inform him soon.

Communists today advised MAC secretariat they would hold meetings in a hall built by them and astride the demarcation line, which hall General Lacey considers entirely satisfactory our purposes. Am making preliminary inspection trip tomorrow to be sure there is no propaganda value to them in selecting this hall. Receiving most complete cooperation from Ambassador Briggs and everyone concerned and will leave for Munsan-Ni either late Sunday or early Monday morning.[3] Colonel Babcock and Kenneth Young will make preliminary check Monday morning to make sure status Communist presentation satisfactory. Press statement on arrival Tokyo and Seoul being sent separately.

[DEAN]

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[3] Oct. 25–26.

895.00/10–2753

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 27, 1953.

Subject: Status of Korean Aid Program.

I. *Negotiations*

Economic Coordinator C. Tyler Wood has been negotiating for several weeks with the Korean Government on basic economic policies to be pursued by the Republic of Korea under the economic aid program.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Howard F. Smith of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs.

On October 24, Mr. Wood reported that he apparently had reached the final stage of his negotiations. It appeared that questions relating to the exchange rate, credit, budgetary, and pricing policies, control of the Republic of Korea foreign exchange, and the composition of the import program were nearing amicable solution. Mr. Wood reported that he was amazed by the change for the better of the negotiating atmosphere.

Today, Mr. Wood reported that revised proposals have been made by the Republic of Korea which seem at one fell swoop to destroy all that had been gained during recent discussions. The revised proposals, delivered to Mr. Wood by an American advisor to President Rhee, imply that the United States would virtually guarantee the permanence of the 180/1 exchange rate; cancel the February 25, 1953 agreement on the conversion rate; eliminate the Combined Economic Board coordination of the use of Republic of Korea foreign exchange; eliminate the provision relating to the privilege of the Economic Coordinator to use up to 5 percent of the counterpart fund for administrative expenses; and in general emasculate the stabilization plans.

Mr. Wood suggests that there are two alternative courses of action that can be taken: (1) He can stand firm and insist on an agreement containing the minimum conditions for the effective use of aid funds, or (2) the United States can, in view of other considerations, not insist on any agreement relating to performance by the Republic of Korea or controls by the United States, relying on persuasion and the good faith of the Republic of Korea to take effective action.

Mr. Wood recommends that a firm stand be taken and that he be authorized to tell President Rhee that in view of the new proposals by the Republic of Korea to which he has no authority to agree he would have to return to the United States for consultation. He would base this action on the decision of the NSC that funds be made available only on the basis of an agreement on an effective stabilization plan. He requests advice as to whether he should in addition cease issuing any further firm requests for procurement.

I agree with Mr. Wood that we have reached the point in the negotiations where we should stand firm. I think there is a reasonably good chance that President Rhee will agree pretty much to Wood's proposals when confronted with his departure.

II. *Operations*

A. *FOA Program*

In the meantime, the FOA program has gotten underway, albeit somewhat slowly. Mr. Wood is still operating within the limits of the original $50 million made available to FOA. He has made firm requests for about $34 million and procurement authorizations totaling $13.7 million have been issued. There is no record thus far of any payments made to Japan. Actual deliveries have been limited to grain and possibly some chemical fertilizer. The main items for which firm requests have been made are fertilizer, $12 million; rolling stock, $12 million; grain, $3.2 million; raw cotton, $3.2 million; and raw materials, $2.8 million.

Thus, with almost one-third of the fiscal year elapsed, procurement authorizations equal to about 15 percent of the program have been issued, while arrivals equal about 1 percent of the program.

B. *Civil Relief in Korea (CRIK)*

For the present, the mainstays of the import program are the CRIK Army relief imports and imports resulting from the expenditures of the Republic of Korea foreign exchange. CRIK arrivals are averaging about $10 million a month and should continue at approximately this rate during the remainder of the fiscal year. CINCUNC has requested that the Department of Army request funds for a relief program for FY 1955. No decisions have been made on this question.

C. *United Nations Korean Reconstruction Program (UNKRA)*

The UNKRA program of Korea is faced with a real fiscal crisis. Sir Arthur Rucker, Deputy Agent General, has been in Europe soliciting contributions; so far he has obtained no firm promises. The United States has recently disbursed $15 million additional to UNKRA, but cannot make further disbursements from the $51 million appropriation until other nations contribute funds to bring into balance the 65–35 percent ratio between United States and non-United States contributions. UNKRA operations in Korea will grind to a halt within a few months unless substantial pledges can be obtained from other nations during the current session of the General Assembly. A contribution campaign will shortly be undertaken by USDel. A less propitious time to solicit contributions is difficult to imagine.

JCS records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 27 October 1953.

Subject: United States Courses of Action in Korea in the Absence of an Acceptable Political Settlement (NSC 167).[1]

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views on a report by the National Security Council Planning Board entitled "United States Courses of Action in Korea in the Absence of an Acceptable Political Settlement"—NSC 167.

2. In connection with the draft statement of action to be taken by the United States in the event there is no resumption of hostilities by either

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[1] Dated Oct. 22, p. 1546.

side, the Joint Chiefs of Staff favor the retention of subparagraph 5 *b* as now stated, in preference to the wording proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adviser to the Planning Board as a substitute for this paragraph. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not at this time take issue with the proposed substitute wording, they consider that it would serve to prejudge the outcome of a Joint Chiefs of Staff study which is now in progress.

3. In their study of NSC 167, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have addressed themselves primarily to the possible alternative United States actions in the event the Republic of Korea (ROK) takes, or clearly demonstrates an intention to take, the initiative in unilaterally renewing hostilities. They are in general agreement with the assessment of the hazards that would attend the adoption of any of the four alternative lines of action. In addition, there is an important consideration not touched upon in the report which would serve further to complicate this problem; i.e., the possibility that some, but not all, of the ROK forces might refuse to carry out President Rhee's orders and choose to stand with the United Nations Command (UNC) in continuing to observe the armistice. Under these circumstances, the ultimate disposition of the ROK units which had aligned themselves with the UNC would present a most serious problem should the Communists overrun South Korea and the UN forces be eventually evacuated from Korea. The United States might well be faced with the alternative of abandoning large numbers of ROK military personnel to their fate in Korea or of attempting to evacuate, relocate, and support them indefinitely outside of Korea. The enormous difficulties which could result from this situation are obvious.

4. An assessment of the consequences which would in all probability attend the adoption of any of the alternative courses of action, or combinations thereof, leads to the conclusion that these consequences would be so damaging to United States security interests as to require that the United States, both in its own behalf and, as executive agent for the UN, in concert with its principal Allies, make every possible effort (a) to dissuade or prevent President Rhee from issuing orders for unilateral action by the ROK forces and (b) to reduce the likelihood that ROK commanders would carry out such orders if received.

5. In evaluating the alternative general lines of action set forth in the report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that Alternative D; i.e., United States participation in the reopening of hostilities and in combined action to unify Korea by force of arms, would not be acceptable and should not receive further consideration. Should the United States voluntarily join the ROK in such a deliberate military move, it would not only involve the risk of general war, the probable loss of our major Allies, and the branding of the United States as an aggressor and a violator of the armistice agreement, but in all probability, would not have the support of the people of the United States.

6. If Alternative D is discarded, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States freedom of action is primarily in the direction of those steps which might be taken in endeavoring to prevent the reopening of hostilities by the ROK. Once the ROK has initiated such action, the measures taken by the United States would be those dictated primarily by the counteraction of the Communists and by the necessity of safeguarding the security of its forces. It is not possible to determine whether any measures now open to the United States would be effective in dissuading President Rhee from initiating unilateral action. Nevertheless, under the assumption that the United States would elect not to participate in such action, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that President Rhee must be informed in unequivocal terms that the United States will not support any unilateral action on the part of the ROK in violation of the armistice.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that no one of the courses of action would of itself be suitable for adoption as United States policy. They feel rather that if the ROK takes, or clearly demonstrates the intention to take, the initiative in unilaterally renewing hostilities, elements of the three courses of action stated in Alternatives A, B, and C would have to be adopted to meet the requirements of the situation with which the United States would then be faced. Again, the reaction of the enemy to unilateral action by the ROK in renewing hostilities would be a large factor in determining the courses of action which would be applied after hostilities begin.

8. In the situation with which we are now confronted in Korea, any selection of courses of action must, of necessity, make reasonably adequate provision for the most adverse combination of factors and possible eventualities. The courses of action recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are based upon the following considerations:

a. It is assumed that in the event hostilities in Korea are renewed through unilateral ROK action, the UN forces will not join with nor support the ROK Army but will continue to abide by the terms of the armistice until attacked or dangerously threatened;

b. An unsupported offensive by all or part of the ROK Army would soon be halted and might be followed by a Communist counteroffensive which could within a relatively short time defeat the ROK Army, and if unopposed by UN forces, could place Communist forces astride UN land lines of communication, dangerously envelop UN forces, and ultimately overrun all of South Korea except UN enclaves;

c. The Communists may at any time after the renewal of hostilities elect to initiate attacks against UN forces; in any event the possibility of hostile incidents will be great;

d. In the event of renewal of hostilities by the ROK, it may be expected that the Allies of the U.S. now fighting in Korea would, with few if any exceptions, regard themselves as relieved of all obligations toward the ROK, including those obligations associated with the Joint

Policy Declaration, and would favor withdrawal of their forces from Korea at the earliest practicable date;

e. Some ROK Army units may elect at the outset not to join in the unilateral action of the ROK Government but to remain under UN command; such units might or might not be in positions adjacent to UN forces;

f. It is almost certain that once the tide turned against the ROK Army, large numbers of ROK Army stragglers would attempt to seek refuge within the UN lines;

g. It may be expected that every conceivable attempt would be made by the ROK Government and military forces to involve the UN forces in the fighting;

h. The ROK Army might attempt to attain possession of UN military supplies by forceful means; and

i. If fighting between ROK and Communist forces reaches large-scale proportions despite appropriate UN efforts to prevent the renewal of hostilities, it would be in the best interest of the United States and the UN forces not to employ military force to block or obstruct ROK military action beyond those measures necessary in the interest of the security of UN forces.

9. It is recommended that a U.S. governmental decision be made at this time to adopt the following courses of action, which in the aggregate represent a combination of Alternatives A, B, and C:

a. At an appropriate time in the proximate future, and preferably in concert with our principal Allies, inform President Rhee unequivocally that in the event of renewal of hostilities in Korea through unilateral ROK action the UN forces will not support the ROK military forces either directly or indirectly, that all economic aid to the ROK will immediately cease, that the UN Commander will take all necessary action to safeguard the security of his forces including all possible measures consistent with their security to avoid their involvement in the fighting;

b. Take all possible measures, both overt and covert, to gain the earliest possible knowledge of a decision on the part of President Rhee to issue orders to the ROK forces to attack and, in the event of such decision, to prevent such an order from being issued or, if issued, from reaching ROK military commanders in the field; such measures should not exclude the seizure and detention of key ROK military and civil personages involved;

c. At the appropriate time, take all possible measures to reduce the probability that such an order, if received by field commanders, would be carried out;

d. Depending upon the results obtained from the measures set forth above, consider the advisability of making public the statement of intent contained in subparagraph *a* above; and

e. If and when hostilities are renewed through unilateral ROK action, take the following actions:

(1) Cease all economic and military assistance to Korea;
(2) Discontinue all logistic or other support to ROK forces;
(3) Evacuate United States civilians;

(4) Announce to the Communists that the UNC will continue to abide by the armistice terms, will defend UN forces against any Communist attack, and will be prepared, if a Communist counterattack against the ROK threatens the security of UN forces, to undertake such military action as may be necessary for the security of UN forces;

(5) Announce to the Communists, preferably in concert with our principal Allies, that if the UN forces are attacked by the Communists, the counteraction will not be confined to Korea;

(6) Renew general hostilities only if forced to do so.

10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that while President Rhee should be informed unequivocally that the UNC will not support unilateral ROK action in violation of the armistice and would take all possible measures to avoid involvement of UN forces in the ensuing hostilities, such a statement to President Rhee should not include a threat to withdraw UN forces from Korea in such an eventuality.

11. It is recommended that the foregoing views be reflected in the Department of Defense position to be presented to the National Security Council.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
EDWIN H. J. CARNS
Brigadier General, USA
Secretary

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 167 Series

Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 28, 1953.

Subject: Comments on JCS views regarding NSC 167 [2]

1. The JCS flatly reject any UNC participation in a reopening of hostilities to unify Korea by force (Alternative D).

2. The JCS state that the basic objective must be to dissuade or prevent Rhee from initiating unilateral action by the ROK forces and to reduce the likelihood that they would carry out any orders for this purpose.

3. The course of action recommended by the JCS differs from that recommended in our paper in the following respects:

a. In the warning to Rhee, the JCS would not threaten possible withdrawal of UNC forces from Korea.

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[1] In a covering note, Bowie informed Dulles that this memorandum represented the combined views of Murphy, Robertson, Johnson, and himself.

[2] For text of NSC 167, Oct. 22, see p. 1546. The JCS comments are *supra.*

b. To prevent issuance of orders for unilateral ROK action, the JCS would take all necessary measures, including seizure and retention of key ROK personnel.

c. The JCS would inform the Communists that the UNC, if endangered by Communist operations against the ROK forces, would undertake counteraction against the Communists, and that if the Communists attacked UNC forces, the counteraction would not necessarily be confined to Korea.

4. The main objections to this course of action are as follows:

a. The refusal to threaten Rhee with the possibility of UNC withdrawal eliminates the most effective weapon at our disposal for either dissuading Rhee from taking unilateral action or for mobilizing other ROK opposition to such unilateral action. Under the JCS plan, Rhee would conclude and convince other Koreans that he would be able ultimately to draw us in. We could never convince Rhee that if we intend to remain, we could afford to wait until the ROK forces were destroyed before intervening.

The only way over this obstacle is to make clear that we are prepared to withdraw in order to avoid intervention. This gamble offers much better hope of not having to withdraw than does a temporizing approach.

b. The JCS proposal would not lay the necessary basis for taking Rhee and other leaders into custody. Under the JCS plan, the reasons for our action would not be apparent to most of the Korean people or to the outside world. Many South Koreans and Asians would feel that such action was an unjustified interference with Korean independence in the interest of a U.S. military position. Under these conditions, many Koreans would remain loyal to Rhee with the serious risk of chaos and civil war. Such an outcome would itself undermine the capacity of the UNC forces either to defend themselves or to withdraw.

The State proposal seeks to minimize these hazards. Under it, the South Koreans would face the clear-cut choice between following Rhee to national suicide or taking steps in the Korean interest to prevent Rhee's action. Under those conditions many patriotic Koreans could be expected to oppose Rhee and to take the necessary steps to change the ROK course. Then the U.S. support would appear as promoting Korean interests and would be much less likely to create confusion or conflicts of loyalty.

Furthermore, if our action is clearly based on the need for protecting UNC forces from the consequences of Rhee's unilateral action, our position would be far more defendable and far more likely to receive support from our allies and others.

5. Any course of action will involve a gamble.

a. The JCS course risks the security of our forces and their ability to defend themselves after serious ROK reverses. It does not create the conditions most likely to deter Rhee from taking the unilateral action. Moreover, if, under the JCS plan, ROK forces were destroyed and chaos and civil war resulted in Korea, the UNC might still have to withdraw but under conditions which would make it extremely costly both in men and in prestige.

b. The State plan frankly takes the risk of having to withdraw, but it uses the possibility in a way which should minimize the risk of having to carry it out and maximize the chance that Korean and other forces will prevent or deter ROK unilateral action.

R. R. BOWIE

S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 167 Series

Memorandum by the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Scott) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 28, 1953.

Subject: Revised plan EVER READY

In an "exclusive" message to General Ridgway, General Hull has tentatively approved the following revised plan EVER READY.[2]

EVER READY provides for the safeguarding of UNC forces and supplies and insures that the UN position, relative to the armistice, is maintained in the event operational control of the ROK forces is weakened or lost prior to, during, or following the political settlement.

The plan is conditioned by four assumptions:

One, the political settlement has been, will be, or is being negotiated.

Two, UN forces maintain the *status quo* of their positions and strength as of October 14, 1953.

Three, the ROK reluctance to accept the armistice terms may produce:

> Condition A: ROK Government or military is unresponsive to UNC directives.
>
> Condition B: ROK Government and military take an independent course of action.
>
> Condition C: ROK Government, military or people are overtly hostile.

Four, the present favorable UNC/ROK relationship may deteriorate suddenly.

The over-all assigned tasks remain substantially the same; however, the revised plan EVER READY enumerates countermeasures which the Eighth Army Commander may invoke under conditions A, B, or C, as follows:

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[1] This memorandum was also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

[2] Telegram CX 65694, Oct. 24, not printed. (JCS records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-53))

1. Instruct the ROK Army Chief of Staff to enforce UN countermeasures.
2. Relieve disloyal ROK commanders.
3. Withdraw all logistical support and delay ROK Army expansion.
4. Withdraw air support, ground the ROK Air Force, and bomb designated ROK ammunition-supply points.
5. Secure custody of dissident military and civilian leaders.
6. Secure control of Korean transportation and electric power facilities.

The Eighth Army Commander may also recommend to CINCUNC (General Hull) the following:

1. Demand that Rhee comply with the UNC declaration of policies and disseminate this decision to the ROK Army, *et al.*
2. Reduce military and economic aid.
3. Withdraw recognition of the Rhee government and expel ROK forces from the UNC.
4. Establish a naval blockade.
5. Block the ROK dollar-sterling accounts.
6. Initiate an anti-Rhee publicity campaign.
7. Proclaim martial law.

The countermeasures outlined above (which the Eighth Army Commander can carry out or recommend to CINCUNC) are principally intended for use under condition C, wherein relationships have deteriorated beyond the point of a containment by the UNC of an acceptable situation and the Eighth Army Commander deems the conditions of a phased withdrawal imminent or advisable.

WKS

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 168th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, October 29, 1953 [1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 168th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. The Vice President did not attend the meeting because of his absence from the country. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Items 2 and 3); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Items 2 and 3); the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers (for Item 2). The following were present for Items 2, 3 and 7: the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Acting Secretary of the Air Force; the Acting Chief of Staff, U.S.

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[1] Drafted by Gleason on Oct. 30.

Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Acting Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; and the Acting Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps. Others also present were the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Robert Bowie, of the Department of State; the Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows discussion on items 1. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security", 2. "Review of Basic National Security Policy", 3. "FY 1955 Budget Considerations", 4. "Continental Defense", 5. "Near East Oil Situation", and 6. "Safeguarding Official Information in the Interest of the Defense of the United States".]

7. *U.S. Courses of Action in Korea in the Absence of an Acceptable Political Settlement* (NSC 167;[2] Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated October 28, 1953;[3] NSC Action No. 794[4])

Mr. Cutler took great pains to explain the sensitive nature of this paper and, in order to clarify the problem and to emphasize the content and significance of the alternative courses of action, read paragraphs 1 through 8 of the paper. He explained the urgency of Council action in the choice of an alternative, since General Hull was in need of guidance and also because the Vice President would reach Korea on November 12 and might be very helpful in bringing pressure on Syngman Rhee to avoid unilateral resumption of hostilities. Mr. Cutler also called the Council's attention to the JCS comments on this report.

At the conclusion of Mr. Cutler's lengthy exposition, the President interposed to observe that when the Council had earlier discussed action which the United States would take if the Communists broke the armistice and resumed hostilities, it was agreed that we would use atomic bombs to meet the situation. We were therefore supposed to discuss the use of atomic weapons with our allies. The President wanted to know whether such discussions had taken place and whether our allies fully understood our position respecting atomic weapons.

Secretary Dulles said that he was quite certain our major allies did understand our view, even though there had not been formal discussions with them.

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[2] Dated Oct. 22, p. 1546.

[3] Presumably this memorandum, not printed, transmitted a memorandum from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, Oct. 27, p. 1563.

[4] For text, see the memorandum of discussion at the 145th meeting of the NSC, May 20, p. 1064.

Mr. Cutler then brought the discussion back to the written comments of the Joints Chiefs of Staff.[5] He noted that the Joint Chiefs had thrown out the fourth alternative, namely, of joining in with the ROKs if they resumed hostilities. He also pointed out that the Joint Chiefs felt that any threat to withdraw from Korea was inadmissible. In substance, Mr. Cutler believed that the Joint Chiefs' proposal was a combination of Alternatives A and C of NSC 167, but in any case he asked Admiral Carney to summarize the JCS position.

Admiral Carney stated that the Joint Chiefs favored putting every practical pressure on Rhee at once in order to prevent him from resuming hostilities. They did not, however, believe that we should even indicate a possibility that we might withdraw from Korea. If these efforts to dissuade Rhee failed, continued Admiral Carney, the Chiefs made certain recommendations as to how to proceed, but they did not forecast the precise courses of action which it would be necessary to follow in order to carry out these recommendations. Admiral Carney then read the recommendations contained in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the JCS comments.

At the conclusion of Admiral Carney's statement, the President said that he assumed that we were gradually concentrating our own and other UN forces in Korea in such a way that an attack by the ROK on the Communists would not automatically involve our own forces. When General Bolte replied that such changes in disposition of our forces were mostly complete, the President went on to express a conviction that we must avoid any course of action which played into the hands of the Communists while attempting to restrain Rhee. If we stay in Korea, said the President, it was above all essential to avoid allowing the Communists to eliminate the ROK forces, after which they could turn upon the UN forces and administer a crushing defeat. In short, said the President, the Communists must be made to understand clearly that any attack on the UN forces would mean general war. After further discussion of the JCS views, the President called on the Secretary of State to read the statement[6] which he had prepared on this subject and which had been circulated to the members of the Council (copy in Minutes of 168th NSC meeting).

The Secretary of State said that he would prefer not to read from his written statement, but to speak extemporaneously. He said he believed that the consequences of any renewal of the war in Korea by a unilateral Rhee initiative would be so disastrous that all our efforts must be to forestall such a renewal. For if this does happen there was really no good alternative to choose from. We certainly could not follow Course

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[5] See footnote 3 above.

[6] Not found, but the proposed Department of State position is summarized in a memorandum by Bowie to Dulles, Oct. 28, p. 1567.

D and join Rhee in a flagrant act of aggression. Yet neither do we want to see, first, his ROK forces defeated, and then our own, nor, finally, could we bring ourselves to abandon the peninsula.

In view of what faced us, continued Secretary Dulles, the State Department believed that there were two main approaches to what should be done to forestall a Rhee initiative. First, measures to persuade Rhee not to undertake the action. Secondly, measures to replace Rhee if he nevertheless initiates the action. In order to accomplish the first of these we in the State Department feel that it is essential to confront Rhee with the direct question as to whether he would cooperate with us or not, and to secure from him an answer in writing to this question. It is essential that we know his answer in advance in order to allow time to make our plans. At this time we would also tell Rhee what we would do if he proceeds to go it alone. In essentials, continued Secretary Dulles, State and Defense are agreed on what we should say to Rhee, except on the point as to whether we threaten him with the possibility that we would withdraw from Korea. This latter issue had been fully debated in the State Department, and Secretary Dulles said that he was now willing to agree with Defense that [*what?*] we should not say to Rhee or prepare to get out of Korea. We would simply be silent on this point, and inasmuch as Rhee was going off on his own, we would simply tell him that we will do what we think best if he jumps off.

On the second matter, that of replacing Rhee if he does nevertheless start hostilities, there was no great difference between the views of State and Defense. If Rhee refuses to agree to cooperate with us, or appears about to break such an agreement, Secretary Dulles said that we should have measures ready to replace him as head of the ROK. Without minimizing the very great difficulties involved in this task, Secretary Dulles pointed out that in recent days it appeared that certain significant elements in the ROK Government now seemed less likely to rally to Rhee on a course of national suicide. Accordingly, it was not necessarily hopeless to find a replacement for Rhee. On the other hand, Secretary Dulles pointed out that the replacement of Rhee was not merely a matter of technical measures. We must also have a strong moral case before the world, so that we do not appear to be treating the Republic of Korea in the same fashion that the Soviets treat the governments of their satellites. This case could surely be made, since such an act of aggression by Rhee would certainly be fully as reprehensible as the initial North Korean attack on the ROK in June 1950.

The President was most emphatic in stating his agreement with this latter statement by the Secretary of State, and pointed out the advantages which would accrue from a declaration of martial law in the event that Rhee went off on his own.

In any event, continued Secretary Dulles, with his qualification on the subject of withdrawal from Korea, there was a considerable similarity between the positions taken by State and Defense on how to proceed. Even so, it might prove useful to pull some of our forces back from the front in order to create apprehensions in South Korea that we might actually withdraw from the peninsula.

Secretary Wilson said that he wanted to call to the attention of the Secretary of State one other important point in which Defense still differed from State in its approach to this problem. Defense seriously questioned the desirability of trying to get 90 days notice from Rhee before he acted.

Secretary Dulles replied that the State Department no longer held to this time interval. All that State wanted was a written promise from Rhee not to resume hostilities unilaterally. Of course, it would be highly advantageous to get such a commitment in time to be able to act effectively if Rhee violated his promise.

Speaking to General Bolte, the President said that if, as he assumed, the UN Command was in complete control of communications to all the divisional headquarters, he didn't see how Rhee could possibly send a message ordering renewal of hostilities without our Commanders having almost instant knowledge that it had been sent. General Bolte concurred in the President's judgment.

Secretary Dulles spoke with regret and concern of the present impasse on economic aid, which deprived us of this factor as a means of influencing Rhee to behave himself. Actually, neutral observers had made it plain that the Soviets were forging far ahead in the rehabilitation of North Korea, while we were doing next to nothing, thanks to Rhee's stubbornness, in restoring South Korea. After all the money which we had appropriated for rebuilding South Korea, we had virtually nothing to indicate visible results of the advantage of U.S. friendship to the population of the ROK.

Mr. Rand explained that the impasse in our aid progress had developed because Rhee and Mr. C. Tyler Wood has been unable to agree on a currency exchange rate. Rhee had quit their last conference on the subject in a huff.

Secretary Dulles said that whatever the facts of the matter, our economic leverage is at the moment worthless.

Mr. Dodge noted that this was merely the last in a long line of agreements on exchange rates which President Rhee had broken, while Secretary Dulles said that some way must be found to impress the people of South Korea with the advantage of our economic assistance. Otherwise a threat to withdraw such economic assistance would have no effect whatever.

The President expressed warm agreement, as he said, "with every word the Secretary of State had uttered", and stated his irritation that so much effort and expenditure to assist in the rehabilitation of South Korea had thus far produced no visible result.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that the hour was late, and that he was still uncertain what kind of a response should be sent to General Hull for his guidance, and furthermore, what decision the Council would make in the choice of the alternatives in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the somewhat changed position taken by the Secretary of State.

Secretary Dulles expressed the view that the Council was not really yet ready to make a decision now among these four alternatives. We were close, however, to an agreement, and if a special meeting could be arranged within the next few days, it would be possible to reach a decision.

The President replied that he wholly approved of the courses that General Hull proposed to take, and that what we needed to tell him in addition was to secure maximum flexibility and maximum security in the deployment of the UN forces. The President agreed, he said, also with Defense that it was impossible to deploy our forces in front of the ROK forces in order to forestall an ROK attack. In this case he found himself on the side of Secretary Wilson.

Secretary Dulles answered that the State Department had felt that such a deployment would have great psychological advantages, but if it was the judgment that it was unsound militarily, he would drop it.

After further discussion of what interim action the Council should take at this time, the President pointed out that it would take some few days at least to reach agreement as to measures to dissuade Rhee from taking unilateral action or of measures to be taken in the event that Rhee initiated hostilities despite all our efforts to dissuade him. These measures should be worked out by the Secretaries of State and Defense with the assistance of CIA. Meanwhile, we should inform General Hull of what we had agreed to, including the decision that we are making plans for the eventuality of seizing Rhee. The President expressed agreement with Secretary Dulles' doubts as to whether a General (General Hull) was the appropriate person to approach Rhee on this problem, and it was suggested by a number of other Council members that the Vice President might be a logical choice for this task.

Mr. Allen Dulles, at the conclusion of the meeting, pointed out his doubt whether Rhee would ever be convinced of our determination to prevent him from renewing hostilities unless at some point we issued a public statement of our position.

The National Security Council: [7]

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[7] The following paragraphs and note constituted NSC Action No. 949, a record copy of which is located in S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.

a. Discussed the reference report on the subject (NSC 167) in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of October 28 and of the memorandum of the Secretary of State of October 28.

b. Agreed that the Secretaries of State and Defense should prepare an interim message[8] on the subject to the Commander in Chief, UN Command, along the lines discussed at the meeting, for approval by the President.

c. Requested the Departments of State and Defense, with the assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency, to prepare, in the light of the discussion, for Council consideration at its next meeting, a summary of courses of action to dissuade or prevent the Republic of Korea from initiating unilateral renewal of hostilities, or to deal with the situation if, despite our efforts, the ROK renews hostilities.

d. Requested the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency as appropriate, to review urgently the military and diplomatic measures provided in NSC Action No. 794, and to report the results thereof to the Council at its meeting on November 19, 1953.

e. Noted the President's desire urgently to expedite the program for strengthening the Korean economy in accordance with NSC 156/1;[9] having in mind that the carrying out of this program will provide concrete evidence to the people of the Republic of Korea of the benefits of cooperating with the United States.

f. Noted that the NSC Planning Board would prepare an over-all statement of policy on Korea for Council consideration at its meeting on November 19, 1953.

Note: The actions in *b, c* and *d* above subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence for implementation. The action in *e* above subsequently transmitted to the Director, Foreign Operations Administration, for implementation.

S. EVERETT GLEASON

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[8] Sent as JCS telegram 951671, *infra.*

[9] Dated July 17, p. 1384.

FE files, lot 55 D 338, "Korean Political Conference, October 1953": Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Hull)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 31, 1953—[11:37 a.m.].

JCS 951671. From JCS for CINCUNC. Exclusive for Hull. Ref: A. C 65636[2] B. JCS 951018.[3]

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[1] The source text was a draft copy, approved by Dulles, Wilson, and the JCS, on which a note was written indicating that this draft was approved by the President and sent to Hull on Oct. 31. The time of transmission is taken from the JCS copy.

[2] Dated Oct. 21, p. 1543.

[3] In this telegram, Oct. 23, the JCS informed CINCFE that their response to recommendations contained in telegram C 65636 was deferred pending NSC consideration of

1. At NSC meeting on 29 October it was decided to inform you concerning current agreed thinking for your information and guidance but not to be the basis of any action by you except as subsequently instructed.

2. It is presently the consensus of the NSC that:

a. At an appropriate time in the approximate future President Rhee will be informed unequivocally that in the event of renewal of hostilities in Korea through unilateral ROK action the UN forces will not support the ROK military forces either directly or indirectly, that all economic aid to the ROK will immediately cease, and that the UN Commander will take any action necessary to avoid becoming involved and to provide for the security of his forces.

b. All possible measures will be taken, both overt and covert, to gain the earliest possible knowledge of a decision on the part of President Rhee to issue orders to the ROK forces to attack and, in the event of such decision, to prevent such an order from being issued or, if issued, from reaching ROK military commanders in the field; such measures should not exclude invoking martial law, as a means of controlling signal communications, transportation and police functions, and the seizure and detention of key ROK military and civil personages involved.

c. At the appropriate time, all possible measures will be taken to reduce the probability that such an order, if received by field commanders, would be carried out.

d. If Rhee should ask whether or not UNC forces might be withdrawn from Korea, he will be told that if he ceases to cooperate with UNC, the UNC will decide its course of action purely in terms of its own interest, and without consulting him.

e. Every effort will be made to secure a commitment from President Rhee that he will not undertake unilateral aggressive action at any time. Unless he is willing to give such commitment, our position shall be that we, also, must then act independently and our plans or intentions will not be disclosed to him.

3. It has not yet been decided who shall present these governmental views to President Rhee nor have the manner and timing been decided. Consideration being given here to directing Vice President Nixon as governmental spokesman to present position outlined in para 2*a* above to President Rhee. You will be notified when this decision is made.

4. Meanwhile, confident here at highest level that your plans and dispositions will permit maximum flexibility in meeting any eventuality.

5. NSC continuing consideration of U.S. Courses of Action in Korea in the Absence of an Acceptable Political Settlement.[4] When final decisions are reached on this subject you will be informed.

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the issue scheduled for Oct. 29. (FE files, lot 55 D 338, "Korean Political Conference, October 1953")

For a report of the NSC consideration, see the memorandum of discussion at the 168th meeting of the NSC, Oct. 29, *supra.*

[4] NSC 167, Oct. 22, p. 1546.

795.00/11-153: Telegram

The Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Dean) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY MUNSAN-NI, November 1, 1953.[1]

20. Repeated information Seoul, Tokyo, New Delhi, CINCUNC unnumbered. From Dean. Limit distribution. Following summary first week's negotiations: [2]

1. Commie agenda obviously unacceptable but during first week they have unyieldingly adhered their demand we accept their proposed agenda and that first item on it, composition, be discussed and settled before discussion other items.

2. While adhering to our basic position we have made several proposals aimed at by-passing problem of agenda in order get on with substantive discussion without commitments on settlement of any one item.

3. Communists have made no effort whatsoever respond our constructive proposals even by gesture.

4. If propitious we may broach proposition contained Deptel 10,[3] provided I can satisfy Rhee, as MSA's [*means*?] getting away from agenda problem.

5. In event Communist reaction is one of willingness to pass directly to discussion of substantive items or of willingness to modify agenda in manner satisfactory to us, would like to be prepared with clearcut idea our minimum position on composition since it seems improbable Communists will give final agreement on time and place without some understanding as to composition and I shall attempt reach such understanding at current meetings.

6. Apart from clearance with Rhee essential that I have Department's thinking on what is furthest we can go on this matter ourselves in order that our tactics in the meetings can be properly planned.

7. There are number of possibilities open to me here for agreement re composition within terms of paragraph 60 and August 28 resolution:

(*a*) Ex officio or observer status for India, India and Sweden or all members NNRC.

(*b*) Each side to designate mutually agreed third party or its own additional party to participate in conference with or without vote.

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[1] There was no time of transmission indicated on this telegram which was received in the Department of State at 11:09 a.m., Nov. 1.

[2] Talks between Dean and his North Korean and Chinese counterparts, Ki Sok Pok and Huang Hua, began on Oct. 26 at Panmunjom.

[3] In this telegram, Dean received authority to state that as to some aspects of the proposed Korean Political Conference, the United States would not object to the presence of some nonbelligerents, as in the case of India as the Chairman of the NNRC when the prisoner question was before the conference. However, the proposal, if made, should be limited to India. (795.00/10-2953)

(*c*) Conference itself to meet and put composition at end of round for decision only when other agenda matters agreed to.

(*d*) Composition not to be on agenda of political conference but conference being plenary free to take it up after progress made on Korean item or if necessary to make progress Korean item or when other than Korean items are raised.

(*e*) Seven-power conference—note this has disadvantage including Communist China with Big Four.

(*f*) Seven-power conference with India and Sweden or Switzerland and Czechoslovakia or Poland in ex officio capacity as members NNRC—latter has advantage of fuzzing up precedent of including Communist China on Big-Five basis.

8. Reference US atrocity charges in UNGA (Deptel 9),[4] they may have some pattern on negotiations here. How much is too early tell but see no reason here not to pursue in UNGA if advisable domestic situation. May make Commie line here even harder and less subject to any modification. Commies may assume direct tie-up between our UNGA charges and my tactics here. Having already put forward reasonable proposals for ending agenda impasse before these charges made, I believe best tactic is continue stress my proposals here for few days and hold brief meetings if neither side has anything to say.

DEAN

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[4] In telegram 9 to Munsan-ni, the Department of State repeated for Dean's information telegram Delga 184, Oct. 29, in which Lodge suggested that the issue of atrocities committed by the Chinese and North Koreans against American and other UN POWs should be placed as an item on the UN General Assembly agenda, and telegram Gadel 49, same date, in which the Department of State agreed with the suggestion. (695A.0026/10–2953)

795.00/11-153: Telegram

The Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Dean) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY MUNSAN-NI, November 1, 1953.[1]

19. Repeated information Seoul, Tokyo, CINCUNC unnumbered. Personal for the Secretary from Dean. Limit distribution.

Atmosphere, arrangements and procedures in political talks here astride demarcation line, we on our side, they on theirs, make it almost impossible hold informal conversations on the side or make substantive suggestions informally during regular meetings.

Site of talks is joint security area which so far is not conducive normal diplomatic negotiation with guards, tension re prisoners, military transportation with necessity military passes and inspection, etc. Military demarcation line actually bisects length of conference table along crease in tablecloth. Each side enters from its side of line and leaves from separate entrance and could not cross line even inside building without consulting per paragraph 7 of armistice agreement. So far, there has been no exchange of normal amenities, no gesture, no personal remarks of any kind whatsoever. It is all rigid, stereotyped and utterly impersonal though we face each other for several hours daily across a 4-foot table. This similar to armistice negotiations and MAC procedures. Communists suggested it and appear to follow it naturally. They may even be deliberately adhering such procedures to demonstrate impossibility of two-sided negotiations and therefore, necessity for presence of neutrals. We and UNCMAC staff estimate Communists will make no move to alter rigid procedures.

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[1] There was no time of transmission indicated on this telegram, which arrived at the Department of State at 9:46 a. m., Nov. 1.

Consistent armistice agreement, am thinking of exploring some channel for informal meeting outside talks, perhaps through Swedes, possibly Indians. Nehru has instructed Thimayya not to come into South Korean territory, so difficult return courtesies. Even with Swedes, must invite to general military mess at Munsan-ni about 14 miles rough roads from Swedes' camp near Panmunjom. Realize utilization such channel has danger of proving other side's case for neutrals, but am looking into it.

Difficulties negotiation directly with Chinese Communists may make it advisable have third party intermediaries available to send up serious trial balloons if we wish to put up new and substantive proposals at political conference.

DEAN

795.00/11-253: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET SEOUL, November 2, 1953—7 p. m.

384. Repeated information Tokyo 197. Tokyo pass CINCUNC exclusive for General Hull. Repeated information Munsan-ni for Ambassador Dean by pouch.

Purpose of this message is to survey status US–ROK relations and make recommendations relative early US action. Message submitted in light impending separate visits to Seoul of Vice President Nixon (November 12–15), Senator Smith (about November 8) and Congressman Judd (November 17–19), on which I believe we should seek to capitalize. Also have in mind current negotiations of Ambassador Dean regarding political conference.

1. Our relations with Korea at this time depend chiefly on attitude and behavior of President Rhee. Although Rhee has had long association with democratic nations his own government is one-man show operated along personal dictatorial lines. His political position has strengthened during present year, partly through elimination effective

opposition and partly as result his success in dealing with US. Successive visits high US officials beginning with President-elect last December have likewise enhanced Rhee's prestige.

2. US-ROK relations have grown increasingly unsatisfactory, especially since last April when Armistice negotiations renewed. By agreeing "not to oppose" (rather than to support) Armistice Rhee obtained significant advantages from US including signature Security Pact plus promise of costly economic and military assistance programs stretching several years in future.

During same period Rhee has become increasingly stubborn and defiant by reason of observing that defiance and stubbornness have achieved his objectives vis-à-vis US by bringing about substantial modifications US position in direction Rhee's own demands. To degree we have permitted Rhee wring major concessions from us we have increased his appetite as well as his conviction of infallibility.

3. Not only have US-ROK relations become increasingly unstable, but Rhee's behavior especially since Armistice has adversely affected US relations with other countries, notably Japan and India but including also other members Commonwealth and other UN Nations fighting in Korea, whose continuing close collaboration highly important to US. Rhee's hostility toward India and constant denunciation of that country are making it more difficult to go forward with political conference seeking unification Korea. Japan has been brought close to point of explosion against Korea by Rhee's enforcement of "peace line" and arrest several hundred Japanese fishermen.

Although undertakings set forth in Rhee-Dulles Agreement of August 8 have been generally honored, attempts to enforce Rhee line by ROK Navy represent undermining of authority United Nations Command which at very least sets dangerous precedent. In addition various threats which we cannot ignore have been made in regard to unilateral action at end of six months after Armistice (January 27) regardless of whether political conference convened.

5. In economic field, economic coordinator Wood in ten weeks of patient and skillful negotiation has not yet been able obtain ROK Government's written agreement on arrangements and measures necessary for reasonable prospect of effective use of US aid. I am extremely gratified that in past few days Wood has received authorization from Unified Command to take firm stand on crucial issues, and to hold up at his discretion submission of further firm requests to FOA Washington to initiate procurement, but decisive meetings with President and Prime Minister have still to take place.

6. Embassy has on various previous occasions (Embtels 350 and 237)[1] recommended abandonment "soft" attitude which has marked

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[1] Neither printed. (795.00/10-2153 and 611.95B/9-1953, respectively)

our dealings with Rhee and substitution therefor of insistence that reasonableness and mutual respect should henceforth characterize relations, and that friendship is two-way street involving recognition that on certain fundamental issues US national interest must prevail.

7. If I correctly understand Department's reluctance to come to grips with Rhee it is that we should save our ammunition for big issue of possible unilateral ROK action to terminate Armistice by resuming fighting, and in meantime tolerate other actions by him even though inimical to US interests. If this understanding correct, I must record my belief that such policy is merely storing up trouble and cost for US Government. While obviously we should not waste ammunition over trifling issues, it is submitted that those facing us at present in connection with Korean-Japanese relations (including status Dulles–Rhee agreement August 8) as well as in economic field are fundamental and should not be postponed. Furthermore, they can only be solved by firmness and willingness back up our demands on Rhee; they will undoubtedly become more acute in measure in which we temporize, vacillate, or postpone in hope something may turn up.

8. I believe we should forthwith confront issues described and that we should capitalize on official visits taking place during next three weeks to drive home to Rhee fact his recent conduct if persisted in can only lead to destruction of his country and himself and major victory for communism in Asia.

Specifically I recommend:

a. With respect to ROK relations with Japan that, if present attempts to reopen bilateral negotiations not successful, we tell Rhee (and state publicly at proper time) that we do not recognize Rhee line nor will we support it by permitting US aid, military or economic, to be employed for purposes its enforcement. Unless Rhee will abandon policy which will otherwise lead directly to rupture peaceful relations with Japan, we should immediately inform Rhee of withdrawal logistic support from ROK Navy. While recommendations may shortly be formulated in greater detail, approach which I believe we should make is generally as set forth in Embtel 377 October 31.[2]

b. We should support Wood 100 percent in his insistence on satisfactory commitments from ROK government on arrangements and measures necessary to permit effective use of US aid. Now that our government has reached high level decision authorizing Wood make firm stand, it is imperative he be fully supported when final test comes. Worst possible outcome, from a standpoint our broad interest, would be to have Wood back down when Rhee challenges his position.

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[2] The approach set forth included three proposed public statements to be issued simultaneously: first, that Japan and Korea had requested the United States to use its good offices to help settle ROK-Japanese differences; second, that Japan would return such Korean national treasures as it held; and third, that Korea would release immediately Japanese fishermen whom it held. At the same time, without announcement, the United States would inform the ROK on behalf of Japan of Japanese willingness to forego claims against Korea and settle the fishery dispute along conservation lines. (694.95B/10–3153)

c. I hope that Senator Smith and Dr. Judd will be willing give strong support this position and to add that unless appropriate safeguards are accepted by ROK government, further appropriations on part US Congress are unlikely—notwithstanding profound sympathy of American people for Korea and our desire make substantial contribution to relief and reconstruction of this country.

d. Re mutual defense treaty, I hope our Congressional visitors, especially Senator Smith, will be equally explicit in letting Rhee know how damaging his behavior has already been to prospects of obtaining Senate ratification during next session. When one considers importance apparently attached by Rhee to obtaining such pact, it is difficult to believe he would be willing now to throw it all away if it were made clear to him that that would be consequence of continued intemperate and unreasonable conduct on his part.

e. There remains possibility of unilateral action on Rhee's part to resume fighting. I believe Rhee should be left in no doubt whatsoever that if he attempts to breach armistice and resume war, he can expect no support from us. I believe further that strongest possible deterrent to reckless resumption fighting will be certainty in Rhee's mind that we will not support him nor permit US-UN involvement and that he will be destroying himself and risking loss of everything obtained thus far by attempting to make war alone. Visit of Vice President offers unparalleled opportunity for this message to be put across on behalf President Eisenhower earnestly, sincerely, with genuine friendship for Korea, and in terms both unmistakable and convincing.

BRIGGS

S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 167/1

Draft Report by the Departments of State and Defense With the Assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency to the National Security Council [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 2, 1953.

NSC 167/1

U.S. COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA IN THE ABSENCE OF AN ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT (Summary prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 949–*c* [2])

1. The U.S. should promptly notify Rhee formally and let other ROK leaders know that if South Korea unilaterally initiates military operations against Chinese or North Korean forces in or north of the demilitarized zone, then:

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[1] According to a covering memorandum by Lay, Nov. 2, this draft summary was to be transmitted to the NSC for consideration at its meeting of Nov. 5. Lay reiterated that the special security precautions which were required for NSC 167 would be in effect with this paper. Furthermore, records were kept of individuals who had access to the summary and all copies were to be returned to the NSC after Council action on it.

[2] For text, see the memorandum of discussion at the 168th meeting of the NSC, Oct. 29, p. 1570.

a. U.S. air, ground and sea forces will not support such operations directly or indirectly;

b. The U.S. will not furnish any military or logistic support for such operations;

c. All U.S. economic aid to Korea will cease immediately;

d. The UNC Commander will take any action necessary to prevent his forces becoming involved in the renewal of hostilities and to provide for their security.* If Rhee should ask whether or not the UNC forces might be withdrawn from Korea, he should be told that, if he ceases to cooperate with UNC, the UNC will decide its course of action purely in terms of its own interest and without consulting him.

2. At the same time the U.S. should seek to obtain from Rhee a formal assurance in writing that he will not initiate unilateral military action at any time against the Communists in or north of the demilitarized zone. If he refuses to give such assurance, the UNC should inform him immediately that it reserves all rights to take whatever actions it deems necessary to preserve the security of the UNC forces.

3. The UNC plans and dispositions should be such as to permit maximum flexibility in meeting any likely eventuality and, insofar as possible, to reinforce the statements made to Rhee and to manifest U.S. determination to carry them out.

. . . .

5. If the ROK should renew hostilities unilaterally, the U.S. should, . . . :

a. Stop all economic and military assistance to Korea;

b. Discontinue all logistic or other support to the ROK forces;

c. Take such other military measures as seem feasible and consistent with the security of UNC forces to block ROK offensive action;

d. Evacuate U.N. civilians;

e. Notify the Communists that the UNC will continue to abide by the armistice terms, but will defend UNC forces against any Communist attack, and will be prepared, if a Communist counterattack against the ROK threatens the security of UNC forces, to undertake such military action as may be necessary for the security of UNC forces;

f. Notify the Communists that if UNC forces are attacked by the Communists, the counteraction will not be confined to Korea;

g. Renew general hostilities with the Communists only if attacked in force by the Communists or if Communist attacks against the ROK seriously threaten the security of UNC forces.

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*Hereafter in this paper, the term "UNC forces" refers to those forces which remain loyal to the UNC and excludes ROK forces engaged in any unilateral renewal of hostilities. [Footnote in the source text.]

JCS records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 4, 1953.

Subject: Courses of Action in Korea (A draft proposed by representatives of State, Defense, and CIA [1] in response to NSC Action No. 949 *c* [2]).

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views regarding the attached draft of proposed courses of action in Korea, dated 2 November 1953, prepared for consideration by the National Security Council pursuant to NSC Action No. 949 *c*.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in general agreement with the proposed courses of action for dissuading or preventing the Republic of Korea (ROK) from initiating unilaterally a renewal of hostilities, and for dealing with the situation, if despite our efforts, the ROK does renew hostilities. They feel, however, that the following changes would be appropriate in the interests of clarity and to distinguish between actions to be taken by the United States in its own behalf and actions to be taken in its capacity as executive agent for the United Nations (changes indicated in the usual manner): [3]

a. Change paragraph 1 to read as follows:

> "The U.S., *acting in its own behalf and its capacity of executive agent for the UN,* should promptly notify Rhee formally and let other ROK leaders know that if South Korea unilaterally initiates military operations against Chinese or North Korean forces in or north of the demilitarized zone, then:"

Reason: It would be more appropriate, as well as more authoritative, for the U.S. to speak both for itself and as executive agent for the UN.

b. Change subparagraph 1 *a* to read:

> "~~U.S.~~ *UN* air, ground and sea forces will not support such operations directly or indirectly;"

Reason: For accuracy and for consistency with the change recommended in *a* above.

c. Change the second sentence of paragraph 2 to read as follows:

> "If he refuses to give such assurance, the ~~UNC~~ *US* should inform him immediately that ~~it~~ *the UNC* reserves all rights to take whatever actions it deems necessary to preserve the security of the UNC forces."

Reason: To indicate that this information is to be transmitted by the U.S. Representative acting both for the U.S. and the UNC.

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] For text, see the memorandum of discussion at the 168th meeting of the NSC, Oct. 29, p. 1570.

[3] i.e., additions in italics; deletions struck through.

d. Change subparagraph 5 *c* to read as follows:

> "*So long as there remains any prospect of limiting the hostilities and restoring the armistice,* take such other military measures as seem feasible and consistent with the security of UNC forces to block ROK offensive action;"

Reason: If fighting between ROK and Communist forces reaches large-scale proportions despite appropriate UN efforts to prevent the renewal of hostilities, it would be in the best interest of the U.S. and the UN forces not to employ military measures to block or obstruct ROK military action beyond those measures necessary in the interest of the security of UN forces.

e. Delete subparagraph 5 *f.*

Reason: Any Communist reaction to a renewal of hostilities by the ROK would almost certainly involve UN forces in some degree. If the U.S. and the UNC were categorically committed in advance to expand the hostilities beyond Korea in such circumstances irrespective of the manner in which UN forces became involved, there would be no alternative other than attacking Communist China without adequate preparation, or failing to carry out the threat. If the Communists react in a manner intended to restore the armistice line, it would not be in the U.S. interest to extend hostilities. If the threat is not to be carried out, it should not be made.

3. With reference to subparagraph 2 *e* above, in the event that the National Security Council should not agree to the deletion of subparagraph 5 *f* the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that it be changed as follows:

> "*Preferably in concert with our principal Allies,* notify the Communists that if ~~UNC forces are attacked by the Communists, the counteraction will not be confined to Korea.~~ *they take military action beyond that necessary to restore the armistice line and attack UN forces, in all probability it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.*"

Reasons:

(1) Inasmuch as this proposed counteraction might involve extension of hostilities outside of Korea, it would appear that the U.S. should consult with its principal Allies prior to announcing its intentions in this regard.

(2) Any Communist reaction to a renewal of hostilities by the ROK would almost certainly involve UN forces in some degree. If the U.S. and the UNC were categorically committed in advance to expand the hostilities beyond Korea in such circumstances irrespective of the manner in which UN forces became involved, there would be no alternative other than attacking Communist China without adequate preparation, or failing to carry out the threat. Therefore, any warning should apply specifically to Communist action beyond that necessary to restore the armistice line.

(3) The revised wording conforms to the text of the Joint Policy Declaration agreed to by the UN Allies in Korea.

4. Subject to the foregoing comments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you concur in the adoption of the proposed courses of action formulated pursuant to NCS Action No. 949 *c.*

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
EDWIN H. J. CARNS
Brigadier General, USA
Secretary

795.00/11–453: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Dean) [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, November 4, 1953—11 a. m.

24. For Dean from the Secretary. Further your 20. [2]

1. I have considered further question of composition. In view position we have taken publicly and Rhee's attitude I do not see we can go very far towards meeting Communists point of view, if they continue insist on advance agreement that we will admit neutrals to the conference. Suggestion contained paragraph [7] *b* your 20 that each side designate mutually agreed neutral, or neutral on its side, appears basically contrary to position we have taken against neutral participation. Neither does it solve problem of India. We could not agree to or designate India in view Rhee's attitude; and it would be highly undesirable have India come to conference as nominee of Communists.

2. It would be best if we could still persuade Commies leave this question to conference itself on basis either paragraph [7] *c* or *d* your 20.

3. So far as any advance understanding on substance composition question is concerned we could not go further than along lines suggestions your telegram 20:

(*a*) It would be acceptable to us to have India present in its capacity as Chairman NNRC, and if necessary we could accept other members NNRC in same capacity. For this however we should seek obtain Rhee's acquiescence.

(*b*) We see no objection proposing seven-power conference if you believe this holds promise of breaking deadlock but only if we can get our allies to agree. We are taking this up with some of our friends and will inform you. (See Deptel Munsan-ni 23.[3])

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[1] This telegram, repeated to Seoul as telegram 310 and Tokyo as telegram 1065 (to be passed to CINCUNC), was drafted by Henkin and McClurkin and cleared by Wainhouse, Drumright (in draft), and Dulles.

[2] Dated Nov. 1, p. 1578.

[3] This telegram reported that Murphy had asked the Canadian Ambassador in Washington to take up the seven-power conference idea with Pearson who, if he concurred, might be willing to raise it among the 16 nations with troops participating in Korea (795.00/11–353). The result, according to telegram 38 to Munsan-ni, Nov. 7, was that the

Continued

(*c*) No objection combining (*a*) and (*b*) under conditions stated above.

DULLES

Canadians agreed to canvass the so-called "lesser 12" (nations whose forces in Korea were only token ones) to determine whether or not they would be willing on their own initiative not to participate in the conference. (795.00/11-753)

Editorial Note

The preliminary discussions at Panmunjom dragged on through November and half of December without resolving the basic differences of the opposing sides over composition. At Dean's suggestion, the outstanding issues were discussed at the subcommittee level and after two weeks a plan was devised for simultaneous discussion of composition, time, and place of the proposed Korean Political Conference. The Communist side's insistence that the Soviet Union be considered a neutral, South Korea's opposition to India's participation, and the general inability to agree to the kind of role neutral nations would play at the conference proved in the end insurmountable problems. On December 8, Dean put forward a "package proposal" which attempted to maintain the principle of a two-sided conference (with the Soviet Union as a voting member on the Communist side) while allowing for limited neutral nations participation. It was rejected by the Communist side on the grounds that it did not recognize the Soviet Union as a neutral and that it unreasonably limited neutral participation. The negotiations ended acrimoniously with charges and countercharges which Dean used as the reason for recessing the fruitless talks.

Extensive documentation of these preliminary discussions is located in the 795.00 files, and the Department of State *Bulletin,* December 21, 1953, pages 877–878, has printed a copy of Dean's proposal of December 8. Because of the limitations of space, the editors have not treated these negotiations extensively.

795.00/11-453: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Hull) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
ROUTINE

TOKYO, November 4, 1953—4:42 p. m.

C 65842. 1. Subject is recommended psn at the political conf regarding withdrawal of non-Korean Forces from Korea.

2. Analysis of psn to be recommended from a mil viewpoint involves consideration of:

a. Whether such a withdrawal of UN Forces would jeopardize the security of South Korea, and ultimately the security of Japan and the Ryukyus.

b. Whether, and to what extent, US/UN Forces should be retained in Korea to stabilize the ROK Government, or to prevent ROK aggression in violation of the armistice or eventual peace settlement.

c. The ultimate effects of retaining US/UN Forces in Korea with the attendant risk of becoming reinvolved in a protracted grd war on the Asiatic mainland.

3. After reviewing the factors involved, and considering the risk of Communist reinitiation of hostilities, I have concluded that a withdrawal of all, or all but a fixed number of non-Korean Forces of both sides, phased over a sufficient pd to provide for an orderly turnover of equip to ROK Forces, will involve no unacceptable risk to this comd, if proper safeguards are provided. While expanded US Mil Advisory Groups should remain in Korea for an indefinite pd to assist in the development of South Korean defenses and to cont log support to ROK Forces until ROK capabilities in this fld are properly developed, in my opinion retention of UN Combat Forces in Korea would not restrain the ROKs in any unilateral action once the UN Command in Korea is removed. On the contrary, the Rhee Government might take the presence of residual UN Forces as implied support for unilateral action. I also believe that an early withdrawal should be effected to avoid the risk of becoming reinvolved in a protracted ground war on the Asiatic mainland.

4. I therefore recommend:

a. UN objectives at the political conf should include withdrawal of US/UN Forces from Korea in consonance with the withdrawal of CCF Forces.

b. US Mil Advisory Groups should be expanded and remain in Korea for an indefinite period in order to cont the development of the defenses of South Korea, complete the turnover of US supplies and equip, and assist in maintaining the contd cooperation of the ROK Government.

c. The early withdrawal of US/UN Forces from Korea should be effected in order to minimize the possibility of the US becoming reinvolved in a ground war on the continent of Asia against nations having unlimited manpower resources.

d. Withdrawal of US/UN Forces from Korea should be begun as soon as the decisions of the political conf can be determined, and should be completed in a min of 11 months.

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 167 Series

The Secretary of State to the Vice President [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 4, 1953.

DEAR DICK: I enclose herewith a letter from President Eisenhower to President Rhee.[2] For reasons given in the letter, which you will fully understand, it is necessary to get some explicit written assurance from Rhee that he is not going to start the war up again on the gamble that he can get us involved in his effort to unite Korea by force. Rhee has been making a good many statements to the effect that he will order his forces to attack after the expiration of the period he agreed on with me. We do not refer to these statements in the President's letter itself, as it seemed that to do so would merely make it more awkward for Rhee to back down. There is no reason, however, why you should not mention these statements orally to Rhee when you talk with him, if you think fit. Briggs and Hull can tell you about them.

The background of this letter is an NSC action which, in substance, has been reported to General Hull and which he will make available to you.

Also I am enclosing a memorandum embodying much the same information.[3]

There are two other major issues up with Rhee. One is the handling of economic aid, where there is an impasse with Tyler Wood. The other is relations with Japan, which are near the exploding point, particularly because of the ROK seizure of some 500 Japanese fishermen and their imprisonment. Rhee is fanatically anti-Japanese.

These matters you may want to mention orally, so that Rhee will not think we ignore them. But it did not seem wise to have the President get into these matters at this time, or to complicate the basic issue of war or peace in Korea with these other problems. While the economic and Japan matters are of great importance they are, in a sense, subsidiary to the central issue of sustaining the armistice.

As the enclosed letter suggests, we think it wise that it should be presented in the presence of Ambassador Briggs and General Hull. They will have to carry on after you leave, and it would embarrass them and undermine their future authority if they were not present when the

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[1] Additional copies of this letter are located in file 795.00/11–453 and the Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, Korean file, box 54.

[2] A note on the source text indicated that the enclosed letter was delivered to Rhee by Nixon on Nov. 12.

[3] The text portion of the attached memorandum was identical to NSC 167/2, Nov. 6, p. 1598, with the exception of paragraph 5*f* which read as in NSC 167/1, Nov. 2, p. 1583. According to telegram 409 to Taipei for Nixon, Nov. 9, paragraph 5*f* was to be deleted and paragraph 5*g* to become 5*f*, with the rest of the memorandum standing unchanged. (033.1100 NI/11–953) This change was as per the agreement reached by the Secretaries of Defense and State after the 169th NSC meeting on Nov. 5 (see the memorandum of discussion, p. 1595).

President's letter was delivered. On the other hand, our experience has been that oftentimes it is profitable to talk privately with Rhee, and I am sure they would have no objection to your following up this matter in private talks, when he will not have his advisers present, and when he can talk more freely.

Throughout your conversation with Mr. Rhee, however, you should, of course, make it clear that it is our keen desire to cooperate fully with Mr. Rhee to achieve a united Korea by peaceful means; to assist largely in binding up the wounds of his devastated country and restoring its economy, and in general to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with him in combating aggressive Communism.

Kenneth Young, now working with Arthur Dean, has the most complete background on negotiations with Rhee, and we shall try to get him free to see you. Incidentally, Arthur Dean has been doing a superb job—resourceful, flexible, firm and patient. His cables have been highly illuminating with reference to Communist tactics. I know you will want to have a good talk with him.

The President and I are very happy that you are to be available at this time in Korea for this very important mission.

With best wishes and congratulations on the outstanding success of your trip so far, I am

Faithfully yours, FOSTER

[Enclosure]

President Eisenhower to the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee)[4]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 4, 1953.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: There is a matter which I must take up with you in the interest of our future close cooperation. I want you to know that such cooperation is my sincere purpose. However, to achieve it, I must know your purpose also.

I recall that your agreement of August eighth with Secretary Dulles provided that, until the Mutual Defense Treaty between our two nations could be expected to come into force—which we then thought might be about sixty days after the Senate reconvenes in January—you will keep your forces under the United Nations Command which would comply with the armistice terms.

Time is fast running out on this period. I need now to be thinking and planning ahead beyond this period in political, security, and economic terms.

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[4] A copy of this letter was not attached to the signed letter from Dulles to Nixon in S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351. This copy came from file 795.00/11-453. Texts of this letter as drawn up by Dulles in draft on Nov. 1 for Eisenhower's approval are located in the Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, Korean file, box 54.

From a political standpoint, the important thing is the ratification of our Mutual Defense Treaty. We shall face many questions from the Senators when they meet again and begin considering this Treaty. I hope for prompt and favorable action from the Senate. But to get that, I shall have to be able to assure the Senators that this Treaty will actually promote peace and mutual *defense.* If I should be forced to conclude that after the coming into force of the Treaty, you might unilaterally touch off a resumption of war in Korea, I could not recommend its ratification and I am certain that the Senate would not ratify it. When I formally submit the Treaty to the Senate next January, I must be in a position personally to give a clear assurance on this point.

From a military standpoint, I have heavy responsibilities for the safety of the United States forces in Korea as their Commander-in-Chief, and for the safety of the other United Nations forces as President of the United States which exercises the unified command for the United Nations action in Korea. We are, of course, now committed to react instantly if the Communist forces violate the armistice. Planning for this contingency involves the assumption that your forces and those of the United Nations will continue to act in coordination. But if you should decide to attack alone, I am convinced that you would expose the ROK forces to a disastrous defeat and they might well be permanently destroyed as an effective military force. Therefore, I must know whether or not we are to stand united so that our military leaders may make appropriate plans.

In signing the armistice, the United States has pledged itself not to renew hostilities in Korea. We mean to carry out that commitment fully. Moreover, we will not directly or indirectly violate or evade that commitment by assistance in any form to any renewal of such hostilities by ROK forces. If you were to plan to initiate military action while the Communist forces are complying with the Armistice, my obligation as to both United States forces and other United Nations forces would be to plan how best to prevent their becoming involved and to assure their security.

To turn now to economic matters, we are making plans for the future which will require me to ask for further appropriations from the Congress during the next session. When I request those appropriations, I shall surely be asked whether I have confidence that the expenditure will promote a long-term restoration of the Republic of Korea. If I believed that those funds would merely create new targets in a war renewed by you, I could not, consistently with my duty, request Congress to authorize this appropriation.

I am sending you this frank letter to take you into my confidence about pressing problems of great concern to both our countries. I count upon your loyal cooperation. However, I cannot, as you see, leave that to assumption and speculation. I must have explicit confirmation from you, in order to reach my own decisions and to be able to answer the questions which the Senate and the Congress will properly ask before they make their indispensable contribution to the cooperative plans which you and Secretary Dulles and I have been developing.

I have asked the Vice President to hand this note to you when he calls on you with Ambassador Briggs and General Hull.

He has my complete confidence and you can talk to him as you would to me. As you know, he is not only Vice President but the President of the Senate and a former member of the House and Senate. As such, he will be consulted by many Senators and Representatives when our Treaty comes before the Senate for ratification and when economic appropriations are sought. He is conversant with my views on the matters covered in this letter.

You can, if it is convenient to you, hand to him your reply to this letter. Otherwise, you can deliver it to our Embassy for transmission to me.

I extend to you and Mrs. Rhee my very best wishes and the assurance of my continuing regard.

Sincerely, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

795.00/11-253: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 5, 1953—6:59 p. m.

324. Your 384 [2] indicates complete misunderstanding Department position and apparently you are confusing the sequence of certain events. Department does not agree that US-ROK relations in past 6 months have deteriorated nor that during this time a "soft" policy toward Rhee has enabled him to "wring" concessions from US through "intransigence". To the contrary. As late as mid June Rhee was refusing to cooperate on any basis in connection with implementation of the Armistice despite fact that promises of economic aid, strengthening and maintenance of military forces and Mutual Defense Pact, the latter strongly recommended by both you and Clark, had all been offered him. It is therefore incorrect to state that "By *agreeing* 'not to oppose' (rather than to support Armistice) Rhee obtained significant advantages from US including signature security pact plus promise of *costly* economic and military assistance programs stretching several years in future." Since President Eisenhower's letter June 6 [3] no US concessions have been made to Rhee with the exception (1) US agreement to walk

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[1] This telegram, which was repeated to Tokyo as telegram 1087, was drafted and cleared by Robertson.

[2] Dated Nov. 2, p. 1580.

[3] Regarding this letter, see unnumbered telegram from Seoul, June 7, p. 1148.

out of political conference if after 90 days US considered conference to be a sham, and (2) Secretary's promise to come to Korea *after* signing of Armistice to consult regarding plans for political conference and negotiations Defense Pact along lines of Philippine Treaty previously offered him. In the meantime Rhee has receded from positions repeatedly proclaimed to Korean people and world as unalterable, the Armistice has been signed, prisoners of war desiring repatriation have been exchanged and Rhee to date has kept his agreements. Further, Rhee's commitment was obtained despite his failure to obtain commitments demanded of US which he considered basic and at a time when he had greatest ability by unilateral action to disrupt Armistice negotiations and involve us in continued and possibly wider hostilities. Department considers this progress.

Of course there are many outstanding problems with ROK as there are with Japan, France and many other countries. In none of these instances, however, do we consider the situation to be such that all problems can be packeted for settlement by ultimatum on all-or-none basis.

The Department now as in the past fully backs Wood in his recommendations and at all times has urged that he be supported without equivocation and that he be given wide latitude of judgment. We did not and do not agree that Wood's economic problems should be complicated with Korean-Japanese questions or even be mentioned in connection with such minor issues as the acquisition of a site for construction of new Embassy residence. Fisheries and other questions at issue between Japan and Korea should be settled by negotiation between the two countries with every proper assistance from US. It is our hope that Bond and Herrington will be helpful in bringing about resumption of negotiations and practical resolution of outstanding issues. We are prepared to help in every way open to us and at appropriate time after due notice to ROK to make public US position regarding Rhee line.

We agree that forthcoming visits by Vice President Nixon, Senator Smith and Congressman Judd should be fully utilized to best interests US and have been making plans to do so. It is particularly important that all take same US position. We are briefing Congressman Judd before he leaves and you will be sent telegram for delivery to Senator Smith requesting that he emphasize to President Rhee absolute necessity for appropriate safeguards US economic aid and likewise for continued cooperation between ROK and US if ratification Mutual Defense Treaty to be obtained.

Letter from President Eisenhower to Rhee and covering letter from the Secretary to Vice President Nixon[4] are being dispatched by courier to Vice President in Taipei. The Vice President in company with you and General Hull will deliver President Eisenhower's letter to Rhee.

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[4] *Supra.*

Letter states in clear and unmistakable terms situation which would be created by unprovoked unilateral action by ROK to resume fighting. Copies are being sent to you, Allison and Hull by courier arriving Tokyo NW flight #1 November 8. Tokyo please meet.

SMITH

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 169th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, November 5, 1953 [1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

The following were present at the 169th meeting of the National Security Council: The President of the United States, presiding; the Under Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration, and the Acting Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. The Vice President was not present at the meeting because of his absence from the country. Also attending the meeting were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary of Commerce (for Items 2 and 3); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Acting Secretary of the Air Force; General Ridgway for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Acting Chief of Naval Operations; the Acting Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Acting Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Assistant Secretary of Commerce (for Item 3); Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the Assistant to The Assistant to President (for Items 1, 2, 3 and 4); the Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

[Here follows discussion on items 1. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security", 2. "U.S. Economic Policy Toward Hong Kong and Macao", 3. "United States Policy Toward Communist China", and 4. "United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Formosa and the Chinese Nationalist Government".]

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[1] Drafted by Gleason on Nov. 6.

5. *U.S. Courses of Action in Korea in the Absence of an Acceptable Political Settlement* (NSC 167/1;[2] NSC Action No. 949 [3])

With respect to NSC 167/1, Mr. Cutler noted that the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff[4] had been received only the evening before, and that there had been no time to circulate these comments, many of which seemed to him meritorious, to the Council. He then read the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Certain proposals by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which were designed to distinguish between actions by the United States in its own behalf and actions by the United States in behalf of the UN, were accepted after a brief discussion. The major proposals for changes in subparagraphs 5–*c* and 5–*f* were, however, the subject of lively discussion.

Secretary Smith stated that he was reluctant to accept either of these two proposals. The language suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to paragraph 5–*c* seemed to him designed to play into the hands of President Rhee. In effect, they gave him a blank check in taking the initiative to renew hostilities, and Secretary Smith was certain that Rhee would take any blank checks offered him and gamble on them. Accordingly, Secretary Smith suggested that the Council be permitted a day or two in which to think about the proposed changes.

Secretary Wilson also expressed some concern about the proposal for a change in paragraph 5–*c*, and supported Secretary Smith's request for additional time to study the matter.

Secretary Smith repeated the view that the Joint Chiefs' phraseology suggested to him a return to the general idea of concerting with President Rhee if he succeeded in initiating hostilities against the Communists in violation of the armistice.

The President pointed out that of course the proposal of the Joint Chiefs should be read in conjunction with the earlier statements in the paper which called for the utmost expenditure of effort to persuade Rhee to abide by the terms of the armistice.

Secretary Smith replied that he was aware of this, and indeed he was so concerned to dissuade Rhee that he felt that if we were pushed to the last extremity by Rhee we might well decide to tell him that we would withdraw from Korea. In any case, we could not agree with the phraseology of the Joint Chiefs, which was tantamount to suggesting to the ROK's that they could fight all they wanted north of the demarcation line, but not south of it.

When exception was taken by the President and others to any suggestion of a threat to withdraw, Secretary Smith said that of course he did not mean that we intended actually to withdraw, but merely that we would use the threat to deter Rhee.

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[2] Dated Nov. 2, p. 1583.

[3] For text of NSC Action No. 949, see the memorandum of discussion at the 168th meeting of the NSC, Oct. 29, p. 1570.

[4] See the memorandum from JCS to Wilson, Nov. 4, p. 1585.

The President warned that it was impossible to contemplate walking out of Korea. To do so would be to cross off three years of terrible sacrifice. He then asked Admiral Duncan to explain the purpose behind the revision proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In the first instance, said Admiral Duncan, he wanted to point out that this proposal dealt with what we would do *if* Syngman Rhee had actually succeeded in renewing hostilities, and had nothing to do with attempts to dissuade him from renewing hostilities. As regarded the views of the Joint Chiefs respecting paragraph 5–*f*, they felt that it was desirable either to delete this subparagraph entirely or to change it in such a way that we did not find ourselves obliged to tell the Communists just exactly what our reactions would be in the event that the ROK's renewed hostilities.

After further discussion, during which there seemed to be no meeting of minds, the President suggested that the Secretaries of State and Defense get together and agree as to a final wording for subparagraphs 5–*c* and 5–*f*.

Secretary Humphrey added that he wished to express strongly the view respecting paragraph 5–*f* that we *should* tell the Communists what we would do.

Secretary Wilson, however, said he greatly regretted any modification of this action until we had in readiness war plans to back up the action about which we would warn the Communists.

The National Security Council: [5]

a. Discussed the reference report on the subject (NSC 167/1) in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect thereto, as read at the meeting.

b. Adopted the courses of action in NSC 167/1, subject to:

(1) The following amendments:

(a) *Page 1, paragraph 1, 1st line*: Insert, after "The U.S.", the words ", acting in its own behalf and in its capacity as executive agent for the UN,".

(b) *Page 1, subparagraph 1–a*: Change "U.S." to "UNC".

(c) *Page 2, paragraph 2, 5th line*: Change "UNC" to "U.S.", and "it" to "the UNC".

(2) Agreement by the Secretaries of State and Defense as to the final wording of subparagraphs 5–*c* and 5–*f*.

Note: NSC 167/1 as amended and approved by the President, including agreement by State and Defense to retain subparagraph 5–*c* and delete 5–*f*, subsequently circulated as NSC 167/2 [6] and referred to OCB as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

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[5] The following paragraphs and note constituted NSC Action No. 954, a record copy of which is located in S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.

[Here follows discussion on item 6. "NSC Status of Projects."]

S. EVERETT GLEASON

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[6] *Infra.*

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 167/2 Series

Report by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council [1]

TOP SECRET
NSC 167/2

WASHINGTON, November 6, 1953.

U.S. COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA IN THE ABSENCE OF AN ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

1. The U.S., acting in its own behalf and in its capacity as executive agent for the UN, should promptly notify Rhee formally and let other ROK leaders know that if South Korea unilaterally initiates military operations against Chinese or North Korean forces in or north of the demilitarized zone, then:

a. UNC air, ground and sea forces will not support such operations directly or indirectly;

b. The U.S. will not furnish any military or logistic support for such operations;

c. All U.S. economic aid to Korea will cease immediately;

d. The UNC Commander will take any action necessary to prevent his forces becoming involved in the renewal of hostilities and to provide for their security.*

If Rhee should ask whether or not UNC forces might be withdrawn from Korea, he should be told that, if he ceases to cooperate with UNC, the UNC will decide its course of action purely in terms of its own interest and without consulting him.

2. At the same time the U.S. should seek to obtain from Rhee a formal assurance in writing that he will not initiate unilateral military action at any time against the Communists in or north of the demilitarized zone. If he refuses to give such assurance, the U.S. should inform him immediately that the UNC reserves all rights to take whatever actions it deems necessary to preserve the security of the UNC forces.

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[1] According to a covering memorandum by Lay, the President approved this paper on Nov. 6 including the agreement by State and Defense to retain paragraph 5–*c* and delete 5–*f*. The OCB became the coordinating agency for implementation of the courses of action in this paper. Lay again requested that special security precautions be observed and access to NSC 167/2 be "very strictly limited on an absolute need-to-know basis."

* Hereafter in this paper, the term "UNC forces" refers to those forces which remain loyal to the UNC and excludes ROK forces engaged in any unilateral renewal of hostilities. [Footnote in the source text.]

3. The UNC plans and dispositions should be such as to permit maximum flexibility in meeting any likely eventuality and, insofar as possible, to reinforce the statements made to Rhee and to manifest U.S. determination to carry them out.

. . . .

5. If the ROK should renew hostilities unilaterally, the U.S. should, . . .

a. Stop all economic and military assistance to Korea;

b. Discontinue all logistic or other support to the ROK forces;

c. Take such other military measures as seem feasible and consistent with the security of UNC forces to block ROK offensive action;

d. Evacuate U.N. civilians;

e. Notify the Communists that the UNC will continue to abide by the armistice terms, but will defend UNC forces against any Communist attack, and will be prepared, if a Communist counterattack against the ROK threatens the security of UNC forces, to undertake such military action as may be necessary for the security of UNC forces;

f. Renew general hostilities with the Communists only if attacked in force by the Communists or if Communist attacks against the ROK seriously threaten the security of UNC forces.

795.00/11–753: Telegram

The Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Dean) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT MUNSAN-NI, November 7, 1953.[1]

39. Repeated information Seoul unnumbered, Tokyo unnumbered, CINCUNC unnumbered.

1. [*One*?] Of most affirmative ways to prevent ROKs war of nerves by threatening to move north unilaterally would be to work out satisfactory agreement time, place, composition political conference. At least that is something positive and concrete to which we can point and then ask American, ROK and world opinion to wait conference itself.

In order to reach satisfactory results here believe we must be prepared work out some compromise theory which will be reasonably satisfactory American and world opinion and consistent spirit armistice agreement if possible and do level best with top level pressure if necessary to convince Rhee. For if no agreement these preliminary talks which he is already sabotaging by frequent unattributable comments on radio he will threaten, since perfectly obvious political conference cannot begin, no use waiting further before acting unilaterally. Even if Department believes nothing satisfactory will come out of political conference itself, should we not again (*a*) weigh concrete advantage reaching agreement these preliminary talks and (*b*) advantage of possibly forestalling threatened unilateral ROK moves against making compromise at all and allowing conference to fail? In view Swedes and Swiss and majority press correspondents real admiration Indian handling here and renewed Commonwealth pushing for India, if question composition of conference is ever thrown back in UNGA, believe our position will be infinitely more difficult than last August. Know you are examining all proposals, but hope reflective examination will be made of all possible solutions with relative advantages and disadvantages whole situation including military as of today and decision as of last August will not hold us captured.

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[1] There was no time of transmission indicated on this telegram, which was received at the Department of State at 3:20 a. m., Nov. 7.

Real question of course is whether Rhee without real persuasion will ever agree to any of our suggestions on composition. We must then consider what we should do in Panmunjom talks if Rhee remains intransigeant. We can go ahead here despite Rhee, or break off talks if Communists remain inflexible, or try to get Communist agreement any of our proposals through diplomatic channels during talks here including possibly approaching Pakistan, Burma and Indonesia about declination. Should also consider whether we would be better off to break here and then compromise in talks with sixteen or in UNGA itself.

DEAN

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 170 Series

Draft Report by the National Security Planning Board of the National Security Council [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 9, 1953.
NSC 170

[Here follows a table of contents.]

U.S. OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

OBJECTIVES

1. The long-range U.S. objective with respect to the Korean problem is to bring about the unification of a free Korea with its political and

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[1] According to a covering note by Lay, Nov. 9, 1953, this draft statement of overall policy on Korea, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 949-*f* was transmitted to the Council for its consideration at the NSC meeting of Nov. 19, 1953. For text of NSC Action No. 949-*f*, see the memorandum of discussion at the 168th meeting of the NSC, Oct. 29, p. 1570; for a report of the discussion at the NSC meeting of Nov. 19, see the memorandum of discussion at the 171st meeting, p. 1616.

The enclosed statement was intended, if adopted, to supersede the current NSC policies contained in NSC 118/2, Dec. 20, 1951, printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1382; NSC 154/1, July 7, 1953, p. 1341; NSC 156/1, July 17, 1953, p. 1384; NSC 157/1, July 7, 1953, p. 1344; and NSC 167/2, Nov. 6, 1953, p. 1598.

territorial integrity guaranteed by international agreement and with armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of defending Korean territory short of an attack by a major power.

2. The current U.S. objective, pending achievement of the above long-range objective, is to maintain a position of strength in Korea (*a*) in support of the United Nations commitment to oppose aggression, (*b*) to prevent the area from coming under Communist domination either by subversion or by being overrun, and (*c*) to ensure the continuance of a free government on the peninsula.

3. The United States seeks to achieve these objectives through peaceful means, if possible, avoiding or preventing the resumption of fighting in Korea.

4. To achieve these objectives, the United States must be prepared to take the following courses of action:

Preventing or Countering the Resumption of Fighting by the ROK

5. In order to prevent or to counter any resumption of fighting in Korea by the Republic of Korea the United States should:

a. Continue to observe the armistice.

b. Seek to ensure that the Republic of Korea observes the armistice by:

(1) Notifying President Rhee formally and letting other ROK leaders know (on behalf of the United States and as executive agent for the UN), that if South Korea unilaterally initiates military operations against Chinese or North Korean forces in or north of the demilitarized zone, then:

> (a) UNC air, ground and sea forces will not support such operations directly or indirectly;
>
> (b) The United States will not furnish any military or logistic support for such operations;
>
> (c) All U.S. economic aid to Korea will cease immediately;
>
> (d) The UN Commander will take any action necessary to prevent his forces becoming involved in the renewal of hostilities and to provide for their security.

If Rhee should ask whether or not UNC forces might be withdrawn from Korea, he should be told that, if he ceases to cooperate with UNC, the UNC will decide its course of action purely in terms of its own interest and without consulting him.

(2) Attempting to obtain from Rhee a formal assurance in writing that he will not initiate unilateral military action at any time against the Communists in or north of the demilitarized zone. If he refuses to give such assurance, the United States should inform him immediately that the UNC reserves all rights to take whatever actions it deems necessary to preserve the security of the UNC forces.

(3) Making UNC plans and dispositions such as to permit maximum flexibility in meeting any likely eventuality and, insofar as possible, to reinforce the statements made to Rhee and to manifest U.S. determination to carry them out.

6. In anticipation of the possibility that President Rhee may order the renewal of hostilities by an attack on Communist forces in or north of the demilitarized zone, despite all the actions taken by the United States under paragraph 5–*a* and *b* above, the United States should take the measures stated in Annex A, which is being given separate distribution.[2]

7. If ROK forces should renew hostilities unilaterally, the United States should, in addition to appropriate actions under Annex A:

a. Stop all economic and military assistance to Korea.

b. Discontinue all logistic or other support to the ROK forces.

c. Take such other military measures as seem feasible and consistent with the security of UNC forces to block ROK offensive action.

d. Evacuate UN civilians.

e. Notify the Communists that the UNC will continue to abide by the armistice terms, but will defend UNC forces against any Communist attack, and will be prepared, if a Communist counterattack against the ROK threatens the security of UNC forces, to undertake such military action as may be necessary for the security of UNC forces.

f. Renew general hostilities with the Communists only if attacked in force by the Communists or if Communist attacks against the ROK seriously threaten the security of UNC forces.

g. Promptly seek to obtain the support of the other members of the UNC, and as appropriate inform the United Nations of the actions taken by the UNC under UN authority to ensure compliance with the armistice.

Countering the Resumption of Fighting by the Communists

8. If Communist forces violate the armistice and renew hostilities in Korea, the United States should:

a. Invoke the Joint Policy Declaration by calling upon the signatories to carry out the commitment that "if there is a renewal of armed attack, challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea."

b. Make clear to the world the necessity of expanding the war to China by air and naval action as the only feasible way of honoring our collective security commitments to the United Nations and our security commitments to the Republic of Korea.

c. Implement the military and diplomatic measures referred to in NSC Action No. 794 of May 20, 1953,[3] as approved following the urgent review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State.

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[2] Access to Annex A was strictly limited on an absolute need-to-know basis and therefore it was distributed separately from NSC 170. Annex A is not printed.

[3] For text, see the memorandum of discussion at the 145th meeting of the NSC, May 20, p. 1064.

d. Call on other UN members for effective manpower and other military assistance appropriate to the expanded war against China.

Seeking to Obtain Satisfactory Agreements from the Communists

9. The United States should:

a. Continue to seek, by political negotiations between the Communists and the UN (with the Republic of Korea associated with the latter), a unified and neutral Korea under a substantially unchanged ROK [under a ROK based on free elections].* To this end be prepared to accept:

(1) A unified Korea friendly to the United States, without U.S. or other foreign forces or bases in Korea;

(2) Mutual guarantees with the Communists for the territorial and political integrity of Korea under the ROK but foregoing all rights granted to the United States under a U.S.-Korean mutual assistance pact; and

(3) A level of Korean armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of defending Korean territory short of an attack by a major power.

b. Continue to exert political and economic pressures against Communist China, including unconventional and covert pressures, at least until settlements satisfactory to the United States can be achieved in the areas around Communist China.

Achieving a Position of Strength in Korea

10. Pending a political settlement and in the absence of a violation of the armistice, the United States should, conditioned upon the satisfactory cooperation of the Republic of Korea, continue to observe the armistice and try to avoid renewed fighting; accept indefinitely the division of Korea on the present demarcation line while seeking a satisfactory solution of the Korean problem by the use of other than military pressures; tie the Republic of Korea into the U.S. security system and develop it as a military ally. To this end the United States should:

a. Ratify the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea.

b. Build up and maintain the defensive capacity of ROK armed forces in accordance with existing commitments, consistent with the armistice terms, and in a manner and to an extent that will permit the phased and orderly redeployment of the bulk of U.S. armed forces at the earliest feasible date.

c. Carry on a vigorous campaign to secure additional armed forces from other UN members for service in Korea in accordance with the existing formula (see Annex B), covering reimbursement of U.S. expenditures for such forces.

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* Proposed by the Defense member. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]

d. Working in and through the organs of the UN where feasible, continue to strengthen the government and democratic institutions of the Republic of Korea.

e. Pending a satisfactory understanding with the ROK Government with respect to internal measures required to achieve economic stability, make such use of UNC facilities in Korea as is practicable, consistent with the primary mission and security of the UNC, to provide limited assistance to the Korean people in order to give tangible evidence to them of the value of U.S. friendship and assistance.

f. Conditioned upon a satisfactory understanding with the ROK Government with respect to internal measures required to achieve economic stability, implement the present expanded program of economic assistance in that portion of Korea controlled by the ROK and the UNC, subject to the following conditions:

(1) The Republic of Korea satisfactorily cooperates in carrying the armistice into effect.

(2) A standard of living approximating the 1949–1950 levels should be the goal toward which the program should contribute.

(3) The investment component of the program should be increased as rapidly as is consistent with economic stability.

(4) Investment in areas which would be most affected by renewal of hostilities should proceed at a limited rate until an assessment can be made of the likelihood of such renewal.

(5) Investment in those projects which would be subject to reconsideration in the event of unification should proceed at a limited rate until an assessment can be made of the likelihood of such unification.†

(6) The program should be directed toward an economy which the Republic of Korea could support with a minimum of future external aid.

g. Continue in effect all pertinent instructions to the UNC involving the maintenance of the security of U.S. forces in the Korea area.

h. Conduct a high-level diplomatic campaign to persuade our allies to accept U.S. courses of action and contribute to their support.

i. Continue a program of covert operations designed to assist in the achievement of U.S. objectives vis-à-vis Korea.

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† The State member proposes substitution of the following for subparagraphs (4) and (5):

The investment program should be restricted to those projects contributing to the goals stated in subparagraphs (2), (3) and (6) of this paragraph, and should place greatest emphasis initially on projects contributing most immediately to increased productivity. [Footnote in the source text.]

Annex B

FORMULA REGARDING REIMBURSEMENT FOR U.S. LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF OTHER UN FORCES IN KOREA

(NSC Action No. 858–*b*, July 23, 1953 [4])

1. The United States desires to obtain and retain the maximum contributions of effective manpower from the nations allied with it in the effort of the United Nations to repel aggression in Korea.

2. In principle, each such nation should, to the extent that it is able, either equip and supply its own forces or pay for such military equipment, supplies and services as may be furnished to it by the United States.

3. The overriding consideration, however, should be the maximum contribution of effective manpower. When any such nation is willing to contribute effective manpower but not able to provide for logistic support, the Department of Defense should furnish to such nation military equipment, supplies, and services; without requirement of payment to the extent that the Department of State, in consultation with the Departments of Treasury and Defense, may determine such nation cannot reasonably be expected to pay.

4. A nation capable of contributing money beyond the support of any forces furnished by it, should be encouraged also to contribute toward the logistic support of the forces of other nations.

5. Except when the manpower furnished by any such nation is additional to forces already furnished by it, the contribution should be in effective military units as determined by the Department of Defense.

Annex C

EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE POLITICAL CONFERENCE AND THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

Excerpt from the Understanding Between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea Regarding the Political Conference

The understanding between the United States and the Republic of Korea regarding the political conference is contained in the following portions of the Statement issued by Secretary of State Dulles and President Rhee on August 8, 1953:

> "If, after the political conference has been in session for 90 days, it becomes clear to each of our governments that all attempts to achieve these objectives have been fruitless and that the conference is being exploited by the Communist delegates mainly to infiltrate, propagandize

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[4] For text, see the memorandum of discussion at the 156th NSC meeting, July 23, p. 1420.

or otherwise embarrass the Republic of Korea, we shall then be prepared to make a concurrent withdrawal from the conference. We will then consult further regarding the attainment of a unified, free and independent Korea which is the postwar goal the United States set itself during World War II, which has been accepted by the United Nations as its goal and which will continue to be an object of concern of United States foreign policy."

Excerpt from the Special Prisoner of War Agreement Supplementary to the Korean Armistice Agreement

11. At the expiration of ninety (90) days‡ after the transfer of custody of the prisoners of war to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, access of representatives to captured personnel as provided for in Paragraph 8 above, shall terminate, and the question of disposition of the prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated shall be submitted to the Political Conference recommended to be convened in Paragraph 60, Draft Armistice Agreement, which shall endeavor to settle this question within thirty (30) days,§ during which period the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall continue to retain custody of those prisoners of war. *The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall declare the relief from the prisoner of war status to civilian status of any prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated and for whom no other disposition has been agreed to by the Political Conference within one hundred and twenty (120) days‖ after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission has assumed their custody.* Thereafter, according to the application of each individual, those who choose to go to neutral nations shall be assisted by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Red Cross Society of India. This operation shall be completed within thirty (30) days, and upon its completion, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall immediately cease its functions and declare its dissolution. After the dissolution of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, whenever and wherever any of those above-mentioned civilians who have been relieved from the prisoner of war status desire to return to their fatherlands, the authorities of the localities where they are shall be responsible for assisting them in returning to their fatherlands.

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‡ This 90 days expires December 23, 1953. [Footnote in the source text.]

§ This 30 days expires January 22, 1954. [Footnote in the source text.]

‖ This 120 days expires February 21, 1954. [Footnote in the source text.]

S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 170 Series

Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 12, 1953.

Subject: Record of Action 949 [2]—meeting of Oct. 29, 1953

1. State, Defense and CIA were requested to review the military and diplomatic measures provided in NSC Action No. 949 (courses of action in Korea) and submit a report to the Council on November 19. In effect what is desired is to determine the military course of action if the Communists renew hostilities in Korea, and the foreign affairs consequences of the course of action proposed by Defense.

2. State and CIA cannot do their part of the review until Defense reaches its conclusions about the military course of action it wishes to recommend. Defense has been working on this, but has not yet arrived at a final position. It may take some days more to iron out certain present differences of opinion among the Services.

3. State and CIA will probably require at least a week to prepare the political and intelligence parts of the review. Accordingly, I plan to request General Cutler to postpone the date for the report to the Council at least a week beyond November 19.

4. As soon as the views of Defense are settled, I shall start consultations to provide the State and CIA views, working with the Deputy Under Secretary as was done in preparing the original Political Annex to NSC 147.

R. R. B.

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[1] A marginal note by O'Connor indicated that the Secretary of State saw and approved this memorandum. Dulles himself initialed this memorandum with the comment, "OK".

[2] For text of NSC Action No. 949, see the memorandum of discussion at the 168th meeting of the NSC, Oct. 29, p. 1570.

795.00/11-1353: Telegram

The Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Dean) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT MUNSAN-NI, November 13, 1953.[1]

57. Reference Deptel 36.[2] In view very short period between arrival Vice President and his meeting with Rhee yesterday afternoon, Young, in response instructions Deptel 36, drafted summary statement quoted below which I approved and, at my suggestion and without being able clear it with Embassy, handed it to Vice President with brief oral remarks following short general briefing at Embassy with Briggs, Dean,

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[1] The source text did not indicate the time of transmission of this telegram, which was received at the Department of State at 2:22 a. m., Nov. 13.

[2] In this telegram to Munsan-ni, Nov. 6, the Department of State informed Dean of the existence of the Eisenhower letter of November 4 to Rhee (p. 1591) and the plan for Nixon to deliver it. Briggs was to show the letter and the related documentation to Dean, who in turn was to ensure that Young briefed the Vice President. (795.00/11-653)

Hull, Taylor, Wood, Young, Bond, Caraway, Watts and Herter. Same group present long discussion last night with Vice President at Embassy residence at which time Deptel 36 carried out in more detail. Thought it better not to ask Vice President to mention political conference. Summary statement follows:

United States Objectives and Policy in Korea.

1. It is the objective of the United States in Korea to establish and maintain a position of strength against Communism to the greatest extent possible, and to seek a political settlement that will achieve a united, independent and free Korea.

2. At this time, there are two primary problems in achieving our objective because of the attitudes of the Government of the Republic of Korea.

a. Observance of the armistice agreement—President Rhee threatens to ignore the armistice and move his forces north to unify Korea approximately six months following the signing of the armistice on 27 July 1953;

b. Holding of a political conference as soon as possible—President Rhee really opposes political conference, is making difficulties in convening it, has violently opposed India and Indian participation in any political conference and is maintaining such a rigid, provocative position as to frustrate in large part the holding of a political conference.

3. The major steps we need to take are:

a. To leave Rhee no illusion or ambiguous misconception regarding our opposition to any violation of the armistice against our judgment or without our knowledge;

b. To persuade him to cooperate with us in complete partnership, regarding the convening and operation of a political conference. This would mean relaxation in his attitude toward the governments who should attend the political conference on the non-Communist side, specifically India.

4. If President Rhee continues to threaten to, or if he should, violate the armistice or prevent the holding of a political conference, it would have the following effect on the United States objectives:

a. The first would involve us in military hostilities under circumstances not of our choosing and with possible severe consequences.

b. If he is the principal obstacle to the political conference he will be in effect forcing United States to tie up large military forces and tremendous military supplies indefinitely in Korea.

5. In conclusion, United States objectives in Korea can be best served if President Rhee and his government can be persuaded to observe the armistice and to work with us in holding a political conference.

6. Therefore,—

a. It is of vital importance to US-ROK relations that armistice be observed in letter and spirit on UN side;

b. It is fundamental that President Rhee observe in all respects his commitments in joint communiqué of 7 August 1953 with Secretary

Dulles to leave his troops under the United Nations Command and to take no unilateral step to threaten peace;

c. Peace in Asia can be preserved only by the cooperative effort and understanding among the free nations in Asia. No one nation must be allowed, or has the right, to jeopardize or break that peace;

d. Full cooperation of the Republic of Korea will bring it the full support of all free Asia and give it a new position of dignity, leadership and strength, which it has shown on the battlefield against Communism.

DEAN

795B.00/11-1953

Draft Telegram From the Vice President to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET [SEOUL, November 13, 1953.]

Thursday afternoon following my arrival in Seoul and briefing with Ambassadors Briggs and Dean and Generals Hull and Taylor I paid initial call on President Rhee in order to present President Eisenhower's letter of November 4. Following initital discussion of 45 minutes with Ambassador Briggs and General Hull and Prime Minister and Foreign Minister present, others withdrew and I had more than two hour conversation alone with President.

President Rhee read letter aloud slowly and carefully. It was obvious to me during his reading that letter had deep emotional effect on him. His only comment at end of reading, however, was "That is a very fine letter".

In subsequent discussion Rhee emphasized primary importance to him of close friendly relations with United States and his particular appreciation of personal relationship of friendship between him and President Eisenhower. He added however that despite this fact he cannot forget his first loyalty to Korea and specifically to the three millions (*sic*) enslaved in North Korea. His obligation to these people required unification of Korea whether by peaceful means or otherwise. He expressed view that there was chance political conference might achieve unification and stated he would give it this chance although he considered it a slim one.

During ensuing discussion Rhee rambled off in various directions including his well known views on Japan, economic problems related to US aid, etc. Without wishing to press him too closely I several times brought him back, however, to discussion of letter and assurance desired from him by President Eisenhower. At one point in discussion Rhee leaned towards me and said "I pledge to you that before I take any unilateral action I shall inform President Eisenhower." During discussion of this point I sought to impress him with fact that what was needed was agreement to act together in all such matters.

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[1] In a covering note from Allison to Dulles, the U.S. Ambassador explained that at Nixon's request he sent via special courier to Eisenhower a single copy of this draft telegram which was prepared in Seoul but not sent telegraphically. This message was drafted by the Second Secretary and Consul at Seoul, John A. Calhoun.

Question of Rhee's reply to letter, which he stated he would make, was left unsettled, and I will not insist that reply be made before my departure from Seoul Sunday. Depending on whether he replies before that time and nature of that reply, however, I contemplate writing him a letter, perhaps from Tokyo, thanking him for his courtesies and for conversations which we had and stating specifically that I have passed his pledge on to President Eisenhower. This will place on record fact he made such statement regardless of what his reply may say. If reply received before I depart and contains satisfactory assurance, I shall probably not include this reference in my letter to him.

Have discussed my private conversation fully with Ambassadors Briggs and Dean and Generals Hull and Taylor and they believe this oral pledge by Rhee, although short of commitment desired from him, marks definite step forward. We have agreed it would not be desirable to press Rhee too much on fundamental questions raised in your letter but rather to allow time for them to sink in. I hope that later in my visit there will be opportunity discuss subject further however and shall report results any such conversations.

I made brief reference to possibility of Rhee visiting Washington in January or February and stressed this would give opportunity for him to discuss these and other matters with President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles. In touching on timing of submission of Mutual Defense Treaty to Senate and request for further appropriations for economic aid, I made the point that his actions and statements between now and then would of course have a bearing on the attitude of Congress.

Meeting was friendly and cordial throughout and I made effort to keep it so. At no point did Rhee become angry or emotional although as mentioned above letter itself was obviously considerable shock to him.

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Korea, 1953"

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 17 November 1953.

Subject: NSC 170—U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views regarding a draft statement of policy prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board and entitled "U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in

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[1] This memorandum was transmitted to the NSC under a covering memorandum by Lay to the NSC, Nov. 18, at the request of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) for the information of the Council in connection with its consideration of NSC 170 at its meeting of Nov. 19.

Korea" (NSC 170), which is intended, if adopted, to supersede current NSC policies on Korea as set forth in NSC 118/2, NSC 154/1, NSC 156/1, NSC 157/1, NSC 167/2, and the memorandum for the NSC from its Executive Secretary, subject "Additional United Nations Forces for Korea" dated 27 [*17*] July 1953.[2]

2. The views of General Hull contained in DA IN 18719 dated 4 November 1953 [3] have been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection with their review of NSC 170.

3. In paragraph 2 of the draft statement of policy, it is stated that "The current U.S. objective . . . is to maintain a position of strength in Korea. . . ." The Joint Chiefs of Staff interpret paragraph 10 of the draft statement of policy as delineating the nature of the intended position of strength in Korea and as detailing the means by which it would be achieved. They assume that the provisions of subparagraph 10*b* would not preclude the possibility that an adequate defensive position in Korea might ultimately be provided by ROK armed forces alone, backed up by a strong United States military posture in the Far East region in general.

4. The words "if possible" as used in paragraph 3 are ambiguous. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the intent of this paragraph would be more precisely expressed if the paragraph were amended as follows:

"3. The United States seeks to achieve these objectives through peaceful means, ~~if possible,~~ avoiding or preventing the resumption of fighting in Korea *if possible to do so without compromise of our obligations, principles, and military security.*"

5. Since the action called for in subparagraph 8*b* of the draft statement of policy would not be advisable until a decision had in fact been reached to expand military action to China, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the timing of such action should be clarified, and recommend amendment of subparagraph 8*b* as follows:

"*8b. At the time when the action referred to in the Joint Policy Declaration is being carried out, make* ~~Make~~ clear to the world the necessity of expanding the war to China by air and naval action as the only feasible way of honoring our collective security commitments to the United Nations and our security commitments to the Republic of Korea."

6. The provisions of paragraph 9 of the draft statement of policy would continue in effect the current policy as to the United States position in political negotiations, a position which would accept a unified and neutralized Korea (see paragraph 9 of NSC 157/1 [4]). This negotiating position was adopted in the belief that "the achievement of a uni-

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[2] For references to NSC documents, see footnote 1, p. 1600. The memorandum, July 17, by Lay transmitted the Report by the Special Committee to the NSC, p. 1394.

[3] Printed as telegram C 65842, Hull to JCS, Nov. 4, p. 1588.

[4] Dated July 7, p. 1344.

fied Korea under the ROK, tied into the United States security system and developed as a military ally, is not a practicable possibility under present circumstances." The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not favor adoption of this position. In their memorandum for you of 30 June 1953[5] subject "NSC 157, U.S. Objective with Respect to Korea Following an Armistice,"* the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed the views (1) that the establishment of a unified but neutralized Korea would be to the strategic disadvantage of the United States, (2) that the precedent which would be set would constitute a serious hazard if applied, for example, to Germany, (3) that the basic United States objective with respect to Korea should be the attainment of a unified, independent, and non-Communist Korea, and (4) that until this objective is realized the United States should maintain a strong military posture in the Far East and that this posture should include the retention and support of adequate ROK armed forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff still hold these views. Further, they are of the opinion that as long as the Communists continue to pursue their expansionist policies in the Far East, a Communist guarantee of the territorial and political integrity of a unified and neutral Korea would be meaningless and that the Communists would use all possible means to subvert the new ROK with the ultimate objective of subjugating it to the status of a satellite. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that without continued outside (U.S.) assistance, Korean armed forces could not be established and maintained at a level which would insure their capability of preserving internal security and of defending Korean territory short of an attack by a major power. Therefore, it is considered that the degree of neutralization of Korea accepted by the United States incident to a political settlement should not be such as to preclude the continuation of United States assistance to Korea in the establishment of adequate security forces.

7. While recognizing that the matter is primarily political, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would favor adoption of the bracketed phrase in subparagraph 9*a*, as proposed by the Department of Defense member, inasmuch as it is considered that the establishment of a unified Korea based on free elections throughout North and South Korea would provide a more representative and stable government than one which might result from the incorporation of North Korea into the present ROK.

8. It is recommended that the following be added to subparagraph 10*b*:

"preferably in accordance with a Communist proposal for a concurrent reduction or withdrawal of foreign forces by both sides."

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[5] *Ante*, p. 1288.

* See memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 30, 1953. [Footnote in the source text; the reference memorandum transmitted the views of the JCS to the NSC.]

The reason for this recommended addition will be apparent.

9. The matter of the adoption of the substitute paragraph proposed by the Department of State member in lieu of subparagraph 10*f* (4) and (5) is not considered to be within the purview of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

10. Subject to the comments set forth above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you concur in the draft statement of policy contained in NSC 170.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
RICHARD H. PHILLIPS
Captain, USN
Deputy Secretary

S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 170 Series

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 18, 1953.

Subject: NSC 170, "U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea"

Discussion

This report to the National Security Council by the National Security Council Planning Board is a draft statement of overall policy on Korea. If adopted, it will supersede the current NSC policies on Korea contained in the reports listed on the first page of the document. [2] With very minor exceptions, NSC 170 contains no new policy proposals and is merely an orderly compilation and presentation of existing policies with which you are familiar.

In its review, however, FE has found a number of statements in this report which I believe could be improved. FE therefore transmitted a memorandum to Mr. Bowie suggesting that we try to get planning board approval of a number of changes. (I have attached a copy of this memorandum for your information.) We do not know as yet what action, if any, the planning board took today on these suggestions. I believe, however, that there are a sufficient number of changes that would be worthwhile making to justify postponing approval of NSC 170 as it now stands until the planning board has taken another look at the report in the light of our suggestions.

The Department wishes to call to the attention of the National Security Council that the new reimbursement policy set forth in Annex B of this document cannot be implemented because, to date, the opinion of the Attorney General as to its legality has not been rendered. The Department urges that the NSC give consideration to steps which could be taken to expedite the formulation of the aforementioned legal opinion. It will then become possible for the Department to carry forward its negotiations looking toward the settlement of bills with Governments which have received logistic support from the U.S. It would also help to stimulate replacements for a limited number of U.S. troops by troops from other U.N. Members within the levels set forth in the Armistice Agreement.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Jones of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs.

[2] The reference was to a covering note by Lay to NSC 170, not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1600.

Recommendations

1. That you not approve NSC 170 until further staff work has been done by the National Security Council Planning Board.

2. That you urge the National Security Council to give consideration to steps which could be taken to expedite the formulation of a legal opinion by the Attorney General on the new reimbursement policy set forth in Annex B of NSC 170.

[Attachment]

Memorandum to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) [3]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 17, 1953.

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA
CHANGES PROPOSED BY STATE TO NCS 170

Page 1, para 1

The long-range U.S. objective with respect to the Korean problem is to bring about the unification of ~~a free~~ Korea *with a self-supporting economy and under a free, independent and representative government, friendly toward the United States,* with its political and territorial integrity guaranteed by international agreement and with armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of defending Korean territory short of an attack by a major power.

Page 6, para 9a

a. Continue to seek, by political negotiations between the Communists and the UN (with the Republic of Korea associated with the latter), a unified and neutral Korea ~~under a substantially unchanged ROK~~ *under an independent and representative government.* To this end be prepared to accept:

Page 6, para 9a(2)

(2) ~~Mutual guarantees with the Communists~~ *United States* and Communist guarantees for the territorial and political integrity of Korea under the

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[3] The source text did not indicate who in FE drafted this memorandum.

ROK but foregoing all rights granted to the United States under a U.S-Korean mutual assistance pact; and

Page 7, para 10

Delete the word "indefinitely" in brackets in line 5.

Page 8, para 10f(1)

Substitute in line 2 the word "maintaining" for "carrying" and the word "in" for "into."

795.00/11-1953: Telegram

The Vice President to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET Tokyo, November 19, 1953—1 p. m.
PRIORITY

1276. Repeated information priority Seoul 122. Seoul pass Dean Munsan-ni; pass General Taylor, Eighth Army. Copy passed General Hull CINCUNC. For the Secretary eyes only from Nixon.

I received in Tokyo yesterday a letter from Rhee to the President which he requested that I transmit personally to the President only. I have today sent that letter to the President via the Secretary together with a memorandum covering the conversations I had with Rhee.[2] Rhee personally asked that I disclose the contents of his letter only to the President. For the information of the addressees, however, I will state that his letter confirmed in express terms the personal assurances which he made in my first conversation with him and which he repeated in the conversation which I had with him the day I left Korea. The proposed message to the Secretary prepared by the Embassy in Seoul dated November 13 sets forth correctly the substance of our conversation. The essence of that conversation was that Rhee gave a personal pledge for transmittal to the President that he would never take any unilateral action without first informing the President. Nothing which was stated in the later conversation I had with Rhee or in his letter modifies the observations contained in that proposed message. I have transmitted the substance of that message together with Rhee's letter by courier to the Secretary for delivery to the President. It is vitally important that the substance of the conversations I had with Rhee particularly insofar as his pledge regarding unilateral action is concerned not be disclosed to anyone except those who are recipients of this message. It would be most unfortunate if Rhee were to learn that a message which he gave to me orally for direct transmission to the President only was disclosed to persons other than the President.

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[1] A covering memorandum from Dulles, Nov. 19, transmitted this cable to Eisenhower.

[2] The editors have not found this letter, dated Nov. 16, in either Department of State files or those of the Eisenhower Library. No copies were made of it; however, it is extensively quoted from in a memorandum from Bowie to Dulles, Dec. 18, p. 1662. The memorandum of conversation between Nixon and Rhee referred to here was sent by special courier from Nixon to Eisenhower through Dulles along with Rhee's letter. This memorandum of conversation was originally the draft telegram from Nixon to Dulles, Nov. 13, which was never sent telegraphically, but for text, see p. 1609.

[NIXON]

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 171st Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, November 19, 1953 [1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 171st meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. The Vice President did not attend because of his absence from the country. Also present at the meeting were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Huntington Sheldon, Central Intelligence Agency (for Item 1); The Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

[Here follows discussion on items 1. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security, 2. "United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Indonesia", and 3. "Interim Defense Mobilization Planning Assumptions".]

4. *U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea* (NSC 170;[2] Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated November 18, 1953 [3])

Mr. Cutler stated to the Council that this report really constituted only a codification of a great number of policy papers on Korea going back a number of years. In view of the shortness of time, he suggested that he run through the paper and indicate the proposals for revisions which had been suggested by the State Department and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A number of minor revisions were suggested, but the first discussion centered on a suggestion by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to paragraph 8–*b,* which called on the United States to make clear to the world the necessity of expanding the war to China in the event of a resumption of hostilities by the Communists. The Joint

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[1] Drafted by Gleason on Nov. 20.

[2] Dated Nov. 9, p. 1600.

[3] This memorandum transmitted views of the JCS on NSC 170 to the NSC; see footnote 1, p. 1610.

Chiefs had suggested that this clarification not be made until after hostilities had begun or were about to begin.

The President inquired whether the Joint Chiefs' amendment would prohibit any discussion of this matter even in a preliminary way at the forthcoming Bermuda Conference.[4]

Secretary Dulles pointed out in turn that a great deal of "educational work" had to be done on this point and it was really essential that we begin to talk to our allies about it in the near future.

Upon reflection, Admiral Radford said that he could not agree with the position taken by the Joint Chiefs on this point.

With respect to subparagraph *d* [of paragraph 8] at the top of page 6, Secretary Dulles noted that the paragraph seemed to indicate that in the event the Communists resumed hostilities we would call upon other UN members for effective manpower and other military assistance. He said he simply wanted to be clear that this reference to additional manpower did not imply that if war were resumed and spread to China, it would involve operations on land in China by ground forces. Since this was likely to be a very different kind of war than others in the past, this might very well not be the case, and he believed that it would be best to strike the term "manpower".

With respect to subparagraph 9–*a*, which indicated that the United States should seek a unified and neutral Korea in its political negotiations with the Communists, Mr. Cutler noted that in addition to certain proposals to change the language of the paragraph, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had raised objections to the substance of this proposal. After agreement as to the phraseology of this paragraph, Mr. Cutler called on Admiral Radford to explain the substantive issue raised by the Joint Chiefs.

Admiral Radford replied that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unclear as to whether a neutral or neutralized Korea meant a disarmed Korea. The Joint Chiefs feared that in any case a neutralized Korea would presently succumb to Communist subversion.

The President replied that he had no doubt whatever that the Communists would make every effort to subvert a neutral Republic of Korea, even if they agreed to setting it up. The proposal had been put forward, however, as a practical suggestion to put to the Communists in the political conference. The President added that his idea was a "neutral Korea on our side".

Admiral Radford repeated the view of the Joint Chiefs that a neutral Korea simply could not last, but the President countered with the argument that in his mind a neutral Korea would certainly have the right to arm itself and defend its internal security.

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[4] For documentation on the Bermuda Conference, Dec. 4–8, 1953, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1710 ff.

Secretary Dulles confirmed that a neutral or neutralized Korea to his mind did not mean a disarmed Korea. The pattern was Switzerland. Nor did this paragraph exclude the United States from keeping a protective umbrella over Korea by means of stationing forces in Okinawa which would be ready to strike if Korea were again the victim of aggression. Finally, said Secretary Dulles, a neutral Korea certainly did not exclude United States assistance to help the Korean economy to remain viable. For these reasons, Secretary Dulles doubted the reality of the differences between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the other agencies.

Mr. Cutler suggested that the point be clarified by the addition of a paragraph affirming that the United States would not be precluded from rendering military and economic assistance to a neutral Korea.

Still unconvinced, Admiral Radford directed to Secretary Dulles a question as to the precise meaning of "neutral".

Secretary Dulles replied that what he meant was that while the United States and the other free world powers would remain free to help Korea preserve its independence, a neutral Korea would not become a military ally of the United States, nor would it afford us bases within its boundaries. The President stated his agreement with Secretary Dulles' concept.

In subparagraph 10–*b,* which called for the United States to build up and maintain the defensive capacity of the ROK armed forces pending a political settlement in Korea, Secretary Dulles recommended that the Council delete the adjective "defensive". He argued that it was not easy any longer to differentiate between offensive and defensive arms, and he did not wish to support the limitations suggested by the present phraseology.

The President suggested the substitution of "the security position of the ROK", and it was also agreed to omit the phrase "in accordance with existing commitments", on the ground that it was unwise at this time to specify a level of twenty divisions for the ROK, since Korea might not be able to maintain so large a force for an indefinite period.

Discussion then moved on to a consideration of the paragraphs on page 9 dealing with the form and character of economic assistance to South Korea [paragraph 10*f*(2)–(6)]. Mr. Cutler pointed out that the State Department objected to the language in the draft and felt that emphasis should instead be placed on projects which would increase productivity and which could be completed quickly in order to impress on the South Koreans the value of their ties with the United States.

After Mr. Cutler's explanation of this disagreement, the President expressed himself, in terms of bitterness and disappointment, that after all the careful plans that had been laid to rehabilitate South Korea, the Communists were actually doing a much more impressive job in the rehabilitation of North Korea.

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Secretary Humphrey expressed his complete accord with the position taken by the State Department and by the President. In this instance, said Secretary Humphrey, the object is to spend the money allocated for rehabilitation in Korea just as quickly as possible in order to show concrete results.

Not to be outdone, Secretary Wilson recommended the elimination of the term "limited" before "assistance" in subparagraph *e* [of paragraph 10] on page 8.

After the President had again spoken of his sense of frustration with the results of our program for assisting South Korea, Governor Stassen attempted to point out that the picture perhaps was not quite as black as the President painted it. We had shipped a lot of food, hospital supplies and the like to South Korea. We were moving ahead on the program as fast as possible, although President Rhee was a terrific obstacle.

The President said he was not too impressed with the list of achievements offered by Governor Stassen, although he understood the difficulties. What he wanted, said the President, was not merely food, but houses, hospitals, roads, bridges, and the like, so that the South Koreans would feel they had some stake in peace and would not be prone to resume hostilities if President Rhee breaks his promise to us and tries to lead his people into another war. In sum, said the President, he wanted all limitations taken out, and he wanted the Council to tell Governor Stassen to do whatever was necessary to assure that the South Koreans remained on our side.

The National Security Council: [5]

Adopted the statement of policy contained in the reference report on the subject, including Annex A thereto, subject to the following changes:

a. Paragraph 1. Delete, and substitute the following:

> "1. The long-range objective with respect to the Korean problem is to bring about the unification of Korea with a self-supporting economy and under a free, independent and representative government, friendly toward the United States, with its political and territorial integrity assured by international agreement and with armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of defending Korean territory short of an attack by a major power."

b. Paragraph 3: Delete, and substitute the following:

> "3. The United States seeks to achieve these objectives through peaceful means, avoiding or preventing the resumption of fighting in Korea, if possible without compromising our obligations, principles, and military security."

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[5] The following paragraphs and note constituted NSC Action No. 964, a record copy of which is located in S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.

c. Subparagraph 8–d: Delete "Manpower and other".

d. Subparagraph 9–a: Delete "under a substantially unchanged ROK", and substitute "under an independent and representative government." Also delete the phrase in brackets, the asterisk and the footnote to which it refers.

e. Subparagraph 9–a–(2): Delete, and substitute the following:

> "(2) United States and Communist assurances of the territorial and political integrity of Korea under the ROK but foregoing all rights granted to the United States under a U.S.–Korea mutual assistance pact; and ".

f. Subparagraph 9–a, following subparagraph 9–a–(3): Add "The foregoing would not preclude the provision by the United States of economic and military assistance to Korea."

g. Paragraph 10, line 5: Delete "indefinitely".

h. Subparagraph 10–b: Substitute "the security position of the ROK" for "the defensive capacity of ROK armed forces in accordance with existing commitments."

i. Subparagraph 10–e, line 6: Delete "limited".

j. Subparagraph 10–f–(1): Substitute "maintaining" for "carrying", and "in" for "into".

k. Subparagraphs 10–f–(4) and –(5): Delete and substitute the following, renumbering subparagraph (6) as (5):

> "(4) The investment program should be restricted to those projects contributing to the goals stated in subparagraphs (2), (3) and (5) of this paragraph, and should place greatest emphasis initially on projects contributing most immediately to better living conditions and future increased productivity for the Koreans."

Note: NSC 170, as amended, and approved by the President, subsequently circulated as NSC 170/1 [6] and referred to the OCB as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

[Here follows discussion on item 5. "U.S. Civil Administration in the Ryukyu Islands."]

S. EVERETT GLEASON

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[6] *Infra.*

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 170/1

Report by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 20, 1953.

NSC 170/1

[Here follows a table of contents.]

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[1] In a covering note, Lay stated that the President approved this paper on Nov. 20, 1953, directed its implementation by all appropriate departments and agencies, and designated the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency. Lay also noted that Annex A was approved without changes, and thus became Annex A to NSC 170/1, not printed.

U.S. OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

OBJECTIVES

1. The long-range objective with respect to the Korean problem is to bring about the unification of Korea with a self-supporting economy and under a free, independent and representative government, friendly toward the United States, with its political and territorial integrity assured by international agreement and with armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of defending Korean territory short of an attack by a major power.

2. The current U.S. objective, pending achievement of the above long-range objective, is to maintain a position of strength in Korea (*a*) in support of the United Nations commitment to oppose aggression, (*b*) to prevent the area from coming under Communist domination either by subversion or by being overrun, and (*c*) to ensure the continuance of a free government on the peninsula.

3. The United States seeks to achieve these objectives through peaceful means, avoiding or preventing the resumption of fighting in Korea, if possible without compromising our obligations, principles, and military security.

COURSES OF ACTION

4. To achieve these objectives, the United States must be prepared to take the following courses of action:

Preventing or Countering the Resumption of Fighting by the ROK

5. In order to prevent or to counter any resumption of fighting in Korea by the Republic of Korea the United States should:

a. Continue to observe the armistice.

b. Seek to ensure that the Republic of Korea observes the armistice by:

(1) Notifying President Rhee formally and letting other ROK leaders know (on behalf of the United States and as executive agent for the UN), that if South Korea unilaterally initiates military operations against Chinese or North Korean forces in or north of the demilitarized zone, then:

> (a) UNC air, ground and sea forces will not support such operations directly or indirectly;
> (b) The United States will not furnish any military or logistic support for such operations;
> (c) All U.S. economic aid to Korea will cease immediately;
> (d) The UN Commander will take any action necessary to prevent his forces becoming involved in the renewal of hostilities and to provide for their security.

If Rhee should ask whether or not UNC forces might be withdrawn from Korea, he should be told that, if he ceases to cooperate with UNC, the UNC will decide its course of action purely in terms of its own interest and without consulting him.

(2) Attempting to obtain from Rhee a formal assurance in writing that he will not initiate unilateral military action at any time against the Communists in or north of the demilitarized zone. If he refuses to give such assurance, the United States should inform him immediately that the UNC reserves all rights to take whatever actions it deems necessary to preserve the security of the UNC forces.

(3) Making UNC plans and dispositions such as to permit maximum flexibility in meeting any likely eventuality and, insofar as possible, to reinforce the statements made to Rhee and to manifest U.S. determination to carry them out.

6. In anticipation of the possibility that President Rhee may order the renewal of hostilities by an attack on Communist forces in or north of the demilitarized zone, despite all the actions taken by the United States under paragraph 5–*a* and *b* above, the United States should take the measure stated in Annex A, which is being given separate distribution.

7. If ROK forces should renew hostilities unilaterally, the United States should, in addition to appropriate actions under Annex A:

a. Stop all economic and military assistance to Korea.

b. Discontinue all logistic or other support to the ROK forces.

c. Take such other military measures as seem feasible and consistent with the security of UNC forces to block ROK offensive action.

d. Evacuate UN civilians.

e. Notify the Communists that the UNC will continue to abide by the armistice terms, but will defend UNC forces against any Communist attack, and will be prepared, if a Communist counterattack against the ROK threatens the security of UNC forces, to undertake such military action as may be necessary for the security of UNC forces.

f. Renew general hostilities with the Communists only if attacked in force by the Communists or if Communist attacks against the ROK seriously threaten the security of UNC forces.

g. Promptly seek to obtain the support of the other members of the UNC, and as appropriate inform the United Nations of the actions taken by the UNC under UN authority to ensure compliance with the armistice.

Countering the Resumption of Fighting by the Communists

8. If Communist forces violate the armistice and renew hostilities in Korea, the United States should:

a. Invoke the Joint Policy Declaration by calling upon the signatories to carry out the commitment that "if there is a renewal of armed attack, challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea."

b. Make clear to the world the necessity of expanding the war to China by air and naval action as the only feasible way of honoring our collective security commitments to the United Nations and our security commitments to the Republic of Korea.

c. Implement the military and diplomatic measures referred to in NSC Action No. 794 of May 20, 1953, as approved following the urgent review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State.

d. Call on other UN members for effective military assistance appropriate to the expanded war against China.

Seeking to Obtain Satisfactory Agreements from the Communists

9. The United States should:

a. Continue to seek, by political negotiations between the Communists and the UN (with the Republic of Korea associated with the latter), a unified and neutral Korea under an independent and representative government. To this end be prepared to accept:

(1) A unified Korea friendly to the United States, without U.S. or other foreign forces or bases in Korea;

(2) United States and Communist assurances of the territorial and political integrity of Korea under the ROK but foregoing all rights granted to the United States under a U.S.-Korea mutual assistance pact; and

(3) A level of Korean armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of defending Korean territory short of an attack by a major power.

The foregoing would not preclude the provision by the United States of economic and military assistance to Korea.

b. Continue to exert political and economic pressures against Communist China, including unconventional and covert pressures, at least until settlements satisfactory to the United States can be achieved in the areas around Communist China.

Achieving a Position of Strength in Korea

10. Pending a political settlement and in the absence of a violation of the armistice, the United States should, conditioned upon the satisfactory cooperation of the Republic of Korea, continue to observe the armistice and try to avoid renewed fighting; accept the division of Korea on the present demarcation line while seeking a satisfactory solution of the Korean problem by the use of other than military pressures; tie the Republic of Korea into the U.S. security system and develop it as a military ally. To this end the United States should:

a. Ratify the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea.

b. Build up and maintain the security position of the ROK consistent with the armistice terms, and in a manner and to an extent that will permit the phased and orderly redeployment of the bulk of U.S. armed forces at the earliest feasible date.

c. Carry on a vigorous campaign to secure additional armed forces from other UN members for service in Korea in accordance with the existing formula (see Annex B[2]), covering reimbursement of U.S. expenditures for such forces.

d. Working in and through the organs of the UN where feasible, continue to strengthen the government and democratic institutions of the Republic of Korea.

e. Pending a satisfactory understanding with the ROK Government with respect to internal measures required to achieve economic stability, make such use of UNC facilities in Korea as is practicable, consistent with the primary mission and security of the UNC, to provide assistance to the Korean people in order to give tangible evidence to them of the value of U.S. friendship and assistance.

f. Conditioned upon a satisfactory understanding with the ROK Government with respect to internal measures required to achieve economic stability, implement the present expanded program of economic assistance in that portion of Korea controlled by the ROK and the UNC, subject to the following conditions:

(1) The Republic of Korea satisfactorily cooperates in maintaining the armistice in effect.

(2) A standard of living approximating the 1949–1950 levels should be the goal toward which the program should contribute.

(3) The investment component of the program should be increased as rapidly as is consistent with economic stability.

(4) The investment program should be restricted to those projects contributing to the goals stated in subparagraphs (2), (3) and (5) of this paragraph, and should place greatest emphasis initially on projects contributing most immediately to better living conditions and future increased productivity for the Koreans.

(5) The program should be directed toward an economy which the Republic of Korea could support with a minimum of future external aid.

g. Continue in effect all pertinent instruction to the UNC involving the maintenance of the security of U.S. forces in the Korea area.

h. Conduct a high-level diplomatic campaign to persuade our allies to accept U.S. courses of action and contribute to their support.

i. Continue a program of covert operations designed to assist in the achievement of U.S. objectives vis-à-vis Korea.

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[2] For text of Annex B, see p. 1605.

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 172d Meeting of the National Security Council, Monday, November 23, 1953 [1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 172nd meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. The Vice President did not attend because of his absence from the country. Also present were Mr. Tuttle for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; The Assistant to the President (for Item 1); Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C.D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Col. Powell, Department of Defense (for Items 1 and 2); Huntington Sheldon, Central Intelligence Agency (for Items 1 and 2); the NSC Representative on Internal Security (for Items 1, 2 and 3); the Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC; Mr. Farley and Hall, NSC Special Staff Members (for Items 1, 2 and 3).

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows discussion on items 1. "Continental Defense," 2. "Coast Guard Operations, Including Port Security," 3. "Review of Internal Security Legislation," and 4. "Prevention of Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified NSC Information".]

5. *U.S. Courses of Action in Korea in the Absence of an Acceptable Political Settlement* (NSC 167/2; [2] NSC 170/1 [3])

After the Council meeting had been confined to the usual members, Secretary Dulles said he believed he ought to report to the Council on recent developments with regard to President Rhee. In response to Council directive, Secretary Dulles said, we had sought assurances from President Rhee that he would not resume unilaterally hostilities against the Communists. The matter had been handled by Vice President Nixon, who had presented a letter from President Eisenhower to President Rhee on this subject during his recent visit to Korea. The State Department had just received Vice President Nixon's report of his meeting with Rhee, together with a letter from Rhee to President Eisenhower. Pointing out that he wished no copies of his letter to be made, President Rhee had stated, nevertheless, that he would not take unilateral action to resume hostilities without prior consultation with President Eisenhower. The Vice President had expressed the view that this was just about as far as we could hope to get at present in extracting a commitment from Rhee. With this judgment Secretary Dulles expressed general agreement. As a result of the exchange of letters, he concluded, we have very largely increased the likelihood that Rhee will not act unilaterally, or at least will not do so without prior consultation with President Eisenhower. Under the circumstances, Secretary Dulles thought it would be advisable for the Council to take a new look at the recently approved general policy report on Korea (NSC 170/1).

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[1] Drafted by Gleason on Nov. 24.

[2] Dated Nov. 6, p. 1598.

[3] *Supra.*

The National Security Council:[4]

Noted an oral report by the Secretary of State on the results of the Vice President's discussions with President Rhee pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 of NSC 167/2 (subsequently superseded by subparagraphs 5-*b*-(1) and -(2) of NSC 170/1).

S. EVERETT GLEASON

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[4] The following paragraph constituted NSC Action No. 970, a record copy of which is located in S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.

S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 170 Series

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 27 November 1953.

Subject: U.S. Courses of Action in Korea

1. Pursuant to decision of the National Security Council (NSC Action No. 949 *d*), 27 [*29*] October 1953, and your memorandum of 3 November 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the military measures considered by the National Security Council on 20 May 1953, (NSC Action No. 794), in connection with the various possible courses of action with respect to Korea outlined in NSC 147.[1] In this latter action it was the sense of the National Security Council that, if conditions arise requiring more positive action in Korea, the course of action recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be adopted as a guide. This course of action which was furnished you by memorandum dated 19 May 1953, subject "Courses of Action in Connection with the Situation in Korea (Analysis)",[2] is repeated below:

"Extend and intensify military action against the enemy, to include air and naval operations directly against China and Manchuria, a coordinated offensive to seize a position generally at the waist of Korea and be prepared for further operations as required in order to:

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[1] Dated Apr. 2, p. 839.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1059.

"*a.* Destroy effective communist military power in Korea.

"*b.* Reduce the enemy's capability for further aggression in Korea and the Far East.

"*c.* Increase possibility of enemy acceptance of an armistice on U.S.-U.N. terms.

"*d.* Create conditions favorable for ROK forces to assume increasing responsibility for operations in Korea."

2. It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the above course of action is no longer applicable to the existing situation in Korea. Salient factors necessitating a new course of action are as follows:

a. The previously recommended *Course of Action* envisaged a substantial augmentation of forces requiring a 9 to 12 months' buildup period before offensive operations could be launched.

b. The *Course of Action* previously recommended was designed in part, to increase the possibility of enemy acceptance of an armistice on U.S.-U.N. terms. The situation now requires a reappraisal of national policy to adopt the following primary military objectives:

(1) To destroy effective Communist military power applied to the Korean effort.

(2) To render the enemy incapable of further aggression in Korea and the Far East.

(3) To create conditions under which expanded ROK forces can assume full responsibility for the defense of Korea.

(4) Create conditions which will lead to a unified, independent Korea, aligned with the West.

The achievement of the above objectives will permit redeployment of U.S. forces from Korea, thereby substantially improving the military posture of the United States to meet any eventuality, including that of general war.

3. In the event that Communists re-initiate hostilities in Korea, the best course of action which can be undertaken immediately to achieve primary U.S. military objectives is as follows:

a. Employing atomic weapons, conduct large-scale air operations against targets in China, Manchuria and Korea. Exploit such successes as may be gained by coordinated ground, air and naval action to destroy enemy forces in Korea.

b. Immediately consider what further military buildup is then required to meet resulting contingencies in Korea or elsewhere.

4. The action outlined in paragraph 3 *a* above is within the capability of U.S. forces and can be initiated immediately. Military planning is being finalized under the assumptions set forth in Appendix "B" hereto. The implementing tasks to accomplish the action in paragraph 3 *a* above are as indicated in Appendix "A". Planning assumptions are contained in Appendix "B".

5. In the event that the Communists do not re-initiate hostilities and we are confronted with a prolonged stalemate, the expansion and devel-

opment of the ROK ground forces to an effective 20-division Field Army will permit the redeployment of a substantial number of U.S. forces from Korea.

6. In compliance with the request of the National Security Council, the Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for NSC Affairs has been provided with a copy of this review in order that coordination with the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency may be effected for presentation to the NSC at its 3 December meeting.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
EDWIN H. J. CARNS
Brigadier General, USA
Secretary

Appendix "A"

MAJOR IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS

1. Obtain now the necessary Presidential authority to enable the immediate employment of nuclear weapons in sufficient quantity to insure success of the proposed course of action.

. . . .

3. Expedite planning for offensive atomic air operations against:

a. Troop concentrations and military installations in Korea.
b. Those targets in Manchuria and North China which constitute an immediate threat to UNC military operations.
c. Those targets in Manchuria and China beyond the scope of those in *a* and *b* above.

4. Upon the outbreak of hostilities launch immediately a large-scale air offensive employing atomic weapons to destroy Chinese Communist forces and selected targets in China, Manchuria, and Korea.

5. Exploit enemy weaknesses resulting from success of the air offensive in order to destroy remaining enemy forces in Korea.

6. Initiate the necessary psychological, political, economic, and unconventional warfare measures in support of the military campaign.

7. Intensify guerrilla operations against Communist China.

8. Maintain the security of Japan, the Philippines, Formosa, and the Ryukyus, consistent with the need to provide for the over-all security of U.S. forces.

Appendix "B"

PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

1. Resumption of hostilities in Korea will be due to Communist action.

2. The broad mission of the UNC is to obtain a military victory.

3. Enemy forces in North Korea may have been augmented since 1 August 1953, especially air forces.

4. Combat effectiveness of ROK-U.S.-UNC Forces will be maintained.

5. ROK forces will remain under UNC.

6. Sufficient atomic weapons and suitable delivery means will be made available.

7. Provision for attacks on targets in the Dairen-Port Arthur area will be included in the plans. Specific approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be required prior to implementation of such attacks.

795.00/12-153: Telegram

The Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Dean) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

MUNSAN-NI, December 1, 1953.[1]

122. Repeated information Seoul, Tokyo, CINCUNC, New Delhi unnumbered. Reference my telegram 120; Department's telegram 111.[2]

Suggest for your further over-all consideration whether or not it is really our own best interest, in light present situation, for us continue pressing for PC convening immediately. Now that we have apparently convinced Thimayya on our ideas PW timetable, might be wise let PW question work itself out to point, according to our fixed timetable, when (1) non-repatriated PWs have been released from custody and moved South out of demilitarized zone, (2) Indian custodial forces safely withdrawn from Korea without incident, and (3) NNRC out of existence February 22. Assuming this all happens satisfactorily and according to plan, presume major daily irritant on ROK side of Indian troops on Korean soil in charge of prisoners and major problem for India will be removed. Notwithstanding what Communists may charge or attempt in UNGA or elsewhere concerning PW question, atmosphere would be somewhat clearer for PC to convene and concentrate on real question of peaceful settlement.

If it convenes during period prisoner exchange Communists will undoubtedly attempt use it as propaganda sounding board reciting alleged murders, intimidation prisoners wishing repatriation, presence Kuomintang and ROK agents, smuggling of radios, messages, etc., for some of which charges there is, unfortunately, some vestigial basis.

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[1] There was no time of transmission indicated on this telegram, which was received at the Department of State at 12:59 p.m., Dec. 1.

[2] In telegram 120 from Munsan-ni, Nov. 30, Dean suggested that the time was ripe for breaking off the preliminary Panmunjom talks; but the feeling in the Department of State, as expressed in telegram 111 to Munsan-ni of that same date, was that the talks should not be broken off or recessed until after Dec. 8 and Dean should then designate his deputy to continue the conversations. (795.00/11-3053)

As it becomes clear unification cannot be achieved in any event by military means, and no successful move unilaterally, ROK might just possibly moderate present totally negative policy on PC and be willing to cooperate with us concerning it. Even Communists might come round to accept some reasonable formula on withdrawal of forces. Meanwhile, onus clearly on Communists, particularly Chinese, for preventing PC.

As I have indicated, and as I think will become increasingly clearer, I believe little chance PC can actually work out satisfactory unification and territorial agreements respect free United Korea. By March 1st we should know whether Rhee will really cooperate Wood on economic policy and with us on Japanese policies and reference India or will continue present policy almost complete non-cooperation in economic rehabilitation and Japanese relations, and we will know whether ratification defense pact advisable. Believe Soviet is holding back on PC now. Chinese complete domination over North Koreans evidenced our talks, and at MAC meetings, and at NNSC observation teams in North Korea, Chinese and Russian public plans rehabilitate North Korea, Russian rebuilding steel centers, Peiping's terms 10-year agreement with NK, and economic and military importance Communist-controlled area contiguous Manchuria, Port Arthur area, and Vladivostok complex—all militate against peaceful objectives US, UN, and ROK in Korea. These factors may form basis apparent Communist opposition to PC in near future which they are cloaking under convenient pretext neutral nations which they know from armistice negotiations, and our categoric rejection, we cannot accept.

At same time I still believe firmly in importance holding PC some time near March or April. It would be tangible evidence to soldiers here and people at home we are constantly trying to bring peace. It would hold forth on keeping UN troops here longer. (. . . has made no secret to our military here that Pearson would welcome disagreement with us on make-up PC so as to put blame on us for not holding PC which would thus give Canadian Government strong justification for withdrawal Canadian troops reference both Canadian and American public opinion.) And most important, PC would provide US forum to present attractive, humane, appealing plans for future of Korea on realistic basis. I am sure we would capture imagination and support whole free world, particularly articulate opinion in Asia, and put ourselves in strong moral background against Communist rejection of such plans. If we cannot hold PC due to Communist intransigence and ROK stubbornness, at least we can set forth eloquently and clearly our objectives in Korea, and give us time to formulate them in PC.

Rhee is presently very querulous. Thinks he was tricked into armistice. Now thinks defense pact and economic program are dishonorable bribes to him not to unify Korea by force. US position unilateral hostilities has deprived him of psychological release of sabre rattling and extreme anti-Communist jingoism and he feels let down and hurt. He sees his lifetime dream of a unified Korea rapidly fading. Although seems astonished [*astonishing*?] from our viewpoint, have distinct impression Rhee now feels free world does not deserve a fighting Korea, that rest of us have lost our courage to fight Communism and he would be glad to see us go. He recites in detail every bit of concession we made to get armistice and in working out demilitarized zone and he is convinced, if we do not fight, PC will merely result in yielding up one concession after another by our side to final surrender all Korea. Any constructive suggestions by us are, of course, outright concessions to Communists in ROK view. ROK Government utterly unable see or even attempt understand practical problems for other nations in maintaining their troops in Korea or our own problems. They think they are doing us a favor by allowing us here. ROKs uncontrollably emotional about whole matter, which in some ways is understandable. But this attitude is leading gradual paralysis US–ROK working partnership at this stage with Rhee believing that if he sufficiently intransigeant we will always back down. Have discussed this fully with Ambassador Briggs.

I again recommend carefully worked out statement in Washington or New York on our objectives. Whether Rhee will believe them or not, and he is very skeptical, it would at least give him sense of our purpose at PC and of our joint objectives in Korea which he now seems very upset about. He continually and repeatedly asks me why United States is abandoning its objectives Far East and what can we possibly accomplish at PC. Of course, I outlined objectives in general terms without mentioning buffer zone or guarantee territorial integrity or withdrawal foreign forces. I feel they could be given much more authority in statements or speeches Washington or New York.

Understand from Jim Greenfield, *Time-Life* correspondent here, that British Foreign Office has done considerable work along lines Deptel 34[3] and has released large parts of it to *Times* London office along lines Foreign Office position paper just received from Department.

All Communist tactics and propaganda past two weeks, particularly their usual Communist tactic twisting PW timetable around on us to charge we are stalling PC to hold PWs, seem at this point lead up to their breaking off, trying to put onus on us, and throwing PW and PC questions into UNGA, perhaps along Indian lines (Deptel's 108 and

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[3] Telegram 34 to Munsan-ni was a repeat of telegram 1859 from London, Oct. 29, which summarized the principal points of the British position paper on the political conference as follows: 1. the United Nations should seize the initiative; 2. it should aim for the creation by peaceful means of a unified and neutral Korea; 3. it should avoid a joint North–South Korean Government before elections on the German model; 4. if unification proved impossible, it should attempt to reach a *modus vivendi* allowing for the withdrawal of a portion of UN forces; and 5. if all of the above failed, it should accept a continuance of the *status quo.* (795.00/10–2953)

109[4]) where Communists would have larger propaganda sounding board for charges re POWs and much more pressure for neutrals etc. than these talks here. Mixing whole business up in UNGA would delay PC even longer and spread confusion.

On other hand, I feel we would be in strong position on PC and POW issues in view all efforts made on explanations, favorable attitude Indian NNRC members, and constructive proposals I have made in these talks.

Accordingly, in light all above, I am convinced our refusal to accept Soviet masquerading as neutral, attempting to use good offices as "harmonizer" at PC as so-called non-voting observer with right to take part in discussions without restriction and with no right either side to put matter to vote if any nation, including neutral, has different opinion, according to Communist proposal, gives us sound, clear, powerful issue for us to break on cleanly and emphatically at this juncture. Too much effort continue trying to seek formula acceptable to Communists may only serve to confuse that issue and cloud it up. We have gone pretty far already in attempting to slick over status of USSR as full participant not formally on either side but entitled vote and required be bound—in effect, almost a three-sided conference, with USSR in effect having veto power. No matter how we slice it, this bothers me because it gives Soviets special place and comparatively greater veto power at PC than any other representative. Therefore, I recommend, in view all the constructive proposals and flexible formulae we have already put forward on this issue, that we should go no further but stand firm and reiterate our position. If Communists make no constructive proposal, and if you agree Spring of 1954 is now better time to try for PC, and that immediate urgency is over, suggest we proceed along lines making no more proposals, build-up careful and destructive analysis their proposal, further re-affirm complete reasonableness our proposal and, assuming this feasible with Communists, attempt to carry on through UNGA recess of December 8. Then wait for Communists either accept or break off these talks, or recess them indefinitely.

DEAN

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[4] Neither printed. (795.00/11–2753)

795.00/12-153: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Dean) [1]

TOP SECRET
NIACT

WASHINGTON, December 2, 1953—6:19 p. m.

123. Assuming political conference is ever held, urtel 122, [2] we are not certain it would be advantageous for it to be delayed until March or April. Undue delay will compound uncertainty re Korea's future, give Communists pretext for continued accusations against UNC, prevent stabilization of ROK status if Korea is to remain divided. While we therefore feel advantages of delay are questionable we agree with you completely that we must continue publicly to press for conference in accordance with Article 60 of Armistice Agreement and UNGA resolution August 28. Your negotiations have already served to demonstrate to our allies and free world that we are making every reasonable effort to get conference convened, and that Communists are stalling. Even if talks now break down, they will have been most valuable for this reason.

We also agree that with presentation written counter-proposal along lines Deptel 115 [3] you will have made just about every possible concession consistent with our interpretation Armistice Agreement and GA resolution. We think you are now standing on strong position from which you should not recede. Our objective during remainder of GA should be to highlight unreasonableness of Communist position so as to fortify our position in world opinion. Consequently we agree thoroughly with pertinent parts three sentences your 122. Appreciate difficulties our making proposal in writing but believe this would be helpful in making our position perfectly clear by comparison with Communist written proposal and therefore hope you can see your way to present written proposal in near future. When proposal is presented you should make clear it constitutes complete and serious basis for settling outstanding issues on which we intend stand firm, without threatening at this time to break off talks. We will take same line here in supporting statements, for which we need soonest your final text and estimate of timing.

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[1] This telegram, which was repeated to New Delhi as telegram 608, to Seoul as telegram 463, and to Tokyo as telegram 1315 (to be passed to CINCUNC), was drafted by Popper and cleared with Drumright and Murphy.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] In this telegram to Munsan-ni, Dec. 1, Dean received a suggested text from the Department of State for his "package proposal" at Panmunjom. According to the proposal, a political conference would be held within 4–6 weeks after the conclusion of the preliminary discussions. The principle of the two-sided conference would be maintained because the two belligerents would have plenary authority over the proceedings, the two sides would vote, and the Soviet Union would be included as a voting member on the Communist side. Nations with "current experience" in Korea (most particularly India) could take part in the conference, but without the right to vote, without the power to introduce proposals or motions, and with the stipulation that they stick to the agenda. For the text of the proposal as presented on Dec. 8, see Department of State *Bulletin,* Dec. 21, 1953, pp. 877–878.

USGA Delegation informs us Korean item will not be reached before Friday December fourth.

At briefing meeting group of sixteen just concluded, ROK not present, sentiment solidly behind our position. Several representatives made point progress had been made last few weeks, and all feel conversations should not be broken off.

Dulles

611-95/12-353

Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [Washington,] December 3, 1953.

Subject: JCS Memorandum—US Courses of Action in Korea

1. The JCS, pursuant to NSC Action 949*d*, by Memorandum of November 27 to the Secretary of Defense,[1] have recommended a military course of action to be undertaken in the event that Communists re-initiate hostilities in Korea. The Department of State was requested by the same NSC action to prepare a report on the political implications involved in the recommended course of military action. The Department has given urgent consideration to the JCS paper, and is of the opinion that it cannot make a useful report on political implications without a clearer understanding of the military courses of action which the JCS have in mind.

2. The primary question on which it is necessary to have clarification is the geographic location and general nature of the targets which the JCS intend to attack. The recommended JCS course of action is stated in paragraph 3*a* of their paper: "Employing atomic weapons, conduct large-scale air operations against targets in China, Manchuria, and Korea." Within this very general course of action there could be various general types of attack which would carry markedly different risks of Russian reaction against U.S. bases in Japan and Okinawa, and consequently would involve markedly different reactions from the Allies of the U.S., and from the other nations of the Free World.

a. U.S. attacks against the air bases above the Yalu, against communications lines supplying the Korean theatre, and against Chinese forces moving toward that theatre, would undoubtedly meet Russian resistance but might not impel the Russians to undertake attacks against U.S. bases outside of Korea.

b. U.S. atomic attacks on important Chinese cities would face the Russians with a critical political problem in their relations with the

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[1] *Ante*, p. 1626.

Chinese, might indeed impel them to undertake attacks against U.S. bases in Japan and Okinawa, but by avoidance of Russian-controlled territory would leave the Russians some choice as to the nature of their reaction.

c. U.S. attacks on Port Arthur and Dairen would almost certainly result in Russian attack on U.S. bases in Okinawa and Japan.

d. U.S. attacks on Vladivostok and the Soviet Far East would probably spark World War III.

3. The JCS paper is imprecise on which type of action is envisaged.

a. The JCS state that one of the "primary military objectives" which should be adopted is (2*b* (2)) "To render the enemy incapable of further aggression in Korea and the Far East". Since "the enemy" is defined only as Communist, this objective, if literally applied, would call for the destruction of all Chinese and Russian military capabilities in the Far East, and could hardly be achieved without attack on Soviet bases in the Far East.

b. The JCS state (Appendix B, para 7) "Provision for attacks in the Dairen–Port Arthur area will be included in the plans. Specific approval by the JCS will be required prior to implementation of such attacks." It is not clear whether the JCS are recommending NSC approval of this course of action.

c. The JCS describe one of their "major implementing actions" as follows (Appendix A, para 4): "Upon the outbreak of hostilities launch immediately a large-scale air offensive employing atomic weapons to destroy Chinese Communist forces and selected targets in China, Manchuria and Korea." If read literally this would call for the destruction of all elements of Chinese Communist forces in China Proper, in which case the "selected targets" would involve practically every Chinese city.

d. None of the types of action described above would be inconsistent with the JCS general recommendations (para 3*a*) "Employing atomic weapons, conduct large-scale air operations against targets in China, Manchuria and Korea. Exploit such successes as may be gained by coordinated ground, air and naval action to destroy enemy forces in Korea." But this general course of action could also be interpreted as including only those attacks against air bases. communication lines and enemy forces which were required to defeat the Chinese Communists in Korea.

4. A second important question on which clarification is required is whether or not the JCS recommended "primary military objectives" (para 2*b*) are intended to be applicable no matter how hostilities in Korea are initiated. Allied and Free World reaction to U.S. courses of action will differ markedly in accordance with the degree of conviction that the Communists are responsible for the renewal of hostilities. The JCS paragraph on "military objectives" (para 2*b*) is so worded that it reads as if these objectives should be adopted by the U.S. now, as its general objectives rather than in the contingency of Communist renewal of hostilities.

Recommendations

1. The Secretary request a postponement for two weeks of the State Department formal report on political implications of the recommended military course of action.

2. The Secretary question the JCS in the NSC as to whether their recommended military course of action involves attacks against air bases, communication lines and enemy forces in and proximate to Korea; wide-spread attacks against Chinese cities; attacks against Darien and Port Arthur; or attacks against Russian bases in the Soviet Far East.

3. The Secretary question the JCS in the NSC as to whether the JCS recommended "primary military objectives" (para 2*b*) are intended to be applicable as our general objectives now, or only in the contingency of Communist renewal of hostilities.

R. R. BOWIE

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 173d Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, December 3, 1953 [1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at this meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State (for Items 1 and 2); the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. The Vice President did not attend because of his absence from the country. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator; the Under Secretary of State; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the Acting White House Staff Secretary; Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

[Here follows discussion on item 1. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security."]

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[1] Drafted by Gleason on Dec. 4.

2. *Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea* (NSC Actions Nos. 794 and 949-*d*;[2] NSC 147;[3] NSC 170/1[4])

After briefly sketching the background of this problem, Mr. Cutler invited Admiral Radford to present his reports on (1) objectives and courses of action in Korea in the event of a resumption of hostilities by the Communists and (2) courses of action in the event of a prolonged stalemate in Korea.

At the outset, Admiral Radford stated that he wished to clear up any misunderstanding of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reports on both these subjects. He referred to General Bradley's earlier plan of last spring,[5] and pointed out that this plan was responsive to circumstances which would permit the United States a period of nine to twelve months in which to build up its forces in Korea. The problem the Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked to discuss in the present paper was of quite a different order, namely, what course of action to follow if the Communists suddenly initiated a renewal of hostilities. There would be no time for an advance build-up, and the U.S. and UN forces would be compelled to strike back immediately with whatever forces they had available. The circumstances would thus be not wholly unlike those which existed at the end of June 1950 when North Korea had attacked South Korea.

Admiral Radford then read portions of a written report describing the military objectives and courses of action in this contingency[6] (copy of this report filed in the Minutes of the 173rd NSC Meeting). In the course of reading from his memorandum, Admiral Radford indicated his view that the Chinese Communists were unlikely to resume hostilities in Korea unless they were of the opinion that global war was a very strong possibility. Hence the outbreak of such hostilities would probably dictate to the United States the decision to proceed promptly to full mobilization.

After discussing the concept of operations in detail, Admiral Radford emphasized that the role of U.S. and UN ground forces would largely be limited to the actual theatre of war in Korea and not spread out to Manchuria or China proper. In essence, therefore, the concept of operations called initially for a massive atomic air strike which would defeat the Chinese Communists in Korea and make them incapable of aggression there or elsewhere in the Far East for a very considerable time.

The President asked whether, in the course of considering this course of action, the Joint Chiefs had laid out their target system. Admiral Radford replied that they had not.

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[2] For texts, see memoranda of discussion at the 145th meeting of the NSC, May 20, and the 168th meeting, Oct. 29, pp. 1064 and 1570, respectively.

[3] Dated Apr. 2, p. 838.

[4] Dated Nov. 20, p. 1620.

[5] Presumably the reference was to the JCS memorandum to Wilson, May 19, p. 1059.

[6] The reference was to the JCS memorandum to Wilson, Nov. 27, p. 1626.

The President then inquired whether the course of action outlined by Admiral Radford contemplated going further into China than the course outlined by General Bradley last spring. Admiral Radford replied there had been misunderstanding on the point of expanding operations into China, but before he could elaborate on this point, the President expressed with great emphasis the opinion that if the Chinese Communists attacked us again we should certainly respond by hitting them hard and wherever it would hurt most, including Peiping itself. This, said the President, would mean all-out war against Communist China.

When the President had finished speaking, Admiral Radford returned to the President's unanswered question and observed that the Joint Chiefs had not been able in the circumstances to work up a military plan of operations in the usual form or comparable to the plan presented earlier by General Bradley. Unlike the circumstances of General Bradley's plan, the Joint Chiefs could not know, in the contingency of a future Communist resumption of hostilities, when such hostilities were to be expected, what forces the Communists would have in Korea, or what forces the UN and U.S. would have available to oppose such a Communist attack. At the outset of the war, in any case, operations would almost certainly have to be limited to Korea, Manchuria and North China.

The President said that he wanted an answer from Admiral Radford to a simple but very serious question. Did Admiral Radford believe that we would be at war with Communist China if they once again attacked us?

Admiral Radford replied in the affirmative, and stated that we had no option but to treat the attack in this way. We would have to strike against the Communist Chinese in the air from Shanghai all the way north.

The President stated that this fitted exactly into his thinking, and he could see no other way of treating a renewed Communist attack. Admiral Radford observed that he had always thought that we had been at war with Communist China ever since the intervention of the "volunteers".

The President then raised the question of how long a time it would take to get from the Congress a declaration of war against China. He referred to the charge against Mr. Truman that the latter had fought an unconstitutional war because of his failure to secure such a declaration from Congress. The President expressed a desire to avoid a repetition of this difficulty, since we would need the support of Congress and the people in prosecuting the kind of war envisaged in Admiral Radford's report. Certainly, concluded the President, the first move in such a war would be a rapid and thorough attack on the enemy's airfields.

Mr. Cutler noted that Admiral Radford's course of action contained no mention of a naval blockade of the Chinese coast. Was such a blockade implicit in this course of action?

Admiral Radford said that this was one more indication of the difficulties which the Joint Chiefs encountered in trying to plan for this contingency. Whether we blockaded or not would simply have to depend on what naval forces were available at the time of the attack. Certainly, however, we would blockade the Chinese coast as soon as we could get the ships in a position to do it.

Secretary Dulles then asked if he might be heard on this subject. He said it was not for him to question the military implications of the courses of action recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but he felt that he could be useful in discussing the political implications of these courses of action. It was plain to him, continued Secretary Dulles, that Admiral Radford's course of action contemplated general war with China and probably also with the Soviet Union because of the Sino-Soviet alliance. He felt that there were grave disadvantages to a course of action such as this, and the State Department believed that other steps could be taken by the UN and U.S. forces which would be less likely to involve the Soviet Union in the war. The State Department felt that the first of such courses of action amounted to a full atomic strike in Korea itself. The second involved the bombing of troop concentrations in and near the area of Korea. In addition to these two steps, Secretary Dulles said that there were two others which he himself believed could likewise be taken without serious risk of bringing in the USSR. These were (1) a blockade of the China coast and (2) the seizure of various offshore islands and most particularly Hainan Island.

The President broke in to inquire whether the Secretary of State would be willing to add just one other course of action which the President emphatically believed we should follow, namely, that the U.S. and UN command should have the right of hot pursuit against any attacking plane to its base, wherever that base was located.

Secretary Dulles replied affirmatively to the President's query, and then went on to discuss the political disadvantages which he perceived in the course of action outlined by Admiral Radford. Over and above the cardinal point that the Soviets were almost certain to enter the war, Secretary Dulles predicted that there would be virtually no UN participants with the United States in any general war against China. We would thus be isolated from our allies. Furthermore, Admiral Radford's proposed course of action would raise serious problems for us in the Far East itself. There was grave question that Japan would permit the United States to use Japanese bases if they concluded that such permission would expose them to direct Soviet attack. In addition, we would have a terrible problem in dealing with Chiang Kai-shek, who, of course, would consider a war between the U.S. and Communist China as his long-wished-for golden opportunity to invade China. Meanwhile, we could consider it as a virtual certainty that the pursuit of Admiral Radford's course of action against China would induce the Chinese Communists to send a large force, of perhaps 300,000 troops, into Indochina. This would certainly result in the defeat of the French Union forces there.

Lastly, said Secretary Dulles, it was necessary to give very careful consideration to our position in Europe as it would relate to our position in the Far East if we followed Admiral Radford's suggestions. The USSR was not likely to engage itself heavily against the United States in Asia if to do so meant pulling its forces, especially its air forces, out of Eastern Europe. On the other hand, if the United States embraced a course of action which amounted to initiating general war in Asia, most of the West European countries would immediately run to cover by seeking a neutrality pact with the USSR. This would be something like the situation in the spring of 1941, when, in order to free its forces in the Far East for use against the Germans on the Western front, the USSR had concluded a neutrality pact with Japan.

In support of these views, Secretary Dulles pointed out the very considerable opposition which Prime Minister Churchill had evidenced when we sought his adherence to the so-called "greater sanctions" commitment. Sir Winston had obviously attempted to wriggle out of the commitments made on this point by the previous Labor Government, and was only induced to support the greater sanctions statement on the assumption that the action to be taken by the UN in the event of renewed Communist aggression would be limited to operations in areas adjacent to Korea. He was plainly unwilling to stretch the meaning of the greater sanctions statement to embrace support in a general war with China or a global war involving both China and the USSR.

In view of all these disadvantages, Secretary Dulles said that, at the very least, the problem needed further study.

Upon conclusion of Secretary Dulles' comments, the President asked him whether he was in effect advocating a course of action which would be similar to the kind of war that we had prosecuted in Korea since 1950. Secretary Dulles replied that this was not his recommendation, and that what he envisaged was the prosecution of a war which would produce a victory *in* Korea. This, of course, was quite a different thing than Admiral Radford's report had advocated, which was the prosecution of a war to achieve a total victory over China. To that, said Secretary Dulles, the State Department was opposed.

Admiral Radford said that he believed that the discussion had gotten a good bit off the track. He pointed out that it had been virtually impossible to make any long-range military plans for dealing with a new Communist attack because of our inability to envisage the precise position we would be in when the attack occurred. What his own report had attempted to do was to set forth a U.S. course of action in immediate response to a Communist attack. What steps we should take thereafter were still subject to consideration and decision.

The President commented that he was at least clear on one point. In any future war there was to be no sanctuary for Communist aircraft in Manchuria. However he was going to fight the war, he was not going to fight that kind of war.

Secretary Wilson observed that after listening to all this discussion he didn't really believe that there was any serious difference of opinion between the Secretary of State and Admiral Radford. The President agreed with Secretary Wilson, as did Admiral Radford himself.

Where the Joints Chiefs had got off the track, continued Admiral Radford, was in making certain assumptions as to the objectives to be sought by the United States in the event of renewed Communist aggression, which objectives should really have been sought by the military from the National Security Council. Obviously we would strike back against such an attack in the first instance with all the forces at our disposal, but the delineation of subsequent objectives should be determined by others than the military planners. Specifically, however, Admiral Radford said that he must take issue with Secretary Dulles' contention that initiation of the Joint Chiefs' course of action would result in an invasion of Indochina by 300,000 Chinese Communist troops. This was one more example of our continuing tendency to ascribe undue capabilities to the Chinese Communist forces. Admiral Radford was confident that in the event of a Chinese invasion of Indochina, the French and Vietnamese would be able to hold at Haiphong.

Secretary Dulles said that he could perhaps have been wrong in this position, but the Director of Central Intelligence interrupted to state that the Secretary's views were in general supported by the intelligence community.

Secretary Dulles then summed up his views on this problem by stating that he was quite sure that any resumption by the Communists of hostilities in Korea would eventually end in general war. Nevertheless, we should not treat such a resumption of hostilities as general war from the very beginning. It was necessary to have an interval in order to bring our allies along to share our own point of view. It was for this reason that Secretary Dulles felt it dangerous to provide the military with a decision now which might permit them to make a general war automatically in Asia in response to a Communist attack.

While Admiral Radford expressed agreement with this general conclusion, he warned that tying down the commander in the field with too many strings would be dangerous, since it was his first duty to protect the security of his forces in Korea.

The President stated that he felt there was no real difference between the two positions, and it seemed to him best that the Joint Chiefs get together with the State Department and revise their views in the light of the discussion. He felt that out of this Admiral Radford would have all that it was necessary for him to have to meet a Communist attack in the future.

Governor Stassen inquired whether the manner in which the Communists actually started a new war would make a great deal of difference in the character of our own and allied reaction to it.

Admiral Radford replied by stating his belief that if the Chinese Communists started hostilities again we would probably be able to detect their preliminary build-up and thus have some advance warning. Nevertheless, he pointed out, they have even now, in violation of the armistice terms, succeeded in building up an even larger air capability in North Korea.

In conclusion on this report the President said that he must admit the necessity of distinguishing between airfields adjacent to the Yalu River as opposed to targets in the south of China. There was certainly a difference.

Mr. Cutler then asked Admiral Radford if he was ready to speak on the second paper, setting forth a recommended course of action in the event of a prolonged stalemate in Korea.

Admiral Radford summarized this course of action, and stated the agreement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that in this contingency it would be advisable to redeploy a substantial number of U.S. forces from Korea as soon as the Republic of Korea army had reached the level of 20 combat-effective South Korean divisions.

The Secretary of State said that he was 100% behind this recommendation, and Secretary Wilson likewise heartily endorsed it.

Admiral Radford went on to indicate that the Joint Chiefs proposed to leave behind in Korea, after this phased redeployment, one army corps to consist of two U.S. divisions and one composite UN division, together with a strong military assistance and advisory group. Furthermore, it was thought inadvisable to weaken notably the air and naval forces already stationed in Korea. In this connection Admiral Radford pointed out that the goal of the 20-division ROK army was not very distant. If equipment were available the level should be reached in two or three months, and if our returning divisions leave their equipment behind, that problem would be solved.

The President, the Secretary of State, and Admiral Radford all agreed on the excellent psychological effect which we would obtain if we could quickly redeploy two U.S. divisions from Korea. Such redeployment would indicate to both our enemies and our allies our confidence in being able to maintain our objectives in Korea; it would indicate that we had no intention of making war on Communist China; and the withdrawal of the divisions might also have a salutary effect in deterring President Rhee from unilaterally resuming hostilities.

Secretary Humphrey expressed enthusiasm for a prompt redeployment of two divisions, as did Secretary Wilson, who noted that such a move would fit in very nicely with a three-year program upon which he was now engaged in the Defense Department.

Secretary Humphrey then inquired why we could not start the redeployment of the two divisions immediately. What were we waiting for?

Admiral Radford reminded Secretary Humphrey that, after all, the Council had just finished a discussion of courses of action in the event of a renewed Communist attack, and pointed out that we must not be caught in a position from which we could not strike back if the Communists attacked.

Secretary Wilson, however, strongly supported Secretary Humphrey's call for prompt action, stating that he would like to be able to count on having the two divisions back in the formulation of the Defense Department budget for the Fiscal Year 1955.

The President said that he saw no reason not to go ahead and start action in this direction even before the Council received a revision of the course of action which Admiral Radford had recommended in the event of a renewed Communist attack.

Admiral Radford replied that the decision to withdraw the divisions depended on a decision by this Government as to when we could be said to have entered into "a prolonged stalemate". These were the terms of reference of the problem.

The President replied that in his mind this was not the essential question. It was, rather, a decision as to the date or time when it would be prudent to withdraw these two divisions. The time when we expect the 20 ROK divisions to be combat-ready, of course, had an important bearing as to the appropriate time to redeploy the two divisions.

Admiral Radford said that he believed the 20 ROK divisions would be reasonably combat-ready between February and March of next year.

The President then suggested that the two U.S. divisions be withdrawn from Korea between the first of March and the first of May, and that they be brought home and demobilized. He went on to say that he wished to be able to state this to Churchill when he met with him in Bermuda. Pointing out that Churchill considered himself a very great tactician, the President observed that it would be necessary to give him a very clear explanation of our withdrawal of these two divisions, and also to explain why we expected Sir Winston to keep his own British forces there. After all, the British had never really sent sufficient forces to Korea anyhow.

Secretary Wilson stated his belief that we could quite properly redeploy two U.S. divisions without any formal consultation with our UN allies, though we should, of course, have to consult with them on the further phased withdrawal down to the minimum of the single army corps.

Governor Stassen warned that it was vital to consider how we explained to our allies and to world opinion the reasons for this redeployment.

(At this point, Secretary Dulles left the meeting, and Under Secretary Smith took his place.)

The National Security Council: [8]

a. Noted and discussed:

(1) An oral report by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the military objectives and courses of action proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the event of a renewal of hostilities in Korea by the Communists.

(2) An oral report by the Secretary of State on the political implications of pursuing the courses of action outlined in (1) above, and on certain possible alternative courses of action suggested by the Secretary of State.

b. Agreed that the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should prepare, in the light of the discussion, a restatement, for Council consideration before January 1, 1954, of the initial military objectives and major courses of action to be undertaken in the event that hostilities in Korea are renewed by the Communists.

c. Noted and discussed a recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the reduction of UN forces in Korea within the framework of paragraph 10–*b* of NSC 170/1.

**d.* Agreed that, pursuant to paragraph 10–*b* of NSC 170/1:

(1) Assuming a continuation of present conditions, two U.S. divisions should initiate, about the first of March, a redeployment from Korea.

(2) Subsequently, in the event of a continued stalemate in Korea, agreement among our UN allies should be sought for:

> (a) A phased reduction in UN forces in Korea initially to a strength of approximately one army corps of three divisions, consisting of two U.S. and one composite UN division, supported by tactical air units and appropriate naval forces and supplemented by a comparatively large U.S. military advisory group; and
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> (b) Deferring the decision as to any further reduction in UN forces until the situation obtaining after completion of the initial reduction can be observed and evaluated.

Note: The action in *b* above subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for implementation. The action in *d* above subsequently referred to the OCB as the coordinating agency designated by the President for NSC 170/1.

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[8] The following paragraphs and note constituted NSC Action No. 972, a record copy of which is in S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.

* It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of this Council action. [Footnote in the source text.]

[Here follows discussion on items 3. "Reappraisal of the Military Effect of Relaxation of Control of Trade With the Soviet Bloc in Strategic Materials" and 4. "Disclosure of Atomic Information to Allied Countries."]

S. EVERETT GLEASON

795.00/12-553: Telegram

The Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Dean) to the Department of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, December 5, 1953—2 p. m.

492. Repeated information Tokyo 289, repeated information New Delhi 28, information Munsan-ni by pouch. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. From Dean.

Bond, Young and I met with President Rhee, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister for hour this morning. President very calm.

I said we must all stand together against Communists and essential there be no division in our ranks, that all United Nations members contributing troops who would participate in conference wanted to make full written proposal to Communists and then stand before the world on that proposal and we felt essential to have some nonbelligerent nations there but would probably not use term "nonvoting observer" as I had previously called them. Parenthetically I believe use of term neutral in relation to India, Czechoslovakia or Poland is highly allergic to him.

Presented our proposed written proposal which Pyun read aloud and left copy with each of them. Emphasized USSR not a neutral and explained unit voting per side but emphasized resolution [paragraph] 5 (A) UNGA August 28[1] and read again sentence that each government bound only by substantive agreements to which it adheres. Went over very carefully precise things invited nonvoting governments could and could not do. Pyun very insistent USSR must be on other side and objected to composite scheme, alphabetical scheme or in fact anything which did not in effect list USSR as belligerent. Carefully explained why we must have USSR and that in insisting on her presence we were really adding to two sides specifically named in armistice agreement. Pyun remained unconvinced. He raised further objections to dropping out term "nonvoting observer" and disliked use of word "participate" though I carefully explained could only speak on agenda items, in agenda order, and in scheduled order, and could not introduce proposals. He further objected to use "unanimous" in describing agreement between two sides.

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[1] For a text of the resolution, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Sept. 14, 1953, p. 366.

President Rhee said they would study carefully and at my request agreed to meet Sunday [2] at 11 with me.

Explained in confidence Swiss might not come and we might try eliminate Czechs and Poles, but could not promise. Said might end up with Sweden, India and Pakistan or just latter two, and would be hard bargaining. Must have room to maneuver. They wanted me to specify countries.

Believe going will be very tough but am hopeful. Expect Pyun to be very difficult on whole proposal and on detailed language. Returning Munsan-ni this afternoon.

[DEAN]

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[2] Dec. 7.

695A.0024/12-653: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 6, 1953—1:49 p. m.
NIACT

Gadel 117. We realize difficulties confronting you in preventing deterioration of tactical situation because of Menon's activities. [2] Naturally we do not relish public display of differences with Menon, and you should of course attempt avoid them by reasonable efforts looking toward accommodation to any well-founded Indian interest. At same time, Menon must not be permitted use his personal prestige or prestige of India with Arab-Asians and Commonwealth to press for GA action serving Communist interest and harmful to objectives of UNC in Korea. To yield in any substantial way to such pressure would be disservice to US national interest.

It is obvious from Ambassador Allen's telegram 887 [3] repeated to you that GOI does not share Menon's extreme attitude with special reference to Menon's suggestions to Arabs that opposition to his resolution would be considered a "hostile act" by GOI. It is our belief that firm support of Brazilian resolution is safest course not only regarding present question but also as precedent for future. It is hoped that USUN will informally convey to other delegations that we have been in consultation with New Delhi and also clarify US position to effect that we are not opposing resumption of session at appropriate time. We assume of course clarification US position will be provided by Ambassador Lodge in his statement supporting resolution before Committee.

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[1] This telegram, repeated to Munsan-ni as 133, Seoul as 480, New Delhi as 638, and Tokyo repeat CINCUNC as 1350, was drafted by Popper and Murphy and cleared in draft with McClurkin.

[2] The First Committee of the Eighth Session of the UN General Assembly considered the Korean question Dec. 5–7, 1953. Two draft resolutions were before it. One submitted and strongly supported by Menon (UN document A/C.1/L.91 Rev.1) called for a recess of the Assembly from Dec. 8, 1953 to Feb. 4, 1954, with the President of the Assembly being able to convene the Assembly during the recess for further consideration of the Korean question. Menon stated in debate that India's presence in Korea in the custodial forces and as chairman of the NNRC required that his government be able to present the Assembly with problems encountered in carrying out its duties. The other draft (UN document A/C.1/L.95) was introduced by Brazil and called for deferring consideration of the Korean issue with the Assembly President being able to reconvene the session whenever, in the opinion of the majority of members, Korean developments required its consideration. The Brazilian Representative argued that deferring consideration would facilitate the preliminary negotiations for a political conference at Panmunjom.

[3] Not printed. (695A.0024/12–653)

Concretely applied, foregoing seems to us to dictate following guide lines:

(1) Nothing should be done to hamper or complicate Dean's efforts at this critical moment in his talks through injection of GA into negotiating situation re political conference. Menon's speech indicates that, at least ostensibly, he would agree on this.

(2) While we are perfectly clear in our own minds as to meaning and consequences of paragraph 11 of prisoner of war agreement in event of failure of political conference to meet, we should so far as consistent with point one meet Indian desire for GA expression of view or interpretation of that paragraph, as basis for India action subsequent to January 22. As indicated above, this can be done in Lodge statement.

(3) We want to avoid so far as possible establishment of precedents in GA harmful to orderly conduct of business in future cases. In particular, we do not wish to give a minority the power to force the GA to meet; we do not wish to give the Secretary-General the function of making political decisions; we do not wish to broaden the powers of the GA president in this respect beyond those already established by past practice.

In light of foregoing:

1. As basic negotiating position you should stand firm on principles of Brazilian resolution; that is, President to initiate reconvening of General Assembly Session; majority concurrence to be necessary for such reconvening; no fixed date to be set for reconvocation at this time. You should not accept fourth formula listed Delga 372.[4]

2. For purposes negotiating flexibility with Menon and Jebb, you may if you think necessary modify resolution through inclusion of phrase indicating President may initiate request for resumed session on basis developments in Korea, particularly as regards status of Indian troops in Korea after January 22, 1954. We would strongly prefer this point be covered in Lodge statement rather than resolution but will follow your judgment if, but only if, you think this will make substantial contribution to rapid passage of General Assembly Resolution.

3. Menon formula quoted Delga 376[5] absolutely out of question for reasons you state.

SMITH

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[4] The formula referred to called for a recess with the Secretary-General of the United Nations to reconvene, unless there was a majority of members opposed to it. (795.00/12-453)

[5] In the Menon formula referred to in Delga 376, the Assembly session would be reconvened at the request of any member unless a majority of the Assembly opposed the reconvening; furthermore, if one-third of the Assembly desired a session, it would be held. (795.00/12-553)

795.00/12–653: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, December 6, 1953—8 p. m.
NIACT

Delga 381. Re: Korea. Ambassador Lodge at his request saw Menon (India) early this evening and reached following understanding with him *ad referendum.*

1. Menon agreed to introduce following as his own resolution:

"The GA resolves to stand recessed and requests the President of the Assembly with the concurrence of a majority of members, to reconvene the present session if she finds that developments in Korea warrant the reconvening of session."

2. Menon desires that there be no preamble.

3. Menon requested Lodge to incorporate following ideas in his statement:

(A) Reference to Indian custodial forces;
(B) Praise of Indian troops;
(C) Reference to the progress of negotiations at Panmunjom;
(D) Reference comment to effect that if Indian Government for good and sound reasons desires the reconvening of the session, the US would join India wholeheartedly in securing such a session.

Menon also requested that we seek adjournment Committee 1 tomorrow from 10:30 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. presumably to permit circulation of his resolution in appropriate languages. This has already been arranged with chairman and secretary of committee. Menon objected to inclusion of phrase in operative paragraph 2 "particularly as regards status of Indian custodial forces in Korea" because he feared that his people in New Delhi would get frightened.

Lodge suggested that language of new resolution be given to Brazilians to introduce. This too Menon thought would be undesirable since the USSR understands Brazil to be a friend of the US. Several other suggestions as to who might sponsor this resolution were made by Lodge, all of which Menon turned down including a joint sponsorship of India and US, presumably on the ground that such a sponsorship would not find favor with USSR. Ambassador Lodge and staff agree that this draft meets the two essential criteria (1) no fixed date and (2) no reconvening without concurrence of majority.

We believe suggestions which Menon made to Lodge regarding the inclusion of items set forth above in statement we are to make fall within the purview of guidance given us by Department in previous telegrams.

Draft statement for Committee 1 which takes into account the negotiations held with Menon this evening will be sent to Department.[1]

LODGE

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[1] The final resolution (716 (VIII)) jointly sponsored by Brazil and India and passed on Dec. 8 by the General Assembly requested the President of the Assembly to reconvene the Eighth Session with the concurrence of a majority of the member states, if (*a*) in the President's opinion developments in Korea warranted such reconvening, or (*b*) one or more member states requested a reconvening.

795.00/12-753: Telegram

The Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Dean) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT SEOUL, December 7, 1953—10 p. m.

501. Repeated information Tokyo 296, Munsan-ni pouched. Tokyo for CINCUNC. From Dean.

Briggs and I at conference President Rhee, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister presented our written proposal 137[1] again with textual changes authorized by Department. They are unalterably opposed to not listing USSR on other side and definitely consider failure to do so makes USSR neutral. They ignore our condition USSR must vote with Red China and North Korea at time each vote is taken. They also insisted only ROK and US vote on our side and none of 15 United Nations members have right to vote. I explained this impossible but was sure we would work out satisfactory assurances to satisfy them on our side but naturally did not wish hand our foreign policy over to them. They expressed concern lest vote be by majority our side and they and we would be outvoted by 15 who would be perfectly satisfied to leave Chinese troops in North Korea and abandon unification Korea. Carefully explained we must stand together and again explained exact manner USSR would vote with other side without necessarily being listed on other side. They insisted I had gone back on my word and had labeled USSR as a neutral. Also charged me with eliminating term "non-voting observer." I explained substance of the rights of the invitee nations remained the same as I had outlined and went over language carefully and reasons for not using term.

Finally President said he would give me carte blanche in arranging conference if US would enter into definite agreement US would unconditionally join in fighting along with ROK if conference held and in ninety days did not succeed in bringing about unification. I said that was utterly and completely out of question and American people would not tolerate renewal of hostilities except to repel unprovoked attack.

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[1] Presumably the drafter of this telegram meant to refer to telegram 149, Dec. 7, which gives the complete text of the overall proposal Dean was to make at Panmunjom the next day. (795.00/12-753) In telegram 137 from Munsan-ni, Dec. 4, Dean sent revisions of this proposal to the Department of State for approval. (795.00/12-453)

President said then why don't your forces withdraw completely and you can quote me on saying we would be glad if that occurs. If you don't want to fight, get out. And he then gave a long tirade on our relations with Japan and our lack of courage in fighting Russia.

I again said we believed in negotiation at conference table and not in resumption of hostilities and asked their cooperation. Said we must make proposal to Communists and if they agreeable would be willing to say would be presented on behalf of some of governments I represented and would they cooperate by not commenting until Communists had replied. They said they certainly would comment and would advise Korean nation they did not agree with my statement.

Again made explicitly clear to President there was no possibility whatever our being willing to resume hostilities. Very significant none of these made any mention of certain letter already delivered or of reply copy to [*of*?] which none of us here has ever seen. In reply, Rhee made complete "sacrifice and unity by death" speech and renewed attack on wavering character of US and weak attitude toward USSR and our loss of leadership. Again went over ground patiently and about 1 o'clock President against objection of other two invited me back to see them at 3.

Briggs and I went back to see Prime Minister and Pyun at 3. Again went over proposal carefully agreeing to make certain changes and emphasizing under literal text paragraph sixty they had no right to come nor could we force USSR to come conference. Emphasized our insistence ROK be at conference at UNGA seventh session in fighting original Russian resolution. Also explained imperative necessity of our knowing exactly how USSR stood in each point at conference before we voted and we had to negotiate to get her at conference.

Young joined us at 4:30 and he and Briggs carefully went over all of our arguments. All of us very patient.

Finally Prime Minister after exchanging glance with Pyun said they would agree only if we would agree to resume hostilities ninety days after political conference convened if no unification was achieved. Said after that time they must be free to resume hostilities and that we must agree to join. Repeated there was absolutely no possibility of this and if administration were to agree people would repudiate. Again reviewed complete reasonableness our position and asked them to consider carefully.

Pyun said they would have to insist on, (A) listing USSR on other side, (B) other 15 UN members contributing forces could not vote, (C) no neutrals could be invited under any conditions whatever.

I said they were being non-cooperative and were running very grave risks of serious rupture in ROK–US relations which would only help Communists and do no one good.

Again asked if I could make offer on behalf of some governments and have them wait until Commies replied. They refused. Wanted me to give advance notice when I would make statement at conference so they could simultaneously issue statement before Commies could reply, and I declined. They said they would report to President tomorrow but they have recalled Cho and Li to Seoul and possibly they may make announcement tonight. Leaks are beginning to appear.

Quite apparent Prime Minister and Pyun had advance agreement to refuse. I argued quietly and reasonably three hours this morning and two and one-half hours this afternoon and we know of nothing I could have said further to convince. Believe President knows he can never achieve unification and thinks now is better time to force us into fighting than after conference convenes. He apparently believes we are building up Japan and do not plan support Korea and is using this threat in attempt to force our hand in fisheries dispute and in connection conference. His discussion of Japanese relations complete temperamental outburst. Recommend we do not make any concession to him. He will probably try to wreck our offer before we can make it. Plan make our offer on behalf of certain governments to Communists tomorrow.

Both Briggs and I feel they have made up their mind on some policy, though President has not yet made his final decision, and are using our desire for political conference as means of forcing us into new agreement.

[DEAN]

795.00/12-853: Telegram

The Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Dean) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL MUNSAN-NI, December 8, 1953.[1]

153. Department pass USUN; repeated information Seoul, Tokyo, CINCUNC, New Delhi unnumbered.

This morning at 1100 hours presented written proposal contained mytels 149 and 151.[2] Communists immediately in the meeting flatly, curtly and "categorically" rejected it as absurd, ridiculous and stale. They did not look at English, Korean, Chinese copies I handed to Ki who did not take them. Huang and Ki did not touch proposals and left them lying on table after meeting recessed. Plan to make the most of this calculated rudeness tomorrow, so suggest not featuring it in comments.

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[1] There was no time of transmission indicated on this telegram, which was received at the Department of State at 8:10 a.m., Dec. 8.

[2] Neither printed. (Both 795.00/12-753) For a text of the proposal, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Dec. 21, 1953, pp. 877-878.

This, together with general tenor of their statement, constitutes very good proof they have ceased real negotiations. Their statement following my proposal was rehash and solely propaganda—similar to Chou En-lai radio statement yesterday and statements in UNC MAC.

Pyun issued statement denouncing theory of having neutrals and insisting USSR be on Communist side which Embassy Seoul has sent Department. Have urged Pyun through Briggs not to emphasize any differences between us on offer in view flat rejection. Believe we are approaching the end of the talks, and on talks themselves are in excellent position, except for ROK intransigence on neutrals, and stubborn opposition to any finessing of USSR, et cetera.

In UNC MAC and NNRC meetings and on Peiping radio they are building up simultaneous attack on prisoner of war timetable and our alleged efforts to impede convening of conference and insisting PC must precede release. Pyun remains absolutely obdurate on any formula for convening conference and either sees no connection to have good Indian relations and prisoner timetable or else wants intentionally to exacerbate ROK-Indian relations which his brother does daily in the newspaper *Korea Republic.*

Full summary today's meeting follows.[3]

DEAN

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[3] The reference was to telegram 154 from Munsan-ni, Dec. 8, 1953, not printed. (795.00/12–853)

795.00/12–853: Telegram

The Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Dean) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT MUNSAN-NI, December 8, 1953.[1]

155. Repeated information Seoul, Tokyo, CINCUNC unnumbered. As I indicated on November 30 in mytel 120,[2] Communist proposal that day showed they do not want Political Conference now, and in mytel 122[3] suggested wait Communists either accept or break off these talks, or recess them indefinitely.

Now clear Communists have taken hard stand. They probably will not wish to take initiative break or recess talks here, although they will continue to try to provoke us into doing so. Faced with rude categoric rejection and refusal even pick up our (mytel 153[4]) proposal, I strongly believe we should not dangle along much longer after today. Our moderate position vis-à-vis Communist truculence would seem to put 16 UN members in most favorable possible light in seeking Political Conference. If Swiss announce declination, most important they make it clear it is for policy reasons and not because of wording our proposal since other side says our formulation insulting to true neutrals.

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[1] There was no time of transmission indicated on this telegram, which was received at the Department of State at 8:12 a.m., Dec. 8.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1629.

[3] Dated Dec. 1, *ibid.*

[4] *Supra.*

Request your guidance time schedule—believe I should continue meetings at least through this week. This would be better than peremptory demand they accept or else we go home. It would also carry over beyond UNGA adjournment although have no information on this point. Accordingly, would hope end talks here about Saturday 12 December, if this meets your approval.

Also request your guidance whether (A) terminate talks, (B) recess them indefinitely, or (C) recess them on call either side to meet again by mutual agreement.

They will undoubtedly accuse us of recessing talks so as to prevent Political Conference considering prisoner-of-war question and thereby arguing paragraph 11 timetable does not work. Might be well to alert press to this line of attack.

Assume our proposal now meets full approval other 15 UN members and no one thinks we should make any other offer.

DEAN

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 174th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, December 10, 1953 [1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 174th Council meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. The Vice President did not attend because of his absence from the country. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Frank C. Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense; Gen. Porter, Foreign Operations Administration; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President (for Items 1, 2 and 3); Maurice Arth, Foreign Operations Administration (for Item 5); the Acting White House Staff

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[1] Drafted by Gleason on Dec. 11.

Secretary; the Acting Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Coordinator, NSC Planning Board Assistants.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows discussion on item 1. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security."]

2. *The Bermuda Conference* [2]

Secretary Dulles stated that since he had already spoken to the Cabinet generally about the Bermuda Conference, he would confine his remarks this morning to matters of special concern to the National Security Council. The first of these matters was the attitude of the British and French to our suggestions with regard to normalizing the use of atomic weapons. Secretary Dulles said that both the British and the French exhibited very stubborn resistance to any idea of the automatic use of atomic weapons, even in the case of a Communist renewal of hostilities in Korea.

The President interrupted to say that he had explained our proposed intentions and courses of action in the event that the Communists broke the truce in Korea, along the lines which he and the Secretary of State had indicated at the last NSC meeting. Sir Winston Churchill, however, had opposed the use of atomic weapons even in Korea and adjacent areas, unless such a course of action were agreed to by our UN allies in advance.

Secretary Dulles pointed out Sir Winston's conviction that if the United States took the initiative in the use of such weapons there would be a world-wide revulsion which to Secretary Dulles indicated that our thinking on the atomic weapon was several years in advance of the rest of the free world. Sir Winston had also indicated the very great anxiety of the British people lest, on account of their exposed position, they would suffer if the Soviets retaliated against our use of atomic weapons by attacking the population centers of the British Isles. Secretary Dulles emphasized that no final conclusions had been reached in his discussions of this subject with Churchill and Bidault, but he pointed out that the United States had not renounced its right to use atomic weapons if war were forced upon us by the Soviets.

The President then stated that there was a short sequel to the conversations on the subject which Secretary Dulles had just described. In his last talk with the President, Sir Winston had indicated greater concern that no announcement of our proposed use of atomic weapons should be made, rather than such great concern over their actual use by the

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[2] President Eisenhower, British Prime Minister Churchill, and French Prime Minister Laniel and their respective Foreign Ministers, Dulles, Eden, and Bidault, met at Bermuda, Dec. 4–8, 1953. Korea was a topic at these talks. For relevant documentation, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1710 ff.

United States. Sir Winston had related this concern about an announcement of our intention to the President's forthcoming speech to the UN,[3] which he felt would appear incompatible with any announced intention to use atomic weapons. The gist of Sir Winston's view, said the President, was let us plan to use these weapons if necessity arose, but let us not talk about these plans. In the circumstances, therefore, the President stated that the best follow-up of the Bermuda discussions of atomic weapons would be discussions between the U.S. and the British Chiefs of Staff. The President also admitted that Sir Winston seemed to have a point as to the psychological disadvantages of a contrast between the President's UN speech and an announcement of intention by the United States to resort to the use of these weapons. The President said that he felt that the small nations of the free world had been greatly bucked up by his speech, and he did not wish, if he could avoid it, to let them down.

[Here follows discussion of issues other than Korea at the Conference and items 3. "The NATO Ministers Meeting," 4. "United States Policies and Courses of Action to Counter Soviet or Satellite Action Against Berlin," 5. "United States Position With Respect to Germany," 6. "United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Latin America," 7. "U.S. Assistance to NATO Allies," and 8. "NSC Status of Projects."]

S. EVERETT GLEASON

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[3] The reference was to Eisenhower's address to the UN General Assembly on the peaceful uses of atomic energy, Dec. 8, 1953. For text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 813–822.

795.00/12–1253: Telegram

The Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Dean) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL MUNSAN-NI, December 12, 1953.[2]

NIACT

168. Repeated information Seoul, Tokyo, CINCUNC, New Delhi, Department of Defense unnumbered.

At end uninterrupted 5-hour and 45 minutes meeting today from 1100 hours to 1645 hours, I finally walked out after Huang, Chinese delegate, refused withdraw repeated charges of perfidy against United

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris for Dulles who was attending the NATO Ministerial meetings.

[2] There was no time of transmission indicated on this telegram, which was received at the Department of State at 12:43 p.m., Dec. 12.

States after my repeated requests to do so or I would consider it notification to us they were proposing indefinite recess.

Last interchange between us went as follows:

Mr. Dean: "I have a statement to make.

"Your remarks today were so calculatedly rude, arrogant and insulting and you accused my government of perfidy which you know to be untrue and your remarks were made with such a complete lack of responsibility for the truth and the facts that I can only interpret your remarks as notifying us that you wish these talks to recess indefinitely. I can place no other interpretation on your actions. You have charged my government with perfidy. You know the charge to be untrue. Unless the charge is withdrawn, I shall treat it as a notice to me that you wish these talks to recess indefinitely."

Mr. Huang Hua: "The position of our side is very clear. Since your side has violated the terms of reference signed by your side, it is a perfidy. Can you deny this? Do you want to break up the discussions? If you dare to bear the responsibility of breaking off the talks between the two sides, I propose to recess until Monday." [3]

Mr. Dean: "Your charges are untrue. I therefore treat it as a notification that you wish these talks recessed indefinitely."

During previous 2 hours and 45 minutes we listened to increasing tempo of rude, arrogant intemperance and increasingly insulting abuse not against me which doesn't bother me in the slightest but against the Government of the United States for "plot", "treacherous designs" and "perfidious actions". He was reading from typewritten papers so it was calculated browbeating and intentional insult which could not be ignored. Specifically accused Government of USA conniving with Rhee to release 27,000 prisoners after General Harrison had signed terms of reference in June. If we had merely accepted recess felt our negotiating position would have become intolerable, if, indeed, not impossible and with considerable reluctance finally made the move I did. Am very sorry not to continue meetings but tempo of build-up has been increasing to crescendo and am sure was planned insult. Ki opened meeting on this note of questioning my authority but not with much tone. After I finished carefully reasoned statements on agenda and secretariat and stating my authority to represent ROK if they could represent USSR, Huang began tirade against me for not representing all 17 and for possibility we would carry out perfidious acts at Political Conference and in effect challenged my authority. After I replied by denying his allegations and refuting his rudeness and replying very reasonably, I proposed a recess until Monday.

Huang rudely refused the recess and went through long vicious harangue with increasing tempo of questions regarding my authority. I answered most of his questions on voting procedures in calm reasoned way for 2 hours and 45 minutes and calmly ignored his vilification. He increasingly jeered at my answers and then he became more and more insulting, arrogant and rude in tone and manner. He finally said I had not answered satisfactorily, ridiculed our voting procedures as designed to permit ROKs to wreck conference as they did armistice and finally said he would continue such questions later since my answers were not correct and proposed recess until Monday. I countered by saying his statements were untrue and did he want indefinite recess. He replied and each time he again accused us of violating armistice and perfidy and conniving with Rhee intentionally to release prisoners in violation our agreement. After much consideration and some reflecting finally concluded boded ill for our negotiations for a representative of USA and of 17 free nations to take such bullying, intentionally rude statements and charges of perfidy from a Chinese Communist which were very carefully prepared. Honestly did not see how we could continue negotiations Monday unless he withdrew his assertions. Ki took no part in this at all.

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[3] Dec. 14.

Would have to recess and to make over-all statement Monday before leaving but believe it would have been impossible for our future relations in light of his exceptionally rude tone and obviously arrogant manner today. Talks therefore are recessed indefinitely unless his charges are withdrawn. Regret not carrying out instructions and took action only after most careful reflection on ultimate results.

DEAN

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 170 Series

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 15, 1953.

Subject: Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea

Attached is a memorandum from General Cutler on the above-cited subject.[2] It will be noted in reference to NSC action No. 972 that State and the JCS are requested to prepare a statement for NSC consideration before January 1 of initial military objectives and major courses of action to be undertaken in the event that hostilities are renewed in Korea by the Communists.

I suggest that S/P, as in the past, prepare the initial draft for our joint discussion and clearance.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Drumright.

[2] In the attached memorandum, Dec. 10, 1953, Cutler informed the Department of State of NSC Action No. 972–*b*, which directed the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a restatement for Council consideration of military courses of action to be undertaken in the event that the Communists renewed hostilities in Korea.

In transmitting the attached memorandum, FE would like to submit the following preliminary comments on the subject matter.

As previously stated, FE considers that the military courses of action proposed by the JCS were too sweeping in character and likely, if implemented, to involve the United States in widespread hostilities. FE is of the view that if the Communists resume hostilities in Korea, a major effort should be made of course to dispose of the enemy forces. From the political point of view, FE would like, if possible, to see hostilities limited to Korea and to Manchuria, particularly lines of communication leading into Korea, air bases under use by the enemy and supply areas. FE believes that areas adjacent to the Soviet Union, areas in China proper and the Port Arthur–Darien area should be excluded from attack unless it is conclusively shown that installations and facilities in such areas are being used to great advantage by the enemy. The purpose of so limiting our military activities, if feasible, would be to avoid precipitation of general hostilities, but at the same time to take adequate action to dispose of the enemy in Korea and put out of action facilities needed by the enemy in Manchuria. FE also believes that military activities contemplated above should be accompanied by an effective blockade of the whole China coast.

If the enemy should resume hostilities in Korea, the United States should immediately call for implementation of the 16-power joint declaration issued in connection with the Korean armistice. Immediate and vigorous action should likewise be taken in and out of the United Nations to obtain the widest possible political and military support for the course of action taken by the UNC in Korea and adjacent areas. FE believes that if the enemy should launch a renewed attack in Korea, there should be no insuperable difficulty in getting the great majority of the UN powers and several friendly powers outside the UN to support our course of action. The main channel of activity would of course be through the United Nations.

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 175th Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, December 15, 1953 [1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at this meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Acting Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; Walter Williams for the Secretary of Commerce (for Item 3); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; General Porter, Foreign Operations Administration; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

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[1] Drafted by Gleason on Dec. 16.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows discussion on items 1. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," 2. "Continental Defense," and 3. "Development of Nuclear Power."]

4. *Report by the Vice President*

In anticipation of the Vice President's arrival, Mr. Cutler reviewed briefly the relevant courses of action in NSC 170/1 and Annex A thereto.[2] He also read a telegram from General Hull, dated December 10, which was also germane to this subject.[3] In view of the situation, Mr. Cutler said that it seemed to him sensible to press forward now with our courses of action designed to deter President Rhee from reinitiating hostilities. He asked Secretary Smith to speak to this point.

Secretary Smith stated that while Tyler Wood had finally arrived at a satisfactory understanding with President Rhee,[4] the discussions had been extremely acrimonious. Furthermore, the other serious problem, namely, the conflict between Rhee and the Japanese, remained unresolved. President Rhee was behaving quite outrageously, and there was no solution in sight. Moreover, continued Secretary Smith, we are of course now faced with the possibility of further difficulties as a result of the breaking off of the Panmunjom negotiations, which he felt were not likely to be renewed on any satisfactory basis. While the prisoners would undoubtedly be released, we may have difficulties with India on this point. Krishna Menon has stated that the prisoners could not be released in the absence of a political conference. Secretary Smith again pointed out that Rhee seemed to be talking a great deal of late about a unilateral renewal of hostilities. While Assistant Secretary Robertson apparently believes that Rhee is bluffing, one could never tell, since Rhee is such an incalculable quantity.

Admiral Radford thought there was very good reason at this point to review the courses of action set forth in NSC 170/1, with particular respect to ways and means of preventing Rhee from initiating hostilities. He noted that General Hull, among other things, had been directed to consult with ROK army leaders in order to prevent Rhee from acting unilaterally. There was danger that General Hull would, in following this directive, talk to so many leaders that it would be as good as publishing to the world an effort to undermine the loyalty of the ROK army to President Rhee. Admiral Radford thought we should go very slowly in implementing such a course of action, and the President expressed emphatic agreement with this view. Secretary Smith also commented on the danger of giving NSC 170/1 as a directive to the people in the field. It should, he thought, have been confined to the people around this table. Secretary Smith further suggested that when Admiral Radford went to Korea in the near future he should sit down and explain to General Hull the objectives we sought in NSC 170/1 and devise the best ways and means of reaching these objectives.

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[2] Dated Nov. 20, p. 1620.

[3] Reference was to telegram C 66454, CINCFE to the Department of the Army, Dec. 10, not printed. (JCS records, CCS 383.2 Korea (3-19-45))

[4] For the text of the agreement signed at Seoul on Dec. 14 on a program for strengthening the Korean economy, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 11, 1954, pp. 65-67.

The President said that it had certainly never been his intention to take action which would undermine the *esprit de corps* of the ROK army or destroy its loyalties. He not only agreed with the proposal that Admiral Radford discuss this subject with General Hull, but recommended that Generals Hull and Taylor be brought back every few months for consultation.

After a brief discussion of the situation in Iceland and the status of our bases in Morocco, the Vice President arrived from the State Department and was asked by Mr. Cutler to report to the Council briefly on the results of his conversations with President Rhee.

The Vice President stated that the best way to summarize his talks with President Rhee was first to analyze what we are seeking to accomplish in Korea. President Rhee was a very complex character, as we all knew. The Vice President had had two conversations with Rhee, one lasting two hours and the other an hour and a half, and these conversations had heightened the Vice President's impression of Rhee's complexity. On the other hand, it was important to distinguish between what Rhee says and what he will actually do—his public actions from his private thoughts. Rhee had what might be described as a conspiratorial mind, not unlike that of a Communist. Accordingly, it was possible to draw erroneous conclusions from his statements.

My assignment, continued the Vice President, was to deliver to Rhee the letter from President Eisenhower.[5] This letter was unequivocal in content, and I delivered it. Rhee's reaction was one of considerable emotional shock, and he began at once his sparring tactics to avoid the commitment which President Eisenhower's letter had asked for. At last, however, we did get down to the commitment, and when we had reached this point Rhee finally said, after protestations of his desire to follow President Eisenhower's wishes and to respect U.S. interests, that he would not do anything unless and until he had informed the President of the United States.

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[5] For text, see the enclosure to the letter from Dulles to Nixon, Nov. 4, p. 1591.

In subsequent conversations with our Ambassador and other officials, they all stated their feeling that Rhee had gone further than he had ever gone before. Actually, however, said the Vice President, at his final meeting with President Rhee he went even further. He had prepared in advance two typed pages of what he was going to say, and he gave these two pages to the Vice President after he had read them aloud.

Rhee believes that in the battle with Communism you must always make an effort to retain a good bargaining position, just as the Communists always sought such a position. It was necessary for them continually to fear what you might do. Hence any public announcement by Rhee of a denial of intent to resume hostilities without U.S. approval would actually weaken the position of the United States at the conference table. Indeed, such an announcement would assure the Communists of much greater freedom of action. Why, inquired Rhee, could not President Eisenhower make the same use of me and the ROK as the Communists use their satellites—to take positions which subsequently the USSR itself might or might not stand by, depending on the circumstances?

The Vice President also commented that Ambassador Dean was inclined to agree that this argument of President Rhee had some merit and that it was indeed unwise to pull all of Rhee's teeth.

So, to sum up: I do not believe that Rhee will take any action of the sort we fear without prior notification to the President. Nor will he take any action unless he is assured that the U.S. will go along. He will, however, continue to utter threats for reasons which are not, even now, wholly clear to me, since he knows in his heart that as a practical matter he can never get away with any course of action which would forfeit U.S. support.

Another complicating factor is that Rhee hears from time to time from friends in the United States that he will actually have American support if he "goes it alone". The Vice President stated that he had done his best to disabuse Rhee of this belief, speaking to him as a friend. All in all, therefore, the Vice President felt that we have finally got across to Rhee the realization that we will not back him up if he moves along the course that he has threatened. This realization, said the Vice President, would almost certainly control Rhee's action. He will nevertheless continue violently to oppose the presence of the Soviet Union at the political conference except as a belligerent. Moreover he will continue to be violently opposed to India's presence, since he regards that nation as no more than a Communist satellite.

Secretary Smith observed that if this report proved to be accurate, we could certainly make great use of Rhee as a threat to the Communists.

The Vice President answered that that was precisely why Rhee was so anxious that his pledge to the President should not be made public.

The President inquired whether it would not be a good idea to place in the files of the Council a single copy of the original memorandum which the Vice President had sent from Korea describing his conferences with Rhee.[6] No other copies were to be made.

Admiral Radford pointed out that the Vice President was presumably unaware of the recent decision to withdraw two divisions of our troops from Korea. We have been discussing the best means of making a public announcement of this move. Should Rhee be told privately of this proposal before the public announcement was made? Secretary Smith answered that President Rhee should by all means be told in advance.

The Vice President said that he had one final point to make. We very frequently hear, particularly from diplomatic personnel who are irritated by Rhee's maneuvers, that Rhee did not have the genuine support of the people of South Korea. If I am convinced of anything as a result of my visit, continued the Vice President, it is the very complete support which the President enjoys in Korea and also the strong popular desire to achieve the unification of Korea. Accordingly, we must be very cautious in judging the temper of the Korean people. This had proved very different from what the Vice President had anticipated before he got to Korea.

The National Security Council: [7]

Discussed a preliminary oral report by the Vice President on his recent world trip, with specific reference to his conversations with President Rhee.

S. EVERETT GLEASON

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[6] This memorandum is printed in its original form as a draft telegram from Nixon, Nov. 13, p. 1609.

[7] The following paragraph constituted NSC Action No. 986, a record copy of which can be found in S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.

795.00/12-1853

Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 18, 1953.

Subject: Proposed reply by the President to President Rhee

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[1] According to a covering note by Bowie, the attached draft letter, sent Jan. 2, 1954, p. 1685, was revised in light of discussion between Dulles, Robertson, and Bowie and then approved by Dulles. There is no indication of what the revisions were on the source text.

1. NSC 167/1, paragraph 2, stated that "the United States should seek to obtain from Rhee a formal assurance in writing that he will not initiate unilateral military action at any time against the Communists in or north of the demilitarized zone." In an attempt to obtain such an assurance, the President wrote Rhee on November 4 a letter which was delivered by Vice President Nixon.

a. The President stated: "I must have explicit confirmation from you (of loyal cooperation) in order to reach my own decisions and to be able to answer the questions which the Senate and the Congress will properly ask . . ."

b. With regard to the Mutual Defense Treaty, the President said: "If I should be forced to conclude that after the coming into force of the treaty, you might unilaterally touch off a resumption of war in Korea, I could not recommend its ratification and I am certain that the Senate would not ratify it. When I formally submit the Treaty to the Senate next January, I must be in a position personally to give a clear assurance on this point."

c. With regard to economic assistance to Korea, the President said: "If I believed these funds would merely create new targets in a war renewed by you, I could not, consistently with my duty, request Congress to authorize this appropriation."

d. The President stated: "If you were to plan to initiate military action while the Communist forces are complying with the armistice, my obligation as to both U.S. forces and other U.N. forces would be to plan how best to prevent their becoming involved and to assure their security."

2. President Rhee, in his letter of November 16,[2] does not give any explicit assurance that he will not renew hostilities.

a. Rhee says: ". . . there is no question about our willingness to cooperate with you in every way possible. So long as the U.S. Government pursues the policy of justice at any cost, instead of peace at any cost, and decides to unify Korea either by peaceful means or by other means, there is no reason why we should hesitate even a moment to cooperate with the UN member nations in general and the U.S. in particular. I know that we will work together to get the Chinese invaders now in Korea to evacuate at the earliest possible moment."

b. Rhee says: "In reply to Mr. Nixon's question put to me just before his leaving, I said that if everything should go contrary to our expectation and the worse comes to the worst, I would feel compelled to take a unilateral action, which I earnestly hope would never happen. I added, however, that I would inform you before making any such move."

c. Rhee also states: "I told Mr. Nixon further that we should keep this understanding strictly in confidence."

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[2] Not found, but see footnote 2, p. 1615.

3. Although neither Rhee's letter nor his oral statements to the Vice President contain any explicit assurances that he will not act unilaterally, Rhee did in his talks with Mr. Nixon make statements to the effect that he realized that Korea could not possibly act alone and that he had to act always with the United States. Rhee told the Vice President: "We must fix our goal and travel together. We are the last people in the world who will disagree with the United States. We realze that we will get everything as long as we travel together and that we will lose everything if we don't." The Vice President states that "as a result of the President's letter, the firm statements I made to him during our conversations, and his own recognition of the hard fact that he simply is not capable of going it alone, I believe that Rhee, as of now, has no intention to act unilaterally."

4. The present situation appears to be that the President's letter and Nixon's statements, together with the representations previously made by us to Rhee, have convinced Rhee that the U.S. does not intend to support or to become involved in hostilities if he should renew them unilaterally. Our representations may have convinced him that we are capable of keeping ourselves from becoming involved in any hostilities which he might initiate as well as being determined to avoid involvement. If the conviction is fostered and maintained in Rhee's mind that the U.S. is capable of avoiding and determined to avoid involvement in any hostilities that he might initiate, it is highly probable that Rhee will not in fact start fighting. If however he comes to believe that the U.S. is not adamant against involvement, or that it could not keep from becoming involved even against its own wishes, it is highly possible that Rhee will initiate hostilities.

5. In this situation, there are three alternative courses of action that the President might follow with regard to Rhee's letter:

a. Make no reply at all;

b. Reply with insistence that Rhee provide formal written assurance that he will not take unilateral action;

c. Reply to Rhee with a letter which interprets the combination of his letter and his talks with Nixon as providing satisfactory assurance that he will not act unilaterally.

6. If the President makes no reply to Rhee and goes ahead with formal recommendations to the Congress on economic assistance and the treaty:

a. Rhee might construe this as a retreat from the position taken in the President's original letter and possibly as a softening of U.S. resolution not to support or become involved in hostilities.

b. If the President gave any assurances to the Congress with regard to unilateral action by Rhee, the President would be open to possible attack on the grounds that he had given such assurances in the face of a letter which could be construed as putting him on notice that under certain conditions Rhee would act unilaterally.

7. If the President replied to Rhee with renewed insistence that Rhee give formal written assurance that he will not take unilateral action, the President would have to take the line that Rhee had not satisfied the President sufficiently to justify recommending either the treaty or the economic assistance program to the Congress. If Rhee should respond with the requisite assurances, all would be well. But it is highly improbable that Rhee would be willing to incur the great loss of face involved in backing down, under obvious pressure, from a position which he has publicized so thoroughly. In that case an impasse would result from which neither the U.S. nor the ROK would have any good way of extricating itself, and a dangerous breach could be expected between the Koreans and ourselves.

8. If the President replies to Rhee and interprets Rhee's letter and Rhee's statements to Nixon as satisfactory assurance that Rhee will not act alone, it would be necessary to build somewhat on what Rhee actually said, but this could be done without actual distortion of Rhee's statements. It would be difficult for Rhee to challenge the President's interpretation without risking serious dispute. If Rhee allowed the President's interpretation to stand unchallenged, the President would have a basis for reporting to the Congress that he was satisfied that Rhee would not take unilateral action, and that it was wise to proceed with the treaty and economic assistance.

9. On balance, it seems that the last course of action, that of interpreting Rhee's letter and statements to Nixon as satisfactory assurance against unilateral action, is the best, or at any rate the least undesirable alternative. A draft letter along this line is attached.[3] In sum, this letter takes Rhee's letter and statements to Nixon as assurance to the President that Rhee will not take action except by mutual agreement, and agrees to keep the exchange of letters confidential, but reserves the right of the U.S. to make its position clear on unilateral renewal of hostilities whenever it seems advisable.

10. NSC 167/1,[4] paragraph 2, states that if Rhee refuses to give formal assurance in writing that he will not initiate unilateral military action at any time "the U.S. should inform him immediately that the UNC reserves all rights to take whatever action it deems necessary to preserve the security of the UNC forces." This draft letter would not precisely fulfill this directive since Rhee has not given formal assurance in writing. The President's previous letter, however, has in effect already notified Rhee that the President will reserve all rights to take action necessary to preserve the security of the UNC forces. In a letter

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[3] This draft, which is not printed, was approved as drafted and was identical to the letter from Eisenhower to Rhee, Jan. 2, 1954, p. 1685.

[4] For text, Nov. 2, see p. 1583.

which interprets Rhee's statements as satisfactory assurance, it would seem best not to repeat the warning.

11. If the President sends this letter to Rhee, the letter should be considered as only one step in a continuing series of moves by this Government to foster and maintain a conviction on Rhee's part (a) that the U.S. is determined not to become involved in any hostilities which he might initiate; (b) that we are capable of avoiding any such involvement; and (c) that he really would be going it alone if he took unilateral action. The actions outlined in NSC 167/1 should be vigorously pursued. In particular, we should proceed—

a. to redispose our forces;
b. to make clear our intentions to other ROK leaders; and
c. to plan and prepare for the contingency of unilateral action by Rhee.

795.00/12-2153

Memorandum of Conversation by Elizabeth A. Brown of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 21, 1953.

Subject: Korean Briefing Meeting, December 21, 1953.

Participants:		
	Australia	Mr. Tange, Minister
		Mr. Allen, Second Secretary
	Belgium	Mr. Carlier, Minister
	Canada	Ambassador Heeney
		Mr. Campbell, Second Secretary
	Colombia	Ambassador Zuleta Angel
		Mr. Chaves
	Ethiopia	Mr. Tesemma, First Secretary
	France	Ambassador Bonnet
		Mr. Millet, Counselor
	Great Britain	Mr. Scott, Minister
		Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor
		Mr. Troy
	Greece	Ambassador Politis
		Mr. Cavalierato, Counselor
	Korea	Ambassador Yang
		Mr. Han, First Secretary
	Netherlands	Ambassador van Roijen
		Mr. van Boetzelaer, Second Secretary

New Zealand	Ambassador Munro
	Mr. Laking, Counselor
	Mr. Wade, First Secretary
Philippines	Mr. Abello, Minister Plenipotentiary
	Mr. Albert, Attaché
Thailand	Ambassador Sarasin
	Mr. Snidvengs, Second Secretary
Luxembourg	Mr. Le Gallais
Turkey	Mr. Nuza, Counselor
South Africa	Mr. Jarvie, Counselor
	Mr. Botha, Second Secretary
United States	Mr. Dean, S
	Mr. Murphy, G
	Mr. Key, UNA
	Mr. Drumright, FE
	Mr. Braggiotti, USUN
	Mr. Wainhouse, UNP
	Mr. Popper, UNP
	Mr. DePalma, UNP
	Miss Brown, UNP
	Mr. Sisco, UNA
	Mr. Sneider, UNA
	Mr. Allen, EUR
	Mr. Phillips, UNA
	Mr. Jones, NA
	Mr. Treumann, NA

Ambassador Dean stated he had found the negotiations with the Communists at Panmunjom stimulating and challenging. He explained that the talks took place in a hut astride the demilitarized zone, with the line actually going through the middle of the conference table. Noting that the Chinese obviously ran the negotiations from the very outset, Ambassador Dean said that every statement made by the North Korean spokesman, Ki Sok Bok, was written out in advance by the Chinese representative, Huang Hua, and passed to the former; the two never spoke to each other in the conference hut. As for the tone of the sessions, he noted that each morning he and the North Korean bowed to each other, but the Chinese representative did all he could to ignore the fact that the United Nations representatives were even physically present. There were about thirty people in the Communist delegation. Observing that the Communists began almost every meeting with a series of personal attacks on him, calling him thief, liar, crook, warmonger and the like, Ambassador Dean said that he had decided at the outset not to reply to any such personal attacks.

On the substance of the negotiations Ambassador Dean pointed out that agreement had been reached on a good many procedural issues. He expressed the personal opinion that if our side was willing to withdraw the requirement that the USSR attend the political conference, the Communists would drop their proposal that the USSR should be there as a neutral, in which case they would probably agree to have only Pakistan and India present as non-voting observers. He said that, for some reason or another, the Communists definitely did not want either Sweden or Switzerland; they appeared to want to limit the neutrals to Asian states.

With respect to the question of the site of the political conference, Ambassador Dean thought that the Communists, having dropped Panmunjom, would be prepared to accept a site such as Colombo, Kandy, Nuwara Eliya, or Beirut.

Turning to the Communist position on the time of the political conference, he reported that Huang had told Haksar, Indian Minister to London, now in Korea, that the Communists came to Panmunjom prepared to keep Ambassador Dean in preliminary talks well into next May. In this connection, Mr. Dean noted that the Communists were currently spending enormous amounts of money in civilian rehabilitation in North Korea. They were also building a huge system of tunnels through the mountains, by which they could transport men and materials, and heavy concrete bunkers, thus showing that they apparently expect to remain in their present positions for some time. It was also reported that there were big posters throughout North Korea, all on the peace theme, happy children returning to school in peace, etc. Ambassador Dean expressed the belief that, while the Communists were engaged in consolidating their present positions, they had no real desire or intention of resuming hostilities. He noted also the increasing integration of the North Korean economy with that of China. There were reports that North Korean officials had almost disappeared. He thought that the Communists were hoping to keep us talking until next May, by which time they would have their civilian economy going again and their military position so completely strengthened that they would not be interested in resuming hostilities. Ambassador Dean also referred to the recent economic agreement between North Korea and Communist China and an agreement just announced with the Eastern European satellites for substantial amounts of aid and technical assistance. He expressed the view that the Communists want the political conference, but at the same time he cautioned that when they get to the conference, they might say that what is meant by a free, united, independent and democratic Korea is the integration of the ROK into North Korea. They might insist that, after the Chinese Communist forces withdraw, having first turned over all their equipment to the North Koreans, the United Nations forces must also get out, leaving the settlement to the Koreans themselves.

Ambassador Dean observed that the two sides were not too far apart on the question of the actual role of the neutrals, leaving aside the question of what neutrals were to attend. For example, it was agreed that the agenda would be made up by the two voting sides, that speeches were to be scheduled by arrangement between the two sides, and that the two sides were each to vote as a unit. However, there was a difference in the voting procedures. The Communist position was that no proposal could be submitted to the vote unless every state present was prepared to have it put to the vote; under our proposal each side voted as a unit in accordance with the General Assembly's resolution, but any state could announce that it did not want to be bound by a particular decision. On this point, Ambassador Dean said he had emphasized to the Communists that our side would be composed of seventeen free nations and that what mattered was that those states essential to the implementation of a particular decision should vote for it because otherwise it would never be carried out.

Ambassador Dean told the group that he had seen President Rhee on the average of four to five afternoons a week, sometimes individually and sometimes with his entire Cabinet. As a result of these consultations, Ambassador Dean expressed the opinion that, so far as the question of including neutrals was concerned, there were no fundamental differences between President Rhee and himself that could not have been worked out, provided, of course, that the Communists withdrew their demand for the inclusion of the USSR as a neutral.

Mr. Dean said he thought the Communists were bitterly disappointed in our oral proposal of November 28, in which the suggestion for an alphabetical list of participants was presented. Recalling that he had submitted our proposal in writing on December 8 and had previously given the Communists a list of fourteen procedural matters on which agreement had been reached, he commented that he did not think the Communists honestly wanted that much progress so early in the negotiations. He repeated that he thought they wanted a political conference but at the same time they wanted the preliminary talks to continue well into the spring. He ventured the opinion that this was one reason why Huang had brought in the written statements which the Communists presented at the December 12 meeting. At that meeting his remarks had become progressively ruder and ruder. Mr. Dean said that when he had proposed at two o'clock that the meeting recess, Huang had countered that he (Dean) was not going to leave until he (Huang) was ready, and only then and not before. Huang then returned to a series of questions related to our proposal on voting procedure. Ambassador Dean said he again proposed a recess at three o'clock but without success. (In the course of the meeting he made a total of five such proposals for recess.) After that Huang launched into his charges concerning violation of the Armistice Agreement. His first charge was directed at the ROK, but Mr. Dean said he immediately pointed out that the ROK had not signed the agreement on prisoners of war. Huang next said that General Harrison knew, when he signed the prisoner agreement on June 9, that the ROK was going to release the prisoners. This Dean denied. Then Huang charged the ROK with perfidy. Mr. Dean said he again proposed a recess, debating then in his own mind whether he should walk out. Huang repeated the charge of perfidy, to which Dean countered it was incorrect. Huang said he was bringing up this matter to show that our side was not dealing in good faith and could be expected to do the same thing in these negotiations, particularly on voting procedure; he then charged the United States Government with perfidy. Dean proposed an indefinite recess, at which Huang repeated the charge of perfidy and said he agreed to the recess. Ambassador Dean explained that if he had agreed to the recess on this basis, he knew the Peiping radio would say we admitted the charge of perfidy. It therefore seemed to him on balance that we would have been put in an impossible situation if we accepted the motion for a recess linked with the charge of perfidy. For this reason he decided to walk out. Early on the following Monday morning, before 5:00 AM, he had been advised that the Communist negotiators had left a note for him at Panmunjom. This note asked that the negotiations be renewed but repeated the charge of perfidy. In reply, Ambassador Dean said that he would not resume unless the Communists retracted this charge, expunged the exchange on this subject from the record, or otherwise corrected the record in a manner satisfactory to the United States. In this connection, Ambassador Dean said he had told the Indian representative he would accept the physical expunging of both his remarks and those of Huang from the record.

Turning to another matter, Mr. Dean said he had discussed the time schedule for the release of prisoners with General Thimayya. He expressed his tremendous admiration for the General and his associates. He thought the Indian troops, under great provocation, were doing a most amazing job in extremely difficult circumstances. He believed the Indians would definitely withdraw on January 22, although General Thimayya would stay on in his capacity as chairman of the NNRC for an additional thirty days to aid the prisoners in their return to civilian life.

He pointed out that the Communists had done everything that they could do to wreck the explanations. For example, they would call General Thimayya at midnight to make arrangements for explanations to a certain compound, then, an hour later, they would call to cancel them, the next hour to set them up again, and so on throughout the night. He said that while General Thimayya had gone to Korea believing that the non-repatriate prisoners had been intimidated, he was now by and large convinced that this was not the case.

Ambassador Dean again repeated that he thought the Communists were bitterly disappointed when we worked out a role for neutrals at the conference, an issue he believed they were using in the hope that it would divide India, the United States and the British Commonwealth states. He also thought it was possible that the Communists wanted to have the political conference in session so that they could take an appeal to it from anything General Thimayya might decide in his role as umpire. It was his opinion that the Communists would try to interpret the 90-day explanation period, not on a calendar basis, but counting only the actual hours spent in explanation, so the period would run until there had been a total of 720 hours spent in explanations to prisoners.

Ambassador Dean reported that General Thimayya knew that if there were the slightest extension beyond January 22 in holding the prisoners, they would rush the gates and the Indians would have to decide whether to fire upon them in an effort to restrain the break-out. He said he had personally told the General that if his troops fired upon prisoners after January 22, it would be murder, since after that date the Indian forces had no legal right to remain in Korea, and for that matter we had no obligation to give the Indian forces logistic support. However, Mr. Dean thought it was clear that the Indian troops would depart on the night of January 22, at which time the prisoners would revert to civilian status; otherwise there would be bloodshed.

Ambassador Dean was confident that the Communists would resume the preliminary talks, which they wanted for their own purposes. He was fairly sure, however, that they would wait a couple of weeks to make any move. He repeated that he thought we could have the political conference if we would withdraw our proposal to include the USSR, in which case they would probably withdraw their requirement that the USSR should attend only as a neutral. In short, he did not think it was impossible to arrange the political conference.

Ambassador Bonnet inquired what would happen if a note is received from the Communists indicating their readiness to resume the talks. Mr. Dean replied that Mr. Young will be there, adding that he had requested him to remain in Korea and by a note had informed the Communists of his availability. Mr. Young planned to stay in Korea at least another week or so, but whether he would remain indefinitely was another matter. If he returned, however, arrangements could be made by which the Communists could get in touch with our side in some other way. Mr. Dean added that he has also informed the Communists that he would return to Korea, if necessary.

In response to an inquiry from Ambassador Munro, Mr. Dean said that resumption would depend upon dealing with the charge of perfidy in one of the three ways already proposed to the Communists.

Mr. Scott expressed his gratitude for Ambassador Dean's report and his appreciation for what he had done in Korea. Ambassador Heeney associated himself with these remarks; while there was no time for further questions at this meeting, he expressed the hope that some of the points that Ambassador Dean had mentioned might be further developed in individual conversations in the Department. He added that in his view Mr. Dean had shown the greatest patience, courage and forbearance in his negotiations with the Communists.

Ambassador Dean said he wanted all those present to understand that he did not want to walk out of the negotiations. It had taken him an hour and a half to come to the conclusion that it was the only thing that he could do in the particular circumstances, it being perfectly obvious that the Communist objective was to embarrass us.

Ambassador Heeney asked whether it was Mr. Dean's opinion that this was not going to prevent the Communists from making a move for renewal of the negotiations and whether sufficient leeway had been left to make resumption possible. Ambassador Dean referred to a conversation he had had with General Thimayya in which he had made plain we were prepared to dispose of this issue of the charges in any reasonable way, and the General had said that he would see what he could do in informal conversations with the Communists.

Ambassador Dean then mentioned another matter which he said was pure surmise on his part but stemned in part from conversations which Huang, the Chinese representative had with the Indians. From questions Huang had asked General Thimayya, Mr. Dean felt that the Chinese view was that the Korean question was primarily a Chinese problem which did not concern the USSR. The Chinese apparently did not understand why we in effect wanted to insult them by not accepting them as the "number one" spokesman, and why their signature alone on any Korean agreement was not enough. Mr. Dean said he rather got the feeling that while Communism is Communism and Mao Tse-tung and Malenkov were in close relationship, nevertheless the Korean question was the particular baby of the Chinese. Ambassador Politis said he thought Ambassador Dean's view on this point was quite right. Mr. Dean noted that he did not intend to imply that there was any divergence between the USSR and Communist China but simply that Mao feels he is top man in this situation, and does not wish to be put in an inferior position.

Along the same lines, Ambassador Dean said that, in discussing the inclusion of the USSR in the political conference, he had argued that we wanted to see her there, to perform the obligations toward Korea already undertaken at Cairo, Potsdam and Moscow. He had also asked why we should object to the USSR when we accept two of its agents. The Communist representatives had obviously been outraged by this remark and had called it slander. He had simply replied that he had noted the statement that it is slanderous to be an agent of the USSR.

Mr. Tange summed up the foregoing as meaning that the Communists want us to drop the proposal for including the USSR at the conference in any capacity. Mr. Le Gallais asked whether this would be consistent with the action taken by the United Nations. Ambassador Dean replied that the USSR's inclusion was not required by the terms of the Assembly's resolution, which he then reviewed.

Ambassador Munro inquired what those present should say to the press after the meeting; he assumed there should be no statement by anyone. It was agreed that the press should simply be told that Ambassador Dean had given a detailed report on his negotiations and that nothing had been decided.

Ambassador Bonnet asked whether if the Communists proposed that the USSR be dropped from the conference the group would be consulted. Mr. Murphy assured him that it would. He added that the Communists might wait for such a proposal to come from our side. Ambassador Bonnet suggested that we might, in fact, try to provoke it.

795.00/12-2353

The Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 23, 1953.

DEAR FOSTER: Attached is a copy of a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff which contains the statement of the initial military objectives and the major courses of action which they recommend be undertaken in the event that hostilities in Korea are renewed by the Communists in the near future. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken into account in this statement the discussion of the National Security Council on this subject at the 3 December meeting.[1]

As you know, this subject is scheduled for presentation to the National Security Council again on Thursday, 7 January 1954. I hope that you can examine the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that your representatives can meet with representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs on this subject at an early date so that we may present to the Security Council a coordinated paper.

C. E. WILSON

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[1] For a report on that meeting, see the memorandum of discussion at the 173d meeting, p. 1636.

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 18, 1953.

Subject: Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea

1. Pursuant to your memorandum of 10 December 1953, subject as above,[2] the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith a restatement of the initial military objectives and the major course of action which should be undertaken in the event that hostilities in Korea are renewed by the Communists in the near future.

2. In light of the discussion at the 173rd meeting of the National Security Council on 3 December 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the course of action which they recommended to you in their memorandum of 27 November 1953 [3] should now be restated as follows:

a. Employing atomic weapons, conduct offensive air operations against military targets in Korea, and against those military targets in Manchuria and China which are being used by the Communists in direct support of their operations in Korea, or which threaten the security of US/UN forces in the Korean area.

b. Simultaneously, exploit as practicable such successes as may be gained as a result of action outlined in *a* above, by coordinated ground, naval and air action to destroy enemy forces in Korea.

c. In light of the circumstances prevailing at the time, and subject to an evaluation of the results of operations conducted under *a* and *b,* be prepared to take further action against Communist China to reduce their war-making capability in the Korea area, such as:

(1) Blockade of China Coast.
(2) Seizure of Hainan and other off-shore islands.
(3) Raids on the China mainland by Chinese Nationalist forces.

d. Immediately consider what further military build-up is then required to meet the resulting contingencies in Korea or elsewhere.

3. The above course of action should achieve the following initial military objectives:

a. Destroy effective Chinese Communist military power applied to the Korean effort.

b. Reduce Chinese Communist military capability for further aggression in the Korean area.

c. Create conditions under which ROK forces can assume increasing responsibility for the defense of Korea.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that any positive course of action to oppose renewed Communist aggression in Korea might involve increased risk of World War III. However, if the Communists

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[2] Not printed.

[3] *Ante,* p. 1626.

attack our forces in Korea, there is no suitable alternative to this course of action.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that this restatement of the major course of action and the initial military objectives be approved and coordinated with the Department of State prior to submission to the National Security Council.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
ARTHUR RADFORD
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

795.00/12-2953: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Deputy Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Young) [1]

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1953—7:15 p. m.

172. Following from Dean. Reference your 175 and 190.[2] Do you deem it advisable tentatively to explore with Thimayya, Haksar, and Singh precise basis on which they think Communists would be willing to resume talks, making it clear we are not making any offer? While we have reached no decision whether we would be willing to retract charge of "agents", we don't wish to eat crow and we certainly would not wish to be placed in position of making that offer and then having Communists reject it publicly without formally retracting "perfidy" charge. Do you think it possible that they do not quite understand full connotation of "perfidy" in English and that they might be willing to withdraw or expunge any charge or intimation that Lt. General Harrison when he signed the Agreement on Prisoners on June 8, had reason to believe that President Rhee intended to release the prisoners as he did later? In other words, without our having to make any retraction or expunging, would it be possible for you to explore whether they willing to withdraw or expunge their statement that General Harrison did not act in entire good faith? Don't want to enter into debate with them as to precise wording or to put them in a position to reject any offer of ours but as far as we are concerned or American public opinion, it would satisfy us to have a statement on their part that General Harrison did act in good faith on June 8th or negative statement at time he did not know of Rhee's intentions. Essential American public understand

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[1] This telegram, repeated to Seoul as 552 and to Tokyo as 1538 for transmission to CINCUNC, was drafted by Dean and cleared with Drumright, Popper, and Murphy.

[2] In both these telegrams, Young relayed to the Department information provided him by the Indians on their discussions with members of the Chinese Delegation concerning the deadlock over the Korean Political Conference. (795.00/12-1853 and 795.00/12-2953, respectively)

charge of lack of good faith on the part of our Government on June 8 is withdrawn or expunged and that we don't lose face in the process.

Assuming you believe feasible to work out through Indians or if you deem preferable through Swedish Ambassador at Peiping, precise arrangements for such withdrawal, what would your idea be for (a) appropriate time for resumption of talks, (b) do you think it would be wise for talks to be resumed before or after January 22? and (c) in view Seoul 585,[3] what effect would resumption of preliminary talks have on our ROK relations in view recent Rhee statements and especially if we were to have to agree on Pakistan and India as non-voting observers and upon further assumption, which is by no means determined, that if we were sure other side would withdraw their nomination of USSR as neutral we might withdraw our insistence USSR be there as full voting participant and as signatory to any agreements so USSR would not be at conference in any capacity?

In view of fact on December 14 Huang was attacking our voting procedure as crooked and as paving way for the rest of our side other than ROK to vote which would allow ROK to violate vote with impunity, with no responsibility our side for subsequent ROK action which would then not constitute violation, do you think advisable mention casually we are prepared review voting procedures carefully and to distinguish between actual voting procedures at conference and subsequent substantive agreements needed to implement voting on substantive items?

In view your 190[4] what do you think we would actually get out of political conference if convened? How clear is it Rhee would agree over-all plebiscite? Is there any information as to infiltration Chinese Communists into North Korea? What is best estimate population North Korea? Are Chinese attempting to build up North Korean army as such? Is there any evidence actual withdrawal Chinese forces? Assuming no possibility unification of Korea would Chinese Communists then be willing agree guaranty territorial integrity South Korea and not to send forces there? If USSR not a signatory to withdrawal forces and guaranty territorial integrity South Korea would Red China observe its terms? Realize these are really unanswerable questions but would like to focus your views on desirability having political conference with and without USSR.

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[3] In this telegram, Dec. 28, 1953, Young reported that the Indians had been signatories of an interim report of the NNRC, released on Dec. 28, which stated that the failure of the explanations process was due, in part, to the influence of the Republic of Korea. (695.0024/12–2853)

[4] In this telegram, Dec. 29, 1953, Young reported that Thimayya had informally broached the idea of a double retraction of the "agent-stooge" charge of Dean and the "perfidy" charge of Huang to Communist military officers in Kaesong who stated that their delegation would not withdraw the charges. It was the opinion of Thimayya, Haksar, and Singh that the Chinese would never leave Korea and the political conference would not succeed in unification. (795.00/12–2953)

Have not reached definitive view here as to whether wise to resume talks but some members UN, particularly UK, feel early resumption of talks and my presence there would be helpful. Jebb and Scott believe might be particularly helpful in defeating an Indian motion for reconvening UNGA to have talks resumed ten days or so before January 22 and if talks not resumed then may not be possible to do so for several months. Of course there would then be no possibility of conference itself convening by January 22.

We are trying to formulate policy on this matter and would be most helpful to have your views before taking any action. Have scheduled meeting sixteen for next Monday.[5]

DULLES

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[5] Jan. 4.

795.00/12-3053

Memorandum by the Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Dean) to the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 30, 1953.

Subject: Considerations for and against continuing our efforts to arrange for a Korean Political Conference

Considerations Supporting Continuation of Efforts to Arrange a Political Conference:

1. The Secretary's and the President's recent and repeated statements we are willing to negotiate with Communists on specific issues.

2. Previous commitments in armistice agreement and UNGA resolutions.

3. Desires of our Allies (e.g., Jebb-Scott-Dean conversations and Murphy-Heeney conversations [1]).

4. Continued imminence of conference might possibly tend to retard Communist timetable for North Korea, assuming any negotiation really retards their timetable.

5. Conference would provide us with strong propaganda platform for pressing for free, supervised elections throughout all of Korea—a position we have very successfully maintained re Germany—assuming Rhee would acquiesce.

6. If, as expected, no political unification is possible, conference may furnish useful means replace cumbersome armistice machinery by *modus vivendi* perhaps including mutual withdrawal of troops, although possibly full-fledged conference is not needed for this.

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[1] The records of these conversations have not been printed; generally they are located in file 795.00.

7. Demonstration of Chinese Communist intransigence at conference will help us maintain line on Chinese representation in UN, China trade, etc., and enable us take a full look at their picture.

8. Similarly, imminence or existence of conference will help prevent damaging actions in UN General Assembly.

9. Imminence of conference, or beginning of conference, helps to counteract Russian pressure at Berlin for Five-Power Conference and for discussion of other Asian questions as means of "relaxing international tensions."

10. Possible test of extent to which Chinese Communists are willing to take line independent of Soviets, although conference may not be needed for this.

Considerations Opposing Convocation of Political Conference

1. They would use the conference as a means of gaining time to buttress their position in North Korea—i.e., build up North Korean economy, build up armed forces, consolidate political control. Though absence of a conference might not retard this.

2. They might build up North Korean army, withdraw Chinese forces across the Yalu and then use it to demand UN troop withdrawal (non-Korean forces as agreed to by Admiral Joy), before we were ready for it, thus putting us in a difficult propaganda position.

3. ROKs may refuse to agree to any reasonable proposals we wished to present such as non-voting observer, plebiscite, withdrawal of UN forces, etc.

4. If unification is impossible in any event, it may be easier to reach *modus vivendi* through MAC or in direct conversations with Chinese Communists unencumbered by sixteen neutrals, ROKs, etc.

5. Chinese Communists would seek to use conference to promote their admission to UN and consideration of other Asian questions.

6. Pressure of public opinion might force us into undesirable concessions.

Recommendation

On balance I recommend that:

(a) We try, on a completely appropriate basis either through Young and the Indians at Panmunjom or the Swedish Ambassador at Peiping to resume the preliminary talks about January 10, 1954.

(b) The fact that the talks are resumed may take off the pressure for the reconvening of UNGA.

(c) If they are not resumed before January 22, it may take months to get them going afterwards.

ARTHUR H. DEAN

795.00/12-3153: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET SEOUL, December 31, 1953—7 p. m.

605. Repeated information Tokyo 357, Manila 23. Repeated information Taipei by pouch. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Manila for Robertson.

Although ROK Government reaction to Eisenhower announcement re withdrawal two divisions from Korea [1] has on whole been unnaturally restrained, it is evident genuine surprise, confusion and disappointment mingled with some disillusionment are prevailing reactions.

Comment, whether official, editorial or private, has been disturbed and has reflected uncertainty as to interpretation. In general, move criticized as failing correctly assess Communist aims and methods, as poorly timed from viewpoint negotiating situation in Korea with Communists, and as blow at ROK objective unifying Korea. There has been some recognition by responsible individuals and one or two newspapers of fact withdrawal should be considered in context world-wide developments and world-wide responsibilities of US. This has been limited however.

Although there is as yet little substance on which to base conclusions re effects this move on ROK, following possibilities should be considered. It may engender a certain feeling of abandonment and thus be blow to ROK morale, civilian and military. With respect specific effect on Rhee's thinking re unilateral ROK action, it might conceivably spur him to decision to act earlier in order embroil UN Forces before they are substantially weakened. I doubt however that Rhee has either (1) made decision to take unilateral action or (2) been pushed toward affirmative decision on this question by Eisenhower announcement. Conversely, move may have healthy effect in driving home to Rhee and other ROK leaders facts of (1) US has world-wide commitments which must influence her actions in Korea, (2) domestic opinion in US does not favor renewal of war and this has been factor in withdrawal move, (3) prospect unifying Korea by force is slight and ROK cannot count on US military support.

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[1] On Dec. 26, Eisenhower released a statement that U.S. ground forces in Korea were to be "progressively reduced as circumstances warranted" and, as an initial step, two Army divisions were to be withdrawn and returned to the United States. Eisenhower cited as justification for this action the armistice, the capabilities of ROK forces, and increased U.S. air power; but he warned that, if aggression should occur in Korea, the United States would be ready to oppose it "with even greater effect than heretofore." For a complete text of the statement, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953,* pp. 860–861.

According to a memorandum by Cutler to Smith, Dec. 17, 1953, the President agreed with Cutler that it was not desirable for information on the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces in Korea to be sent to the Far East by message. Instead, Radford, who was going to the Far East, was to convey the information to Rhee before Eisenhower's announcement on Dec. 26. (795B.551/12–1753)

Therefore, balance my estimate is that US move, although sharp disappointment to ROK, is not likely precipitate sudden action on part ROK. (However, due his absence from Seoul I have not seen Rhee since his evening meeting with Radford and Robertson.)

BRIGGS

795.00/12-3153: Telegram

The Deputy Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Young) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT MUNSAN-NI, December 31, 1953.[1]

199. Repeated information Seoul, Tokyo, CINCUNC, Taipei unnumbered.

In view ROK opposition to our 8 December proposal, reiterated in effect by Rhee on 21 December, and divisive issue this presents to Communists, I associate myself with Ambassador Briggs' recommendation (Seoul's 560 to Department [2]) for over-all re-appraisal US position with respect to Korea. Urgency this matter indicated by considering position we would face if arrangements should be worked out with Communists for resumption Panmunjom negotiations. With respect preliminary talks and Political Conference, seems to me out here that concentrated effort effect closer alignment ROK views on composition Political Conference might well be first order of business re talks before we try move their resumption or before UNGA happens to reconvene. I can have no illusions such alignment will be possible or any easier now than it was during past two months, in light over-all context our policies and current conditions Korea. In this connection I wish to offer following comments:

Part 1.

Our policies in Korea face difficult future resulting from obstacles erected by Communists and from hurdles created by intransigeance and incapacity ROK Government.

(*a*) Sturdy hard-working people are shackled by poor leadership across the top. Despite his sense of history, his understanding of Communism, his patriotism and certain marks of leadership, President Rhee does not have effective Cabinet or government with whom we can deal on regular responsible basis. President's abilities do not include creation effective administration, nor virtue surrounding himself with able lieutenants. Coupled with tendency toward irresponsible, capricious administration, stultifying mediocrity and widespread corruption, there is unfortunate trend toward autocratic, one-man, unrepresentative government. Opposition parties, groups and leaders are being silenced. Signs multiply of President's intention to develop one-voice press.

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[1] There was no time of transmission indicated on this telegram, but it was received at the Department of State at 10:51 a.m., Dec. 31, 1953.

[2] Not printed. (694.95B/12-1953)

(*b*) Authoritarian government here might not be major problem if it were competent, responsible and just, or if it were evolving in ways responsive to needs of Korean people and of Asia generally. Korean people themselves have many admirable qualities and abilities, but they lack experience in self-government, in the mechanics of operations any government, and particularly in foreign relations. In fact, nearest thing to civil service currently existing in [*is*] ROK Army, built and fostered by US military authorities in stress of battle, but likely to wither, or rust, or be undermined by politics during protracted uneasy armistice if UNC–ROK relationship is substantially altered.

(*c*) As possibility of unification fades away, ROK Government and people may not only be more frustrated than today, but they may conclude that United Nations (and especially US) have miscalculated in Korea and ignored obvious intention of Chinese Communists try to append and control North Korea to Manchuria. In short, they may blame US for their woes. Indefinite division of Korea will create exceptionally difficult social and economic problems (assuming ROK can survive with present area), but most acute and exasperating consequence for US will probably be in field of ROK foreign relations, not alone with US but likewise with rest of free world. It may take several years and complete change of ROK leadership before ROK relations with non-Communist Asia are stabilized. Except to extent he is able give impression of defying US, and of getting away with it, Rhee has surprisingly little standing in this part of world. As long as he continues present policies toward Japan, India, British Commonwealth and UN, ROK will suffer. If Rhee intensifies his drive for absolute power, standing of ROK abroad (and specially in US) may be further impaired. In those circumstances position of United States regarding Korea could become even more difficult in near future.

(*d*) Two recent developments may tend harden President Rhee's attitude on Political Conference and cooperation with USA in international matters: The Indian action on the majority interim NNRC report, and the announcement of the two-division withdrawal. He may make resumption talks as difficult as possible. He may return to his absolute rejection India and neutrals at Political Conference, on which by mid-December he gave some indication of softening.

Part 2.

Among the numerous possible conclusions to be drawn from foregoing, following impress me as particularly pertinent:

(*a*) American Government and people have tremendous stake in Korea, yet we cannot adequately carry out our commitments and meet our national interests if trend toward absolutism, poor leadership and intransigeance continues to grow. Notwithstanding this, collapse of US–ROK relations will probably not occur because ROK leans so heavily upon US for everything. Time may be on our side if used in patience and persistence.

(*b*) In this context of absolutism, poor leadership and intransigeance, our present projects may founder in Korea because we attempt too much, too soon, on too large scale, or in too shallow a receptacle. We should perhaps consider some retrenchment on big, expensive, generally directed aid programs that require extensive implementation by ROK Government. Perhaps goals in Tasca and Nathan reports [3] should be stretched out in time, or modified. More emphasis might be put on "grass-roots" approach, with more direct dealing at community level with tangible needs of people; this is aim of modest armed forces assistance program ($15 million) operating under General Taylor's leadership. Perhaps we should seek to disengage somewhat at top and deal more directly with communities, professions and groups. There might then be fewer difficulties at the governmental level and wider understanding of our aims and methods in the country, both of which would facilitate our national objectives here.

(*c*) In relations with ROK Government itself, we should seek greater respect and better performance. In view of recent ROK record of behavior with reference to Political Conference, economic aid and Japanese relations, would it not be advisable consider strictly pay-as-you-go basis with President Rhee. Favors (for example, erasing ROK $20 million indebtedness merely because ROK asks us to do it) might well be withheld until collaboration is being regarded by ROK as two-way street and reciprocal enterprise.

(*d*) We should help foster development of ROK civil service. Creation by army shows what can be accomplished with hard work and inspiring leadership; to accomplish this in civilian area, in peacetime, will be more complex and delicate and doubtless require considerably more time. Likewise, exchange of students, professors and leaders. Cultural and professional fields should be expanded to maximum limit by Korean personnel able to meet requirements.

(*e*) Political implication of growth of ROK military establishment are not all reassuring. Maintenance of armed forces as non-political instrument, in country lacking historic democratic traditions, would be difficult in best of circumstances. In terms maintenance armistice agreement pending political settlement, and possible negotiated troop withdrawal in a political conference or other forum, it is essential that relations between UNC and ROK military be maintained on as close and comrade-ly a basis as possible, which, however, may be affected as withdrawal of US contingents from Korea takes place.

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[3] The Tasca Report is printed as Attachment 2 to NSC 156/1, July 17, p. 1389. The Nathan Report is not identified.

(*f*) Partition of Korea may be long-term phenomenon. While this falls far short our declared objective of unification, it may conform for time being to political realities of struggle between free and Communist world. In other words, buffer area may, *de facto*, be North Korea with demilitarized zone and some eventual form UN observer group or NNSC as safety valve. This at least provides space ahead of us for air-front, opportunities for observing and probing Red China in northeast Asia, and strong hold on Asian continent near center Red China's power. This bridgehead would then be outermost point in arc swinging through Japan, Okinawa, Formosa, Philippines into Indochina. This is uncomfortable and unhappy situation for ROK people, but better than being plunged into possible World War III on Rhee's narrowly nationalistic terms, regardless over-all political realities and strategic considerations. Collaboration with ROK on such military outpost, together with effect joint policy statement and mutual defense treaty, if ratified, might counteract ROK opposition Political Conference and ROK reaction failure unify Korea peacefully.

(*g*) Finally, our appraisal and planning should be on basis of 5, 10, 20 or more years depending on duration and development Communist regime in China and elsewhere, since time means nothing to them. We have major long-term responsibility in Korea. If we cannot succeed in devising effective peaceful pressures in political conference, United Nations or elsewhere to get Chinese Communists out of Korea, road ahead may be long as well as difficult, with no easy solution. In immediate future we might begin exposing Chinese Communist designs on North Korea in terms their "conquering" and occupying it in classic fashion historic Chinese imperialism. I have consulted fully with Ambassador Briggs on this telegram.

YOUNG

695A.0024/1-154: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY SEOUL, January 1, 1954—8 p. m.

610. Repeated information Tokyo 361 (pass CINCUNC), New Delhi 39, Munsan-ni by pouch. Re Embassy telegram 606 [1] and Department telegram 557 [2] December 31.

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[1] In telegram 606, Briggs reported that Pyun called him in a great state of agitation to report that ROK sources stated that the Indians were illegally screening Chinese and North Korean POWs and were on the point of returning 125 to the Communists. Briggs counseled patience, promised to look into the matter, and set up the meeting with Rhee and Pyun described in telegram 610. (695A.0024/12-3153)

[2] In this telegram, the Department of State instructed Briggs to exert a moderating influence on Rhee and Pyun and pointed out that it was not in the interest of the ROK to have pro-Communist POWs in its territory. (695A.0024/12-3153)

Following official reception this morning, General Talyor, Young and I had inconclusive but nevertheless useful conversation with President Rhee and Pyun with latter at his unreasonable and argumentative worst. We described operation as primarily head count by Indians for purpose verifying rolls (a necessary function to be completed prior relinquishment responsibility by CFI after January 22) as by-product of which each prisoner had opportunity leave compound, thereby indicating desire be repatriated, following which each case was considered by NNRC before individual certified for repatriation. Out of over 4,000 PWs handled yesterday, 127 had elected repatriation. We emphasized that this was not, as Pyun had alleged, extension of explanation period. Furthermore to our knowledge no force, coercion or persuasion of any kind was being applied by Indians. We also pointed out greatly to advantage of ROK weed out Communist sympathizers before turnback of prisoners begins on January 23, since that will help prevent entry Communist agents into South Korea. We declared operation not only within armistice terms of reference but also consonant with principle of no forcible repatriation for which UNC had fought so steadfastly and long during armistice negotiations.

Rhee argued that since Indians are un-neutral and pro-Communist, process described cannot be fairly handled. Pyun, whose conduct throughout could scarcely have been more offensive, went much further than President in denouncing Indians and threatening ROK force to rescue prisoners from Indian "policemen turned robbers" (see text Pyun public statement telegraphed this morning[3]). After considerable argument along above line, with no meeting of minds and Pyun increasingly intemperate, President said he desired have ROK military police observing Indian guard procedure at compound gates, since he altogether lacks confidence in Indians and owes it to anti-Communist prisoners to protect them from Indians. General Taylor pointed out numerical limitation on unarmed UN guard personnel in demilitarized zone but offered investigate possibility of having ROK observer when individual cases come before NNRC for final action, following emergence from compound of each individual desiring repatriation. Also offered consider replacing limited number UN guards within demilitarized zone (now unarmed US marines) with ROK personnel who could be stationed near prisoner compounds on south side to observe proceedings. Pyun continued to demand "armed ROK MPs to protect anti-Communist prisoners from Indians".

Notwithstanding Pyun's attitude, which was not today expressed by Rhee (although latter's cold versus Pyun's hot may of course have been pre-arranged act) we do not anticipate sudden ROK action implementing Pyun's threats. On other hand, situation credited by Pyun is far from satisfactory; for example while foregoing discussion taking place, Mrs. Rhee indicated to my wife much concern "at way things going between our two countries".

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[3] Text of this statement was transmitted in telegram 609 from Seoul, Jan. 1, 1954, not printed. (795.00/1–154)

We are considering later today with General Lacey, ranking US officer UNCMAC, possibilities mentioned re use ROK guards and observers.

BRIGGS

611.95B/1-454

President Eisenhower to the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 2, 1954.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: It has been gratifying to me to hear from Vice President Nixon of his friendly and frank talks with you, and of your cordial hospitality to him. I thank you for the warm welcome which you gave him and I agree with you that his visit has further deepened the friendship and understanding between your country and mine.

I welcome the statement in the letter [2] which you asked Vice President Nixon to give me that you will not undertake unilateral action without informing me beforehand and that any such action would be contrary to your expectation. Vice President Nixon has given me a detailed account of his talks with you and of your statements to him. He has reported how keenly aware you are of the necessity of your country and mine always acting together and in mutual agreement. From his talks with you, the Vice President is satisfied that you will not renew hostilities unilaterally. In reliance on this, I feel warranted in asking our Congress to go ahead with the ratification of our Mutual Defense Treaty and with the enactment of the legislation necessary for the economic assistance program.

I agree with you that our letters to each other should remain confidential. I cannot, however, as you will well understand, enter into any undertaking to refrain from making the position of the United States on these questions perfectly clear at whatever time it may appear to me to be advisable to do so.

In the future, as in the past, my constant purpose will be to cooperate closely with you in working for the unification of your country by peaceful means, in its rehabilitation, and in the restoration of its economy. Our friendly cooperation will, I am sure, enable our two countries to overcome whatever problems may arise and to stand together steadfastly for peace and against aggression.

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[1] According to the memorandum of discussion at the 178th meeting of the NSC, Dec. 30, 1953, the Council approved the text of this letter. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file) The letter was sent to Seoul in telegram 560, Jan. 4, 1954, no distribution, eyes only for Briggs, who was to deliver it to Rhee.

[2] Not found, but see footnote 2, p. 1615.

With warmest regards and very best wishes for the coming New Year to you and Mrs. Rhee.

Sincerely, • [DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER]

795.00/1-354: Telegram

The Deputy Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Young) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT MUNSAN-NI, January 3, 1954.[1]

201. Repeated information Seoul, Tokyo, CINCUNC unnumbered. Personal for Dean from Young. Reference Department telegram 172,[2] the following is further comment to mytels 198 [3] and 199,[4] and is based wholly on local scene and subject any correction from Department's over-all perspective.

Part 1.

Regarding first paragraph Deptel 172. There is real possibility Communists do not understand full connotation of "perfidy" in English or intensity Americans' reactions to such a charge. Haksar and Singh corroborated this as a possibility Thursday.[5] But on the basis of Peiping radio output, Communist's written note of 14 December,[6] and impressions of diplomatic sources Peiping, it may be doubtful Communists would withdraw or expunge any charge or intimation UNC signed terms of reference on 8 June knowing President Rhee intended release prisoners. Since Communists have charged UNC with "conniving" that action ever since it occurred, it may be impossible for them climb back limb. Charge of "perfidy" is associated with political talks and might be handled more easily by diplomatic means. Therefore, I doubt we would get any results on retraction or expunging statements indicated in your first paragraph, or in persuading Communists make a statement as indicated last sentence paragraph 1. While this is speculation, and perhaps no real difference in substance, I suspect elimination of the last three statements from the transcript of 23rd plenary session might be worth exploring as one possibility.

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[1] The source text indicated no time of transmission, but the telegram was received in the Department of State at 10:11 a. m. on Jan. 3.

[2] Dated Dec. 29, p. 1675.

[3] In this telegram, Dec. 31, Young reported more information from Indian sources in Korea to the effect that the Chinese wished the negotiations at Panmunjom to be resumed. (795.00/12-3153)

[4] Dated Dec. 31, p. 1680.

[5] Dec. 31.

[6] Not found.

Part 2.

With respect to the following three questions in your third paragraph:

(*a*) When is appropriate time for resumption of talks? January 10 seems premature. I can see no particular date appropriate for resumption, but three pertinent dates may affect Department's decision: January 22, January 28 and February 9. These dates raise conflicting considerations. Resumption during the next three or four weeks might help us with respect to the intentions and decisions of the GOI regarding PW disposition, since Indians here greatly regret their suspension and postponement of the political conference. However, final paragraph Ambassador Allen's telegram is most relevant (New Delhi's 1032 to Department [7]). On the other hand, early resumption talks will create new difficulties with ROK in atmosphere of real tension and divergence between the US negotiators and the ROK Government, as indicated below. If the US Government still believes PC desirable to be convened as soon as possible, then appropriate time for resuming preliminary talks might be around February 1 just after January 28 which will be moment of great interest in Korea as to whether time passes without Rhee taking unilateral military action, and just prior any reconvening or discussion reconvening GA on February 9.

(*b*) Should the talks be resumed before or after January 22? I have discussed the military aspects of this question fully with Generals Lacey and Daley, UNCMAC. They believe the PW situation and circumstances in the MC are secondary factors in answering the question which should depend on much larger and over-all political considerations. They see no impact on their situation in the MAC.

There is the possibility that, viewed solely from the context of PW situation in Korea, it would be advisable to postpone actual resumption of political talks until end of January, after we hope PW's have been let out and CFI is in process of staging out of Korea. First, if this process progresses smoothly and ROK Government is satisfied with Indian conduct, it may be easier work out understanding with ROK on Pakistan and India as non-voting observers. Second, last two weeks January are going to be supercharged with tension at perhaps fever pitch over a powder keg. As January 22 approaches, PW's may become increasingly taut, and susceptible to rumors, provocations and mass desire for unhindered release. UNC and Indians are doing everything allay these feelings and conduct orderly let-out.

During next three weeks, Communist reaction to PW release may become exceedingly violent in propaganda and political terms. They may even seek to disrupt let-out and excite prisoners in order to cause maximum disturbance and bloodshed. They might send formal protest to stir up the GA. Whether the Communists will make any overt major physical or military move to frustrate or prevent PW release, or to "snatch" them, I do not know. No doubt they have capability—and Indians, Swiss, and Swedes are becoming increasingly nervous over this matter. This whole question of possible Communist countermoves is no doubt receiving continual and full attention from our intelligence agencies at all levels, particularly in the light of the strong statement reportedly made by Chou En-lai to the Indian Ambassador (Deptel 176).[8]

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[7] Dated Jan. 1, 1954; the paragraph under reference read as follows:

"As regards resumption of PC talks at Panmunjom, I am inclined to think we should make no effort towards resumption until POWs are safely outside demilitarized zone. It will be easier to hold GOI in line if no complicating factors intervene during next three weeks." (695A.0024/1–154)

Therefore, Panmunjom in month of January may be progressively less conducive to resumption of talks on respectable, constructive basis get results quickly. On the other hand, efforts on our part now to begin to arrange resumption of talks may slightly offset tensions here, as well as out-maneuver any Indian move for reconvening UNGA. Other consideration is that resumption of talks after 22 January might get away from PW problem if that is liquidated and Communists give indications accept *fait accompli.*

(*c*) What effect would resumption of talks have on US–ROK relations? This strikes me as major question in consideration timing and policy resumption of political talks. On basis present indications and atmosphere here I am sure, and Ambassador fully concurs, such resumption will produce real collision with President Rhee. In mytels 178[9] and 199 I attempted highlight my question and concern whether talks should be resumed before we had worked out some understanding with ROK on composition of conference, perhaps voting procedure, and resumption. I believe we should meet issue head on, if we want talks and political conference, and in light our policy on unilateral ROK military action. In view of Rhee's New Year's statement[10] that suspension of talks is final, together with his statement on 21 December,[11] I am sure he and Pyun will officially object to resumption. This time they may publicly disassociate the ROK Government completely from the talks both by denouncing them and by not delegating Vice Minister Cho and Colonel Li as observers. We will be put in even more impossible position than in early December when you had so skillfully and patiently led the President nearly to acceptance our proposals. Suspension talks viewed with delight and satisfaction by ROK; resumption would provoke immediate ugly reaction in present deterioration temper and mood in ROK–US relations.

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[8] Telegram 176 to Munsan-ni was a repeat of telegram 2786 from London in which the Embassy reported on the Chou–Raghavan conversation as follows:

"Chou's chief preoccupation at moment was POWs. He said his government could never agree that explanations to POWs should now cease or that they be released January 22. Chinese Communists would refute these views as strongly as possible. They had lost 16 days at beginning because UNC refused make alterations in camps on ground they would take 30–35 days to complete; at end alterations completed in 24 hours. Again, explanations were held up for month owing refusal UNC agree to segregation. It useless proceed with explanations without segregation, as POWs to whom explanations had already been given were showing up in subsequent batches and even filtering into other camps, identification disks being exchanged. Now suddenly on December 20 it had been found possible segregate POWs and Chinese Communists had immediately resumed explanations. (Raghavan inferred if decision had been taken extend explanations Chinese Communists would have continued them as they anxious repatriate every POW who could be persuaded to accept repatriation)." (795.00/12–2953)

[9] Not printed. (795.00/12–2053)

[10] An advance text of Rhee's New Year's message was in telegram 595, Dec. 30, not printed. (795B.11/12–3053)

[11] Presumably the reference was to a statement made by Rhee in an exclusive Reuters interview reported in telegram 574, Dec. 22, 1953, not printed. (795.00/12–2353)

Moreover, at the moment, official ROK temperature has risen again to boiling point against Indians. It may subside around 22 January if things work out.

Unless Communists are absolutely sincere and anxious for quick agreement in talks, they will again exploit divisions between US and ROK and put us in impossible position at talks unless US and ROK are united. I subscribe fully to the Ambassador's recent telegram[12] on this subject.

Part 3.

With respect to your fourth paragraph on voting procedure, I am not sure whether you mean mention casually to Indians or Chinese Communists we are prepared review voting procedure, et cetera. I think we should do both when time is ripe. I have already tried with the Indians to fuzz the issue on voting procedure proposals. They do not believe it is primary issue. They have told me explicitly Chinese Communists view it as wholly negotiable. Therefore, I believe it would be advisable to indicate our intentions in general but not specific terms to the Indians and to the Chinese Communists when, if and after Department makes basic decision to resume talks.

Part 4.

All the questions in your paragraph 5 cannot be answered briefly. Much of the information on the answers should be available through intelligence people in the Department, CIA, and the Pentagon.

Some answers are as follows:

(*a*) My personal opinion is that we will get nothing out of a PC if it is ever convened, except perhaps the facility to state our case for a peaceful unification of Korea and to expose Communist intentions in North Korea and Asia. Daeniker and Franke[13] told me today in most positive terms PC will never succeed in unifying Korea or of getting Chinese out. Indians here hold same opinion.

(*b*) If the US and general opinion in the free world strongly support over-all plebiscite as part of peaceful settlement of the Korean question under circumstances that would not endanger the sovereignty and integrity of the ROK, my guess is President Rhee would come along.

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[12] Not identified.

[13] These men were Swiss members of the NNRC.

(*c*) There is an increasing amount of information on the "infiltration", settlement, and take-over by Chinese Communist civilian and military elements North Korea. Swedish observation in mytel 182 [14] are an illustration. As many of our telegrams from here have indicated, North Korea appears to be turning into an adjunct of Communist China. The Indians are convinced Chinese will never give it up.

(*d*) There is no reliable estimate of the NK population, but it may be somewhere in the neighborhood of five millions.

(*e*) There are indications Chinese and Soviet advisors are attempting build up NK armed forces, including air.

(*f*) There is intelligence on withdrawal of some Chinese units from NK.

(*g*) I cannot imagine Chinese Communists would be interested in any kind of a guarantee without demanding expensive *quid pro quo* from us. If the USSR is not a member of the conference nor a signatory, the bargaining power of the Chinese Communist on a guarantee either of South Korea or of all Korea would seem to me to increase greatly. Is there not a possibility Peiping would bargain *inter alia,* for total US military withdrawal, elimination military agreements with ROK, Peiping's representation in Security Council, and even diplomatic recognition? These demands could also take place even if Russians are at conference, who would sponsor them, assuming Moscow and Peiping fully aligned as seems to be case on these matters. However, in the light of our developing information regarding the possibility an increasingly active, positive attitude of Chinese Communist regime concerning their status and role international affairs, a political conference with only Chinese Communists and North Koreans on the other side would put Peiping in the key position in the hard, time-consuming bargaining for which the Chinese and Communists, but particularly the combination, are skilled at. It will also greatly increase the status and prestige of Peiping if it is negotiating in effect alone with the US and the Western world and if it tries to act as spokesman for Asian unity, et cetera. Unless we wish to take advantage of Peiping's desire for status and recognition on some terms, in our policy to create stress and strain in the Soviet orbit, I still have the feeling the advantage in Soviet participation in the political conference outweigh the disadvantages, particularly if the Chinese Communists generally resent and oppose our insistence on full Soviet participation. The latter may give us some leverage.

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[14] In this telegram, Dec. 21, 1953, Young relayed information he received from a Swedish member of the NNSC who had just returned from a 2-week inspection of North Korea. The Swede observed that the Chinese appeared to be running North Korea and were there to stay. (795.00/12–2153)

Swedes and Swiss are dubious about our insistence on Soviet signature, and tell me British do not agree or understand our attitude.

Part 5.

With respect to your paragraph 6, may I suggest that every effort be made to conceal the fact that some UN members, and particularly the UK, are pressing us for early resumption of the talks. If President Rhee and Pyun pick up this information, our difficulties with them regarding resumption talks and neutrals participating will be increased, in view of fact they told you so many times our coming out here and our proposals on neutrals in non-voting observer's role were due to Allies and British whom Koreans do not like or trust. The Ambassador fully concurs.

Part 6.

I have consulted with the Ambassador on this telegram.

YOUNG

795.00/1-454: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, January 4, 1954—7:21 p. m.

770. 1. Briefing meeting with group of sixteen today produced general agreement desirable resume Panmunjom conversations preferably before January 22. Re last para New Delhi's 1032 [2] we feel on balance beneficial effect of move to resume on Indian Government and others outweighs possible though slight risk of complicating prisoner release question. Resumption will also help avoid premature convocation of GA. Therefore we would hope if talks could not be resumed by January 22 we could at least work out arrangements for resumption prior to that date.

2. Allen should therefore make high-level approach to Indians asking if they would not wish sound out Chinese Communists on possibility resumption Panmunjom talks. This would not be a formal request for Indians to take any specific action, and in anything they did we would expect them to approach Chinese Communists as if they were themselves initiating proposition in interests reaching political settlement in Korea. Resumption might be on basis of Chinese Communist agreement expunge statements they made re "perfidy" at last Panmunjom meeting, simply as technical matter of rectifying record and as not germane, and not as prejudicing any position or claims on substance. Alternatively, if Communists react negatively to this idea, perhaps Indians could explore

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[1] Also repeated for action to Young at Munsan-ni and to Tokyo with instructions to pass it to CINCUNC.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 7, *supra*.

possibility expunging Panmunjom record so as also to remove our charge Chinese Communists are Soviet agents, under same qualification.

3. Young in his discretion should raise matter with Indians in same terms. In both cases, important it be made completely clear we are not moving with undue haste or attempting exercise any pressure; that this is not formal request for resumption and that we would welcome Indian assistance in making soundings on their own initiative to ascertain Chinese Communist response.[3]

DULLES

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[3] Ambassador Allen sent the following response in telegram 1050, Jan. 5, from New Delhi:

"In absence of Prime Minister Nehru I discussed question of resuming Panmunjom conversations with Foreign Secretary R. K. Nehru today, stating that Department wished to find out whether GOI might be willing to sound out Chinese Communists on this question. I emphasized that any action GOI might take should be at GOI initiative and without reference to our approach.

"R. K. said he would take matter up promptly with Prime Minister when latter returns to Delhi tomorrow at noon. R. K.'s personal reaction was sympathetic. I think he was pleased at this indication of our belief that GOI might play useful role.

"R. K. asked how we thought demands by both sides that charges be withdrawn might be overcome. I said we thought conference record might be edifed and perfidy charge omitted. If Communists insisted we also edit out charge that Chinese Communists were Soviet agents, I thought we would be agreeable.

"He asked whether we had any specific date in mind for resumption of talks. I said I thought we were ready at any time agreement could be reached." (795.00/1-554)

695A.0024/1-554: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT SEOUL, January 5, 1954—1 a. m.

620. State pass Defense; repeated information niact Tokyo 369 (pass CINCUNC), New Delhi 44. Tokyo for General Hull. ReEmbtels 614[1] and 617.[2]

General Taylor and I spent nearly two hours with President Rhee and Foreign Minister Pyun this afternoon following receipt of Pyun's note in which he notified UNC that ROK "will move armed police into demilitarized area by noon January 6 to halt illegal screening of anti-Communist prisoners by Indian custodial troops". Atmosphere of meeting was tense, with Rhee at times almost hysterical, with Pyun whenever Rhee showed signs of adopting more rational attitude again inflaming President by references to Indian "coercion, brutality and torture" in connection with what President repeatedly described as "134 anti-Communist prisoners sent to their death by pro-Communist Indian forces".

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[1] Dated Jan. 3, not printed. In it, Ambassador Briggs said that Taylor had drafted a letter to Rhee, to be sent on approval by General Hull, offering to replace a limited number of U.S. Marine guards with an equal number of ROK guards in the demilitarized zone who could observe from outside the compounds the roll call procedures which were to be resumed on Jan. 4. General Taylor indicated that it would not be practicable to have ROK observers attend the proceedings of the NNRC while cases of individual North Koreans or Chinese seeking repatriation were being considered. (695A.0024/1-354)

[2] Dated Jan. 4, not printed. It conveyed the text of Pyun's letter to General Hull, the substance of which is given in this telegram. (695A.0024/1-454)

Taylor called attention to his letter of this date (delivered noon today approximately three hours before arrival of Pyun's "ultimatum" although President said ROK note prepared prior receipt Taylor's letter) and explained that proposal set forth therein—(namely replacement by ROK personnel of limited equal number UNC American personnel to enter demilitarized zone, but not prisoners' compound, and observe from boundary prisoners' compound roll call procedures undertaken by Indians) was the only suggestion within armistice terms which UNC could make.

Rhee made several proposals which all boiled down to having unarmed ROK observers present at verification process and within compounds to observe what Indians were doing. He first insisted on having such observers armed but finally seemed to accept unarmed observers. Under such conditions he appeared not to oppose verification and screening. Taylor pointed out that ROK suggestion probably either beyond terms of reference or would require Indian permission which probably could not be obtained. Rhee reiterated demand that his request be considered "in highest quarters".

During meeting Taylor and I pointed out to Rhee as earnestly as we could both deplorable effects from point of view of welfare Korea (including attitude toward Korean matters of US Congress at forthcoming session) and also the world-wide harm to Korea's interests resulting from present situation in which Communist and ROK are found on same side and against UNC. This apparently new idea to Rhee who somewhat shaken. However, under prodding from Pyun he quickly resumed intemperate attack on Indians as root all demilitarized zone evil.

Taylor warned Rhee that if the armed intervention apparently contemplated by Pyun were carried out it might well lead to violence between troops of Eighth Army and the violators of the armistice.

We emphasized to Rhee serious nature of language of first paragraph of Pyun's note which amounted to threat to violate armistice by armed force. He showed considerable dismay and asked hopefully whether letter had been sent to Washington. On being told it had he said that though it might be a mistake he would accept consequences.

Meeting ended by counsel on our part that Rhee seriously consider direction in which his present policy is leading and by suggestion we discuss matter after further consideration. As we prepared depart, Rhee sought describe Pyun's note as "merely suggestion" and nothing US Government ought to take "so seriously". This however was followed by statement "we must protect our anti-Communist prisoners".

Recommendations: That we stand pat. Rhee has no intention of using force against UNC troops. For moment feel we should not show too much concern with Rhee's demands and adhere generally to offer made in Taylor's letter. Meanwhile we should encourage Thimayya to go ahead as rapidly as possible with Swiss and Swedes present. (General Bryan [3] today given to understand roll call procedure to be resumed by Indians January 7.) To show nervousness in face of Pyun's "ultimatum" would in our estimation create impression of feebleness and indecision on Rhee. Requests to Rhee to produce evidence or proof of pressure by Indians were rejected by statement "I know what I know." This, without support other than Pyun's activity, is altogether unconvincing.

Understand Hull is sending Taylor instructions tomorrow which we will await before resuming discussion with Rhee.[4]

BRIGGS

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[3] Maj. Gen. Blackshear M. Bryan, USA, Commanding General, I U.S. Corps.

[4] In telegram 1047, Jan. 5, from New Delhi, Ambassador Allen observed that resolute action by the UNC was needed to maintain the demilitarized zone and said that he had no doubt that the UNC would take the necessary steps to prevent ROK police or other forces from violating the zone. He stated that ROK interference could only provoke a serious clash with the Indian forces in the demilitarized zone. (795.00/1–554)

In telegram 624, Jan. 5, from Seoul, Ambassador Briggs informed the Department of State that his conversations with Ambassador Wang of the Republic of China in Seoul led him to believe that the developments surrounding the Pyun letter were strictly attributable to Rhee and Pyun and were not the product of any collusion between the Chinese Nationalists and the Republic of Korea. (695A.0024/1–554)

695A.0024/1–554: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT SEOUL, January 5, 1954—7 p. m.

627. Repeated information priority Tokyo 373, priority Taipei 45, priority New Delhi 47. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Re Embtel 625 [1] and previous telegrams this subject.

Within fifteen minutes of delivery General Taylor's letter to President Rhee (see reference telegram) latter telephoned Taylor to say whole incident of Pyun's note of January 4 (Embtel 617, January 4 [2]) and subsequent developments had been misunderstanding. He said he accepted Taylor's letters (second letter delivered this afternoon reiterated offer re unarmed Korean Police proceeding to DZ to participate in DZ patrol). He added that he was sending General Won Yong Tok [*Duk*] (ROK Provost Marshal General) to see Taylor immediately re latter.

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[1] Telegram 625 from Seoul contained the following text of the letter from Taylor to Rhee, Jan. 5:

"In reply to Foreign Minister Pyun's communication of January 4, 1954, the Commander-in-Chief, UNC, directs me to inform the Government of Republic of Korea that entrance into demilitarized area by South Korea armed police as outlined in the aforesaid communication is totally unacceptable as it is in direct violation of terms of armistice agreement. The UNC is morally obligated to carry out both in spirit and letter the terms of armistice agreement. This the Commander-in-Chief of the UNC intends to do to limit of his ability.

"The custody of the prisoners of war for present is in hands of custodial forces India which under terms of armistice agreement, has full custody of prisoners of war while they remain in that category. Under paragraph 6 of terms of reference, the UNC is responsible for 'preventing and restraining any armed forces (including irregular armed forces) in area under his control from any acts of disturbance and intrusion against the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody'. This responsibility the UNC will carry out even though it requires the use of force." (695.0024/1–554)

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 2, *supra*.

At meeting one hour later between General Taylor and General Won, which I attended, Won said he was prepared to send "his men" (that is, Korean Military Police outside UNC control) to DZ immediately. Taylor replied he not prepared receive Won's men but would permit enter DZ not exceeding 100 ROK Marines who would replace equal number US Marines. They would be under UNC in strict accord with letter quoted Embtel 625. It was left that detailed plans to effect this would be worked out tomorrow between General Won and General Bryan, Corps Commander.

I later called on Pyun at his request but declined to enter into further discussion of matters settled by Taylor letter and Rhee's acceptance thereof. Pyun notably subdued and turned to separate unrelated matter. Of interest, however, that as I left I encountered in Pyun's anteroom General Won who after proceeding from Taylor's office to Rhee had obviously come to consult with Pyun regarding situation. This confirms my view that those two largely responsible for campaign which terminated for the moment this afternoon with Rhee acceptance Taylor letter.

BRIGGS

795.00/1-654: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State

SECRET NEW DELHI, January 6, 1954—10 a. m.

1051. Repeated information London 172, Tokyo 66, Seoul 37, Munsan-ni 9. Tokyo for CINCUNC; Munsan-ni for Young. Re Deptel 770, January 4.[1]

During meeting with R. K. Nehru yesterday I had another long discussion concerning release of POW's. He said GOI decision would have to be reached "during next few days" since whatever decision might be, arrangements would have to be made before January 23 for carrying it out.

His personal view now is that although CFI will no longer be competent to hold prisoners as such after January 23, it nevertheless will continue to be responsible for maintaining order inside POW enclosures until February 22. Since responsibility for maintaining order in DZ but outside POW enclosures rests with military police, he personally thought arrangement could be made between CFI and each command separately for releasing POW's to military police at gates of compounds on successive days beginning January 23. However, before CFI enters into agreement with separate commands, he thought Thimayya should go through preliminary procedure of asking both sides if they would agree to resumption of *status quo ante* September 24, (that is, return of POW's to respective sides). R. K. does not contemplate obtaining agreement from both sides to this procedure but feels Thimayya should make request for the record.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 1691.

I succeeded in making R. K. go over with me again carefully Paragraph 11 for NNRC Terms of Reference. I emphasized once more how clear the language was that NNRC should declare POW's civilians on January 23. He repeated GOI position that NNRC could not do so because PC had not considered question for 30 days.

I then emphasized again that unless arrangements are made before January 23 for orderly release, terrific explosion and possibly mass slaughter would occur on that date. He showed astonishment at my use of word "slaughter". I explained that prisoners would most certainly attempt mass breakout and if CFI tried to maintain order, it could do so only with machine guns. He said, "That is why we must reach agreement before then."

I referred to Thimayya's statement in today's press that POW's would be released January 23. He said, "I can't understand why Thimayya keeps on saying that". I said Thimayya undoubtedly realized that statement was necessary to calm prisoners. I ended conversation with expression of entire confidence that POW's would be released on January 23 and that GOI had no other alternative.

Conversation was pleasant throughout. It is entirely clear to me that GOI will arrange for releasing prisoners in orderly manner.

ALLEN

795.00/1-654: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET
NIACT

SEOUL, January 6, 1954—10 p. m.

635. Reference: Deptel 560, January 4.[2] President's letter delivered to President Rhee at noon today. Letter produced tense, quietly venomous monologue lasting approximately thirty minutes. Foreign Minister Pyun present. During this period Rhee progressed, slowly reading letter aloud with increasingly contemptuous asides, from disappointment to

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[1] According to notes attached to the source text, copies of this telegram were sent to Dulles, Smith, Robertson, Murphy, and Bowie. A marginal notation on the source text, presumably by Drumright, read: "This telegram should be closely held."

[2] In telegram 560 to Seoul, the Department of State transmitted Eisenhower's letter of Jan. 2 to Rhee; for text of the letter, see p. 1685.

undisguised hostility. He concluded by rejecting, in context of second paragraph of letter, both mutual defense treaty and economic aid program as "cheap political bribes" offered to divert him from unification of Korea, and by declaring that unless US is prepared assist ROK to unify country (that is resume war at ROK side) "we shall open negotiations with Soviet Russia".

In addition Rhee made following comments:

Concerning phrase "always acting together in mutual agreement" Rhee complained this one-sided affair to date. Succeeding sentence "Vice President satisfied you will not renew hostilities unilaterally" led to charge US has been acting unilaterally throughout, whereas Rhee's reiterated warnings that Korea cannot be unified except by force have fallen on deaf American ears. Furthermore Rhee said he tired of our constantly throwing this phrase in his face. He went on to declare better for Korea to be "united under Communist slavery" than left divided. This led series further charges to effect armistice has benefited only US but is strangling Korea, while Rhee's fellow citizens in north are being tortured and slaughtered (*sic*). Next sentence, referring to President's request to Congress for action on Korea's behalf evoked reference to bribery mentioned above. As to "unification by peaceful means" (penultimate paragraph) Rhee reiterated his conviction unification impossible except by fighting, or capitulation to Soviet terms; any further attempt at negotiation he characterized as "childish".

Rhee's reception of President Eisenhower's letter should be considered in conjunction with developments here during past week.

Rhee obviously suffering from all the resentment, bile and repression generated since December 31 over POW issue and some part of foregoing can be interpreted as blowing off steam, following his retreat before resolute stand of Generals Hull and Taylor against Pyun's threat to march ROK forces into demilitarized zone. However, believe Rhee's attitude should also be interpreted in much broader context as something which has been developing ever since armistice negotiations resumed last April. These developments have included our experiences with him during May, June and July over his conviction armistice would fail promote unification; Rhee's success (from his point of view) in unilaterally releasing POW's last June; reports of growing post-armistice Communist strength in North Korea ("for every 100 soldiers it would have cost last July to unify Korea," Rhee declared bitterly, "it will cost 1,000 soldiers now"); recent Red China–North Korea pact; Rhee's altercations with Economic Coordinator Wood over aid program and his persistently held erroneous notion US seeking dictate; his equally erroneous belief US favoring Japan at expense ROK; November–December Panmunjom negotiations which strengthened still further Rhee's conviction no peaceful unification possible; and announcement impending withdrawal of two US divisions from Korea.

There is also problem of Rhee's advancing age; of his blind, intense and narrow nationalism; and of tragic frustration he inevitably feels that time, for him, is running out.

Because of relevance developments described in this telegram to matters raised in NSC/170/1,[3] I am showing this telegram to General Taylor and Kenneth Young.

BRIGGS

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[3] *Ante*, p. 1620.

795.00/1-754: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET SEOUL, January 7, 1954—2 p. m.
NIACT

639. At small private dinner given by Commanding General Air Force last night President Rhee present. He looked extremely worn and haggard. While personally friendly he made no reference to meeting described Embassy's telegram 635.[1]

I suggest that for next few days at least we take no further step with Rhee concerning matters discussed, leaving him to reflect on consequences of statements made and attitude he adopted yesterday. In particular, I believe it would be undesirable for Young and me to call on Rhee with reference to proposed resumption of Panmunjom talks. Department's telegram 570, January 7,[2] just received. This is in reply to Young's 633[3] which was drafted before my call on Rhee yesterday at which President characterized as "childish" attempt resume negotiations. Department will recall he likewise expressed his opposition to resumption in public New Year statement. Furthermore, presence of Ambassador Yang at January 4 meeting can be interpreted as official notification to Republic of Korea.

While there is always chance Rhee may issue public blast denouncing resumption and disassociating his government therefrom, this prospect would probably not be noticeably diminished by proposed visit.

Young agrees and I suggest therefore, that we postpone approach to Rhee, at least pending Department's consideration of this message.[4]

BRIGGS

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] In this telegram, Jan. 6, the Department of State informed Briggs and Young, *inter alia*, that it did not wish to become involved in drawn out negotiations with Rhee on resumption of the Panmunjom talks. (795.00/1-654)

[3] In this telegram, Jan. 6, Briggs suggested that some understanding was needed with the ROK regarding resumption of the preliminary talks for a political conference. (795.00/1-654)

[4] In telegram 574 to Seoul, Jan. 7, 1954, the Department of State approved Briggs' recommendation to defer conversations with Rhee regarding resumption of Panmunjom talks and asked the Ambassador to inform Young. (795.00/1-754)

795.00/1-754: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union [1]

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1954—6:05 p. m.

444. 1. As summarized in Deptel 639 to New Delhi,[2] being repeated Moscow as Deptel 443, we took position at Panmunjom talks that Soviet Union should attend Korean Political Conference as full voting participant. Chinese representative insisted USSR be invited as non-voting neutral.

2. Chinese representative in informal conversation with Indian NNRC officials reported to have stated he unable understand why Ambassador Dean insisted USSR attend as voting participant and be signatory to conference agreements and asked if Dean intended this as insult to CPR. He also expressed surprise when Indians expressed conviction US would never agree have USSR attend as a neutral.

In reporting conversation to Ambassador Dean, Indians indicated it was their impression Chinese regard CPR as principal Communist power concerned with Korean matters and would be willing withdraw their proposal USSR be invited as neutral if we would not insist on its being a voting participant.

We have no other indication Chinese attitude, but question arises whether CPR, having already suggested secondary status for USSR, may in fact prefer USSR not attend conference in any capacity. If so, further question is whether CPR could or would agree to exclusion USSR.

3. For our part we are prepared reconsider our position in view present estimate that conference will not be able achieve major agreements re Korea's future and likely at best do no more than arrange *modus vivendi* to supersede or supplement Armistice Agreement. In our view, Soviet adherence such arrangements not essential. We are of course also interested in possibility testing CPR–USSR relationship.

4. Your comments would be appreciated as to desirability and feasibility political conference without USSR and implications such a conference for CPR–USSR relations.

DULLES

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[1] This telegram was drafted by De Palma and cleared by Drumright, McClurkin, Key, Murphy, and with Barbour.

[2] Not printed. (795.00/11-2453)

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Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, January 7, 1954.] [2]

Subject: Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea

Reference: NSC Action 972*b* [3]

1. If the Communists renew hostilities in Korea in the near future, the United States military objectives should be to:

a. Destroy effective Chinese Communist military power applied to the Korean effort.

b. Reduce Chinese Communist military capability for further aggression in the Korean area.

c. Create conditions under which ROK forces can assume increasing responsibility for the defense of Korea.

2. In pursuit of these objectives in the event of Communist renewal of hostilities, the following military courses of action should be undertaken:

a. Employing atomic weapons, conduct offensive air operations against military targets in Korea, and against those military targets in Manchuria and China which are being used by the Communists in direct support of their operations in Korea, or which threaten the security of US/UN forces in the Korean area.

b. Simultaneously, exploit as practicable such successes as may be gained as a result of action outlined in *a* above, by coordinated ground, naval and air action to destroy enemy forces in Korea.

c. In light of the circumstances prevailing at the time, and subject to an evaluation of the results of operations conducted under *a* and *b*, be prepared to take further action against Communist China to reduce its war-making capability in the Korean area, such as:

(1) Blockade of China coast.
(2) Seizure of Hainan and other off-shore islands.
(3) Raids on the China mainland by Chinese Nationalist forces.

d. Immediately consider what further military build-up is then required to meet the resulting contingencies in Korea or elsewhere.

3. In the event of Communist renewal of hostilities in Korea, the United States should immediately seek to secure UN and general inter-

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[1] As requested in NSC Action No. 972-*b*, Dec. 3, 1953, the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff jointly prepared this restatement of the initial military objectives and courses of action in the event the Communists renewed hostilities in Korea. For a text of the portion prepared by the JCS before coordination with the Department, see the attachment to the letter from Wilson to Dulles, Dec. 23, 1953, p. 1674.

[2] The source text did not indicate a drafter or a date; since the statement was still being discussed on the morning of Jan. 7 (see memorandum by Bowie, *infra*), the editors have given it that date.

[3] For text, see the memorandum of discussion at the 173d meeting of the NSC, Dec. 3, 1953, p. 1636.

national support for the military courses of action stated in paragraphs 2*a* and *b* above. To this end, the United States should seek to:

a. Clearly demonstrate Communist responsibility for the renewal of hostilities, and in particular facilitate reports on Communist actions by representatives in Korea of the non-Soviet neutral powers and UN agencies;

b. Secure UN action reiterating condemnation of Communist aggression, endorsing continuation of the UNC effort under United States leadership, and calling on all member States for increased assistance to the UNC;

c. Secure immediate implementation of the sixteen-power Joint Declaration, and contribution of forces and other assistance to the Korean effort by other nations.

4. If, after evaluation of the results of operations conducted under paragraphs 2*a* and *b*, it was decided that the U.S. should embark upon the courses of action stated in paragraph 2*c*, the United States should then attempt to secure UN and general international support for such military courses of action.

5. In the event of Communist renewal of hostilities, Soviet reactions to U.S. countermeasures would be importantly influenced by Soviet estimates of U.S. objectives.

a. If the Soviets were convinced that U.S. objectives were limited to those stated in paragraph 1, it is estimated that they would:

(1) Undoubtedly participate on a large scale, although probably not openly, in the air defense of North Korea, Manchuria and China;

(2) Increase assistance to Chinese Communist and North Korean forces in equipment, advisers, and technicians;

(3) Assist the Chinese Communist and Korean air forces, and might participate with Soviet forces, in offensive air action against US/UN bases in Korea;

(4) Probably not initiate Soviet offensive action against U.S. bases in Japan and Okinawa or seek to broaden the war.

b. If the Communists believed that the United States military objectives went beyond those stated in paragraph 1, the Soviet reaction would be likely to be more extensive and might well involve overt Soviet participation.

c. If the U.S. undertook the courses of action stated in paragraphs 2*a* and *b* above, and the blockade of the China coast referred to in paragraph 2*c*(1), and if in implementing these actions the U.S. limited air attacks to targets connected directly with and in the vicinity of the Korean operations and avoided air attacks on Port Arthur and Dairen, the Soviet Union might be satisfied that U.S. objectives were limited to those stated in paragraph 1. Massive U.S. air attacks on numerous targets in China Proper, large scale landings on the China mainland, or possibly the seizure of Hainan, would stimulate Communist belief that the U.S. had objectives going beyond those stated in paragraph 1, and that the U.S. in fact intended to bring about the complete overthrow of the Peiping regime.

6. *a.* Free World reaction to U.S. countermeasures would depend upon the degree to which the other nations were convinced—

(1) That the Communists were responsible for the renewal of hostilities;
(2) That U.S. military objectives were limited; and
(3) That U.S. countermeasures would not stimulate either overt Soviet participation in the Korean hostilities or Soviet aggression in Europe.

b. If the U.S. clearly demonstrated Communist responsibility for the renewal of hostilities, undertook the courses of action stated in paragraphs 2*a* and *b*, and in implementing these courses of action limited attacks to targets directly connected with and in the vicinity of the Korean operations and avoided air attacks on Port Arthur or Dairen, it is probable that the other Free World nations could be convinced that U.S. objectives were limited to those stated in paragraph 1. In this case it is estimated that:

(1) The Allies of the United States in the Korean action would probably honor their commitments under the sixteen-power Joint Declaration, and would provide political and some material support for United States courses of action.
(2) A majority of the UN would probably give UN sanction to United States courses of action.
(3) Friendly powers outside of the UN, such as Japan, would support United States efforts.

c. It is possible that blockade of the China coast would not seriously affect the conviction of our Allies that U.S. military objectives were limited to those stated in paragraph 1.

d. Massive U.S. air attacks on numerous targets in China Proper, large scale landings on the China mainland, or the seizure of Hainan would probably lead our Allies to believe that the U.S. was intent upon the complete overthrow of the Peiping regime, and that accordingly there was acute danger of overt Soviet participation in the hostilities or of Soviet aggression in Europe. In this case it would be difficult to secure UN or Allied support of U.S. courses of action and the cohesion of United States alliances would be seriously weakened.

7. In undertaking the actions stated in paragraphs 2*a* and *b*, and in making decisions about undertaking the actions stated in paragraph 2*c*, the United States should pay due regard to the desirability of minimizing the risks of overt Soviet intervention in the Korean hostilities and of maximizing the possibilities of securing UN and Allied support for U.S. courses of action. In the last analysis, however, the U.S. should undertake the military courses of action stated in paragraph 2 which prove necessary to achieve the objectives outlined in paragraph 1, with such Allied support as it may be possible to mobilize.

8. Approval of the courses of action set out in this paper is based on the estimates of the reactions of the Soviet Union and the Free World contained in paragraphs 5 and 6. Since conditions may change with the passage of time, these estimates and the planned courses of action should be reviewed periodically by the National Security Council. For the same reason, the planned courses of action should be put into effect only with the specific approval of the President at the time of any Communist renewal of hostilities. [Nothing in the above is intended to restrict in any way the authority of the U.S. Commander in Chief, F.E., to take whatever action is necessary to insure the safety of his forces.] [4]

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[4] Brackets in the source text. The following note appeared at the end of the source text: "Defense's suggestion is bracketed."

S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 170 Series

Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 7, 1954.

Subject: Courses of Action in Korea

1. After our briefing this morning, Defense notified us that it wished to add, at the end of paragraph 8 of this paper,[1] the following sentence:

> "Nothing in the above is intended to restrict in any way the authority of the U.S. Commander in Chief, F.E., to take whatever action is necessary to insure the safety of his forces."

The Commander should, of course, be able to take necessary emergency action to insure the safety of his forces. As worded, the new JCS sentence could easily be read very broadly. When I raised this question, I was told that it was not intended to authorize the carrying out of the atomic offensive called for by paragraph 2–*a*. I would suggest that if this point is to be covered, the sentence might read as follows:

> "In the event of any such Communist renewal of hostilities, the U.S. Commander in Chief, F.E., may, however, take necessary emergency action, not involving the use of atomic weapons, to insure the safety of his forces."

[Here follows a report on the minutes of the Bermuda Conference and the agreed United States–United Kingdom policy regarding nuclear weapons.]

ROBERT R. BOWIE

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[1] *Supra.*

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 179th Meeting of the National Security Council, Friday, January 8, 1954[1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 179th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 2); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Items 1 and 2); the Deputy Secretary of Defense (for Item 3); the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (for Item 3); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Sherman Adams, the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Gen. Persons, Deputy Assistant to the President; the NSC Representative on Internal Security; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

Following is a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

[Here follows discussion on items 1. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security" and 2. "Review of Internal Security Legislation".]

3. *Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea* (NSC Actions Nos. 794, 949–*d* and 972;[2] NSC 170/1 [3])

General Cutler summarized prior Council action on this problem, and said that he understood that, in accordance with a Council directive, the Secretary of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had now produced an agreed report on the military objectives and major courses of action in the event that the Communists renewed hostilities in Korea in the near future.[4] There was, however, said General Cutler, some question as to whether the Secretary of State had agreed to a last-minute addition to this report made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, relating to the right of the U.S. Commander in the Far East to take whatever action he thought necessary to protect the security of his forces.[5]

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[1] Drafted by Gleason on Jan. 11.

[2] For the texts of these actions, see the memoranda of discussion at the 145th, May, 20, 168th, Oct. 29, and 173d, Dec. 3, 1953, meetings of the NSC, pp. 1064, 1570, and 1636, respectively.

[3] Dated Nov. 20, p. 1620.

[4] Dated Jan. 7, p. 1700.

[5] See the memorandum by Bowie, *supra*.

After Admiral Radford had read the report (copy filed in the minutes of the 179th NSC meeting), the President commented that this last sentence seemed to him merely to set forth an inherent right of any military commander.

Secretary Dulles pointed out that the only question with respect to this final sentence which worried the State Department, was whether this sentence was intended to convey authority to the U.S. commander to use atomic weapons without reference back to Washington.

In reply, Admiral Radford stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had given most careful consideration to this point, and that he himself had talked personally to General Hull about it. The Council should be aware, continued Admiral Radford, that in the present circumstances it would take 22 hours for General Hull actually to initiate an atomic attack in the event that the Communists did renew their aggression. This interval would provide ample time to secure Presidential permission before actually using atomic weapons against the aggressor.

The President commented that there would be no trouble about the mechanics of the matter. The real problem was how to get public opinion in the free world nations to grasp the fact that the Communists had initiated the hostilities. Sir Winston Churchill had been afraid that if the United States reacted too promptly with atomic weapons, we might fail to secure a clear understanding that the Communists were the guilty party. 22 hours, however, the President thought, should certainly be sufficient to establish Communist guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Admiral Radford pointed out that of course the military were constantly striving to reduce the 22-hour interval so that atomic attack could be launched more promptly, and stated that there were at least 22 enemy airfields which our commander would want to take out as promptly as possible.

The President replied that he understood this point, and believed that our Air Force, in its anxiety to react to Communist attack at once, would in the first instance attack these targets with conventional armaments. Our people, continued the President, have understood the atomic weapon, but we must be a little patient with our allies, who had not as yet fully grasped the import of atomic warfare. We could not control the situation in advance by sending a directive on this matter to General Hull, but the latter must be assured that he was free to react instantly to a new Communist aggression with everything he had except the atomic weapon. The decision on use of this weapon would have to be referred to Washington.

Secretary Wilson stated that he understood the President's feeling about using the A-bomb strategically in the contingency envisaged, but wondered whether there was not a difference which would permit the use of the atomic shell tactically.

In response, the President expressed doubt as to whether such shells were now in a position to be used promptly, and stated his belief that it would take some little time to assemble them for use against the enemy.

Admiral Radford commented that what was really requisite would be a constant review of the problem if in the future it looked as though a Communist attack was imminent. He felt sure that we would have some warning of the intentions of the Communists to resume the war.

The President then changed the subject and stated that he seemed to be in disagreement with many members of the Council on one very important issue. He did not believe, said the President, that the USSR was going to let itself get involved in full-scale warfare in the Far East. The risks were just too great and the distances for supply too extended. Admiral Radford expressed agreement with the President, and said he did not believe that the Soviets would intervene overtly.

Governor Stassen said that to him it seemed of the utmost importance that for the first 12 hours of the Communist attack our military commanders issue news bulletins every half hour or so, specifying precisely where and how the Communist forces were attacking. While he realized that this was contrary to the instincts of a military commander, he felt that prompt news releases would be very important in convincing our allies that the Communists were indeed the aggressors.

Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that the memorandum which Admiral Radford had read at the beginning of the discussion, contained various intelligence estimates. Ordinarily the CIA had an opportunity to examine such estimates. Perhaps in this instance the matter was considered too sensitive, but in any case Mr. Dulles warned the Council that in his view the circumstances of a renewal of Communist aggression were likely to be very fuzzed up and obscure at the outset. We might, therefore, well confront a situation in which the act of Communist aggression was clear enough to us, but not at all clear to the rest of the free world.

At least, said the President, let us be sure of one thing: that we are not going to use the A-bomb in any "border incident". This was to be reserved for a major Communist attack.

Mr. Dulles went on to explain what he had in mind. He thought it quite possible that the Communists would launch their attack by infiltrating ROK units and staging an attack on the Communist lines in order to make it appear as though hostilities had been started on ROK initiative. The Communists would then proceed to denounce the ROK as violators of the armistice, and then to invade South Korea.

The President replied that although the situation at the outset was likely to be very confused, he was inclined to doubt whether the Communists could act as Mr. Dulles feared they might.

Admiral Radford shared the President's skepticism with regard to Mr. Dulles' fears, since, thought Admiral Radford, the first Communist move would logically be an attempt to destroy our air forces. If, on the contrary, the Communists initiated hostilities by some such border incident as Mr. Dulles feared, they would give away their hand and warn us of their intentions in sufficient time to enable us to protect our own forward air bases. In short, it would clearly be to the disadvantage of the Communists to attack otherwise than without warning.

In any case, said Mr. Dulles, he was not in complete agreement with various points of the intelligence estimate in the report which Admiral Radford had read, particularly with respect to the circumstances under which the USSR might be provoked into intervention. He was quite sure that the Soviets would be extremely sensitive about any targets close to the Soviet borders.

The President commented that if we could attack simultaneously all of the Communist forward air bases, the enemy would be seriously crippled at the outset of hostilities. This was our plan in Europe. If you put one A-bomb on each enemy airfield you destroyed all the planes on the field and, moreover, any of the planes which managed to get into the air would have no bases to return to. This would be a very tough situation for any enemy.

Secretary Wilson said that he gathered that an attack upon Hainan Island was placed by the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the category of operations which the U.S. could undertake in the contingency of a renewal of hostilities, without expanding the war and bringing the Russians in.

The President replied that the only reason that Hainan had been mentioned was because it looked as though this were the kind of operation which might be successfully done.

Secretary Wilson suggested that the Hainan operation be omitted, but both the Secretary of State and Admiral Radford preferred that it be continued as a course of action.

Admiral Radford then suggested a revision of the last sentence of the report, dealing with the problem of atomic weapons. The Council agreed to the language suggested by Admiral Radford, and the President said that of course, while the decision as to the use of weapons was to be made by him, the commander in the field was to be told to be ready as promptly as possible to use atomic weapons when the decision had been made. Admiral Radford replied that the President need not worry, and that all advance preparations would be made.

Secretary Dulles felt that it was important to assure a regular and systematic review of the objectives and courses of action which the United States should take in the event of a Communist renewal of hostilities in Korea. Almost all the presumptions on which the present courses of action had been based were subject to rapid change; for example, the circumstances which would provoke the USSR to intervene, or the attitude of our allies toward the use of atomic weapons. Since these attitudes could change in as short a time as three months, it was of vital importance to keep the problem under constant review.

Admiral Radford pointed out that within the next six to eight months he believed that we would be able to react against the enemy with atomic weapons in a matter of four hours or less, instead of the present 22 hours.

Secretary Dulles, however, explained that he was not referring to physical reaction, but reaction by the United States in a manner which would not risk alienating the sympathies of our allies. Perhaps the single most important step we could make in this direction would be the exchange of certain atomic information with our European allies and letting some of these fellows in Europe have a few atomic weapons.

Mr. Flemming[6] then inquired whether Council approval of the present report should be the cue for him to set in motion mobilization plans for the contingency of renewed hostilities. Some preliminary military plan would, of course, be made, and if certain of its content could be made available to ODM the latter would be able to proceed with the appropriate mobilization plan.

Secretary Wilson stated that he believed all of this could be done within the Defense Department itself, but the President disagreed, and stated his own conviction that a Communist renewal of aggression in Korea would require general mobilization by the United States.

Mr. Flemming again expressed his views as to mobilization planning, and Secretary Wilson said that his own concern stemmed largely from the prevalence of leaks, which he found a very frustrating problem.

On this latter point, the President observed that certain of the more sensitive subjects which came before the Council for consideration should not be set forth in any written paper at all, but should be presented orally to the Council by the responsible member. This should be the rule with specially sensitive problems, and might help solve the serious problem of leaks. As for the issue of mobilization planning which Mr. Flemming had raised, the President expressed his conviction (and with warmth) that every time in the past when this nation had gone to war it had fooled around for an inordinate length of time with partial mobilization measures and controls. As a result, by the time we got to the point of invoking real controls, our economy was in a mess for which we had to pay after the conclusion of hostilities. He hoped this would never again happen, and that in the next war, if there was one, all our mobilization plans would be in readiness and we should be able to go to the Congress with a call for full mobilization and get what we needed at once to prosecute the war. It was much better to overshoot the mark, and it was easier to recede from full mobilization, if circumstances dictated, than it was to advance to full mobilization from partial and improvised initial steps.

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[6] Dr. Arthur S. Flemming, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization.

Turning to Mr. Flemming, Admiral Radford pointed out how difficult it was to predict the precise circumstances in which the Communists might renew warfare in Korea. It was accordingly difficult for the military to supply an estimate which would offer a suitable basis for mobilization planning. But it was his own view, said Admiral Radford, that any new outbreak of hostilities in Korea would require full U.S. mobilization immediately. Mr. Flemming said that he agreed with this judgment, and would prepare his mobilization plans in accordance with it.

The President added that we should get tough right away quick and get into the business with both feet. Let's have all our plans ready to go full out. It is easier to retreat from this kind of situation than to go ahead promptly without adequate preparation. When you finally decide to resort to force you should plan no limits to its use.

Secretary Humphrey said that he had only one clear idea on this issue, namely, when you drop your first atomic bomb you go to full mobilization.

The President concluded the discussion by asking that the Council record indicate that if anything required the United States to expand beyond its present military posture, the contingency should call for full mobilization.

The National Security Council: [7]

a. Adopted, subject to certain amendments, the military objectives and major courses of action in the event that the Communists renew hostilities in Korea in the near future, as presented at the meeting by the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff pursuant to NSC Action No. 972-*b.*

b. Noted the comments by the Director of Central Intelligence regarding the intelligence estimates contained in the presentation by the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. Agreed that the objectives, courses of action and estimates presented by the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be reviewed periodically, and any necessary revisions presented to the National Security Council.

d. Agreed with the President's view that in the event of aggression which would, under approved policies, require an increase in U.S. armed forces, the United States should at once proceed to general mobilization; and noted the President's directive that the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, in collaboration with the Secretary of Defense, prepare for Council consideration a plan for immediate general mobilization in such event.

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[7] The following paragraphs and note constituted NSC Action No. 1004, a record copy of which is located in S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.

Note: The action in *a* above, as approved by the President, subsequently referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President. The action in *c* above subsequently referred to the Secretaries of State and Defense for appropriate implementation. The action in *d* above subsequently transmitted to the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, for appropriate implementation.

[Here follows discussion on items 4. "United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia," 5. "Presentation of the FY 1955 Foreign Assistance Program," and 6. "NSC Status of Projects".]

S. EVERETT GLEASON

795.00/1–854: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State

SECRET NEW DELHI, January 8, 1954—8 p. m.

1075. Department pass USUN unnumbered; repeated information Tokyo 71, London 182, Munsan-ni 14, Seoul 42. Munsan-ni for Young; Tokyo for CINCUNC.

R. K. Nehru has just called me to say GOI has received reply to inquiry Indian Ambassador made in Peking re resumption of talks at Panmunjom. R. K. said Indian Ambassador was told to say that GOI wished to know, in view of Indian responsibilities in Korea, whether talks were likely to be resumed and to inquire whether "any obstructions to such resumption might be removed".

Chinese replied merely that resumption was entirely up to Americans, since Chinese stood on their last statement at Panmunjom and were ready to resume at any time.

I asked R. K. whether Indian Ambassador had specifically suggested record be edited to expunge objectional phrases. R. K. said Ambassador had merely inquired whether whatever obstructions existed could be removed. Chinese took position no obstructions existed as far as they were concerned.

I then asked R. K. whether GOI felt it could send further instruction to Peking, specifically suggesting, as from GOI, that record be expunged. R. K. said this would be substantive step by GOI and he would have to ask Prime Minister Nehru. R. K. said he had just been reading record of final days' talks and had brought portions of it to attention of Prime Minister, whose reaction was that it was full of "most amazing vituperation from both sides". He would not know where to start expunging. I said we wanted perfidy charge removed and Chinese wanted us to withdraw charge that Chinese were stooges of Moscow.

He said he would ask Prime Minister immediately whether further step was possible.

ALLEN

795.00/1–954: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State

SECRET Moscow, January 9, 1954—4 p. m.

830. As indicated Deptel 444[1] central point in consideration shift of attitude re Soviet participation depends on estimate of possible agreement on conference on Korea's future. I am fully in agreement with Department's view that it is unlikely that any major agreements will be achieved and that in all probability present line of demarcation will become in fact frontier between north and south Korea and therefore Soviet attendance not essential.

As to Soviet-Chinese relations, as Department is aware there is virtually no information available on that subject here in Moscow. We have of course, no contact with Chinese Communist Embassy, and publicity material is generally confined to generalized propaganda statements concerning "eternal" friendship Soviet-Chinese people, et cetera. However, I believe as matter vague speculation there is very probably a good deal of oriental maneuvering between Chinese Communist and Soviets, especially in regard to Korea. Most firm evidence to that effect is fact that last Spring Soviets invited North Koreans to Moscow for conference without Chinese participation and subsequently Chinese returned Korea and matched or possibly exceeded Soviet contribution to North Korean recovery. In addition there have been two purges in North Korea which we are of course, unable to evaluate from here but may well have some relationship to question of Chinese versus Soviet influence.

In circumstances I would think it would be very useful move to indicate our willingness to have conference without any Soviet participation. As matter of tactics it might be preferable to offer Communists choice of either Soviet full voting participation, or non-attendance. This would have additional advantage from general propaganda point of view of offering two alternatives and in event both refused by Communists would help to educate public opinion as to who was blocking possibility conference and would also avoid possible unfavorable reaction on eve Berlin conference of single proposal to exclude Soviet Union.

BOHLEN

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[1] Dated Jan. 7, p. 1699.

795.00/1–954: Telegram

The Deputy Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Young) to the Department of State

SECRET MUNSAN-NI, January 9, 1954—11 p. m.
PRIORITY

206. Repeated information Seoul, Tokyo, CINCUNC, New Delhi unnumbered.

I. I had four hours discussion at dinner in Panmunjom Saturday evening, 9 January, with Haksar, Singh, Kaul, and several others of Indian delegation. Three Indian correspondents also present before supper. Indians who had visited Peiping had spent Friday evening at Kaesong with . . . Chinese and Korean political delegations, which formed background our conversations on many topics, but particularly political conference, US-Chinese Communist relations, and situation in Asia.

About their conversations Friday evening, Singh and Haksar conveyed the following information in strict confidence, on a personal basis, and notwithstanding their annoyance and embarrassment over the "intermediary" stories out of Washington.

1. Huang and Ki were both angry and disturbed over press reports of "secret negotiations" between Americans and themselves, and press reports of Indians acting as "intermediaries". . . . The Communists denied anything was happening.

2. All the Indians here, and Singh in particular, are unhappy over the "intermediary" stories. Singh cited a long article of 27 December in the *Washington Post* naming him, a 1 January story from Washington in *Times of India* reporting US Government dealing with Communists through intermediary in Indian delegation Panmunjom, and Washington comment last Monday. Because of combined effect these stories, Singh said he had to rectify his and Indian position with the Communists at Kaesong who suspected the Indians were perhaps acting in some capacity which they and the Americans had worked out without telling the Chinese. Singh and Haksar both felt sure they had clarified the matter and reassured both Huang and Ki. However, this episode has now made the Indians here shy away self-consciously from appearing in the slightest way as acting as intermediary. At the same time they continue interested in finding out what both sides think, and are continuing convey, but only as they see fit, information from one side to the other. They just don't like to be tagged. I tried to impress them it was a passing flurry nearly over.

3. They apparently were also guarded Friday evening about what they said to the Communists about their talks with Americans and what they tell us about the Communist views. But they did tell me they have made it a point, and again on Friday, to confirm . . . my continued presence here and my intention remain on. It became clear to me as

evening passed that they have conveyed to . . . gist of what I tell them.

4. Haksar and Singh again emphasized that . . . all the Chinese Communists they meet consider the Americans "the trickiest," most difficult people in the world to deal with. I asked, "More so than the Russians?" and all the Indians answered "Yes, indeed". . . .

5. The Communists again on Friday night appeared ready for a resumption of political talks and holding the political conference, but then seemed in no hurry, nor anxious to make first move. Since the Americans walked out and suspended the talks, the Communists say it is up to the Americans to walk back in and resume them. Until they do, the Communists will continue to wait. Communist attitude Kaesong seems parallel that reported in New Delhi's 1075 to Department.[1] The entire Chinese delegation including interpreters is still in Kaesong. The other day I noticed that their two flags are still on the table in the conference building at Panmunjom; the UN flag is not.

6. The Communists believe we do not really want the talks nor the political conference. From conversations with various Chinese and Korean Communists Singh concludes they have these three theories to explain why they think we are preventing a political conference:

(*a*) It would interfere with the administration's budget request for defense funds and foreign aid by relaxing tensions and therefore congressional support.

(*b*) There should be no political conference until the PW problem is disposed of to American satisfaction.

(*c*) A political conference would not serve purpose intensifying world tensions, particularly in Asia, which is basic US policy. Indians thought there was some plausibility in Communists analysis. I, of course, said not a grain of truth in it.

7. According to Indians here, Communists do not believe we will make any real move for political conference until US Government decides arms budget is safe and PWs gone, if then. In the meantime, Communists interpret and denounce Washington announcement 4 January[2] re resumption as another American trick to confuse the world and conceal our "true end" purpose above, by now appearing to want the talks. The Communists told the Indians we have to go through the motions now because of pressure from our Allies to resume talks and because we want to head off the reconvening of the GA on 9 February. The Communists suspect, I am informed, that we will appear more and more interested in convening the talks as 9 February approaches. If that stalls off the GA, or if the talks actually get going and the GA is not convened, then we will let the political talks fade out or break off again after 9 February.

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[1] Dated Jan. 8, p. 1710.

[2] Not further identified.

8. Apparently Huang . . . and Ki . . . showed no concern or interest in the problem of retraction of charges. They again indicated the perfidy charge is really not a serious one. and, since it was just a "pretext" for our suspension, it is no obstruction to resumption if we wish to start the talks again. They are making no move to try out any formula. I did not explore question of charges with Indians since it might have crossed wires with Ambassador Allen's conversations with R. K. Nehru.

9. We discussed and argued in great detail attitudes toward, and of, Communist China. This apparently had also been part of Kaesong conversation Friday night. They again vigorously presented and, I believe, with sincerity, viewpoint reported in paragraph 2 part II mytel 203[3] that Chinese Communists would welcome normalization relations with United States which, Indians declared, would produce a new and better relationship between China and America never before matched between those two countries and which would profoundly change course of events in Asia, particularly in South Asia. They brushed aside all my questions and objections paragraph 10. In this context Indians again urged we iook carefully at our position on insisting USSR be full participant at political conference. They tried to make sure I fully understood not just that Chinese Communists resent we consider them untrustworthy secondary adjunct Soviet Union, but that they will not accept this "derogation" of their "integrity," "sovereignty," and "independence." I asked: "Do you here really think Peiping is so independent of Moscow?" They answered "Yes" without qualification on the basis of their own observations and experiences here or in Peiping.

II. *Comment:*

I hope that Indian attitude expressed above will remain classified and protected. Otherwise my relationships at Panmunjom will suffer. Whatever their views are or are not worth, I believe the Indians are talking to me on all these matters and the PW problem in a spirit of mutual confidence, most complete and detailed candidness, and real friendliness. Therefore, I have been reporting, as accurately as I can but not without some misgivings, those Indian views that seem fixed, pre-considered, and based on some real evidence of theirs.

YOUNG

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[3] Not printed. (795.00/1–654)

320/1-1154: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 11, 1954—6:24 p. m.
NIACT

805. 1. Press reports Madame Pandit has communicated with UN SYG asking him poll UN members reconvening UNGA early in February and indicating desire for responses by January 22. USUN expects receive official communication from Hammarskjold tonight or tomorrow.

2. We are puzzled and somewhat suspicious as to significance of January 22 date for receipt of responses. There is no precedent for setting date for receipt of responses. It would seem related to date for release of POWs, and it may be that Indians, on releasing POWs to two sides, will request latter not to dispose of them until GA has ruled on whether or not terms of armistice agreement have been complied with. Alternatively, though we consider this highly unlikely, Indians might decide retain custody of prisoners pending a GA finding. Either hypothesis involves serious difficulties which we believe we must do utmost avoid.

3. Therefore we will delay our reply to request for resumed GA until we can clarify intentions GOI on disposal POW problem and we shall seek have our friends do same. We do not feel it unreasonable for us to ask for such clarification before make a decision as to desirability resuming GA at a particular time and in particular circumstances. We believe Indians and others will appreciate justice our position on this point.

4. Bearing foregoing in mind approach Indians urgently at high level and ask them what is significance of January 22 date. Explain we cannot reach conclusions re desirability GA session February 9 unless we are aware of basis on which GA will be called upon to consider POW question. For this we must have clear understanding of procedure Indians intend follow regarding POWs when time arrives for their release on January 23. Assuming Indians mean to release POWs or at least to return them to the two commands, we hope Indians make early public statement to that effect, possibly in communications to the two commands.

5. You will appreciate desirability expediting earliest GOI response to foregoing queries.

6. Foregoing without prejudice to our views on desirability of GA action in connection with Korean political conference. Press report this morning states Communists have sent letter to Young proposing re-

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Popper and cleared with McClurkin, Drumright, and William L. S. Williams (Officer in Charge of India-Nepal-Ceylon Affairs) in draft, and Key and Murphy. It was repeated to Seoul as 584, Tokyo as 1610 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC, USUN as 316, and Munsan-ni as 190.

opening Panmunjom talks.[2] We will wish examine their proposal and assess prospects for re-opening talks before we take decisions re GA role in matter.[3]

DULLES

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[2] In telegram 207 from Munsan-ni, Jan. 11, Young relayed the text of the Communist side's note for a liaison meeting Wednesday, Jan. 13, to discuss a date for resumption of political talks. (795.00/1–1154)

[3] In telegram 210 from Munsan-ni, Jan. 12, Young reported that he had agreed to a meeting of liaison secretaries on Jan. 14. (795.00/1–1253)

795.00/1–1154: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET SEOUL, January 11, 1954—10 p. m.

NIACT

660. Reference: Embtel 635, January 6.[2] I believe we should interpret Rhee's current campaign of recrimination and misrepresentation as echoes for public ear of statements made to me January 6.

These attacks unchecked will soon adversely affect US–ROK relations if they have not already done so. I accordingly urge we consider initiative from Washington, either statement or perhaps observations by Secretary at press conference, which without entering into personal polemic with Rhee might nevertheless clear the air and thereafter produce greater ROK restraint. I cannot recommend we accept these continuing false charges without response, even though there may be little we can say to Rhee in his present temper (short of offering resume fighting at his side) which likely alter his attitude toward armistice and related matters.

As germane to foregoing I today received call from departing American citizen associated with Rhee for past several months in advisory capacity. Caller expressed astonishment at US permitting Rhee's attacks to go on, thus encouraging as he put it other Korean officials to conclude Rhee has our government in retreat and way to handle US is through abuse. In this connection he pointed to quick termination ROK nonsense about invading demilitarized zone in face of courteous but firm Hull-Taylor stand last week. While admittedly situations are hardly comparable, nevertheless I doubt whether we ought much longer to let Rhee's behavior pass unnoticed.

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[1] Attached to the source text was a covering memorandum which transmitted a copy of this cable from Drumright to Robertson and advised the following:

"You will note from the attached telegram that Briggs is continuing his campaign to slap Rhee down.

"While we are under provocation, I think that we have to understand Rhee's position and motives. I believe that Rhee's and his PIO's recent statements are mainly for the record and home consumption, that we should not indulge in public recriminations with Rhee, that such tactics on our part could only give Korean pronouncements added prominence and significance, and that we should not allow these verbal blasts to deflect us from our attempt to arrive at an understanding with Rhee. Neither should we allow such activities to deter us from submitting the defense pact to the Senate."

[2] *Ante*, p. 1696.

Or we might defer submitting defense pact to Senate and without public statement let word out we had matter under advisement, and were observing developments.[3]

BRIGGS

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[3] In telegram 589 to Seoul, Briggs was informed that the Secretary considered it inadvisable to engage in public controversy with Rhee or the Korean Government. Instead, Briggs was to stress that abusive statements only harmed U.S.-South Korean relations and prejudiced the attainment by peaceful means of a united and independent Korea to which the United States was committed. Furthermore, in reliance on understandings and agreements already reached with Korea and in the belief that the United States could expect South Korea's further cooperation, the Executive branch had submitted the Mutual Defense Treaty to the Senate. Briggs was to remind Rhee, not as a threat but as a simple statement of fact, that ratification of the treaty could be seriously jeopardized by his government's continuing to issue such unjustified and baseless statements. (795.00/1-1254)

795.00/1-1254: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Deputy Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Young)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 12, 1954—1:49 p. m.

NIACT

192. Following are further instructions promised Deptel 191[2] for use at meeting of liaison secretaries.

1. US Representatives should not accept any Communist proposal that liaison secretaries simply agree to date for resuming discussions as proposed in Communist letter to Young January 11—that is, on basis of Chinese Communist and North Korean statements which we gather propose resumption on basis of Communist November 30 proposal.[3] It must be clearly understood that resumption is without prejudice to right of either side to make any proposal it wishes regarding arrangements for political conference, and that no one proposal, past or future, can have any preferential status unless both sides fully agree.

2. As regards retraction or expunging of Communist charges of US "perfidy", in preliminary conversations we must be careful, on the one hand, not to make demands in such form as to give Communists further opportunity to take intransigent position and to denounce us, and on

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Popper and Dean and cleared with Drumright and Murphy. It was repeated to Seoul as 587, Tokyo as 1615 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC, and New Delhi as 810.

[2] In this telegram, Young was given preliminary instructions to agree to the Communist side's suggestion for a liaison secretaries meeting but, of course, to avoid accepting any specific date until the conditions for resumption were clear. (795.00/1-1154)

[3] The proposal included a shift of the site of the conference from Panmunjom to New Delhi, inclusion of the Soviet Union as a neutral, and general participation of neutral nations in the conference without restrictions, except as to voting.

the other hand not to resume talks on basis which will give the rest of the world, the ROK's and American public opinion a platform from which to denounce us because we are in effect "suing" for the resumption of preliminary talks without any retraction or expunging of charges by Communists.

We, therefore, suggest that these talks be handled in executive session and on an exploratory basis so that we will have complete opportunity to consider appropriate basis for the resumption of talks. You should inform ROK but you should be careful about releasing too much detail so we are not faced with denunciatory statements prior time actual resumption formula is agreed upon.

3. You should seek agreement on following formula: physical expunging last three statements on December 12 and word "perfidious", page 28 of the December 12 meeting, and physical expunging Dean's statement re agents on October 28, page C7, to which they took formal exception on October 29.[4]

4. In order to forestall possibility that talks at secretarial level might themselves become stalled or have to be called off, you should if at all possible work out appropriate formula for resumption through intervention of Indians prior to the secretaries' meeting. We have received no indication Communist reaction to Indian soundings via Peiping, and you should proceed at once without regard to it.

5. When satisfactory agreement reached on expunging or other satisfactory method of correcting record, you may propose date shortly after January 22 for resumption Panmunjom talks.

6. If conditions propitious, Dean plans leave Washington with Stevens January 15 to arrive Seoul before January 22.

DULLES

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[4] Regarding the Dec. 12 meeting, see telegram 168, p. 1665. Summary reports of the Oct. 28 and 29 sessions at Panmunjom were transmitted in telegrams 9 and 13 from Munsan-ni, Oct. 28 and 29, respectively, neither printed. (795.00/10–2853 and 795.00/10–2953)

320/1–1254: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State

SECRET NEW DELHI, January 12, 1954—5 p. m.
NIACT

1094. Repeated information London 190, niact Tokyo 75, Seoul 46. Tokyo for CINCUNC. Seoul for Young and Taylor.

Pillai asked me to come to see him today to discuss UNGA session. He said Prime Minister Nehru had asked him to talk with me to urge our support for February 9 date.

I repeated my personal opinion that US decision would depend on prior arrangements re POWs. Pillai then said, entirely for my "personal information and not to be reported" that GOI was in most difficult possible position with Chinese over this question. He said Chinese anger at Indians over termination of explanations and roll call of POWs was "as nothing compared with their fury over release of POWs January 22". He declared GOI would not weaken in its determination to turn POWs loose, no matter what Chinese said or did, but he hoped we would cooperate by agreeing to start receiving POWs January 20, so that by midnight January 22 only handful who had chosen neutral destination would be left in Indian hands.

I said I had already expressed personal opinion to Krishna Menon that we would not wish to receive POWs before January 23 since this would make us party to armistice violation. He said beginning of turn over January 20 would be merely mechanical arrangement since 22,000 could not easily be delivered on one short winter day whereas three days would be sufficient. I said if arrangement was clearly for mechanical convenience, I supposed we could receive them January 20, 21 and 22 as well as 23, 24, 25. He pleaded for earlier dates because he feared mass breakout January 23.

Comment: I believe we can rely on GOI decision to release POWs to us January 20 and 22. Pillai referred again to Nehru's horror lest CFI might have to shoot rioting POWs. I hope Department will agree now to accept POWs January 20–22 and consequently to support GA session February 9.

ALLEN

320/1-1254: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 12, 1954—6:52 p. m.

320. Re: Resumption GA. Communication from President of GA to UN Members requesting reconvening of Eighth GA on 9 February raises difficult problems of policy and procedure on which we feel it highly important to consult urgently with friendly delegations. Therefore, please approach UK, French, Canadian and other representative Commonwealth and Latin American Delegations and others in group of sixteen tomorrow to ascertain their promptest reaction to following alternative means of meeting situation created by Madame Pandit communication.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Popper and cleared with Wainhouse, G. Hayden Raynor (Director, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs), Drumright, Murphy (in principle), and John D. Jernegan (Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA). It was repeated to London as 3600 and Paris as 2483.

First alternative would be to respond in negative to President's communication on basis present situation and to urge other UN Members to do the same. Basis for this action would be that deciding hold GA before prisoners are released and before it is clear what will develop out of Panmunjom conversations could only complicate both POW and political conference situations. We therefore believe negative answer should be given to President's communication in order to forestall a GA at which loyal UN Members will only be subjected to familiar barrage of pro-Communist proposals which will have to be beaten down and on which harmful compromises might have to be made.

Second alternative would recognize that there is no advantage to be gained from holding GA in present circumstances, but would focus on point that we must not in any way agree to reconvening GA before prisoners are released or returned to the two commands in Korea, i.e., before January 23. Under this alternative we would retain flexibility to decide after prisoners are turned back exactly how we wish to react to resumption of GA for purpose of endorsing Indian action re prisoners or for utilization of GA in connection with preparations for political conference.

We would like to ascertain views other delegations before taking firm decision. In any event we believe UN members should in some way register dissent from terms of Madame Pandit's communication, particularly sentence stating that "If for any reason your reply has not been received by that date, I venture to presume your concurrence with the initiative I have taken in this matter." We consider this method of polling Members entirely inconsistent with evident intention of GA in adopting resolution Number 173 [*716 (VIII)*] of December 8, 1953. Debates in first committee reflect clear understanding on part of committee that GA could not be reconvened pursuant to terms of resolution unless majority of Members had actually expressed their concurrence. Language used in resolution follows that of Rule Nine of GA Rules of procedure governing calling of special session, and practice in application of this rule has always been clear in sense that majority of UN Members must positively express concurrence before special session can be convened. Interpretation now raised for first time by Madame Pandit could have serious consequences in enabling individual Members to profit by inertia or hesitation of Members to project GA into many sensitive questions which it ought not under the rules to consider unless an actual majority of UN Members concur. Method chosen by President clearly weights question on affirmative side on basis of arbitrary dates selected by her.

In making inquiries indicated above you should inform other delegations we do not agree that under the resolution failure to reply can be presumed to constitute a concurrence and we do not agree GA can be reconvened on this basis.[2]

In your conversations you should point out steps are underway to seek basis for resumption of talks at Panmunjom.[3]

DULLES

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[2] In telegram 336, Jan. 13, Wadsworth reported the highlights of a meeting with the Sixteen. There was unanimous agreement that there should be an extension of the Jan. 22 date for at least a week or 10 days; the majority appeared to acquiesce to the inevitability of a resumed GA session some time in February; and the majority also believed that the "silence gives consent" procedure of Madame Pandit was a dangerous precedent. (320/1-1354)

[3] In the final paragraph of telegram 336, the U.S. Mission asked for Department guidance on the possibility of sending a reply to the UN Secretary-General stating that it would be impossible to determine by Jan. 22 if the General Assembly should be reconvened. In telegram 328, Jan. 15, the Department of State sent a text of such a reply with instructions to address it to the Secretary-General. Furthermore, the reply stated that in view of the resolution of Dec. 8, 1953, and UN practice, the U.S. Government believed that the concurrence of a majority of members was required to reconvene the Eighth Session. (320/1-1354)

795.00/1-1454: Telegram

The Deputy Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Young) to the Department of State

SECRET
NIACT

MUNSAN-NI, January 14, 1954.[1]

218. Exclusive for Dean from Young. Re paragraph 6 of Deptel 192[2] and Deptel 196[3] concerning your return to Korea.

After today's liaison meeting with Communists may I suggest from the vantage point here it might be worth considering whether it really would be advisable for you to leave the US on January 17, before we know the outcome of the liaison talks at Panmunjom. In fact, I wonder whether it is advisable for you to come out until we have some concrete indications Communists' intentions are conductive [*conducive*?] to constructive results. In any resumed talks, their use of them primarily as another sounding board for PW propaganda which may be their main purpose in reopening talks, their continued insistence on November 30 proposal, their refusal to negotiate or alter their views, and the increasingly tense atmosphere at Panmunjom are some of the factors.

With this prospect and possibility liaison talks may last several days and not succeed, your remaining in the US might be better so as (*a*) not to give impression we are anxious to get into the talks before knowing what we are getting in for, (*b*) to appear hard to get in order not to relax Communist initiative seek talks and thus detract from our bargaining power regarding difficult problem of conditions for resuming talks, and (*c*) not put you immediately again in an impasse on substance.

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[1] The time of transmission was not indicated on this telegram, which was received at the Department of State at 10:40 a. m., Jan. 14.

[2] Dated Jan. 12, p. 1717.

[3] In this telegram, Jan. 13, Dean reminded Young that he should bear in mind that there would be a sharp reaction from the American public and from the Congress if the United States did not obtain from the Communist side satisfactory response to demands for retraction or expunging of "perfidy" charges. (795.00/1-1354)

Therefore, might be worth your considering using formula Department recommended on December 12 in paragraph 3 Deptel 148 [4] that I continue talks for short time to determine whether any change likely in Communist's position. Also, if deadlock on present substance is to be reached again, there may be some advantage in your maintaining freedom of action for evolving some different approach, assuming we still want political conference.

Problem of USSR and type of conference (mytel 608 from Seoul [5]) particularly any new approach, may be impossible solve with Chinese and North Korean Communists at Panmunjom. Rather, some other forum or avenue might be more practical, which may not be saying much. Perhaps the Soviet problem and question of conference can only be handled directly with the Russians in appropriate place—perhaps at UNGA, perhaps on side at Berlin, or through diplomatic channels. Can Peiping authorities—let alone Chinese Communist representatives at Panmunjom—negotiate in public issue of the USSR as a full participant, as a neutral, or as not at the conference at all?

Assuming talks are resumed during next two weeks, will you let me know what staff might be coming out and whether you want me see if Embassy could temporarily assign secretarial or other assistance in Seoul or in Munsan-ni as may be available and appropriate.

I have informed General Lacey of substance of this telegram.

YOUNG

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[4] Not printed. (795.00/1–1254)

[5] In this telegram, Dec. 31, 1953, Young submitted comments which he had discussed with Briggs and his staff on the advantages and disadvantages of holding a political conference as well as his views on participation by the Soviet Union. (795.00/12–3153)

795.00/1–1454: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET SEOUL, January 14, 1954—4 p. m.

677. Substance Deptel 589 January 12 [1] conveyed orally to Foreign Minister Pyun this afternoon—in no ambiguous terms. Pyun appeared initially startled, thereafter expressing regret, contrition and finally excuse that ROK, faced with solidification of armistice line as permanent border, finds itself so desperate that "desperate statements should

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[1] Not printed, but see footnote 3 to telegram 660 from Seoul, p. 1717.

not be misunderstood". I said that if by desperate statement he sought to excuse such untrue and offensive declaration as OPI issue in question, he ought simultaneously to recognize what harm it is doing to ROK interests in general while at same time rendering more difficult such efforts as my government may seek in the future to take on Korea's behalf.

I also told Pyun what my government thought of allegations emanating from official Seoul sources that US Government siding with Japan in present difficulties existing between Japan and Korea.

Pyun remained in meekness phase noted Embtel 666 January 13.[2] He made no effort to defend OPI release or recent intemperate ROK behavior beyond reference to desperate strait mentioned above. He expressed appreciation "for Washington's frankness" and said he would repeat my observations in official circles.

I am glad to have had this opportunity to clear the air. It remains to be seen what effect, if any, taking Pyun to task may have on Rhee's behavior.

BRIGGS

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[2] Not printed. (695A.0024/1-1254)

320/1-1354: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 14, 1954—6:56 p. m.
PRIORITY

3645. We are disturbed by paragraph 2 urtel 2978 [2] to effect that UK will agree to Indian proposal convene GA February 9 on basis understanding POWs will be returned January 23. Scott made same points to Murphy today.

1. Reports from Young in Munsan-Ni indicate Communists are engaging in war of nerves in Panmunjom which is having its effect upon Indians and even Swiss and Swedes and which could produce new obstacles to release of POWs. We think that if Indians knew they could now count on GA meeting on February 9 they might possibly be tempted to yield in face of heavy and increasing Communist pressure and take steps which would increase complications surrounding return POWs January 23. We wish reduce to absolute minimum any possibility prisoners will not resume civilian status January 23. Consequently we

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Popper, cleared by Drumright, Murphy, Key, McClurkin, and Ward P. Allen. It was repeated to Paris as 2516, to Munsan-ni as 200, to Seoul as 595, to New Delhi as 830, to USUN as 327, and to Tokyo as 1651 with instructions to pass CINCUNC.

[2] Not printed. (320/1-1354)

cannot give any commitments regarding reconvening GA prior to their release and strongly hope UK would take same position.

2. Furthermore GA when it meets will presumably also take up status negotiations for Korean political conference. We do not believe decision at this time to resume GA session February 9 would be helpful to objectives of group of sixteen. Indeed, from point of view political conference, we have some apprehensions about GA session at all in next few weeks. We must frankly say we foresee prospect of embarrassing divergencies arising between US and UK and others in group of sixteen as a result of clever Indian or Communist "compromise" proposals on composition and other aspects of Korean political conference. We do not relish this prospect, having in mind our common difficulties on subject in GA last August. It would be particularly harmful to run risk of a public show of dissension at GA during Berlin conference if that should then be in session.

3. We do not therefore agree with UK line implicit urtel 2978 that discussion might as well come February 9 as at any other time. We see no reason whatever on basis our past experience to believe support of Indian position on this matter of procedure will favorably influence Indian presentation before GA. On contrary we think force of Indian aspersions against UNC position on POW issue will be lessened if that subject debated sometime after prisoners have been released, and not while mutual recriminations over what has happened and what should have happened on January 23 are fresh in everyone's mind. Nor do we believe support of Indian position will have appreciable effect in influencing Arab-Asian opinion at GA or help to assure majority vote.

Please make these points at Foreign Office.[3] They appear to us to justify fully reply we plan make Madame Pandit's request for reconvening GA, copy being repeated you in separate telegram. In any event we think it most desirable avoid any definite commitment to Indians or answer to their request prior to January 23.

DULLES

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[3] In telegram 3014, Jan. 15, from London, Butterworth reported that the arguments embodied in paragraphs 1–3 of telegram 3645 to London were presented thoroughly and energetically to the Foreign Office on Jan. 15. (320/1–1554)

695A.0024/1-1554: Telegram

The Deputy Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Young) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT MUNSAN-NI, January 15, 1954.[1]

219. Repeated information Seoul, Tokyo, CINCUNC, New Delhi unnumbered. Reference my telegrams 214[2] and 216[3] and New Delhi 1094[4] and 1098[5] to Department regarding NNRC and POW problem:

Thimayya had quite a bit to say yesterday about the Communists reaction to the Indian proposal to turn back POWs. Apparently Nehru had purposely informed Chou En-lai of Indian intentions to release the prisoners. Thimayya indicated the Chinese Communist Government had reacted violently and furiously and had protested in the strongest terms to Nehru against any Indian action releasing the prisoners in any manner whatsoever. According to Thimayya, Chou En-lai told Nehru in substance, "they are our prisoners, not yours, and you cannot release them. It would be better let them break out on 23 January and then you must shoot them whatever happens." Nehru responded to Chou's outburst by saying that India would have no part in shooting or bloodshed, it was India's duty to see that the prisoners were handled in a humanitarian way since the functions of the CFI end midnight 22 January, and India could not be left in position of being held responsible for bloodshed and major disturbance after 22 January.

Thimayya described his visit on Wednesday afternoon with the Communist Generals in Kaesong as two of the unpleasantest hours of his life. He said they attacked him personally, in his official capacity, and as an Indian representative for the whole two hours. His characterization of them to Stenstrom, Daeniker and me was in unusually profane terms. They also strongly protested any Indian release of the prisoners as dangerous to "peace and tranquility in Korea". He did not accept their attacks or protests.

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[1] No time of transmission was indicated on this telegram, which was received at the Department of State at 1:15 a. m., Jan. 15.

[2] In this telegram from Munsan-ni, Jan. 13, Young reported on the beginning of a "Communist war of nerves in Panmunjom" against the Indians and the planned release of remaining POWs on Jan. 22. (695A.0024/1-1354)

[3] This telegram related a discussion among Young, Thimayya, Stenstrom, and Daeniker in which these members of the NNRC expressed concern that the Indian Government in New Delhi had insisted that the remaining prisoners held by the Commission be returned to each side for retention until the political conference. (695A.0024/1-1454)

[4] Dated Jan. 12, p. 1718.

[5] In this telegram, Jan. 13, the Ambassador reported that Thimayya had been given full authority on Jan. 10 to work out the release of the 22,000 nonrepatriate POWs to the UNC. In discussing this issue with Allen, Krishna Menon said that his government would point out that the UNC should hold the POWs until the political conference considered their case. Allen commented that this was an obvious gesture to placate Peking and Menon did not disagree. (695A.0024/1-1354)

Apparently both he and Nehru maintained their firm position on the POWs with the Communists despite the strain it is creating in New Delhi–Peiping relations at this time.

The Indians may after 22 January seek some means to make up with Peiping for their action on the POWs. Perhaps this will appear at UNGA or concerning the political conference, since Singh has talked to me quite personally but frankly several times about the problem of compensating the Chinese Communists for their "psychological defeat" here, or at least our not insisting on positions which register more loss of face or retreats for Peiping at this time.

YOUNG

795.00/1–1554: Telegram

The Deputy Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Young) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT MUNSAN-NI, January 15, 1954.[1]

221. Repeated information Seoul, Tokyo, CINCUNC unnumbered. Regarding possibility of retraction Communists charges, there now seem to be enough indications Communists may resist and then refuse make any change whatsoever in the record of previous meetings.

Soundings made by the Indians in Peiping and Kaesong last week indicate Communists take position there are no obstructions to resumption of the talks. The insistence in their letters of liaison meetings only to agree on the date and their statements in first two liaison meetings follow out their basic positions that there are no impediments to talks.[2] We thus start the liaison meetings with a basic divergence. Yet Communists have not, so far, gone completely out on limb against making any changes in the record. There may still be some slight flexibility left.

This may be a difficult period to negotiate with the Chinese Communists any backtracking in public on their charges, no matter how we seek to ease them into it. It is probably a question of face and prestige for them as well as a disinclination to make any concessions to our side at a time when they are wrought up over the "release" of the prisoners which is a major issue of "prestige" for them. The neutrals at Panmunjom consider the release, following the results of explanation, a substantial "psychological defeat" for the Chinese Communists particularly in view of the fact that, as things now stand, the Indians are thwarting Peiping by carrying out an action which Chou En-lai has protested to

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[1] No time of transmission was indicated on this telegram, which was received at the Department of State at 5:54 a. m., Jan. 15.

[2] A report of these inconclusive liaison meetings can be be found in telegram 22, Jan. 15, 1954, not printed. (795.00/1–1554)

Nehru in the strongest possible terms and which directly counters the Communist position on the PW question.

Am certainly not suggesting that we should not stick to our guns at Panmunjom. We must. Martin and I will do our best tactfully to negotiate the question of retraction or expunging the record in such a way the Communists are not confronted with an unacceptable public challenge. We are aware their sensibilities and question on face as well as need keep some flexibility between their position and ours on expunging record.

YOUNG

695A.00/1-1554: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 15, 1954—7:31 p. m.
NIACT

839. Your 1094; [2] Deptel 829.[3] Assume text Thimayya's January 14 letter [4] available you. Telegraphing separately through military channels text reply General Hull authorized make.[5]

Main purposes our reply are make clear:

(1) Communist intransigence made it impossible NNRC fully accomplish mission and led to breakdown explanations. Same cause prevented Political Conference from meeting. Nevertheless, in our opinion NNRC will be defaulting on its obligation under terms reference by returning prisoners before expiration period custody and by failing declare their release to civilian status.

(2) We can not accept prisoners on terms defined Thimayya's letter implying we should retain them in prisoner status until Political Conference meets and considers their disposition.

(3) If CFI unilaterally return custody POWs 20 January UNC would clearly not be justified using force against them but from humanitarian considerations and to insure them full enjoyment benefits Agreement UNC would arrange for their accommodation and disposition.

(4) Return prior January 23 is failure by NNRC fully discharge its duties but this does not affect POWs right become civilians that date and UNC in accordance Agreement on POWs will honor obligation treat them as fully entitled freedom as civilians on January 23.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by McClurkin and cleared with De Palma, Runyon, Henry T. Smith (Deputy Director, Office of South Asian Affairs), and Bacon. It was repeated to Munsan-ni as 202, Seoul as 599, and Tokyo as 1665 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.

[2] Dated Jan. 12, p. 1718.

[3] In this telegram, Jan. 14, the Department of State informed the Embassy in New Delhi that until it received a text of Thimayya's letter and Hull's proposed reply, it was holding up its response to telegram 1094 from Seoul. (695A.0024/1-1454)

[4] For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 25, 1954, pp. 113-115.

[5] For text, see *ibid.*, pp. 115-116.

For your information we want avoid any implication we understand or could accept Thimayya's letter as an interpretation under paragraph 24 Terms of Reference.

Time public release reply Thimayya's letter will be determined Tokyo.

DULLES

320/1–2054: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 20, 1954—6:57 p. m.

336. Following is rationale underlying our essentially negative response Madame Pandit's request for resumed GA session, for use with delegations and foreign offices.

1. We see no point in resumed GA at present because we believe it will not serve useful purpose in connection Korean problem. As long as we hold this view we do not expect send further communication in response to Madame Pandit's request. Specifically we cannot agree to postponement of resumed session from February 9 to another date at this time. USUN should seek dissuade Urrutia from suggesting postponement to Indians and make same point to other dels inquiring re date resumption GA.

2. GOI request to Madame Pandit to reconvene eighth session indicates first purpose of session would be to consider work of NNRC and circumstances in which Indians have disposed of POWs. If Indians had complied with armistice agreement and had released POWs to civilian status January 23 as required therein it might have been desirable for GA subsequently express moral approval of Indian course and we would have viewed sympathetically Indian request for such action. However Indians have in effect washed their hands of problem and, in prematurely turning prisoners back to UNC, have stated UNC release of prisoners inconsistent with armistice agreement. By time assembly met POW controversy would be academic problem for legal dispute. GA consideration of POW problem could only result in presentation three conflicting points of view,—i.e., Communist, Indian and UNC views re what would have been proper disposition POWs—with fruitless recriminations and controversial resolution of dubious practical utility.

3. GOI also seeks have GA deal with question of Korean political conference or other steps looking toward settlement Korean question.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Popper, Paul B. Taylor (Officer in Charge of General Assembly Affairs, UNP), and Betty C. Gough of UNP. It was cleared with Wainhouse, Drumright, Nicholas G. Thacher of SOA, Ward Allen, and Murphy; it was repeated to London as 3755, New Delhi as 864, Tokyo as 1695 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC, Munsan-ni as 208, and Seoul as 613.

Again, we fail see utility GA action. By resolution August 28, 1953[2] GA has already set forth its views on organization of political conference. As current liaison meetings at Panmunjom indicate, negotiations pursuant to August 28 resolution have not yet reached deadlock. We think it by no means impossible difference between two sides in these talks can be worked out and are continuing to explore methods for doing so. We believe we can do this more effectively than GA, unless or until some radically new basis of procedure becomes desirable. Meanwhile, if Communists should come to believe a resumed GA session is imminent, they will obviously refrain from any serious negotition. To throw political conference issue back into assembly would be to invite spate of new "compromise" proposals produced by Menon and by Communists which might result in creating dangerous splits within group of sixteen. GA consideration this question could also revive in very difficult form demands for GA hearings for Chinese Communists and North Koreans.

4. Therefore, since on our analysis GA to consider POW issue and Korean political conference would at present produce no useful result but would actually increase tension and difficulties of negotiation, we are not now prepared to agree that session should be resumed or to set date for resumption. We believe we should all keep open mind on this question and avoid commitment until clear prospect of concrete improvement in Korean situation through GA action seems likely.

USUN should make our position clear to other delegations and New Delhi should make foregoing points at high level, reporting responses.[3] London should similarly approach FonOff if in its view UK position at variance with above.

We note January 20 press report Madame Pandit stated UNGA must decide fate 96 prisoners not desiring return to either side. Under paragraph 11 POW terms of reference in armistice agreement, it is responsibility NNRC and Indian Red Cross assist individuals choosing to go to neutral nations for period of thirty days after January 23. We would expect India, in its capacity as Chairman and Executive Agent of NNRC, assist resettlement of these individuals by active diplomatic means during thirty-day period. GA has no legal authority in this matter and we fail to see how GA action could be as effective as action prescribed in armistice agreement. Indian sources are also reported as implying GA might have to take action if Communists refuse to take back POWs desiring to go to Communist China and North Korea. We note Communist response to Thimayya, while attacking Indian decision to turn back POWs, does not refuse to accept POWs. Here again, GA has no legal authority deal with situation and we fail see how GA action at this time could be as useful as diplomatic methods to determine fate these prisoners if indeed Communists should refuse accept them.

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[2] See the editorial note, p. 1503.

[3] In telegram 1182 from New Delhi, Jan. 26, Allen told of discussing the question of a special General Assembly session with Pillai in New Delhi, who said that the Indian Government would await the decision of the majority, and if it was against reconvening, would accept the decison with equanimity. (320/1-2654)

DULLES

Editorial Note

At the order of General Hull (see his letters to General Thimayya of the NNRC of January 16 and January 19, 1954, Department of State *Bulletin,* January 25, 1954, pages 115–116 and *ibid.,* February 1, 1954, page 154, respectively) the approximately 22,000 prisoners of war who had been returned to the custody of the UNC (see Thimayya's letter to Hull, January 18, *ibid.,* pages 153–154) became civilians as of January 23, 1954. At the 181st meeting of the National Security Council, Allen Dulles emphasized that this release of prisoners "constituted one of the greatest psychological victories so far achieved by the free world against Communism. Conversely, it amounted to a great loss of face for the Communists, particularly in light of their threats and warnings prior to the event." (Memorandum of discussion at the 181st meeting of the NSC, January 21, 1954; Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file)

795.00/1-2354: Telegram

The Deputy Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Young) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT MUSAN-NI, January 23, 1954.[1]

232. Repeated information Seoul, Tokyo, CINCUNC unnumbered.

Part I.

Communists' unwillingness meet today (mytel 231 [2]) and postponement meeting to 26 January—six days after previous meeting—further evidence Communists' present disinterest in these meetings and in reaching agreement on satisfactory conditions for resumption. While intention charge US on PW issue at today's MAC meeting may have been one reason for their postponement simultaneous liaison meeting at Panmunjom, it may have something to do with opening Berlin conference Monday,[3] arrival there of Chinese delegation and Soviet demand for Chinese participation five-power conference.

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[1] There was no time of transmission indicated on the source text, which was received in the Department of State at 2:04 p. m., Jan. 23.

[2] Not printed. (795.00/1-2354)

[3] Jan. 25.

Part II.

Re Deptel 204,[4] it therefore seems to us current efforts negotiate resumption of talks and arrangements Korean PC have reached point diminishing returns at Panmunjom. I believe consideration should be given to complete review of PC problem, to recessing liaison meetings indefinitely next week, and to our return thereafter to Washington for consultation. This suggestion based on following considerations as seen from here:

1. Main purpose Korean PC as stated paragraph 60 of Armistice Agreement and paragraph 11 of terms of reference should be reappraised in light developments since 27 July. Thus, non-repatriated PWs no longer pertinent; North Korean-Peiping 10-year pact and Chinese activities North Korea indicate possibility peaceful unification Korea even more remote than previously appeared to be, as indicated mytels 199[5] and 201[6] and the consensus of foreign observers here; threat of unilateral ROK action, while not to be entirely discounted, also seems lessening; and our own announcement withdrawal two divisions and probable withdrawal some ChiCom troops indicate possibility slowly making such adjustments on a *de facto* basis in absence PC.

2. While we not at this time advocating whole idea Korean PC be dropped or that US change posture seeking a PC in order carry out UN objectives re Korean unification, we suggest objectives should be realistically re-examined on basis current situation, since it may be pressure and need for PC lessened. Moreover, PC would give Communists best forum push proposals for date and manner withdrawal foreign military forces which might be undesirable and untimely from viewpoint our own military plans.

3. At same time difficult to see any great pressure on Communists convene Korean PC of type envisaged in Armistice Agreement in view factors mentioned in paragraph 1. Of course, it continues to be Communist aim get US Military Forces out of Korea, but their principal objective now may be gain propaganda forum along lines their 30 November proposal. They will probably continue press for this type PC in order enhance their prestige by means of this international conference and to seek introduce broader issues. As indicated today's MAC meeting they still insist PC take up PW issue, which creates another obstacle to agreement on PC. On balance, over-all situation does not appear conducive rapid bridging differences between Communists 30 November and our 8 December proposals even under best of negotiating conditions.

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[4] In this telegram to Munsan-ni, Jan. 16, Young was instructed to continue his present course of action in the liasion meetings until the crisis over the release of POWs had passed. At that point, the Department of State would review the whole picture bearing in mind the courses of action Young had outlined. (795.00/1-1654)

[5] Dated Dec. 31, 1953, p. 1680.

[6] Dated Jan. 3, p. 1686.

4. It would be hard conceive less propitious conditions bridge gap than existing situation at Panmunjom, where thus far unable even agree renew attempt to bridge it. Despite our somewhat indirect approach, liaison meetings seem to have drawn lines between two sides more rigidly as to rectifying record, it even more difficult either side modify its position without risk having it dramatized in world press as major retreat. Moreover, after their defeat on POW issue, Communists under great pressure counterattack US with propaganda, especially at Panmunjom scene of defeat. At MAC meeting today, which conducted in very tense atmosphere, Communists made wild charges and issued warnings. In short, atmosphere Panmunjom such now, and likely remain so some weeks, that modification Communist position in liaison meetings appears most unlikely.

5. In face continuation liaison meeting deadlock, effectiveness argument contained Deptel 208[7] re negotiations continuing Panmunjom steadily diminishing, if it is not already outdated, though it has served useful purpose for past three months. In liaison meeting 20 January, mytel 229,[8] Communists displayed irritation effectiveness this argument so far and may feel continuation liaison meetings disadvantageous to them. This may partly explain today's postponement. For this reason they may well make it increasingly difficult for us maintain liaison meetings and dignity too. They may try bring about indefinite recess, or do so in effect by increasing intervals between meetings.

Communist statements in meetings, propaganda, and remarks reported by Indians (mytel 206[9]) indicate to me Communists believe we are "manipulating" Panmunjom talks chiefly to detour GA. Peiping Radio today sharply accuses us deliberately delaying talks and PC in longest radio notice yet given to liaison meetings. We cannot force Communists make something of these meetings if they refuse budge on correcting record or if they are seeking another locus. Also, our effort will become increasingly transparent.

6. In considering alternative courses to present, suggest Department should also take into account undesirability of adding to prestige Peiping and North Korea regimes, especially in Asia, by continuing trying to negotiate with them on behalf of US and 16 Allies on ground Communist choosing despite insults and intransigence, which as indicated paragraph 4 above seem likely continue. Should not three months effort be enough demonstrate our good faith and intentions? Will longer period, in face continued intransigence, not be viewed as vain attempt travel dead-end road, if not positive sign weakness?

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[7] Printed as telegram 336 to USUN, Jan. 20, p. 1728.

[8] Not printed. (795.00/1-2054)

[9] Dated Jan. 9, p. 1712.

7. While appreciating reasons outlined Deptel 208 [10] for forestalling February GA, we feel strong case could be made out in GA, if it must meet during next month, for our 8 December proposal, which Communists left lying on table. Also might be worth considering whether continued deadlock in spasmodic unproductive meetings Panmunjom is not perhaps as much if not more obvious reason to other governments to convoke GA to discuss PC than would be indefinite recess and possibility any time renew preliminary talks here. Yet, can basic issues with Communists—USSR role, voting procedure, agenda, and perhaps neutrals at PC—be negotiated in public at Panmunjom, or might some other avenue be more productive, if anything will paragraph 8 [*sic*]. Meanwhile, alternatives to both Panmunjom and GA might be sought. At same time effort should be made arrive common position with ROK of PC, since wherever question is negotiated basic divergence with ROK will constitute major stumbling block to success and weakness our side easily exploited by Communists.

Part III.

Therefore, I would recommend that, unless the Communists make some new and constructive proposals on Tuesday, (1) we seek recess the liaison meetings at the following meeting after Tuesday (2) leave channel open through MAC secretariat and Embassy Seoul so that means are always available meet with Communists Panmunjom (3) I deliver to Communists after indefinite recess letter outlining main points our efforts implement paragraph 60 and desire for reasonable constructive atmosphere for talks and PC, and (4) explore new channels to iron out, if possible and it may not be, differences between 30 November and 8 December proposals. If that done satisfactorily on a general basis, then talks could be resumed Panmunjom or elsewhere to draft and initial agreement on PC.

Part IV.

General Lacey has seen.

YOUNG

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[10] Printed as telegram 336 to USUN, Jan. 20, p. 1728.

320/1–2454: Telegram

The Director of the Berlin Element, Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany (Parkman) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET BERLIN, January 24, 1954—9 p. m.

809. Repeated information London 69. Department pass USUN. Limit distribution. From USDel. Secretary[1] and Eden discussed reconvening of GA last night. Eden expressed view we were committed to holding resumed session GA.[2] Thought some assurances this respect had been given India when they agreed recess regular session end of December. Secretary asked what he thought Assembly would do. Eden thought it would do little except pass resolution expressing appreciation to India and others for their work in handling POWs.

Secretary said he felt it probable they would pass resolution seeking impose their ideas re political conference. Said he saw little prospect of great success from political conference and felt strongly we were not justified in paying large price to get such conference. As such large price cited agreement treat Soviet Union as neutral and without blame in Korean affairs, and elevation India to leading role in Asia. Said he felt majority of GA which has little responsibility might be willing try impose such terms in effort get political conference. Secretary said this might mean open break with US on subject. Said US had on whole discharged its responsibilities satisfactorily. We had obtained armistice. POWs desiring repatriation had been returned. POWs not wanting repatriation had been given their choice. Rhee had not broken armistice and it seemed unlikely Communists would do so. We were spending large sums to develop ROK economy and make it viable. Against this background others having no comparable responsibility were seeking impose their views because they thought it would be "nice" to have political conference. Secretary hoped UK would not play this game.

Eden seemed impressed by presentation and indicated he had not realized there was any such hazard in meeting. Secretary said if he could get assurance GA would limit itself to innocuous action and not attempt impose its views as to terms political conference then he thought no harm would be done. Eden said he would explore situation and let Secretary know further views.

PARKMAN

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[1] Dulles arrived in Berlin on Jan. 23 for the Berlin Conference at which the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States met, Jan. 24–Feb 18, to discuss questions concerning Korea, Indochina, Germany, Austria, European security, and disarmament. Full documentation on the Conference is presented in volume VII.

[2] In telegram Tosec 21 to HICOG Berlin, Jan. 22, the U.S. Delegation to the Berlin Conference was informed that the British, and Eden in particular, believed that there was growing support for a meeting of the General Assembly and the British Government was thus supporting the Indian request for a resumed session and considered Feb. 16 to be the right time to begin. (320/1–1254)

795.00/1-1354: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Deputy Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Young) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 25, 1954—6:33 p. m.
NIACT

210. 1. Re your 232 [2] we are reviewing PC problem in light GA, Berlin meeting, possible use new channels and release POW. We plan discuss possible courses of action with group 16 by end of this week and will inform you soonest our conclusions. We agree efforts resume talks approaching point diminishing returns and appreciate your helpful estimate present situation.

2. Pending clarification situation re reconvening GA, however, you should continue meet with Communists on present basis. Breaking off now would spur drive for reconvening Assembly which, subject reconsideration on basis Secretary's talks with Eden, we still oppose. Continuation your meetings will also assist Secretary in dealing with Soviet proposal Five Power meeting.

3. If Communists propose indefinite recess, you should deliver letter next day making clear they requested recess, pointing to availability MAC and Embassy for further contacts and summarizing our efforts implement paragraph 60 and GA resolution August 28.

SMITH

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[1] This telegram was drafted by De Palma and cleared by Drumright, McClurkin, Key, and with Murphy in draft. It was repeated to Seoul as telegram 617 and Tokyo as 1720 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.

[2] Dated Jan. 23, p. 1730.

795.00/1-2654: Telegram

The Deputy Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Young) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT MUNSAN-NI, January 26, 1954. [1]

237. Repeated information New Delhi, Seoul, Tokyo, CINCUNC Tokyo unnumbered. Reference my telegram 236.[2]

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[1] There was no indication of time of transmission on the source text, which was received at the Department of State at 11:15 p. m., Jan. 26.

[2] In this telegram, Jan. 26, Young reported that at the fifth meeting of the liaison secretaries, the Communist side handed the U.S. liaison secretary a letter for Dean and proposed to recess the meeting to await a reply. After a 30-minute recess, the U.S. liaison secretary countered that the persistent Communist refusal to discuss conditions for resuming talks and their present move to bypass the meetings by communicating directly to Dean indicated that they did not wish the liaison meetings to continue. The Communists replied with a four-point summary of their position: 1. demanding immediate unconditional-

Continued

1. Commie letter to Dean and their four-point summary statement today demonstrate again they are interested only in setting date for resumption of talks and will make no move whatsoever correct record or meet us regarding satisfactory basis for resumption. We considered during recess advisability returning letter to Communists but decided it would put U.S. Government in poor posture and appear picayune.

2. Their tactic today is in effect indefinite recess of liaison meetings particularly in view their abrupt departure from meeting before recess agreed to and their going over our heads directly to Ambassador Dean.

3. We regret we could not carry out instructions in paragraph 2, Deptel 210.[3] Without appearing over-anxious or off balance by their letter and tactic, we tried to keep meetings alive but Commies, probably sensing this, suddenly walked out. Their conduct and typewritten statements showed that they had prepared it. They would have done the same had we proposed recess till tomorrow or Thursday which we decided inadvisable as immediate gambit on return after recess. It clearly was intention Communists take matter out of liaison meetings today which they made certain by walking out.

4. Matter is now directly up to Department and Ambassador Dean almost in form of peremptory, intransigent demand accept unconditional renewal of talks, on a take it or leave it basis. Quite typical. After leaving our 8th December proposals on table and later charging us with treachery and perfidy, they now insist on our complete concession to their position on resumption. Though the tone of their letter and statement today is moderate, it is inflexible and curt.

5. I assume letter suggested in paragraph 3 of Deptel 210 is now overtaken by Commie letter. In our statements today we summarized briefly efforts bring about political conference and pointed out it was they who requested liaison meetings and they who wish recess them. The use of MAC and possibly an Embassy officer designated as "liaison secretary" for a continuing channel could be specified in any reply from Ambassador Dean or from me.

6. Concerning nature and timing of reply, and particularly the 1 February date, we are not in a position to judge, on a local basis and without the information available in Washington, the implication of UNGA and Berlin. But, after our endeavor to negotiate in as unchallenging and unprovocating but firm a way as possible the question of conditions, we do not see how U.S. could concede to Communist representatives

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al resumption of the talks; 2. accusing the United States of undermining the discussions by suspending them; 3. rejecting the need for a new basis for the negotiations; and 4. reiterating that they had no intention of correcting the record. The Communist side then proposed another recess to await a reply to their letter and walked out without waiting for the U.S. response. (795.00/1–2654) A text of the letter to Dean, which made essentially the same points as the four-point summary, can be found in telegram 235 from Munsan-ni, Jan. 26. (795.00/1–2654)

[3] *Supra.*

under the circumstances here. Re GA, viewed from here we wonder if not possible for US to take offensive if GA must meet to make strong case for our efforts and against Communist intransigence, as well as Communist activities North Korea.

7. Any reply should, among other things, rebut their contention liaison meetings began on "exactly" the basis they set—namely to agree on date. I specified "conditions" in all three of my letters. Perhaps it might be a good tactic for me to reply on behalf of Ambassador Dean or simply on instructions so as not to engage him as yet in this controversy.

8. We take it from paragraph 3, Deptel 210 that in event of Communist recess—which now in effect—we would not continue here indefinitely either as liaison channel or for initial resumption of talks. We await Department's instructions. In face of today's episode we dislike idea standing by much longer in area of Panmunjom.

9. I asked Bond this afternoon to convey results of today's meeting officially to Dr. Pyun whom I met briefly yesterday with the Ambassador. I have also informed General Lacey.

YOUNG

895B.2547/1-2754: Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Bond) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, January 27, 1954—5 p. m.

720. During past two weeks ROK Government concern over expiration tungsten purchase agreement[1] has been expressed to Embassy several times. Letter of January 24 to Secretary Dulles from Foreign Minister Pyun, being air pouched to Department, contains following main points supporting argument that UN should renew present purchase agreement:

1. Rapid development tungsten mining was possible only because of assured market.
2. If assured market removed Korean mines will incur "terrific deficits" in light present slump world tungsten prices.
3. Fact that 80 percent world tungsten produced Communist China makes it necessary keep principal free world sources operating.
4. Price support given to US tungsten mine would be extended to Korean mines by renewing purchase agreement.
5. If (4) impractical new purchase agreement should be negotiated stipulating "new reasonable price".

Local press quoted government source January 26 stating ROK Government may issue "White Paper" warning US it will be forced sell tungsten to hostile nations if purchase agreement not renewed. In view Pyun's point (3) the possibility this move appears slight.

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[1] For background on this issue, see the memorandum by McClurkin to Drumright, Feb. 2, p. 1742.

Events cited above constitute opening of expected campaign for agreement renewal. In view of large profits and dollar earnings accruing to ROK Government under present agreement, increasing pressure may be anticipated. Embassy convinced government has little hope renewing agreement present basis but wishes negotiate new agreement for as high a price as possible. (Utah representatives believe price as low as $30 per STU would be accepted in showdown, however.)

Korea tungsten mining company President Ahn Bong Ik left for United States January 25 on three months survey US chemical plants. Because of molybdenum content of Korean tungsten concentrate, chemical treatment essential before it can be sold on world market. Ahn's trip therefore indication ROK Government realization it may not be able renew purchase agreement.

BOND

320/1-2854: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW DELHI, January 28, 1954—3 p. m.

1192. Repeated London 205, Berlin. Department telegram 864, January 20,[1] and Embassy telegram 1182, January 26.[2]

During long talk with Mrs. Pandit last night, I gave her several openings to discuss special General Assembly session, but she obviously was not anxious to discuss it.

However, I gained impression she is more or less reconciled to idea that her call for special session may not obtain majority approval.

Both Canadian and Australian HICOMs have informed Pillai, their governments are dubious regarding value of General Assembly session at this time, but neither has given final reply. Canadian HICOM thinks idea planted with Pillai (Embassy telegram 1182) that session might result in quarrel between Krishna Menon and Vishinsky, may have taken root. While Nehru will not withdraw Indian proposal for session and feels we are committed to it, Government of India may regard defeat with mixed emotions.[3]

ALLEN

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[1] Printed as telegram 336 to USUN, p. 1728.

[2] In this telegram Allen reported on a conversation with Pillai in which the U.S. Ambassador suggested, *inter alia*, that a special session might cause India embarassment as Vishinsky was likely to take Menon to task for releasing the POWs. (320/1-2654)

[3] As reported in telegram 392 from New York, Jan. 29, not printed (320/1-2954), only 22 member nations replied affirmatively to the request for reconvening the General Assembly on Feb. 9, and thus the session was not reconvened. (*Yearbook of the United Nations, 1954*, p. 30)

795.00/1-2854: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 28, 1954—4:56 p. m.

Tosec 48. Following text drafted by Ambassador Dean as proposed reply to Communist letter Jan. 26 [2] is forwarded for your information and comment. It will not be dispatched until we receive your approval.

"This will acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated January 26, 1954.

In view of the urgent importance that the politcal conference, envisaged by paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement, be convened at as early a date as possible, on behalf of the seventeen governments whom I have the honor to represent at the preliminary talks I am very glad indeed that you wish to resume the preliminary talks promptly.

We naturally are proceeding on the assumption that you would not have addressed your letter of January 26, 1954, directly to me, rather than continuing to present your views through the liaison secretaries now meeting at Panmunjom, unless you were willing to make satisfactory correction or emendations of the remarks, irrelevant to the main theme of our discussion, which led to the indefinite recessing of the preliminary talks on December 12. The spirit, and not the mechanics, is the important thing.

It will afford encouragement to the entire world and particularly to the sorely harassed people of Korea that at long last you are willing to negotiate for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

We had already arrived at agreement on a number of procedural matters and I hope that we will be able to resolve the remaining questions left for discussion at an early date.

As to place, assuming we can mutually satisfy ourselves that they possess the necessary secretariat and conference facilities, I would think we could agree very readily on Geneva, Stockholm, Vienna, Beirut, Bandung, Kandy or Colombo.

As to time, I should think we could agree very quickly on the convening of the political conference in approximately 30 to 40 days after the preliminary talks.

As to composition, the participants at the conference should be the Republic of Korea and those of the other nations who contributed troops to the United Nations Command as may desire to attend on our side, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. Also, as we have repeatedly said, it is quite agreeable to our side that your side should invite the USSR to participate in the discussions as a full participant. If on the other hand the USSR were not to participate in the conference at all, we believe we could work out satisfactory and appropriate arrangements for the implementation of those agreements arrived at at the conference which concern the neighbors of Korea.

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[1] This telegram, drafted by Dean and Popper and cleared by Drumright and Murphy, was repeated to Munsan-ni as 213.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 2 to telegram 237 from Munsan-ni, p. 1735.

As to other nations at the conference, we are prepared to work out with you appropriate participation by other nations which both sides agree could make a constructive contribution to the conference.

As to voting, substantive decisions of the conference shall be worked out by agreement among the participants directly concerned. We are quite prepared to work out an appropriate method by which each side will know, before final agreement is reached, which nation on the other side will be bound by that particular agreement. The necessary agreement of the parties directly concerned could be provided by incorporating such decisions in the Final Act of the Conference or they could be concluded in some other appropriate manner.

To insure smooth progress of the conference, other decisions taken during the course of the conference should be made by agreement between the two sides.

I am prepared to resume the talks at Panmunjom on short notice after I have received word that the liaison secretaries have worked out the necessary arrangements, in open session if you wish.

We believe there is no real reason now why the preliminary talks should not be resumed promptly. I look forward to hearing from my Deputy, Mr. Young, at an early date that we can resume the talks within a few days after February 1, 1954, and hope that the convening of the political conference may be soon arranged."

SMITH

795.00/1-2754: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Deputy Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Young) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 29, 1954—8 p. m.

214. 1. Your 237 [2] and 238.[3] Without foreclosing possibility eventual change of venue, or form of negotiations we wish for present avoid definite break-off Panmunjom talks. This posture not dictated by false or optimistic evaluation prospects at Panmunjom, but by desire continue holding off resumption of GA and to support Western position at Berlin.

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[1] This telegram, drafted by De Palma and cleared by McClurkin, Drumright, Key, and with Murphy in draft, was repeated to Seoul as 627 and Tokyo as 1751 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.

[2] Dated Jan. 26, p. 1735.

[3] In this telegram, Jan. 27, Young reported on a conversation with Singh, the sole remaining political adviser to Thimayya, in which the Indian described his personal impression of possible Chinese attitudes, following their walkout from the liaison meetings. (795.00/1-2754)

2. Re your 239 [4] you will note from our 213 [5] we maintain view some positive act other side required to dispose of issue posed by their charge, although we flexible as to method. Our draft reply intended also reduce area disagreement on substantive issue and thus encourage Communist meet conditions for resuming talks. If delivered, our reply should leave us in stronger position with our Allies and world opinion. Delivery of course depends on Secretary's judgment in light Berlin situation.[6]

SMITH

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[4] In this telegram, Jan. 29, Young suggested that it would be unrealistic to expect the Communists to accept any implication that they were withdrawing their perfidy charge. Young also believed that any basis for subsequent meetings with the Communists would have to be agreed to before the meetings began. Finally, he observed that a change of venue from Panmunjom and a move to open new talks on the political conference rather than resuming the present ones might be worth considering. (795.00/1-2954)

[5] Printed as telegram Tosec 48, Jan. 28, *supra.*

[6] In telegram Secto 58 from Berlin, Jan. 31, the U.S. Delegation at the Berlin Conference sent the Department of State a statement made by Molotov in the third quadripartite meeting of the Foreign Ministers on Jan. 27 to the effect that the cause of the failure of the discussions at Panmunjom for a political conference lay in the fact that the decision to hold a conference was adopted in spite of the objections put forth by the Soviet Union and without the participation of the People's Republic of China or the Korean People's Democratic Republic. In telegram Secto 59, the U.S. Delegation considered this statement to mean that the Communist side had decided to avoid further discussions at Panmunjom. (795.00/1-3154)

According to a memorandum of conversation by Elizabeth Brown of IO, Feb. 19, Dulles had held the draft letter contained in telegram Tosec 48 (*supra*) during the negotiations at Berlin, but the understanding reached at Berlin to hold the Geneva Conference made sending this letter unnecessary. (795.00/2-1954)

795.00/2-154: Telegram

The Deputy Representative for the Korean Political Conference (Young) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT MUNSAN-NI, February 1, 1954.[1]

242. Pass for action to the Secretary Berlin. Sent niact Berlin for the Secretary of State unnumbered; Seoul, Tokyo, CINCUNC unnumbered. Reference Berlin Secto 59.[2] Our reactions to reference telegram follow:

1. Molotov statement and dovetailed Communist tactics Panmunjom and Peiping radio output do seem indicate Communists backing away from Korean political conference idea and from talks here, at least temporarily (mytel 232 to Department [3]). Since Communists apparently believe Panmunjom talks allowed us circumvent UNGA session on Korea

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[1] No time of transmission was indicated on the source text, which was received at the Department of State at 7:51 a. m., Feb. 1.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 6, *supra.*

[3] Dated Jan. 23, p. 1730.

in December and February, they may think resumption of talks and PC would provide us same basis hold out against Big Five conference.[4]

2. We believe Chinese Communist objectives are (*a*) to seek important internationally-accepted status on their terms and (*b*) make political conference on Korea in effect Far Eastern conference designed promote objective "(*a*)" and advance Peipings's influence and leadership in Asia rather than solve Korean problems.

3. In view our rejection their 30 November proposals for such conference,[5] they apparently now concentrating efforts on obtaining five-power conference and on representation at Korean session UNGA, as means seeking their objectives. Chinese Communists apparently under no pressure convene political conference restricted to Korean problems, since they can seek attainment their broader objectives elsewhere.

4. Believe Communist tactical decision on resuming or dropping Panmunjom talks determined by their estimate best channels seek basic objectives. Even if we decided overlook perfidy charge and agree immediate resumption discussions here (which we are not suggesting), seems doubtful Communists at Panmunjom would compromise on substance their 30 November proposal, as long as their objectives can be sought through other channels. Even were these channels blocked off, still possible Communists would prefer no Korean PC at all than agree to one on lines UNGA Resolution and our proposals.

YOUNG

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[4] Presumably the reference was to the Soviet Union's proposal made at Berlin for a five-power conference, including the People's Republic of China, to discuss solely Far East matters.

[5] On Nov. 30, Ki Sok Pok had submitted a plan for the Korean Political Conference to begin at New Delhi on Dec. 28 which included five "neutrals": the Soviet Union, India, Pakistan, Burma, and Indonesia. Neutrals would have the right to take part in the discussion, but decisions at the conference would be by unanimous agreement of the signatories of the armistice. (Telegram 119 from Munsan-ni, Nov. 30, 1953; 795.00/11–3054)

FE files, lot 55 D 480, "Korean Black Book, February 1–17, 1954"

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Drumright) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] February 2, 1954.

[Subject:] Background for Discussion of the Tungsten Purchase Agreement

Background

On March 28, 1952 the United States entered into a Tungsten Agreement with the Republic of Korea under which the United States undertook to: (a) purchase all the tungsten offered by the ROK under terms specified in a separate purchase agreement, (b) furnish supplies, equipment and technical assistance on a reimbursable basis, (c) furnish on a grant basis motor transportation to and from the mines, (d) assist the ROK in the negotiation and administration of a management contract with a mutually acceptable company.

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[1] Drafted by Howard Smith of FE/NA.

A Purchase Contract was entered into simultaneously to last five years or until 15,000 short ton of tungsten had been purchased. Under this contract the US agreed to pay $65 a ton for the first two years (April 1, 1952–March 31, 1954), with the price to be renegotiated to a level directly related to the world price level at the end of the two year period.

During the past two years two developments have led to the present Korean concern over the termination of the contract: (a) the world tungsten supply situation has eased markedly with the world price falling to about $18 a ton, (b) Korean tungsten production has exceeded all expectations, and deliveries of more than 13,000 tons have been made. It is expected that the full 15,000 tons will be delivered by April 1, 1954, at which point the contract will be terminated.

The ROK has sent a letter to the Secretary (Tab C)[2] and to Wood (Tab D)[3] requesting that the purchase contract be continued on the present terms, citing that tungsten is the most important export and that the industry will collapse without an assured market.

Discussion

Tungsten exports are undeniably the mainstay of Korean commodity exports. During the first nine months of 1953, tungsten exports accounted for 70% of commodity exports ($23 million out of $33 million).

The ROK has been advised of the probable termination of the Purchase Contract on at least two occasions in the past. A Department instruction on July 6, 1953 pointed out the fact that the ROK must endeavor to improve the competitive position of its tungsten mines in view of the falling world market price and the probable termination of the contract. On November 24, 1953, the ROK was advised by Wood that the US is not prepared to enter into new purchase commitments from Korea or elsewhere. At that time FOA urged the ROK to explore world markets immediately and offered to assist the ROK by furnishing a qualified marketing consultant. Apparently there was no reaction from the ROK until the recent requests to the US to continue tungsten purchases.

There appears to be no possibility for continued tungsten purchases by the US at the present contract price of $63 a ton or even at the world market price of about $18 a ton. We are assured by the Emergency Procurement Service that no funds exist for additional purchases at any price. Even if contracts with other countries should be cancelled the funds would be employed for other purposes, since the tungsten stockpile objective is all under contract.

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[2] Not printed, but see telegram 720 from Seoul, Jan. 27, p. 1737.

[3] Tab D is not printed; reference was to telegram Tofoa 361. (FOA files, lot 55 A 374, box 27)

Seemingly, no one knows whether the Korean tungsten industry can compete at existing world market prices, in view of the purported lack of sound accounting and financial practices prevalent in the industry. However, as the producer of the most valuable export commodity the tungsten mining industry should be kept alive if at all possible. From the long run viewpoint, the sooner the industry is compelled to face up to world competition the better. During the two years of the Purchase Contract little capital improvements were made, but it seems obvious that a plan of capital improvement aimed at improving the competitive position should be developed. It may prove necessary to extend a temporary subsidy to the industry. This would be justifiable if a non-subsidized operation would be an attainable goal.

The purchase of tungsten in excess of market prices as a form of economic aid would be less effective than straight grant aid, even if funds for such purchases were available. It probably would result in reduced incentive for the industry to reduce costs so that world competition could ultimately be met. Rather than perpetuate a high-cost industry the funds would have more effective alternative uses.

Recommendation

It is recommended that Ambassador Yang be informed that:

1. Funds for the continuation of the purchase of Korean tungsten at the present contract price or even at a reduced price do not exist. Therefore, the Purchase Contract which probably will expire April 1, 1954 will not be renewed by the US, as stated by Mr. Wood in November 1953.
2. The tungsten industry must be preserved, however, and the United States wishes to extend such assistance as it can by furnishing qualified people to aid in marketing tungsten and, if necessary, to aid in improving the efficiency of the industry. It is important for the long-run health of the industry that it face world competition and embark upon a plan to reduce costs. This probably will involve capital improvements over a period of years. As a temporary measure, it is conceivable that a government subsidy may be necessary.
3. It is considered that the purchase of tungsten as a form of economic aid is a less effective use of aid funds than their use for imports of an investment nature since it probably would result in reduced incentive for the industry to reduce costs to meet world market prices.

A reply to Pyun's letter to the Secretary along the above lines will be prepared when a copy of the letter is received.[4]

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[4] Regarding the Secretary's reply, see telegram 699 to Seoul, Feb. 25, p. 1751.

A copy of the tungsten agreement and Purchase Contract and copies of the relevant telegrams are attached.[5]

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[5] These telegrams and the purchase agreement were not found attached to the source text.

795B.11/2-1554

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to President Eisenhower [1]

[SEOUL,] February 4, 1954.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your gracious letter of January 2, 1954 [2] and again express Korea's gratitude to you for your generous offer of the aid and assistance funds and ratification of the Mutual Defense Pact.

The most vital question which concerns us is whether Korea can survive as an independent nation. We have stated publicly many times that any peace which allows a million or more Chinese communist troops to remain in Korea is not and cannot be acceptable, for this will lead Korea to the same path as China. We have stated also that out of the seven million north Korean population, only three million remain alive. A report received eight months ago revealed that three thousand of our people in the north are dying daily, either of hunger, cold, disease or murder. How many more have been destroyed since I do not know. Yet we are engaged in idle, meaningless peace talks.

Still you ask us to cooperate with you and to promise not to renew war. How can we cooperate with anyone who considers Korea's survival as of secondary importance? And how can we promise not to renew war if none of our friends is concerned about getting the Chinese out of Korea without unnecessary delay? How can we save our own people in the north who are being driven out of their homes into Sinkiang and other parts of Manchuria? And who is to stop the Chinese communists from coming daily to permanently settle in our northern Provinces?

Your peaceful means of unifying Korea cannot be interpreted otherwise than a determination to avoid possible conflict with the Soviets, whose program calls for destruction of "imperialistic" and "capitalistic" America. Has not the Armistice arrangement put the communists in an infinitely stronger position than they were? What did the United States accomplish by the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission Conference during the years from 1945 to 1948? How can we pin further hopes on the meaningless political conference?

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[1] The following note appeared on the source text: "This letter was withdrawn by Pres. Rhee in accordance with my suggestion to Ambassador Yang, and was not delivered to Pres. Eisenhower. It is therefore NOT an official document. WSR."

[2] *Ante*, p. 1685.

When your message informing me of your decision to withdraw two divisions of the U.S. Army from Korea was delivered to me by Admiral Radford on December 24, 1953, I accepted it without comment. What could I have said, when told that it was your decision? We Koreans cannot ask our friends to stay and fight for us for an indefinite period of time. When Admiral Radford told me that the two U.S. Divisions would leave their weapons with the ROK Army I thanked him.

To confess the truth I did believe that our fight against the communists was not only for the freedom and independence of Korea but also for the freedom and security of the United States and other free nations. Now I am convinced that our friends and others do not share this belief. If they do, how can they stop the war and make peace? Have we accomplished war's original objective?

And there is another point which we cannot afford to ignore. America's program for rebuilding Japan both economically and militarily makes the Korean people profoundly nervous. The American people do not heed our friendly warning against trusting the Japanese too much, just as they ignored it until after the Pearl Harbor disaster. They would rather count on their former enemy than listen to their friend who remained loyal all the bygone years. The Japanese officially declared that 85 per cent of all the property in Korea is theirs and that Korea should pay for the damage done to their former property in Korea by the war. They try to come to our territorial waters to fish as they did for the last forty years, but the Korean fishermen who thereby lost their means of livelihood will not tolerate them and there will be a clash between the coasts of the two countries so as to maintain peace. Instead of defending Korea's position, the U.S. Government has taken sides with Japan and refuses to judge who is the aggressor. It is becoming quite clear to the Koreans that the United States has no intention of treating the two countries on a just and equal basis.

American aid funds given for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Korean economy have been spent more for Japanese economy than Korean economy. A total of $515 million allocated for Korea through the ECA and UNKRA agencies has been used in importing consumer goods and the machines of old and obsolete models, which the Japanese themselves are replacing with modern U.S. and German makes. This has been and still is being done according to the U.S. policy, as I was told by a high U.S. authority. If that is the case, United States should give all the aids to Japan, instead of giving some to Korea "for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the Korean economy" which is only in name while the actual aid goes to the building up of the Japanese economy. The reason why ECA returned $30 million of the aid funds to the U.S. Treasury in the first year and $60 million in the second year on the ground that there was nothing more to do with the money was because Japan had not enough consumer goods ready to fill the orders at that time.

Under these circumstances, we see no hope in the U.S. Government. So long as we continue to cooperate with the United States we will either be another China or once again the Korea of the last forty years. If we have to be sold to either of our enemies, we would rather fight until we are united with our own people. If we succeed, we will become free men, or slaves if we fail fighting alone, but we will be united. This may simplify the matter for you to solve as you wish. I deeply regret that we have been a cause of great trouble for the United States and other U.N. nations. The time is here when we must decide either one way or the other. Please tell me frankly what your present policy is regarding the unification of Korea.

With continued best wishes for your health and success,

Sincerely yours, SYNGMAN RHEE

711.11 EI/2-954

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 9, 1954.

Subject: Letter from President Rhee to President Eisenhower [2]

Participants: Philip Han, Counselor, Korean Embassy
Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
Robert J. G. McClurkin, Acting Director, NA

Mr. Han came in at his request. He delivered to Mr. Robertson two sealed envelopes, one addressed to President Eisenhower and the other to Mr. Robertson. The envelope addressed to Mr. Robertson contained a letter to him from President Rhee [3] and a copy of the letter from President Rhee to President Eisenhower.

After reading both letters carefully Mr. Robertson said that he was distressed that he should be asked to deliver such a letter to President Eisenhower. The letter not only contained statements which were untrue, but was offensive in tone, and he was sure the President would be shocked to receive such a communication.

Mr. Robertson suggested that consideration be given to its withdrawal. Mr. Han made no comment on the suggestion.[4]

WSR

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by McClurkin.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Not found in Department of State files.

[4] According to a summary memorandum of a telephone conversation between Smith and Eisenhower, 11:55 a.m., Feb. 10, Smith informed the President that he was refusing *Continued*

795.00/2–954: Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Bond) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, February 9, 1954—10 p. m.
PRIORITY

761. Repeated Tokyo 455 (for CINCUNC and CAG), New Delhi 73. Regarding Embtel 757,[1] repeated Tokyo 451, New Delhi 71.

During conversation reported Embtel 759,[2] Pyun raised question of assurances requested by ROK Government re disposition "neutral" Korea ex-POW's now en route to India and displayed considerable concern over possibility such assurances might not be forthcoming. He said this would place his government in most difficult position and would oblige it take some action which would demonstrate to Korean people that it was not "abandoning these unfortunates," whom he said ROK still regards as its citizens. He was obviously nervous about threat he had made earlier that ROK Government might seek to prevent departure Indian contingent scheduled leave February 10, and was seeking way out. He inquired, for example, whether some substantial number of Indians might not be remaining beyond February 10 and whether it might not be possible for them to delay their departure until ROK demands met. Obvious implication of his remarks was that ROK Government might have to hold at least a few Indians as "hostages" until satisfactory assurances obtained.

Without going into question of capability of ROK Government to enforce such decision, I emphasized to Pyun exceedingly adverse effects which any such intemperate action would have on Indian Government, which was after all, for better or worse, present custodian of those Koreans about whose future ROK Government so concerned. I suggested that if ROK Government really had interests of latter group at heart, it should make every effort establish relationship of mutual

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to accept Rhee's letter (a practice followed, Smith explained, when such offensive communications were received from Heads of State). Eisenhower asked why such a letter had been written. Smith could only surmise that sleepless nights, overwork, and Rhee's age conspired to produce this hysterical, insulting, and vituperative communication. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file)

The Department of State sent a photostatic copy of this letter to the President, who read it and made it a part of his unofficial records. (Memorandum for the record, Feb. 10, 1954; Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file)

[1] In this telegram, Feb. 9, Bond reported that Pyun had told him that the Republic of Korea could not allow the departure of the 76 Korean POWs who had chosen to go to a neutral country unless it received assurances in writing that they would go to a non-Communist state other than India, that they would never be financial burdens on the Republic of Korea, and that they would be able to lead "free man's life" with opportunities for earning a livelihood. (795.00/2–954)

[2] This telegram, Feb. 9, dealt with the plan of the ROK Government to announce the offer of a division of its army for service in Laos. The American Embassy discouraged this announcement as premature and unwise. (795.00/2–954)

confidence with Indian Government with view to working out mutually satisfactory disposition of ex-POW's.

Pyun came later to say he had just learned that last contingent of Indians not scheduled leave until February 23, which he said would allow "plenty of time" to obtain necessary assurances. While I have at no time given Pyun reason to believe that assurances which he requested are likely to be forthcoming, and to date I believe he now convinced it not within province of UNC to provide such assurances, he obviously continues to hope that something of sort may be obtained from some source, even if it has to be from Indians themselves. In this situation some useful purpose might be accomplished if Indian Government could see its way clear in some way to reassure ROK Government re ultimate disposition Korean ex-POW's now in Indian hands.[3]

Although it is my understanding that it is not in power of ROK Government forcibly to interfere with departure of CFI from demilitarized zone, it undoubtedly does possess capability of instigating troublesome incidents should it so choose.

BOND

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[3] In telegram 655 to Seoul, Feb. 10, Bond was instructed to tell Pyun that the men involved freely entrusted themselves into Indian custody and rejected going to the ROK. The U.S. Government was confident that India would treat them well and would facilitate their settlement in neutral nations of their choice. (795.00/2-954)

795B.11/2-1554

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 15, 1954.

Subject: President Rhee's Letter of February 4 to President Eisenhower[1]

Participants: His Excellency You Chan Yang, Korean Ambassador
Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
Mr. Robert J. G. McClurkin, Acting Director, NA

Mr. Robertson said that he was greatly concerned about the letter of February 4 from President Rhee to President Eisenhower. Ambassador Yang said that he had just returned to Washington and had not yet seen the letter.

Mr. Robertson said that he had personally taken the responsibility for not delivering the letter to President Eisenhower because of his own friendship for Korea and because of the friendship which he knew President Eisenhower has for Korea. He had refrained from delivering the letter because he believes that it is a letter which could do serious harm to the relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea. Whatever President Rhee's intentions, the letter is not only insulting but an incredible one from the head of a State for which the United States has done so much.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 1745.

Mr. Robertson said that we have noted with concern and dismay other abusive statements about the United States which have been made by President Rhee and by other Korean Government spokesmen both in the Republic of Korea and outside—for example, a recent release in London. He emphasized that the United States was not objecting to the Koreans having firm convictions about the problems of the free world or to their expressing them.

Ambassador Yang said that frankly his sentiments were in general accord with Mr. Robertson's, but he could understand President Rhee's feeling of tension and despair. President Rhee sees the German and Austrian situations getting nowhere in years of talking, and he fears that Korea likewise may remain indefinitely divided. So far as the letter is concerned, however, Ambassador Yang said he was glad that Mr. Robertson had held it up. Ambassador Yang then said he would report this whole conversation frankly to President Rhee in the hope that the letter might be modified.[2]

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[2] According to a memorandum by O'Connor to Robertson, Dulles informed Eisenhower on Feb. 24 that President Rhee had withdrawn his letter. (795B.11/2–2554)

Editorial Note

On February 18, 1954, the four Ministers meeting at Berlin issued a communiqué describing the agreements they had reached during four weeks of discussions. For a text, see Department of State *Bulletin,* March 1, 1954, pages 317–318. This communiqué was the culmination of the efforts at the Conference, among other things, to call a conference of Korean belligerents to discuss the political settlement of the Korean problem. The meeting was scheduled to begin in Geneva on April 26, 1954. There was no provision for neutral participation and the question of the restoration of peace in Indochina was also to be discussed. For documentation on the Korean phase of the Geneva Conference, initially concerned with United States efforts to persuade the Republic of Korea to participate in the meeting, see volume XVI, pages 1 ff.

895B.2547/1-2754: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 25, 1954—7:10 p. m.

699. Your 720.[2] After coordination Wood you are authorized reply for Secretary to Pyun re tungsten purchases along following lines:

1. U.S. Government requirements tungsten either met or under contract. No Government funds exist purchase additional tungsten. Present contractual obligations being reduced where possible.

2. U.S. shares ROK concern re impact termination contract on Korean tungsten industry and prepared furnish marketing and technical assistance and finance capital improvements if necessary within framework aid program to improve efficiency mines so world competition can be met.

3. Suggest plan looking increased efficiency be developed which probably will involve capital improvements over period years.

DULLES

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Howard Smith of FE/NA and cleared by Robertson and by representatives of FOA, the Army, and OMP.

[2] Dated Jan. 27, p. 1737.

IX. MARCH 1-DECEMBER 31, 1954: U.S.-KOREAN RELATIONS IN THE POSTARMISTICE PERIOD

REDEPLOYMENT OF U.S. TROOPS IN KOREA, EXPANSION OF THE ROK ARMED FORCES, AND THE VAN FLEET MISSION; THE RHEE VISIT TO WASHINGTON; CONCERN OVER THE NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION; ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID AND THE SIGNATURE OF THE U.S.-ROK AGREED MINUTE OF UNDERSTANDING; FINAL ISSUES AND THE SIGNATURE OF THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY; HWAN CURRENCY ADVANCES CONTROVERSY

795.00/3-154

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 1, 1954.

Subject: Withdrawal of Foreign Forces from Korea and the Korean Political Conference.

There is attached a memorandum on the above subject for your signature, in accordance with your request of today.

In his telegram, Ambassador Briggs is referring to a long discussion which took place in John Allison's office on Wednesday, February 24. General Hull, General Harrison, Ambassador Allison, Ambassador Briggs, Mr. Parsons,[1] Mr. Calhoun and I participated. A number of matters came up which the group wished me to take up in Washington. Among these was the subject of Briggs' telegram No. 841.[2] General Hull reported that the Department of Defense was considering unit withdrawals this year which would lead to redeployment of most, if not all, of our forces from Korea within a year or two. He mentioned the possibility of leaving a token force and a large military mission in Korea for purposes of training and possible operational control. General Hull pointed out that the rapid and substantial reduction in our forces in Korea might adversely affect United States relations with the ROK. He felt that it would greatly lessen our influence there, at least the influence of the United Nations Command and the Eighth Army.[3]

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[1] James G. Parsons, Counselor of the Embassy at Tokyo.

[2] In this telegram, Feb. 28, Briggs reported as follows:

"During my talk with General Hull February 24 he outlined in general terms planning which proceeding in Defense Department re deployment US Forces Korea. In connection with eventual dissemination this information I urge that Department consider this question in relation to our substantive position on withdrawal forces from Korea at Geneva conference. While as I understand it decision on redeployment can be expected soon, I recommend strongly that information regarding that decision be held as closely as possible. I recognize that it has to be discussed with a number of other governments including that of ROK but would hope that in doing so we should take every precaution to avoid plans becoming public knowledge. It becomes increasingly apparent that major Red Chinese objective at Geneva will probably be to obtain withdrawal foreign forces from ROK. To make known publicly in advance of or during conference fact we are contemplating withdrawal bulk our forces might give Communists substantial tactical advantage at conference table." (795.00/2-2854)

I gathered from General Hull's remarks that his planning for redeployment had reached a pretty advanced stage and would proceed forthwith. Therefore, I raised the question of the relationship between the planning, public announcement and actual troop movement and the position to be taken at the Korean Political Conference in Geneva on the withdrawal of foreign forces. I suggested that it would be advisable for State and Defense seriously to consider deferring any announcement or implementation of further redeployment until we determine at Geneva whether any agreement on anything is to be obtained. Both General Hull and General Harrison appeared somewhat doubtful that it would be possible to hold up this matter pending the outcome of the Political Conference. However, everyone at the meeting agreed this was an extremely important question which should be taken up as soon as possible in Washington.

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Acting Secretary of State[4]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 1, 1954.
SPECIAL HANDLING

Subject: Troop Withdrawal from Korea and the Korean Political Conference.

I believe it will be necessary in the near future to take up with the Department of Defense the question of future redeployment of United States forces in Korea in connection with the objectives which we intend to seek on this question at the Korean Political Conference.

Paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement recommends a political conference to settle "through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc." It is likely that the Communists at Geneva will concentrate their efforts on obtaining agreement on prompt withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea. This is probably their principal objective in Korea. The Communists are not interested in immediate unification of Korea unless it is under complete Communist control.

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[3] A marginal note referring to this sentence read as follows: "I believe it will have adverse repercussions generally in East Asia. E[verett] F. D[rumright]"

[4] This memorandum was drafted by Young and cleared by Drumright and was sent through Murphy.

The interest of the United States and the United Nations will be directed more where it is a question of unification than toward the withdrawal of forces. The continued deployment of United Nations forces in Korea will provide us with substantial leverage at Geneva in attempting to negotiate with the Communists a satisfactory agreement on unifying Korea.

If we carry out or make public plans for additional redeployment of United States divisions from Korea before or during the Political Conference, we will be weakening and perhaps eliminating our major bargaining power at the conference table. To make known in advance that the United States is planning to withdraw the bulk of its forces will give the Communists a substantial tactical advantage. Ambassador Briggs has strongly recommended, and I concur, that information regarding withdrawal of United States forces from Korea be restricted to the maximum degree possible.

Recommendation

I recommend that you discuss this matter in the near future with the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense,[5] and that you make the following points:

(a) Final decisions on the timing, speed and amount of additional redeployment from Korea should be deferred until the outcome of the Korean Political Conference can be determined;

(b) Plans for redeployment should be correlated with our substantive position to be taken at Geneva;

(c) Every effort should be made to prevent our plans on redeployment from becoming public knowledge prematurely.

[W.B.S.]

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[5] A marginal note by Smith read as follows: "Sec. Wilson agrees. Done by phone."

S/P–NSC files, lot 61 D 167, "ROK Troops to Laos"

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 2, 1954.

Subject: Proposed ROK Offer of Troops to Laos

Reference: NSC Action No. 1043–*a* [1]

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[1] NSC Action No. 1043–*a*, Feb. 17, read as follows:

"Agreed that General Hull should be authorized to advise President Rhee that this contemplated offer is being considered at the highest levels in the United States Government; and that the NSC Planning Board should prepare recommendations thereon for Council consideration." (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95)

1. In letters to General Hull (CINCUNC) President Rhee and the Korean Prime Minister [2] have stated that the Government of the Republic of Korea is prepared to allocate a division of the Korean Army to help Laos in its struggle against Communist aggression, if the United States concurred. General Hull subsequently told the Koreans that he would refer the question to the United States Government for consideration.

2. Attached are three studies [3] of this question:

a. A study by the Department of State of the political aspects of the proposed offer.

b. A report by the Department of Defense of the military aspects, based on the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. A memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence assessing probable reactions to ROK participation in the Indochina war.

3. In summary, the three studies conclude that the rest of the free world would react adversely to ROK participation in the Indochina war and that the military and political disadvantages of accepting the offer materially outweigh the advantages. The Departments of State and Defense, however, have alternate proposals as to the reason which should be expressed to the ROK Government for considering acceptance of the offer undesirable at this time.

4. The NSC Planning Board therefore recommends, in response to NSC Action No. 1043-*a*, that General Hull be directed to advise the ROK Government that, after full consideration at the highest levels in the United States Government which commends the ROK Government for its determination to combat Communist aggression in Asia even outside the borders of Korea, it is considered that [for military reasons] * [in the best interests of the Free World] † it is not desirable at this time that a division of the Korean Army be sent out of Korea to Laos.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

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[2] Neither printed.

[3] None printed.

* Department of State proposal. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]

† Department of Defense proposal. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 187th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, March 4, 1954 [1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

The following were present at the 187th NSC meeting: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States;

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[1] Drafted by Gleason on Mar. 5.

the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. Morrison for the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; Commissioner Campbell, AEC; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Mr. Cutler and Mr. Jackson, Special Assistants to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

At the outset of the meeting the President, in a humorous tone, said that if any member of the National Security Council or anyone who attended its meetings had talked to the Alsops for more than 30 seconds in the course of the last four weeks, that individual was to make a date to come in and talk with him.

[Here follows discussion on items 1. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security", 2. "Status of U.S. Programs for National Security as of December 31, 1953", 3. "U.S. Objectives in the Event of a General War With the Soviet Bloc", 4. "United States Policy Toward South Asia", and 5. "Report by the Director, Foreign Operations Administration".]

6. *Proposed ROK Offer of Troops to Laos* (NSC Action No. 1043–*a*; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 2, 1954)[2]

Mr. Cutler called attention to the three studies of this problem which were attached to the Planning Board's recommendation that the offer of a Korean division to Laos be rejected. While the Planning Board was in unanimous agreement that General Hull should be instructed to tell President Rhee that the United States felt that this offer should not be made, Mr. Cutler pointed out the difference in opinion between the Departments of State and Defense with regard to the basis on which this opinion was to rest. The State Department believed that General Hull should explain this decision as motivated by "military considerations", whereas the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that it should be based upon "the best interests of the free world".

The President said, with great emphasis, that he thought the basis should be that public opinion in the United States would never support the removal of an ROK division for adventures in other parts of the world while the United States itself was still obliged to maintain forces in Korea. He would certainly hate to have to explain such a situation to the mothers of American soldiers.

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[2] For text of NSC Action No. 1043–*a*, see footnote 1, *supra*. The memorandum from Lay is *supra*.

Secretary Smith said that this was precisely what the State Department had in mind when it spoke of rejecting the offer for military reasons.

The President then asked Admiral Radford for his views. Admiral Radford replied that he had felt that military reasons offered the soundest basis on which to reject Rhee's offer, but that the Chiefs of Staff had out-voted him on the issue. He therefore proposed that the Joint Chiefs should send General Hull a message indicating that he was to frame a rejection, in talking with President Rhee, on military grounds, and then to add what the President had said as to the impossibility of public acceptance of this move in the United States.

The President replied that he did not think the basis he had in mind should be described as "military reasons", but simply as domestic political reasons. In any case, he wanted General Hull to make quite clear to President Rhee that domestic opinion in the United States would never stand for the removal of a Korean division to Indochina.

In that case, Admiral Radford said, it was necessary to say nothing more than this in the JCS instructions to General Hull.

The Vice President commented that the best way of handling Rhee, in his opinion, was simply to tell him the truth.

The National Security Council: [3]

a. Discussed the subject on the basis of the recommendation contained in paragraph 4 of the reference memorandum.

b. Agreed that the Department of Defense should transmit a message to General Hull[4] directing him to advise the ROK Government that, after full consideration at the highest levels in the United States Government which commends the ROK Government for its determination to combat communist aggression in Asia even outside the borders of Korea, it is considered that it is not desirable at this time that a division of the Korean Army be sent to Laos because U.S. public opinion would not support the maintenance of U.S. forces in Korea while ROK forces were withdrawn from Korea for action elsewhere.

Note: The action in *b* above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for implementation.

[Here follows discussion on items 7. "Assurances to the French in Connection With the European Defense Community", 8. "Law Regarding the Order of Succession to the Presidency", and 9. "Status of Projects".]

S. EVERETT GLEASON

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[3] The following paragraphs and note constituted NSC Action No. 1054, a record copy of which is located in S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.

[4] Telegram JCS 957963, Mar. 4, to CINCFE, exclusive for Hull, not printed. (JCS records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–54))

INR–NIE files

Special National Intelligence Estimate [1]

TOP SECRET
SNIE 100–2–54

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1954.

PROBABLE REACTIONS OF COMMUNIST CHINA, THE USSR, AND THE FREE WORLD TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

THE PROBLEM

To examine probable reactions of Communist China, the USSR, and countries in the Free World to certain US courses of action against Communist China in the event hostilities in Korea are resumed as a consequence of Communist aggression there during 1954.

ASSUMPTIONS

A. The US objective is limited to expelling Communist armed forces from Korea.

B. The US would announce this objective immediately after the renewal of hostilities.

C. In response to the Communist aggression, the US immediately would:

1. Conduct air attacks, with atomic weapons when militarily desirable and authorized, against:

a. Military targets in Korea; and

b. Those military targets* which directly support Communist military operations in Korea or which threaten the security of US–UN forces and which are located either:

(1) In the general vicinity of Korea (i.e., the area bounded by and including Kirin–Mukden–Tientsin–Tsinan–Tsingtao); *or*

(2) Anywhere in China or Manchuria. (In either (1) or (2) above to avoid attacking Port Arthur and Dairen)

2. Simultaneously, exploit as practicable such success as may be gained as a result of action outlined above, by coordinated ground, naval, and air action to destroy enemy forces in Korea.

D. The US might undertake at a later date the following supporting or diversionary actions:

1. Blockade of the China coast;

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[1] According to a note on the cover sheet, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Joint Staff participated with the CIA in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred with this estimate on Mar. 2, 1954, but the note on the covering sheet referred the reader to the footnote to the next to the last sentence of paragraph 10 and also stated that the FBI abstained as the subject was outside its jurisdiction.

*Targets would include military concentrations, airfields, naval bases, military installations, and transportation systems, etc., even if these targets were adjacent to or within urban concentrations. [Footnote in the source text.]

2. Large-scale Chinese Nationalist raids on the China mainland;
3. Seizure of Hainan Island.

I. *Introduction*

1. It is possible that the Bloc leaders, in deciding upon a new act of aggression in Korea, deliberately chose Korea as the place most desirable for initiating general war. Or, in light of the repeated US warnings, they may at least have considered general war a highly probable consequence of their aggression, and been willing to accept the consequences. In this case, their reactions to the assumed US courses of action would presumably be in accordance with their strategic plans for such a war, which we do not undertake to estimate in this paper.

2. However, we have estimated previously and still believe that the Chinese Communists will not deliberately undertake courses of action which they believe would involve serious risk of US action against the Chinese mainland. We have also estimated and still believe that the Communists will try to avoid courses of action which clearly involve substantial risk of general war.

3. We therefore believe it more probable that the Communists, while realizing that their aggression would involve a risk of US action against mainland China, would nevertheless have estimated that this risk was not so great as to be unacceptable. It is unlikely that the Communists would have misunderstood the US warnings, although they might have underestimated US determination to carry them through with atomic weapons. Or they might believe that they could so conceal their aggression as to make such US action infeasible. Whatever their reasoning may have been, we believe that they would in these circumstances react to the assumed US courses of action in the ways described in the following paragraphs.

II. *Communist Reactions*

A. *Initial Reactions*

4. Regardless of US assurances concerning its objectives, the Chinese Communists would view the bombing of military targets in China and Manchuria (Assumption C) as a grave threat to their regime. The assumed US courses of action would almost certainly impel the Communists to reassess the strategic situation in Asia and particularly their military posture in Korea. Nevertheless, we believe that they would not react by immediately abandoning their military position in Korea. The Chinese Communists would, to the extent that their then available capabilities permitted, counter the US action with maximum countermeasures, probably including:

a. Maintenance of military operations in Korea;
b. Air defense by the Communist Air Force in China (CAFIC); and
c. Air strikes against US targets in Korea and US bases on Okinawa.

Initially, the Communists might refrain, for political reasons, from attacking US bases in Japan.

5. The USSR is bound to Communist China by close ties of interest and ideology as well as by the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950. It is therefore possible that the USSR might intervene directly and overtly even at the outset of the fighting, especially if the Kremlin considered that vital Soviet security interests were endangered. We believe, however, that the Kremlin would not estimate that the assumed US courses of action had made general war inevitable, and that it would seek at first to counter the US actions by measures which it believed would involve a minimum risk of precipitating an attack on the USSR itself. Thus, the USSR would provide all possible logistic support to the Chinese Communists. It would probably support Chinese Communist air defense operations, including committing elements of its Far Eastern air forces, but would endeavor to conceal its participation. It might also covertly commit Soviet submarines. We believe, however, that the Kremlin would not, at this stage of the fighting, commit substantial identifiable Soviet forces beyond the limits of Communist-held territory.

6. In connection with their resumption of hostilities, the Communists would make every effort to persuade the world that the ROK or the US, not the Communists, was the aggressor. In so doing, they would exploit their own capabilities for deception and subterfuge, the confused situation created by President Rhee's frequent avowals of an intention to renew hostilities unilaterally, and the suspicion with which much of the non-Communist world views Syngman Rhee. In addition, the Communists would react vigorously on the political front to the US counteractions and would:

a. Attempt to gain support, particularly in Asia, for the charge that the US was using weapons of mass destruction against "non-military" targets;

b. Appeal to the UN to condemn and halt US "aggression" and to sponsor negotiations for a cease-fire; and

c. Attempt to divide the US from its allies by all other available diplomatic and propaganda means, including a threat to invoke the Sino-Soviet treaty.

B. *Subsequent Reactions*

7. Subsequent Communist reactions would depend to a large extent on how the military situation developed, particularly in terms of the degree of damage inflicted by US action. The Communists would continue to assert their willingness to negotiate a settlement in Korea. However, we consider it unlikely that the Communists would withdraw their forces from Korea as long as their military position there and their position at home remained tenable.

8. If the USSR concluded that the US was about to expel Communist forces from Korea and to take up a position along the border of North

Korea, the USSR would almost certainly accept increased risks to protect its own strategic interests in the area and would expand further its unavowed participation, including even committing its own ground forces in the guise of volunteers. The CAFIC might attempt to make air attacks on Japan. There is some slight chance that the USSR might even provide atomic weapons with delivery units to CAFIC. We believe, however, that the USSR would still seek to avoid further expansion of the area of conflict.

9. If the US expanded its operations against China by a blockade of the China coast, by sponsoring and supporting large-scale Chinese Nationalist raids on the China mainland, and/or by seizure of Hainan Island, the Communists would become convinced that the US, despite its announced objective, intended to destroy the Chinese Communist regime. In such circumstances, the Chinese Communists would probably take Hong Kong if the UK had by this time committed itself to supporting the assumed US action. Moreover, the Chinese Communists might undertake an invasion of Indochina as a diversionary measure.

10. If the Kremlin estimated that the Chinese Communist regime was about to be destroyed or lost to the Bloc, the Kremlin would have to decide whether to seek an end to the war by the withdrawal of Communist armed forces from Korea or to take such additional overt measures to support its ally as the military situation seemed to demand, including, if necessary, the open commitment of Soviet ground, naval, and air forces using all weapons. There is now no adequate basis for a confident estimate of the probable Kremlin decision in this case as this decision would be greatly influenced by the cause of events leading up to the situation we predicate. It is possible that the Kremlin might think it worthwhile temporarily to sacrifice North Korea if such a sacrifice appeared necessary and sufficient to save the Chinese Communist regime and the Chinese Communist alliance. On the other hand, if the Kremlin estimated that the situation was such that the Chinese Communist regime could not be saved except by giving it overt Soviet military assistance as noted above, the USSR might give such assistance even at grave risk of expanding the area of conflict beyond the issues at stake in Asia.† However, even in this case we believe the Kremlin would attempt to localize the hostilities to the Far East.

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†The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, feel that, given the situation postulated, this sentence minimizes the danger that the USSR would give all out assistance to Communist China rather than accept its loss to the bloc. They believe that the Kremlin would probably regard the loss of Communist China as an intolerable blow to Soviet strength and security and as an encouragement to further US military pressure on the remainder of the bloc. They, therefore, believe that there would be the gravest danger that the Kremlin would not abandon its ally but would give it such full and open support as the military situation seemed to demand, even at the grave risk of expansion of the area of hostilities or of general war. [Footnote in the source text.]

III. *Free World Reactions*

11. Among the general considerations which would shape the probable reactions of the non-Communist peoples of Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia to the assumed US courses of action is their concern that the US may become more deeply involved in the Far East. More important, however, is the widespread fear that renewal of war in Korea would lead to general war. The fear is strengthened by concern lest the Sino-Soviet treaty be invoked.

12. If the fact of Communist aggression were clouded or uncertain, US use of atomic weapons would be viewed unfavorably by most US allies. However, if they were convinced that the Communists had in fact initiated hostilities, they would probably reluctantly accept the US use of atomic weapons in North Korea, and probably accept their use in Manchuria and North China against those military targets in the general vicinity of Korea (Assumption C.b.(1)) which are not adjacent to or within urban concentrations. With respect to other areas in China (Assumption C.b.(2)), they would probably not oppose US atomic attacks on Chinese Communist air bases, if those bases were being used for attacks against US or allied forces. In any event, the European allies of the US, and the peoples of the non-Communist world generally, would not support the use of atomic weapons by the US against military targets which are adjacent to or within urban concentrations. They almost certainly would not consider that the issues of the Korean war justified such an act, even in the event of renewed Communist aggression.

13. The allies of the US would probably not oppose a naval blockade of Communist China if the Korean war were resumed. However, most of them would probably object to the extension by the US of hostilities to any part of China beyond the general vicinity of Korea, whether by seizure of Hainan, by large-scale Nationalist raids on the mainland, or by air attacks other than those against air bases being used for attacks against US or allied forces.

14. The reaction of the governments and peoples of Asia and the Pacific to the assumed courses of action would be mixed. Australia, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea, Nationalist China, the Philippines, and Pakistan would almost certainly support, and India, Burma, and Indonesia oppose the US action. The attitude of Japan and Thailand would probably hinge upon their estimates of the imminence of the Communist threat to themselves, with each seeking initially to maintain a neutral role. The reaction of remaining Asian countries, and of those of the Middle East, except Greece and Turkey, would probably be adverse to the US action.

795B.5/3-954

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 9, 1954.

Subject: Strengthening the Republic of Korea's Defense Forces

Participants: His Excellency You Chan Yang, Ambassador of Korea
Mr. Pyo Wook Han, Counselor of Korean Embassy
Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director of NA
Mr. Robert J. G. McClurkin, Deputy Director of NA

Ambassador Yang came in at his request to discuss the Republic of Korea's request for strengthening of its defense forces. He began by stating his understanding that the Secretary and Mr. Robertson had indicated, when they were in Korea last August, that the United States would go ahead with building up the Republic of Korea's forces. Mr. Robertson pointed out that all of these discussions had centered around an increase to approximately twenty divisions. He stressed the fact that the economic implications of any further increase would have to be very carefully considered.

Ambassador Yang said that there continues to be talk about further withdrawal of United States forces from Korea. There is no objection to this so long as the Koreans are in a position to defend themselves, but he does not think that twenty divisions are sufficient for that purpose if United States forces are withdrawn. General Van Fleet has written that for the cost of one American division twenty-five Korean divisions can be maintained. Certainly it costs a good deal less to maintain a Korean division. Ambassador Yang believes, therefore, that it makes good sense for the United States to train further Korean divisions and then withdraw the American forces.

Mr. Robertson said that there is a limit not only to what the economies of the Asian States can support in the way of armed forces, but to what the United States can do. The United States has cut its military budget because the development of nuclear weapons has changed the strategy of war. Essentially there are problems which the military have to decide; however, despite any talk about withdrawal from the Far East of United States forces, Mr. Robertson said that he knows of no withdrawal of American naval or air strength from the Pacific area.

Ambassador Yang said that not much is being done for the Korean navy and air force, whereas destroyers are going to Formosa and Japan, and it seems as though United States policy regards Japan as the future leader in a military way in the Far East. Mr. Robertson said that we have not loaned any destroyers to Japan,[1] and then went on to say that we resent the continued Republic of Korea statements about our favoring Japan as a leader in the Far East because they are not fair and not true. Such statements are particularly distasteful to us because Korea has no better friend than the United States. However, the United States needs all of its friends in the global fight with international communism. Japan has been standing virtually defenseless against any Communist aggression, and has been only with great difficulty brought along to undertake defense measures, whereas Korea has willingly and eagerly developed much larger forces.

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[1] For documentation on this subject, see volume XIV.

Ambassador Yang said that pamphlets are being circulated in Japan urging the destruction of the Republic of Korea, and that the Japanese are sending in boatloads of Communists to infiltrate Korea. (He subsequently modified this statement as a result of a question from Mr. Robertson to say that the Communists were coming from Japan, and not that they were being sent by the Japanese Government.) He said that there is an organized propaganda campaign in the Japanese and American press to belittle Korea and President Rhee, and that it all emanated from Tokyo. Mr. Robertson commented that he was much more concerned about what is being said in Korea and is being written in the Korean press about the United States.

Ambassador Yang reiterated his belief that it would be desirable to increase Republic of Korea forces. Mr. Robertson replied that while this is a military question, he personally believed first things must come first. He was reluctant even to consider the request at a point at which the Republic of Korea is not cooperating with us, especially with respect to the Korean Political Conference at Geneva.

795B.5/3–1854

Memorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 17 March 1954.

1. Last evening I requested General Hull's comments on President Rhee's letter of 16 March to President Eisenhower.[1] The reply has just been received and is enclosed herewith.[2]

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[1] At the direction of Secretary Dulles, Executive Secretary Scott, on Mar. 16 sent to Admiral Radford a copy of telegram 896 from Seoul, Mar. 16, not printed, transmitting the text of Rhee's letter of Mar. 11 to President Eisenhower. Rhee stated that, as agreed upon with Nixon in Seoul in November 1953, he was informing the U.S. Government of his possible intention to take unilateral action to unify Korea. If the United States was unprepared to support a military offensive to take the north, Rhee proposed that the U.S. Government undertake the alternative program as described in this memorandum.

Admiral Radford requested Hull's comments on telegram 896 in telegram JCS 958438 to CINCFE, Mar. 16, not printed. (JCS files)

[2] Reference was to CINCFE telegram C 67435, printed *infra*, which suggested points to include in the President's reply to Rhee.

2. While I have not had the opportunity to analyze General Hull's remarks in detail, my initial reaction is that they are sound except in one major matter—that is the extent to and manner in which we reject Rhee's alternative proposal.

3. Rhee's alternative proposal has three parts which, as stated by him, are for the purpose of "protection of free Korea and its allies".

The first involves adequate air, naval and logistic support for 20 divisions of the ROK army to prevent a surprise enemy break through. I believe that Rhee is entitled to such an assurance with the understanding that U.S. Naval and Air Forces will quickly and in strength come to the assistance of ROK if attacked by the Communists.

The second involves building up the ROK army to a strength of 35 to 40 divisions. I agree with Hull that this is beyond prospective capabilities except under conditions prevailing under full mobilization. However, we can well endorse the concept of building up the trained mobilizable reserve in South Korea. This matter will require further study to determine the exact scale which can be underwritten.

The third involves the assignment of General Van Fleet the task of training the ground forces of South Korea and our other Asian allies. This is certainly a matter that can be considered to determine whether the psychological, as well as the practicable, benefits to be attained would merit persuading General Van Fleet to accept such a task.

4. I feel that President Rhee is honestly striving to find military and political solutions for his problems, and therefore they should not be arbitrarily rejected.

ARTHUR RADFORD

795.00/3-1054: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Hull) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, March 17, 1954—7:10 p. m.

C 67435. Exclusive for Radford. Ref: [JCS] 958438.[1]

1. I have obtained from Briggs copy of ltr from Pres Rhee to Pres Eisenhower dated 11 March.[1]

2. I am convinced Pres Rhee and his mil leaders are well aware of the inevitable defeat of any unilateral effort on his part to atk Communists in order to unify Korea. Rhee has been informed that unilateral action would not be supported by the US with either troops or supplies. The ltr is therefore, in my opinion, strictly political in nature and designed for the purpose of obtaining additional commitments from the US.

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[1] See footnote 1, *supra.*

3. The first course of action desired by Pres Rhee is contrary to our policies. The alternative course would be beyond the capabilities of Korean manpower and economy and if ever achieved would encourage Rhee to believe he had the means successfully to undertake offensive action against North Korea.

4. Both courses I consider completely unacceptable.

5. I consider it equally unacceptable to permit Pres Rhee to think that we cannot enter the Geneva conf without ROK participation.

6. Recommend that any reply contain the fol:

a. Rejection of both his proposed alternatives and refusal to support either one.

b. In the interests of a real effort to achieve agreements leading toward peaceful relations among nations, the Geneva conf must be held and should be attended by representatives of all govts concerned. In view of ROK deep concern in the matter, it is hoped that it will send its representatives. For it not to do so would not prevent the functioning of the conf, but would be an indication to Communist govts of a lack of solidarity among the free peoples and possible agreement on Korean affairs without participation of ROK representatives.

c. The position of the US govt, should Pres Rhee decide to take unilateral action, must be once more clearly stated.

d. In view of the mil implications of this problem, consideration might be given as to whether I should accompany Amb Briggs when he delivers ans to Pres Rhees ltr.[2]

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[2] According to telegram 926 from Seoul, Mar. 22, 1954, Hull was not present when Eisenhower's reply was delivered to Rhee; for text of telegram 926, see vol. XVI, p. 48. President Eisenhower's reply to Rhee's letter was transmitted in telegram 748, Mar. 20, and is printed *ibid.*, p. 44.

795.00/3-2554: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET SEOUL, March 25, 1954—2 p. m.

936. Repeated information Tokyo 572. Tokyo for CINCUNC exclusive for General Hull. Limit distribution.

Defense Minister Sohn has informed me in confidence that at meeting with President Rhee, top ROKA Generals (presumably JCS Chairman Yi, ROKA Chief of Staff Chung and ROK First Army Commander Paek) all informed Rhee flatly he could not hope to succeed in unifying Korea by unilateral ROK military action. Meeting in question apparently took place March 23.

Foregoing information, accuracy of which I have no reason to doubt, is interesting confirmation that top ROKA Generals realistic in their appraisal military factors involved in drive North.

I have informed General Taylor of above. He is reporting separately on other aspects Rhee's relations with ranking Korean Generals.[1]

BRIGGS

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[1] Not printed.

S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 170 Series

Progress Report by the Operations Coordinating Board to the National Security Council [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 26, 1954.

PROGRESS REPORT ON NSC 170/1,[2] "U.S. OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA"

I. SUMMARY

A. *Actions in Execution of Policy*

In implementing NSC 170/1 the following major actions have been taken:

1. The United States has continued to observe the armistice, and has endeavored unsuccessfully through the Military Armistice Commission to get Communist compliance with the armistice terms.

2. President Rhee has been formally notified of the UNC and US reaction to a unilateral initiation of military operations by the ROK (see Appendix A).

3. The U.S. has developed plans and taken appropriate actions to permit maximum flexibility in meeting any likely eventuality in respect to preventing or countering resumption of fighting by the ROK.

4. A political conference to consider the Korean question will meet at Geneva on April 26. Political and economic pressures on Communist China are being maintained pending the outcome of the conference.

5. The United States and the Republic of Korea have ratified the Mutual Defense Treaty.[3] It can be brought into effect at any time by an exchange of ratifications. The United States is delaying this action pending further assurance of continued ROK cooperation.

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[1] In a covering note by Elmer B. Staats of the OCB to Lay, Mar. 31, 1954, Staats explained that the OCB directed that this progress report be forwarded to the NSC. This was the first such report on NSC 170/1 and covered the period Nov. 3, 1953–Mar. 15, 1954. Appendix B of the report summarized the recent exchange of letters between Rhee and Eisenhower and, according to Staats, brought this aspect of the report up to date as of Mar. 31.

[2] Dated Nov. 20, p. 1620.

[3] The Senate approved the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea on Jan. 26 by a vote of 81–6. (Department of State *Bulletin*, Feb. 8, 1954, p. 208) For text of the treaty, see TIAS 3097 or 5 UST (pt. 2) 2368.

6. Redeployment of two U.S. divisions from Korea (cf. NSC Action No. 972*d.*[4]) has been announced[5] and a phased withdrawal of these units is taking place. Further action to withdraw U.S. forces will await developments at the Geneva Conference.

7. The policy in NSC 170/1 to allow new construction in Korea and the conclusion of an economic aid agreement on December 14 have cleared the way for more rapid progress in the Korean reconstruction program.

8. A separate report on covert operations will be made to the Board.[6]

B. *Evaluation of Policy*

1. The working group considers that NSC 170/1 continues to be effective, timely and applicable, with the following exceptions:

. . . .

Para. 10c. providing for a vigorous campaign to secure additional armed forces from other UN members has not been practical in view of the armistice, the withdrawal of the French battalion and the South African Air Force squadron, and the announcement of U.S. intention to withdraw two U.S. divisions.

It is recommended that the above paragraphs of NSC 170/1 be re-examined in due course in the light of the situation current at that time.

C. *Major Problems*

A number of developments, both political and economic, in US–ROK relations, (e.g., The Korean Political Conference, review of the dollar-hwan conversion rate, slower than expected progress in economic programs) are likely to converge in May or June, in which case there may well be a period of very difficult relations.

II. DETAILED REPORT

A. *Statement of Actions by Paragraphs of NSC 170/1*

Preventing or Countering the Resumption of Fighting by the ROK.

Para. 5a. The United States has continued to observe the armistice. However, despite continuing efforts through the Military Armistice Commission, and the efforts of the Swiss and Swedish members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, Communist non-cooperation has made it impossible to enforce Communist compliance with the armistice terms or to carry out effectively the inspection provisions of the armistice agreement.

Para. 5b.(1) See Appendix A.

Para. 5b.(2) See Appendix B.

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[4] For text, see the memorandum of discussion at the 173d meeting of the NSC, Dec. 3 1953, p. 1636.

[5] For text of a statement by the President, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953,* p. 860.

[6] Not found in Department of State files.

Para. 5b.(3) As a portion of the overall detailed military planning required by NSC 170/1, provisions were made for UNC troop dispositions in Korea to permit the maximum flexibility in meeting likely eventualities, and in so far as possible to demonstrate U.S. determination to carry out its policies in respect to resumption of hostilities. There is further reference to this operational planning in the following paragraphs.

Paras. 6, 7, and 8. The contingencies of unilateral action by the ROK (paras. 6 and 7) and resumption of hostilities by the Communists (para. 8) did not materialize during the reporting period. Coordinated military planning was nonetheless required and accomplished, and in respect to para. 6 (Annex A to NSC 170/1, separately distributed[7]) certain capabilities had to be created even though it was determined that the courses of action should not be fully implemented because of changed circumstances. Revision of para. 6 in the light of these changes, including the diminished likelihood of unilateral action by the ROK, is therefore desirable. Despite the letter of March 6[8] from President Rhee to President Eisenhower giving notification that the ROK may take unilateral action, the present estimate is that the courses of action followed by the United States since the armistice, and the changed circumstances arising from the armistice have materially lessened the likelihood of unilateral action by the ROK.

Seeking to Obtain Satisfactory Agreements from the Communists

Para. 9a. Negotiations to arrange for a political conference to consider the Korean question were initiated on October 26 at Panmunjom by Ambassador Dean and were indefinitely recessed on December 12. Liaison negotiations were reopened January 14. However, these were abandoned when the Foreign Ministers' Conference at Berlin agreed to arrangements for a Korean Political Conference to convene at Geneva on April 26 on terms substantially better than those which had been rejected by the Communist negotiators at Panmunjom.

Para. 9b. The United States has continued to exert political and economic pressures against Communist China. This subject is treated in greater detail in other NSC papers.

Achieving a Position of Strength in Korea

Para. 10a. The United States and the Republic of Korea have ratified the Mutual Defense Treaty. It can therefore be brought into effect at any time by means of an exchange of ratifications in Washington. As a result of President Rhee's letter of March 6 to President Eisenhower giving notification that the ROK may take unilateral action, the exchange of ratifications is being delayed pending further assurance of continued ROK cooperation.

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[7] Not printed.

[8] This reference was in error. The letter from Rhee to Eisenhower giving notification of possible ROK unilateral action was dated Mar. 11, 1954, and sent to the Department of State in telegram 896, Mar. 16, 1954, not printed. On Mar. 6 the Department of State received in telegram 861 the text of a letter from Pyun to Dulles responding to the U.S. invitation to attend the Geneva Conference with a series of 11 questions. The letter of Mar. 11 is not printed; for text of telegram 861, see vol. XVI, p. 29.

Para. 10b. The United States has continued to build up and maintain the security position of the ROK consistent with the armistice terms, has announced its intent to redeploy from Korea two U.S. divisions in FY 1954, and has commenced their phased withdrawal. Plans are being made for major phased withdrawals in U.S. Fiscal Year 1955, but no further overt action will be taken pending developments at the Geneva Conference.

Para. 10c. In view of the armistice and the redeployment of two of our own divisions, it has not been practical to carry on a vigorous campaign to secure additional armed forces from other UN members for service in Korea, and the only augmentation of Allied forces has been a hospital unit from West Germany. The U.S. has given its approval to the withdrawal of a French battalion to fight in Indochina, and has reluctantly assented to the withdrawal of the South African Air Force squadron, the India ambulance unit, and two New Zealand frigates. The Department of State, however, has been endeavoring to persuade other countries to maintain the present level of their forces in Korea.

Para. 10d. The United States has continued to work in and through the organs of the United Nations where feasible and in this connection has supported the continuance of UNCURK and its movement to Seoul where it may better observe developments in Korea, and similarly has supported the continuance of UNKRA and has taken steps to ensure that UNKRA's program is integrated with the United States bilateral aid program.

Para. 10e. The United States is making use of UNC facilities in Korea to provide assistance to the Korean people. In this connection a supplemental armed forces assistance program ($15 million in materials has been made available in FY 1954) is in full-scale operation and has already made significant contributions, which have been given wide publicity in Korea, to the rehabilitation of schools, churches, roads, etc. Military units are giving technical assistance in various areas of the Korean economy and took very effective measures for the relief and reconstruction of Pusan after the disastrous fire in November 1953.

Para. 10f. On December 14, 1953, an agreement between Mr. Wood, as CINCUNC's Economic Coordinator, and Prime Minister Paik Too Chin further specified the basic terms for operation of the Combined Economic Board in order to facilitate large-scale augmentation of the program of U.S. economic assistance to the ROK. This agreement was executed pursuant to the US–ROK Economic Coordination Agreement of 24 May 1952 and to the US–Korean Economic Cooperation Agreement of 1948. Implementation of the economic program proceeded slowly in the first half of FY 1954 owing to problems in planning and in reaching accord with the Republic of Korea on internal stabilization measures. Until late November 1953, the Economic Coordinator in Korea, Mr. C. Tyler Wood, was restrained from undertaking new construction in connection with the Korean Aid Program by *Para. 10f.*(4) of NSC 170. In order to give the Economic Coordinator greater latitude in determining projects for Korean reconstruction, the NSC ruling was modified. Of the $200 million available to FOA for the economic program, firm requests were received for approximately $50 million in the first half of FY 1954. Implementation proceeded at a much faster rate in January, but it is probable that not more than $150 million of the $200 million will be committed by the end of June 1954. Unless saleables can be increased and absorbed, with a proportionate decrease in the investment component, and other appropriate measures initiated, increased budgetary expenditures and a marked increase of money supply will create serious danger of a new inflationary spurt between now and June. This situation could lead to serious differences with the Government of the ROK.

Para. 10h. The Department of State has constantly in its contacts with our Allies carried on a campaign to persuade them to accept U.S. courses of action and contribute to their support. Specifically, Department of State officers have met frequently with our sixteen Allies in order to reach agreement on the issues and positions involved in the POW problem and in the political conference. In addition, the U.S. delegation at the UN has constantly worked with our Allies in an effort to gain their support for U.S. policies, and our Embassies abroad have acted similarly with the Foreign Offices of the Governments to which they are accredited.

Para. 10i. Covert operations will be reported on separately.[9]

USIA support of above mentioned actions. USIA prepared information policy guidances on those subjects for which special efforts were deemed advisable to develop understanding and support abroad of the U.S. position. Continuous news policy guidance was provided to USIA press and radio offices in the U.S. and major items were treated in information guidances transmitted to overseas posts. The latter were made available to the Department of Defense for transmission, in its discretion, to overseas commands.

With respect to the US–ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, USIA output included Secretary Dulles' letter to the President and the President's message to the Senate requesting early ratification of the treaty, Senate discussions of the treaty, and the Senate's approval of it. All progress was immediately communicated to Korea through press and radio channels. Guidance and output concerning the withdrawal of the two U.S. divisions from Korea was designed to assure the ROK that the withdrawal would not result in a diminution of the overall strength that would be available to turn back renewed aggression. Meanwhile output both in and to Korea continues to portray progress in the build-up of ROK defense forces. All available material on progress in the relief and reconstruction programs, including about one story a day on the Armed Forces Assistance Program, was communicated to Korean audiences. Twelve MSA/Marshall Plan motion pictures, emphasizing self-help in the U.S. aid program to European countries, were used in Korea. The ROK–US economic agreement was reported globally and output stressed the magnitude of the problem, and the amount of aid to be delivered by the end of the current fiscal year, and, particularly to Korea, the need for and examples of cooperation in achieving the goals of the aid program. The US–UN position in the efforts of Ambassador Dean and his staff to reach an agreement with the Communists on arrangements for a political conference was supported globally through USIA channels which used material supplied by Agency correspondents covering the negotiations at Panmunjom.

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[9] Not found in Department of State files.

B. *Assessment of the Current Situation in Korea in Relation to U.S. Objectives*

1. The likelihood of unilateral action disrupting the armistice by the Government of the Republic of Korea has diminished but still remains a possibility that must be reckoned with. The letter delivered by the Vice President,[10] the fact of the existence of the armistice, the measures taken by the military to protect their position in case of unilateral action, and the release to civilian status of the prisoners held by the UNC all contributed.

2. The relatively small possibility that in a political conference agreement might be reached to unify Korea seems even less now in the light of the economic and military assistance being provided to North Korea by the Communist Chinese and the Soviet Union. However, if agreement can be reached with the ROK on a proposal for unification of Korea which will appeal to the free world as reasonable, the political conference may provide a forum in which the Communists could be dealt a severe propaganda defeat.

C. *Current Estimate of the Possibility of Attaining U.S. Objectives*

1. Since the long-range objective is not likely to be attained, the United States should concentrate upon the achievement of the current objective stated in paragraph 2 of NSC 170/1, through measures designed to strengthen the economy and the defense forces of the Republic of Korea, and to improve its relations with other free world governments.

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[10] For text, see p. 1591.

2. It is doubtful that it is possible to achieve the objective of economic stability simultaneously with the maintenance of a 20-division army and the carrying out of a major investment program. The importation of a quantity of saleable commodities sufficient to balance even a reduced investment program, together with the ROK defense expenditures, might raise the standard of living beyond the goal of the 1949–1950 level set forth in NSC 170/1. Some continuing inflation will accordingly have to be accepted; the investment program will probably proceed more slowly than is desirable; and the period necessary to achieve self support (with some continuing defense support) may have to be extended.

III. MAJOR PROBLEMS PENDING IN US–ROK RELATIONS

A. The joint statement by the Secretary of State and President Rhee on August 8 [11] committed us to negotiate an administrative agreement or agreements with the Republic of Korea which would provide for the privileges and immunities of the United States and other United Nations forces stationed in Korea. Until this arrangement is negotiated it is expected that present informal arrangements will stay in effect. It has not been decided whether to negotiate one agreement covering both United States and United Nations forces or separate agreements. However, in any event the United States will negotiate on behalf of all forces concurrently, consulting with the other United Nations Governments in advance as it may prove necessary.

B. The ROK has presented a series of requests for strengthening its military establishment. Specifically, the ROK has asked for increasing the armor and fire power of the present forces and an increase of the present ground forces to a total of 35 to 40 divisions with simultaneous increase in the ROK navy and air force. These requests are being carefully considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and have been placed on the agenda of the NSC.

C. The various efforts to improve relations between Japan and the ROK and to reopen negotiations between them on pending issues have proved unsuccessful, although President Rhee and Prime Minister Yoshida recently made separate statements expressing willingness to meet. The Department of State is now trying to encourage both Governments to follow up on these expressions. This effort and any other which would be likely to prove effective in bringing about a *rapprochement* between the two governments should be vigorously and promptly pursued.

D. Economic relations are likely to produce the following friction points: (1) rate of construction of new plants and facilities (investment); (2) proportion of aid funds devoted to anti-inflation imports as distinguished from investment; (3) use of ROK foreign exchange; (4) control of procurement with aid funds, in particular procurement in Japan; and (5) the dollar–hwan conversion rate. These problems taken together may present a period of very difficut U.S.–ROK relations by May or June of this year. Every possible effort must be made to accelerate the aid program and to secure adequate publicity for its accomplishments within Korea. The U.S. should not compromise, however, by agreeing to measures which are clearly not in the interest of the Korean economy.

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[11] For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 17, 1953, pp. 203–204.

It will be difficult, but important, to secure Republic of Korea cooperation before and during the Korean Poltical Conference at Geneva in order to develop a coordinated position consistent with U.S. objectives and interests.

Appendix A

Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Cutler) to the Chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board (Smith)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 9, 1954.

Subject: NSC 170/1

In connection with the preparation of the Progress Report with respect to the above-mentioned policy paper (U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea, November 20, 1953), the course of action stated in Paragraph 5 *b* (1) has been accomplished insofar as Fresident Rhee is concerned in the course of meetings between Vice President Nixon and President Rhee during November 1953, as subsequently reported to the National Security Council by the Secretary of State and Vice President Nixon, and by correspondence between President Eisenhower and President Rhee.

Until further direction from higher authority, no further action need be taken to implement this course of action.

ROBERT CUTLER

Appendix B

[WASHINGTON,] March 23, 1954.

Further Exchange of Letters Between President Eisenhower and President Rhee (NSC 170/1) [12]

On March 6, President Rhee wrote to President Eisenhower giving notification that he might take unilateral action to unify Korea.[13] In addition, he said that the ROK would attend the Korean Political Conference at Geneva if the United States would either (a) agree to assist the ROK in military efforts to unify Korea or (b) strengthen the ROK forces in accordance with ROK requests.

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[12] There was no indication on the source text who drafted this appendix.

[13] As explained in footnote 8 above, this reference was in error.

As a result of this letter, the Secretary of State directed that the exchange of ratifications of the Mutual Defense Treaty, which will bring the Treaty into effect and which had been scheduled for March 18, should be postponed. No reason was given the Koreans for the postponement.

The answer, dated March 20,[14] recapitulates the position on unilateral ROK action expressed in the President's letter of November 6, which was delivered by Vice President Nixon. It also rejects President Rhee's alternative proposals, although it suggests the possibility of developing a mobilizable reserve in the ROK. The answer was delivered to President Rhee on March 22. He received it with little comment. He has not yet said whether the ROK will or will not attend the Korean Political Conference.

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[14] The reference was to the letter contained in telegram 748 to Seoul, Mar. 20, 1954, a reply to Rhee's letter to Eisenhower of Mar. 11 sent to the Department of State in telegram 896, Mar. 16, 1954. For text of telegram 748, see vol. XVI, p. 44; telegram 896 is not printed.

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 192d Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, April 6, 1954 [1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

The following were present at the 192nd Meeting of the Council: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army and Navy; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; Herbert Miller, Central Intelligence Agency (for Item 3); the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

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[1] Drafted by Gleason on Apr. 7.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting, together with the main points taken.

[Here follows discussion on item 1. "NSC Action No. 1074–*a*" (which dealt with United States policy toward Indochina).]

2. U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea (Progress Report, dated March 31, 1954, by the Operations Coordinating Board on NSC 170/1 [2])

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the content of this Progress Report, and pointed out that it raised two questions. The first of these concerned paragraph 6 of the Special Annex to NSC 170/1,[3] regarding measures to prevent or counter unilateral resumption of fighting by the ROK. The Progress Report suggested revision of this paragraph, and Mr. Cutler asked Secretary Dulles to express his views.

Secretary Dulles said that he had had no opportunity to read the Progress Report. After Mr. Cutler had refreshed Secretary Dulles' memory, the latter suggested that our relations with President Rhee were drifting along reasonably well, and that he therefore saw no reason for changing paragraph 6 or for suggesting any new action by OCB. In summary, said Secretary Dulles, this represented the view that we do nothing at this time. He understood that President Rhee had recently been rebuffed by his own military people on the issue of unilateral action.

Mr. Cutler then invited the Council's attention to the second point raised in the Progress Report, namely, the matter of the withdrawal of U.S. divisions beyond the two already being withdrawn or earmarked for withdrawal in the near future.

Secretary Wilson commented that the Defense Department proposed to make no further moves in the matter of redeployment of our forces from Korea until after the conclusion of the Geneva Conference. Secretary Smith pointed out that our divisions in Korea would constitute one of our most useful trading assets at the Conference, and Admiral Radford said that we could stop all actions looking toward further redeployment until at least June 1. Secretary Dulles expressed considerable anxiety over further redeployment of U.S. forces, especially if they were brought home and disbanded, in view of the looming problem of Southeast Asia.

The National Security Council: [4]

a. Noted the reference Progress Report by the Operations Coordinating Board on the subject.

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[2] *Supra.*

[3] The Special Annex A to NSC 170/1 was identical to that to NSC 170, not printed.

[4] The following paragraphs and note constituted NSC Action No. 1087, a record copy of which is located in S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.

b. Agreed that implementation of Annex A to NSC 170/1, which remains valid policy, should continue to be deferred for the time being, subject to continuous review by the Operations Coordinating Board.

c. Agreed that implementation of paragraph 10–*c* of NSC 170/1 should not be pressed at this time.

d. Noted that the Secretary of Defense was deferring all further redeployments of U.S. forces from Korea (except the two U.S. divisions being returned to the United States) until after June 1, 1954.

Note: The actions in *b* and *c* above subsequently transmitted to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency for NSC 170/1.

[Here follows discussion on item 3. "The Soviet Atomic Energy Program to Mid-1957".]

S. EVERETT GLEASON

S/P–NSC files, lot 61 D 167, "Korea: Increase in ROK Forces (NSC Action No. 1043–*b*)"

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 7, 1954.

Subject: Expansion of Republic of Korea Forces

Reference: NSC Action Nos. 1043–*b* [1] and 1054–*b* [2]

The enclosed memorandum by the Secretary of Defense and its attached statement of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 1043–*b*, are transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Tuesday, April 13, 1954, at 9:30 a.m.[3]

The NSC Planning Board has considered the enclosures, as also directed by NSC Action No. 1043–*b*, and concurs therein, subject to the following:

a. The Department of State member reserves his position with respect to the proposal to limit to one the number of ROK Air Force fighter wings equipped with jet-type aircraft (par. 7–*d* of the JCS memo).

b. Final approval of the detailed recommendations as to the improvement of the ROK force within currently authorized force goals should await completion of the studies now in preparation in the Department of Defense on cost data and time scheduling.

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[1] NSC Action No. 1043–*b* read as follows:

"Noted the President's request that the Department of Defense study and report to the Council, through the NSC Planning Board, on the desirability of an increase in the number of ROK Army divisions from the 20 presently authorized to 35, as suggested by the ROK Government." (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95)

[2] For text of NSC Action No. 1054–*b*, see the memorandum of discussion at the 187th meeting of the NSC, Mar. 4, p. 1755.

[3] For the memorandum of discussion at this meeting, see *infra.*

c. Decision as to the practicability of a joint U.S.–ROK program for reserve forces in Korea should await further study.

d. Further consideration should be given to the possibility of employing one or two ROK divisions at an appropriate time in support of the struggle against Communist aggression in Indochina. (See NSC Action No. 1054–*b*)

It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of the enclosure and that access to it be very strictly limited on an absolute need-to-know basis.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 2, 1954.

Subject: Expansion of Republic of Korea Armed Forces

1. Recognizing the urgent requirement for data on which to base decisions concerning the possible expansion of ROK armed forces, I am forwarding herewith, in partial fulfillment of the requirement set forth in NSC Action No. 1043–*b*, a memorandum dated 31 March 1954, containing the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject.

2. Under present conditions, I agree with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the security of the Republic of Korea depends on the deterrent effect of the military posture of the United States and on the immediate employment of U.S. forces in support of ROK forces in the event of Communist aggression in Korea rather than on the size of the ROK armed forces themselves and, therefore, I concur in the conclusion stated in paragraph 7 of the JCS memorandum. Any further expansion of ROK forces beyond that outlined in this paragraph should be justified on the basis of political rather than military considerations.

3. The cost data and time scheduling for the implementation of the JCS conclusion, which are now in the process of preparation within the Department of Defense, will not be ready for Council consideration at the meeting on 8 April 1954. It can be stated, however, that under present plans for the MDAP program, it is not contemplated that the equipment required to implement paragraph 7 of the JCS memorandum will be made available until FY 1956. It should also be recognized that the Republic of Korea does not possess the economic capability of sustaining the forces recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, without continued U.S. aid. Therefore, in assessing the total cost of these proposals, consideration must be given to both economic and military as-

sistance, and the program as a whole must be weighed in terms of the policies set forth in NSC 162/2.[4]

4. With respect to the establishment of a practicable joint ROK–U.S. program for reserve forces in Korea, the Department of Defense has not yet completed its study of this aspect of the problem. When specific recommendations have been developed in this regard, they will be immediately forwarded to the National Security Council.

5. This memorandum, plus the cost data and time schedule for the implementation of the JCS conclusion, which are to be submitted later, will constitute the complete Department of Defense report required pursuant to NSC Action No. 1043–*b*.

C. E. WILSON

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 31, 1954.

Subject: Recommendations of the Korean Minister of Defense Concerning Expansion of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces

1. This memorandum is in response to your memorandum dated December 23, 1953, subject as above, and to a memorandum by the Acting Secretary of Defense dated February 24, 1954, subject "Augmentation of ROK Armed Forces," [5] which noted the President's request that the Department of Defense study and report to the Council, through the NSC Planning Board, on the desirability of an increase in the ROK Army divisions from the 20 presently authorized to 35, as suggested by the ROK Government.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied, in light of the current national policy, the recommendations of the ROK Government for an expansion of their armed forces. Many of the considerations which influenced the military strategy recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (in a memorandum for you dated December 9, 1953, subject: "Military Strategy and Posture" [6]) to support the National Security Policy set forth in NSC 162/2 are also applicable to the problem of expanding the ROK forces. Some of the more important of these considerations which are considered applicable are restated below:

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[4] The reference was to "Review of Basic National Security Policy," Oct. 30, 1952, approved by the President on that date. For documentation on the NSC 162 Series, see volume II.

[5] Neither printed.

[6] Not printed.

a. "NSC 162/2 stresses the need for greater reliance upon our allies for the provision of indigenous forces, particularly ground forces, in countering local Communist aggressions, with greater stress upon our atomic capability as our major contribution to the needs of collective security. . . ." (In this connection the determination to use U.S. atomic capabilities in the event of a renewal of hostilities in Korea by the Communists had subsequently been approved by the President as indicated by NSC Action No. 1004–*a.*[7])

b. "In the Far East the U.S. must assist in defending the off-shore island chain (Japan, Ryukyus, Formosa and the Philippines) and Korea."

c. "The major deterrent to a renewed aggression in Korea should be Chinese Communist and North Korean fear of atomic retaliation, coupled with the announced intention to resist renewed aggression. Thus our forces in the Far East should be given the capability of employing atomic weapons immediately, both in retaliatory attacks against targets in Communist China and in support of ROK troops in Korea."

d. "U.S. foreign aid should be meted out to our allies with discrimination in order to help them to generate and maintain reasonable and attainable military forces which can best complement the U.S. contribution."

3. In a memorandum for you dated February 11, 1953, subject: "Further Expansion of the ROK Forces",[8] the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the establishment of a 20 division force goal as the maximum that the ROK manpower and economic potential with U.S. assistance could support. On February 12, 1954, the Commander in Chief, Far East, reiterated the view that the 20 divisions were adequate and the maximum supportable by the ROK.

4. The present study indicates that currently authorized naval and air force goals are also adequate and that an expansion of them, as in the case of ground forces, is beyond the ROK capability to support from a manpower or economy viewpoint. The study also indicates that the equipping of a ROK Army beyond 20 divisions would be largely at the expense of the U.S. Army strategic reserves.

5. Additional factors which have been considered in connection with the proposed expansion of the ROK forces are contained in the Appendix hereto.

6. The considerations in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 above relate only to active armed forces as proposed by the ROK Government. Within the limitations of manpower and matériel resources of the ROK, further study may prove that ROK security could be enhanced by organization and training of sizeable reserve forces to augment their active forces in time of emergency. The size of such reserve forces would be governed primarily by the availability of equipment to be furnished from U.S.

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[7] For text, see the memorandum of discussion at the 179th meeting of the NSC, Jan. 8, p. 1704.

[8] Not printed.

sources. Therefore, it may be desirable to determine whether it would be practicable and feasible to develop a joint ROK–U.S. program for reserve forces. In the event the two governments determine that a reserve program for ROK armed forces is practicable and feasible, it may be indicated also that, as reserve forces are built up, active forces can be somewhat reduced.

7. In view of the foregoing considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that the ultimate force goals which are currently authorized by the President are adequate and are the most the ROK Government can support with U.S. assistance at this time. Within this force structure, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that an improvement of the force is possible through:

a. Continued development on an austere basis of the ROK Army to a field army which is capable of sustained combat operations.

b. Continued modernization of the ROK Navy as currently authorized.

c. Reorganization of the ROK Marine Corps from a brigade of scattered small units to a combat-capable division.

d. Modernization of the ROK Air Force by reequipping the existing fighter wing with jet-type aircraft, and by the establishment of an efficient tactical control organization (see paragraph 6 of the Appendix hereto).

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the conclusion in paragraph 7 above be adopted as the Department of Defense position on this subject.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
ARTHUR RADFORD
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appendix

ADDITIONAL FACTORS CONSIDERED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PROPOSED EXPANSION OF THE ROK FORCES

1. *ROK Recommendations*

a. On October 7 and 21, 1953, the Korean Minister of Defense, in letters to the Secretary of Defense,[9] recommended certain actions to be taken to expand the ROK forces. The recommended additions to the ROK forces are summarized as follows:

(1) *ROK Army*—additional armored and artillery units, and one airborne RCT.

(2) *ROK Navy*—6 DD, 16 DE, 4 AM, 2 AO, 2 AE and 1 AR.

(3) *ROK Air Force*—5 fighter wings, 2 light bomb wings, 1 reconnaissance wing, 1 transport squadron and necessary command and supporting units.

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[9] Neither printed.

b. The ROK Prime Minister, in a letter to the Secretary of the Army, dated January 22, 1954,[10] requested U.S. support for the organization and activation of 15 to 20 additional divisions for the ROK Army.

2. *Currently Authorized Strength of ROK Armed Forces*

As currently authorized by the Secretary of Defense and the President, the strength of the ROK armed forces is as follows:

Army—655,000 personnal (20 divs)
Navy—15,000 personnel (maximum of 83 ships)
Marine Corps—23,500 personnel (now organized as a brigade)
Air Force—9,000 personnel (one fighter wing)

3. *Considerations Affecting the ROK Army Expansion*

a. There are currently 18 fully-equipped combat-ready ROK Army divisions. An additional Corps Headquarters and field army headquarters have been activated in order that the ROK Army may ultimately assume field army status. The Secretary of Defense has authorized the expansion of the 2 remaining divisions from a cadre basis to full organizational strength utilizing equipment of the 40th and 45th U.S. divisions upon their redeployment during the 3rd and 4th quarters of FY 1954. This expansion is now in progress. The Department of the Army is currently reviewing the tables of organization and equipment for the ROK field army. The equipment to be provided, however, will be on an austere basis and only for those units essential for the operation of the ROK Army.

b. In a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense dated February 11, 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the ultimate force goal for the ROK army be established at 20 divisions as the maximum that ROK manpower and economic potential could support with U.S. assistance. On February 12, 1954, CINCFE stated that 20 ROK divisions was adequate and that this force was the maximum which the ROK could support with U.S. assistance.

c. With regard to the military strategy, and implementing actions therefor, in support of NSC 162/2, as recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum dated December 9, 1953, and expansion of the ROK Army beyond the 20-division force would have serious logistical implication in equipping these additional divisions at the expense of the U.S. Army strategic reserves.

Therefore, ROK Army development on an austere basis should continue only toward the goal of a 20-division field army which would be capable of sustained operations.

4. *Considerations Affecting the ROK Navy Expansions*

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[10] Not printed.

In a recent review of the ROK Navy requirements, it was determined that the ultimate force goals should include the following additional ships: 2 DE, 4 PCEC, 12 LSM, 4 LST, 1 ARL, 1 YO, 3 AKL, within a personnel increase from 10,000 to approximately 15,000. This ultimate force goal was subsequently approved by the Secretary of Defense for MDAP planning. The development of ROK naval forces to this goal will eventually give the ROK a balanced, small but well-equipped Navy which is within the capability of the ROK to support and operate with U.S. assistance.

5. *Considerations Affecting the ROK Marine Corps Expansion*

On February 12, 1954, CINCFE stated that one ROK Marine Division is adequate and all that the ROK can possibly support with U.S. assistance. As presently constituted, the ROK Marine Corps is organized as a brigade of smaller units which have thus far operated in a special mission role which tended to reduce the development of its full combat capability. This force should be reconstituted as a division-type force within the existing personnel ceiling and made capable of sustained combat operation.

6. *Considerations Affecting the ROK Air Force Expansion*

On February 12, 1954, CINCFE forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the ROK plan for expansion of its Air Force, together with comments of the Air Force Advisory Group, Korea, Commander, Fifth Air Force, and COMFEAF. CINCFE concurred with the recommendations of COMFEAF as to force goals for the expansion of the ROK Air Force. These force goals, considerably below the ROK proposed plan for expansion to 8⅓ wings, are as follows:

6 Fighter Bomber Squadrons
1 Composite Group
1 Air Tactical Control Squadron
1 Tactical Control Group
1 Communications Group
Sufficient personnel and equipment to man a 9-airbase complex on an austerity basis.

As a result of studies carried out by Headquarters, USAF, it has been concluded, however, that the ROK Air Force should not be expanded but that the existing fighter wing should be re-equipped with jet-type aircraft and an effective tactical air control organization should be established within existing personnel ceilings. This proposed re-equipping of the ROK Air Force cannot be accomplished prior to FY 1956 inasmuch as funds MDAP and/or USAF, are not available within existing approved programs. Factors leading to this conclusion are listed below.

a. Essentially, all matériel required for logistic support would have to be furnished by the U.S. with the possible exception of food and clothing, and the cost to the U.S. of maintaining and insuring the operation of this force would be high as compared to the cost necessary to support an equivalent Title I, II, or III force. Therefore, from the standpoint of economical use of matériel resources world-wide, it would be better to allocate those resources to Title I, II, or III countries and to continue planning to utilize USAF forces to meet the majority of air force requirements in Korea.

b. The existing ROK Air Force fighter wing is now equipped with obsolete propeller-type aircraft (F–51s) which are becoming increasingly difficult to maintain because of an acute shortage of replacement spare parts. Unless these aircraft are replaced with modern equipment for which spare parts can be supplied, the operational capability of the ROK Air Force will steadily decrease.

c. Equipped with obsolete aircraft, the ROK fighter wing would be ineffective either in a ground support or an air defense role against a superior North Korean Air Force equipped with MIG 15s. The ROK fighter wing must be re-equipped with jet-type aircraft if it is to be retained as an effective combat unit.

d. Conversion of the ROK fighter wing to jet aircraft at this time would facilitate a future expansion of the ROK Air Force if the necessary resources should subsequently become available.

e. The major deterrent to renewed aggression in Korea should be Chinese Communist and North Korean fear of atomic retaliation, coupled with the announced intention to resist renewed aggression. Even if the ROK Air Force should be expanded as proposed by the ROK Minister, the U.S. would not be relieved of responsibility to provide this deterrent. On the other hand, it is considered important that the ROK be provided with a token force in the interest of morale and national prestige. A force of the size which now exists, if equipped with modern equipment, is considered to be adequate for this purpose.

f. In anticipation of ultimate withdrawal of all USAF units from Korea, including tactical air control organizations, it is considered desirable that an efficient tactical air control organization be established within the ROK Air Force. Such an organization would not only be necessary to the efficient operation of the ROK Air Force, but would facilitate operation of USAF aircraft in support of ROK ground forces upon a renewal of hostilities.

g. Since the U.S. is committed to support the ROK in the event of renewal of hostilities by the Communists, it is to the U.S. advantage that the existing air base complex in South Korea be maintained and capable of sustaining combat operations. A ROK Air Force of the type indicated above should facilitate the maintenance of these bases in an operational status.

h. The existing USAF matériel commitments, both to MDA Programs and USAF organizations, will not permit satisfying the proposed re-equipping of the ROK Air Force without causing slippage in existing programs.

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 193d Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, April 13, 1954 [1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 193rd Meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Items 1 and 2); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Mr. Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

The following is a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows discussion on items 1. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security", 2. "Constitutional Authority for Use of U.S. Forces in Reacting Promptly to Aggression", and 3. "U.S. Strategy for Developing a Position of Military Strength in the Far East".]

4. *Expansion of Republic of Korea Forces* (Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated April 7, 1954 [2])

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the content of the report, and called attention to the sheet of cost data for an increased ROK force,[3] which was distributed by Secretary Wilson. He pointed out that the current report was of an interim character, since the State Department wished to reply to President Rhee's request for increasing the size of the ROK military establishment, prior to the Geneva Conference. He then read the recommendations in paragraph 7 of the JCS report, which had been approved by the Planning Board. Thereafter he called attention to the high annual maintenance cost for the proposed new level of ROK forces, and also to the manpower problem which increased ROK forces would pose. Finally, he said, the Department of State had reservations about refusing to provide a second wing of jet aircraft for the ROK Air Force, and that the Planning Board had desired to raise again the question of the use of an ROK division in Indochina, to which the State Department was opposed at this time.

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[1] Drafted by Gleason on Apr. 14.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] See the memorandum, *infra.*

At the conclusion of Mr. Cutler's remarks the Council discussed for some little time the accuracy of a manpower figure provided by FOA, which indicated that there were only two million males between the ages of 17 and 40 available for service in the ROK armed forces. It was widely believed that this figure was too low, and the President stated that it was essential to get the correct figure as the basis for a reply to President Rhee's request.

Admiral Radford expressed the opinion that there was plenty of manpower available in the ROK, and also pointed out how much cheaper it was to maintain Korean rather than U.S. divisions. Admiral Radford also said that we should recast our whole approach to the organization of Asiatic armies. There was no need to provide them with the elaborate and expensive equipment which we provided for our own forces.

Secretary Smith stated that the important thing was to formulate a reply to Rhee's letter to the President, since the ROKs have now agreed to attend the Geneva Conference without any *quid pro quo* in the shape of an increase in the level of the ROK armed forces. The Department of State supported the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with very slight reservations. The State Department did not insist on providing an extra wing of jet aircraft at this time, but wished the door to be left open in case we wanted to provide the second jet wing at a later time. Also, in view of the fact that the Chinese were pouring tanks and artillery into North Korea, some items should be supplied by us to the South Korean forces. He heartily agreed with the rule of austerity in equipping the ROK forces, but he did not think that this austerity should extend to combat matériel.

The President said that of course we must not reply to President Rhee by throwing a wet fish in his face. The JCS recommendations were sound, and we should certainly tell Rhee the facts of life. Nevertheless, there was a lot more assistance that we could provide and many things that we could do to improve the quality of the ROK forces within present force levels.

Admiral Radford observed that General Van Fleet had a lot of useful ideas on this subject. It might be a good idea to send him on a temporary survey trip to Korea.[4] Secretary Smith warmly seconded Admiral

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[4] On Apr. 21 Secretary of Defense Wilson announced that President Eisenhower had appointed retired General Van Fleet to head a mission to the Far East to survey U.S. military assistance programs in the Far East with special attention to Korea and the Republic of China. Visits to Japan and the Philippines were also scheduled. The mission was in the Far East from early May to early July 1954. The "Report of the Van Fleet Mission to the Far East", submitted to the President by Wilson on Sept. 30, 1954, is not printed. (Attachment to covering note, Oct. 7, from Maurice W. Roche, Administrative Secretary to Secretary Wilson, to the Secretary of State; 611.90/10–754) For a memorandum from Robertson to Dulles, Oct. 25, assessing the Van Fleet report, see volume XII, Part 1.

Radford's proposal, and suggested that Van Fleet be asked to go out and write a comprehensive report when he returns.

The President again pointed out the need of getting a quick reply to Rhee which would have as its theme, "We still love you, you s.o.b."

The Vice President commented that as, in the State Department's phrase, "a bone to Rhee", Van Fleet would be perfect. President Rhee was completely devoted to him.

Mr. Cutler then inquired whether the Council approved the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President replied that this should be the tentative position. The answer to President Rhee would be subject to modification in the light of General Van Fleet's report.

Mr. Dodge said that there was another aspect of this problem which the Council should recognize. The larger the military forces that the ROK could get the United States to support, the greater would be their demands upon us for economic support in order to bolster their economy. Admiral Radford admitted that this was true, but pointed out that the United States was attempting to recruit indigenous forces among the Asian nations. The big problem in Korea, Japan and Formosa was their economic debility. If we want these nations to support larger armed forces, we would have to provide them assistance.

Mr. Cutler asked the Council if it now wished to reconsider the offer of an ROK division for service in Indochina.[5] The President replied that no consideration should be given at this time to the use of an ROK division in Indochina.

The National Security Council:[6]

a. Agreed that the Secretary of Defense should ask General Van Fleet to undertake a mission to Korea of limited duration for the purpose of recommending the future size and composition of the active armed forces of the Republic of Korea and the practicability of a joint US-ROK program for Korean reserve forces.

b. Concurred in the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, contained in paragraph 7 of their memorandum attached to the reference memorandum, as the tentative position of the United States on the subject, pending receipt of the above-mentioned recommendations by General Van Fleet.

c. Agreed that the Departments of State and Defense should draft for the President's consideration a message to President Rhee on the subject, reflecting the actions in *a* and *b* above.

Note: The actions in *a* and *b* above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate action. The action in *c* above subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for appropriate action.

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[5] See the memorandum of discussion at the 187th meeting of the NSC, Mar. 4, p. 1755.

[6] The following paragraphs and note constituted NSC Action No. 1092, a record copy of which is located in S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.

[Here follows discussion on items 5. "U.S. Policy Toward Italy", 6. "FY 1955 Appropriations for USIA and Educational Exchange Programs", 7. "Reports by the Acting Secretary of State" (on Indochina and Geneva Conference), and 8. "NSC Status of Projects".]

S. EVERETT GLEASON

795B.5/4–1354

Memorandum Distributed by the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) at the 193d Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, April 13, 1954 [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.]

Rough Costs Involved in Expansion of Republic of Korea Armed Forces

Cost of Initial Equipment

The equipment and supplies required to implement the JCS recommendations with respect to the ROK Army and Marine forces are physically available in Korea. A substantial, but undetermined, amount of this has already been turned over to the ROK forces. The remaining equipment and supplies will be turned over from existing Army stocks.

Since all the equipment in question is already in Korea at the present time, turning it over to the ROK forces does not involve an immediate or direct expenditure by the Army. Additional Army expenditures of an undetermined amount may be involved in future, however, if such equipment and supplies are replaced by the Army. If the supplies and equipment were not given to the ROK forces, they would be available as part of Army mobilization reserves, but an undetermined amount of money would be required to cover the costs of packing, handling and transportation of the items involved to return them to the U.S. or other areas in which they would be stored.

A major part of the cost of equipping the ROK ground forces involves providing equipment for the non-divisional and service support units. The Department of the Army is currently reviewing the tables of organization and equipment for these ROK units. If the build-up continues on the basis of the recommendations of the U.S. Far East Command, which appears to be susceptible to downward revision, the ROK Army would be provided with initial equipment valued at roughly $750 million, and the ROK Marines would be given equipment valued at approximately $25 million.

In the case of the Air Force, the aircraft required to convert the existing ROK fighter wing to jets are not expected to be made available prior to FY 1956. It is estimated that it would cost about $43.5 million to provide the jet aircraft required for the conversion and undertake the necessary transition training.

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[1] According to a covering memorandum by J.S. Cottman of S/S to Harold N. Waddell of FE, Apr. 13, this memorandum was prepared in the Department of Defense to familiarize the NSC with the costing problem involved in expansion of the ROK forces.

In the case of the Navy, it is estimated that it would cost between $11 and $12 million to activate and completely outfit 27 additional ships involved in the recommended augmentation of the ROK Navy. To the extent that any of these ships were actually released from the Active Fleet, rather than from the Reserve Fleet, this cost would be reduced.

Annual Maintenance Costs

It is estimated that it would require an outlay of at least $1 billion per year to operate the proposed ROK forces under peacetime conditions. About $400 million of this annual cost would consist of military equipment and supplies, virtually all of which would have to be provided under the Military Assistance program. The Koreans would have to budget for the remaining $600 million or more per year to cover the costs of military pay and allowances, food, clothing, maintenance and operation, military construction, etc. It is clear that the ROK civilian economy cannot carry this burden. Consequently, the U.S. would have to be prepared to meet an annual bill of roughly $1 billion per year for maintenance of the presently approved ROK forces, partly through direct military assistance and partly through economic or defense support aid.

795.00/4–1454

Memorandum by the United States Coordinator for the Geneva Conference (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 14, 1954.

Subject: Arthur Dean's trip to Korea.

Discussion:

Morton spoke to Senator Knowland concerning Arthur Dean's trip to Korea.[1] Knowland's reaction was to suggest that Van Fleet might be more effective, but he did not oppose Dean's going. Morton's assessment is that if we feel it important that Dean should go, we should go ahead and send him without any further checking with the Hill. He feels that while we might get some adverse Congressional reactions, we can live with them, and that the possibilities thereof are greatly reduced by the fact Van Fleet will now be going to Korea in connection with the military program.[2]

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[1] Anticipating acceptance by the Republic of Korea of the invitation to the Geneva Conference, Department of State officials considered sending Dean to Seoul to confer with Rhee on issues concerning the conference. On Apr. 22, the Department of State announced that, at Dulles' suggestion and with Rhee's approval, Dean was going to Korea. (Department of State *Bulletin*, May 10, 1954, p. 708)

[2] The reference was to the Van Fleet Mission to the Far East, which was discussed at the 193d meeting of the NSC, Apr. 13, p. 1785.

We and the ROK are a long way apart on whatever unification plan we put up at Geneva. I consider it of the highest urgency that Dean be prepared to go immediately to Seoul on the announcement of ROK intentions to attend the Conference.

Recommendation:

I recommend that you approve the necessary arrangements being made.

Concurrence:

General Smith concurs.[3]

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[3] Written on the source text and initialed by Smith was the phrase "I agree". A memorandum attached to the source text by Dulles to Johnson stated that the Secretary agreed to ask Dean to go to Korea if Van Fleet were also going.

795.00/4–1654: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, April 16, 1954—3:42 p. m.

831. In separate but coordinated calls April 14 Swedish and Swiss Chiefs Mission presented *aides-mémoire* re NNSC.[2] Swedish *aide-mémoire* states Swedes had agreed participate NNSC with expectation that within reasonable period Korean Political Conference would be held and would result termination their task. Original fear unworkability NNSC well founded. NNSC no position ensure Armistice provisions re increase military strength. In case no early peaceful settlement Korea or early dissolution NNSC, Swedes must reconsider question continued participation NNSC.

Swiss memo similar. In addition states Swiss Federal Council asking 2 parties armistice consider termination activities NNSC and raising question whether this matter should not be examined Geneva Conference.

Swiss and Swedes indicated similar representations made Peiping and that UK, French, Poles and Czechs informed.

Department officers expressed gratification efforts Swedes Swiss carry out NNSC tasks. Stated presence Swedes and Swiss North Korea deterrent greater Communist violations and resumption hostilities. U.S. prepared at appropriate occasion, particularly Geneva Conference make known real facts NNSC frustration.

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[1] This telegram, which was drafted by Treumann and cleared by Young, was repeated to Tokyo as telegram 2294 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC, to Bern as telegram 1260, and to Stockholm as telegram 794.

[2] A report of these meetings can be found in a memorandum of conversation by Allen, Apr. 14, 1954, not printed. Attached to this memorandum are the *aides-mémoire*. (795.00/4–1454)

Swedish Ambassador authorized Department free hand publicity Swedish *aide-mémoire.* Swiss desire no publicity *aide-mémoire.*

Swedes and Swiss said best channels U.S. consultation with them Geneva would be Swedish Minister Bern and U.S. Embassy Bern respectively.

Aides-mémoire and memo conversation being airpouched.

SMITH

Editorial Note

In the course of discussion at the 194th meeting of the National Security Council on April 29 on the possibility of armed United States intervention in Indochina, the following exchange took place:

> "Governor Stassen suggested that it would be possible to take some of the U.S. forces out of Korea for use in Indochina, but the President pointed out that President Rhee was screaming and yelling because we had already redeployed two divisions. Moreover, it was well to remember that there were a million Chinese soldiers across the border ready to pounce on South Korea if its defenses were weakened. Governor Stassen observed that he thought that the ultimate sanction of an all-out attack on Communist China if they renewed their aggression against South Korea, was sufficient to prevent a Communist Chinese attack on South Korea in the event more of our own forces were withdrawn. The President, however, insisted on his view that if the United States fought unilaterally against the Vietminh in Indochina, the Chinese Communists would move against Korea."

For the complete text of this discussion on item 8. "Reports on the Geneva Conference and the Indochina Situation", see memorandum of discussion at the 194th meeting of the National Security Council, April 29, volume XIII, Part 2, page 1431.

795B.5/5-1054: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT SEOUL, May 10, 1954—10 p. m.

1141. Eyes only for the Secretary from Dean. Defense instructions Commanding General 8th Army are to review all ROK procedures and cut expenditures to bone. Apparently no attempt made by Defense to brief head current mission [1] on these instructions or current thinking of Joint Chiefs on use of "almost conventional weapons."

Consequently head mission talks to President on basic philosophy of our building up ROK strength proportionately as we withdraw, while

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[1] The reference was to the Van Fleet Mission; see footnote 4, p. 1786.

8th Army subordinates charged with getting up figures for Commanding General are talking opposite ROK numbers about cutting down.

Hence President exceptionally suspicious. Naturally hard for him believe head current mission our government not cognizant other instructions same government.

Head current mission believes that for same money we can build up approximately five ROK divisions for each US division withdrawn, so very enthusiastic ROK thinking and since we stand shoulder to shoulder with ROKs in common struggle against communism as such in Far East, believes should cooperate with ROKs in their desire to build up to 35 divisions.

8th Army and Wood have received no such instructions and Wood emphasizes effect build up on inflation.

Fully realize purpose of visit, but timing of mission visit with such extraordinary prestige, together with potential promises of more and greater aid, affords Rhee exceptional opportunity to attempt play one off against the other and to attempt exceptionally tough attitude reference Geneva in hopes being bought off.

Head current mission most frank, cooperative and pleasant, and leaves impression complete honesty and integrity. Also leaves impression of not being acutely aware detailed financial and most modern logistical thinking and over all political, economic and sociological developments Far East or our over all budgetary problems.

Mission in question scheduled leave for Formosa Wednesday morning.[2] Foregoing sent only as possible explanation local situation.

BRIGGS

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[2] May 12.

795.00/5-1454: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 14, 1954—7:50 p. m.
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

924. Your 1141.[2] We have received following information from Defense which provides partial answer questions raised reference telegram. No doubt General Taylor can provide detailed information his actions implement this policy. You may consider it desirable arrange with General Taylor for you and him to talk with President Rhee or Sohn or both about this policy.

1. CINCFE is under instructions support and maintain 20 Division ROK Army.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by McClurkin and cleared by Drumright.

[2] *Supra.*

2. CINCFE has submitted proposed tables organization and equipment for 20 Division force. These proposed tables were drawn up in conformity with certain JCS criteria for equipping foreign forces and in light of foreseeable matériel and funds available CINCFE.

3. After proposed tables reviewed here CINCFE was advised of further reductions to be made to eliminate specific non-essential units and equipment unless he could provide justification to contrary. Subject these specified modifications CINCFE was authorized put proposed tables into effect.

4. In general terms decision organize and equip ROK forces on more austere basis than U.S. units was made in recognition of following two facts:

a. Certain service and support units normally part U.S. formations are not essential to effectiveness ROK forces which can be streamlined compared U.S. standards.

b. Equipment and logistic support 20 ROK Divisions on U.S. standards would jeopardize other essential U.S. military commitments.

5. Four specific factors necessitate organization and maintenance ROK forces on relative austere basis:

a. Probable future availability funds and equipment.
b. Budgetary limitations.
c. Other world-wide commitments.
d. Status U.S. reserves of equipment.

6. CINCFE and 8th Army are of course continuing follow their present instructions to support 20 Division ROK Army. Problem they face is how force should be composed. 8th Army has been experimenting for months devise prototype ROK division that can have maximum military effect with minimum logistic investment. Any "cutting to the bone" such as mentioned in reference telegram applies this effort and does not pertain to reduction over-all 20 division level.

DULLES

795.00/5-954: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET SEOUL, May 19, 1954—noon.

1212. Repeated information Tokyo 720, Geneva 102. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Re Embtel 1191, May 17.[1]

Rhee's lengthy denunciation of our economic aid program poses problem which I believe we must face at earliest possible date. Although much of his criticism was as unfair as his facts were distorted, fundamentally his attitude toward American aid program is conditioned by fact that notwithstanding publicity and fanfare with which plans announced last August, it is unfortunate there is nothing yet physically visible in Seoul as solid tangible evidence that program exists, and secondly Rhee is profoundly embittered by what he interprets as our efforts force procurement from Japan. He also recalls with irritation efforts last autumn to include ROK assets along with aid funds in joint US–ROK administration through Combined Economic Board, and he is particularly sensitive on subject of hwan exchange rate. Rhee is once again highly critical of Economic Coordinator Wood.

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[1] As reported in this telegram, Rhee launched into a long criticism of the U.S. economic aid program in Korea. For text, see vol. XVI, p. 275.

President declared repeatedly to Dean and me if this is way US Government trying to operate program Korean Government would prefer to have no aid and to forego American assistance entirely.

Department reminded that as of June 1 new military conversion rate due and both Wood and CINCUNC have recommended new rate approximately 300 hwan to one instead of 180 to one as at present. (See CINCUNC C 68056, May 15 to Department Army,[2] which message concludes that recommendations "do not reflect present political considerations which may be overriding.") In our opinion, in which Wood concurs, attempt to negotiate 300 rate will probably provoke major explosion from Rhee. Latter, as Department aware, has little understanding economic production and consumption factors involved. President asserts inflation primarily caused by US Army hwan drawings and by changes in exchange rate and declares way to meet inflation is to declare "permanent rate" and stick to it. Considers importation consumption goods from Japan entirely detrimental to Korean economy.

In foregoing connection reference made Embtel 1155, May 11,[3] which recommended *inter alia,* as I have done several times since armistice signing last July, that urgent examination be made of entire field US–ROK relations with view to adopting coordinated program and of making US–ROK cooperation a two-way street.

For example, we cannot expect to stabilize Korean economy unless civilian economic assistance program is integral part of over-all including military program. This presupposes early decision on size and composition ROK armed forces, amount annual US contribution required to maintain such forces as well as decision whether to merge military and nonmilitary programs or keep them separate, if necessary with provision for two major US appropriations.

An important factor in aid program and one which sooner or later must engage attention of Congress is degree of collaboration in international and bilateral relations Rhee's Government extends. His attitude has hardened perceptibly since fall of Dien-Bien-Phu and attitude of

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[2] Not printed. (FE files, lot 55 D 480, "Korean Black Book, May 1954")

[3] See vol. XVI, p. 244.

British toward Southeast Asia pact. In other words he apparently now feels we cannot do without him or that he is favoring us by accepting aid. Furthermore, there is danger that by permitting Rhee to peck away piecemeal at current issues he finds distasteful or displeasing, whole program of economic aid may well be undermined and tone current political relations affected. This seems now to be occurring.

BRIGGS

795B.00/5-2454: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, May 24, 1954—8 p. m.
PRIORITY

1235. Repeated information Tokyo 731 priority Geneva 118. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and CAG. Re Embtel 1231.[1]

Complete election reports show results definitely favorable to President Rhee's Liberal Party. In contrast to 1948 and 1950 elections when independents secured pluralities, Liberal Party "official" candidates now are only three short of absolute majority and can obtain voting majority in new Assembly by inviting non-official Liberals into fold and seeking cooperation of the few pro-government independents. While Liberal Party's parliamentary negotiating group in last Assembly was notoriously undependable, particularly in secret ballots, the new members are likely at outset be more amenable to government wishes. Party appears likely show general unity and discipline which it maintained through campaign, particularly since defeat of Yi Kap-song and Pae Un-hi has left Yi Ki-p'ung in effective leadership.

The opposition has been weakened but not put out of action. DNP should have little difficulty mobilizing 20 members needed for negotiating group[2] from its 15 official candidates and other adherents who ran without stated affiliation. Shinicky, Chough Pyong-ok, Kim Chun-yon and other DNP members will probably take forceful role in new Assembly. DNP will continue constitute hard-core of opposition around which most of the 67 "independents" will be likely group themselves.

Position of several doubtful groups not yet clarified. Chang T'aek-sang will probably play prominent role in Assembly, particularly because number his personal associates from north Kyongsang were reelected, some as Liberals and some as independents. The few Yi Pomsok adherents elected are listed as independents; Yun Chae-uk of Seoul and Kim Su-son of Ulsan A appear to be their only prominent leaders. Politically they will have little recourse other than to align with Liberals, perhaps by forming bloc with Yi Kap-song's adherents.

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[1] In telegram 1231, May 23, the Embassy reported on the results of the election for members of the National Assembly held on May 20, 1954. (795B.00/5-2354) Of the 203 constituencies, Rhee's Liberal Party won 115 seats (with 36.8 percent of the total vote if unendorsed Liberals are included), the Democratic Nationalists won 15 seats (7.9 percent of the vote), and the Independents and minor parties won 67 and 6 seats, respectively (55.3 percent of the vote). For more information and an analysis of the election, see the UNCURK Report for 1954, UN document A/2711, pp. 7-10. For the analysis of the U.S. Embassy staff, see despatch 5 from Seoul, *infra.*

[2] A negotiating group consisted of 20 or more Assemblymen registered for the purpose of negotiating and reaching compromise solutions on matters discussed in the Assembly. (UN document A/2711, p. 7)

Political organization of new Assembly probably will be effected more quickly than in 1948 and 1950 because of the stronger Liberal Party structure which has come out of this election and also because Assembly as whole seems somewhat more experienced and competent than its predecessors. Altogether 44 incumbent Assemblymen were reelected and many other newly elected members have served in first Assembly, local councils, or executive offices. Leadership at least initially will probably rest in hands of veteran political leaders.

Assembly will reconvene June 9 under chairmanship of oldest member and will then elect chairman and vice-chairman as first order business. Also, if 1952 constitutional amendments adhered to, reconfirmation or rejection of Prime Minister would be taken up at once, and President may also try to push through proposed constitutional amendments, to which official Liberal Party candidates have committed themselves. Action on these problems will be determined to large extent by negotiations among new members before Assembly convenes. Increased strength of Liberal Party in Assembly creates possibility for improved executive-legislative relations, especially if President uses conciliatory tactics.

BRIGGS

795B.00/7-1454

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, July 14, 1954.

No. 5

Subject: Conduct of the ROK National Assembly Elections of May 20, 1954.

Enclosed are five memoranda [1] by American Embassy officers who unofficially observed the May 20 National Assembly elections. The conclusions reached were reflected in the telegraphic reporting of the Embassy but it is believed that more detailed information may be desired for research purposes. With the exception of the memorandum on observations in the Pusan B District, these papers are being made available to the British Legation and to the Principal Secretary and Australian Delegate of UNCURK, with the understanding that the information is for background purposes and would not be publicly attributed to

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[1] These enclosures were attached to the source text, but they are not printed.

American Embassy sources. Two memoranda by officers of the British Legation were transmitted to the Department by Embassy despatch No. 22, June 4, 1954,[2] and the UNCURK Principal Secretary and Australian Delegate briefed the American Embassy officers on their observations during the election period.

The conduct of the 1954 Assembly elections contrasted unfavorably with that of the Assembly elections in 1948 and 1950. Police interference in varying degrees was very widespread, and in at least a few districts such interference created serious incidents. The election committees, composed predominantly of government officials and with almost no opposition party members, functioned practically as adjuncts of the administration and were largely ineffectual in maintaining a free atmosphere. The presence of plainclothes police in polling places was common. When UNCURK observers requested an explanation, the local election committee personnel explained that they had requested these policemen to help maintain order during the voting. The non-appearance, for no clear reason, of the poll watchers of candidates other than Liberal Party candidates was also common. Stuffing of ballot boxes was reported for the first time in Korean elections—the most conclusive case being the discovery of a bundle of ballots in Pusan C District.

While such overt last-minute interference probably was not of primary importance and the actual balloting was on the whole comparatively free, police action prior to the election day appears to have substantially affected the outcome. It was clearly an important factor in reducing the Assembly seats won by independent and Democratic Nationalist Party candidates and in gaining a majority for the Liberal Party, which until shortly before the elections had been troubled by serious internal conflicts. Limited police measures in favor of the Liberal Party may have caused certain popular reaction against the Liberal candidates, particularly in urban areas, but in most districts where pressure was rigorously applied (Pusan B being a notable exception) the Liberal Party candidates were elected.

The elections of May 20, 1954 provide evidence of the resurgence of old authoritarian traditions coupled with the development of a one-party system. These two related developments, in retrospect, appear to have gained headway beginning in 1951 after the North Korean aggression of June 1950 had led to UN and Chinese Communist intervention and a military stalemate. They are still far from complete. At the moment the opposition is alive although weakened and intimidated force in Korean politics. It is apparent that President Rhee does not wish a strong opposition to exist, although he has repeatedly stressed the desirability of maintaining the facade of an opposition party. The development of democratic processes in Korea should, of course, be considered within the perspective of the short and turbulent history of the Republic of Korea—and also in contrast to the Communist regime in the north. Nevertheless, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the trend of recent political events in the ROK is tending to compromise the democratic framework established here in 1948 and may, if not arrested, ultimately undermine it.

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[2] Not printed. (795B.00/6-454)

The conduct of the elections and the continuing authoritarian trend have a bearing on the ROK's international position. For one thing they tend to blur the ideological issues involved in the struggle between the ROK and the North Korean Communist regime. From this standpoint it may have been fortunate that developments in Indo-China helped prevent the Korean elections from becoming an issue at Geneva. Over the long run, however, authoritarian trends in the ROK may reduce world sympathy and support for the Korean cause. The UNCURK report is a problem in this context. Censure of the election procedures would benefit the Communists and be unlikely to affect ROK policies except to aggravate ROK–UNCURK relations. At the same time a laudatory report would fly in the face of news reports and would tend to support Communist claims of partiality on the part of UNCURK. The results of the elections of 1954 do not, as did those of 1950, serve to repudiate charges of government control over the elections, and parallel discussion of elections in North Korea, which would bring the report into more favorable perspective for the ROK, is hard to inject. UNCURK is apparently deferring its report largely for this reason and is expected to follow a middle course, not "white-washing" the elections but not roundly condemning the ROK either.

The May 1954 elections and the one-man, one-party trend which they reflect have a direct bearing on United States relations with the Republic of Korea. The ROK Government is publicly interpreting the elections as a strong endorsement of President Rhee's administration and policies even though the Liberal Party received only thirty-seven percent of the popular vote. The narrowed role and influence of the opposition as a result of the elections may encourage President Rhee in his tendency towards obstinacy and intransigence in dealing with the United States on issues arising between the two Governments. On the other hand, the present leaders of the Liberal Party, despite the tactics employed by them in the recent elections, at least pay lip service to democratic methods and Western standards of government. Although the political principles of these leaders may be compromised through their dependence on President Rhee and the ruthless struggle for personal power and influence in which they must compete, as a group they nevertheless represent an improvement from the United States viewpoint over the Liberal Party leaders of 1952 and early 1953.

Action Requested:

It is requested that the Department reproduce and return five copies of this despatch and enclosures to the Embassy by air pouch.

For the Ambassador:
JOHN A. CALHOUN
First Secretary of Embassy

795.00/5-2654: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 27, 1954—6:33 p. m.

956. Seoul's 1247 [2] and 1249 [3] repeated Geneva 127 and 129 and Tokyo 739 and 741. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. From the Secretary. Re Mutual Defense Treaty.

At appropriate time convey following to President Rhee as view of Secretary concerning possible alternative Defense Treaty ROK.

Japanese Treaty imposes no obligation on US and gives Japan no rights. Treaty gives US rights dispose US forces in and about Japan, utilize these forces for specified purposes and veto any proposed grant by Japan of base, maneuver or transit rights to military forces of any third power. Termination clause Japanese Treaty continues Treaty until both parties agree other satisfactory individual or collective security arrangements have come into force. Effect this termination clause is to make it impossible for Japan unilaterally to cancel rights granted US by Treaty. Therefore termination clause discriminates against Japan in contrast to termination clause of treaties with Australia, New Zealand and Philippines on which termination clause of Korean Treaty is modeled.

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[1] The substantive part of this telegram, drafted by McClurkin and repeated to Geneva as telegram Tosec 280 and to Tokyo as telegram 2637, was a paraphrase of a memorandum by Dulles to Drumright, May 26, 1954, not printed. (795.00/5-2654)

[2] According to telegram 1247, May 26, the following exchange took place in the course of a discussion between Dean and Rhee concerning the Geneva Conference:

"President next turned to mutual defense treaty (please see Embassy telegram 95 to Geneva, 1204 to Department, 712 to Tokyo, May 19) informing me of message from ROK Chargé d'Affaires Washington who said State Department preparations now completed for exchange ratifications and promulgation. In this connection Rhee again asked whether it would be possible modify text in two particulars. First a termination clause similar to US-Japan treaty (I assume Article IV although Rhee did not specify) and second 'an aggressor clause' which would cover US assistance in ROK military action to eject Communist aggressors from north. After considerable conversation reminiscent Rhee's efforts obtain secret letter from Dean, Rhee agreed not insist now on second modification. But he declared Korea must have improved termination clause lack of which he described as discrimination.

"I pointed out any modifications or amendment of treaty would have to follow same Washington procedure as treaty itself including Senate approval and that delay probably until next session would be caused by attempt to modify present already approved text. Also said executive of course not in position guarantee Senate approval.

"Rhee then said he desired to have statement from State Department approving desire termination provision and agreeing to recommend such provision to Senate. Rhee asked if I would give him such letter and if not would I request one from Secretary Dulles. Whether Rhee plans instruct Chargé d'Affaires to defer exchange ratifications until this point clarified remains to be seen.

"I gave Rhee no encouragement Secretary would accept different termination clause, much less Rhee's proposed aggressor clause." (795.00/5-2654)

For the full text of telegram 1247 along with that of telegram 95 from Seoul to Geneva, referred to, see vol. XVI, pp. 319 and 284, respectively.

[3] In telegram 1249 from Seoul, May 26, Briggs suggested that the Department of State could interpret Rhee's remarks concerning the Mutual Defense Treaty reported in telegram 1247 from Seoul as a basis for further postponement of the exchange of ratifications of the treaty. (795.00/5-2654)

I do not believe President should recommend to Senate and I believe Senate would not grant termination clause which would make it impossible for US ever terminate its obligations under a treaty without consent other party. I know of no treaty by which US has thus bound itself.

For your information. Defense has received Seoul's 1213 [4] repeated Tokyo 721 together with CINCUNC's opinion in C 68127 [5] would be highly desirable, prior to or concurrently with bringing treaty into effect, obtain reaffirmation ROK commitment leave forces under UNC. Desire Embassy comments on probable Rhee reaction such request and political desirability making it at this time.

DULLES

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[4] In telegram 1213 from Seoul, May 20, Dean noted that once the Mutual Defense Treaty came into effect, Rhee would not be obligated to leave his forces under UN Command. (795B.5/5-2054)

[5] Not printed.

795.00/5-2854: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET SEOUL, May 28, 1954—9 p. m.

1259. Repeated information Tokyo 746, Geneva 132. Geneva for USDel; Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Deptel 956,[1] repeated Geneva 280, Tokyo 2637.

Before approaching Rhee with negative response to his request for modification termination clause pending defense treaty, I believe desirable consider what we not seek in connection therewith, together with certain broader issues. Do we now, for example, favor further postponement entry into effect treaty (with ROK still presumably bound leave armed forces under UNC Command), or do we prefer entry treaty into effect leaving for subsequent discussion such matters as relationship US/UNC Forces to ROK Forces?

As to specific question set forth last paragraph Deptel 956, I can conceive of few worse moments to approach Rhee for commitment leave his forces under UN Command than meeting at which President likely be informed of our refusal accept his cherished amendment to defense treaty.

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[1] *Supra.*

It would be preferable at this time not raise issue relationship ROK Forces to UN Command but to work this out on pragmatic basis depending on developments. Furthermore, do we not as practical matter have strong leverage on ROK in that we can always if Rhee threatens remove forces from UN Command counter with statement further logistic support in that case will not be forthcoming? (I have not seen CINCUNC's C 68127 commenting on Embtel 1213[2] but I have discussed this question with General Taylor).

However in broader perspective these are all items within general area of US-ROK relations which if considered piecemeal or on *ad hoc* day-to-day basis seem unlikely result in solutions fully satisfactory our interests. More effective approach, in accordance with general tenor Embtels 1155 and 1210[3] (repeated Geneva 72 and 101; Tokyo 685 and 718) would be through recognition that on failure Geneva Conference to unify Korea, US-ROK relations should be re-examined, re-defined and if necessary restated to Rhee. This means economic, military and political matters would all be placed in hopper and that from those ingredients we would propose to construct definitive US position with accompanying statement our intentions and capabilities which Rhee would then be called upon to accept or reject. In this I emphasize that Rhee is likely be extremely difficult beginning moment we concede (what he has all along declared) that Geneva Conference unable unify Korea. That may well be time for re-examination our relationship in all particulars, and thereafter time for straight talk accompanied by such show of firmness as may be required to make our policy stick.

BRIGGS

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[2] Neither printed, but see footnote 4, *supra*.

[3] For the texts of these telegrams, dated May 11 and May 19, respectively, see vol. XVI, pp. 244 and 292.

795.00/6-254: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 2, 1954—1:05 p. m.

974. Seoul's 1259 [2] and 1272 [3] re Korean Defense Treaty repeated Tokyo 746 and 755 Geneva 132 and 140, Seoul's 1277 [4] repeated Tokyo 757. Tokyo pass CINCUNC.

Especially since President Rhee in his May 29 letter to Dean emphasized alleged discriminatory aspect Korean Defense Treaty, you should utilize convenient opportunity near future convey to him in writing and discuss with him Secretary's thinking as set forth Deptel 956 [5] repeated Geneva Tosec 280 Tokyo 2637.

This question discussed in some detail on May 28 with Han of Korean Embassy by Department officer who told him substance Deptel 956 and said it probably already communicated Rhee. Han coming in again today to discuss subject.[6]

Appreciate analysis situation your 1259 but do not believe we have bargaining factor in Defense Treaty. As Secretary pointed out in Tedul 52 [7] repeated Seoul 907 Tokyo 2481 we should not ask ROK buy same horse twice. In addition see no chance US would agree either to termination article of "aggressor clause" of sort Rhee wants.

DULLES

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[1] This telegram, drafted by McClurkin and cleared by Drumright, was repeated to Tokyo as telegram 2668 and to Geneva as telegram Tosec 324.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] In this telegram, the Embassy transmitted to the Department of State Rhee's letter to Dean of May 29 in which the South Korean President alleged that the Mutual Defense Treaty between South Korea and the United States did not provide the security granted to the Japanese in their treaty. Rhee noted that the Japanese treaty could be terminated only by mutual agreement while the Korean treaty only required notice by one party to the other. For text of this telegram, see vol. XVI, p. 327.

[4] In this telegram, June 1, Briggs requested that before he replied to Rhee's concerns about the Mutual Defense Treaty, the Department of State should consider the factors he mentioned in telegram 1259 from Seoul, May 28.

[5] Dated May 27, p. 1810.

[6] A report of this meeting can be found in telegram 978 to Seoul, June 2, 1954, not printed. (795B.5/6-254)

[7] For the text of this telegram, dated May 10, see vol. XVI, p. 242.

795.00/6-454: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET SEOUL, June 4, 1954—4 p. m.

1297. Repeated information Tokyo 771, Geneva 153. Reference: Embtel 1292,[1] repeated Geneva 151, Tokyo 769.

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[1] In this telegram, Briggs stated his intention to discuss with Rhee Dulles' thinking as set forth in telegram 956, May 27, p. 1799. The Ambassador, however, admitted to being unsure if the Department of State regarded it as useful to press for the ratification of the Mutual Defense Treaty or to let matters ride. (795B.5/6-354)

This morning I delivered to President Rhee following letter dated June 3, first explaining to him orally contents thereof, plus further comments along line Deptel 956 (repeated Geneva 280, Tokyo 2637):

"Dear Mr. President:

"With reference to our conversation of May 26 and to your letter of May 29, 1954 addressed to Ambassador Dean, in particular to the question which you raised of possible revision of mutual defense treaty between our two countries, I have been asked by Secretary Dulles to convey following points to you as representing his views on subject.

"Security treaty between US and Japan, to which you referred, differs basically from mutual defense treaty between US and ROK in that former agreement imposes no obligations upon US and confers no rights upon Japan. That treaty gives to US right to dispose of its armed forces in and about Japan and to utilize such forces for certain specified purposes. Termination clause of that treaty serves to continue treaty in force until such time as both parties agree that other satisfactory security arrangements, either individual or collective, have come into effect. This termination clause, form of which was dictated by special nature of undertaking embodied in treaty with Japan, is thus necessarily in contrast to comparable clauses of mutual defense treaties concluded by US with Australia, New Zealand, and Philippines, upon which termination clause of treaty with Korea is modeled.

"Secretary does not believe that President should recommend to Senate or that Senate would agree to any termination clause which would make it impossible for US ever to terminate its treaty obligations to another nation without latter's consent. He adds that he knows of no treaty undertaking by which US has thus bound itself.

"I have been advised that Department of State on June 2 conveyed foregoing views to Korean Chargé d'Affaires a. i. in Washington, and further informed him of impossibility of US Government's agreeing to inclusion in mutual defense treaty of a provision which would commit US to support unilateral military action by ROK to eject Communist aggressors from North Korea. Faithfully yours, (Signed) Ellis O. Briggs, American Ambassador."

President Rhee received information without any special indication interest. He asked me to thank Secretary Dulles "for his unvarying attention to Korean matters" but did not indicate what action he now proposes with respect to pending US-ROK treaty. I gathered Rhee may already have received report from his Washington Embassy of interviews on same subject at Department.

BRIGGS

795B.5/6-354: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 4, 1954—10:02 a. m.
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

984. Seoul's 1292[2] repeated Tokyo 769 Geneva 151. Regret following information not provided earlier messages this subject.

We will be glad exchange ratifications and bring unchanged Treaty into effect at any time but do not wish urge it upon ROK now that we have made offer and any delay is their responsibility.

Do not believe August 8 agreed statement need be considered in this connection. It reads "between now and date when Mutual Defense Treaty *can be expected to* come into force and effect" ROK armed forces will be subject to UNC. That commitment ran out about end of March. Later paragraph in August 8 agreed statement says ROK "has agreed take no unilateral action unite Korea by military means for agreed duration political conference". Presumably that commitment runs out when conference ends. However whether or not there exists explicit commitment retain ROK forces under UNC we believe factors mentioned second and third paragraphs your 1259[3] operate.

DULLES

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[1] This telegram, drafted by McClurkin and cleared by Drumright, was repeated to Tokyo as telegram 2688 and to Geneva as telegram Tosec 342.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 1, *supra.*

[3] Dated May 28, p. 1800.

795B.5/6-954

Memorandum for the Record, by Walter Treumann of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 9, 1954.

Subject: Debriefing of General Maxwell Taylor.

In reply to various questions put to him by Departmental officers,[1] General Taylor made the following significant points:

1. In the event of a Communist attack, the UN and the ROK forces can take care of the situation.

2. The ROKs presently have 18 effective divisions and two in training. Those two divisions will be ready in late fall. Present ROK manpower ceiling is 650,000.

3. No present evidence of offensive intentions by the Communists. However, many airfields are being built and repaired in north Korea.

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[1] The source text does not indicate which Department of State officers were at this debriefing of Taylor. McClurkin did initial this memorandum and presumably he attended.

4. If faced by the north Korean Army alone, the ROK Army would prevail. This takes into account present ROK air inferiority.

5. 65 percent of the ROK officers corps have seen only three years of active service. In case of an emergency, KMAG officers would undoubtedly take over command of the larger ROK units.

Ultimately, General Taylor envisages a standing ROK Army of 200,000 to 250,000 men with a reserve of 800,000 to 900,000. General Hull favors such a plan. It has not been discussed with President Rhee. President Rhee's plan for a 35-division force is preposterous.

6. There are 1,400,000 able-bodied men in the ROK. 1,041,000 would be the maximum that could be put into the field by the ROK. 900,000 could be maintained in the field for 18 months.

7. ROK division size is 14,000. The ROKs have adequate tank support. We are under an obligation to leave the equipment of departing U.S. divisions.

8. The airforce program is way behind. A moderate ROK airforce is absolutely necessary to help protect the investment which we have put into Korea. Presently, the airforce is totally inadequate. Modernizing the Korean airforce and converting it to jets would take from 3 to 4 years.

9. General Taylor favors the complete withdrawal of UN forces from Korea. He takes a dim view of a UN corps staying behind indefinitely. Such a corps would not be much good militarily and would be a "hostage to President Rhee". If the corps were retained there, Rhee would have to agree to keep his forces under the UNC. A UN corps would not have much deterrent effect against the Communists. The real deterrent is our determination to defend the ROK.

10. Unilateral action is not "highly probable". If convinced we won't support him and if the ROK generals know it, President Rhee won't go it alone. The ROK Army is being kept on the lowest possible supply level. This means 6 or 7 days of supplies. The ROK generals are loyal to the 8th Army. However, they fear the President's old age and that he might take precipitate action.

11. Present emphasis in training is the development of ROK technical and logistic services.

12. Even if we were to consider sending ROK troops to Indochina, Rhee would undoubtedly charge us for this by demanding at least another 2 divisions to replace those sent to Indochina. He would probably not put the troops under a French command. Moreover, the troops would not put up an adequate fight without U.S. advisers as far down as regimental level.

13. The reinforcement provisions of the armistice do not hurt us very much yet. In the future they may. For instance, atomic artillery could not be put into Korea. Also, our airforce cannot be modernized, and its effectiveness is therefore being gradually impaired.

14. The ROK Army will only perform as well as its KMAG advisers who presently serve on the regimental and higher levels.

15. Maintaining the ROK Army in its present size would mean that each man would have to serve for ten to eleven years.

16. Present ROK training in logistics points up to ROK officers the difficulty of "going it alone". The ROK officers are becoming aware of this difficulty.

JCS records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

SECRET WASHINGTON, 11 June 1954.

Subject: Abolition of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

1. Reference is made to DA IN 57651 [C 68020], 12 May 1954,[1] in which Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, reaffirms his previously expressed view that the Communists have exploited their participation in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission with serious adverse consequences on the United Nations Command. Chief among a number of considerations, he points out that the Communist members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (the Czechs and Poles) are utilizing the inspection functions of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission with substantial success for propaganda and intelligence purposes. Further and of critical importance, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, reports that the Communists have successfully evaded effective Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission inspection of their forces in North Korea.

2. Meanwhile the United Nations Command has supported the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in good faith. General Hull reports that matériel replacement restrictions based on paragraph 13 b of the Armistice Agreement, have been imposed by the Commission on his Command, which permit the introduction of replacement combat aircraft into Korea only when such replacements are of the same type, model, series and even sub-numeral designation. Although this interpretation has been supported by the Swiss and Swede Commission members, possibly through lack of technical understanding of combat aviation, the United Nations Command cannot agree. This, General Hull considers, constitutes a curtailment which, if permitted to continue, will eventually depress his air capabilities to the point of impotency. When weighed against the fact of ever increasing air power in North Korea, General Hull states that it is all the more intolerable to permit such a condition to continue.

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[1] Not printed. (JCS files)

3. Should the *status quo* continue unchanged, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command is convinced that the Pole and Czech members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission will continue their practice of using large staffs to compile detailed intelligence data concerning the United Nations Command. Also, he believes that the United Nations Command will become even more harassed by unfounded accusations and Communist propaganda exercises.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, strongly favors the abolition of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as soon as possible by one of the following courses of action in the order of preference listed below:

a. By inducing Switzerland and Sweden to withdraw their representatives from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

b. By United Nations Command action to unilaterally revoke Section C, paragraphs 36 through 50 of the Armistice Agreement, thus dissolving the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

c. As a last resort, renegotiate Section C of the Armistice Agreement at the Geneva Conference in order to reconstitute the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as a workable supervisory unit.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed DA IN 57651 and consider the views expressed by Commander in Chief, United Nations Command therein to be sound. They concur that steps to renegotiate the Armistice Agreement at the Geneva Conference would not be productive, and indeed would merely offer the Communists opportunities to create an additional forum for anti-United Nations Command propaganda and to cause possible divisions between the United States and its Free World Allies. Similarly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that political considerations at this time may militate against United Nations Command unilateral action to dissolve the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission through renunciation of Section C of the Armistice Agreement except as this step would constitute an implementing measure following withdrawal of Swedish and Swiss representation. In this connection they desire to express agreement with the preference indicated by Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, that abolition of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission be accomplished, if at all possible, through action by the Governments of Sweden and Switzerland to withdraw their representation from the Commission. Should this course fail, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur that the action listed in subparagraph 4 *b* above should be pursued, and that only as a last resort, should the course listed in subparagraph 4 *c* above be attempted. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request they be consulted prior to the firm adoption of either of these two latter courses of action.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you request the Secretary of State to approach the Governments of Sweden and Switzerland, and utilizing the views expressed by Commander in Chief, United Na-

tions Command, induce them to withdraw their representation from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as an essential step in the dissolution of this Commission as soon as possible.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N. F. TWINING
Chief of Staff
United States Air Force

795B.11/6-1854

The Secretary of State to the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, June 18, 1954.

MY DEAR PRESIDENT RHEE: I understand that our Delegations have withdrawn from the Geneva Conference on the ground that it has been demonstrated to be fruitless as regards the attainment of a unified, free and independent Korea.

I recall that our joint statement of August 7 [*8*], 1953,[2] made when I had the pleasure of being with you in Seoul, provided that in the above contingency we would consult further.

I should be happy to have an exchange of views with your Government as to where and how such consultations should take place. If it meets your pleasure, I shall be glad to take up with President Eisenhower the question of extending an official invitation to you to come to Washington for the purpose.

With very kind wishes,

Sincerely yours, JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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[1] This message, drafted by Dulles, was transmitted in telegram 1026 to Seoul, June 18, 1954, which was repeated to Tokyo as 2813 with instructions to pass it to CINCUNC.
[2] For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 17, 1953, pp. 203-204.

795.00/6-1854: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET SEOUL, June 18, 1954—6 p. m.
PRIORITY

1358. Repeated information Tokyo 809, Geneva 182. For the Secretary from Briggs. Tokyo pass CINCUNC exclusive for General Hull. Re Embtel 1259,[1] repeated Tokyo 746, Geneva 132.

Conclusion Korean phase Geneva Conference calls for reexamination our Korean policy both with respect broad principles and specific questions precipitated by Geneva failure unify Korea. This telegram seeks define these problems within political sphere and recommend courses of action.

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[1] Dated May 28, p. 1800.

1. Rhee–Dulles agreement of August 8, 1953,[2] provides for consultation following political conference re demand unifying Korea if conference abortive. Although agreement envisaged 90-day conference period, I believe we should accept view we have commitment consult with ROK on this subject and should at early date take initiative do so. If Rhee still unwilling visit Washington in response earlier invitations, I recommend consultations be undertaken through Embassy Seoul although it might be desirable renew President Eisenhower's invitation if feasible. Believe we should be prepared discuss entire spectrum our relations with ROK and our policy in Asia.

Rhee's commitment not undertake unilateral military action to unify Korea is ended and in fact some months back he gave us notice of his freedom to act. I do not believe these facts unnecessarily increase likelihood of early ROK unilateral move however, as other factors, particularly developments in Southeast Asia, and attempts unify free nations of Asia, have intervened and may influence Rhee for time being. President Eisenhower's April 16 letter[3] is clear re US refusal support military action unify Korea but obligation remains make final determination re expansion ROK Armed Forces and I presume this may be done on basis General Van Fleet's present survey.

2. Related to above is status of armistice agreement which by terms paragraph 62 remains in effect. Nevertheless, I believe we should examine provisions of armistice agreement carefully to evaluate their long-term advantages and disadvantages and to determine courses of action we should pursue. Specifically re NNSC I recommend we urge Swiss and Swedish Governments take early action withdraw their representatives so that NNSC can be terminated soonest.

3. As recommended Embtel 1350[4] we should promptly agree with UNCURK measures to effect transfer area north of 38th parallel to ROK control, administratively and ultimately juridically.

4. Related to above problem is general question UNCURK's future. While there are some functions UNCURK can usefully perform between now and Ninth UNGA Session, particularly action re item three above, we should in conjunction other interested governments consider whether UNCURK or other UN body should be continued indefinitely. Various ideas have been advanced here, both within and without

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[2] For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 17, 1953, pp. 203–204.

[3] In this letter Eisenhower told Rhee that the United States was considering assisting the Republic of Korea in maintaining a field army capable of sustained combat operations, modernizing the ROK Navy, reorganizing the ROK Marines from a brigade to a combat division, and equipping the ROK Air Force with jet aircraft and trained South Korean pilots. For text of the letter, transmitted in telegram 829 to Seoul, Apr. 16, see vol. XVI, p. 103.

[4] Not printed. (795.00/6–1654)

UNCURK, including (*a*) continuation of commission as is (*b*) retention of commission on more streamlined basis perhaps with new membership (*c*) reduction to representative of UN Secretary General with small staff (*d*) amalgamation of latter with UNKRA or creation of new political-economic aid agency of UN. Embassy has no detailed recommendations at this time but strongly favors continuation some distinct form of UN political representation, preferably in form of commission of not less than 5 members.

5. Korea's relationship to Indochina war and defense SEA should be given fresh examination. Failure achieve Korean settlement as isolated problem suggests necessity considering it increasingly in future in context Communist threat throughout Asia. Our moves to organize collective defense in SEA and somewhat corollary efforts by Rhee through mechanism Chinhae conference[5] should to extent possible be brought together or at least coordinated. Heretofore, we have for good reason pursued a passive policy re Rhee's not very skillful efforts in this field but I believe we should now seek to exercise greater leadership in order channel his and other Asian efforts in directions most nearly consistent with our own interests.

For example I favor re-examining advisability convening early meeting among foreign ministers of free Asian nations and interested western powers in order weld together separate efforts in common aims and policy. Meeting of this sort should have helpful effect in demonstrating our interest in Asian problems and as setting precedent for subsequent meetings and possibly creation of a limited regional organization. While question arises whether a sufficient ground work can be laid for profitable meeting of this sort, I am convinced seriousness and urgency of Asian situation warrant careful exploration of this approach. We might include (in addition to US, UK and France) Australia, New Zealand, ROK, Japan, Philippines and Thailand. Formosa, of course, presents special problem. We could also consider desirability including all or some of Colombo powers.

6. In context foregoing we should re-examine state of ROK–Japan relations and decide whether further attempt should be made, either openly or behind scenes, to bring parties together in negotiations. Conceivably multi-lateral meeting such as envisaged paragraph 5 above, might have helpful effect in affording framework within which high

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[5] The Chinhae Conference held in mid-June 1954 under the sponsorship of the Republic of Korea succeeded in establishing the Asian People's Anti-Communist League. Thirty-one delegates from Nationalist China, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, Hong Kong, Macao, and Thailand assembled at Chinhae, Korea. Ostensibly the delegates were "people's" representatives, although in the cases of South Korea, Nationalist China, and Vietnam, the participants had strong governmental connections. The conference set up a constitution for the unofficial anti-Communist organization it had created and passed a number of anti-Communist resolutions. Additional information on the Chinhae Conference is located in file 790.00.

Korean and Japanese officials could meet and discuss bilateral problems. Frank exposé to Rhee of general lines our Asian policy and essentiality active Japanese role therein might help influence him in direction regularization ROK-Japanese relations. (While Rhee's attitude toward Japan so ingrained it is impossible be optimistic relative real improvement relations, I nevertheless share view expressed Ambassador Dean in Embtel 1155 May 11,[6] that we should "tell Rhee frankly about our Japanese program and that he has nothing to fear.")

7. Entry into force of mutual defense treaty, on assumption ROK willing proceed with treaty as it now stands, may precipitate long-pending question administrative agreement covering US and UN Forces and may also raise problem command relationship ROK forces to UNC. Latter question must be dealt with eventually in any event.

Foregoing does not attempt cover all subjects at issue between US and ROK, particularly those in economic field which demand urgent consideration. I understand Wood will be submitting certain recommendations to FOA with particular view to obtaining congressional assistance regarding most important problems in his field.

BRIGGS

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[6] For text of this telegram, see vol. XVI, p. 244.

795B.11/6-2154: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT SEOUL, June 21, 1954—7 p. m.

1376. Repeated information Tokyo 820, niact Geneva 189. Geneva for USDel. Tokyo for CINCUNC. For the Secretary.

Spent day at Chinhae with President Rhee who expressed his deep appreciation suggested Washington invitation but said he could not see way clear to leave Korea at this time. Personally Rhee said nothing would give him more satisfaction than to accept since he regards invitation great honor not to speak of value of renewing personal touch with President and you. Later in conversation with Mrs. Rhee, President remarked would be impossible make round trip in less than 2 weeks and even so at his age bound to be exhausting and in addition air travel adversely affects Mrs. Rhee. I think President was genuinely pleased and considerably tempted but nevertheless definitely declined for any predictable future.

Rhee then turned to other pending business. He said he is working on post-Geneva declaration to be issued after further consultation with and if possible endorsement by US which would include following points:

1. Statement that consultation with Communists over Korea is finished; that Communists by Geneva conduct once again demonstrated

futility of negotiating with them because no solution possible, Communists merely consumed time meanwhile strengthening and arming selves, as he declared enemies are now doing in north in violation armistice terms. Therefore Rhee said he will attend no more meetings of "5 or 7 or 9" and would refuse participate in any follow-up project including any post-Geneva mission or committee.

Although Rhee failed specify I doubt whether this rules out ROK attendance at informal Washington meetings such as preceded Geneva but Rhee did object to special UNGA and in fact said he could see no profit in any further UN efforts toward Korean unification. "Every time big powers meet with Russia to talk about small countries latter are sold down the river" Rhee observed bitterly.

2. Because Communists have refused negotiate in good faith Rhee regards armistice as terminated insofar ROK concerned. He said that does not mean he is planning unilateral action toward north "right now" but he does not propose to be bound any further within ROK by armistice terms. He also said "I do not propose allow Poles and Czechs travel around any longer in my country."

Rhee went on to say he is in process of getting his ideas on paper but wanted my government to know direction of his thinking. He indicated he might defer making his views public until after return of Foreign Minister Pyun, who is due reach Tokyo June 26. (Rhee mentioned Pyun invited by Tasca see latter in Rome; also that Ben Limb accompanying Pyun back to Korea after which Limb will return US.)

In reply to Rhee's statements I said it is my understanding that US Government likewise would be reluctant have follow-up meetings or see established anything in nature standby committee on Korea, or have special UNGA session called discuss Korea. In other words I said we are probably in approximate agreement concerning Rhee's first point.

Re armistice, however, I said my government regards it as still in effect pursuant Article 62 and that I recalled General Smith had so expressed himself at final Korean plenary Geneva. (Rhee interrupted with some heat to denounce armistice again, reiterating his intention not to be bound by it any longer.)

Regarding NNSC I then outlined plan explained last week to Cho, who was present with me at Chinhae today, whereas we hoped to persuade Swiss and Swedes to withdraw. I said this impressed American Government as more effective way to end NNSC than by unilateral ROK action. Rhee agreed proposal might have merit "if you can really persuade Swiss and Swedes to act". In this connection it appears, however, that Cho issued statement last week prior to conversation reported Embtel 1370[1] declaring ROK will soon demand commission cease functioning within ROK.

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[1] In this telegram, June 19, Briggs reported a conversation with Acting Foreign Minister Cho as follows:

Continued

To say that Rhee appeared convinced by any observation made to him today would probably considerably strain the facts. I received distinct impression views President expressed are evidences of feelings and intentions that have been developing and hardening ever since Geneva meeting scheduled, possibly ever since armistice.

After about 1 hour of discussion Rhee remarked very amiably "now let's go fishing" which we did. He did not revert to business until after luncheon when he said again how personally distressed he is not to be able to accept Washington invitation and also that he assumed there would be no publicity about Secretary Dulles' approach regarding possible Washington visit. I told Rhee I knew of no plan for publicity in that connection.

I likewise informed President Rhee of General Van Fleet's proposed visit to Chinhae from tomorrow evening through June 23. Rhee expressed satisfaction at prospect. I am seeing Van Fleet here this evening.

Briggs

"Cho was informed lines our thinking re NNSC and emphasis was placed on importance avoiding premature publicity re possible withdrawal Swiss and Swedish members, and eventual dissolution of commission. Cho expressed gratification at news and stressed importance ending NNSC activities in ROK as soon as possible. Agreed keep ROK Government informed re developments this subject." (795.00/6-1954)

795B.11/6-2354: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET SEOUL, June 23, 1954—7 p. m.

1383. Repeated information Tokyo 825. Department pass General Taylor. Tokyo pass CINCUNC exclusive for General Hull.

In connection mytel 1376,[1] I believe additional reason behind Rhee's decision decline Washington invitation is his feeling that he is in stronger negotiating position here than in Washington where he might be more subject pressures US official and public opinion. This impression has been fortified during past year by numerous official visits to Korea by high-ranking US Government officials to discuss fundamental matters relating US-ROK relations. As result Rhee probably feels he can continue to deal with these matters through emissaries sent him from Washington. While I do not wish to underestimate importance Korean matters to US Government, I believe Rhee should not be encouraged in his conviction he can continue play "hard to get" practically at will in his dealings with us. It is important for Rhee to understand that our problems and relations with ROK must be placed within context our world wide problems and responsibilities. Consequently, if Rhee replies to Secretary Dulles' letter along lines indicated my conversation with him June 21, I recommend we undertake consultation through normal diplomatic channels.

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[1] *Supra.*

Re paragraph 1 Embtel 1358,[2] I have been giving much thought, in connection General Van Fleet's present mission, to problem expansion ROK armed forces and its relation to other matters pending between our two governments. I believe Rhee counting heavily on Van Fleet recommendation for substantial increase ROK military establishment and this expectation colors Rhee's current thinking. I am somewhat reluctant to tread on this subject which obviously involves military considerations. I am not able fully to judge but there are also pressing political and economic implications of further build-up ROK forces which cannot be ignored. I recognize that determination of size ROK armed forces requires most careful consideration but nevertheless believe it is important to reach decision soonest in order this problem be dealt with along with other matters between our two governments.

I therefore urge that conclusions of Van Fleet's mission be formulated soonest, at least in preliminary form, in concert with General Hull as per President's April 16 letter and Defense Secretary directive April 26, to General Van Fleet.[3] (Van Fleet now in Chinhae with Rhee; Assistant Defense Secretary McNeil reaches Seoul from Tokyo tomorrow.)

Once decision reached on this fundamental matter of size future ROK military establishment, related decisions re US–UN forces to be left in Korea, rate redeployment, command relationship between UNC and ROK, etc., can then be taken. All of these decisions together with others in political and economic fields (Embtel 1358, repeated Tokyo 809) ought to be brought together as basis for early discussions with Rhee. As indicated in number of recent Embassy messages, I anticipate Rhee may become more difficult to deal with in near future. For example, his impending denunciation of armistice and his proposed action barring further NNSC activities in ROK are only two of several actions he may take on unilateral basis—to our subsequent embarrassment or danger. I doubt Rhee contemplates any drastic step such as attempting resume war for present at least. Likewise I recognize it can perhaps be argued that so long as he does not know precisely what he can expect from us in way of military aid he may be more inclined to refrain from provocative actions, but we would be deluding ourselves if we consider that a valid reason against informing him of our intentions in political, military and economic fields.

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[2] Dated June 18, p. 1808.

[3] This directive from Wilson to Van Fleet established general guidelines for the Van Fleet Mission. The specific reference to Korea read:

"The President has asked specifically that you go to Korea to consult with President Rhee and his military advisers to study the situation thoroughly, and to develop recommendations in concert with General Hull both as to the future size and composition of the active armed forces of the Republic of Korea and the practicability of a joint United States-Republic of Korea program for Korean reserve forces." (Eisenhower Library, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Records, 1952–61, Report of the Van Fleet Mission)

Even though suggested negotiations with Rhee may be difficult and perhaps at times unpleasant, I think clearer understanding on his part of what he can and cannot expect from us is now essential to fundamentally better relations. It is equally my opinion that any apparent lack of decisiveness and clear talking on our part is more likely encourage intransigence and *faits accomplis* than reverse.

BRIGGS

795.00/6-2654: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 26, 1954—4:30 p. m.

1043. Secretary Wilson has raised question of what should now be done about plans for further redeployment US forces from Korea which were suspended pending outcome Geneva Conference. Recent telegrams from Ambassador Briggs and General Hull have also suggested consideration this subject.

It is desired to continue deployment from Korea in accordance with the program announced by the President on December 26 [2] under the safeguards and reassurances which he then expressed. However, before making this decision final in regard to a second state of deployment from Korea, I would like your estimate as to whether it would be interpreted as a sign of weakness and if so, whether any statements or explanations to be given at the time of announcements would obviate this impression.

President's statement was transmitted by wireless bulletin FEF-2 Dec. 28, 1953.

DULLES

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[1] This telegram, which was drafted by McClurkin and Dulles and cleared by Dulles, was also sent to Tokyo as telegram 2876 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC, to Taipei as telegram 957, and to Saigon as telegram 2736.

[2] See footnote 1, p. 1679.

795.00/6-2854: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET SEOUL, June 28, 1954—midnight.

1398. Repeated information Tokyo 831, Taipei 117, Saigon 45. Tokyo pass CINCUNC.

Announcement last December of withdrawal US Forces [1] was not well received by President Rhee because he regarded it as unrelated to broad pattern of US–ROK relations and US-Asian policy, and being imperfectly understood it increased Rhee's apprehension over abandonment. If new redeployment plan is discussed well in advance and explained in terms of our broader objective there is some hope we can obtain Rhee's understanding and cooperation whereas announcement of plan without proper preparation could be misinterpreted as sign of US weakness and evidence lack of intention support ROK in future.

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[1] Reference was to the statement of Dec. 26; see footnote 1, p. 1679.

Later this week I hope to discuss matter with Generals Hull and Taylor. Pending that conversation my interim view is that it is essential consider redeployment in context entire US–ROK relationship. In particular decision should be related to whatever conclusion we reach regarding size ROK Forces (Embtels 1358 and 1383 [2]).

BRIGGS

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[2] Dated June 18 and June 23, pp. 1808 and 1813, respectively.

795.00/6–2954: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET TOKYO, June 29, 1954—4 p. m.

3257. Repeated information Seoul 285, Taipei 183, Saigon 84. Reference: Deptel 2876, June 26.[1] With Geneva out of way would from viewpoint this post see little reason hold up second stage redeployment much longer.

Immediate thought which occurs to me is whether it is in fact necessary to make public announcement of plans for further redeployment of US forces from Korea. President's December 26 statement made clear our intention of redeploying forces under proper safeguards. I have received the impression from talks with military members of General Van Fleet's mission that natural attrition would reduce our forces in Korea progressively and that in fact redeployment is thus constantly taking place. The Communists do not deem it necessary to make public announcements of deployment of their forces. Why should we?

If, however, it is necessary, as I suspect it is, from a domestic political point of view, to make an announcement concerning further redeployment, I strongly urge that it not be done in isolation but in the context of our overall Far Eastern policy. Merely to announce the withdrawal of more US divisions from Korea might well be interpreted as sign of weakness but if this withdrawal is related to overall American planning for Asia it might have the following compensating advantages:

1. It would evidence US concern not exclusively with Korea but in building up strategic reserve of US strength which would be ready to meet new aggression elsewhere.

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[1] Printed as telegram 1043 to Seoul, June 26, p. 1815.

2. By announcing greater availability of troops released from Korea we might well strengthen our bargaining position in connection with Indochina situation.[2]

3. Redeployment of troops from Korea could mean more assets available for contribution to any Southeast Asian collective security system which might be developed.

4. While not primarily for Tokyo comment, continued withdrawal of US troops from Korea would seemingly reinforce our statements to Rhee that we will not support a military move north.

5. The continued withdrawal from Korea could indicate desire of the US to find peaceful solutions and not view all problems solely in terms of military solutions which many Asians now charge US with doing.[3]

Immediate effect of any announcement in Japan might well be double-edged. On the one hand it would point up the need for all countries in this area to increase their efforts at self help both military and economic. On the other hand it could reinforce an already evident wishful tendency to conclude that Japan is right in not taking the military threat to her security as either urgent or grave. Japan's attitude of course would be further affected by whether or not US troops would be deployed all the way to the US or whether some of them would come to Japan and Okinawa.

I hope to meet with Briggs and Generals Hull and Taylor here this week end after which we may have further comments to submit either individually or collectively.

ALLISON

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[2] In telegram 2944 from Saigon, June 30, the Embassy staff gave its view of redeployment as follows:

"So far as Indochina is concerned we would much regret to see this redeployment at this time.

"If US troops are now withdrawn from Korea to ZI, it will be difficult to convince Mendes-France Government that French Expeditionary Corps should not likewise be removed from Indochina and furthermore pace of such evacuation might indeed be stepped up.

"With or without public announcement Communists will most certainly know that US is reducing its military commitments in Far East and this will likewise become known to Asiatic peoples generally. Although so far as Indochina is concerned local governments are now without hope of US military intervention in war here in time to redress present deteriorating situation, some of these governments may still feel there is a chance that US and other Western powers will underwrite a viable system of collective defense for Southeast Asia. Surely they will, however, be forced to doubt *bona fides* of any proposal for such a collective system which we might put forward, if at same time we draw our troops home." (795.00/6-3054)

[3] In telegram 726 from Taipei, June 28, Rankin gave his view of redeployment as follows:

"I believe that further reduction US Forces in Korea under present conditions would be interpreted as sign of weakness; and that no statements or explanations I can imagine would obviate this impression, unless they were to include convincing announcement to effect that total anti-Communist strength in East Asia was actually being increased." (795.00/6-2854)

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, 1951–1959

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to the Secretary of State [1]

SEOUL, 2 July 1954.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Your letter of 18 June 1954 [2] was read with much interest and deep appreciation.

You are to be congratulated on the successful withdrawal from the Geneva Conference with the unanimous support of some fifteen nations. It was great moral victory, to say the least.

The Conference having come to an end, we should, as suggested in your letter, consult further together. Since the futility of peaceful negotiation with the Communists has been categorically demonstrated to all Allied Nations, we must employ some other means to save the situation before it drifts beyond control. One alternative is renewal of war.

In this connection, I have a definite plan to propose and explain confidentially to President Eisenhower and you. This plan will, I am sure, enable us to push up to the Yalu River with comparatively little sacrifice. This historic boundary line, if properly fortified, will be more easily held against the enemy than any other line to the South. It is quite certain that this conclusive but limited action will not provoke a general war.

President Eisenhower seems, however, to be of the opinion that fighting must not be resumed, no matter what the circumstances. He also appears to be convinced that we cannot fight our way so far North as we wish. The only other alternative then is for President Eisenhower to carry out the plans outlined in his letter to me of 16 April.[3] When General Van Fleet came to Korea, it was presumed he would undertake immediately to implement this program of building up our defense forces and we were disappointed when he was required to return to the United States. It is desired that General Van Fleet shall return to Korea immediately and be fully empowered. These plans should be implemented without delay under General Van Fleet, fully empowered to take charge of their execution under the direct orders of President Eisenhower. An adequate appropriation for arming and equipping the additional twenty Army Divisions and Sea and Air Forces to commensurate with the land strength, and for the manufacturing of arms and planes in Korea, should be made. The time element is very important in stemming the growing tide of Communist strength. We are more than disturbed about the daily-worsening situation.

Before I can decide to leave for the United States, I must give our people, as well as our military leaders, a definite assurance of some action to be taken when I return. Since the failure of the Geneva Conference they have been agitating for a definite measure to rout the Communists out of North Korea, or an immediate increase in strength to ensure our own security against aggression. Our enemy may push down anytime as they did four years ago, taking advantage of our weakness. Some of our military leaders are impatient of my hesitation to order them north. If I were able to promise that action would be taken when I return, the present unrest could be quieted down. Will you please let me know whether you will be able to agree to either or both alternatives mentioned and I will come at once to discuss the matter in detail.

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[1] This letter was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 6 from Seoul, July 3, 1954. (795B.11/7–354)

[2] *Ante*, p. 1808.

[3] See footnote 3, p. 1809.

For my part, an official invitation from President Eisenhower to visit the United States would be a great honor, but I think you will understand my situation.

With warm personal regards, I am

Cordially yours, SYNGMAN RHEE

795.00/7-454: Telegram

The Chief of the Mission to the Far East (Van Fleet) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

TOP SECRET TAIPEI, July 3, 1954—2 p. m.

MG 7558. (Army Message) Information to State Department and CINCFE (for Hull). From Van Fleet Mission for Secretary of Defense Wilson.

1. My attention has been called to Secretary of State cable No. 1043 to Seoul 26 June [1] and repeated to Tokyo, Taipei, Saigon and CINCUNC requesting views as to whether further withdrawal of American forces from Korea would be interpreted in Far East as sign of weakness and if so whether public statements or explanations could obviate such an impression. Because of close relationship to purposes of my mission, I wish to give you an expression of my views for such use as you may deem appropriate.

2. Withdrawal in present atmosphere would be interpreted throughout the Far East as another retreat and marked sign of weakness, further endangering our prestige and position and would be most disheartening in Korea itself. I agree that large numbers of United States Forces must be withdrawn from Korea but believe this should be done only as we are prepared to announce the simultaneous activation of additional ROK divisions of comparable strength.[2] I have discussed this

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[1] *Ante*, p. 1815.

[2] On a copy of this telegram in the Eisenhower Library, this sentence was underlined and a marginal note was written and initialed by Eisenhower which read: "This cable shows difficulty of allowing more than 1, in a region, to advise in policy." (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file)

problem with President Rhee and he would have no objection to withdrawal of any United Nations Forces if met by activation of additional ROK units.

3. In my view we should reverse current planned priority of withdrawal of divisions from Japan and Korea, or at least effect divided withdrawal of United States divisions. Moreover, withdrawals from Korea now and in the future should be direct without staging through Japan or other intermediate areas, both for reasons of morale and economy and for best political effects.

4. Announcement of withdrawals from Japan should be couched in terms of the increased strength and effectiveness of the Japanese national defense forces. Such action would provide a strong incentive to Japan to move faster under own defense program. Needed facilities would become available to the Japanese and departure of United States Forces would enable the Japanese to recognize their reliance on their own defenses. Japan has the capability with some help from the United States of building powerful defenses of her own but so long as we provide defenses for her, she will not achieve the transformation in her thinking that is requisite to her rearmament. Withdrawal of one division now and another soon will enhance Japanese pride and sense of responsibility.

5. Announcement of withdrawals from Korea should be accompanied with announcement that additional ROK divisions are being activated even if they are to be under strength or reserve divisions.

6. President Rhee and other Korean civil and military leaders already are fearful that the United States is preparing gradually to abandon Korea and any further withdrawal without replacement by ROKs would lend credence to their fears and produce deep discouragement. In my opinion, no other explanation of further withdrawal could have any effect in allaying that fear or in obviating the impression of weakness either in Korea or elsewhere in the Far East.

7. Recent evidence of withdrawal of some Chinese Communist armies from North Korea may be cited as basis for withdrawal of further United States Forces from South Korea, but in current situation in Far East I do not find that argument convincing. Those Chinese Communist Forces can be redeployed back across the Yalu on short notice. They are a force in being which actually threatens all the fronts. Moreover, any lessening of tension from this source has been more than offset among ROK civil and military leaders by their increasing fear of being abandoned by the United States.

8. Geneva Conference and impending concessions to the Communists by the French are already widely interpreted in Far East as major diplomatic defeat for the United States and a major victory for Communist China and as revealing our inability to secure support from our European allies and unwillingness by the United States to act without their

support. It is being said that we ourselves by our actions and inactions have built up Red China from a regime beset by grave and fundamental weaknesses to a position as one of the major world powers. This is the context in which we must weigh effects of withdrawal or other actions or statements and explanations.

9. I have found in the Far East also a strong current of distrust of British policy and a growing fear that United States policy in the Far East is being determined in London rather than in Washington. Leaders in both Korea and Formosa express puzzlement over this in view of the relative power positions of the two countries, the dependence of Great Britain on United States power in Europe, and the different stakes of the two countries in the Pacific. In particular, they express the fear that London is step-by-step forcing the United States to recognize Communist China and admit her to the United Nations which they would take as an ominous hand writing on the wall. The feeling has also been expressed that the British and the French take unilateral action when their interests are at stake, whereas the United States will act only when backed by a united front which, in practice, we are unable to form in the Far East. Therefore, the impression is created that the British and the French exercise veto power on United States Far Eastern policy. We must ask ourselves what future formidable problems we are building up for ourselves in the Far East and specifically what further losses of countries or partitions we must be prepared to face over the next few years under the trends now apparent.

10. In conclusion, I find:

a. That strength can be maintained and vastly improved by native efforts and at great savings in United States personnel and dollars, and by a proper redeployment of US Forces.

b. That a statement of United States position of strength in the Far East is mandatory.

11. To recapitulate I recommend:

a. Redeployment of United States Forces both in Japan and Korea be continued and expedited, with combat elements being withdrawn from Japan first and Korea last.

b. That simultaneous announcements be made in Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul by governments concerned, and perhaps by other governments in Far East.

c. That the announcement emphasize the strategic redeployment in Far East of United States Forces, and the continued buildup of country forces, perhaps mentioning a figure of 10 additonal combat divisions each for Japan, Korea, and Formosa, but not mention their reduced or reserve status.

d. Specifically withdraw First Cavalry Division and First Marine Division to the United States. Move Third Marine Division to Okinawa and the Philippines and 1 other division in Korea to Hawaii; and the immediate activation of 2 full strength (less artillery) ROKA Divisions.

795.00/7–554: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Hull) to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, July 5, 1954.[1]

C 68619. (Army Message) Sent Department Army G–3 passed for information to State Department. For Ridgway, signed Hull. Noforn. References: A. Van Fleet MG 7558.[2] B. Your 964055. C. My C 68573. D. My letter AGJ 091.711 subject: ROK Armed Forces dated 29 June 1954.[3]

1. As requested in your DA 964055 I set forth below my comments on Van Fleet's MG 7558 (reference A). My comments are numbered to correspond to the paragraphs of Van Fleet's cable to which they relate.

2. In my opinion withdrawal of United States forces from the Far East (in which I include Hawaii) would be a sign of weakness. Withdrawal from Korea but retention in the Far East would merely free these divisions for employment anywhere in the Far East and would not be a sign of weakness. With respect to activating additional ROK units of "comparable strength" to replace US units, I feel that, under present conditions, there is no justification for increasing the personnel ceiling of the ROK Armed Forces nor their equipment above that already recommended. In addition, I feel that the present personnel ceiling can be maintained only if additional military support funds are made available this year to a minimum of $100 million. Within the ceiling of presently authorized personnel strength and available equipment, I believe that additional Korean divisions can be formed. If these divisions have approximately one-third of their strength furnished by reserves we could unquestionably form one additional Korean division to compensate for each US division withdrawn, but each of these Korean divisions would be lacking strength comparable to that of a US division.

3. With respect to the withdrawal of US divisions from Japan before or concurrently with the withdrawal of US divisions from Korea, I feel that Korea does not need the military strength now available there since the Communist withdrawal has left the UN with greater strength in Korea than that the Communists deploy there. US divisions in Japan are better able to intervene anywhere in the Far East than are US divisions in Korea. My principal mission is the defense of Japan. Moreover, the forces now available in Japan are marginal to accomplish this mission. Accordingly, I do not feel it advisable to redeploy units from Japan in advance or concurrently with the redeployment from Korea.

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[1] There was no time of transmission indicated on this telegram; the information copy passed to the Department of State was received at 11:43 p. m., July 5.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] References B, C, and D are not printed.

4. I favor a change in US policy with respect to Japan from the current policy of withdrawing US forces only after Japanese forces have been organized in adequate strength to take over the defense mission. I will shortly propose to you a scheduled withdrawal of US forces from Japan at a rate which will permit the Japanese to take over their own defense providing they make a reasonable effort to do so. In accordance with this policy, I have already directed withdrawal of the First Cav division from Hokkaido beginning in August of this year; concurrently the Japanese will take over primary responsibility for the ground defense of that most sensitive area. The First Cav division will occupy the area in northern Honshu originally planned for the 24th division. The transfer of facs [facilities] on Hokkaido to the NSF will reduce the maximum US deployment that can be quartered in Japan, exclusive of Okinawa, to 3 and ⅓ divisions. I expect shortly to receive requests from the NSF for the release of additional accommodations for the 6th NSF division. I propose to comply with this request. This will reduce to 2 and ⅓ divisions my ability to accommodate US forces in Japan, exclusive of Okinawa. When and if the 24th Division is withdrawn from Korea, I recommend that I be authorized to place it on Okinawa under field conditions if no funds for permanent housing are available.

5. Announcement of withdrawals from Korea may be accompanied by announcement that additional ROK Divisions are being activated providing it is accepted that in augmenting the number of Korean Divisions, personnel strengths will not be increased, additional equipment will not be required, and the additional aid funds already requested will be furnished. In forming additional divisions I have reference here to the plan for the reorganization of the ROK Army which I have forwarded to you (reference D).

6. President Rhee and other government leaders are reported to be fearful the US is preparing to abandon Korea and further withdrawal will undoubtedly deepen their discouragement. However, ample assurances have been given to the ROK Government and to the world that the US will defend the ROK against aggression. Rhee's discouragement is therefore probably related not to any inadequacy of ROK defense to meet the current threat but to a realization that the US will not cooperate in an offensive to re-unite Korea. I doubt if anything at this time other than offensive action by the United States can balance the discouraging effect of the deterioration of the situation in Indochina. It is essential that we face up to the long term issue that Korea presents to the United States. Korea is a small country surrounded by three powerful neighbors. Korea cannot maintain itself against any of these neighbors without strong support from the United States. Since Japan is the one of these three friendly to the West, Korea must align itself with Japan or forever be a millstone around the neck of the United States. Korea's value to the US is only in the degree it protects Japan militari-

ly and supports Japan economically. We must find a way to make Korea look to Japan for protection. Unless Japan is far stronger militarily than Korea and unless Korea feels the need for cooperating with Japan and of Japanese protection we are unlikely to be able to bring these two powers together. Accordingly, any further strengthening of the Korean military forces will only prolong the period in which the United States must be prepared to commit powerful military forces to the Far East.

7. *a.* There has been a major withdrawal of Chinese Comunist strength from North Korea. Since spring of last year Communists have redeployed from Korea 8 out of 19 CCF Armies. To some degree this withdrawal is compensated for by the increase in North Korean Corps from 6 to 7 and by the increased effectiveness of all North Korean Forces, although their combat value is still lower than that of the CCF.

b. The UN Forces are now stronger than the Communist Forces and there is therefore little prospect of Communist attack unless strong reinforcements are brought in from Communist China. The movement of these reinforcements would give us some warning of an impending attack. The ROK can never be expected to be strong enough to defeat Communist China, but only to delay a Communist attack until the United States or Japan can intervene. In this connection it is well to realize that the UN Forces are stronger now than they were at the time of the armistice. We have increased the Korean strength by 5 divisions. We have reduced the UN strength by only two. In addition the South Koreans have tremendously improved in training, in equipment, in command capability and in supporting troops.

8. I question that the remedy for any alleged diplomatic defeat at Geneva is to strengthen further an ally who is already strong enough for the requirements of the current situation and whose increased strength would not be readily applicable in newly threatened areas.

9. The essentiality of a US policy for the entire Far East cannot be over emphasized.

10. With respect to Van Fleet's conclusions, I believe:

a. That necessary strength in Korea can be provided by native efforts within the present ceiling of manpower and equipment if additional financial aid is made available at once. Our over-all strength can be increased by a proper redeployment of US Forces, but the redeployment I recommend is different, as indicated elsewhere in this cable, from the redeployment Van Fleet recommends.

b. I am not convinced of the desirability of a statement of the "United States position of strength in the Far East." We are inclined now to deviate from Theodore Roosevelt's wise admonition, "speak softly but carry a big stick." The Communists will evaluate our strength by what we do, not by what we say, particularly this soon after our reversal in Indochina.

11. I recommend:

a. Redeployment:

(1) Retention of the present 2 and ⅓ US divisions in Japan, exclusive of Okinawa, for the time being with acceptance that this force will not be increased.

(2) Withdrawal of one US Army Division from Korea to Hawaii.

(3) Withdrawal of one US Army Division from Korea to Okinawa.

(4) Reduction of service support in Korea by transferring to the Korean's line of communication functions from Pusan forward, together with reserve stocks for Korean Forces up to 45 days reserve, retaining for US Forces a port at Inchon and reserves for all the remaining UNC forces less the ROKs.

b. Before any further redeployment is decided, or any announcement is made other than for the redeployment recommended in *a* above, US policy must be determined for the entire Far East. Such policy might require deployment elsewhere in the Far East of US Divisions which might be withdrawn from Korea. For example, if the US is going to send forces to Thailand in the event of attack on that country, it might be well to move a division there now and thus perhaps forestall an attack rather than to wait until Thailand is already under attack.

c. I recommend strongly against any announcement or any policy such as one which would mention 10 additional combat divisions for Japan, Korea and Formosa but not mention their reduced or reserve status. Such statements would have no effect on the Communists who would recognize them as propaganda but would have a dangerous effect at home in lulling the people of the US into an unjustified feeling of security. When and if we are prepared to so do, we should of course announce the formation of a SEATO and a North East Asian alliance including Japan, Korea, Formosa and possibly the Philippines. Depending on the strength of these organizations, this might provide a considerable encouragement to the ROK as well as to other Asian countries.

d. I do recommend the early movement from Korea of the 25th US Division to Hawaii and the movement of the 24th US Division from Korea to Okinawa. I do not recommend the withdrawal at this time of major units from Japan. I do not recommend further withdrawal of major units from Korea until a United States Far East policy is decided upon.

795B.11/7–654: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY SEOUL, July 6, 1954—7 p. m.

12. Repeated information Tokyo 6. Tokyo for CINCUNC. It is apparent from President Rhee's July 1 [*2*] letter to Secretary Dulles[1]

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[1] *Ante*, p. 1818.

(Embtel 6 repeated Tokyo 1) that Rhee is viewing possible Washington visit primarily in terms of benefits he can extract from it. He will accept only if he is reasonably confident he can obtain tangible dividends to exhibit on return in compensation for failure achieve Korean unification in near future. Unless he can expect something substantial seems doubtful he will undertake trip at this time as he is well aware relative advantage in past of negotiating from Seoul (Embtel 1383, June 23 repeated Tokyo 825).[2]

Line followed by his letter suggests once again (1) that Rhee has little expectation direct US support for military drive north, (2) that he is still anticipating, and probably counting on, substantial increase ROK forces as result General Van Fleet's recommendations, (3) that by continuing truculent behavior he can obtain at least some part of his objectives through US action to pacify him, and (4) that US imperfectly informed re attitude ROK people (penultimate paragraph giving impression eagerness military leaders march north, etc. is altogether contrary facts, as interpreted by Eighth Army and Embassy). Rhee's relating question of size ROK forces to broader questions US policy re Korea emphasizes a new necessity our being prepared consider major pending political, economic and military questions together. To handle them on piecemeal basis would invite trouble and magnify difficulty in obtaining satisfactory solutions. My impression from studying General Hull's recent messages is that from miltiary viewpoint we should implement promptly and adequately standing commitment in Rhee–Dulles agreement of August 8, 1953 to expand ROK air and naval (including marine) forces [3] but not increase ROK ground forces much beyond existing level. This agrees with my assessment of situation.

If I am correct in interpreting Rhee's first alternative as envisaging atomic bombing, I assume this is as unacceptable to us as resumption Korean hostilities by any other means. As to second alternative I assume that until Van Fleet recommendations are in and have been considered in concert with General Hull (as per President's April 16 letter [4]) it may be difficult give Rhee specific answers. For various reasons (including fact that until we decide size and cost underwriting ROK military establishment, FOA economic program will continue to be seriously handicapped) decision re ROK military establishment is most urgent question now facing Washington concerning Korea. Notwithstanding this I would favor reply to Rhee, preferably Presidential reply, at earliest possible date and along following lines:

1. In American international affairs and among US international responsibilities, unification of Korea remains an important objective of US

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[2] *Ante*, p. 1813.

[3] At this point a marginal note by McClurkin read as follows: "*No* such *commitment.*"

[4] See footnote 3, p. 1809.

Government. We shall continue to strive honestly and actively that this ancient land may be reunited, free and able pursue its independent destiny without Communist or other outside interference.

2. Having accepted armistice, we are unwilling resume fighting following failure political conference bring about Korean unification. We recognize this may mean deferment unification of Korea perhaps for considerable period, perhaps even until some general readjustment possible of relations between Communist and non-Communist world. But whatever develops we are pledged seek peaceful reunification and will strive sincerely in association with ROK to do so.

3. Although we are unwilling resume hostilities or support ROK initiative involving resumption hostilities, should ROK again be victim Communist or other aggression we are prepared in accordance mutual defense treaty immediately to come to assistance of ROK.

4. As tangible evidence our policy above declared, US Government is prepared, pending unification and in order render ROK strong, thus minimizing Communist threat to Korea to underwrite: (*a*) ROK military establishment capable of resisting Communist aggression until we can come to their aid. We are thus prepared develop, support and maintain land, sea and air forces at levels to be described. (Having in mind General Hull's recommendations last week re air and navy strength, I again stress importance reaching comparable decision concerning size ROK Army along with decision meet major share cost thereof.) (*b*) General program of economic rehabilitation and reconstruction, to be integrated with (*a*) above. In this connection we could remind Rhee of our willingness go forward with this program as per Rhee–Dulles August 1953 agreement to a total of approximately one billion dollars during next several years, in addition to amount required to develop and maintain military establishment, both these major contributions necessarily subject congressional appropriations.

5. All foregoing must be considered in context general Asian developments and US responsibilities in other (notably SEA) areas. For example US Government may decide encourage and support formation of regional organization of Asian states and directly interested non-Asian powers to strengthen collective defense of area and promote economic, cultural and political cooperation. Prerequisite to this is regularization ROK–Japanese relations so both nations can participate equally and simultaneously in developing organization. Anything less might fail obtain US support and might require limiting American efforts organize collective defense in Asia, with primary emphasis at least for present on SEA area.

6. This program cannot, however, be effective without unreserved acceptance thereof and thereafter genuine collaboration by ROK. During past year our efforts have repeatedly been handicapped by Rhee's tendency to proceed unilaterally via criticism, threats or denun-

ciation. This repeated rocking of our boat and upsetting of our applecart whenever spirit of Rhee's irritation moves him must be dealt with in connection present situation. It is recommended therefore that our program be contingent on certain pledges by Rhee including:

(*a*) Honest acceptance of entire program by ROK Government and pledge of ROK collaboration during period program is in operation. In military field this should also require pledge no ROK unilateral military action except in agreement with US Government.

(*b*) Acceptance workable terms of reference concerning economic program, including necessary supervision required by US Congress over disbursement US funds and agreement on part ROK Government to cease public carping and sniping. US Government prepared to entertain at any time private suggestions from ROK Government designed improve performance but public campaign of sort indulged in during past several months apparently deliberately seeking discredit program should not further be stalemate. Terms of reference should also include agreement to move as rapidly as possible toward rationalization of ROK economy, including establishment realistic exchange rate.

(*c*) Assurance from Rhee that negotiations with Japan will be resumed in good faith without further opposition and delay on his part and that genuinely sincere effort will be made by ROK to normalize relations between two countries. Substitution of so-called Rhee line by conservation arrangement and abandonment by Rhee of attempt boycott Japan procurement should be included in pledge concerning normalization ROK–Japan relations.

I recognize foregoing is large order and that its acceptance by Rhee major undertaking, but to fail to face these issues at this juncture would in my opinion be borrowing future trouble. Although Rhee talks confidently of public support for unilateral action, extremely little such support now in fact exists and in my judgment notwithstanding threats and blackmail aspects Rhee's latest letter, way to handle situation created thereby is through firm presentation of US positions, with Rhee left in no element doubt concerning our attitude.

Briggs

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, "Meetings with the President"

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[Extract]

TOP SECRET [Washington,] July 7, 1954—4 p. m.

. . . .

2. The President read Syngman Rhee's letter to me of July 2.[1] He indicated he thought that President Rhee was being rather arrogant in

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[1] *Ante*, p. 1818.

attaching conditions to acceptance of the President's possible invitation. We discussed the possibility of getting the Van Fleet recommendations before making a definitive reply to Rhee's request for additional Korean divisions. I said that I thought if he came he would want to come before Congress adjourned so as to be able to appear before a joint session. That made the timing difficult. The President said he doubted that Van Fleet's recommendations on this subject would be very important. He was good as a field general but not as a planner. I said I would try to find out the Defense Department's views with a view to drafting a reply to Rhee in the light thereof.

. . . .

795B.11/7-754

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 7, 1954.

Subject: Proposed Visit to Washington by President Rhee

Participants: His Excellency Dr. You Chan Yang, Ambassador of Korea
Mr. Pyo Wook Han, Minister of Korean Embassy
The Secretary
Mr. Robert J. G. McClurkin, Acting Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

Ambassador Yang came in to bring the signed original of President Rhee's letter of July 1 [*2*] [1] replying to the Secretary's letter of June 18.[2] The text of this letter had been received from Seoul as the Embassy's telegram No. 6.

Ambassador Yang said that he hoped that President Rhee would come to Washington and that he had been urging him to do so. If he should come, he thought that it ought to be before Congress adjourns. The Secretary said that he certainly hoped so, because he was sure that he would have an excellent reception here and that it would be a very fine and stimulating thing to have him visit this country and have him address a joint session of Congress.

In response to a question from the Secretary, Ambassador Yang said that he believes what President Rhee really wants is to have ROK forces built up so that they compare favorably with the Communist forces. Precise details could be worked out if President Rhee comes much better than they can by letter. Ambassador Yang added that he had talked to Admiral Radford, who suggested a continuous build-up with some sort of reserve system. The Secretary commented that this reserve system seems to be the only way in which the ROK economy could stand such a build-up. As new men are brought into the armed forces, the old could go into some sort of reserve units.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 1818.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1808.

Ambassador Yang then went on to stress the desirability of building up a manufacturing capacity in Korea for small arms and ammunition so that Korea, as well as Japan, could serve as a source of supply for Southeast Asia.

The Secretary said that he would want to talk to both the President and the Secretary of Defense about President Rhee's letter within the next day or two and then would be in touch with Ambassador Yang. However, it would be very difficult to give an advance commitment on something where the details—which are very important—have not yet been worked out. On our side we cannot work out the details until General Van Fleet gets back here with his recommendations.

Ambassador Yang concluded by saying with respect to the further strengthening of the ROK forces, "You do not need to worry. We will never take unilateral action until you give us the go sign."

795B.11/7–1054: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, July 10, 1954—1 p. m.

27. Repeated information Tokyo 14. Tokyo pass CINCUNC exclusive for General Hull. For the Secretary.

President Rhee asked me to call this morning and informed me he has now decided accept Washington invitation. He said this decision made on receipt Ambassador Yang's report of recent conversation [1] in which you had again urged visit and had pointed out advantages personal conversations concerning pending matters, "especially", added Rhee, "two alternatives set forth my letter July 1 [*2*]".[2]

Prime Minister Pyun and Vice Foreign Minister Cho present this morning.

Rhee discussed various plans but ended by suggesting tentative program be drafted in Washington and telegraphed to me for his consideration. Said would like depart "within two or three weeks" if that convenient President Eisenhower and spoke of spending day or two in Honolulu on invitation Admiral Stump and day or two New York after Washington. President expects at least nine or ten persons in party including Mrs. Rhee, Admiral Sohn Won-il, Defense Minister ("as suggested by Secretary McNeil", said Rhee), Major General Choi Tok-shin, ROK Observer at Panmunjom during armistice negotiations, General Chung Il-kwon, Chief of Staff ROKA, General Im Chung-yul, ROK Air Force (chosen because speaks English whereas General Choi,[3] head Air Force, does not), one or two secretaries and "perhaps Dr. Glenn" (Rhee's American advisor on public information who assists in drafting Presidential letters, statements, et cetera).

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[1] See McClurkin's memorandum of conversation, *supra.*

[2] *Ante,* p. 1818.

Only other observation relevant to trip made by President was in connection alleged "unrest among ROK Generals" along lines penultimate paragraph Rhee's July 1 letter. (I found this no more impressive than paragraph in question.) It is of interest, however, that accompanying staff is so predominantly military.

Parenthetically, I have never seen President Rhee in such poor shape. Mind wandered several times during half-hour meeting and he appeared confused and to have difficulty expressing himself as well as in following conversation. Moreover, he has developed in recent weeks pronounced droop left eyelid with possibly impaired vision that eye. When at end of conversation about trip he asked whether any additional subject I wished bring up, I mentioned Department's efforts toward ROK administrative control of area between 38th Parallel and DZ (Department telegram 17 July 8[4]). This remark appeared not to penetrate at all; after pause President made vague reference to Banto Hotel.

Having in mind President's age and recent apparent deterioration his condition (see my letter June 30 to Young summarizing latest medical report[5]), I suggest in drafting schedule Department consider 24-hour pauses at least twice en route. I assume special mission aircraft will be made available.

Since no mention Pyun to accompany President, I gather he may remain Korea during President's absence.

President expressed hope there would be no publicity concerning trip at least until after dates and details arranged.

BRIGGS

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[3] Gen. Choi Yong Duk.

[4] In this telegram, the Department of State informed the Embassy that the 16 allies had raised no objections to the proposal to give administrative control of the UNC territory north of the 38th parallel to the Republic of Korea and it was then consulting countries with UNCURK representation. (795B.00/7-754)

[5] Not found in Department of State files.

795B.11/7–1054: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, July 10, 1954—2 p. m.

28. Repeated information Tokyo 15. Tokyo pass CINCUNC exclusive for General Hull for the Secretary. Reference my telegram 27,[1] repeated Tokyo 14.

President Rhee's references this morning to his July 1 [*2*] letter [2] raise question whether he might consider extension official invitation visit Washington following receipt his letter as constituting tacit acceptance thereof as basis Washington talks. I think there should be no ambiguity on this point and that in any reply made to Rhee extending official invitation it should be made clear that this cannot be construed as acceptance his terms as basis for discussions. This can, perhaps, be done by stating that problems raised in his letter and other outstanding matters between our governments will form basis for Washington talks.[3]

Rhee's reversal re Washington visit probably results from number of recent developments which may have convinced him that now is most propitious moment for him put forward his ideas re development anti-Communist alliance in Asia. Although this necessarily speculative, following factors may have influenced him: (1) rapid deterioration in Indochina situation and possible collapse French military and diplomatic efforts; (2) fear recent Churchill-Eisenhower meeting may lead to softening in US policy against communism in Asia; (3) feeling that recent statements by Senator Knowland, and subsequently by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, regarding Communist China membership in UN afford useful framework for presentation his ideas; (4) knowledge that General Van Fleet returning to US and conviction that his report will be sympathetic to Rhee's views and that Rhee can follow it up effectively by personal appeal to administration.

In above connection we anticipate Rhee will make strong efforts vis-à-vis high US officials including Congress and administration as well as American public, seeking support for his thesis combining Free Asian manpower with American guns and equipment against communism in Asia.

Tentative makeup of party to accompany Rhee suggests his primary interest and purpose will be to discuss military matters and specifically mobilization greater ROK manpower with US underwriting program. In formulating program for presentation to Rhee I again urge there be consideration of all major problems now facing US and ROK, as outlined my telegram 12, July 6, 1383, June 23, and 1358, June 18 as well as General Hull's recent messages these subjects. Placing question expansion ROK armed forces in context US world-wide aims and responsibilities and in relation to other outstanding US-ROK problems probably offers best hope of obtaining helpful collaboration from Rhee, who seems likely in any case be difficult to handle.

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] *Ante,* p. 1818.

[3] A marginal note by McClurkin indicated that this matter raised by the Embassy in Seoul had been answered by telegram 32 to Seoul, July 10, *infra,* which crossed telegram 28 from Seoul.

BRIGGS

795B.11/7-1054: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 10, 1954—6:38 p. m.

32. For Ambassadors. Pass General Hull. Re Seoul 27[2] rpt info Tokyo 14. Extend invitation to Rhee from President Eisenhower visit Washington July 26 to July 30. President Eisenhower not available after July 30 so official visit must end that date. Rhee could then visit New York as he requested. If further negotiations required following week Rhee might return to ROK Embassy. Make clear, however, President Eisenhower and I only available week of official visit. These will be Congress' closing days and all high officials will be under great pressure which Rhee should understand. President goes West after Congress adjourns.

Travel could be arranged to allow day or two Honolulu perhaps also San Francisco. I appreciate General Hull's offer provide airplane with adequate sleeping arrangements for Rhee. Blair House available for period of official visit although Rhee may prefer stay ROK Embassy. If he presses point it may be possible arrange invitation for him and wife stay White House first night in Washington.

In extending invitation make completely clear and in writing that while we welcome visit there is no advance commitment of nature requested his letter July 1 [*2*].

I suggest it might be useful for you accompany Rhee and remain during conversations.

DULLES

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[1] This telegram was drafted by McClurkin and John W. Hanes, Jr. of the Executive Secretariat and cleared by Dulles. It was also sent to Tokyo as telegram 66.

[2] Dated July 10, p. 1830.

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, July 12, 1954—4 p. m.

30. Repeated information Tokyo 18. Limit distribution. Department for the Secretary. Tokyo pass CINCUNC exclusive for General Hull.

Yesterday Mrs. Rhee sent me word that President had decided make no stops between Seoul and Washington except as necessary to aircraft operation and that Rhee wished avoid stopping Japan either way. She added President would enjoy visiting Honolulu for day or two on return trip. Accordingly on receipt Deptel 32,[1] repeated Tokyo 66, I drafted following letter of invitation dated July 12 which I delivered to Rhee at noon today:

> "Dear Mr. President: On behalf of President Eisenhower I have honor extend most cordial invitation for Mrs. Rhee and you visit United States as guests American Government and be in Washington from July 26 to July 30, 1954, should those dates meet with your convenience. Transportation by special mission aircraft is being arranged through General Hull, with stopover Honolulu on return flight if this is your wish.
>
> "In Washington, Blair House will be at your disposal for duration your official stay. Arrangements also being made for visit of few days New York City following your Washington visit.
>
> "If this general outline satisfactory to you, my government will shortly submit more detailed schedule for your consideration. As you may be aware, your visit may coincide with closing days of congressional session—period of some congestion.
>
> "Secretary Dulles has asked me to tell you President Eisenhower and he warmly welcome your visit and opportunity it will afford exchange views on problems discussed in your letter to him July 1 [*2*], 1954, as well as other matters of importance to our two governments. Secretary has also asked me inform you that with respect your letter July 1, no advance commitment of nature requested can be made. Faithfully yours, Ellis O. Briggs".

Rhee read letter slowly aloud and made no comment concerning last paragraph. He expressed appreciation and said he looked forward with much eagerness to seeing President and Secretary on July 26. We discussed New York visit for "two or three days" and Rhee said at conclusion thereof he thought he should return Korea. There was accordingly no discussion of possibility second perhaps unofficial visit to Washington although possibility thereof should perhaps not be ruled out depending on developments official July 26 to 30 visit.

I raised question of official announcement, pointing out possibility of leak and indicating this should be made soonest. It was left that first announcement would come from White House, text of which Rhee said he would appreciate having if possible in advance so that corresponding statement could be issued simultaneously here.

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[1] *Supra.*

I also offered to ascertain from General Hull Seoul departure date and route, which I said I assumed might be via Alaska. President also asked how many persons can comfortably be accommodated "since of course everyone from here will want to go".

I also mentioned your suggestion that I likewise go to Washington at which Rhee expressed satisfaction. However in my opinion it might be more helpful for me to precede President and arrive Washington few days in advance Rhee party. Would accordingly appreciate receiving corresponding travel orders and will probably plan depart Seoul coming weekend. Rhee's general condition and alertness much improved over meeting July 10. Balance of conversation had to do with his preoccupation over situation Indochina as described following telegram.[2]

BRIGGS

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[2] Reference was to telegram 32, *infra.*

795.00/7-1254: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, July 12, 1954—5 p. m.

32. Repeated information Tokyo priority 20, Taipei 1, Saigon 1. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For the Secretary.

After conversation described Embassy's telegram 30,[1] repeated Tokyo 18, President Rhee talked for half hour in deeply pessimistic vein regarding Indochina with renewed request "two or three ROK divisions be sent there at once" and also request his views be brought personal attention President Eisenhower.

Rhee said he spent yesterday with ROK generals who share his conviction that while French talk and talk at Geneva all Indochina is being lost to free world with consequences disastrous to contemplate. Substance Rhee's thesis as follows:

Fall of Dien Bien Phu, unless immediate remedial measures can be taken, will have proved turning point in collapse of all Asia to Communism. Until then, non-Communist Asia felt that notwithstanding menace of Red China, free world was winning side. Since fall Dien Bien Phu, Rhee says this attitude changed and free Asia is alarmed, discouraged and either scrambling to get aboard Communist bandwagon or swinging inevitably toward Nehru's neutralism "which is suicide." (As Department will recall from Ambassador Dean's telegrams two months ago, Rhee deeply affected by surrender Dien Bien Phu and this continues to color his thinking.)

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[1] *Supra.*

"The French in Asia," said Rhee, "are finished. I think they are finished in Europe too, along with British and Italians, but looking at scene from strictly Asian point of view, Indochinese don't want French and won't fight for French, and French themselves won't fight in Asia. Colonialism is dead in Asia and so are the French. So unless something prompt and drastic is done, Communists are bound to win, just as they are in fact winning right now, while US Government thus far powerless stem tide far less reverse it." Only solution as Rhee sees it is Van Fleet plan (*sic*) utilizing Asian manpower willing fight for freedom plus US air and naval power and US material. (See Embassy telegram 28,[2] July 10, repeated Tokyo 15.)

Rhee accordingly advocates immediate transfer ROK divisions Indochina and all-out US air, navy and logistic support. Any Asian willing to fight Communism should be encouraged fight, declared Rhee. I gather from this (and previous indications) Rhee likewise advocates participation Nationalist Chinese forces, if not directly in Indochina then by Nationalist attack on mainland in vicinity Formosa.

Rhee indicated foregoing project discussed in some detail with General Van Fleet during latter's recent visits and that he now looks forward eagerly to Van Fleet support plus support other US leaders during forthcoming Washington visit. (As to what Van Fleet and Rhee discussed with exception vague reference by Van Fleet to ROK–Japan relations, I have not been previously informed.) In bringing up these subjects today Rhee emphasized that in his opinion time is now so rapidly running out and that Washington decisions should be made without awaiting other developments.

In general connection all foregoing, Department's attention called OPI release yesterday by Kongkee Karl, government spokesman (TWX DTG 111400Z[3]) who again declared ROK no longer bound by armistice. This contains following sentences:

> "Should US and other UN allies seek any further temporizing with Communism, however, we shall have no choice except to go forward alone. We have made no commitments to contrary, and we shall make none.
>
> "We are not waiting for leadership of US or any other country. If we have that leadership, well and good. We want it. But if we do not have it, we shall proceed anyway, as best we can."

At end our conversation President Rhee again urged his views be placed before President and you as soon as possible.

Briggs

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[2] *Ante*, p. 1832.

[3] Not printed.

Editorial Note

In telegram 37 from Seoul, July 13, the Embassy transmitted to Washington a letter from President Rhee to Ambassador Briggs amplifying their discussion of July 11, as reported in telegram 32 from Seoul, *supra.* In this letter Rhee accepted the United States invitation to visit Washington from July 26 to 30 and reiterated in writing his offer of three Republic of Korea army divisions for Indochina. (795B.11/7-1354)

795.00/7-1254

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Drumright) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 16, 1954.

Subject: Redeployment from Korea.

Your telegram of June 26 to Seoul, Tokyo, Taipei and Saigon [2] concerning redeployment from Korea brought forth considerable comment from, and difference of opinion among, the posts mentioned, General Van Fleet and General Hull. The chief points made are summarized below:

(1) Redeployment to the United States would be interpreted as a sign of weakness, but deployment from Korea to other places in the Far East could be publicly treated as increasing strategic flexibility of United States forces.

(2) Publicity should be minimized except as the increased strategic flexibility can be stressed.

(3) The ROK and other Governments concerned should be informed in advance. Discussions with the ROK should not take place until we are prepared to tell them what we will do to strengthen or increase their defense forces.

(4) Any plans for redeployment should be considered in the context of our whole Far East policy.

(5) General Van Fleet recommends redeployment from Japan first, simultaneous announcement of 10 additional native combat divisions each for Japan, Korea and Formosa (these would be reduced-strength or reserve divisions except for two in the ROK), and later movement of two divisions from Korea—one to go to Okinawa and the Philippines and one to Hawaii.

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[1] According to an attached memorandum by McClurkin to O'Connor, July 16, this memorandum for the Secretary did not reach the Executive Secretariat until Dulles had left for consultations with Congress; therefore, it was sent to Smith who approved it. However, according to a marginal note by McClurkin, who drafted both memoranda, Dulles did see it on July 19, 1954.

[2] The reference was to telegram 1043 to Seoul, p. 1815.

(6) General Hull recommends redeployment of two divisions from Korea first, with one division going to Okinawa and one to Hawaii, no further withdrawals from Korea or from Japan until United States policy for the whole Far East is determined, and no announcement of, or policy for, 10 additional native combat divisions each for the ROK, Japan and Formosa. Ambassador Allison agrees. General Hull recommends development of additional reduced-strength Korea divisions which he says can be done within presently authorized personnel strength and with available equipment. Additional military support funds of at least $100 million will be required.

(8) [*sic*] General Hull has announced the plan to withdraw the First Cavalry Division from Hokkaido to Northern Honshu, thus turning the defense of Hokkaido over to the Japanese forces. He will soon submit a plan for the scheduled withdrawal of United States forces from Japan.

(9) General Hull reports that since last spring 8 out of 19 Chinese Communist armies have been moved out of North Korea. North Korean forces have been increased from six corps to seven and have gained in effectiveness. The UN forces are stronger than Communist forces and are relatively stronger than they were at the time of the Armistice since ROK forces have been increased by five divisions and "improved tremendously" while United States forces have been reduced by only two divisions.

I suggest that decisions on deployment from Korea should be made in the course of preparations for President Rhee's visit and that these decisions should be discussed with him along with United States plans for the increase or strengthening of the ROK forces.

Eisenhower Library, James C. Hagerty papers

Hagerty Diary, July 26, 1954 [1]

[Extract]

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

. . . .

I also talked over with the President this morning Syngman Rhee's visit to Washington. We agreed that the Vice President should welcome Rhee at the airport before the sound cameras and that there should be no sound at the White House, mainly because we did not know whether Rhee might try to sound off publicly in the presence of the President on Korea and thus embarrass the President. To play it safe we will have no sound when the President and Mrs. Eisenhower meet President and Mrs. Rhee—just photographs.

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[1] Hagerty was Press Secretary to and a confidant of President Eisenhower.

Eisenhower Library, James C. Hagerty papers

Hagerty Diary, July 27, 1954

[Extracts]

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

. . . .

In at the White House at 7:15 A.M. The President called me up to his bedroom at 7:30. He said that he wanted me to stay with him throughout the morning so that he would have a record of any conversations that took place. He asked me also to sit in on the Korean-American talks with the same thing in mind.

The President told me that he was having considerable difficulty with Rhee: "I feel sorry for the old man. He wants to get his country unified, but we cannot permit him to start a war to do it. The consequences would be too awful. But he is a stubborn old fellow, and I don't know whether we'll be able to hold him in line indefinitely."

. . . .

The American-Korean talks were held in the Cabinet Room at 10:00 A.M. with the following present: [1]

From our side

The President
The Secretary of State
American Ambassador to Korea Ellis O. Briggs
Secretary Wilson
Admiral Radford
Harold Stassen
General John E. Hull, Commander in Chief, Far East Command
Everett Drumright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
C. Tyler Wood, Economic Coordinator of Korea, FOA
Robert J. G. McClurkin, Deputy Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State
Admiral Davis [2]

From the Korean Side

H. E. Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea
Admiral Sohn Won Il, Defense Minister
H. E. Dr. You Chan Yang, the Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the United States
H. E. Paik Tu-Chin, Economic Coordinator
(Miss Crystal Crone, Secretary to Ambassador Yang)

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[1] A copy of these minutes is also located in the Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file. Summary minutes prepared by members of the Department of State are located in Secretary of State's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199 and Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 346.

[2] Adm. Arthur C. Davis, USN, Director of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

The President sat in his customary seat in the Cabinet Room with Dulles on his right hand and Wilson on his left. Other members of the American Delegation sat on that side of the table.

President Rhee sat in the Vice President's chair with his Ambassador on his right and his Economic Coordinator on his left. The Defense Minister sat next to the Ambassador.

At the start of the meeting the President asked Secretary Dulles to open the meeting with a short statement. Dulles did so, saying that one of the purposes of these talks, in addition to the pleasure and honor we had in welcoming President Rhee to this country, was naturally to talk over matters of mutual concern, particularly with reference to the statement of understanding that he had had with President Rhee in Seoul. At that time (April) he and President Rhee had mapped out a program to cover the situation for a few months. At that time it was also agreed that if the political conference did not come to any agreements regarding Korea, both sides had agreed that it would be necessary to sit down and talk again. That was the reason for this meeting.

The Secretary said that the United States and Korea had many problems to talk about—political, military and economic. He said that there had always been a feeling of understanding and cooperation between the two countries but that he felt it was necessary to have these talks now on the highest level; namely, between the Heads of the two countries.

On the political side, the Secretary said that the unification of Korea had always been the long range objective of the United States and that he thought this subject would again come up at the United Nations Assembly.

As far as the military problem is concerned, it evolved around the question of maintaining strong Korean forces. Such maintenance, however, was placing considerable economic strain on the Korean Government and that Government was faced with the dangers of inflation and black market operations.

As far as the economic situation in general was concerned, the United States and the Republic of Korea were vitally concerned about a long range build-up of the economic strength of Korea so that the Republic could become a self-sustaining economic unit.

The Secretary said that everybody realized that the burden of maintaining strong Korean forces was a very serious one for the Korean people but that this was understood fully by the United States and that working groups from both countries were constantly keeping this problem under study.

In response, President Rhee, talking in a low tone which was very difficult to follow although his English was very good (with a very heavy accent, however) said that he welcomed the opportunity to be here in Washington to talk over these problems. Since our discussions at Seoul his government had agreed to try everything they could to arrive at concrete solutions, but now that Geneva was at an end he wanted to know where the United States stood. As far as Geneva was concerned, Rhee said that naturally he had expected some results but that these had not happened and that was the reason he was here for these talks. He said that Secretary Dulles in his opening remarks had suggested ways and means of continuing efforts toward the successful conclusion of Korean problems and that while he realized that these talks would not be able to settle every problem, he hoped that at least they would present some understanding of the problems of Korea.

The President then asked President Rhee if Rhee wanted to have his people or our people talk in regard to any specific proposal. Do you want to have your Defense Minister or your military advisor discuss any problems? the President asked.

Rhee said that he would like first to discuss the question of unification of his country. He would like to know formally what the next step is you want us to take. He would like to have it settled in some definite way. I don't believe the United Nations will suggest any further conference but there must be some way, Mr. President, in which we can cooperate with our great ally, the United States. This is a very important moment in our history. It is a very important moment for us to know what we can do. President Rhee said that he was sure that the soldiers of the United Nations who were presently in his country did not want to stay there forever and that the people of their own land were tired of having their boys remain there on the front lines without doing anything. He said that his nation might propose to start some positive action at the front so that the United Nations forces would not have to remain there for a long time.

The President interrupted to say that on the question of Korean unification he regretted very much indeed that there was no immediate solution. He said that the same tragic situation is being borne by other nations; for example, Germany, Austria and now Indochina. Any deliberate resort to war is completely barred in our calculations. We want to free Austria. We want to see Germany unified. We want to see your country unified, but I must tell you, Mr. President, that no one in this world will get America to go to war over these problems. So if we exclude war, then there should be no plan which we would not be willing to listen to and consider—even subversion of the peoples like they have done in some of the countries they have taken over. Let's subvert them to our side. But I want to point out one thing very clearly. We cannot undertake any engagement that involves deliberate intention of going to war with Iron Curtain countries. We are willing to talk over anything that seems reasonable.

President Rhee in response said that we have to know where the United States stands. Never mind Austria and Germany. We have to know where our great ally, the United States, the champion of democracy, stands in relation to the attempts of Communist Russia and the Communists of China to take over our country and to keep it divided. If the United States will take a definite stand in the defense of itself and of free nations, we are willing to go to any extent to unify our country. But we have found out to our disappointment that the peace policy in the United States is growing stronger. If we know definitely that the United States will not fight any aggressor in the defense of freedom, then we will have to make up our mind. We cannot allow our enemies to come down from the north and destroy us. In the end China went down to the Communists because the United States was not willing to stand for the free nations regardless of the risk. Instead the peaceful policy resulted in China going Communist.

President Rhee said that the situation in Korea was not as bad as China, to which he had just referred, but that Korea could not hang for an indefinite period of time through years of talking. Where are we going? That's our problem. We would like to know what we can expect from the United States. Naturally, we are more than grateful for the help of our great ally, but what we are going to have to know from now on is what stand the United States will take and what we must do. If I may be permitted a few words more, we know and all Asia knows that four years ago Soviet Russia made a decision to conquer all of the world and to destroy materialistic, capitalistic America. All of their advertisements, all their propaganda all over the world is geared to that end. People may say that England, France and Italy are presently free. But that is not so. They are afraid. Now they have won in Indochina, Viet Nam is partitioned. Pretty soon Thailand will be gone and South America will come next. Still, how can you say that still we must sit still and let the Communists conquer and conquer and conquer. If we still believe that people amount to anything, we must never be afraid. If we are afraid, democracy will be conquered. Your efforts to save the world at peace will suddenly end. I am not talking for the salvation of Korea. That means nothing in the long run unless the rest of the world can remain democratic, free and united. We are holding to that little spot in Korea to create courage among anti-Communist nations to oppose Communism. That is what rightly or wrongly we have been working for—to encourage the free world to combat Communism. If we have had illusions on that score we would like to be disillusioned right now.

Secretary Dulles replied by saying that he felt a great deal of sympathy with President Rhee's analysis of the world situation and the world's problems. He said that he agreed with President Rhee that the final objective of hostile Communist strategy is the destruction or enslavement of the United States. He said also that he agreed with President Rhee that it was dangerous to have a gradual encirclement (to use the Russian phrase) of the United States. He pointed out that Stalin had said that this plan of Soviet encirclement of the United States was one of the more obvious plans of Communist strategy and that as Stalin said, we would be encircled so much that we would bow in terror to the Soviets because the peril would be so great. We are not blind to this peril but one has to face the reality that any deliberate starting of a war in order to correct present injustices would involve the world and consequences so great that it would be unthinkable. The starting of such a war would create world opinion against the United States that could easily turn the tide against the free world. If we fight to unite Korea, should we not also fight to unite Germany, Austria, the Baltic States and Indochina. If we start a global war, we would unleash such terrible weapons—weapons that have never been used before—that it would destroy civilization. You say you cannot see any alternative to war. I cannot think that human beings must conclude that there is no alternative to war. It is far better for human beings to be persistent in the right, for persistence in the right eventually brings results that cannot be seen in advance. When you, Mr. President, started to free your country from Japan, you could not foresee the developments that would bring independence to Korea. A lot of things are going to happen that we can't see now. Who knows what is going on in the recesses of the Kremlin? When we got inside Nazism at the conclusion of the last war, we found how terrible it was. We found it was on the verge of collapse. To assume now that the only conclusion is war is quite unjustified. The American people will not accept war to correct evils that exist like those in your country, but it is important to stand for the right, to work for the right, to not be afraid. I can't tell you how Korea can be united anymore than you could foresee twenty-five years ago how Korea could be free. But Korea was free. It is up to us to keep pressures on. The other side will crack. I don't think it is necessary for me to say that a Korea condemned to partition and [*in*] perpetuity is something we would not like to see. Mr. President, you as a devoted Christian, must agree with me that there are things that happen for the right that cannot be foreseen at the present time but they will happen without resort to a terrible worldwide global atomic war.

President Rhee said that he was not here particularly to demand more military aid. We are here like one family. We are here to see how we can agree on some plan, to agree to work out together our problems. I do not wish to embarrass you, Mr. President, or anyone. I know that you want to solve the Korean problems by peaceful means. Of that I am aware. There are two opinions on this problem. One that says we must stand still and do it peacefully. The other that says we should stand for war. Our desire is to have a heart-to-heart conference as two friends and two best allies. We will tell you frankly, Mr. President, of our hopes and where we stand. We are not asking for you to decide right away but if we are mistaken, we want to have it corrected. We have been patient so far. Our people in the north were crying for us to help them. We heard their crying but we kept quiet. We did not act. Now we no more can hear that crying. Their children have been sent to Manchuria. Many of our people in the north have been slain. We want to know how we can save these people in the north. This doesn't mean that we are asking the United States only to send more troops and more weapons. That is not our idea. Suppose we sit tight. Can we keep the Communists from coming down from the north? What are we to do? What are all people who love freedom, who love peace, to do? The moment the Chinese turned to Communism they became our enemies; they became your enemies. Our question now is where will the United States stand. You are the hope of the world. The one world question today is whether the United States—the leader nation—will tell the free nations that if they stand up for their freedom against Communism, the United States will help them. There will be no more talk; there will be no more appeasement. We will all stand and work together. That is what the world is crying for today. That is the way we can unite for freedom. Our people have fought and sacrificed side by side with your people's sons. Our people and your people's sons have laid down their lives in my country. They died believing that in doing so they were making this world safe for democracy. We must think of tomorrow. The young men of America must think of tomorrow. This is a solemn moment and I beg you, Mr. President, to think of it seriously. Think of the future. Let us know what you will do and where your country will stand before I go away.

The President said: Mr. President, you are asking us to think seriously about these matters. I assure you we think about them all the time, in every meeting that we have—in our Cabinet meetings, in our meetings of the National Security Council, in the meetings with our leaders of Congress. What you are in effect suggesting is that there can be no peace in the world until the head of the Communist octopus is destroyed. That means that Russia is destroyed. That raises the question of how to marshal our great power, how to marshal it to deliberately go to war. The free nations have never gone to war deliberately—they cannot. Surprise is important in war, but the free nations have a handicap because they cannot act as dictator nations. They cannot take advantage of this surprise. Mr. President, one thing is worse than winning any war—that's losing it. There is no disposition in America at any time to belittle the Republic of Korea but when you say that we should deliberately plunge into war, let me tell you that if war comes, it will be horrible. Atomic war will destroy civilization. It will destroy our cities. There will be millions of people dead. War today is unthinkable with the weapons which we have at our command. If the Kremlin and Washington ever lock up in a war, the results are too horrible to contemplate. I can't even imagine them. But we must keep strong. We must try to repulse aggression by united action. We couldn't go into Indochina because we would be supporting the French. We can't be imperialists and the Asians didn't want us to go in. I assure you that we think about these things continuously and as seriously as you do. The kind of war that I am talking about, if carried out, would not save democracy. Civilization would be ruined, and those nations and persons that survived would have to have strong dictators over them just to feed the people who were left. That is why we are opposed to war.

President Rhee then said: Suppose we had a plan that would not risk world war but would provide the unification of Korea. We have certain ideas on this subject. We would like to keep it a secret but we have in our heads certain things that we can do to unify Korea. If you would help me to do these things, I would be very glad to show and talk about these plans with anyone you would designate.

The President said: I would like you to give to our people every single plan you have for unification. You must not assume that because we are opposed to global war we are lacking in sympathy for you and your country. We will listen to every feasible plan—any plan just so long as it is fair and just, decent and right, and has a chance of success.

That concluded the preliminary remarks and Secretary Dulles then asked President Rhee if he would like to discuss briefly now the question of the ROK armed forces.

President Rhee said he would and continued: We have been for an increase in our forces. To the north of us our enemies have been digging, have been increasing their air fields and their air force, yet our hands have been tied. It is necessary for us, therefore, to have a stronger force to keep our enemies from breaking through our lines. Let me repeat what I have said before. The United Nations forces in my country are uncertain why they are now there. The English and the French troops see that their governments' stands are uncertain. They don't know where their governments stand, and consequently their soldiers' morale is weakened. This influences the soldiers of other nations. I have no heart to ask the UN forces to stay in my country against their wishes and fight for us. Unless we are going to stay together, to line up together, there is no reason for them being there. That is another reason why we must know the policy of the United States.

Specifically, we need more divisions, more air and more sea forces. Let me tell you why. In 1948 General Roberts came to see me. I told him at that time that we needed more tanks and 200,000 more trained soldiers. I was told at that time that such a demand was outrageous, that the Korean economy could not stand it. I was told that tanks in Asia were no good. I was told that the Reds would never come down south—but in 1950 they came south. So, that being our experience, we need and want larger forces. The Chinese have a million men to the north of us in addition to the North Korean army. If we want successfully to defend our lines, we must have a sufficient number of trained troops. We have started our National Guard system and have 1,600,000 men trained. We need to keep up the genius, the training and the organization of fighting men which you showed us how to get.

At this point Secretary Dulles suggested that it would be a good idea if the military advisors to President Rhee met with Secretary Wilson and his advisors. He said that he did not think that these discussions would need to involve the President or himself in their initial stages, but he thought it was the best thing to do at the present time. The President added that he thought economic discussions [3] should go on simultaneously with these military talks. Dulles agreed to this as did President Rhee and Dulles added that there were two aspects of the economic talks—(1) Economic reconstruction of the country and (2) the Korean budget which was part and parcel of the military problem.

With that, the talks adjourned.

After the talks were over, Secetary Dulles and I went into the President's office with him.

The President said that he could not see how President Rhee could say that he wanted only to start a little war in Korea and could not recognize the danger of it rapidly spreading into an all-out global war. Dulles said that he had heard the same theme that Rhee had stressed today in his conversations with Rhee on other occasions.

My own personal observation from listening to President Rhee talk is considerably mixed. I feel sorry for him and his country but, of course, we cannot permit the danger of war and Rhee's actions, if taken, would very likely start one. Rhee is a zealous patriot who has worked all his life for Korean independence, who has been jailed, beaten and tortured in that fight but who closes his eyes to the practical realities of the situation. I don't know whether he realizes that his Korean armies could not stand up for more than two or three weeks against the Chinese Communists, but I am sure that his advisers do, although they are deathly afraid of arguing with him on this subject. You have to admire his patriotism and his steadfast determination to bring about the unification of his country, but we cannot permit him to involve the United States in a war with Asia. It is a tough and somewhat tragic position to be in—but that's the way it is.

When Rhee left the Cabinet Room he was, of course, interviewed by reporters and he told them that there could be no peaceful unification of Korea. Of course, the newsmen asked me for comment on the meeting, and I merely told them that there had been a preliminary exchange of views; that technical discussions would be held that afternoon between the experts of both countries; and that Secretary Dulles and President Rhee would meet with their advisers at the State Department tomorrow. I said that President Eisenhower would meet again with President Rhee at the conclusion of the talks Thursday afternoon[4] or probably Friday morning and that I expected that a statement would be issued when the talks were finished.

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[3] A complete record of these U.S.-ROK economic talks, which continued until Sept. 14, is located in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 346.

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[4] July 29.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199

United States Summary Minutes of the Second Meeting of United States–Republic of Korea Talks, July 28, 1954, 10 a.m.[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 2, 1954.

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary of State
Ambassador Briggs
Mr. Drumright
Mr. Young
Mr. McClurkin

The Secretary of Defense
Admiral Radford
General Hall
Vice Admiral Davis
General Rogers
Mr. Sullivan

Mr. Stassen
Mr. Wood

Republic of Korea

President Rhee
Ambassador Yang
Ambassador Limb
Admiral Sohn Won-il
Paek Tu-chin
Dr. Choe Sun-chu
General Chong Il-kwon
General Kim Chong-yol
General Choe Tok-shin

1. *Report of Military Subcommittee*

Secretary Dulles asked Secretary Wilson for a report of the previous day's meeting of the Military Subcommittee.

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[1] These summary minutes were drafted by McClurkin who indicated that they were approved by Dulles. The meeting took place at the Department of State.

Secretary Wilson replied that the Subcommittee had discussed the program for the next year and in some areas, two years. The following items were discussed in the Subcommittee:

(a) A stepped-up training program doubling the present rate to a figure of 20,000 a month. This rate is greater than the rate of young men becoming available and can be kept up for only about two years when it will have to drop to 10,000 a month.
(b) Building up reserve units.
(c) A personnel ceiling of 655,000 for the ground forces and about 715,000 for all arms of the ROK forces.
(d) Making sure the men in the army are well trained and well fed. The United States recognizes some additional assistance in that area may be necessary. We also noted the importance of stopping the inflation in Korea.
(e) A small arms and ammunition plant. The United States agreed to study this question further.
(f) An increase in vessels for the ROK navy.
(g) Modernization of the air force and the training of pilots and technicians for that force.

President Rhee gave general endorsement to what the Secretary of Defense had said. The specific details would depend upon the recommendation of the United States and ROK military advisers. A program to develop the ROK defense forces will be to the advantage of both the Koreans and the United States. As Secretary Wilson suggested, further economic assistance will be necessary to help Korea bear the financial burden of these forces.

2. *Area North of the 38th Parallel*

President Rhee and Admiral Sohn commented on the desirability of turning over to the ROK the territory between the 38th parallel and the military demarcation line in order that farming in that area can be expanded and mines can be reopened.

Mr. Drumright said that the United States is prepared to turn administrative control of this area over to the ROK. We have consulted with UNCURK.

Secretary Dulles said that he believes the UN Command as a practical matter has the authority to go ahead and take the action, and the United States Government will therefore authorize CINCUNC to effect the turnover.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199

United States Summary Minutes of the Third Meeting of United States–Republic of Korea Talks, July 29, 1954, 2:30 p.m.[1]

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 2, 1954.

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The President
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Briggs
Mr. Drumright
Mr. Young
Mr. McClurkin
The Secretary of Defense
Admiral Radford
General Hull
Vice Admiral Davis
Mr. Stassen
Mr. Wood
Mr. Hagerty

Republic of Korea

President Rhee
Ambassador Yang
Ambassador Limb
Admiral Sohn Won-il
Paek Tu-chin
Dr. Choe Sun-chu
General Chong Il-kwon
General Kim Chong-yol
General Choe Tok-sin

1. *Joint Statement and Draft of Agreed Minute*

President Eisenhower commented that he was not certain a Joint Statement was necessary or desirable, but he was willing to accede to ROK wishes in this respect. He believed that it should be kept short.

Secretary Dulles said that decisions need to be taken with respect to economic and military matters—for example, the question of the exchange rate. Another very basic problem is the importance of better relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan. We have therefore prepared and given to the ROK just before the meeting a draft of an Agreed Meeting [*Minute*?] stating United States intentions and what we hope the ROK will be prepared to do.

It was agreed that a joint public statement would be issued on July 30, and that President Rhee and his advisers would study the draft of an Agreed Minute and discuss it further with Secretary Dulles and Secretary Wilson the next day.

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[1] These summary minutes were drafted by McClurkin. The meeting took place at the White House.

President Rhee added that he was to depart on July 31, but could leave his military and economic advisers to discuss in more detail some of the questions covered by the Draft Minute.

2. *President Rhee's "Plan for Unification of Korea"*

President Rhee said that he had wanted to reveal a plan he has for the unification of Korea to military authorities who would be competent to judge it. However, he had come to the conclusion that the suggestion would have value only if the United States is seriously considering any military measures to unify Korea. If at any time United States Government authorities think that something along these lines should be done, he would be glad to explain the plan which he has in mind.

President Eisenhower said that he certainly trusted that President Rhee's interest in ROK forces was not for purposes of attack.

Secretary Dulles commented on a private conversation he had had with President Rhee in which mention had been made of a plan President Rhee had in mind. Secretary Dulles had said that the United States was not interested in taking the offensive, although our military men always planned ahead for any contingencies. For example, aggressive action elsewhere by others might lead to hostilities which in turn might involve action in Korea.

President Eisenhower said that in the event of hostilities the United States did not intend merely to defend a line.

[Here follows discussion on item 3. "Relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan"; for text, see volume XIV.]

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 208th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, July 29, 1954[1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 208th meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 1); the Secretary of Labor (for Item 2); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (for Item 1); Hugh M. Milton for the Secretary of the Army; the Acting Secretary of the Navy; the Acting Secretary of the Air Force; Assistant Secretary of Defense Quarles (for Item 1); Assistant Secretary of Defense Hannah (for Item 2); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air

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[1] Drafted by Robert H. Johnson of the NSC on July 30.

Force; the Acting Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; Mr. Sprague, NSC Consultant (for Item 1); the NSC Representative on Internal Security (for Item 1); Ralph T. Walters, NSC Special Staff (for Item 1); the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; Major John S. D. Eisenhower, USA; Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Assistant to the Executive Secretary, NSC (for Items 2–6).

Following is a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows discussion on items 1. "Continental Defense" and 2. "Reserve Mobilization Requirements".]

3. *Redeployment of Forces From the Far East–Western Pacific Area* (NSC Action No. 1087-*d*;[2] Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Redeployment of Forces from the Far East–Western Pacific Area; Forces and Manning Levels for FY 1956", dated July 28, 1954[3])

Mr. Cutler opened the discussion on this subject by referring to the previous Council action (NSC Action No. 1087-*d*) by which the Council had deferred decision on further redeployment of U.S. forces from Korea. He then asked Secretary Wilson to outline in detail the Defense Department proposal contained in the first enclosure to the memorandum of July 28 distributed at the meeting.

Secretary Wilson said that what was proposed here was substantially in line with what the Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed to some time ago. Decision on the JCS recommendations had been held up until the completion of the Geneva discussions on Korea. We did not want to deprive ourselves of a bargaining counter there in the event that the Chinese Communists proposed that they would get out of North Korea if we got out of South Korea. Secretary Wilson pointed out that the Defense proposal stated what forces we had now in the Pacific, what we would have if the proposed redeployment were effected, and where the men who were deployed would go. He said that there were two reasons for finalizing a decision now. First, we needed to tell our UN allies, and second, the Army found it difficult to plan for the rest of FY 1955 and for FY 1956 without a decision on redeployment.

Secretary Humphrey asked how the present proposal compared with the previous program.

The President said that he thought that three divisions were to be left in Korea. Admiral Radford pointed out that there were to be two U.S.

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[2] For text, see the memorandum of discussion at the 192d meeting of the NSC, Apr. 6, p. 1775.

[3] A copy of this memorandum, which was a detailed program for redeployment in the Far East–Western Pacific area, is attached to a memorandum from Lay to Dulles and Wilson, Aug. 2, 1954, not printed. (795.00/8–254)

and one UN division left there. The President inquired whether provision had been made for incorporating the one U.S. regimental combat team into the UN division. Admiral Radford said that the Defense Department had this problem in mind. Secretary Wilson suggested that this RCT should be assigned to the British.

The President thought it important that a big UN headquarters be established in Korea. He suggested that since the British would now be getting approximately 40,000 of their combat troops out of Egypt, they might be able to keep in Korea the forces that they have there at present.

Mr. Cutler inquired how soon the proposed redeployment would be effected. Secretary Wilson said that it could be done by the end of the year, depending on the amount of effort put into it. He said that it was agreed that the 3rd Marine Division should for the present be moved to Okinawa under field conditons for training. This would give us more time to decide what forces we were going to leave on Okinawa.

Mr. Cutler inquired whether anyone had talked to President Rhee about these proposals. Secretary Wilson said that we had talked to Korean officials, and that our proposed redeployment of four divisions had come as quite a shock to them. The Koreans had asked, he said, whether we proposed to leave the equipment for these four divisions in Korea. The President inquired whether it was the general thought to leave this equipment. Admiral Radford said it was, but Secretary Wilson stated that we didn't want to commit ourselves to leaving it all. He said that General Van Fleet had proposed four additional somewhat skeletonized reserve divisions for the ROK, and that these would need equipment.

The President asked whether it was still planned to have 20 fully equipped ROK divisions. Admiral Radford stated that it was, and in response to a further question from the President, said that the four new ROK divisions would not need all of the artillery that our four divisions being redeployed have. The President then turned to Secretary Dulles for his views on the proposed redeployment.

Secretary Dulles stated that he had checked with his people in the field on their general reaction to a further redeployment of U.S. forces, although not to the specific proposals of the Department of Defense. He said that he would have to report that it was the unanimous feeling that a reduction now would have bad political consequences. It was felt that this would be taken as further evidence of the intention of Western countries to cut their commitments in Asia. Furthermore, most of his own advisers in the Department of State shared this view. However, he was personally inclined to support the program of the Secretary of Defense, for the reality of the changed disposition was that it represented an increase in our strength on an over-all basis. He pointed out that our strength in Korea was now relatively greater than it had been, because half of the Chinese Communist armies had been pulled out of North Korea and because of the further build-up of South Korean forces. Moreover, Japan had finally agreed to build up its own military strength, and we were building indigenous strength in Formosa and Indochina. However, the Defense proposal had an important psychological aspect. When the U.S. puts troops in a country they tend to become frozen there; the country gets the jitters when we attempt to pull them out. Nonetheless, we can't build indigenous forces and keep our own forces pinned down too. Secretary Dulles concluded, therefore, that while we would have some bad moments, if the reality is more strength, the problem is to get that idea across.

The President said that he had talked to President Rhee about this proposal, and that it was all right with Rhee as long as the overall military strength in Korea was left approximately as it is now. Rhee had pointed out that the Chinese Communists could come back into Korea quickly. The President thought that Rhee could be sold this program.

The President inquired whether there was any particular reason for returning the 2nd and 3rd Divisions to the U.S. and leaving the 24th and 25th Divisions in the Pacific. He said that while there was no thought now of deactivating any additional Army divisions, in 18 months or two years we might possibly want to consider further deactivation. Since the 2nd and 3rd Divisions had long and honorable combat histories, it would be undesirable, he felt, to deactivate them. He therefore wondered whether it wouldn't be better instead to bring back the 24th and 25th to the U.S., where they could be readily deactivated if a future decision were made to do so.

In response, General Ridgway pointed out that the 42nd and 4th Divisions were the next ones scheduled for deactivation. He expressed some concern about stripping the four divisions to be redeployed from Korea in order to give their equipment to the ROK divisions. He stated that we had a limited capability for reequipping these divisions, and would have to take away from our already limited mobilization reserves in order to supply them.

[Here follows discussion on item 4. "Force and Manning Levels for FY '56".]

5. *Republic of Korea Reserve Forces* (NSC Action No. 1092 [4])

The President inquired whether some increase in the strength of the Korean Air Force was not contemplated. Secretary Wilson said that they were to get 85 F-86-F's—the planes that had been so effective at the end of the Korean war. The pilots would be brought over here for training. The Koreans believed that this could all be accomplished by the end of FY 1955, but the Secretary doubted it. The ROK wanted four additional wings, but Secretary Wilson felt that would be too much of a load for them to carry. The President inquired whether, if they got four wings, four of ours might be taken out. Admiral Radford said that the Koreans would not get what they wanted. We don't want that many wings, he said, on the front lines where they would be vulnerable to attack. Secretary Wilson said that we wished to redeploy some of our Air Forces to Okinawa and Japan, partly because of their vulnerability in Korea and partly because we wished to modernize them.

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[4] For text of NSC Action No. 1092, see the memorandum of discussion at the 193d meeting of the NSC, Apr. 13, p. 1785.

Secretary Dulles said that he had grave reservations about providing mobile instruments of war where we are not sure how they are going to be used. He pointed out that when we had given jet planes to Chiang we had got an agreement that they would not be used against the Chinese mainland without our permission. The Koreans were hostile to the Japanese and wished additional naval craft to drive Japanese fishing vessels away from areas that the Koreans claim as theirs. If we gave them jet planes they might use them to drop bombs across the Yalu. In general, the Secretary felt that we should not give mobile forces to countries whose objectives are not the same as our own, who are hostile to their neighbors, and who have a vested interest in starting a third world war. He wondered why it was necessary to provide the Koreans with jets. Admiral Radford said that we planned very little increase in the Korean Navy—they were to get two additonal destroyer escorts. He also felt that an agreement between Korea and Japan on fishing rights was possible. The President suggested that destroyer escorts could sink fishing boats as easily as any other sort of naval vessel. Secretary Dulles suggested that we not give the South Koreans additional forces until there is an agreement on fishing rights. He thought that this would increase the possiblility of an agreement. Admiral Radford agreed that that would be all right. He felt, however, that the Koreans had earned consideration for some additional air strength by the excellent work their air force had done. He suggested that propeller-driven aircraft were as much mobile instruments of war as jets.

Secretary Wilson described the planned increase in the South Korean Air Force, consisting of three squadrons of jets, one transport squadron, and two squadrons of reequipped P–51's. This would provide the Koreans with 200 additional planes and six additional squadrons. General Hull was willing, in addition, to give them three more squadrons of jets and another of transports, for a total of ten squadrons. However, Secretary Wilson felt that there was no hurry about this. He thought that it was necessary that a decision with respect to the forces to be provided South Korea should be finalized at this Council meeting.

Mr. Cutler inquired whether there was general concurrence to the proposed increases in ROK force levels. Secretary Dulles said that the final session with Rhee was scheduled for this afternoon, and that the advice of the NSC was needed on this matter. He was concerned about agreeing to an increase of forces now, prior to an agreement between Korea and Japan. Secretary Wilson felt that we should play the role of mediator beween Japan and South Korea on the matter of fishing rights. He stated that in the discussions with Korean officials he had said that until everything had been worked out with Secretary Dulles there would be no deal. He noted that the South Koreans had just sprung on the Defense Department a proposal for the construction of a small arms plant in South Korea costing $8 million. He thought the proposal not too bad. Governor Stassen stated that we ought to study this proposal quite carefully. The President felt that the U.S. could not be responsible for furnishing everyone with small arms and ammunition from the United States, and that therefore construction of such plants was generally desirable.

Secretary Wilson said that it was proposed to create ten additional ROK reserve divisions. Four of these, as had been noted, would be supplied from equipment left by the four U.S. divisions being redeployed from Korea. With respect to the other six divisions, the U.S. would provide 20% support on the small arms side. The President asked whether we could depend on these six divisions, in time of war. Would there be time to equip them? General Ridgway felt that there would be time, but suggested that we needed to look again at the proposal for providing equipment for four divisions. It would take 12 to 18 months to provide equipment replacement for our four divisions, and there were no funds available for this purpose.

Mr. Cutler noted that the Council had previously agreed that the ROK should have 20 active divisions, and had also agreed to the supplying of the additional destroyer escorts. The proposal with respect to reserve divisions, therefore, appeared to be the only problem on which the Council had to take action now. General Ridgway was uncertain whether the Council could approve this proposal now. He felt that it would be possible to present a paper on the subject by next week.

Secretary Wilson expressed concern that the Koreans might go away with the wrong impression of what had been agreed. In response, the President stated that it should all be got into a paper. The Koreans should be told that we want more local defense forces so that we can redeploy our own troops, and that we therefore look sympathetically upon their proposals. However, they should also be told that we will let them know the exact details of what we are prepared to do at a later date.

Secretary Wilson said that he had told the Koreans that there were three things that might be done in Korea, but that we couldn't do them all. We couldn't leave all our own troops there. There was the problem of training and equipping Korean reserve forces, and the problem of rehabilitating South Korea. He had told the Koreans first, that we felt that we had a sound plan for redeployment; second, that we would look into what equipment could be left behind; and third, that we would look into how much aid we could provide for rehabilitation. Secretary Wilson stated that General Van Fleet believed that $300 million would be required for rehabilitation. The Secretary did not favor spending so much.

The National Security Council:

Noted that the Secretary of Defense would submit for early Council consideration a report on a program for Republic of Korea reserve forces, prepared in the light of recommendations by General Van Fleet and current discussions with Korean representatives.[5]

ROBERT H. JOHNSON

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[5] This paragraph constituted NSC Action No. 1191.

795.00/7–3054

United States Summary Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of United States–Republic of Korea Talks, July 30, 1954, 3 p. m.[1]

SECRET

WASHINGTON, [undated.]

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary of State
Ambassador Briggs
Mr. Drumright
Mr. Young
Mr. McClurkin

The Secretary of Defense
Admiral Radford
General Hull
Vice Admiral Davis
General Rogers
Mr. Sullivan

Mr. Stassen
Mr. Wood
Mr. Moyer

Republic of Korea

President Rhee
Ambassador Yang
Ambassador Limb
Admiral Sohn Won-il
Paek Tu-Chin
Dr. Choe Sun-chu
General Chong Il-kwon
General Kim Chong-yol
General Choe Tok-sin

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[1] These minutes were drafted by McClurkin.

1. *Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission*

Secretary Dulles referred to the statement made by General Won Yong Duk warning the Communist members of the NNSC to leave the Republic of Korea. He said that any action by the Republic of Korea to force the Czech and Polish members to leave South Korea created problems for us. The United States is trying to bring about an ending of the activities of the NNSC and we are planning to impose restrictions on the teams in the Republic of Korea comparable to those imposed in North Korea.

President Rhee said that these Communist members are moving relatively freely in South Korea, taking pictures and serving as a source of intelligence for the Communists. Meanwhile, the military buildup in North Korea continues despite the armistice. The armistice terms should be declared as ended, since the armistice was based on the proposition of the Political Conference, which has failed.

General Rogers pointed out the difficulty of achieving comparability between the situations in South Korea and North Korea, since the Communists have circumvented the port complex in the north by means of new rail lines which avoid the areas and by failure to make reports.

Secretary Dulles asked if President Rhee would agree not to take forceful action at the present time while we endeavor to bring an end to the activities of the NNSC through consultation with the Swiss and Swedes. In the meantime, we will try to see to it that the Czech and Polish members have no luxury facilities and are so far as possible under the same restrictions as they are in North Korea.

President Rhee agreed that he would give appropriate instructions to this effect.

2. *Draft Agreed Minute*

Most of this session was devoted to a detailed, paragraph-by-paragraph examination of a draft of an agreed minute which had been prepared by the United States side and given to the Koreans the preceding day. President Rhee remained only through the discussion of Paragraph 3(a) under the statement of the intentions and policy of the Republic of Korea. Thereafter, the burden of the discussion was carried for the Koreans by Ambassador Yang, Admiral Son Won-il and Mr. Paek Tu-Chin. Attached is a copy of this draft minute with deletions from the original United States draft bracketed and with additions to the original United States draft underlined.[2]

At the end of the meeting, there was agreement on the draft with additions and deletions as shown, but the Korean agreement was subject to President Rhee's concurrence. President Rhee did not initial the draft before he left Washington on July 31. That afternoon, he sent word to Ambassador Briggs through Ambassador Yang that he needed further time to study the proposed minute and that he preferred to delay his initialing until he knew more specifically the details of what the United States proposes as its economic and military programs for the Republic of Korea.

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[2] Additions to the U.S. draft in the attachment are printed as italics.

3. *Redeployment of United States Forces*

Admiral Sohn said that he could not agree to the reduction to one United Nations corps. He could not convince the Korean people that they are safe, and their morale will be very badly affected unless the equipment is left behind and four more Korean divisions are created when United States forces are withdrawn.

Secretary Wilson said that we think the forces which remain will be adequate for the defense of Korea.

Admiral Radford said that we have no prospect of funds to support additional Korean divisions. We believe that the forces which will remain in Korea can contain any renewed Communist aggression. If the Communists attack, we will be fighting a different kind of war.

Dr. Choe said that the Korean people will be greatly worried but if Korean forces are strengthened, that will help. Withdrawal should be accomplished gradually.

Secretary Dulles said that it is necessary to make political preparation for withdrawal, of course. However, the same problem exists all over the world, including the United States. As new weapons are developed, not so much manpower is needed at the front. We can not afford both to develop new weapons and to maintain the old-fashioned forces.

Ambassador Yang asked for more firepower for the present Korean forces and asked also that the equipment of the United States divisions be left behind when they leave.

General Hull said that he needs to study further the problem of equipment before knowing what might profitably be left behind. Equipment has to be taken care of or it will deteriorate. Both General Taylor and he have studied the whole question of Korean defense and he believes that the risk being taken is acceptable, especially since he believes that it is possible to improve the efficiency of the Korean armed forces.

4. *Mutual Defense Treaty*

Ambassador Yang said that the Koreans wanted a mutual defense treaty like the one between the United States and Japan.

Secretary Dulles said that we would be perfectly willing to give the Republic of Korea a treaty like the Japanese treaty. The Japanese treaty imposes no obligations upon the United States. We have no obligation under the treaty to come to the defense of Japan if it is attacked. On the other hand, it gives us perpetual rights to station our forces in Japan. It was a treaty which we made with a defeated enemy before the peace treaty came into effect. The Republic of Korea can have that kind of treaty if it wants, but it would be crazy to take it.

Ambassador Yang said that he would have to study the question further.

5. *Public Statement*

Agreement was reached on a joint public statement to be released from the White House as soon as possible. Attached is the United States draft of this statement, bracketed to show the only change made in it.[3]

[Attachment]

Draft Agreed Minute of Conferences Between President Rhee and President Eisenhower and Their Advisers

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 31, 1954.

It is in the mutual interests of the United States and the Republic of Korea to continue the close cooperation which has proved mutually beneficial and has played such an important part in the Free World's struggle against communism.

Accordingly,

it is the intention and policy of the Republic of Korea to:

1. Cooperate with the United States in *its* efforts to unify Korea [by all appropriate measures short of war],[4] including possible efforts through the United Nations to secure this objective;

2. Retain Republic of Korea forces under the operational control of the United Nations Command while that Command has responsibilities for the defense of the Republic of Korea, *unless after consultation it is agreed that our basic policies diverge and an opportunity is given to the United Nations Command to withdraw*;

3. Take the necessary measures to make the economic program effective, including:

(a) with respect to exchange rates, the official rate of the Republic of Korea Government *and the counterpart rate* being 180 to 1, agreement to procedures as proposed by the United States for the conversion of dollars at a different and realistic exchange rate to cover hwan drawings of United States forces by sales of dollars through the Bank of Korea, and an undertaking to sell its own foreign exchange at realistic rates of exchange, and generally to price aid goods into the Korean economy at similar rates, thereby providing for the maximum contribution to the Korean economy and to the Korean budget from the use of these resources (*it is estimated by the United States that during FY 1955 hwan will be purchased to the extent of $54 million*);

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[3] For text of this statement as it was released, see the attachment to the Hagerty diary, July 30, *infra*. The change made was to omit the following clause from the last sentence of the third paragraph: "in accordance with the Declaration of the sixteen nations at Geneva on June 15, 1954."

[4] All brackets in this attachment are in the source text and indicate deletions from the original U.S. draft; all words printed as italics were additions to the original U.S. draft.

(b) agreement that [a reasonable proportion of the] purchases anticipated in the aid program will be procured *wherever in non-Communist countries* [in Japan, provided Japan can furnish items of] *goods of* the required quality *can be obtained* at the best price (*it being the objective to perform the maximum possible procurement in Korea at competitive prices*);

(c) encouragement of private ownership of investment projects;

(d) cooperation in procedures for administration of United States aid funds consistent with United States legislation and the practices applied generally in such programs;

(e) [consultation with] "*appropriate information*" *to* the appropriate United States representatives concerning Korean plans for the use of their own foreign exchange; and

(f) a realistic effort to balance their budget and resist inflation (*it will be the objective of both Governments to manage the budget of the Republic of Korea in a manner that will not result in serious inflation*); and

4. Normalize relations with Japan and in the near future enter into negotiations with it to resolve the outstanding issues and for that purpose request the United States to [designate a mediator to] assist in bringing about a just solution.

Based upon the conditions which the Republic of Korea declares it will create, it is the intention and policy of the United States to:

1. Continue its program of helping to strengthen the Republic of Korea politically, economically and militarily;

2. Retain in Korea [for the present] the equivalent of one United Nations corps with necessary supporting units, *reduction to this level to be gradual*;

3. In the event of an unprovoked attack upon the Republic of Korea in violation of the armistice, to employ, in accordance with its constitutional processes, its retaliatory striking power against the aggressor;

4. Support *the* unification of Korea [by all appropriate measures short of war];

5. Support a strengthened Republic of Korea military establishment including the development of a reserve system in accordance with arrangements to be worked out by appropriate military representatives of the two Governments;

6. Provide some additional direct support to the Republic of Korea military forces in this U.S. fiscal year, the precise amount to be the subject of further detailed study and joint Republic of Korea-United States examination of the Republic of Korea military budget and to be negotiated [in Seoul] *promptly* after the United States Congress has acted on appropriations and the United States Government has reviewed its world-wide commitments.

7. Subject to the necessary Congressional authorizations, continue to press forward with the economic program for the rehabilitation of Korea.

Eisenhower Library, James C. Hagerty papers

Hagerty Diary, July 30, 1954

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

In at 9:00. The President left for Camp David. Comparatively quiet day here at the White House with the exception of the final statement issued in connection with the American-Korean talks. This statement was not issued until 7:30 in the evening. (Statement attached)

The important thing about the statement is that President Rhee, who has been talking about restarting the Korean war, actually agreed to sign the statement, which in effect places the problem of Korea in the 9th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations which opens in New York on September 21st. The key sentence in the communiqué was the one in the third paragraph which read:

> In view of the failure of the conference at Geneva to reach a settlement of the Korean question, we have discussed means for continuing to seek this objective.

This was a direct reference to the 16-power declaration at Geneva[1] which called for reporting on Korea to the General Assembly if the political conference could not reach an agreement at Geneva. The very fact that we got Rhee to sign this in this form places him on record of favoring peaceful means for at least a while within the UN. None of us can see how he can completely repudiate his signed statement and still save his face. It was also agreed that the economic and military talks be continued here in Washington by the experts in an attempt to try to reach a decision on how much military expansion the budget of the Republic of Korea can stand without breaking both the people and the country. Rhee requested additional armed forces—particularly additional air and sea forces and ships and planes. Of course, he wants several more divisions but he would be much happier if he could get more planes and some Navy ships.

[Attachment]

Statement by Presidents Rhee and Eisenhower

WASHINGTON, July 30, 1954.

We have had a fruitful and cordial exchange of views on a number of matters of mutual concern. These conversations have strengthened the friendship existing between our two countries and are a further demonstration of our solidarity of purpose.

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[1] For text of this declaration of June 15, see vol. XVI, p. 385.

On August 8, 1953, President Rhee and Secretary Dulles agreed that the United States and the Republic of Korea would again consult if the political conference envisaged in the Armistice of July 27, 1953 failed to produce a satisfactory settlement. This conference was held at Geneva from April 26 to June 15, 1954, but at that meeting the Communists refused to accept any formula for the unification of Korea on the basis of genuinely free elections under UN supervision and instead continued to press for arrangements which would have led directly and inevitably to extinguishing the liberties of the Korean people.

We reaffirm our intention to move forward, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions of the General Assembly of Korea to achieve a unified, democratic, and independent Korea. In view of the failure of the Conference at Geneva to reach a settlement of the Korean question, we have discussed means for continuing to seek this objective.

Our military and economic advisers will continue with more detailed discussions of the questions of common interest which concern them.

In conclusion, we reiterate our determination to continue to work together in close and reciprocal cooperation to attain our common objectives regarding Korea.

795.00/8-154: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Hull) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff [1]

SECRET
PRIORITY

TOKYO, August 1, 1954—11:59 a. m.

C 69173. (Army Message) From CINCFE to DA, JCS, General Hull, and Secretary State. The following message received from General Taylor as his KCG 7-38 of 31 July is forwarded for your information.

"General Magruder to forward following message to appropriate addressee. Embassay Seoul requests DA pass to State.

"Accompanied by Chargé d'Affaires Strom, I called on Prime Minister Pyun at 0900 this date and discussed with him the Won Yung Duk press release of 30 July threatening ROK action against NNSC.[2]

"We explained our visit as a call to receive from Pyun an explanation of meaning of this press release and evaluation of weight to be assigned to it. He talked at length of dissatisfaction of his government over indefinite prolongation of armistice and in particular over presence of Communist inspection teams in South Korea. However, he expressed hope that clashes could be avoided and that the current efforts to obtain voluntary withdrawal of the Swiss and Swedes would succeed. He stated several times that he felt that the ROK Government should and would take no unilateral action without acquiescence of US or at least without exhausting all efforts to coordinate with US.

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[1] General Hull, CINCFE and CINCUNC, was in Washington to take part in the discussions between Presidents Rhee and Eisenhower and their respective advisers. This message, which was unsigned, was originally from General Taylor and was transmitted to Washington for the JCS, Hull, and Dulles by General Magruder of CINCFE.

[2] On July 30, Provost Marshal, General Won Yong Duk, issued a press release threatening ROK action against the NNSC unless its Polish and Czech members left South Korea immediately.

"It was pointed out to him that the Won Yung Duk release would have adverse effect on Rhee's mission in US and would tend to create tensions here which might lead to serious incidents. I described way in which Poles and Czechs are escorted by armed UN MP and emphasized danger of armed clashes if the Korean authorities undertook to molest teams. He countered by charging the Poles and Czechs with espionage, saying that he hopes to prove they are spies by presentation of evidence which his people sure collect. He indicated that when this evidence assembled his government will demand the removal of the individual involved in accordance with normal diplomatic practices.

"There was discussion of efforts being made to persuade Swiss and Swedes voluntarily to withdraw from NNSC. Pyun said that his government would certainly await outcome of these efforts before considering more drastic action. I emphasized that even if these efforts failed, our two govenments should continue to work in concert and not consider going separate ways. To my expression of concern over the known irresponsibility of General Won Yung Duk, Pyun made the point that Won Yung Duk is not under him but is responsible only to the President.

"As we broke up, I again emphasized the seriousness of interference with the NNSC teams as constituting a unilateral breach of the armistice of the Korean Government.

"We agreed to no press release at this time other than to state in response to queries that the call had been made during which there was an amicable discussion of the Won Yung Duk release. Mr. Strom has seen this cable and concurs with it. My comment on this matter follows by separate cable.[3] Signed Taylor."

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[3] The reference was to telegram C 69172 from Taylor, Aug. 1, not printed, in which the Commander of the Eighth Army noted that Won Yong Duk's action was the opening gun of a campaign to oust the NNSC from South Korea. (795.00/8-154)

795.00/8-354: Telegram

The Commanding General, United States Eighth Army (Taylor) to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET — SEOUL, August 3, 1954—11:30 a. m.
NIACT

KCG 8-12. (Army Message) From CGArmyEight signed Taylor to DA (for Ridgway) information DA (for Hull), CINCUNC (for Magruder) and State. Reference DA 965445.[1]

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[1] In this telegram, Hull reported on the Rhee-Dulles meeting at 3 p.m. on July 30 concerning the NNSC. A report of this meeting is in the summary minutes of the meeting of that date, p. 1867. A text of this telegram is located in FE files, lot 55 D 480, "Korean Black Book, July 1954."

1. As an outgrowth of the provocative Won Yong Duk press release, three incidents have been directed against NNITs.

a. At 1530 on 31 July 1954 about 200 Korean demonstrators at Inchon attempted to cross the causeway at Wolmi Island where the local NNIT is housed. They were turned back by US military police without actual violence occurring.

b. At 1755 on 31 July 1954, four shots were fired into the NNIT mess hall at Pusan from outside the compound by unknown person. No casualties.

c. At 2203 on 1 August 1954, three homemade beer can bombs were thrown into NNIT compound at Kunsan. One bomb exploded; no damage.

During the same period, several demonstrations were held at Pusan, Kusan, and Kangnung in which violence was threatened against the Czechs and Poles unless they promptly leave South Korea.

2. At this time it is not clear whether Rhee has fulfilled the commitment to call on Won Yong Duk, reported in reference cable. In any case, the disorders incited thus far warrant stern protest to the ROK Government. I recommend that the Department of State make such a protest, demanding that ROK Government (*a*) require any and all of its agents to desist immediately from fostering lawless action against the personnel of NNSC and (*b*) require the entire law enforcement machinery of the ROK Government to assist in putting an end to these disorders. Such a note might be handed to the ROK Ambassador in Washington and simultaneously delivered by the US Chargé d'Affaires to the ROK Government in Seoul. Chargé Strom concurs.

795.00/8–554: Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Strom) to the Department of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, August 5, 1954—5 p. m.

159. Repeated information Tokyo 96. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Reference Department telegram 99.[1]

Formal note delivered Prime Minister 3 p.m. today. Memorandum conversation being pouched.[2]

Prime Minister observed no more acts violence had occurred several days and felt he could assure me there would be no more. Said persons perpetrating actions might have been influenced by General Won Yong-dok's statement July 30 but did not believe direct connection could be shown.

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[1] In this telegram, Aug. 4, the Department instructed Strom to send a formal note, a text of which was included in the cable, to the ROK Foreign Ministry to protest the violence against the NNIT and to remind the South Korean Government of Rhee's assurances to Dulles that Won Yong Duk's threat would not be carried out. (795.00/8–454)

[2] Not printed.

Prime Minister commented favorably on passage to effect Government of US intends find solution NNSC problems saying he considered this statement reassuring. He went on to make assertions regarding position military inferiority being forced on South Korea but [*by*?] unequal observation terms armistice. Concluded by reiterating his conviction there would be no more violence and by saying he would call General Won's attention to contents note.

Atmosphere of conversation was most friendly throughout.

Korean Republic appeared 3 p.m. this afternoon carrying comment by Prime Minister on Secretary Dulles' press statement August 3 to effect he was "glad" to hear Secretary agreed there is no need for neutral body to continue but saying he differed from Secretary's view in that he considered armistice void because Geneva Conference failed achieve solution Korean unification problem. *Korean Republic* quoted Prime Minister as saying ROK will continue insist on this interpretation and he hoped "our Allies will come to agree with us".[3]

STROM

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[3] In telegram 165 from Seoul, Aug. 7, Strom reported that he had received a letter from Pyun stating that Won Yong Duk was under instructions from Rhee not to take the actions implied in his press statement of July 30 for the time being. (795.00/8-754)

Editorial Note

In October 1950, the United Nations decided that the civil administration of territory north of the 38th Parallel won on the battlefield would be placed under the control of the United Nations Command until the question of Korean unification was resolved. As long as fighting raged in Korea, the question of civil administration of the area was not a pressing one. With the armistice, however, a line of demarcation was established which cut across the 38th Parallel and placed approximately 2,300 square miles of territory from the center of the Parallel to the east coast of the Korean peninsula under the control of the United Nations Command.

As early as February 1953, the Republic of Korea requested that the United Nations Command promote resettlement of this zone so as to relieve the refugee problem which faced South Korea. It was not until March 1954 that the United Nations Command began an extensive resettlement program in the area which resulted in raising the population to 130,000. Beginning in August 1953, the Republic of Korea requested that it be given jurisdiction over territory north of the 38th Parallel under United Nations Command control. These requests continued through June 1954. In July of 1954, the United Nations Command agreed that the complexity of civil administration of the zone was beyond the resources of the military authorities and on August 9, 1954, UNCURK adopted a resolution recommending transfer of administration of the area to the Republic of Korea. On August 12, 1954, the South Korean Government was so informed. (UNCURK Report, 1954, United Nations document A/2711, pages 4–7)

611.95B/8–2054: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 20, 1954—7:19 p. m.

148. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Your 208 rptd Tokyo 132.[2] In Ambassador Briggs' discussion with Secretary and Robertson this morning decision taken continue seek ROK Government signature to draft Minute [3] before making any final commitments on US military economic aid programs. Some modifications may be desirable in light appropriation bills for example specifying amounts to be made available. This along lines recommendation reftel.

Instructions now in preparation for Ambassador Briggs, who leaves Washington tomorrow, to take up this matter with President Rhee soonest after his return Seoul.

FOA and Defense will require about ten days apportioning appropriation among several countries concerned before definite figures can be developed on Korea. Stassen so informed Paek this morning and latter will apparently remain Washington for present.

DULLES

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[1] This telegram, drafted by Young and Briggs and cleared with Wood of FOA, was repeated to Tokyo as 391.

[2] In this telegram, Aug. 20, Strom reported that the Embassy staff believed that ROK formal agreement to the draft minute worked out in Washington during the Rhee visit of July 26–30 should be obtained immediately in light of Rhee's past tendencies of avoiding written commitments while insisting on U.S. Government fulfillment of its assurances concerning miltary and economic programs. (795B.5/8–2054)

[3] For text of the draft minute, see p. 1859.

611.95B/9–154: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET SEOUL, September 1, 1954—8 p. m.

253. Repeated information Tokyo 163, Manila 9. Manila for Secretary. Tokyo pass General Hull. Reference joint message from General

Hull and me dated August 28, No. C 69431 [1] and Embtels 240, 241, 243, dated August 30.[2]

Following submitted as of interest concerning current unsatisfactory atmosphere ROK Government circles connection US relations. While I do not attribute undue importance thereto, conversation is illustrative present official ROK misgivings and dissatisfaction. These derive, of course, almost exclusively from President Rhee.

What began as courtesy call on Vice Foreign Minister Cho developed into marathon meeting with Prime Minister Pyun who shortly joined us and dominated conversation ROK side. Pyun made following points:

1. ROK jurisdiction between 38th Parallel and DMZ. ROK must have sovereignty as well as administrative control, this is ROK territory, solution legal matters requires full sovereignty, elections must soon be held for Assembly representatives from territory, et cetera.
Pyun admitted there is no difficulty between UNC and appropriate ROK authorities; on contrary I gathered all moving smoothly there. Agitation for "full sovereignty" I accordingly regard as ROK propaganda move. I told Pyun present agitation incurs risk alienating our allies and that this golden opportunity on ROK side for silence.
2. NNSC. Pyun said since Swiss and Swedes apparently unwilling withdraw, solution is for ROK Government to eject Poles and Czechs from ROK territory. He said he had just signed letter to Secretary Dulles demanding NNSC leave country and that he would send copy to me this afternoon with request telegraphic transmission (see immediately following telegram).[3]
3. Pyun's next act was litany of woe over "abandonment" and I once again explained situation in terms development and maintenance strong ROK military establishment plus assurance prompt US retaliation against Communists should they renew aggression. Pyun declared announcement redeployment has produced "situation of panic" within ROK territory. I said if panic exists I had failed observe it and in any case duty of ROK Government should be to reassure public. Continuing alarmist statements have had contrary effect.

Comment: Pyun appeared to be reasonably pacific in conversation; that is, he successively dropped subjects of complaint after discussion. However, in last analysis it is President Rhee who is calling turns and above all it is Rhee who is attacking our redeployment program and primarily responsible for such public uneasiness as prevails, one result of which has been create sufficient alarm so that flight of capital has occurred and also substantial further depreciation hwan. With regard

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[1] In this telegram, Hull and Briggs advised that signature of the revised draft minute should be obtained from the ROK before steps were taken to implement decisions concerning the South Korean military establishment and the economic aid program. (795.00/8-2854)

[2] In these telegrams, Briggs reported on three visits (essentially courtesy calls) he had with Rhee on Aug. 30 as well as an interview with Pyun on that same date, none printed. (795B.5 MSP/8-3054)

[3] *Infra.*

NNSC, however, I have considerable sympathy ROK position and once more recommend General Hull be given requisite authorization forthwith to terminate that body.

BRIGGS

795B.5/9–154: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, September 1, 1954—9 p. m.

254. Repeated information Tokyo 164, Manila 10. Manila for USDel. Tokyo for General Hull. Re Embtel 253 [1] to Department repeated information Tokyo 163, Manila 9.

Prime Minister Pyun has just sent following letter addressed to Secretary Dulles re NNSC:

"September 1, 1954

"My dear Mr. Secretary: It is long established fact that while rightful operations in North Korea of Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission are actually paralyzed by forcible Communist interference, Communist members of the Commission, stepping over their assigned functions, are carrying on espionage and propaganda activities in South Korea on dangerous scale. Sometime ago, therefore, this government was compelled to announce it would take appropriate action unless NNSC left country voluntarily.

"You issued statement that United States would take measures to get NNSC out of Korea and this government, highly appreciating your timely announcement, decided to hold its unilateral action pending working out of means to achieve our common desire. Since then, weeks have elapsed without seeing anything done towards termination of NNSC activities in South Korea, to the ever-increasing peril to our security. Our enemy in North Korea is fully prepared for another all-out attack, which may come at moment. Under this worsening situation, we cannot afford to suffer the continued presence of NNSC, including dangerous Communist members. This government has, therefore, decided to ask NNSC to leave the country within a week of our notification. Since this is merely an action to follow up what both our governments publicly expressed as their common position on the matter, I earnestly believe and hope that you will give this government full cooperation such as will bring our common objective to fulfillment.

"With warmest personal regards. Yours sincerely, Y. T. Pyun, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister".

As indicated reference telegram I have considerable sympathy ROK position this matter, which as Pyun points out they have long had under discussion with us. They now demand action and it seems to me they are entitled to it.

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[1] *Supra.*

I accordingly urgently recommend that authority to act already sought by General Hull be forthwith granted him. Otherwise there is real danger ROK attempting unilateral action, or at least embarrassing us by renewed agitation or violence.[2]

BRIGGS

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[2] In telegram 176 to Seoul, Sept. 3, the Department of State informed Briggs that a formal reply to Pyun's letter of Sept. 1 would be sent. In the meantime, Briggs was to tell Pyun that Washington was deeply concerned about the announced ROK intention of forcing the NNSC to leave South Korea. Such threats only impeded U.S. efforts to get the Swedes and the Swiss to withdraw voluntarily from the NNSC. (795B.5/9-154)

795.00/9-254: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Hull) to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Ridgway)

CONFIDENTIAL TOKYO, September 2, 1954—6:06 p. m.
PRIORITY

C 69481. Ref ArmyEight KCG 9-3.[1] I am concerned lest ROK issue ultimatum to NNSC visualized in Pyun ltr to Dulles 1 Sept thus put themselves in psn from which they will find it difficult to withdraw without loss of face or to proceed without bloodshed. I therefore have made my psn in matter quite clear to Pyun by ltr quoted below which I have dispatched to him by courier this date.

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

"Thank you for ur ltr of Sept 1 enclosing your ltr of same date to Sec Dulles concerning Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

"I note announced intention of Govt of Republic of Korea to serve notice on members of Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to leave ROK.

"You are aware I am sure of agreement made Wash under which Pres Rhee agreed he would refrain from any unilateral action to terminate activities of NNSC and Dulles agreed to endeavor find way bring its activities to close without abrogating armistice. I am sure you are also aware that this matter being studied diligently Wash and that solution of problem of such consequence in which so many nations are involved should not be arrived at precipitately.

"Under terms of armistice I am responsible not only to afford means by which NNSC is enabled to carry out its functions but I am also resp to insure its protection. My responsibility in this connection is clear and unmistakable. Unless and until I am relieved this mission of protection I shall cont to discharge it with all means at my disposal.

"In light of foregoing considerations I sincerely trust govt of ROK will not embark on any precipitate unilateral action in matter but will instead await determinations being made by my govt Wash in accordance with Rhee–Dulles agreement to end that two govts may act in concert in solution of this delicate and important problem.

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[1] This telegram, not printed, contained the text of Pyun's letter of Sept. 1 which was transmitted in telegram 254, *supra.* A text of KCG 9-3 is located in FE files, lot 55 D 480, "Korean Black Book, September 1954."

"Sincerely,

"J E Hull General United States Army to His Excellency Y T Pyun Prime Minister and Fgn Minister Republic of Korea Seoul Korea."

795B.5/9–554: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET SEOUL, September 5, 1954—11 p. m.
PRIORITY

266. Repeated information Tokyo 169, Manila 16. Limit distribution. Tokyo pass General Hull. Manila for Secretary in reply his telegram 9, September 4.[1]

Surveying Korean scene after my US visit I find it highly unsatisfactory and disquieting in following particulars (in addition to report mentioned Secretary's telegram 9, September 4 from Manila of details of which I already informed.) Since President Rhee's return from Washington he has embarked on four public campaigns, all contrary our interests. That these derive exclusively from Rhee is beyond question.

1. Our military and air redeployment program, disclosed in Washington because of Seoul publicity contrary Washington understanding, is misrepresented as abandonment, as reckless duplication of situation of ROK military nakedness prevailing in 1950, and as indication US does not intend face up to its Korean responsibilities. This has already created public uneasiness that could readily develop into widespread alarm. It has been primarily responsible for further sharp depreciation Korean hwan.

2. Our military aid program is belittled as insufficient even while Admiral Sohn and associates are still negotiating details in Washington.

3. Our economic aid program is under renewed attack as incompetently handled. Effort is in progress force out Economic Coordinator Tyler Wood and his replacement by some one "like General Coulter (UNKRA Agent General) or General Van Fleet."

(Further details this matter in Embtel 265[2] this date.) In meantime effectiveness program very greatly impaired by ROK obstructionism, for example exchange rate altercation and attempted boycott. Present situation is manifestly unsatisfactory and dangerous and if continued may well become more so. Generals Hull, Taylor and I, and our associates in other branches are following all these matters as closely and intently as we can.

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[1] In telegram Dulte 8 from Manila, which was a repeat of telegram 9 from Manila to Seoul, Sept. 4, Dulles wrote Briggs as follows:

"1. Assume you aware contents of CIA outgoing from Seoul (PD 79, 1 September) reporting plans for possible ROK action to create incident with view to renewing hostilities.

"2. Please advise what action contemplated to forestall any such ROK plan." (795B.5/9–554)

[2] Not printed. (795B.5/9–554)

I believe it is of utmost importance to present Rhee without further delay with memorandum of Washington understanding accompanied by clear indication "this is it". There is little at hand justify optimism Rhee will readily accept our terms of reference. Nevertheless there is no evidence to indicate ROK people would welcome resumption of hostilities. In past Rhee has shown understanding of political realities, and if he now recognizes we mean business and do not propose to be moved by his threats, he may eventually come around. Situation in event he rejects memorandum of understanding, or seeks to emasculate it, may admittedly be difficult but we shall at least know where we stand. On positive side present turbulent air should be cleared and situation created where we can consider such further steps as developments indicate.

BRIGGS

795B.5/9–654: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, September 6, 1954—6 p. m.

267. Repeated information Tokyo 170, Manila 17. Manila for Secretary; Tokyo pass General Hull. Regarding Deptel 176 repeated Tokyo 485.[1] Following additional letter from Prime Minister Pyun to General Hull answering latter's communication September 2[2] reached me this noon, original having been despatched to Hull by General Taylor:

"September 6, 1954. My dear General: I appreciate your letter of September 2 as an early response from such a responsible person as you, dear General, to letter I wrote to Mr. Dulles.

As my letter to Secretary State indicated, we are still hoping that some steps can be taken through cooperation between two governments to effect withdrawal of NNSC from Korea. But in view of daily worsening situation here, urgency counsels a quick action.

Is true that President Rhee, during his recent stay in US, agreed to withhold temporarily unilateral action then under contemplation on part of this government on understanding that Mr. Dulles would devise some means to bring an end to activities of NNSC, many of which are proved to be jeopardizing our security. But to be frank, I do not know, nor remember, that there was any understanding that could be construed as binding our President down to no action indefinitely pending working out of a solution which, unfortunately, has so far failed to show any intimation whatever after lapse of weeks since.

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[1] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1869.

[2] The letter was contained in telegram C 69481 from CINCUNC, Sept. 2, *ibid.*

I personally wish we could afford to be more patient. The situation here is daily deteriorating in direction of desperation. We expected Chinese Communists to withdraw from Korea in advance of UN forces, but what is actually happening is reverse, US divisions departing from Korea and leaving huge gap hardly to be filled by ROK units to be newly activated, but which, in fact, do not exist even in paper-planning. While North Korea is bristling with airfields that did not either exist or operate during hostilities, are now in full trim with jet fighters and bombers ready on them, few airfields in South Korea will soon go to weeds if they fail to get proper attention now being promised. This grim picture, my dear General, but fact is that we have no other picture.

I earnestly hope that enemy attaches as much significance to 'massive retaliation' as we hopefully do, having nothing better to do. I fear, however, that there is nothing that blurs enemy's insight into real situation as it exists. Here is aggression that justifies our fighting, but we are actually receding from scene. Naturally verbal interdiction that we will fight if there occurs further aggression cannot have much weight with enemy and consequently fail to deter his next immediate action.

Honestly I do not believe that there is much on ground to hold line long in case of an all-out enemy attack. We do not see much good in 'massive retaliation' if South Korea is swamped, due to deficiency in ground force.

Refuse to see why armistice terms, openly trampled under Communist feet, should be sanctified in our eyes. Nor are we convinced that we should gratuitously and one-sidedly bind ourselves with terms that do not bind Communists.

A less exasperating situation might have called for greater degree of forbearance but this is all too much even for most patient of all governments. We just do not see our way clear to avoid [garbled group] between insecurity and inconvenience, such as likely arise from unilateral action.

I am yet to hear from Secretary of State himself and earnestly hope that his answer will bring us a happy solution that will terminate our anxieties about presence of Communist members of NNSC in Korea.

I should like to thank you on this occasion for satisfactory reply you have given me regarding disposal of bodies of 'civilians' distinct from combat personnel.

With warm personal greetings, very sincerely yours, Y. T. Pyun."

Briggs

795B.5/9–754: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Hull) to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

Tokyo, September 7, 1954—6:11 p. m.

C 69527. From CINCFE to DeptAr info CGArmyEight. DA exclusive for Ridgway from Hull. Army Eight exclusive for Taylor from

Hull. DeptAr OCS now repeats for info State Department exclusive for Dulles.

Taylor informs me that Secretary Dulles has queried Ambassador Briggs concerning ROKA planning for possible unilateral military action.

It has been reasonably clear for some time that on President Rhee's orders ROKA staff is working on plans for unilateral military action. Fact that such planning goes on is not particularly disturbing providing responsible senior commanders do not delude themselves as to practicability of such plans. To preclude this latter possibility, Taylor, with my express approval, has taken advantage of recent opportunities to emphasize to senior ROK Generals that US will not support in any way reopening of hostilities by ROK; furthermore, that we will not be deceived by any incident designed cast blame on Communists. As I had opportunity during past week in conversation with General Lee, Chairman ROK JCS, and General Chung, COFS of ROKA, I made point of informing them along similar lines.

All US authorities in Korea are watching vigilantly for any indications of ROK future intentions.

You may wish to pass above information to other members JCS and top level State Department officials.

795.00/9-1054

Memorandum by the Commander in Chief, Far East (Hull) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET TOKYO, September 10, 1954.

Subject: Matters of Concern to the Far East Command with Respect to Korea

1. *The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.* I have noted with appreciation your efforts to persuade the Swiss and the Swedes to declare publicly that Communist obstructionist tactics have rendered the NNSC completely ineffective as a neutral organization under the Armistice Agreement and to announce their withdrawal from that body.[1] I share your concern that if the present situation is permitted to persist too long, the US may be confronted with the adverse effects which would inevitably follow unilateral ROK action against the NNSC or which would result if the Communists were successful in obtaining a resolution during the 9th General Assembly of the UN to the effect that the NNSC is functioning satisfactorily. We should not wait too long for

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[1] In telegram 316 to Bern and 166 to Stockholm, Sept. 3, the Department of State instructed the respective Embassies to approach the Swiss and Swedish Foreign Ministries and state that the United States was strongly in favor of their withdrawal from the NNSC before the opening of the UN General Assembly. (795.00/8-2545)

evidences of cooperation in this matter on the part of the Swiss and Swedes, who may be motivated by an over-anxiety to preserve neutral appearances. The most positive solution, and thus perhaps the best one available to us, may be the unilateral action on the part of the United Nations Command which I have proposed on several occasions. I would have my representative in the Military Armistice Commission announce to the Communist side that they have by their actions in the north confronted the UN side with a *de facto* abrogation of this portion of the Armistice Agreement and, while reluctant to do so, we have no alternative but to consider those provisions of the Armistice Agreement which pertain to the NNSC as null and void.

2. *Prevention of Unilateral Action by Korea.* As you know, there have been reports of ROK preparations for unilateral military action intended to embroil US forces with the Communists. If such an action is attempted it is most likely to be attempted within the next month, before the departure of major US forces from Korea. As US forces depart, or prepare for departure, more and more control over their own logistic support must be given to the ROK forces. They then become more capable of offensive action. When President Rhee was considering a ROK offensive some time ago, the senior ROK generals convinced him that the offensive could end only in failure and Rhee gave it up. That plan was for an all out offensive. We believe that the plan now most likely to be attempted would only create an incident or start hostilities in an effort to get us involved. In the hope that the senior ROK generals can again influence Rhee, General Taylor and I have both made it clear to them that the reopening of hostilities by the ROK will not be supported by the US nor will we be deceived by any faked incident designed to cast blame on the Communists.

3. *Signature on Memorandum of Understanding.* I was delighted with the strong position which you took in insisting on signature on the part of President Rhee of the Memorandum of Understanding developed as a result of the Washington conference. Indications being received by me and by General Taylor in Korea point to the probability that President Rhee will display a reluctance to sign the Memorandum or will attempt to force the United States to agree to major modification of that instrument. It is my hope that you will adhere to the position you have taken. Over the past months, cooperation and conciliation have only produced opposition or even outright antagonism. Firmness on our part not only gives promise of success, because it has long been effective with Orientals, but it may well serve to stiffen the resolution of those who are in opposition to President Rhee on matters vitally affecting the United States interest.

J. E. Hull
General, United States Army

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

795.00/9-1154: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, September 11, 1954—2:36 p. m.

191. Deliver following letter Robertson to Prime Minister Pyun.[2] Unnecessary words omitted.

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

"In absence Secretary Dulles [3] I am replying to your letter September 1, 1954 to him regarding intention of Government of ROK serve notice on members NNSC leave ROK.[4]

"Declaration this intention is matter deep concern my Government. As you know, during discussions between Secretary Dulles and President Rhee July 30, 1954 President Rhee agreed ROK would refrain from forceful action against NNSC in order give U.S. Government time in which bring activities of NNSC an end in more satisfactory manner.

"U.S. has been carrying on discussions with Swedish and Swiss Governments in order induce them withdraw their members NNSC. As we have earlier informed you, threats of force against NNSC would only make it more difficult for Swiss and Swedish delegations withdraw since do so would then appear be an action taken under duress.

"I have received copy General Hull's reply to your letter to him of September 1, 1954 which enclosed copy of your letter to Secretary Dulles. I concur completely in General Hull's letter and trust Government ROK will not embark on precipitate unilateral action which in view of responsibilities of UNC could only create greater difficulties."

Signed letter follows by air pouch.

SMITH

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[1] This telegram, which was drafted by Jones and cleared by McClurkin, was repeated to Tokyo as telegram 555 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.

[2] According to telegram 293 from Seoul, Briggs delivered this letter to Pyun on Sept. 13. The Korean Prime Minister expressed his disappointment and stated that the Swiss and Swedes would never move for fear of offending the Soviet Union. (796.00/9-1354)

[3] Secretary Dulles was returning from the SEATO meetings held in Manila.

[4] Transmitted in telegram 254 from Seoul, Sept. 1, p. 1868.

FE files, lot 55 D 480, "Korean Black Book, September 1954": Telegram

The Department of the Army to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Hull)

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 15, 1954—2:04 p. m.

DA 967743. From CAMG ref DA 967373, 8 Sep 54; [1] Subj is ROK Econ & Mil Talks.

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[1] Not printed. (FE files, lot 55 D 480, "Korean Black Book, September 1954")

Herewith is final text of Draft Minute context of which was discussed with ROK at meeting 14 Sep.[2] Copies will be provided to ROK officials here 15 Sep. ROK officials have been informed draft minute is to be presented formally to their govt by Ambassador Briggs and General Hull. Signed letter from Secretary of Defense to ROK Defense Minister (ltr transmitted herewith in draft for your information) will be delivered only when draft minute is initialed by ROK.

Further explanation and instructions regarding draft minute, Secretary of Defense letter, and action to be taken will follow in separate message. Draft minute[3] is as follows:

"Draft Agreed Minute Between the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Korea Based on the Conferences Held Between President Eisenhower and President Rhee and Their Advisers in Washington, July 27–30, 1954 and Subsequent Discussions in Washington Between Representatives of the Two Governments.

It is in the mutual interest of the United States and the Republic of Korea to continue the close cooperation which has proved mutually beneficial and has played such an important part in the Free World's struggle against Communist aggression and its determination to remain free.

Accordingly,

It is the intention and policy of the Republic of Korea to:

1. Cooperate with the United States in its efforts to unify Korea, including possible efforts through the United Nations to secure this objective;
2. Retain Republic of Korea forces under the operational control of the United Nations Command while that Command has responsibilities for the defense of the Republic of Korea, unless after consultation it is agreed that our mutual and individual interests would best be served by a change;
3. Accept the force levels and principles set forth in Appendix B which will permit the maintenance of an effective military program consistent with economic stability and within available resources;
4. Continue to encourage private ownership of investment projects;

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[2] As an outgrowth of the Rhee-Eisenhower discussions in Washington, July 26–30, an economic subcommittee made up of representatives of the ROK, the Department of State, the Foreign Operations Administration, the Department of Defense, the Treasury, and the Bureau of the Budget, met to coordinate the economic and military aid program for Korea. The subcommittee continued its work throughout August and September and reports of its proceedings are located in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 346.

[3] At its 213th meeting on Sept. 9, the NSC agreed to recommend that the President approve the draft agreed minute prepared by the Departments of State and Defense and the Foreign Operations Administration. (NSC Action No. 1217) On Sept. 10, Executive Secretary Lay circulated the draft agreed minute to the NSC for information and informed the Council that President Eisenhower had that date approved it; any later agreed changes that might be made to the draft minute were to be reported jointly to the President by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director, Foreign Operations Administration. (Memorandum of discussion at the 213th NSC meeting, Sept. 9; Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file)

5. Cooperate in procedures for administration of United States aid funds consistent with United States legislation and the practices applied generally in such programs;

6. Take the necessary measures to make the economic program effective, including those set forth in Appendix A.

Based upon the conditions which the Republic of Korea declares it will create, it is the intention and policy of the United States to:

1. Continue its program of helping to strengthen the Republic of Korea politically, economically and militarily, with programmed economic aid and direct military assistance furnished during Fiscal Year 1955 to aggregate up to $700 million. This amount would exceed by more than $100 million the amount of assistance previously contemplated by the United States for Korea in Fiscal Year 1955. Of this total, programmed economic aid, including the CRIK carryover and the United States contribution to UNKRA, available for obligation in Fiscal Year 1955 would amount to approximately $280 million (actual expenditures in Fiscal Year 1955 are estimated at approximately $250 million);

2. Support a strengthened Republic of Korea military establishment as outlined in Appendix B, including the development of a reserve system, in accordance with arrangements to be worked out by appropriate military representatives of the two Governments;

3. Consult fully with appropriate military representatives of the Republic of Korea in the implementation of the program for support of the Republic of Korea military establishment;

4. In the event of an unprovoked attack upon the Republic of Korea in violation of the armistice,[4] to employ, in accordance with its constitutional processes, its military power against the aggressor;

5. Support the unification of Korea by all peaceful means; [5]

6. Subject to the necessary Congressional authorizations, continue to press forward with the economic program for the rehabilitation of Korea.

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[4] In the Agreed Minute initialed in Seoul on Nov. 17, 1954, the phrase "in violation of the armistice" was deleted with the understanding that the exchange of ratification instruments of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea would take place immediately, the deletion to be effective when the exchange had been made. (Memorandum from the Acting Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and to the JCS, Nov. 18, 1954; JCS files, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45))

For the final text and Appendix A of the Agreed Minute, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 29, 1954, pp. 810-811.

[5] At the request of the Republic of Korea, paragraph 5 was deleted from the final text of the Agreed Minute; however, the United States in a formal note, not printed, informed the ROK Government that the position of the U.S. Government continued to be to support unification of Korea by all peaceful means. The ROK Government confirmed this understanding. (Memorandum from the Acting Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and to the JCS, Nov. 18, 1954; JCS files, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45))

Appendix A

Measures for an Effective Economic Program.

The Republic of Korea will undertake the necessary measures to make the economic program effective, including:

1. with respect to exchange rates, the official rate of the Republic of Korea Government and the counterpart rate being 180 to 1, agreement to procedures as proposed by the United States for the conversion of dollars at a different and realistic exchange rate to cover hwan drawings of United States forces by sale of dollars through the Bank of Korea, and generally to price aid goods into the Korean economy at a similar rate, thereby providing for the maximum contribution to the Korean economy and to the Korean budget from use of these resources. The operation of existing agreements with respect to hwan drawings by the United States will be suspended so long as the foregoing arrangements work out in practice to the mutual satisfaction of both Governments;

2. agreement that material for the aid program—not furnished from the United States in kind—will be procured wherever in non-Communist countries goods of the required quality can be obtained at the best price (it being the objective to perform the maximum possible procurement in Korea at competititve world prices);

3. provision of adequate information to the appropriate United States representatives concerning Korean plans for the use of their own foreign exchange; and

4. a realistic effort to balance its budget and continue to resist inflation (it will be the objective of both Governments to develop the budget of the Republic of Korea in a manner that will resist inflation).

Appendix B

Republic of Korea Force Levels for Fiscal Year 1955 and United States Support Thereof.

1. The United States will assist in supporting the following maximum number of military personnel during Fiscal Year 1955:

Army	661,000
Navy	15,000
Marine Corps	27,500
Air Force	16,500
Total	720,000

If the Korean Government desires to make minor shifts in numbers as between the four services after discussion with CINCUNC, the United States will agree to such adjustments as long as the maximum of

720,000 is not exceeded. It is understood that the 720,000 total includes all men being trained in training camps and any full-time personnel serving with reserve units.

2. Pending joint consultation and agreement between the Republic of Korea and the United States on a revised over-all budgetary plan, including both military and economic programs, within resources made available, there may be an increase in military pay from the current average rate of 6,900 hwan per man to an average annual rate not to exceed 20,000 hwan per man and in food allowances from the current average rate of 24,800 hwan per man to an average annual rate not to exceed 38,000 hwan per man effective on or after January 1, 1955. In order, however, to ensure that U.S. assistance and/or other factors permit such increases without adverse effect on the Republic of Korea financial and economic position, the Republic of Korea will consult with CINCUNC before putting such increases into effect. The food allowances will continue during FY 1955 to be supplemented by U.S. direct ration assistance at approximately current levels (currently 'combat' rations and components for biscuits). Decisions regarding any additional increases in pay and food allowances desired by the Republic of Korea will be reserved for subsequent discussions.

3. The Republic of Korea will undertake the formation of reserve divisions, which will include trained and organized men with former active service, toward a goal of 10 such divisions to be organized by the end of calendar year 1955. Training for the Army will be accelerated as soon as practicable from approximately 10,000 men per month to 20,000 per month. It is assumed that training at somewhere near this level will continue for at least a year and perhaps as much as two years by which time all of the young men of suitable age will have been in the military services and put through the training camps. At that time the training will drop down to approximately 10,000 per month, not including the training and recruitment for Navy, Marines and Air Force. As the training load diminishes and trained reserve strengths are attained, the total number of active military personnel will be adjusted accordingly.

4. The United States will supply reserve divisions with the necessary equipment, quartermaster items, and other supplies necessary for them to undergo and maintain a reasonable state of training. With respect to equipment and ammunition, it is contemplated that it will be necessary to issue small arms and training ammunition, and that essentially all other equipment will be provided by reallocation of material from the active Republic of Korea forces resulting from the implementation of recommendations to revise tables of organization and equipment. Details of these recommendations are outlined in a letter of this date from the United States Secretary of Defense to the Minister of National Defense of the Republic of Korea.

The amount of equipment required for training reserve divisions will be determined by CINCUNC after consultation with the Minister of National Defense of the Republic of Korea.

5. The United States will assist in the training and organization of the reserve divisions under a plan to be worked out by CINCUNC in consultation with the Minister of National Defense of the Republic of Korea.

6. As a matter of policy and in the interest of efficiency and economy of manpower and resources, functions which are common to more than one service will be operated under a combined type of organization which will have the responsibility of serving all of the military forces.

7. The Korean Navy will continue to build up during Fiscal Year 1955 toward the goal of 79 vessels (as currently recommended by the United States Chief of Naval Operations). The ships required for this build up of the Republic of Korea Navy will be supplied by loan from United States sources under the condition that the loan of the vessels shall not be for a period exceeding 5 years and the United States Government retains the right to reclaim the vessels at any time during the 5-year period, when and if the United States Government in its own discretion should decide that such vessels are no longer being used to serve the best interests of both the Korean and the United States Governments. Within the number of personnel outlined in paragraph 1 above, the Republic of Korea Marines will be reorganized from the present brigade to a division.

8. The United States will make available jet fighter and jet trainer aircraft to the Korean Air Force in such quantitites and at such times as the Korean Air Force pilots have demonstrated the capability to properly utilize this equipment. The determination of this capability will be made by CINCUNC. Based on the foregoing, the United States will plan to make available 10 T-33 jet type trainers and, subsequently as the need is demonstrated, 30 F-86F and 16 C-46 aircraft during 1955, and the remainder of one Jet Fighter Wing (45 additional F-86F's to complete unit equipment and up to 10 additional F-86F's for attrition) by the end of Fiscal Year 1956.

9. All new military construction projects not under construction will be deferred to Fiscal Year 1956 for further review. Minimum facilities for an arsenal and the reworking of ammunition and those construction projects specifically approved by CINCUNC will be funded for construction in Fiscal Year 1955.

10. The Republic of Korea military budget will be jointly reviewed and analyzed by the Republic of Korea and CINCUNC in order to assure that the military program will produce the most effective forces at minimum cost. The Republic of Korea will undertake to revise the present budget of the Ministry of National Defense for Fiscal Year 1955 in order to effect adjustments in the budget conforming to the princi-

ples set forth above, to eliminate from the budget such items as are found to have been budgeted in excess or in conflict with austerity standards, and to eliminate from the budget such items as will be replaced by the items the United States will supply the Republic of Korea Armed Forces under programs of military assistance. The implementation of the aid program planned by the United States contemplates that approximately 35 billion hwan will be made available by the Republic of Korea for the military program in Fiscal Year 1955.

11. The Republic of Korea will cooperate with CINCUNC by implementing recommendations designed to increase the effectiveness of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces and effect economies therein.["]

[Attachment C]

Draft letter:

"My dear Mr. Minister:

"During recent conversations between representatives of the United States and representatives of the Republic of Korea in connection with the economic and military assistance programs for Korea for Fiscal Year 1955, it was agreed that certain details of the mutual understanding between the two Governments of a classified military nature should be the subject of a separate communication from the Secretary of Defense of the United States to the Minister of National Defense of the Republic of Korea.

"Following are examples of some of the specific actions to be undertaken during Fiscal Year 1955:

"1. The implementation of recommendations made by General Van Fleet relating to tables of organization and equipment can result in the elimination of the requirement for approximately 52,000 military personnel in non-combat type units (a list of which is attached). This action will generate quantities of equipment which could be made available to reserve divisions.

"2. The implementation, as indicated below, of the following recommendation made by General Van Fleet, in order to distribute artillery more effectively between the active and reserve forces (it is contemplated that all artillery now in the hands of the Republic of Korea military forces will remain in Korea and title thereto will continue to remain with the United States):

> 'Two economies with respect thereto can be effected:
>
> (1) reduction from a six (6) to a four (4) tube battery, and
>
> (2) shift of medium battalions from divisions to Corps or Army level, plus retirement of 50% of such units to reserve status.'
>
> (The retirement to reserve units will be determined by CINCUNC after consultation with the Republic of Korea.)
>
> General Hull concurs in the above recommendations.

"3. The implementation of the recommendations made by the 8th Army and discussed with the Republic of Korea military officials relating to the quantities of vehicles required by the Republic of Korea Army. This will result in a reduction in the quantities of vehicles required for the active Republic of Korea forces.

"4. As a matter of policy and in the interest of efficiency and economy of manpower and resources, separate organizations for common logistic services, such as the procurement, receipt and distribution of supplies, medical care, schools, industrial facilities, etc., will not be established or continued in each of the Republic of Korea military services. Such functions which are common to more than one service will be operated under a combined type of organization which would have the responsibility of serving all of the military forces. Since the Republic of Korea Army is the principal consumer of common-use supplies, it would be expected that common-use supply facilities would be operated by the Republic of Korea Army, with appropriate representation by the other consuming services.

"In addition to the above, as we both understand, it will be necessary to conduct a continuing review of the military program in order to effect additional economies so that the greatest possible strength may be attained within the resources available.

"This letter is incorporated by reference in the 'Agreed Minute' and is part of the mutual understanding of this date between the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Korea."

[Here follows an enclosure entitled, "Noncombat Units Whose Deletion from the Standing ROK Army Was Recommended by Gen Van Fleet".]

795B.5 MSP/9–1854: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, September 18, 1954—6:02 p. m.

204. Following are negotiating instructions re draft minute cleared by Defense, FOA, Treasury:

Envisaged that Ambassador Briggs, General Hull and Mr. Wood will participate discussions.

Draft minute [2] as now stands reflects basic ROK undertakings deemed essential *quid pro quo* for United States military and economic aid programs FY 1955. Package nature mutual undertakings emphasized during United States–ROK discussions Washington and this continues to be fundamental United States position. The minute has been approved by NSC and the President [3] and any substantive changes must be reported to the President. FYI It is not contemplated that United States will agree any substantive changes.

United States position is that without agreement United States not bound to undertakings expressed in minute and specifically not committed to any particular military and economic aid program. Not practicable nor to United States interest to suspend all military and economic aid pending agreement or in event agreement not reached. Pending agreement existing ROK forces would continue to be supported at existing levels but United States would not undertake to augment or modernize ROK forces (although certain projects specifically approved by Secretary of Defense would continue to be implemented). Re economic aid, program would continue for present with amount now allocated ($45 million); amounts in excess of appropriations would not be made available; investment program as result would be reduced in attempt contain inflation; and United States would reconsider future aid program. (FYI $280 million economic aid refers to obligational authority and balance of $100 million refers to value deliveries.)

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[1] This telegram, which was drafted by Howard Smith of FE/NA and cleared by Robertson, was also cleared by the Bureau of the Budget. It was repeated to Tokyo as telegram 610 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.

[2] Transmitted in telegram DA 967743, *supra.*

[3] See footnote 3, *supra.*

You should emphasize following: Undertakings expressed in minute result of long discussions commencing with visit President Rhee. Number changes made at suggestion Paek and Sohn but minute as now stands represents United States view of undertakings basic to common objectives, approved by NSC and the President. While minute may contain undertakings ROK reluctant accept ROK should understand that the total amount aid United States willing extend represents decision of United States which at least equally difficult and painful. Korean aid program would be largest United States aid program and would be more than $100 million in excess of congressional appropriations. These additional funds included in program are direct result current discussions. Funds still not found and obviously can be made available only at expense of other aid programs already approved by Congress. Inconceivable to United States that aid program this size and character and made available only at sacrifice other programs can be implemented without basic understanding of two governments.

Following are comments regarding major points at issue and should only be discussed at initiative ROK:

Paragraph 5 ROK undertakings. ROK position is that goes without saying ROK will continue cooperate regarding FOA procedures and that paragraph carries implication ROK has not cooperated in past. United States position is that in light of many officially inspired ROK attacks upon role of FOA/W this paragraph is necessary as expression of ROK "policy and intention". To help meet ROK objections paragraph was moved from list of specific undertakings Appendix A and included under statements ROK policy as was paragraph 4 of ROK undertakings.

Paragraph 3 United States undertakings. This paragraph added in attempt meet ROK request for language which will require consultation and concurrence of ROK on implementation military program. ROK unhappy about lack of word "concurrence" and may desire to discuss this problem further. Department Defense firm position is that United States cannot agree to requirement of concurrence of ROK on military aid matters.

Appendix A, paragraph 1. ROK has agreed to this paragraph except as it relates to existing agreements re hwan drawings remaining in force. United States position is that must retain existing agreements in case new hwan drawing scheme not successful at least until another mutually agreed plan could be devised. This paragraph might be made acceptable ROK if phrase added to convey latter thought. You authorized do so.

Appendix A, paragraph 2. ROK insistent that this paragraph be modified under some formula that would exclude trade with Japan although this intent not mentioned as purpose of this modification. ROK wishes forbid procurement any nation which trades Red China or North Korea. United States position is that United States cannot require such undertaking in light United States trade policy with respect to other countries of Free World. Other ROK proposal to accomplish same objective is to substitute "best" quality for "required" quality. This not acceptable for obvious reasons. Re intent paragraph 2, United States continues insist on nondiscriminatory procurement in non-Communist world with United States aid funds.

Appendix B. ROK position is that it is appropriate and necessary for United States to make specific commitments with respect supporting and equipping ROK forces but that ROK can agree only to generalized statement that they will cooperate to achieve economy and savings. ROK specifically objected to commitments to revise TO and E set forth Paragraph 4 and supplemental letter, stating such details should not be specified in minute but left to be discussed and mutually accepted in field. ROK also objects Paragraph 10 preferring to substitute joint military committee which would supervise all aspects military program, including United States aid. (This relates to ROK position on Paragraph 3 of minute.) United States position firm that (1) United States desires joint review and analysis of ROK military budget and programs but reserves right, if consultation were appropriate with the ROK, to determine unilaterally specific manner in which aid will be made available, and (2) agreement regarding all military details and principles expressed Appendix B is essential condition to United States undertaking to support ROK forces along lines outlined in Appendix B. Realize that present lack of authority of ROK Minister National Defense over ROK military services makes implementation difficult, but this is even more reason for obtaining ROK Government approval of principles involved. Department of Defense is sending representatives to discuss details Appendix B with General Hull.

You are requested present draft minute to President Rhee as soon as practicable and seek agreement ROK undertakings therein.

Independently of draft minute but at same time if appears desirable Briggs should inform Rhee United States believes problems ROK-Japanese relations can best be advanced by designation United States mediator who could discuss substantive issues with parties before any new meetings.

SMITH

795B.5 MSP/9-2054: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, September 20, 1954—7 p. m.

324. Repeated information Tokyo 210. Department please pass Defense. Tokyo for CINCUNC. Subject is ROK relations with Japan as essential element US–ROK relations and US position Northeast Asia.

Since sending Embtel 316, September 18,[1] repeated Tokyo 202 and Embtel 320, September 19,[2] repeated Tokyo 205, I have received Deptel 204,[3] repeated Tokyo 610, September 18. Purpose this message is first to urge instructions re Japan (last paragraph Deptel 204) be greatly strengthened to point of informing President Rhee while minute of Washington understanding is still pending that unless he repairs relations with Japan proposed US aid program will not go forward on scale now envisaged, and second to consider next moves if Rhee rejects our representations.

Although I have sought in series of messages since my return last month to describe situation as result Rhee's campaign of misrepresentation and abuse, I recognize how difficult it may be to recreate in Washington impression of deliberately poisoned atmosphere which Rhee has produced in Korea following his American visit. Hardly day passes without some local statement calculated to mislead Korean people or misinterpret pending questions, or as in case of Japan deliberately to produce friction. As I have also reported this campaign has included attacks on Secretary Dulles as being personally pro-Japanese. (In addition, notwithstanding facts disclosed to him and his military advisors, Rhee is busy right now organizing nation-wide campaign against US redeployment; it has explosive possibilities and can easily get out of hand (for example, see General Choi's public statement this date, TWX dating P 200600Z).)

Aside from unpleasant aspects of current situation (which does not augur well for Rhee's acceptance of minute of understanding) everything we are trying to accomplish in this part of world is being jeopardized by Rhee's present conduct including his anti-Japanese agitation. I urge therefore that repairing ROK relations with Japan be declared to Rhee in unequivocal terms as a "must" and that accordingly there be prepared separate agreement for submission to Rhee simultaneous with other documentation. Furthermore, I question whether it would be desirable to suggest (as indicated at end Deptel 204) there be discussion of "substantive issues with parties before any new meetings". From here it would appear more practicable and less likely play into Rhee's hands to establish clear timetable to which Rhee would be committed. For example (1) Japanese withdrawal by [*of*?] Kubota statement[4] to be followed immediately (same day) by (2) US announcement of appointment of mediator on whose arrival in Far East on specified date meetings between accredited ROK and Japanese representatives would be resumed, and (3) joint (or separate simultaneous) ROK-Japanese announcement confirming (2). In other words, if we leave Rhee any ambiguity he will probably use it to render resumption of negotiations more difficult.

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[1] In this telegram, Briggs reported that Pyun had stated that the ROK was prepared to resume negotiations with the Japanese concerning ROK-Japanese differences. (694.95B/9-1854)

[2] In this telegram, Briggs suggested that it would be good tactics if the United States did not appear too eager to entreat the Rhee government to accept the $700 million U.S. aid program. (795B.5 MSP/9-1954)

[3] *Supra.*

To sum up: Our bargaining power with Rhee lies principally in his desire for aid program, especially military program. Once we commit ourselves to him on that program, without having required him to settle issues with Japan, possibility of doing so later will be correspondingly reduced.

As to what we should do if Rhee refuses all this and in effect tells us to go jump in Potomac with aid program attached, I think our initial public position should be objective and unconcerned: "Here it is. If you want it, fine. If not, we'll be on about our business".

Behind scenes however I recommend we get busy. Although Rhee has dominated stage to exclusion lesser personalities there are elements in ROK considerably less intemperate. They lack public support and capacity to act at present but they exist and are known to us. When word gets around (and we can see to it that it does get around) that $700 million aid program including buildup ROK Forces is being rejected, impact should be considerable. People of ROK, in contrast to Rhee, know they are infinitely better off today than one year ago and there is no popular demand for resumption hostilities.

Finally, this altercation with Rhee has been brewing ever since we insisted on resumption armistice negotiations in April last year. We have foreseen difficulties would probably multiply once Geneva conference ended (or as it turned out, after Rhee's US trip failed renew war for unification). Issues are now joined on plane of US national interest and I see no profit in seeking evade or postpone them.

BRIGGS

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[4] On Oct. 15, 1953, Kanichiro Kubota, the head of the Japanese Delegation charged with negotiating with a Korean counterpart a settlement of Japanese-Korean differences, made references which the Koreans interpreted as insulting to their national character. Regarding the Kubota statement, see volume XIV.

795B.5 MSP/9-2054: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 22, 1954—3:25 p. m.

216. Your 316,[2] 320 [3] and 324.[4] Our 204 rptd Tokyo 610.[5] You should soonest possible arrange meet with President Rhee accompanied by Hull and Wood to present Minute which represents US Government position re military and economic programs for ROK developed through long discussions in Washington with ROK representatives. Sooner negotiations can be transferred to official channels from public press the better. Instructions in our 204 still valid.

Once US position thus made known clearly to Rhee agree further discussions should be at ROK initiative in order avoid giving impression US overanxious and in great haste reach understandings set forth draft Minute and appendices.

Re your 316 and 324 on ROK relations with Japan. Nature this matter makes it more difficult US determine whether carried out in good faith and we have recognized it is on different footing by accepting ROK request delete paragraph draft Minute. However, ROK assured us they would undertake negotiate in good faith with Japanese and Pyun's approach to you reported your 316 provides some evidence they may do so. Believe normalization ROK relations with Japan best advanced by patient firm pressure which can be provided most effectively by US mediator (last paragraph our 204) who might discuss issues with parties separately as necessary to develop satisfactory basis for face to face negotiations and attempt avoid another failure in direct negotiations between two governments.

You should explain Rhee strong stable ROK and Japan basic to US policy in Far East and adjustment Japanese-ROK relations is indispensable element this objective as it is to welfare and security ROK. Your discussion should be designed elicit agreement US mediator subject acceptability individual both sides. If withdrawal Kubota statement and Japanese claims condition mediation assume this can still be worked out.

Tokyo take no further action pending discussions with Rhee.

For your information: Embassy here indicated Dean unacceptable account being Executive Officer Japan Society and his firm Sullivan and Cromwell employed by Japanese Government on certain matters.

SMITH

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[1] This telegram, which was drafted by McClurkin and cleared by Robertson, was repeated to Tokyo as telegram 627 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 1, *supra.*

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 2, *supra.*

[4] *Supra.*

[5] Dated Sept. 18, p. 1882.

795B.5/9-2754: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, September 27, 1954—11 p. m.

362. Repeated information Tokyo 237. Joint message for State, Defense, FOA from Briggs, Hull and Wood. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC and CAG.

General Hull, Wood and I met with President Rhee for two hours this afternoon pursuant Department telegrams 216,[1] 204 [2] and 226 [3] (repeated Tokyo 627, 610 and 666). Prime Minister Pyun, Defense Minister Sohn and Economic Coordinator Paek also present.

1. Following brief explanatory remarks I presented text draft agreed minute of Washington conversations. Rhee launched into explanation purpose his trip to US was not obtain further aid but rather achieve unification Korea. He said US policy achieve unification by peaceful means had failed and he had therefore offered present military plan to achieve same objective. Seeing there was no interest in this plan he had not presented it, but unified, independent and democratic Korea remained the most important and urgent problem. He attacked US redeployment as done without proper consideration Communist threat or adequate preparation and concluded Korea must now determine its own course regardless whether US would assist.

General Hull and I emphasized sympathy US Government for ROK objective and awareness difficulties confronting her. Hull described purposes behind redeployment stressing that relative strength forces in ROK remains approximately as at time of armistice, thus serving as both assurance to Korea and deterrent to Communists. Rhee's only reply was that he unconvinced our views re Communist threat Korea and time has come for ROK decide its own course and pursue it. He said that no decision made as yet, however. Re proposed economic and military aid programs he expressed appreciation for past aid but said that future aid, if given, should be used as ROK sees fit.

Following further discussion these points and our restatement of fact draft minute is requirement for economic and military aid programs of size contemplated, he agreed read and consider minute in that context.

2. Re appointment US mediator to bring about resumption ROK-Japanese negotiations Rhee gave usual harangue on Japanese bad faith and intent to take over Korea again, and he implied US Government has understanding to this effect with Japan. He stated that ROK required as

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] Dated Sept. 18, p. 1882.

[3] Not printed. (795B.5/9-2154)

condition resumption of negotiations (1) public cancellation treaty of annexation of Korea, (2) return of books, art treasures and gold reserves, (3) acceptance fishery bans, (4) renunciation property claims. I laid stress on importance Japanese-ROK relations to common objective combatting communism in Asia as well as to welfare and security ROK, pointing out (as did General Hull) that mediator might play constructive role in achieving these objectives. Pyun inserted number of unhelpful comments in this discussion which added up to demand for retraction Kubota statement and public declaration by Japanese Government it would not insist on its property claims and would accept Rhee line. In closing discussion of this item I requested President give further consideration suggestion advanced by US Government for appointment mediator to help resolve these difficulties. He did not altogether reject this but gave no indication whether he would accept on any basis save prior acceptance by Japan of practically all points at issue. This phase of discussion almost completely negative insofar as prospect reasonable approach by ROK.

3. Following discussion these two questions I made strong representations along lines Department telegram 226 re current ROK campaign of abuse and misrepresentations US policy and actions, mentioning specifically statements of high ROK officials, Korean Republic editorials and cartoons and "demonstrations" before US Embassy. I pointed out campaign if continued would have seriously adverse effect on relations our governments and requested it be terminated. Although Pyun sought to argue that Korean press not subject any control by Government, President appeared impressed by seriousness of US Government concern and specifically stated he would see that demonstrators cease disturbing Embassy in future.

In sum Rhee agreed consider draft minute further, gave no commitment whatever re proposed US mediator in ROK-Japanese situation (but did not flatly reject idea) and appeared impressed at genuineness our concern re anti-US campaign. He reiterated several times that Korea was now in "a perilous situation" and gave impression being both depressed and uncertain as to where he would turn, suggesting that unification under Communists is perhaps better than no unification at all. This statement was made rather feebly, however, and with no real show of conviction.

BRIGGS

795B.00/9–2954: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, September 29, 1954—9 p. m.

381. Repeated information Tokyo 252. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC and CAG. Reference Embtels 375, 376 and 377, repeated Tokyo 248, 249 and 250.[1]

Now that issues are joined it is of utmost urgency and importance that our side be placed before Korean officials and people before ROK Government by its anti-American campaign through misrepresentation, fomenting agitation, et cetera, so misleads public opinion and so blocks access to truth that our efforts prove too late.

Insofar as I am aware there is no difference of opinion among representatives various US agencies Seoul and Tokyo as to character of problem, issues and stakes involved, and position US Government should adopt. What is needed is a decision at highest level in US Government to place our position before the public. Various plans for doing it have been developing, including those communicated recently by CIA. Opinions as to means to be employed may differ, but I reiterate that action is imperative and that time is running out.

There is increasing evidence that there are influential Koreans who would not willingly follow Rhee's intemperate leadership at the cost of US friendship and support. In Korea we have the dual problem of encouraging this group and of informing the public generally. There is the related and equally urgent problem of publicity within the United States both to inform the American public and to influence Korean opinion. In last connection Rhee himself has proved throughout period of my association with him sensitive to currents of US opinion as expressed in Congress and American publications and considerably influenced thereby. In particular he sets great store by favorable articles in principal American weeklies and dailies and is correspondingly upset by adverse publicity. If he sees that American public opinion is heavily weighted against his current belligerent views and his present campaign, that, in conjunction with firm US Government stand on matters at issue on official level, might be as effective as any other single factor in influencing him toward more reasonable course.

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[1] In telegram 375 from Seoul, Sept. 29, the Embassy reported that it had received an ultimatum, which was carried in the ROK press, from Korean demonstrators (a veterans group) that unless they were given assurances that the United States would terminate redeployment, they would block the U.S. Embassy indefinitely.

Briggs dispatched two notes to the South Korean Foreign Office protesting this ultimatum and the demonstrations (texts in telegram 376, Sept. 29), prepared a press release to the same effect (text in telegram 377, Sept. 29), and asked for Department approval before making public the notes and the press release. (795B.00/9–2954)

According to telegram 238 to Seoul, Sept. 29, that approval was not given. (795.00/9–2954)

Last statement is made with reservation that Rhee has so recklessly climbed out to end of insecure limb that return without serious loss dignity and of prestige domestically might be difficult feat for younger albeit less experienced climber. I do not consider however that this should in present circumstances constitute valid reason for capitulating to him or showing him way back to firm ground. In view Rhee's conduct past six weeks since return from Washington visit I believe our position should be that extricating himself, if that can now be done, is Rhee's responsibility.

I recognize that above course can perhaps lead to our being faced at early date with new problems and issues of great delicacy, seriousness and urgency, but in my opinion we can not and should not defer them if Rhee is determined to pursue his present reckless course which runs so clearly counter not only to our own interests in Korea and elsewhere but those of Korea itself.

BRIGGS

Editorial Note

The Republic of Korea announced that as of October 1, 1954, it would no longer make hwan available, except at the 180 to 1 rate, to pay for hwan currency advances to United States armed forces and Korean employees of the United States. This action was the culmination of a long-standing controversy between the two governments which was not resolved despite the agreement of February 25, 1953. For the essence of that understanding, see the editorial note, page 797.

Prior to this decision, the United States had offered to pay South Korea for its drawings of hwan for June, July, and August 1954 at the rate of 254 to 1. The Korean decision of October 1 resulted in the United States being left with only enough hwan reserves to pay its expenses for a limited period. Additional information on the United States position in this issue can be found in telegram C 69804 from Hull, October 4, 1954. (FE files, lot 55 D 480, "Korean Black Book, October 1954")

Eisenhower Library. Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 216th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, October 6, 1954 [1]

[Extract] [2]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 216th meeting of the Council were the Secretary of State, presiding; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 4); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Admiral Duncan for the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; General Twining for the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the Executive Secretary, NSC; the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC; the Coordinator, NSC Planning Board [and] Assistants.

Following is a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

. . . .

Mr. Dulles indicated that President Rhee was growing consistently more unreasonable and cantankerous. It was hard to see how the situation could last very much longer, but Mr. Dulles thought that Rhee might cooperate if confronted with a real showdown. Especially difficult was Rhee's decision to shut off Korean currency advances to the United Nations Command. Secretary Wilson interrupted to counsel that we ought to go slow in this matter. It was something like a labor strike—one should not settle a strike too fast—you always go wrong if you do. Governor Stassen expressed agreement with Secretary Wilson that we ought to sit back for a while. President Rhee's actions, he believed, would hurt South Korea more than it would hurt the United States. There was general agreement by other members of the Council to follow this advice.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Gleason on Oct. 7, 1954.

[2] This discussion is extracted from item 1. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security." Also discussed were a recent Soviet atomic test, a Khrushchev statement in support of China, and combined U.S.-French support of the Diem cabinet in Vietnam.

795B.5/10–654: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Hull)

TOP SECRET
ROUTINE

WASHINGTON, October 6, 1954—10:37 a. m.

JCS 968900. From JCS for CINCUNC.

1. Instructions contained in JCS 95977 of 10 Jul 51 [1] are rescinded.

2. Following instructions constitute continuation of your authority as CINCUNC for conduct of military operations in Korea.

3. UN Security Council resolutions which make UN forces and other assistance available to the Unified Command under the United States remain in effect.

4. You will continue to exercise command of all UN and non-UN forces assigned to UNC in the prosecution of your mission as CINCUNC.

US Objectives

5. The current US objective is to maintain a position of strength with respect to Korea: (a) in support of the UN commitment to oppose aggression, (b) to prevent the area from coming under Communist domination either by subversion or by being overrun, and (c) to ensure the continuance of a free government on the peninsula.

6. The United States seeks to achieve these objectives through peaceful means, avoiding or preventing a resumption of fighting in Korea, if possible to do so without compromising our obligations, principles and military security.

US Courses of Action

7. To achieve the objectives set forth above, the United States must be prepared to take the following courses of action:

a. Prevent or counter a resumption of fighting unilaterally by the Republic of Korea.

b. Counter the resumption of fighting by the Communists.

c. Continue to seek, by political negotiations between the Communists and the UN (with the Republic of Korea associated with the latter), a unified and neutral Korea friendly to the United States under an independent and representative government.

d. Pending a political settlement and while the armistice continues in effect, continue the measures prescribed for achieving a position of strength in Korea.

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[1] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 646.

Mission

8. As CINCUNC you will, consistent with the security of forces under your command, comply with the terms of the Armistice Agreement of 27 Jul 53 and maintain assigned forces in a state of combat readiness to undertake such operations as may be directed by JCS.

Tasks

9. As CINCUNC you will:

a. Maintain the integrity of the forces defending the line defined in the Armistice Agreement of 27 Jul 53.

b. Continue in effect all pertinent instructions to the UNC involving the maintenance of the security of US/UN forces in the Korean area.

c. Build up and maintain the security position of the ROK consistent with the Armistice terms, and in a manner, and to an extent, that will permit the phased and orderly redeployment of the bulk of US armed forces.

d. In accordance with approved directives, seek to insure that the Republic of Korea observes the Armistice.

e. Subject to limitations imposed by the Armistice Agreement, make an extensive effort in coordination with other United States agencies concerned using all information media available to initiate and maintain a psychological offensive.

Forces

10. The following forces are available to you as CINCUNC:

a. UN–US Forces. All United Nations and United States forces deployed in FEC, except those United States forces essential for the defense of Japan and Ryukyus.

b. ROK Forces. You are authorized to maintain a total ROK army force of 20 divisions within approved personnel ceilings and to increase the strength of other ROK forces to the following:

(1) Marine Corps to 23,500.
(2) Navy to 15,000.
(3) Air Force to 9,000.

The attachment of ROK personnel to UN units is authorized within prescribed ceilings.

Redeployment Planning

11. Planning assumptions furnished you in JCS 946220[2] (dated 17 Aug 53) are rescinded. JCS guidance governing the redeployment of forces from your command is furnished in JCS 966825[2] dated 27 Aug 54.

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[2] Not printed.

Planning for the Contingency That Hostilities Are Resumed

12. Operational planning to meet the contingency that hostilities in Korea are renewed by the Communists in the near future will continue as a CINCFE responsibility, in coordination with CINCPAC and COMSAC, as appropriate (JCS 955981, 22 Jan 54 and SM-371-54, dated 23 Apr 54[3]).

Korean Economic Aid Activities

13. As directed in DA 945551, 8 Aug 53,[4] the President has assigned CINCUNC the responsibility for development and supervision in the field of an integrated program of economic aid as a basis for Korean relief, rehabilitation and stabilization, with the understanding that a significant portion of this program will be carried out by utilization of services and facilities of United States military units. All Korean economic aid activities will be conducted in accordance with DA 945551, 8 Aug 53.

Civil Affairs

14. In areas under UN control in Korea the provisions of WAR 85117, 6 Jul 50[4] remain applicable.

15. In North Korea provisions of JCS 95328, 28 Oct 50, as interpreted in WAR 95715, 2 Nov 50,[5] remain applicable.

Logistic Support

16. Except as limited by the terms of the Armistice Agreement, you are authorized to send to Korea munitions and supplies from sources at your disposal as may be necessary in the conduct of your mission. Logistic support from U.S. sources outside the control of CINCUNC will be provided on the basis of forces in being as authorized by JCS.

17. Logistic support of foreign forces under your command will be as directed in WAR 90576, 3 Sep 50.[4]

Captured Matériel

18. In event hostilities are resumed, you will be guided with respect to the acquisition, use, and ultimate disposal of enemy matériel captured in Korea by instructions contained in JCS 99193, 19 Dec 50, as amplified by JCS green paper dated 6 Apr 51, subject: "Priorities for the Utilization of Soviet-Type Equipment Captured in Korea" forwarded to you by Chief of Staff, U.S. Army on 24 Apr 51.[3]

Censorship

19. As CINCUNC, you are authorized to employ field press censorship concerning news media material in Korea and to exercise control

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[3] Neither printed.

[4] Not printed.

[5] Neither printed, but for text of the Oct. 28, 1950 directive, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, p. 1007.

of military facilities used for news transmission. You are authorized to curtail use of or impound commercial news transmission facilities in Korea whenever, in your judgment, such action is essential to the security of your command.

Channels of Communication

20. Directives from the U.S. Government, acting for the UN, to the UN Command will be transmitted to CINCUNC by the Secretary of Defense, normally through the Department of the Army which is the executive agency for the Secretary of Defense in these matters. Communications with JCS, involving strategic direction and guidance for operational control of forces and the conduct of combat operations and related matters will be through the Chief of Staff of the Army, acting in the name of and under the direction of the Secretary of Defense.

21. Periodic operations reports of United Nations Command activities will be rendered as directed in JCS 953797, 3 Dec 53.[6]

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[6] Not printed.

611.95B/10-754: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, October 7, 1954—6 p. m.

408. Repeated information Tokyo 272. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Before taking action with President Rhee pursuant Deptel 256 repeated Tokyo 742 [2] there are several aspects which seem to us counsel against such action at this particular time and which I submit for Department's consideration.

1. Having in mind the strong and earnest representations made to Rhee on September 27 in presence not only of General Hull and Economic Coordinator Wood but also Rhee's principal advisors, for me to return now with reiterated complaint of same character seems unlikely impress Rhee as strength on our part. Repetition of representations might inevitably have character of anti-climax, certainly of having been said before. If Rhee was insufficiently impressed by very strong September 27 representations, made directly in name of US Government, there seems scant reason to expect repetition would be more successful.

2. To approach Rhee on subject of misleading ROK official statements while minute of Washington understanding still before ROK Government likewise seems to us somewhat contrary to "formula of

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[1] This message was unsigned.

[2] In this telegram, Oct. 5, the Department of State instructed the Embassy in Seoul to call to Rhee's attention the fact that his contrary and/or misleading statements on redeployment, U.S. concern for Korea, and the supposed pro-Japanese bias in the U.S. Government were not conducive to good ROK-U.S. relations. (611.95B/10-554)

uneagerness" which Embassy, Hull and Wood have agreed is desirable as present tactic.

3. Most urgent irritant in US-ROK relations as of this moment is not ROK misrepresentations (reprehensible though they are) but problem of hwan advances to US Army. We would thus be making representations to chief of state on other than most pressing issue.

4. While admittedly misrepresentations are closely connected with Rhee's views on realignment of US armed forces and aid programs (and hence also on minute of understanding) there have been several inconclusive but interesting indications in last few days that notwithstanding all his agitation, Rhee and his government may decide after all not to shoot Santa Claus. Toward this end we need show of effective firmness and strength rather than further discussion.

5. As we have sought to indicate in various previous messages, what seems to us likely to influence Rhee's behavior, or to restrain him from further bad behavior, is not so much official admonitions, privately administered, as indications from government sources Washington and also in US press that American Government and people are disgusted with sort of behavior in which Rhee has indulged ever since return from American visit. Although Department may have good reason for reluctance to act on this suggestion, I am constrained to repeat that from point of view of our interpretation of events in Seoul, Washington initiative along lines suggested would have vastly more effect on Rhee than shaking another finger at him.[3]

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[3] In telegram 263 to Seoul, Oct. 8, the Department of State replied to this telegram as follows:

"In line your recommendation while here Department had felt cumulative effect continuing official representations would help convince Rhee we follow propaganda carefully and regard current campaign as having serious and bad effect ROK-U.S. relationships but willing defer to judgment expressed your 408." (611.95B/10-754)

611.95B/10-1954: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, October 19, 1954—7 p. m.
PRIORITY

460. Repeated information Tokyo 305. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Reference Embtel 455.[1] Seeking to salvage whatever we can out of unfortunate AP despatch, I have this afternoon sent following personal letter to President Rhee. (This intended to cover matters raised in Deptel 256

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[1] In this telegram, Oct. 19, Briggs reported that the AP story referred to in telegram 460 was a composite of views generally held by Americans in Seoul which was attributed without authorization to a single "American diplomatic official". (895B.131/10-1954)

October 6 [*5*] [2] as well as to reiterate points made September 27 pursuant Deptel 226 [3] regarding ROK anti-American campaign.)

"My Dear Mr. President: On my return from a visit to Tokyo to consult with General Hull on various Korean matters, I was distressed to observe a newspaper despatch originating in Seoul on October 17, attributing certain statements to an unnamed 'American diplomat' with reference to the present state of the relations between our two governments. I deplore the attribution of a statement of this character to an American official and, following investigation, I wish to assure you that no such statement had been authorized by any American diplomatic official in Korea.

"While on this subject, however, I am impelled in all friendship to refer to our meeting on September 27 last, during which, under specific instructions from my government, I took occasion to bring to your attention the public campaign on which the Korean Government had apparently embarked with reference to United States Government policy and objectives in Korea, including statements by highly placed officials of the Korean Government, as well as officially inspired editorials and cartoons. I mentioned to you, likewise pursuant to my instructions, that if this Korean Government campaign continued it could scarcely fail to affect relations between our two governments, which it is the desire of the American Government to be close, friendly and mutually beneficial.

"Thus while I reiterate that I do not view with anything except sincere regret and certainly cannot condone a newspaper article of the character described at the outset of this letter, nevertheless I should be less than frank were I not to view the unfortunate press despatch in question in the context of the continuing statements concerning the United States made by officials of the Government of the Republic of Korea, as well as in connection with the observations on that subject which I had the honor to make on the occasion of our September 27 meeting.

"I am, my dear Mr. President, with highest esteem and regard, Faithfully yours,"

BRIGGS

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[2] Not printed, but see footnote 2, *supra*.

[3] Not printed, but a summary of its main points was contained in telegram 362 from Seoul, Sept. 27, p. 1888.

795B.5 MSP/10–2254: Telegram [1]

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET SEOUL, October 22, 1954—8 p. m.
PRIORITY

474. Repeated information Tokyo 314. Reference my immediately preceding telegram.[2] After approximately two hours unfruitful discus-

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[1] The following file number was also printed on the source text: 611.95B/10–2254.

[2] The reference was to telegram 473 from Seoul, Oct. 22, in which Briggs reported that a meeting among Generals Hull and Taylor, Wood, himself, and Rhee and his advisers failed to produced a solution to the hwan–dollar controversy. (895B.131/10–2254)

sion hwan–dollar controversy I observed that although solution of that problem is urgent it is merely part of much larger panorama of economic matters as set forth in minute of understanding delivered September 27.[3] Inflation is with us because of diverse factors which it is proposed handle through basic understandings set forth in minute. Furthermore I reminded President that unless and until basic understanding reached US position is that we are not committed to any particular military and economic aid program. Hull and Wood supported these observations whereupon Pyun handed me ROK redraft together with various supporting documents (texts following telegrams [4]).

Since cursory examination redraft indicated changes are of such magnitude as apparently constitute rejection US proposals, I asked Rhee whether document submitted this morning covered new ground or whether it contained suggestions already made by ROK negotiators in Washington. Paek Tu-chin after some prodding finally admitted in effect that ROK redraft reiterated Korean positions considered during Washington negotiations. Hull, Wood and I then declared we had no authority to accept any revisions of negotiated instrument presented September 27. We, therefore, limited ourselves to stating ROK redraft would be communicated to Washington and that President Rhee would be informed of reply.

As Department will observe, redraft once more seeks impose ROK views on practically every point at issue, including proposal that US agree to support unification of Korea "even by force". With respect implementation economic program Hull and Wood indicated this morning (in connection hwan–dollar discussion) that appendix A paragraph 1 totally unacceptable. Memorandum accompanying ROK redraft (second succeeding telegram) appears to seek to commit US to practically every unacceptable proposition which has been raised by ROK during past several years, plus suggestion (paragraph 13) that "new UNC economic coordinator for Korea" be appointed.

Embassy recommends that Rhee be informed at earliest possible date, preferably in writing, that his counter-proposals are unacceptable. It is not believed that lengthy or contentious communication would be desirable but that our message should be brief and uncompromising, thus leaving Rhee in no doubt as to our attitude.

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[3] For text, see telegram DA 967743 to Hull, Sept. 15, p. 1875.

[4] Telegram 475, *infra*, and telegram 476, p. 1902.

With respect to Wood, I propose when delivering foregoing communication to Rhee to make oral statement along line Deptel 282, October 20.[5]

BRIGGS

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[5] In telegram 282 to Seoul, the Embassy was informed that:

"If Rhee expresses his intention declare Wood *persona non grata* he should be informed Wood enjoys full confidence US, he is true friend Korea, US believes his knowledge and competence have been of mutual benefit US and ROK, and in your judgment such step would be viewed by US as matter utmost gravity affecting fundamentally mutual trust and cooperation without which aid program cannot succeed. Hope therefore Rhee will reconsider. If he persists he should be informed you obviously have no alternative except communicate this information your Government and you will inform him when reactions your Government known." (795B./10–1954)

795B.5 MSP/10-2254: Telegram[1]

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, October 22, 1954—9 p. m.
PRIORITY

475. Following is text revised draft minute referred to my earlier telegram:[2]

"It is in the mutual interest of the United States and the Republic of Korea to continue the close cooperation in the efforts to unify Korea which has proved mutually beneficial and has played such an important part in the free world's struggle against Communist aggression and its determination to remain free.

Accordingly,

The Republic of Korea shall:

[Here follows paragraph 1 of the draft agreement which became, in modified form, the second obligation of the Republic of Korea in the approved text of the agreed minute of November 17. The text of the minute is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, November 29, 1954, pages 810–811.]

2. Accept the force levels and principles set forth in Appendix B which will permit the maintenance of an effective military program consistent with economic stability and within available resources;

3. Take the necessary measures to make the economic program effective, including those set forth in Appendix A.

Based upon the conditions which the Republic of Korea declares it will create, the United States shall:

1. Continue its program of helping to strengthen the Republic of Korea politically, economically and militarily, with programmed economic aid and direct military assistance furnished during fiscal year 1955 to aggregate up to $700 million.

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[1] The following file number was also printed on the source text: 611.95B/10–2254.

[2] Telegram 474, *supra*.

This amount would exceed by more than $100 million the amount of assistance previously contemplated by the United States for Korea in fiscal year 1955. Of this total, programmed economic aid, including the CRIK carry-over and the United States contribution to UNKRA, available for obligation in fiscal year 1955 would amount to approximately $250 million;

2. Support a strengthened Republic of Korea military establishment as outlined in Appendix B, including the development of a reserve system, in accordance with arrangements to be worked out by appropriate military representatives of the two governments;

3. Consult fully with appropriate military representatives of the Republic of Korea in the implementation of the program for support of the Republic of Korea military establishment;

4. In the event of an unprovoked attack upon the Republic of Korea shall employ, in accordance with its constitutional processes, its military power against the aggressor;

[Here follows paragraph 5 of the draft which was dropped from the approved minute.]

6. Subject to the necessary congressional authorizations, continue to press forward with the economic program for the rehabilitation of Korea.

Appendix A

Measures for an effective economic program.

1. With respect to the exchange rates, the official rate of the Republic of Korea Government and the counterpart rate being 180 to 1, agreement to procedures as proposed by the United States for the conversion of dollars at a different and realistic exchange rate to cover hwan drawings of United States by sale of dollars through the Bank of Korea. No hwan drawings are to be continued and the sale of dollars through the Bank of Korea should be made to authorized traders. Accordingly, the existing agreements regarding United Nations hwan loans are to be cancelled;

2. Agreement that material for the aid program—not furnished from the United States in kind—will be procured wherever in non-Communist countries goods of the best quality can be obtained at the best price (it being the objective to perform the maximum possible procurement in Korea at competitive world prices). However, we must not procure from any country that has trade relations with Communist China or the Northern Korea puppet regime; and

3. Provision of adequate information to the appropriate United States representatives concerning Korean plans for the use of their own foreign exchange."

[Here follows Appendix B, which concerns Republic of Korea force levels for 1955 and United States support thereof.]

BRIGGS

795B.00/10–2254: Telegram[1]

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

SEOUL, October 22, 1954—11 p. m.

476. Following is text memorandum referred to my earlier telegram:[2]

"The situation in Korea is deteriorating with every passing day. We are still trying, against desperate odds, to survive as a democratic state, to unify our tragically divided country, and to create an austere economy that will permit our bare survival.

Representatives of the United States and the Republic of Korea have failed to achieve agreement after months of negotiations, and we therefore suggest a re-evaluation of all the questions and all the evidence involved.

With the sole purpose of maintaining the most cordial relationship with the United States, of building a strong Korea, and of speeding the defeat of our Communist enemies, we submit the following proposals and suggestions for the consideration of the United States:

1. US agreement to reconsider the matter of Korean defenses.

(Explanation: Militarily we are far weaker and the Communists are far stronger than at the time of the cease-fire. The UN forces are withdrawing, while the Communists are reinforcing. Air supremacy has been sacrificed through withdrawal and through permitting the enemy illegally to activate 40 military airfields in the north.

([Here follows a portion of the memorandum in which the Republic of Korea Government complained of lack of United States support for its military forces.] It is the position of the Republic of Korea that an increase of 15 regular divisions, with all appurtenant equipment, constitutes the minimum increase needed as replacement for the withdrawing UN forces and thus ensure holding the line. In the light of the grave and growing Communist threat to the United States and all free Asia, it is our firm conviction that to reject our military proposals is to risk the loss of America's strongest ally against communism, and also to risk the loss of the whole Far East).

2. ROK agreement to retain its forces under the operational control of the UNC so long as that command works in cooperation with ROK in its efforts to defend and unify Korea and in addition for the increase of 10 or 15 actual divisions.

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[1] The following file number was also printed on the source text: 611.95B/10–2254.

[2] The reference was to telegram 474 from Seoul, Oct. 22, p. 1898.

(Explanation: We have the highest regard for the leadership of General Hull, and hope that it will continue to be directed toward our joint goal of a strong and unified Korea).

[Here follows paragraph 3 in which the Republic of Korea opposed an American plan to set aside a fixed percentage of total ROK reserves for South Korea's military establishment.]

4. US agreement to respect ROK currency stabilization.

(Explanation: Inflation already is a terrible threat to the stability of this country. History proves the justification of our fears. In 1945 the currency was won, and the rate was 15 to 1. Under ECA pressure, this was increased again and again—creating cruel inflation and economic chaos. Finally, in 1953 the rate of 23,000 to 1 was demanded, and we changed the currency to hwan (1 hwan representing 100 won) to prevent collapse of the whole economy. The hwan rate then was set at 60 to 1, and later that was trebled to 180 to 1 with the understanding that this rate would remain permanent.

(If this spiral is permitted to continue, we soon shall be back to the 23,000 won rate, and that in hwan. When won was in use, our currency circulation jumped from approximately 55 billion in June of 1950 to almost 1 trillion 137 billion in February 1953. Since then, using hwan, the increase has been 5 fold—from 7 billion to more than 35 billion at the present time. The United States knows that printing-press money is the ruination of any country's economy, and that is what we are desperately trying to avoid. We ask only that the United States help us by not starting a new rate spiral, and by resuming the regular dollar payments for any hwan advances of this government).

5. US agreement to use its civilian and military authorities to help check the smuggling of Japanese goods and materials into Korea.

(Explanation: Such smuggling has shown dangerous increases in the last few months. It is a threat to our economy and a menace to our security, inasmuch as smuggling and espionage are closely inter-related).

6. US agreement to use its good offices to settle that Korean-Japanese dispute on a basis of the minimum Korean proposals.

(Explanation: The Republic of Korea has repeatedly offered to adjust its differences with Japan but the Japanese have persistently refused our overtures. In the interests of peace in the Pacific, we believe the United States should actively intervene and persuade the Japanese to accept our minimum requirements as a reasonable settlement.

(As a minimum to provide suggestion that the Japanese recognize the fishery peace line, and return the art treasures and the gold reserve. Return of the reserve would permit us to re-establish a sound currency based on gold, and thus would be highly effective in stabilizing our economy).

7. Use of the $280,000,000 aid fund to replace the gold reserve, in the event that Japan is unwilling or unable to do so with its own resources.

(Explanation: This would represent a fair and simple way of bolstering the Korean economy and liquidating a Japanese debt without additional cost to the United States).

8. US guarantee of Korean independence against Japanese aggression.

(Explanation: Korea cannot quickly forget the cruel oppression of 40 years of Japanese occupation, and our fears of a resurgent Japan have not been put to rest by Japanese denial of our sovereignty and threats to return to this peninsula. Such a guarantee would give pause to the Japanese militarists, and would permit us to reach a *rapprochement* with Japan without imperiling the future of our country).

9. Once other differences are eliminated, the conclusion of commercial agreements among the United States, Korea, and Japan.

(Explanation: The Republic of Korea is fully aware that mutually beneficial trade relations are essential to the well being of free Asia. When extant barriers are removed, we hope to participate in trade with all other free nations to the fullest possible extent).

10. US declaration that it stands for the independence and freedom of all Asiatic nations and peoples on an equal basis.

(Explanation: This will clear the way for other free Asiatic nations to deal with Japan directly, without further fear of military or economic aggrandizement. All of Asia has felt the whip of the Japanese, and United States policy in the Pacific can never succeed until the widely held suspicions of Japan are ameliorated).

[Here follows paragraph 11 in which the Republic of Korea sought a joint agreement to seek Korean unification by whatever means necessary.]

12. Joint agreement to set aside the counterpart funds for reconstruction work.

(Explanation: American aid funds are declared to be designed for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of this war-worn country. But even the most ambitious and efficient dollar program cannot do the job adequately. We must help ourselves to the fullest possible extent, and reconstruction use of the counterpart funds would greatly implement our role in the total program).

13. Appointment of a new UNC economic coordinator for Korea.

(Explanation: The Republic of Korea strongly feels that the whole aid program would be greatly expedited by new direction. It is our position that such direction should be solely concerned with the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Korean economy, without regard to any benefits to be derived, or not to be derived, by Japan or any other nations.

(We have the feeling, rightly or wrongly, that some anti-Korean and some pro-Japanese sentiments have pervaded certain segments of the FOA organization. These attitudes have led to misrepresentation of the Korean position, and to bad feeling that has impeded the assistance program. We urge that a new start be made in order to strengthen the friendly relations and the cooperation between our two countries).

[Here follows paragraph 14 in which the Republic of Korea asked for amendments to the draft minute to conform with its revisions above.]

15. Cancellation of all previous agreements and understandings between the United States and the Republic of Korea.

(Explanation: During the period of the active war, the Republic of Korea's Government was operating under difficult emergency circumstances. Our need was so great that we had a tendency to sign anything that was put before us, regardless of the long-term effects.

(This government believes that this is the time to make a new beginning with the United States. Starting with these proposals as a basis, we can negotiate new understandings that will be fair to both countries and that will protect our mutual interests. By so doing, we can eliminate all the misunderstandings of the past, and renew our eternal allegiance and friendship).

The Government of the Republic of Korea has every confidence that the Government of the United States of America will give these proposals and suggestions the careful study and evaluation that this government has applied to them. We believe sincerely that they afford a workable basis for mutual understanding that will contribute tremendously toward a strengthening of the US position in the Far East, toward the creation of a puissant and unified Korea, and toward the eventual collapse of communism throughout the world."

BRIGGS

795B.00/10-2654: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 26, 1954—7:25 p. m.

295. Your 474,[2] 475,[3] 476[4] and 478.[5] Re ROK revised draft Minute you should draft and present to Rhee written reply which includes following points: Major changes in ROK draft Minute are in direction of increasing US commitments and decreasing ROK commitments and are unacceptable US. US position these matters has been explained fully during and subsequent visit to US of President Rhee. Re unification,

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Howard Smith and cleared by Robertson and representatives from FOA, Defense, and Treasury.

[2] Dated Oct. 22, p. 1898.

[3] Dated Oct. 22, p. 1900.

[4] *Supra.*

[5] In this telegram, Oct. 23, the Embassy transmitted to the Department of State a four-page Appendix 2 to the ROK revised minute of understanding. In it, the ROK Government detailed what it considered to be misuse of Korean aid funds since 1945 by U.S. authorities. (795B.5 MSP/10-2354)

ROK knows from statements President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles that US cannot accept undertaking to support unification by force. While willing discuss US draft Minute with ROK, US position on substantive points firm and US not committed to economic and military aid undertakings without ROK acceptance undertakings contained US draft Minute and appendices. US hopes ROK will reconsider its position and agree to US draft Minute substantially in present form so that economic and military aid programs can go forward.

When delivering above note you should make oral response ROK memorandum and appendix two contained Seoul 476 and 478 along following lines (including comments on Wood referred Seoul 474): United States position re matters contained memorandum has been expressed in United States draft Minute and explained ROK patiently and thoroughly beginning visit President Rhee. Re Japanese-ROK relations United States has expressed willingness many times extend good offices, but this is matter to be discussed separately. Believe first order business is to agree on Minute which will enable both countries devote energies strengthening economy and armed forces. Re ROK Appendix Two, these allegations have been discussed time and again with ROK officials. Discussion these views most unproductive at this time although Mr. Wood willing discuss problems in CEB. Suffice it to say ROK views on aid matters unique in history United States worldwide economic aid.

DULLES

795B.00/10-2854: Telegram [1]

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET SEOUL, October 28, 1954—8 p. m.

503. Repeated information Tokyo 338. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and CAG. Re Embtel 501.[2] Following is text of letter dated October 28 I shall deliver to President Rhee tomorrow morning in compliance Deptel 295.[3]

Begin text.

My Dear Mr. President: I have honor inform you I have now received instructions from my government on Korean redraft of minute of understanding which was presented to me at our meeting October 22.

Major changes in redraft are contrary to fixed American policy, or precluded by statutory limitations, or of such nature as to make successful aid program impossible. Moreover, changes are in direction increasing commitments of US and decreasing those of ROK. My government directs me state they are unacceptable to American Government.

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[1] The following file number was also printed on the source text: 611.95B/10-2854.

[2] This telegram dealt with the mechanics of arranging an interview with Rhee. (795B.00/10-2854)

[3] *Supra.*

As explained in our meetings on subject of minute respective positions on these matters were fully explored both during your visit to US and in subsequent negotiations in Washington extending over some seven weeks. For example, with respect point five of commitments of US in Korean redraft American Government cannot, as Government of ROK is aware from statements by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, accept undertaking support unification Korea by force, although it does support unification by all peaceful means.

American position on substantive points contained in draft minute of understanding presented to you September 27 is firm. Without agreement of Government of ROK to undertakings contained in draft minute and its appendices, Government of US is not committed to undertakings with respect economic and military aid. American Government is willing to discuss with your government details of draft minute presented September 27, but additional discussion will only delay aid programs and cannot, as stated above, change substantive points that document.

In these circumstances Government of US sincerely hopes Government of ROK will reconsider its position and agree to draft minute as presented to you September 27. In this way economic and military aid program, largest single aid program proposed by Government of US for current fiscal year, can go forward without further delay.

With renewed assurances of my highest consideration and esteem, I am, my dear Mr. President,

Faithfully yours,

End text.

BRIGGS

795B.00/10–2954: Telegram [1]

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET SEOUL, October 29, 1954—9 p. m.

509. Repeated information Tokyo 343. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and CAG. Reference Embtel 503 repeated Tokyo 338 October 28.[2]

Letter quoted reference telegram delivered President Rhee this morning. Prime Minister Pyun, Admiral Sohn and Counselor Strom likewise present. President received letter and supplementary oral observations [3] concerning two memoranda with equanimity, but gave little indication either then or in course of meeting lasting nearly three hours of action which he may eventually take re minute of understanding.

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[1] The following file number was also printed on the source text: 611.95B/10–2954.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Enclosed in a letter from Briggs to McClurkin, Nov. 3, was a memorandum, entitled "Supplementing Embtel 509 from Seoul, dated October 29, 1954," which read as follows:

"On delivering to President Rhee the letter referred to in Embtel 509, I likewise made the oral observation concerning the second ROK memorandum, pursuant to the instructions contained in Deptel 295 of October 26.

"With reference to this second memorandum I informed President Rhee that the majority of the allegations contained therein relative to the economic aid program had already been considered by my Government, that it did not seem necessary therefore for that document to be considered further between him and me, but that should the ROK Government so desire, Mr. Wood would be pleased to consider them through CEB channels. The President made no comment." (611.95B/11–354)

1. With regard to letter and minute Rhee made lengthy discursive statement along familiar lines, with emphasis on unification issue and inability Korea remain indefinitely "half slave and half free." He made, however, two requests both with regard unification. He asked whether US Government would agree either delete all references to unification from minute (which would presumably result in suppression Korean commitment point one and US commitment point five) or else have US point five read "support unification of Korea" with deletion following phrase "by all peaceful means." When he insisted that this be conveyed to Washington as ROK request I agreed but pointed out that as set forth in letter, American position on substantive points in minute is firm, and since my government unquestionably regards unification as substantive, answer bound to be negative. Discussion of letter and minute concluded by statement by Rhee at end of meeting that US Government views would be studied immediately by him and his advisors.

Only reference to hwan drawing and exchange rate controversy also came at end of talk when President expressed optimism concerning prospects of solution to which I replied that solution was inherent in minute as submitted by US, if accepted by ROK.

Balance of conversation had to do principally with economic coordinator Wood and ROK relations with Japan.

2. Regarding Wood I declared after presenting letter (and repeated in substance several times thereafter) that he enjoys full confidence US Government, is true friend of Korea, US considers his knowledge and ability have been of mutual benefit to both ROK and US, and that his removal would be viewed by US as matter of utmost gravity affecting fundamentally trust and confidence without which aid program cannot succeed. Rhee replied with long harangue alleging *inter alia* Wood "unfriendly" and had dragged feet on economic program especially last year by failure comply President Eisenhower's alleged directive to allocate first 200 million dollars by December 31, 1953. I told President that sum mentioned had been for fiscal year ending June 30 rather than for allocation during first half year, that Wood's authority from Washington did not include allocation in absence basic agreement concerning use of funds except that Wood had been able obtain 50 million dollars for immediate allocation last year, and that he had used that amount pending agreement last December on terms of reference.

I also informed President that in precisely same way in which ROK Government is preventing use of this year's funds by failure accept minute, ROK was responsible for delay last year in developing program. I said there is no more reason blame Wood for last year's delays, which were attributable to ROK Government, than there would be to blame Wood concerning present situation which results from failure thus far ROK Government accept minute of understanding.

President received these observations tranquilly, if unenthusiastically, and he did not press points further or specifically declare Wood *persona non grata.* Whether Rhee pays attention is another matter. (In this connection I hear Rhee last night gave interview to Scripps–Howard correspondent Lucam, who reportedly described President as "near considering Wood PNG".)

3. Relations with Japan. On this subject Rhee consumed much time but covered little new territory. Since my primary object today was promote consideration minute I intended limited observations to informing President that as stated many times before US desirous of facilitating solution, and that our willingness extend offices still stands. Rhee however embarked on interminable attack, substance of which was that unless American Government is pro-Japanese US should obtain Japanese agreement to points in controversy, especially renunciation claims, as conditions precedent resumption negotiations. I produced memorandum submitted by Rhee October 22 (Embtel 476[4] that date) whereupon Rhee sought disclaim knowledge thereof asking how he could be expected "remember all these details". When I asked whether 280 million dollars demanded from Japan according to memorandum as part of price for renewing negotiations was a detail, Rhee sought give impression never saw memorandum before and instructed Sohn "find out what this is all about".

(We thus face Alice in Wonderland situation in which Prime Minister Pyun last Monday said memorandum prepared in President's office without Pyun's knowledge, and President today says he himself unaware contents. As if all this were insufficient I this afternoon received letter from Pyun dated today in which he gives me following, described as supplementary clarification re item 7 of ROK memorandum: "During Japanese war against US, Japan took gold reserve away from Korea. If Japan cannot return this gold reserve 280 million dollars allocated as US economic aid may be used toward replacement of gold reserve." If I correctly understand this project, US is being called on to give Japan 280 million dollars now earmarked for Korean economic aid, which Japan transfers to Korea in settlement gold reserve account, which Korea will thereupon use with no strings attached).

4. NNSC. This subject again raised by Rhee in complaint almost identical with that expressed October 22 meeting, see Hull's CINCFE C 70040 October 24.[5] I repeated what Hull said last week.

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[4] *Ante,* p. 1902.

[5] In this telegram, Hull reported that Rhee had stated on Oct. 22 that the presence of the NNSC in South Korea was intolerable and that he proposed to have the ROK police

Continued

5. During meeting Rhee made several statements along line "if US won't cooperate I shall be forced to work out unification with Communists" (Please see Embtel 362 repeated Tokyo 237 September 27 [6]).

Recommendations follow.

BRIGGS

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arrest them and escort them back to the DMZ where they would be freed. Hull cautioned patience and reminded Rhee that the UNC was obligated by the armistice to protect the NNSC and this Hull intended to do. Hull strongly recommended that action be taken in Washington to expedite the withdrawal of the NNSC from South Korea before Rhee initiated an incident which would prove extremely embarrassing to CINCUNC and the U.S. Government. (FE files, lot 55 D 480, "Korean Black Book, October 1954")

[6] *Ante*, p. 1888.

795.00/11-854: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 8, 1954—6:38 p. m.

316. State–Defense message. Reference C 69958.[2]

1. State has recently approached UK and France with suggestion Sixteen make concerted approach Swiss and Swedes suggesting they announce to MAC that because of inability carry out their responsibilities in north they withdrawing their personnel from NNSC inspection teams in both north and south Korea to DZ until convinced of Communist willingness cooperate. Hope was this approach more persuasive in view its concerted nature plus fact withdrawal Swiss and Swedes would be only to DZ rather than complete.

2. Meantime Canadians proposed UNC attempt negotiate with Communist command a strengthened NNSC. Canadians believe negotiations should have limit of 6 months.

3. State made clear to French and British Canadian proposal completely unacceptable in view urgency elimination Czechs and Poles from ROK. French then proposed compromise position which UK strongly supports. Compromise was that Sixteen make concerted approach Swiss and Swedes suggesting Swiss and Swedes announce presumably to MAC that: (*a*) the terms of NNSC and manner in which they are being implemented inadequate permit effective supervision and thus change in these terms should be negotiated by military commands; and (*b*) in view this situation they withdrawing their personnel from teams in north and south to DZ until satisfactory arrangements for more effective supervision have been negotiated by two military commands. Propositions (*a*) and (*b*) constitute package proposal to be carried out simultaneously and thus would solve immediate problem

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[1] This telegram, drafted by Jones and cleared by McClurkin and Sullivan of the Department of Defense (in draft), was repeated to Tokyo as telegram 965 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.

[2] Dated Oct. 18, not printed.

Czechs and Poles in ROK who would be ejected if necessary on grounds no team can exist without equal number neutrals both sides. We would impose time limit not more than 3 months on negotiations.

4. Recognize negotiation probably fruitless but French proposal easier for Swiss and Swedes and our Allies accept and has better chance gain our immediate objective. Realize difficulties involved in conduct negotiations even for limited period. Presumably in negotiations our proposals could include propositions which Communists would find unacceptable but which would not appear unreasonable to our Allies. Might consider for example negotiating change in composition since composition our fundamental criticism present Commission. In proposing changes composition would reject Indians as fifth member on grounds their involvement Indochina commissions and on same grounds suggest Communist nominate replacement for Poles. Argument would be situation two areas somewhat different and unfortunate to have members with responsibilities both Commissions and thus with tendencies use precedent one situation as basis decision other situation.

5. Request comments specific proposal of French and views as to feasibility limited negotiations and detailed changes UNC might propose in such negotiations. Note in this connection comments on Jodahl [3] suggestion reftel.

DULLES

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[3] The retiring head of the Swedish NNSC contingent.

FE files, lot 55 D 480, "Korean Black Book, November 1954": Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Hull) to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Ridgway) [1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

TOKYO, November 8, 1954—8:37 p. m.

C 70208. Exclusive for Ridgway. While Pres Rhee's final posit on draft min of understanding and other iss before US and ROK Govt is still in doubt, there is sufficient likelihood that agreement will not be reached, that urgent consideration ought to be given by highest levels US Govt to what course we should then fol. It is the conviction of rep of all US agencies having resp in Korea that if Rhee does not cooperate in resolving sat the iss presently in dispute, such as the draft min and the dol hwan controversy, and persists in unfriendly acts toward the US, we must be prep to consider other courses of action. It is therefore evident that the resp US auth need an integrated plan embracing political, econ and mil meas to cope with Pres Rhee's cont resistance to cooperate with US plcy in Korea. This msg undertakes to outline such a plan for urgent consideration and concurrence at Wash level.

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[1] This telegram, which was passed by the Department of the Army to the Department of State and FOA, was also from Briggs and Wood and copies were provided them and Taylor for their exclusive information.

The overall obj of this plan is to induce Rhee to cooperate with US plcy. Failing this, the US must consider what dev may result from this situation, incl Rhee's possible reply by elm more fav to the US and decide its course of action in such eventualities.

The plan consists of 4 series of actions increasing severity designed to dev mounting pressures upon the Rhee Govt.

Series 1. The following steps will be taken if Rhee does not cooperate with the US, for example if he does not agree to draft min fol Wash reply to his req of Oct 29.[2] Rhee should thereupon be informed of the substance of (*a*) below. He should also be told that these steps are the consequences of his refusal to cooperate with the US in its plcy of political, econ and mil supp for Korea, and that they do not in any way indc lessening of interest on the part of the US in Korea and its people and the attainment of their legitimate obj.

(*a*) Wash would announce:

(1) Except for certain spec commodities which it is deter essential to cont sup in order to safeguard ROK econ and US aid program against irreparable losses, reduce all outstanding proc auth to amt rep by contr already made and iss no new proc auth. The effect of this action would be to initiate substantial reduction in rate of pdn and consumption, while preventing sudden and catastrophic setback of the econ. For example, POL should be prov after settlement of hwan dwg iss to the min extent nec to mt essential trans and lub, but not for civ heating.
(2) Slow down of mil program, incl cessation of any expansion beyond presently auth levels.
(3) Cont and expansion of present efforts to acquire hwan for US forces needs until ROK lives up to existing agreements or concludes acpt new one.
(4) Wash is rev all plans relating to Korea.

Series 2.

The actions under Series 2 should be considered if Rhee takes action of the fol sort:

(1) Cont build up of anti American sentiment and vilification of US plcy.
(2) Cont to reject the min of understanding.
(3) Cont to withhold hwan.
(4) Enforces an unrealistic exch rate to the detriment of the aid program.
(5) Uses violence against Neutral Nations Insp Teams.
(6) Withdraws ROK forces from UNC opr con.

This list is merely illustrative of some of the actions the US might be reqr to counter either singly or in comb. It is not intended that any one of these actions would auto release the steps contempleted below, but the situation should be reexam for this purpose in light of such actions as Rhee may take.

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[2] Reference was to telegram 509, p. 1907.

(*a*) Wash would announce:

(1) In view of Rhee's attitude, the US will reduce its relations with Rhee Govt to min rqr for maint of formal diplomatic relations;
(2) Susp of all econ aid which is in the phase prior to conclusion of contr;
(3) The US is considering the redeployment of remaining US forces in Korea and will discuss withdrawal of other UN units with the respective Govt;
(4) The US will cont mil aid only on min basis consistent with US interests. This does not signify lessening of US interest in the scty of Korea and its people, as the Joint Declaration of Sixteen and the US ROK Mutual Def Treaty (if ratifications exch) remain in eff.

(*b*) Contacts with Rhee political opponents (incl where desirable, selected mbr of present Govt and Liberal Party) will be established by US ofl in Korea. These political leaders, as well as selected ROKA commanders, will be kept fully informed regarding the situation, and particularly regarding US plcy and actions and reasons therefor.

Series 3. If the Rhee Govt does not give its full cooperation as result of foregoing meas, the fol add steps should be considered:

(*a*) Wash would announce:

(1) To fullest extent possible, all aid fin contr will be term and aid shipmt on the high seas will be diverted. Econ Coord and his staff will be withdrawn. All KCAC actys, except the dir rel of phys emerg, will be susp. All prev offers and proposals of aid will be voided.
(2) The US and UN intends to withdraw all forces from Korea except KMAG.
(3) The reiteration of cont US interest in Korea's scty as exp in Series 2 Para (*a*)(4) above.

(*b*) Withdrawal of residual forces will take place immed fol KCOMZ roll up, prov political situation has not changed in the meantime.

(*c*) Contacts with Korean political and mil leaders will be increased and to the extent deemed appropriate they may be informed that Rhee's continued refusal to cooperate with US may rqr reexam of US attitude toward Rhee Govt, incl consideration of possible altn situations which might be brought about by Koreans themselves; that the US could only consider supp leaders who rep broad segment of political opinion in Korea, have the supp and cooperation of ROKA, and can dmst their ability to cooperate together and with US; and that US would consider prov political asylum in US mil instl on an indiv basis to extent US auth are sat that it is essential and wrnt by circumstances.

Series 4. Assuming that Rhee cont intransigent and that successful move on part of Koreans to repl his Govt has not taken place, the last action remaining to US would be withdrawal of KMAG. In view of valuable mil eqp in hands of ROK, it will never be desirable step to withdraw our advisors as long as their posit is marginally tenable. This action should therefore be considered as last resort.

General comments. It is conceivable that at any time Rhee may take some action so offensive to US interest that telescoping of these series might be rqr. On the other hand, Rhee may take occasional meas to placate US momentarily, such as renewal of sale of hwan. While US actions should be adjusted to recog adequately such fav meas, we should not be beguiled into relaxing pressure on Rhee Govt until it has clearly shown its intention to cooperate as loyal ally.

Recm. It is recm that:

(*a*) The concept of scaled application of pressures to induce Rhee to cooperate be appr.

(*b*) Action in Series 1 be appr for immed planning by appropriate US auth and for impl if Rhee refuses to acpt the draft min of understanding when Wash reply to his req of Oct 29 has been comm to him.

(*c*) The appropriate US auth be dir to dev supp plans to permit impl of Series 2, 3 and 4, with understanding that these series of meas would only be undertaken fol subs recm.

611.95B/11-954: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET SEOUL, November 9, 1954—6 p. m.

540. Repeated information Tokyo 362. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and CAG. As result of Tokyo meeting yesterday among Generals Hull and Taylor, Tyler Wood and me, agreement was reached on important message despatched by Hull last night for State, FOA and Defense (CINCUNC C 70209).[1] Present status US-ROK relations self-evidently unsatisfactory and as indicated in message we believe general plan to cope with Rhee's possibly continued intransigence ought to be considered. Our message also mentions type of measures designed bring increasing pressure on Rhee Government at time when that Government may well be weakening.

We all recognize that possible successor to Rhee may be key to solution and simultaneously that Rhee has so completely dominated local political stage that no single or outstanding successor readily identifiable at this juncture.

It is recommended that Department approve plan outlined including continuing pressure on Rhee who is by no means insensitive to determined US action when taken. For example, hwan advances were resumed when Rhee saw we meant business in selling POL for local currency and paying local employees in US currency. Had these steps been put into effect earlier our position today would be appreciably stronger.

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[1] Telegram C 70209 from Hull was identical to telegram C 70208, *supra*, according to a copy of C 70209 in Department of Defense files.

Similarly with regard to minute of understanding, I believe we should reply soonest to Rhee's request of October 29 plus Pyun's letter October 28 to Secretary (Embtels 509 [2] and 512 [3] repeated Tokyo 343 and 345). Over four months of present fiscal year have already passed and it seems desirable to bring this issue to head as quickly as we can, and in event Rhee still refuses cooperate, to initiate action along line suggested in joint message C 70209 from Tokyo.

Briggs

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[2] Dated Oct. 29, p. 1907.

[3] In telegram 512 from Seoul, Oct. 30, Pyun made a personal appeal to Dulles for changes in the draft minute of understanding. Pyun asked for elimination of the qualifying phrase "by all peaceful means" in conjunction with U.S. support of Korean unification and for deletion of the phrase "in violation of the armistice" with respect to the U.S. obligation to come to the military aid of the ROK in the event of an unprovoked attack. (795B.00/10-3054)

795B.00/11-1254: Telegram [1]

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [2]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 12, 1954—7:34 p. m.

326. Seoul's 509,[3] 512 [4] and 540 [5] repeated Tokyo 338 [*343*], 343 [*345*] and 362 CINCUNC's C 70208.[6]

Consideration being given in State, Defense and FOA to joint recommendations contained C 70208. In meantime, request you transmit following reply (unnecessary words deleted) from Secretary to Pyun's letter of October 30 (signed copy pouched).

"I received letter October 30, 1954 and read carefully together with suggested changes your Government proposed in draft Minute which transmitted us by Ambassador Briggs.

In letter October 30, 1954 you have drawn my attention, in particular, two specific changes. We have you know given very careful consideration over long period to draft Minute and have regarded it as package with which must deal as whole rather than part. Do not wish, therefore, address myself in any detail this time to two proposals you made amendment of Minute, particularly view of apparent fact that these not only changes your Government wants made before we reach agreement.

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[1] The following file number was also printed on the source text: 611.95B/11-1254.

[2] This telegram, drafted by Jones and cleared with McClurkin and Secretary of Defense Wilson, as well as with represenatives of FOA and Treasury, was repeated to Tokyo as telegram 1009 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.

[3] Dated Oct. 29, p. 1907.

[4] Not printed, but see footnote 3, *supra*.

[5] *Supra.*

[6] Dated Nov. 8, p. 1911.

I nevertheless feel constrained reiterate importance this Government places unification Korea by peaceful means. On this subject, essential there be no mistake position of United States. This position, of course, made clear to you on frequent occasions. With respect to second point, phrase 'in violation of the armistice' in item 4 undertakings necessary until ratifications Mutual Defense Treaty exchanged, in order make clear legal basis upon which this Government would act in event aggression against Korea.

In conclusion, let me emphasize distress at lack progress which made reaching agreement between our two countries. More than third year in which hoped implement aid program of increased magnitude has already passed. Further delay only mean continued and serious setback to program economic reconstruction and strengthening of armed forces of which both countries feel essential."

Reply to Rhee request paragraph 1 Seoul's 509 should be in same vein as reply Pyun. In transmitting letter Pyun and replying Rhee you should remind them more than ⅓ current fiscal year passed, failure ROK concur Minute costing Korean economy and ROK military forces millions dollars additional aid had hoped make available since increasingly doubtful can compress into closing months fiscal year all such additional aid. In addition inform them refusal agree undertakings we consider important and which not different from those accepted by other countries to whom aid extended is necessitating review Korean aid program. While no attempt being made here to develop precise figures you may inform Rhee if you think useful that review being conducted determine level economic military aid justified view lack agreement principles fundamental to successful reconstruction effort. May inform Rhee you cannot overemphasize seriousness this situation in eyes your government and belief your government unless agreement reached soon may be necessary inform Congress and public that program developed during Rhee visit Washington cannot be implemented.

For your information only prepared delete entire US undertaking support Korean unification from Minute (but not ROK undertaking support US efforts toward unification) if ROK make clear willingness accede on other points (if appears useful US might then deliver separate letter on subject US views re unification). Such US concession if made should help ROK some and have little effect on general understanding US position.

DULLES

795B.00/11-1454: Telegram [1]

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT SEOUL, November 14, 1954—midnight.

558. Repeated information priority Tokyo 382. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and CAG. Reference: Deptel 326 [2] repeated information Tokyo 1009.

Prime Minister Pyun asked to see me privately before dinner for Congressmen Vorys and Richards tonight. He was accompanied by Defense Minister Sohn.

Pyun began by saying he was going to New York as ROK representative at UN General Assembly during debate on Korean item. He hopes depart Seoul Tuesday [3] and expressed strong desire conclude agreement on draft minute before his departure. He inquired whether reply had been received to his October 30 letter to Secretary Dulles and I then handed him copy of letter contained reference telegram.

In course of subsequent discussion, Pyun made following points:

1. He confirmed that request to Wood by Paek Tu-chin (Embtel 557 [4] repeated Tokyo 381) did not relate to language of draft minute on hwan-dollar conversion rate but was matter for subsequent consideration.
2. He stated that two points mentioned his October 30 letter were only points of disagreement remaining re draft minute.
3. In response to my explanation why words "in violation of the armistice" in item four of US commitments were required, he expressed confidence he could obtain President Rhee's agreement to immediate exchange of ratifications of US-ROK mutual defense treaty.
4. Following discussion of language re unification Pyun suggested alternative of dropping "by all peaceful means" from item five US commitments or else eliminating item five entirely. He stated unequivocally that ROK prepared accept item one of ROK commitment and pointed out this contained all assurances US should need.

I told Pyun I would refer matters discussed points (3) and (4) above to Washington with view to possibility agreement on minute prior his departure Tuesday. In connection possible deletion item five of US commitments I suggested that if Washington agreed to this suggestion it might be desirable have US position on this subject expressed in separate letter from Secretary Dulles to Pyun. He seemed agreeable this solution and stated he would discuss these points with President in morning. I told Pyun that I thought it would be highly desirable for him to have announcement US-ROK agreement on minute made before his departure for UNGA.

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[1] The following file number was also printed on the source text: 611.95B/11-1454.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Nov. 16.

[4] Not printed. (856D.131/11-1354)

In light this conversation, recommend I be authorized accept following solutions if ROK agrees to:

1. Deletion words "in violation of the armistice" from item four of US commitments on receipt authorization from President Rhee to immediate exchange of ratification instruments on MDT in Washington.
2. Deletion item five of US commitments on understanding item one ROK commitments stands and US position on unification Korea by peaceful means will be expressed in letter from Secretary Dulles to Prime Minister.

In view timing Pyun's departure request this authorization soonest subject confirmation by President Rhee of these two points and his acceptance remainder US draft of minute.

BRIGGS

795B.00/11–1754: Telegram [1]

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [2]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 14, 1954—10:19 p. m.
NIACT

327. Your 558.[3] Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. You are authorized subject confirmation by President Rhee of two following points and subject his acceptance remainder United States draft Minute, appendices and letter Secretary Wilson to Sohn:

1. Agree deletion words "in violation of the armistice" from item 4 United States commitments. However you should exchange notes stating item 4 as revised not effective until exchange instruments ratification Mutual Defense Treaty.
2. Agree deletion item 5 United States commitments on understanding item 1 ROK commitments remains. As alternative letter from Secretary to Pyun, exchange notes referred to above might serve as vehicle for indicating United States position on unification unchanged. On other hand our position on unification has been made so clear both in public and private there may be no real necessity restating it unless you believe there is danger ROK might later cite our willingness delete item 5 as evidence shift in our position.

If you reach agreement with ROK in accordance foregoing you authorized initial Minute on behalf United States Government. Words "in Washington" should be deleted from title of Minute.

General Hull has signed original letter form Wilson to Sohn.

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[1] The following file number was also printed on the source text: 611.95B/11–1754.

[2] This telegram, drafted by McClurkin and cleared in substance by Robertson, was repeated to Tokyo as telegram 1012 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.

[3] *Supra.*

Since Minute and its attachments not suitable public release you Hull and Wood should agree with ROK on what will be said publicly. Will appreciate earliest possible prior notification time and text.

This message cleared in substance with Defense and FOA.

DULLES

795B.00/11-1554: Telegram [1]

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT SEOUL, November 15, 1954—5 p. m.

559. Repeated information niact Tokyo 384. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Reference Embassy telegram 558,[2] repeated Tokyo 382 and Department telegram 327,[3] sent Tokyo 1012.

I accompanied Congressmen Vorys and Richards calling on President Rhee this morning. After prolonged discussion of future position Japan in Far East and of other matters President stated:

1. He would instruct ROK Ambassador Washington exchange instruments ratification Mutual Defense Treaty.
2. Re unification question in minute he would be satisfied with deletion point 5 American undertakings. (I told him US position on unification by peaceful means would in that event be set forth in note).

Since President Rhee has confirmed two points set forth Department telegram 327 and has accepted other provisions, I am preparing sign draft minute and exchange notes as soon as final papers can be prepared.[4] Also working with Pyun on draft joint press release which will be telegraphed soonest.[5]

Congressmen Vorys and Richards were most helpful throughout conversation with President today especially in discussion problem of Japan and in impressing on President Rhee extreme desirability reaching agreement on draft minute in order that plans for continued aid to Korea next year may not be prejudiced. They likewise effectively supported immediate exchange ratification MDT.[6]

BRIGGS

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[1] The following file number was also printed on the source text: 611.95B/11-1554.

[2] Dated Nov. 14, p. 1917.

[3] *Supra.*

[4] In telegrams 562 and 563, Nov. 15, Briggs reported that he had called on Pyun to inform him officially of the position contained in telegram 327 to Seoul and that he had given him a note to that effect; Pyun agreed, subject to Rhee's concurrence, to initial the agreed minute on Nov. 17. (795B.00/11-1554)

[5] In telegram 569 from Seoul, Nov. 16, 1954, not printed. For a text of the press release as well as the agreed minute and Appendix A, see Department of State *Bulletin,* Nov. 29, 1954, pp. 809-811; a text is also located in TIAS 3396; 6 UST (pt. 3) 3913.

[6] For a text of the Mutual Defense Treaty, see TIAS 3097; 5 UST (pt. 2) 2368.

795B.5 MSP/11–1654: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET SEOUL, November 16, 1954—3 p. m.
PRIORITY

572. Repeated information Tokyo 395. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and CAG. President Rhee's new-found willingness accept minute of understanding should not be interpreted as wholehearted agreement with provisions he has hitherto opposed, or that our difficulties in that regard likely evaporate once documents initialed. His decision concerning minute chiefly attributable to following factors:

1. Firm US stand, which finally convinced Rhee nothing further obtainable at moment by additional argument, procrastination or haggling;
2. Exigencies of ROK domestic political situation. Rhee recognizes public altercation with US has undermined his position, precisely at time when he is bending his efforts push constitutional amendments (including third-term provision) down unenthusiastic legislative throat. To enhance prospect of winning amendment issue Rhee needs not only to repair relations with US but also to represent solution—that is termination minute of understanding question—as ROK victory. Stage has already been set locally for this.
3. Concern re possible adverse developments at UNGA during discussion Korean item, which, if US–ROK impasse continued, might, in Rhee's view, lead US to support position certain other UN allies rather than ROK. Rhee's ordering of Pyun to New York indicates importance he places on problem.

If foregoing analysis correct, we shall probably now witness determined drive to obtain early favorable action from Assembly on constitutional amendments. In this context it would not be our advantage to tolerate ROK misrepresentation, should that occur, of US/ROK understandings regarding aid program. Accordingly last night, when Embassy queried by INS correspondent re Pyun's press conference, I authorized statement attributable Embassy spokesman in sense that Embassy had no comment except to point out that American proposals establishing terms of reference for aid program have been before ROK Government since September 27.

My doubts concerning genuineness Rhee's acceptance of minute of understanding are based on experiences in dealing with him over past two years, fortified as recently as last evening when in conversation with Economic Coordinator Wood at dinner for visiting Congressmen, Rhee returned to his 180 to 1 exchange rate thesis as if this were matter to be settled to his satisfaction in immediate future. This morning Paik Tu-chin is reported to have told press that all points of difference with US are now settled except hwan–dollar matter. These observations made by Rhee and Paik Tu-chin notwithstanding fact that yesterday

Minister Finance wrote General Hull letter which while declining give desired assurances about further advances of hwan to military, finally accepted repayment for June-July-August advances at 254 to 1, and subsequent advances at 310 to 1 (rates, hitherto rejected, based on February 1953 agreement). Rhee did not refer in conversation with Wood to this letter, but implication is that when new exchange arrangement pursuant minute becomes effective and sale dollars through Bank of Korea inaugurated, bidders may be under pressure.

If matters develop in this direction we can minimize possibility of future difficulties in measure in which our forthcoming positions continue firm and explicit.

1. Our public announcement of conclusion negotiations re minute should be comprehensive and unambiguous. If satisfactory joint statement unobtainable, Department should consider issuing separate statement and also making suitable background information available. (See Embtel 568,[1] repeated Tokyo 390.)

2. Once minute in effect, we should tolerate no chipping away of provisions. Any attempt of that character should be met promptly and decisively, first time it occurs. Otherwise likely be progressively impaired and program eventually rendered unworkable.

In short, while I do not minimize importance of having obtained for first time acceptable terms of reference for aid and related programs and while it would be far more comfortable to assume our ROK problems are about to be solved, it is more realistic (and more in accord with past experience) to await ROK performance and be prepared deal promptly and firmly with any deviations.

BRIGGS

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[1] Not printed. (795B.5 MSP/11-1654)

795B.00/11-1754: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, November 17, 1954—9 p. m.

583. Repeated information priority Tokyo 400. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and CAG. Re Embtel 577,[1] repeated Tokyo 397. During three-hour meeting reported reference telegram President Rhee reiterated principal objections he has raised against minute during last four months and at times it looked as though entire project would be rejected. After reiterating arguments back and forth he finally yielded on all

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[1] In this telegram, Nov. 17, 2 p.m., Briggs made a preliminary report on his meeting with Rhee, Pyun, and Sohn of that date, the gist of which was that Rhee finally agreed after much discussion and argument that the initialing of the minute should take place as scheduled at 4 p.m. (795B.00/11-1754)

except following two points which he eventually accepted with utmost reluctance:

1. Note covering US position on peaceful means as substitute for inclusion item 5 US commitments. Rhee declared he would have to reply to proposed US note by statement of ROK position including intention to proceed unilaterally should that in his judgement be necessary at some later date. I pointed out ROK position on cooperation toward unification set forth in item 1 ROK commitments and exchange notes in this connection should be regarded exclusively as means for placing US position before ROK Government in view of deletion at Rhee's request of item 5. Rhee yielded on this only when I declared I was confident injection question of unilateral action by ROK in its note of reply would reopen entire question and at the least would introduce another delay which I indicated might be protracted. (This was finally settled by exchanging two notes with Pyun, first on deletion phrase "in violation of armistice" in reply to which Pyun would both acknowledge and confirm, and second re deletion item 5 regarding which Pyun would merely acknowledge and note contents. At initialing ceremony this afternoon notes were duly exchanged in above form.)
2. With reference to establishment of new procedures for dollar conversion at realistic rate for US monies, and for pricing aid foods into Korean economy at similar rate, roof once more practically blew off. Rhee declared his intention of making immediate strong public appeal to nation to refrain from any exchange transactions whatsoever except at 180 rate. He said he would permit US pay ROK for hwan "at any rate UNC considered fair" mentioning 254, 310 and 500, and would do this so US would not feel it was being held up in obtaining hwan. He insisted however, rate at which dollars sold to US would be kept secret and he would rigorously enforce 180 rate without exception for all other transactions. There would thus be no sale of dollars through Bank of Korea and whatever was agreed to in this regard with General Hull would be kept from public. (This was obviously what Rhee had in mind when he mentioned matter to Wood on November 15 Embtel 572 November 16[2] repeated Tokyo 395.)

Foregoing proposition outlined by President in emotional vein and with usual references to "country's having been ruined by constant changes in exchange rate" it being Rhee's conviction that changing rate is primary cause of inflation.

I decided nothing could be gained by dodging this issue and told President that what he proposed would be in clear and open violation of pertinent Appendix A provisions, and that if this was his last word on subject we would have to give up idea on negotiating minute of understanding, since economic clauses went to heart of entire arrangements. Moreover, without full understanding and agreement on these points, followed by implementation thereof along line General Hull's recent presentation of method of acquiring hwan through open in restricted [*unrestricted* ?] sale through Bank of Korea at whatever rate supply and demand situation produced, I was sure my government would not be prepared to place proposed program in effect. Finally I said that no program could prosper unless sound economic procedures mutually agreed upon. We argued for approximately one hour over this point alone, during which Pyun and Sohn were as cautiously helpful as possible but obviously handicapped by President's fanatic belief that changing rate creates inflation. President finally agreed to sale dollars through Bank of Korea as set forth Appendix A, saying this would be given fair trial during which existing agreements concerning hwan advances and military conversion rate would be in suspense. (Of considerable interest that during this debate Pyun several times referred to agreements July 1950 and February 1953 being "in full force at the present time", notwithstanding volume of correspondence exchanged during past two months when he has taken directly contrary position. There was likewise considerable discussion about current hwan and petroleum situation, described separate telegram.[3])

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[2] *Supra.*

Once President had finally agreed to all points under discussion, initialing and exchange notes ceremonies set for 4 p.m. this afternoon and went off not only smoothly but in atmosphere of marked good will on part of Pyun, Sohn and other Cabinet members present. In relaxed mood after ceremony Pyun and Sohn told me privately whole Cabinet aware of fantastic presidential views on economics, and they expressed profound relief President dissuaded this morning from issuing his proposed appeal to nation concerning 180 to 1 rate. I told them I felt it accordingly highly important for implementation new military conversion procedures be accomplished soonest, while today's conversation still fresh in Rhee's mind. They agreed. We may hope Cabinet influence on implementation will be helpful with Rhee, but conversation this morning indicates views set forth Embtel 572, November 16 possibly understatement of century.

BRIGGS

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[3] The reference was to telegram 584, Nov. 18, not printed. (795B.00/11-1754)

795.00/11-1854: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 18, 1954—8:01 p. m.

260. Korean Briefing Meeting November 18.[2] Murphy outlined problem arising from unneutral character NNSC activities owing to lack of Communist cooperation in north and from ROK attitude toward activities Czech and Polish members NNSC teams operating in south. Requested group's reactions on approach to Swiss and Swedes on behalf of 16 with suggestion Swiss and Swedes inform Military Armistice Commission (MAC) that: 1) NNSC has not operated on neutral basis 2) they therefore request MAC to develop new procedures or amend Armistice Agreement to make possible effective operation NNSC 3) pending negotiation of necessary changes they are withdrawing their members inspection teams to Demilitarized Zone. This would mean inspection teams could not function since Armistice Agreement specifies they must be composed equal number from both sides.

Murphy expressed hope such suggestion could be made in Bern and Stockholm on behalf of sixteen by perhaps US France and UK and urged matter be dealt with promptly as possible preferably before November 29 when Korean item expected to be considered in UNGA.

French representative concurred in approach but proposed Swiss and Swedish communication to MAC should also indicate readiness hold weekly NNSC meetings in Demilitarized Zone. Agreed.

Colombian representative suggested in approaching Swiss and Swedes importance which sixteen attach to maintenance Armistice and UNC authority be stressed, together with expression of complete satisfaction with way in which Swiss and Swedish NNSC members have functioned and of understanding that lack of Communist cooperation was only reason unable do more. Agreed.

In response question from Canadian representative Murphy indicated approach would be on inquiry basis and results would be reported to sixteen after which situation could be appraised on basis Swiss and Swedish reactions. All agreed UK France and US should make inquiry.[3] Canadian representative said however his Government would wish consider matter further after reactions received in view possible implications for Canada's responsibilities in Indochina.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Elizabeth Brown and cleared by Murphy. It was sent to Addis Ababa, Ankara, Athens, Bangkok, Bern, Bogota, Brussels, Canberra, The Hague, London, Luxembourg, Manila, Ottawa, Paris, Seoul, Stockholm, Pretoria, Tokyo for CINCUNC, Wellington, and USUN New York.

[2] A more detailed record of this meeting can be found in a memorandum of conversation, by Brown, Nov. 18, 1954 (795.00/11-1854).

[3] The instructions to the Embassies in Bern and Stockholm to make this joint approach are located in telegram 681 to Bern repeated to Stockholm as 386, Nov. 22, 1954. (795.00/11-2254)

Importance maintaining complete secrecy this matter emphasized.

DULLES

795.00/11-2354: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET SEOUL, November 23, 1954—8 p. m.

608. Repeated information Tokyo 421. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. CG AFFE/Army Eight and CAG. Joint message to State and Defense from Briggs and Hull.

General Hull and I spent over 1 hour with President Rhee this afternoon over problem created by Provost Marshal General.

Announcement yesterday that he has requested Czech and Polish members NNSC "to leave Korea peacefully" (Embtel 602[1] repeated Tokyo 415). After covering much familiar ground, including points made by Rhee that continued presence "Communist spies" in ROK is intolerable and that action now imperative, and by Hull reiterating his responsibilities pursuant to armistice and his intention fulfill them, Rhee finally asked if I would send personal message from him to Secretary Dulles in following sense:

Recalling his conversation with Secretary in Washington last July and fact that Poles and Czechs still here, Secretary be informed that Rhee cannot wait longer than "another week or ten days" for allied action to solve problem at end of which Rhee himself proposes take action.

I told Rhee that message of that character, which is in essence an ultimatum, would not be favorably received in Washington where Secretary has in fact been bending every effort toward solution desired by Rhee, namely removal Poles and Czechs from ROK territory. To take action threatened by Rhee would alienate friends of Korea among other nations and would certainly not be understood in Washington with ink still damp on agreed minute which sets forth basis for largest aid program authorized by Government. Accordingly I proposed to Rhee to send message saying instead that Rhee would welcome further assurance from Secretary Dulles, with reference to their conversation last July, informing Rhee of progress made to date plus any additional information available concerning developments in our negotiations with other 14 countries plus Swiss and Swedes.

Rhee gave grumbling and unhappy assent, and then asked whether he could make public statement that Secetary Dulles preparing force Czechs and Poles out of ROK within few days. Hull and I immediately pointed out unproductive effect of such announcement and urged that nothing further be said or done by ROK until time comes for us to act together and in agreement. During course of discussion General Hull once more described in sympathtic but firm terms background of present situation including his responsibilities pursuant to armistice. He denied Communist members NNITs can, under existing situation, engage in espionage or carry on any activities beyond those strictly permitted by armistice. In performance those duties, however, Hull made clear he intends continue afford necessary protection. Rhee's argument, many times repeated, was that US now infected by appeasement and belief co-existence possible, therefore US unconcerned by presence of Communists in ROK whereas this is "matter of life and death for Korea".

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[1] Not printed. (795.00/11-2254)

Admiral Sohn, who was present during meeting, informed us privately he had had no advance notice of yesterday's action by Provost Marshal Won Yung-Duk. He also indicated, as demonstrated by our conversation with Rhee, that Provost Marshal action under Rhee's personal orders. Sohn also intimated to us that President may again be raising subject because he recognizes loss prestige over lengthy argument concerning agreed minute and feels necessary reassert himself and show independence.

By way of comment on conversation with Rhee, Hull and I are of opinion that unilateral action against Communist members NNSC somewhat unlikely during next few days. However it is also our belief that unless Rhee convinced progress being made along lines Washington negotiations it will be more and more difficult to keep him in line. Once again we are facing highly emotional issue with Rhee and one in which he is convinced right on his side.

BRIGGS

795.00/11-2354: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 25, 1954—3:52 p. m.

351. Seoul's 608 sent Tokyo 421.[2] Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. Secretary away from city until November 30.[3] Assure President Rhee your report your conversation with him will be brought his attention immediately upon his return. Also tell him as much of following as you think useful.

Since conversations Washington we have worked hard find solution NNSC problem which we like Koreans regard as serious. It not easy solve without putting us at great propaganda disadvantage. Meantime as General Hull has explained he has taken measures we assured Rhee last summer would be taken limit activities Polish and Cezch members Neutral Nations Inspection Teams in ROK. Their potential as espionage agents we believe has thus been eliminated.

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[1] This telegram, drafted by Jones and cleared by McClurkin, was repeated to Tokyo as 1076.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Dulles was vacationing on Duck Island, Nov. 24–28.

At present as Korean Embassy Washington informed we making confidential approach to Swiss and Swedes. The sixteen nations who fought in Korea have all agreed French, UK and US should approach Swiss and Swedes to determine their reaction to suggestion (1) they inform MAC that due Polish and Czech attitude they cannot carry out their specific terms reference and therefore request MAC work out more satisfactory arrangements and (2) they withdrawing their personnel from inspection teams to Demilitarized Zone until two commands can work out more satisfactory arrangements. Once Swiss and Swedish members inspection teams leave ROK there will be no legal basis on which Poles and Czechs could claim right remain within ROK and we would then have no objection if UNC took action to remove them forcibly if necessary.

General Won's ultimatum of November 22 to Polish and Czech members inspection teams gives us concern.[4] Appreciate way Korean people feel about Communists in their territory. Nevertheless hope there will be no further statements this sort at this time [5] nor any publicity of any kind given our approach to Swiss and Swedes. Either action might seriously prejudice possibilities persuading Swiss and Swedes to withdraw since they would be most reluctant do so if there is any public appearance pressure.

SALTZMAN [6]

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[4] Transmitted in telegram 602, Nov. 22, not printed. (795.00/11-2254)

[5] In telegram 620 from Seoul, Nov. 26, the Embassy reported as follows:

"Despite comments by General Hull and me to President Rhee re undesirability public announcement on NNSC (Embassy telegram 608), OPI Director Karl yesterday issued statement on subject. Full text transmitted TWX dated 260250Z. OPI statement declared that Hull and I gave Rhee assurances 'NNSC issue will be settled very shortly to Korea's complete satisfaction'. This is, of course, distortion our comments to President but is obviously used as face-saving device for removing one week time limit for departure NNSC set by Provost Marshal General in his letter to Czech and Polish delegation heads (Embassy telegram 602 repeated Tokyo 415)." (795.00/11-2654)

[6] Charles E. Saltzman, Under Secretary of State for Administration.

320/12-154

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Key) to the Secretary of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] December 1, 1954.

Subject: Korean Question in the UN General Assembly.

Discussion

There are attached alternative draft resolutions on Korea. The first (Tab A),[2] which the British believe India will agree to sponsor, makes only preambular references to the report on the Geneva Conference and to the UN objectives in Korea, and the sole substantive operative paragraph expresses the hope "that progress in respect of the settlement of the Korean question will be made," with no reference to UN objectives. This text, which was undesirably weak when the British first showed it to us, has been weakened even more in the British effort to obtain Indian sponsorship. The second (Tab B)[3] which our delegation worked out with the British, includes as operative paragraphs: (1) approval of the allies report on Geneva (which means endorsement of the position on which we broke off negotiations at Geneva); (2) reaffirmation of the UN objectives in Korea; and (3) an expression of hope that it will soon prove possible to make progress toward these objectives.

We strongly prefer and believe we must continue to support the second draft, as our Delegation is currently instructed to do. It endorses the allied position at Geneva and reaffirms the UN objectives. For the Assembly to do otherwise would be interpreted as a weakening of our position on Korea and as somewhat of a repudiation of the allied stand at Geneva. Moreover, we would be very reluctant to support any resolution sponsored by Menon and see no reason why it is necessary for India to sponsor any Korean resolution. The Republic of Korea shares our views.

On the other hand, the British are committed to support the first draft, provided India sponsors it, and Ambassador Wadsworth reports that some of the other allied participants at Geneva, who no longer fully subscribe to the allied position, prefer it. The only concession that would be made to the United States would be advance agreement on submission of an amendment whereby the first preambular paragraph would read "*Noting with approval*" the report on Geneva. India would abstain on this amendment.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Elizabeth Brown and cleared with Robertson, Murphy, and Merchant (in substance).

[2] The alternative draft resolution, attached as Tab A is not here printed. With the exception of the additional paragraph, "Decides that it would be inopportune to make further recommendations regarding the Korean question at this stage," it was virtually the same as the draft Indian resolution of Dec. 2, UN document A/C.1/L.118.

[3] Tab B, which is not here printed, was adopted by the UN General Assembly on Dec. 11 as Resolution 811 (IX).

The British believe that there are substantial advantages in an Indian initiative on Korea. In view of their commitment, they argue, as Ambassador Makins told you yesterday, that it is better for the United States to go along, making clear in its statement its views on the continuing basis for a Korean settlement, than to expose serious differences among the allies by insisting upon amendments or submitting a separate proposal which they and others would be obliged to oppose publicly. In these circumstances, if we continue to insist upon the alternative draft, or upon submitting amendments, Ambassador Wadsworth believes we risk a public split with the British and others among our Korean allies. However, if we remain firm, this may not materialize.

Recommendation

That if you are approached by the Delegation on this point you reaffirm its present instructions not to accept the weaker draft resolution.[4]

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[4] A marginal note initialed by O'Connor read as follows: "Sec[retary] directed me to tell Wadsworth to stand firm."

795B.5 MSP/12-354: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, December 3, 1954—1 a. m.

646. Repeated information priority Tokyo 446. Tokyo pass CINCUNC; CG AFFE/Army 8. Exclusive for Generals Hull and Taylor. Reference Embassy telegram 644 [1] repeated Tokyo 444.

President Rhee's response to our representations went approximately as we anticipated, as did his renewed ploughing up of territory already settled by agreed minute.

Clear from President's remarks that what Rhee now desires is that we cancel provision calling for sale of U.S. dollars. Quite probable that when we announce return to suspended arrangements for hwan drawings he will initially accept and then soon attempt substitute his proposal for provision of hwan secretly for procedures stipulated in suspended agreements covering hwan drawings. We give little credence to Rhee's ostensible indifference to rate at which dollar repayment for hwan made.

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[1] In this telegram, Dec. 2, Briggs reported on a meeting he had with Rhee on Dec. 2 to protest what the United States considered to be an effort by the ROK to influence the sale of U.S. dollars in Korea so as to keep the hwan-dollar rate as close as possible to the old 180 to 1 figure. Briggs noted that this action was contrary to the letter and spirit of the minute of understanding. (611.95B/12-254)

We visualize three alternative courses of action following Rhee's violation of agreed minute while ink of initials still damp.

(1) Reversion to former arrangements for hwan drawings, allowing other provisions of agreed minute to stand and continuing program as proposed, ignoring his violation of provision governing sales of dollars.

(2) Declaration by U.S. that because of ROK violation, and until this violation corrected to our satisfaction, aid program of magnitude and nature contemplated by agreed minute impossible of fulfillment. Therefore we consider agreed minute cancelled by ROK actions and situation reverts to that existing prior to initialing of agreement.

(3) Steps pursuant CINCUNC [*C*] 70209.[2] These steps might be taken in conjunction second alternative above.

All three alternatives assume abandonment attempt make dollar sales procedure work and issuance public statement in Washington announcing reversion to hwan drawings procedure and explaining our reasons, namely violation of dollar sales agreement made pursuant minute. That statement might precipitate violent reaction from Rhee, indignant denial our accusations, threat to make deal with Communists, etc. In any event however hwan drawings must be resumed promptly if Army's December requirements now due are to be met.

With reservation we have not yet had time to consult with General Hull, Wood and I believe second alternative should immediately be adopted. We are of opinion that clear violation of agreed minute having occurred at outset of implementation program, further violations are inevitable unless we take prompt decisive action. Failing this we shall have to abandon hope of any loyal performance of obligations assumed by ROK under minute of understanding.

Adoption of alternative (1) would put us back where we were prior to start of negotiations on minute, in that Rhee would have his program and we would have no binding or satisfactory resolution of issues which have plagued us and made successful carrying out of program impossible. Rhee would have violated his agreement with impunity with no serious consequences to him except a public rebuke. He would therefore be confirmed in his conviction he need only hold out long enough against U.S. demands in order to get his own way; that he can dishonor his own commitments without paying any onerous penalty and prove that U.S. has no place to stay in Korea except under Rhee's tent.

Adoption course (2) would probably have one of three possible consequences: (*a*) capitulation by Rhee, accompanied by realization that it will be necessary for him to live up to his agreements; (*b*) rejection of our aid by Rhee; or (*c*) overthrow of Rhee.

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[2] According to a copy of telegram C 70209 in Department of Defense files, it was identical to telegram C 70208, Nov. 8, p. 1911.

Result (*a*) would be outcome we are seeking; result (*b*) might soon develop into (*c*); but either (*b*) or (*c*) would be preferable to situation which existed prior to our decision to precipitate issue by requiring acceptance of minute of understanding. That situation would again exist if we failed take resolute action now and all our efforts since July would be sound and fury, signifying nothing.

BRIGGS

611.95B/12–654: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, December 6, 1954—6:06 p. m.

373. Seoul's 644 [2] and 646 [3] repeated Tokyo 444 and 446. Since Wood told Rhee in record conference (Tofoa 699 [4]) U.S. proposed hold second auction believe essential do so.

Request you inform Rhee on instruction your government substantially as follows:

1. U.S. regards sale procedures set forth in Minute which were product elaborate and extended consultations as most conducive satisfactory solution needs of U.S. forces for ROK currency and does not desire adopt temporary arrangement or revert to procedure for direct acquisition at rate which must be agreed from time to time in view unsatisfactory nature this arrangement in past.
2. U.S. has considered President's proposal re 180–1 rate but cannot agree that it is possible to fix and enforce such rate for transactions generally. Would regard such effort as economically most unwise and as contrary to understanding on pricing of aid goods set forth in Minute.
3. In view President's assurances no intention by ROK interfere with free auction U.S. proposes hold second auction near future.
4. U.S. considers ROK obligated by Minute use its full powers to assure genuinely free sale of dollars as stipulated. If bids received from second auction differ markedly and inexplicably from bids received by Korean Government U.S. would be forced conclude ROK not abiding by terms Minute and would regard itself as no longer committed thereto.[5]

FYI, if you received bids for a substantial amount of dollars within exchange rate acceptable range you are authorized at your discretion to accept and subsequently hold other auctions to obtain balance hwan needed.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Hemmendinger and cleared with Defense, Treasury, and FOA, as well as Robertson.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 1, *supra.*

[3] *Supra.*

[4] Not printed. (FOA files, lot 55 A 374, box 12)

[5] Pursuant to these instructions, Briggs and Wood delivered a memorandum to Rhee to this effect, the text of which was transmitted in telegram 658, Dec. 7, 1954. (611.95B/12–754)

Issuing no release here but will answer press inquiries stating serious problem developed implementation Minute re hwan requirements UN forces and hope ROK will shortly make arrangements satisfactorily implement.

DULLES

795B.00/12-2854

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 7, 1954.

Subject: Changes to Operation Plan which Implements NSC 170/1.[2]

1. In a letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 14 October 1954 the Commander in Chief, Far East Command, (CINCFE) stated that he was forwarding revised plans in support of NSC 170/1 (U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea). These plans have been concurred in by Ambassador Briggs and Admiral Overesch and cover the period during and after the redeployment of United Nations Command (UNC) forces. CINCFE states that they will remain workable so long as two or more U.S. divisions remain in Korea, and that they emphasize the security and non-involvement features of the NSC 170/1 mission instead of emphasizing measures intending to block possible Republic of Korea (ROK) action. CINCFE further states in effect that as the size of U.S. forces decreases in Korea our chances are proportionately reduced for retaining loyal and enthusiastic support of the ROK military forces in any undertaking involving resort to martial law to enable new South Korean leadership to assume power in the event that President Rhee initiates or is about to initiate unilateral action.

2. CINCFE recommends that in order to provide realistic guidance to the residual forces in Korea that subparagraph d, Annex A to NSC 170/1 concerning the UNC establishment of new leadership by resort to UNC military force be revised as follows:

"~~To develop the basis for~~ *select and encourage covertly the development of* new South Korean leadership prepared to cooperate in maintaining the armistice, and if Rhee initiates or is about to initiate unilateral action, to ~~enable~~ *assist* such new leadership to assume power~~,~~ by ~~UNC resort to martial law if necessary.~~ *means not involving overt U.S. participation until and unless U.S. overt support is necessary and promises to be decisive in firmly establishing such new leadership.*"

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[1] This memorandum, which received the concurrence of the Department of Defense, was sent by Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs H. Struve Hensel to Dulles on Dec. 28 with a request for Department of State concurrence or comment in order that it might be brought to the attention of the National Security Council. Because of the sensitivity of the subject, the normal method of transmitting suggested changes to NSC policy documents was not being utilized. Hensel suggested that this paper be handled strictly on a need-to-know basis and noted that a copy had been furnished to the CIA.

[2] Dated Nov. 20, 1953, p. 1620.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the foregoing and recommend that subparagraph d, Annex A to NSC 170/1 be modified accordingly.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
ARTHUR RADFORD
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

611.95B/12-854: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

SEOUL, December 8, 1954—6 p. m.

662. Repeated information Tokyo 458. Tokyo pass CINCUNC, CG AFFE/Army Eight. Re Embtel 658 [1] repeated Tokyo 455.

Called on President Rhee this morning and delivered confidential memorandum. Same participants as meeting December 2 reported Embtel 644 [2] repeated Tokyo 444. Text of memo as quoted Embtel 655 [3] except paragraph 5 from which phrase "by Bank of Korea" deleted and amount of hwan 800 million. Meeting lasted only 20 minutes.

President read memo aloud with mounting distaste and annoyance. His first response was to attribute it to unidentified "unfriendly elements" in Washington. Purport of communication seemed fully understood except with reference paragraph 2, since Rhee continues fail comprehend relationship between his attempted freezing of 180 to 1 rate and pricing aid goods into economy.

Re paragraph 3 he inquired when second auction would be held and was informed December 13 (which Wood explained is earliest feasible date in view of public notice and other preparations required). In that connection Wood later suggested would be helpful if ROK Government would sponsor appropriate publicity including its intention have transaction take place with bidders enjoying full freedom. (Wood plans discuss this further with Paek Tu-chin; whether anything comes of it remains to be seen.)

Rhee read paragraph 4 with special irritation apparently controlling his temper with some difficulty.

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[1] Not printed, but see footnote 5, p. 1931.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1929. Those present were Briggs, Wood, Strom, Rhee, Paik Tu Chin, and Acting Foreign Minister Cho.

[3] Telegram 655 from Seoul, Dec. 6, not printed. (795.00/12-654)

Re paragraph 5 he inquired when proposed 800 million hwan loan would be repaid and was informed with proceeds of second auction, to which President said "and suppose you don't like second auction and don't buy hwan?" Rhee did not however pursue matter when I reminded him request set forth paragraph 5 based his own offer to advance hwan for US military commitments, made during our meeting on December 2. Whether requested advance is made likewise remains be seen since President did not further commit himself.

At no time during conversation did Rhee admit there was intimidation and coercion of bidders at first auction. It is of interest in connection foregoing that American correspondents have (somewhat belatedly) picked up story of first auction and during past few days have filed stories thereon, attributed to business sources.

BRIGGS

795.00/12-2254: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 23, 1954—5:33 p. m.

403. Your 708[2] repeated Tokyo 494. FYI clear implication Bern-Stockholm communications also available you Swiss and Swedes unlikely take action any kind on NNSC until Hammarskjold mission[3] has chance yield results. Believe any action endangering or seriously embarrassing Hammarskjold mission must be avoided. Realize difficulties situation posed by ROK but see no alternative this time other than continued efforts dissuade ROK from creating incident by attempting expel Czechs and Poles. View Rhee attitude toward Hammarskjold mission believe inadvisable use this as argument. End FYI.

Request you see Rhee emphasizing we continuing make efforts persuade Swiss and Swedes take action leading solution problem and they actively considering question. Statements such as Won's can only delay and possibly preclude such action as Swiss and Swedes extremely sensitive to and reluctant act under pressures as is any Government. Hope ROK will refrain from future statements such as Won's and give tripartite approach chance succeed. Fact UNC has acted isolate Czechs and Poles with view preventing espionage activities ought make situation bearable short while longer. Finally, repeat warning UNC has responsibility protect NNSC personnel and intends do so.

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[1] This telegram, drafted by Jones and cleared by McClurkin, Elizabeth Brown, Ward Allen, and with Defense, was repeated to Bern as telegram 829, Stockholm as telegram 485, and Tokyo as telegram 1262 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.

[2] This telegram, Dec. 22, read as follows:

"Department's attention invited General Won Yong-tok's latest statement on Communist members NNSC transmitted TWX dated 220830Z. Statement, while setting no specific date, contains declaration 'we have come to conclusion that situation of repeated advice and warnings has come to end'. Won then emphasizes that direct and immediate remedial action should be taken and concludes that remedial steps are ROK responsibility." (795.00/12-2254)

[3] Hammarskjold was in Peking Jan. 5-10, 1955, primarily to negotiate the release of U.S. airmen and UN personnel held captive in China. For documentation relating to the planning of this trip, see volume XIV.

DULLES

795.00/12-2754: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET SEOUL, December 27, 1954—10 p. m.

723. Repeated information Tokyo 503, Stockholm 9, Bern 11. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC, CG AFFE/Army Eight and CAG. Re Deptel 403 [1] repeated Bern 829 Stockholm 485 Tokyo 1262.

In absence President Rhee saw Foreign Minister Pyun today re NNSC situation and at his request I am sending him memo conveying substance final paragraph Deptel 403. I also called Pyun's attention to fact that in addition to steps making it impossible for Czechs and Poles to conduct espionage activities, our military authorities have notified Communists through senior UNCMAC member of discontinuance utilization by UNC of three airfields including transfer January 1 of Seoul airport (K-16) to ROK Air Force. This will not preclude occasional spot inspections at K-16 but will very considerably reduce them. These cited to Pyun to indicate US working steadily to handle problem at this end, while negotiations on part ourselves, British and French are continuing in Bern and Stockholm.

Pyun conciliatory and expressed appreciation what has already been done. At same time he pointed out presence Communist members NNITs constant affront to ROK Government which will find it impossible permit situation continue indefinitely (this in line his statement in New York before first committee in December 8 last, except that in conversation today Pyun privately conceded alleged espionage activities are secondary to basic problem of presence Communists in Korea). Pyun said he would report my call to President Rhee, hence his request for substance final paragraph Deptel 403.

BRIGGS

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[1] *Supra.*

611.95B/12-2754: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET SEOUL, December 27, 1954—11 p. m.

724. Repeated information Tokyo 504, Taipei 39, Saigon 6. Tokyo pass CINCUNC, CG AFFE/Army Eight and CAG.

After transacting other business with Foreign Minister Pyun as reported separate telegrams[1] he brought up subject his recent United States visit, especially his calls in Washington[2] stating he had sought to emphasize to Assistant Secretary Robertson and likewise to United States military leaders his belief that notwithstanding existence United States–ROK bilateral treaty Communists may still be planning overt move toward Korea in fairly imminent future, hence United States should see to it ROK Army strong and in constant readiness. By strong he specifically referred to additional equipment for reserve divisions and supplies, ammunition, et cetera, "sufficient for at least one month." In that connection he observed (as on various occasions in past) that whatever President Rhee may occasionally declare publicly for benefit of Communists Rhee has no intention taking unilateral action to unite Korea by force.

According Pyun's analysis Chinese Communists will not try invade Formosa since that impossible except with powerful assistance Soviet Navy which Soviet unwilling furnish because war with United States would immediately follow. Similarly Chinese Communists do not need provide overt military support to Viet Minh since Communists succeeding there without such assistance. Therefore there remains only Korea "which must not be left exposed", and Japan where Communists working by subversion.

While little of this may be new, I report it as illustrative Pyun's present thinking. I told him that with respect Korea I did not agree as to any imminent overt Chinese Communist attack. On contrary, and perhaps especially in light overwhelming GA endorsement of twin principles for settlement Korean issue, I believe it far more likely Communists as next Korean move would seek obscure those issues and their own GA defeat by such efforts as recent NK proposals for cultural relations, exchange communications, persons, et cetera, along line recent Communist proposals to MAC. These proposals will attempt create impression NK conciliatory and sincerely promoting moves in direction unification, replies to which ROK during Pyun's absence I said had been gratified observe pointed out real character Communist maneuvers.

Pyun expressed satisfaction re GA results[3] saying he believes Assembly action helpful in clarifying Korean issue. However, he also remarked ROK Government cannot permit unification problem to be pigeonholed now Assembly is over, to lie dormant until next UN meeting.

Briggs

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[1] See telegram 723, *supra.*

[2] Pyun was also in New York in late November and early December as the head of the ROK Observer Delegation at the United Nations.

[3] The reference was to UN General Assembly Resolution 811 (IX), passed Dec. 11, 1954.

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to President Eisenhower

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL, December 29, 1954.

DEAR PRESIDENT EISENHOWER: The signing of the recent agreements concerning economic and military assistance [1] can, and I believe should, be a constructive step forward toward the solution of the larger problems in which our two countries are jointly involved.

Korea is now fighting for its very existence in one of the most serious crises in our history. It is only because our survival itself is at stake that I am writing this letter to give you my views on the situation and to ask you to do what you can to help us to save ourselves. Your fair-mindedness and dedication to democratic principles provide the sole remaining hope that we can work together to avert the catastrophe that is rapidly overtaking us.

Militarily our plight is growing desperate. A few miles from where I sit more than one million Red Chinese troops and hundreds of thousands of enslaved Korean troops are getting ready to renew the onslaught against us. Their forty airfields, once pounded into uselessness by the United States Air Force, are fully restored, and hundreds of the latest Soviet jets are based on them. The attack may come at any time, because the Communists are ready, and we are not.

As a consequence of their military superiority, the Reds are increasing their other pressures upon us. The Pyongyang and Peiping radios are broadcasting daily demands that we hold a conference with north Korean leaders and proceed to the unification of Korea under a Red-packed Neutral Nations Commission. As you now know, the Communists have even formalized their diabolical proposals in a cablegram to this Government. They still reject all thought of U.N. supervision of an election. And implicit in all their communications is the threat that if we do not accept unification on their terms, the attack upon us will be renewed.

Meanwhile, enemy infiltration of south Korea has increased to dangerous proportions. Red agents are fomenting unrest and are trying to promote popular support for a Pyongyang Conference at which those loyal to me and to America would be barred. Spies and saboteurs are smuggling in opium, weapons and dynamite from north Korea, China and Japan, in huge quantities. Pro-Communist and pro-Japanese elements are actively plotting and agitating for the overthrow of this Government. Such infiltration and subversion have not yet done much harm, but the public is definitely affected. There is considerable unrest and great fear that the Communists may descend on us again.

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[1] The reference was to the agreed minute of understanding, which was initialed on Nov. 17, 1954. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 29, 1954, pp. 810–811.

This trepidation has been accentuated by withdrawal of two-thirds of the U.S. and U.N. forces, and by our almost total lack of air defense. New rumors are heard daily. There is wide talk of the "Reds coming down" and of air raids in heavy force.

These facts are doubtless known to you, but I hope you are not being advised to discount their grave importance. We, on our part, do not under-rate the importance of the Korean-American Mutual Defense Treaty. But there are underlying factors which cause our dangerously exposed people to have the utmost concern for the safety of themselves and of our nation.

It must be remembered that some Americans, whom we consider friends of Japan rather than of Korea, have recently been raising once more doubts as to the strategic value of the Korean peninsula. This very doubt was asserted to be the principal reason for the withdrawal of the headquarters of the U.S. Far Eastern Air Force. It is also implicit in some of the broad policy statements to the effect that the United States must not again become involved in any "Korean type" wars, and that in case of any localized Communist attacks, the reaction to them would not necessarily be localized defense, but larger retaliation directed at the centers from which the attack is directed.

Mr. President, you should know that there are two basic reactions to this kind of discussion. Some of our people assume that in case the Communists again attack us, Korea might be abandoned, at least temporarily, while war by air is waged against Red China from bases that the U.S. Command considers to be safer than our peninsula. And still others, made deeply anxious by the Geneva agreement on Indo-China, are convinced that neutralist pressures from your Allies would lead to a decision to yield south Korea to the Communists as another attempt to find a basis for long range "peaceful co-existence".

You will recall, as we do, that present circumstances parallel significantly the situation that preceded the attack of 1950. At that time, too, the Communists were flooding the airways with demands for a "unification conference". And also at that time, policy statements emanating from Washington gave the Communists grounds for believing that the U.S. Administration did not believe Korea to be of strategic military importance.

You must know, Mr. President, that the belief is widespread in this part of the world, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, that the United States bases its military and diplomatic policies for the Far East primarily upon the preservation of Japan as the chief center of Asian resistance to Communism. We are conscious of continuing pressures to align ourselves more closely with Japan, economically and militarily. But the totality of our national fears is of such a nature that this whole situation impels many of our people to consider the possibility of accepting reunification on Communist terms as the only form of safety which they may expect from a renewal of Japanese dominion over our nation.

Our people are also upset by the continued espionage activities of the Communist members of the Neutral Nations Truce Supervisory Commission. These enemy agents have no place in Korea. The ninety-day truce period to which we initially agreed is long since past. The political conference, in which hope was placed by the United Nations, was wholly unproductive, and the Communists have violated both the letter and the spirit of the truce daily with complete impunity. Yet when we wanted to get the Russians (who masquerade as Polish officers), the Poles, and the Czechs out of our country, the U.S. Commanding Officer said he would protect them.

In our view, Mr. President, it is a grave mistake to underrate the military threat to our safety. As yet no provisions have been made to replace the U.N. troops that are being withdrawn. How, then, are we going to cope with the greatly strengthened armies just to the north? [Here follow Rhee's comments on South Korean military preparedness against the threat from the north.]

In many ways, militarily, psychologically, and economically, Korea is today in a situation similar to that of China when the Reds took over in 1949. Under these circumstances, I have no alternative except to make this personal appeal to you to do all you can to avert a tragedy that would destroy Korea and imperil the security of the United States itself.

[Here follows Rhee's warning on what he considered to be the grave consequences in Asia for an American pro-Japanese foreign policy.]

We are caught, of course, between our fear of Japan on one side, and of the Communists on the other. Japan has nothing whatsoever to offer the peoples of Asia, either substantively or psychologically. We all have learned by harsh experience the ruthlessness of Japan's ambitions. On the other hand, the Communists penetrate into our midst with all the wide variety of their methods of psychological warfare. They promise better times to impoverished and disturbed people, and they broadcast daily their ability to restore (on their own terms, of course) the re-unification of our nation—just as they proved that they and they alone could provide a basis for ending the long war in Indo-China. The simple fact of the matter is that we see clearly how many people already have chosen under these terrifying circumstances to align themselves with the Reds. Nor is there any evidence now that this trend is being checked, at least in Asia.

I am afraid that my motives may have been misunderstood as I have made these points. My position is not anti-Japanese; it is pro-American, and as such I must do my best as a Korean and an Asian to help you and Mr. Dulles to understand the tenor of feeling that helps shape the course of events in this part of the world.

In connection with our own internal situation, a new agreement has been signed and we shall do our best to abide by it strictly, as we always do try to work cooperatively with the United States in a spirit of utmost sincerity. However, it is simply a fact that the difficulties in our economic and fiscal situation have not been solved, and new problems continue to arise. Personally, I do not see how inflation can be checked or basic economic viability restored except through the rapid development of our means of production. Without the tremendous aid which you are generously extending to us, we should be completely helpless. Even though our Governments do not always agree on how the aid program should operate, I want you to know, Mr. President, that my sole aim is to do all I can to insure that the United States aid funds are spent exactly for the purpose for which they are extended—namely, to restore Korea as soon as possible to a position of full self-support.

One additional comment I should like to make. We cannot avoid being disturbed when we are told that it is the American policy to secure two dollars of benefit (one for Japan and one for Korea) from every dollar expended. What this means is that our own recovery is slowed, as we are expected to buy more from Japan, and accordingly to use less to build up our own productive facilities. This has an immediate effect of once more placing our economy at the mercy of the Japanese. It also means that when the American Congress decides it has voted all the funds it can spare for Korean aid, we may not at that time have developed sufficient productive resources to maintain our stability. These are basic questions which will naturally be under continuing examination by your experts and ours. I hope that our point of view will not be misunderstood and that, if we sometimes disagree on details, we shall not for that reason be considered ungrateful or unreasonable.

In regard to our relations with Japan, we are fully as anxious as is your Government to restore a relationship and a feeling of genuine harmony and friendship.

The astounding fact is that, despite its pledges in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Japanese Government has officially laid claim to eighty-five per cent of all Korea's property. We have been told quietly by some of our American friends that we ought not to take this too seriously, for it is merely a bargaining point. However, we cannot trust a Japanese Government that will bargain with vital matters on which it has solemnly abjured any claim. Recently our Korean Mission in Japan was informed by a Japanese official that the property claims of Japan would be dropped if we would cancel the Fishery Peace Line. Of course, our Mission could not take this offer seriously, because under present chaotic fishing conditions in waters adjacent to our coasts we have no choice but to extend protection to one of our most vital industries. We have also heard that you and Mr. Dulles have asked Japan to drop its property claims. That would be extremely good news. It has always been our position that the United States should ask Japan to withdraw those claims unconditionally. If that is done, conditions would be much more favorable for a *rapprochement* between the two countries. Once the property question is disposed of, we would suggest the intercession of the United States in settling other differences. Our suggestions are already minimal, and we feel they offer a fair and reasonable basis for final agreement.

As some of our American friends have suggested, that agreement could include a non-aggression pact among the United States, Korea and Japan. Should any of the three become an aggressor, the other two would combat that aggression. Such an accord, seriously entered into by the three nations, should assure their peaceful and friendly relationship for the foreseeable future. Once this were signed, Korea may be prepared to negotiate a commercial agreement with Japan and enter into amicable social and cultural exchanges. On this basis, the anti-Communist position in north Asia would be greatly strengthened.

I feel sure, Mr. President, that out of your great affection for Korea and the Korean people, and out of your respect for them as democratic fighting allies, you will give my suggestions and proposals your understanding consideration. Since the problems involved are basic to our very survival as a free nation, and to the knitting together of a dependable structure of peace in Asia, I know that they are receiving your own most careful personal consideration.

[Here follows a section in which Rhee wrote frankly of what he considered to be the dangers of peaceful coexistence with communism.]

It is my devout hope, Mr. President, that none of this will come to pass. The prevention of it, however, depends upon adoption of policies that will solve problems that are now being postponed or even ignored. The desperate situation of our people, beset by inflation, uncertainties and military threat, does not allow us much leeway for further trial and error experience. The very survival of our nation rests upon a thin thread. My daily prayer to our God is that together we may work constructively to strengthen it.

With the warmest expressions of friendship for you and for Mrs. Eisenhower, I am,

Most sincerely yours, SYNGMAN RHEE

S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 170 Series

Memorandum by the Executive Officer of the Operations Coordinating Board (Staats) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 30, 1954.

Subject: Progress Report on NSC 170/1 Korea (Policy Approved by the President, November 20, 1953)

There is attached the second progress report by the Operations Coordinating Board on NSC 170/1, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Korea," covering the period from March 16, 1954 through November 17, 1954. The report was approved by the Operations Coordinating Board on December 29, 1954.

The following significant developments subsequent to November 17, were noted by the Board:

1. *UNKRA.*

It has become clear that funds soon will no longer be available to support the UNKRA operation. The U.K. has agreed to make one additional contribution on condition that it will be the last contribution requested and that an orderly liquidation will ensue. The U.S. has accepted this condition and final program of about $30 million for FY 1955 is now possible. The UNKRA Advisory Committee has requested a liquidation plan from the Agent General.

2. *UN General Assembly Action on Korea.*

On December 11 the General Assembly approved a resolution on Korea by a favorable vote of 50 to 5 (the members of the Soviet bloc) with 4 abstentions (Burma, India, Saudi Arabia, and Syria). The resolution had been proposed by 15 members of the United Nations who had participated on behalf of the United Nations in the action against aggression in Korea, and who had also taken part in the Korean phase of the Geneva Conference. It expressed approval of the report on that Conference made by those nations to the General Assembly. The report had endorsed the two fundamental principles set forth at Geneva as the basis for unification of Korea; namely, that (1) the UN is rightfully empowered to extend its good offices to seeking a peaceful settlement in Korea, and (2) in order to establish a unified, independent, and democratic Korea, genuinely free elections should be held under UN supervision.

In addition, on December 10, 1954, the General Assembly approved by a vote of 47 to 5, a resolution[1] requesting the Secretary General, in the name of the UN Command, to seek the release, in accordance with the Korean Armistice Agreement, of all captured personnel of the UN Command still detained in Communist China. As a result of this resolution, the Secretary General immediately cabled Chou En-lai requesting a meeting in Peiping to discuss the question of imprisoned UN Command personnel. On December 17, Chou En-lai responded favorably to the Secretary General's request, and a meeting will be scheduled shortly after Christmas. The Department of State, with the assistance of the Department of Defense, prepared background briefing material and documentation for the Secretary General. On December 16, Mr. Robertson and Mr. Phleger discussed this material with him in New York.

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[1] The reference is to UN General Assembly Resolution 906 (IX); text in UN document A/2890, p. 56. For related documentation, see volume XIV.

ELMER B. STAATS

[Attachment]

Second Progress Report by the Operations Coordinating Board to the National Security Council on NSC 170/1

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 29, 1954.

"UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO KOREA"

(Policy Approved by the President, November 20, 1953)
(Period of Report: 16 Mar 54–17 Nov 54)

A. *Summary of Major Actions*

1. The U.S. has continued to observe the Armistice and has endeavored unsuccessfully through the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) to get full Communist compliance with the Armistice terms. (Page 5, para 5 a [2])

2. A political conference to consider the unification of Korea convened April 26, 1954 at Geneva and ended on June 15 when the Communist representatives refused to agree to free elections impartially supervised by the UN. During President Rhee's visit to Washington in July, he and other ROK officials were told by President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles and Secretary Wilson that the United States would not support in any way unilateral military action by the ROK to attempt to unify Korea. (Page 6, para 5 b (1) and page 9, para 9 a)

3. The U.S. is redeploying from Korea 4 divisions (additional to the 2 divisions already redeployed) and one regimental combat team. Appropriate elements of air and navy, in consonance with the ground forces redeployed, have been or are being withdrawn. This withdrawal is to be completed about the end of 1954. President Rhee and other ROK officials were notified in July. Korean fear of abandonment by the

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[2] The reference was to Annex A, below.

United States led to vigorous protests by the ROK, including public demonstrations in Korea, but these have now subsided. Approximately two thirds of the other UN nations' forces are being withdrawn. (Page 13, para 10 b)

4. During President Rhee's visit to Washington and thereafter, the United States attempted to negotiate with the ROK a firm and satisfactory basis for continuing with our military and economic aid programs for Korea. The principal issues were the level of economic and military aid, the size of the Korean forces to be supported, the adoption of a realistic exchange rate, procurement from the most economical sources (including Japan) for the economic program, and effective cooperation by the ROK with us in pushing ahead with the economic program. A related issue came to a head in October when the ROK cut off hwan advances to the U.S. forces as a result of U.S. insistence that these advances be repaid at 254 to 1, in accordance with existing agreements, rather than at 180 to 1. (Pages 15, 16, para 10 f)

Finally, on November 17, the ROK and the United States initialed an "Agreed Minute."[3] This Minute provides for economic and military programs of up to $700,000,000 in this fiscal year, and for ROK forces totaling 720,000 personnel. It also commits the ROK to the internal measures and to the cooperation with us which are necessary for the effective carrying out of the program. However, it may be expected that the ROK will continue to raise many of the issues which the Minute attempted to settle. A copy of the Minute and its appendices is attached as Attachment 1.

5. On November 17, instruments of ratification of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROK were exchanged in Washington, thus bringing it into effect. (Page 12, para 10 a)

6. The military departments and appropriate theater Commanders have reviewed the Van Fleet recommendations with respect to Korea which were taken into account in formulating the agreed military program for the ROK contained in the Minute. (Page 13, para 10 b)

7. An Information Policy Coordinating Committee has been established in Korea, consisting of representatives of all U.S. agencies engaged in economic aid and information programs. The Committee is for the first time in Korea producing a unified publicity campaign concerning all U.S. civil and military aid programs. USIA's activities continued to support the Armistice but the main emphasis has been placed on U.S. aid. (Pages 11, 12, para 10)

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[3] For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 29, 1954, pp. 810–811.

B. *Operational Considerations Bearing on Policy*

8. The Working Group considers that the basic policies contained in NSC 170/1, as augmented by NSC 5429/2,[4] are still appropriate. However, the developments reported above have made NSC 170/1 partially obsolete with respect to details of the approved policies. It should, therefore, be revised before the next Progress Report is due.

9. The withdrawal of most of the United States forces from Korea clearly reduces our potential ability to use forceful measures within Korea to prevent the ROK from taking unilateral action, if such orders were issued. Concurrently, ROK potential for unilateral action has increased, since it is no longer practical to restrict the ROK supplies of material and ammunition so drastically as in the past.

On the other hand, there is now less likelihood that the United States forces can, against their will, be embroiled in a conflict initiated by the ROK. And the agreement on the Minute and the carrying out of the economic program create a situation in which it is less probable that the ROK will take unilateral action. No imminent danger is foreseen, especially since the agreed Minute contains a ROK commitment to leave ROK forces under the operational control of CINCUNC. . . .

C. *Emerging Problems and Future Actions*

10. *Unification*

While there is virtually no prospect of Korean unification in the foreseeable future, the ROK may be expected to continue to agitate to achieve this goal by military means. The Communists and even many of our Allies for quite different reasons may be expected to seek a conference of one sort or another to deal with this problem. The combined expression of willingness to negotiate by the Communists and the eagerness of many countries of the free world to continue to negotiate in the hope that (*a*) at some point in some negotiations the Communists will prove more tractable, or (*b*) that continued discussions of the problem will prevent tensions from reaching the breaking point, will pose difficulties for the U.S. in its relationships with the ROK on one hand and its other Allies on the other.

The problem must be handled by firm insistence on the part of the U.S. that there is no point in negotiating with the Communists on this issue until they have clearly recognized the competence and authority of the UN in the matter and until genuinely free elections can be held under UN supervision for representatives in a National Assembly in which representation shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous population in all parts of Korea.

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[4] For text of this NSC paper, Aug. 20, 1954, entitled "Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East", see volume XII, Part 1.

11. *Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC)*

Renewed efforts being undertaken to persuade the Swiss and Swedes to withdraw their inspection teams in north and south Korea to the Demilitarized Zone may again end in failure. If so, the U.S. will face a serious problem with the ROK whose continued insistence that the Polish and Czech members of these teams be withdrawn from the ROK may erupt into violent action which would place the UNC in the untenable position of protecting the Communists at the possible expense of Korean lives. Many of our Allies, on the other hand, are opposed to drastic steps to terminate the activities of the NNSC inspection teams. Despite their objections, the U.S. must take steps preferably in consort with the other principally interested nations, but unilaterally, if necessary, to terminate the activities of the NNSC teams in the ROK. In taking such steps, it should be made clear that while affecting those provisions of the Armistice Agreement which provide for the activities of the Inspection Teams, the U.S. considers the remainder of the Armistice provisions valid. The grounds for such action have been laid in repeated representations in the MAC in respect to Communist refusal to permit the teams to operate effectively in the north, and in the clear statements of last April and May of the Swiss and Swedish members on the issue.

12. *Economic Program Implementation (FY 1955)*

Every effort will be made to obligate the entire U.S. $280 million earmarked for economic aid. However, this may prove impossible because of the delays in implementing the full program, the fact that there are no large single projects for which funds can be obligated as there were in Fiscal Year 1954, and the possibility that additional differences may arise between the U.S. and the ROK particularly with respect to the rate at which aid goods are priced into the Korean economy.

D. *Extent of Agency Interest*

13. The Departments of State, Defense, and the Foreign Operations Administration have been primarily involved in the implementation of NSC 170/1. In this implementation they have been supported by the United States Information Agency and the Department of Treasury. The Control Intelligence Agency also carried on activities in support of NSC 170/1 which will be separately reported to the Operations Coordinating Board.

Annex A

DETAILED DEVELOPMENTS OF MAJOR ACTIONS

Para 5a: [5] "Continue to observe the Armistice."

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[5] From NSC 170/1, Nov. 20, 1953, p. 1620.

The U.S. has continued to observe the armistice. However, in spite of continuing efforts through the Military Armistice Commission and the efforts of the Swiss and Swedish members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), Communist non-cooperation has made it impossible to enforce Communist compliance with the armistice terms or to carry out effectively the inspection provisions of the Armistice Agreement. The ROK has made repeated protests and threats against the NNSC, and every effort is being made to dissuade the ROK from precipitate action against it. CINCUNC has, since April 1954, repeatedly recommended dissolution of the NNSC by the following courses:

(1) Through diplomatic channels, getting the Swiss and Swedes to withdraw from the NNSC.
(2) Through mutual agreement between the Communists and UNC in the Military Armistice Commission.
(3) By UNC unilateral action.

Course 1 is being followed but without success to date. Courses 2 and 3 were approved by Defense and are now awaiting State Department concurrence. The U.S., U.K. and France, on behalf of the nations who fought in Korea, will make an informal inquiry of the Swiss and Swedes to obtain their reaction to a course of action which would lead to removal of the Polish and Czech members of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams from ROK territory. This course of action will involve Swiss and Swedish withdrawal of their personnel from all the Inspection Teams to the Demilitarized zone pending agreement by the two Commands on arrangements which will permit adequate supervision in north Korea. If the Swiss and Swedish personnel leave the ROK, it will be possible to remove the Poles and Czechs since no legal basis will then exist for their presence in either north or south Korea. It is hoped that this concerted approach, together with the suggestion of less drastic action by the Swiss and Swedes than heretofore proposed, will be persuasive and lead to a solution of the problem.

Para 5 b (1): "Seek to ensure that the Republic of Korea observes the armistice by:

(1) Notifying President Rhee formally and letting other ROK leaders know (on behalf of the U.S. and as executive agent for the UN), that if South Korea unilaterally initiates military operations against Chinese or North Korean forces in or north of the demilitarized zone, then:

(a) UNC air, ground and sea forces will not support such operations directly or indirectly;
(b) The U.S. will not furnish any military or logistic support for such operations;
(c) All U.S. economic aid to Korea will cease immediately;

> (d) The UN Commander will take any action necessary to prevent his forces becoming involved in the renewal of hostilities and to provide for their security.

If Rhee should ask whether or not UNC forces might be withdrawn from Korea, he should be told that, if he ceases to cooperate with UNC, the UNC will decide its course of action purely in terms of its own interest and without consulting him."

President Rhee was notified by Vice President Nixon in the course of meetings in November 1953 that the United States would not support the initiation by the ROK of military operations against the Communist forces in north Korea. President Eisenhower informed President Rhee again of this position at the beginning of President Rhee's visit to the United States in July 1954. In this meeting and in subsequent negotiations with high U.S. officials in Washington this position was made clear to other high ROK officials. Generals Hull and Taylor have made it clear to high-ranking ROK Generals that the U.S. would not support in any way ROK unilateral action and furthermore would not be deluded by efforts to conceal such action as defense against a Communist attack.

Para 5 b (2): "Attempting to obtain from Rhee a formal assurance in writing that he will not initiate unilateral military action at any time against the Communists in or north of the demilitarized zone. If he refuses to give such assurance, the U.S. should inform him immediately that the UNC reserves all rights to take whatever actions it deems necessary to preserve the security of the UNC forces."

Attempts to obtain from President Rhee a formal assurance in writing that he will not initiate unilateral military action at any time against the Communists in or north of the Demilitarized Zone have been unavailing. However, in the Minute of the ROK–US negotiations signed by the ROK on November 17, the ROK undertook to "cooperate with the United States in its efforts to unify Korea . . ." and agreed to leave its forces "under the operational control of the UNC while that command has responsibility for the defense of Korea," unless mutually agreed that the interest of both parties would be best served by a change. These undertakings by the ROK serve, in effect, to accomplish the objective set forth in Para 5 b (2).

Para 5 b (3): "Making UNC plans and dispositions such as to permit maximum flexibility in meeting any likely eventuality and, insofar as possible, to reinforce the statements made to Rhee and to manifest U.S. determination to carry them out."

The UNC has prepared plans for disposition of UN troops in Korea to permit flexibility in meeting likely eventualities. When the ROK threatened the NNSC, special security procedures were adopted by the UNC to guarantee the safety of NNSC personnel. The ROK Government was informed at that time that the UNC intended to carry out its obligations under the Armistice to safeguard NNSC personnel. There is further reference to U.S. operational planning and withdrawal of forces in the following paragraphs.

Para 6: "In anticipation of the possibility that President Rhee may order the renewal of hostilities by an attack on Communist forces in or north of the demilitarized zone, despite all the actions taken by the U.S. under paragraph 5 a and b above, the U.S. should take the measures stated in Annex A, which is being given separate distribution."

Para 7: "If ROK forces should renew hostilities unilaterally, the U.S. should, in addition to appropriate actions under Annex A:

a. Stop all economic and military assistance to Korea.

b. Discontinue all logistic or other support to the ROK forces.

c. Take such other military measures as seem feasible and consistent with the security of UNC forces to block ROK offensive action.

d. Evacuate UN civilians.

e. Notify the Communists that the UNC will continue to abide by the armistice terms, but will defend UNC forces against any Communist attack, and will be prepared, if a Communist counterattack against the ROK threatens the security of UNC forces, to undertake such military action as may be necessary for the security of UNC forces.

f. Renew general hostilities with the Communists only if attacked in force by the Communists or if Communist attacks against the ROK seriously threaten the security of UNC forces.

g. Promptly seek to obtain the support of the other members of the UNC, and as appropriate inform the United Nations, of the actions taken by the UNC under UN authority to ensure compliance with the armistice."

The withdrawal of most of the U.S. combat forces from Korea has decreased the potential ability of the U.S. to use forceful means within Korea to prevent the ROK from taking unilateral action. Concurrently, the ROK potential for such action has increased since it is no longer practical to restrict their supplies of material and ammunition. On the other hand, it is now less likely that U.S. forces can become embroiled against their will. This situation, together with ROK agreement in the Minute to retain their forces under the operational control of CINCUNC and reduced domestic support for military action to unify the country, make it unlikely that such action will be taken. However, because of the reduced potential of his forces, General Hull has requested that the mission assigned to him by Annex A (para d) to NSC 170/1, be appropriately revised. Consequently, a review of Annex A has been initiated.

Para 8: "If Communist forces violate the armistice and renew hostilities in Korea, the U.S. should:

a. Invoke the Joint Policy Declaration by calling upon the signatories to carry out the commitment that 'if there is a renewal of armed attack, challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.'

b. Make clear to the world the necessity of expanding the war to China by air and naval action as the only feasible way of honoring our collective security commitments to the United Nations and our security commitments to the Republic of Korea.

c. Implement the military and diplomatic measures referred to in NSC Action No. 794 of May 20, 1953, as approved following the urgent review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State.

d. Call on other UN members for effective military assistance appropriate to the expanded war against China."

The Communists in Korea retain the capability to attack with little warning, but their current dispositions and attitude do not indicate an intention to resume hostilities. Appropriate plans exist to counter such an attack should it develop.

Para 9 a: "Continue to seek, by political negotiations between the Communists and the UN (with the Republic of Korea associated with the latter), a unified and neutral Korea under an independent and representative government. To this end be prepared to accept:

(1) A unified Korea friendly to the U.S., without U.S. or other foreign forces or bases in Korea;

(2) United States and Communist assurances of the territorial and political integrity of Korea under the ROK but foregoing all rights granted to the U.S. under a U.S.–Korea mutual assistance pact; and

(3) A level of Korean armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of defending Korean territory short of an attack by a major power.

The foregoing would not preclude the provision by the United States of economic and military assistance to Korea."

In discussions of the Korean problem at Geneva, it was evident that the Communists would not agree to any unification that did not permit continuance of the Communist regime. The Communist representatives refused to agree to free elections impartially supervised by the UN. There is little prospect for fruitful negotiation on the Korean problem in the foreseeable future. It is expected, however, that the Communists will endeavor to convince the world that it is possible to negotiate a reasonable settlement in Korea. Furthermore, some of our allies will be disposed to enter such negotiations even without adequate assurances that the Communists have agreed to the principles set forth at Geneva, namely, recognition of the competence and authority of the UN in the matter and genuinely free elections under UN supervision.

Para 9 b: "Continue to exert political and economic pressures against Communist China, including unconventional and covert pressures, at least until settlements satisfactory to the United States can be achieved in the areas around Communist China."

Political and economic pressures against Communist China have been continued, but have had little discernible effect on Communist policies in Korea.

Achieving a Position of Strength in Korea

Para 10: "Pending a political settlement and in the absence of a violation of the armistice, the United States should, conditioned upon the satisfactory cooperation of the Republic of Korea, continue to observe the armistice and try to avoid renewed fighting; accept the division of Korea on the present demarcation line while seeking a satisfactory solution of the Korean problem by the use of other than military pressures; tie the Republic of Korea into the U.S. security system and develop it as a military ally."

"To this end the United States should:" (Specific sections of para 10 cited below and discussed separately)

The danger of a renewal of hostilities by either the Communists or the ROK has declined and appropriate measures to reasonably safeguard against renewal of hostilities have been taken. On the other hand, the prospects for unification of the Korean peninsula appear remote. Consequently, the primary emphasis of current policy toward the Korean problem is an effort to achieve a position of strength in the ROK. This effort was the focus of U.S. interests during the ROK–U.S. negotiations in Washington, July–September 1954. A Minute of the understandings reached during these consultations was signed by the U.S. and the ROK on November 17, 1954 (see Attachment 1). This Minute sets forth in specific terms the levels of economic and military aid the U.S. is prepared to grant to the ROK in this fiscal year and makes the granting of such aid contingent upon specific ROK undertakings which are regarded by the U.S. as necessary to render this aid effective. The program set forth in the Minute should substantially fulfill the courses of action set forth in this section of NSC 170/1. The degree to which the program will be successful, however, will depend on the speed with which U.S. aid can be made effective and on the degree to which the ROK honors its undertakings. While the ROK has committed itself to the program set forth in the Minute, it has expressed strong dissatisfaction with the levels of economic and military aid and with policy commitments asked of it. There is reason to believe that many of the points agreed to will again become contentious issues, impeding the progress of the program and requiring patience and firmness to resolve.

USIA actions in support of NSC policies toward Korea fell principally under paragraph 10, NSC 170/1, and specifically under the two parts of this paragraph which state "to try to avoid renewed fighting" and "to tie the Republic of Korea into the U.S. security system and develop it as a military ally."

The emphasis in the USIA program in the ROK has been shifted to the U.S. economic aid programs. The chief aim is now to persuade the government and the people of the ROK that efficiently administered U.S. assistance is establishing a stable economy and is providing needed support for the ROK to maintain sufficient armed strength to repel or deter aggression and preserve ROK independence. USIA is continuing output on a lessened scale on the theme of preventing unilateral resumption of hostilities by the ROK. This change in emphasis follows the evaluation made in the Progress Report of March 31, 1954 that the likelihood of unilateral military action by the ROK has diminished.

In the belief that the top level ROK officials are not amenable to USIA persuasion on issues where the U.S. and ROK differ widely, the following target audiences were established during the period of this report: press and radio personnel, second-level officials; education, business and professional leaders, students, ROK Army and ROK police; and the general agricultural populace. The latter group receives the U.S. economic aid message through a mass program of motion pictures and posters. Both the economic aid message and the theme of Free World unity in the face of the Cold War are directed at the more sophisticated groups through books and publications, motion pictures and personal contacts. The objectives are: (1) to preserve the hearty friendliness toward America which is characteristic of the Korean people, if not of their leaders, and (2) to cultivate all groups which might be in a position to influence succeeding ROK administrations. Thus, the USIA program is now aimed more at the long-range objective of preserving a friendly government in Korea.

USIA has taken the lead in setting up within the last six months an Information Policy Coordinating Committee in Korea, composed of representatives of all U.S. civil and military agencies engaged in economic aid, civil assistance, and public information work in Korea. USIA field officers report that they are receiving very effective cooperation from the various offices concerned, and that for the first time, all U.S. programs in Korea are being coordinated in a coherent publicity campaign.

Sample actions include:

A. The choice of a slogan "Strength for Korea from America" to be stenciled on all economic and military aid goods.

B. Joint production of motion pictures and radio programs by USIA and the military command concerning U.S. aid in Korean reconstruction. (Motion pictures are considered the most effective medium of information in the ROK).

C. Production of posters and instructional booklets by the Army Psychological Warfare Section for distribution through USIA to the ROK Army.

D. FOA supervision of the production of illustrations on the FOA program in Korea for inclusion in USIA wall posters, leaflets, and pamphlets.

USIA provided guidance and press and radio reporting to the world on the Korean phase of the Geneva Conference, with the aim of fixing the blame for failure to reach agreement squarely on the Communist side.

The USIA Seoul library collection, which was dissipated in the war, is being restocked and a much larger, separate building is being sought for a center devoted to material on economic reconstruction.

Para 10 a: "Ratify the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea."

An exchange of ratifications of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and ROK took place November 17, thus bringing the Treaty into full force and effect. Efforts to further tie the ROK into the U.S. security system through the Western Pacific security arrangement, called for in NSC 5429/2 have been started by emphasizing to the ROK the need for satisfactory working relationships between the ROK and Japan. Thus far, however, the ROK has heightened its public criticism of U.S. security policies and its propaganda attacks on Japan. The U.S. should continue efforts to formalize broad security arrangements with the ROK, but it may prove impossible, particularly with respect to arrangements involving Japan, to do so in the short range.

Para 10 b: "Build up and maintain the security position of the ROK consistent with the armistice terms, and in a manner and to an extent that will permit the phased and orderly redeployment of the bulk of U.S. armed forces at the earliest feasible date."

Activation and training of ROK defense units has continued in accordance with the established U.S. position and consistent with the Armistice terms. The U.S. has announced its intention to redeploy from Korea 4 divisions and one regimental combat team during FY 55. The phased withdrawal was begun on 12 September 1954, and is to be completed, approximately, by the end of 1954.

As stated in the agreed Minute (Attachment 1), the U.S. has indicated to the ROK its willingness to support a total ROK defense force of 720,000, to provide the ROK Air Force a wing of jet planes as Koreans become capable of utilizing them, to lend a small number of additional vessels to the ROK Navy, and to grant other specific military assistance. Planning for augmentation and modernization of ROK forces, along the lines outlined in the Minute, has been going forward and, with ROK agreement to the Minute, action implementing these plans can be implemented fully.

Some phases of the military program for the ROK have already been implemented. These include approval of the initiation of the program for the training in the U.S. of Korean jet pilots and the preparation for the loan to the ROK of nine (9) naval craft.

The Van Fleet Report recommendations with respect to Korea have been taken into account in formulating the assistance the U.S. would extend to the ROK and the conditions under which this assistance would be extended.

President Rhee and other ROK officials, both publicly and in private discussions subsequent to Rhee's departure from Washington, objected vigorously to both the level of the ROK forces the U.S. had indicated it would support and to the "premature" withdrawal of U.S. forces. However, these protests have now subsided.

Para 10 c: "Carry on a vigorous campaign to secure additional armed forces from other UN members for service in Korea in accordance with the existing formula (see Annex B), covering reimbursement of U.S. expenditures for such forces."

Efforts to secure additional armed forces from other UN members are impractical in view of the general military situation and the stepped-up withdrawal of U.S. forces. Efforts to persuade other countries to maintain at least the minimum levels recommended by CINCUNC have been successful, and there now exists sufficient forces to comprise an understrength UN division, which together with the two U.S. divisions will make up a UN corps. NSC Action 1087[6] recognized that paragraph 10 c of NSC 170/1 could not be implemented.

Para 10 d: "Working in and through the organs of the UN where feasible, continue to strengthen the government and democratic institutions of the Republic of Korea."

The United States has continued efforts through the UN to strengthen the government and democratic institutions of the ROK. Due largely to U.S. efforts, made with the purpose of discouraging anti-democratic election practices, the delegations to UNCURK were filled out shortly before the ROK general elections of May 20, 1954, and UNCURK was thus able to observe the elections. Subsequently, UNCURK moved its headquarters to Seoul, with U.S. assistance. Although the atmosphere of the general elections in 1954 was in many respects less free than those of 1948 and 1950, UNCURK made a report on them that was on the whole approbatory. The U.S. has continued to support UNKRA by contributing about 65% of its budget and by urging additional contributions from other UN countries. The lack of financial support of UNKRA, however, may require its liquidation during Fiscal Year 1956 or possibly even this Fiscal Year.

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[6] For text, see the memorandum of discussion at the 192d meeting of the NSC, Apr. 6, p. 1775.

Para 10 e: "Pending a satisfactory understanding with the ROK Government with respect to internal measures required to achieve economic stability, make such use of UNC facilities in Korea as is practicable, consistent with the primary mission and security of the UNC, to provide assistance to the Korean people in order to give tangible evidence to them of the value of U.S. friendship and assistance."

The U.S. is continuing to make use of UNC facilities in Korea to provide assistance to the Korean people. During FY 1954, $15 million in materials was made available for this purpose. This program of assistance, although relatively small, was highly successful in terms of relationship with the ROK. By July 20, 1954, 544 projects, including 146 schools and 94 civic buildings, had been completed, and 819 projects were underway. The value of projects completed or underway is estimated as $15.7 million. A total of $5 million is earmarked for purchasing materials for this program in FY 1955.

Para 10 f: "Conditioned upon a satisfactory understanding with the ROK Government with respect to internal measures required to achieve economic stability, implement the present expanded program of economic assistance in that portion of Korea controlled by the ROK and the UNC, subject to the following conditions:

(1) The Republic of Korea satisfactorily cooperates in maintaining the armistice in effect.
(2) A standard of living approximating the 1949–1950 levels should be the goal toward which the program should contribute.
(3) The investment component of the program should be increased as rapidly as is consistent with economic stability.
(4) The investment program should be restricted to those projects contributing to the goals stated in subparagraphs (2), (3) and (5) of this paragraph, and should place greatest emphasis initially on projects contributing most immediately to better living conditions and future increased productivity for the Koreans.
(5) The program should be directed toward an economy which the Republic of Korea could support with a minimum of future external aid."

Implementation of the expanded program of economic assistance to Korea continued at an accelerated rate in the second half of FY 1954, and by June 30, 1954, the entire 200 million had been committed by FOA. Because the bulk of these funds were committed in the second half of FY 1954 and because a substantial portion of the funds were committed for long range capital projects, i.e., thermal electric power plants and a fertilizer plant, the actual arrival of aid goods and construction of investment projects has not been commensurate with fund availabilities. On the other hand, the huge ROK military budget deficit is resulting in currency expansion and the inflation began to quicken beginning in April 1954. It became increasingly clear during FY 1954 that the aid funds would be insufficient to permit the substantial investment program necessary for measurable progress toward viability given the existence of the large ROK military forces. The Economic Coordinator, Mr. C. Tyler Wood, therefore, recommended that the FY 1955 funds be augmented by approximately $100 million for aid of a defense support character if unmanageable inflation is to be avoided. In the agreed Minute of the ROK–U.S. talks, the U.S. has made a commitment to make available up to $700 million in economic and military aid, which is more than $100 million in excess of the amount originally budgeted. This aid is contingent upon the ROK undertaking certain economic measures designed to make U.S. aid most effective.

Para 10 g: "Continue in effect all pertinent instructions to the UNC involving the maintenance of the security of U.S. forces in the Korea area."

There have been continued in effect pertinent instructions to the UNC involving the maintenance of the security of U.S. forces in the Korean area.

Para 10 h: "Conduct a high-level diplomatic campaign to persuade our allies to accept U.S. courses of action and contribute to their support."

The Department of State continued its campaign to persuade our Allies to accept U.S. courses of action and contribute to their support, and in this respect made a significant achievement at the Geneva Conference. Despite Communist attempts to divide the Allies and ROK refusal to agree to the unification proposal the Allies wished to advance, and which the U.S. might have been willing to support, general unity of diplomacy was maintained throughout at the Conference, culminating in a joint statement by the Allies terminating the negotiations on Korea. Meetings of the Sixteen have continued. Substantial unity has recently been effected on efforts to secure Swiss and Swedish withdrawal from the NNSC.

Para 10 i: "Continue a program of covert operations designed to assist in the achievement of U.S. objectives vis-à-vis Korea".

CIA will report separately on this subject.[7]

[Here follows a text of the Agreed Minute of November 17, its Appendices A and B, and a draft letter from Wilson to Sohn with an attachment entitled "Noncombat Units Whose Deletion From the Standing ROK Army Was Recommended by General Van Fleet."]

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[7] Not found in Department of State files.

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